Category: Azerbaijan

  • Azerbaijan’s President and Turkish Prime Minister make a joint statement

    Azerbaijan’s President and Turkish Prime Minister make a joint statement

     
     

    [ 20 Aug 2008 20:41 ]
    Baku-APA. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a joint statement. APA reports that the President of Azerbaijan noted that the relations were successfully developing between the two countries.

    Turkey-Azerbaijan factor ensures peace and tranquility in the region: “Turkey-Azerbaijan friendship contributes to the relations between the countries. Our will has paved the way for the implementation of wide-scale energy and transport projects”.

    Recep Tayyip Erdogan noted that Azerbaijan and Turkey had the same position from the standpoint of maintenance of peace in the South Caucasus. “Nagorno Karabagh conflict must be resolved only within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and on the basis of international legal norms. Minsk Group’s activity has not yielded any results for 16 years and we are very concerned about it. Caucasus Peace and Cooperation Platform can make a contribution to peace in the region”

  • Azerbaijan: Public Angry at Russian Offensive

    Azerbaijan: Public Angry at Russian Offensive

    Ordinary Azeris outraged by Moscow’s intervention in Georgia – but officials largely silent.

    By Tamara Grigoryeva in Baku (CRS No. 455, 19-Aug-08)

    “Our home looks like a dormitory now, because so many relatives have arrived,” said 23-year-old Azerbaijani Parvana Mamedova who has helped take care of a stream of relatives from Georgia’s Marneuli region, which has an Azerbaijani minority. “We don’t have enough space in our three rooms, but it’s our duty to receive them.”

    After August 8, when Russian planes bombed the military base in Marneuli, two families of relatives decided to move to Baku, until the situation settles down. Only her uncle, Asif, stayed in Georgia and joined a unit of Azerbaijani volunteers to support the Georgian army.

    Azerbaijan has strong ties to both Georgia and Russia. The private reaction in Azerbaijan, Georgia’s partner in the GUAM organisation and in several energy projects, has been stronger than the public one.

    Azerbaijani foreign ministry spokesman Khazar Ibrahim has been virtually the only official to comment. “Azerbaijan recognises Georgia’s territorial integrity and believes that the conflict must be settled within [the] framework…of international law,” he said.

    President Ilham Aliev has remained at the Olympic Games for the duration of the crisis and made no public comment.

    Opposition politicians and commentators have criticised him for doing this at a time of conflict in the Caucasus and suggested that the president is too beholden to Russia, with which he signed a cooperation agreement last month.

    “Our president preferred to stay and watch the Olympics and keep silent while the presidents of several other friendly countries personally arrived in Tbilisi and expressed their support for President Saakashvili,” said analyst Ilgar Mamedov.

    “I think that this position can be explained by the president of Azerbaijan’s commitment to good relations with the leadership of Russia, and his wish to preserve stability in the country on the eve of the forthcoming presidential elections.”

    Only last month, Aliev and Russian president Dmitry Medvedev signed a new cooperation treaty.

    Political analyst Hikmet Hajizade said the reaction was understandable. “Azerbaijan fears for of its own security,” he said. “It’s obvious that Russia shouldn’t be driven crazy, because we have seen the consequences.”

    The Azerbaijani public and media were much sharper in their reactions. There have been several statements accusing Russia of supporting separatists and urging it to withdraw. Six protest rallies have been held outside the Russian embassy in Baku.

    In response, the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan Valery Istratov has held two press conferences. At the first, only four journalists, mainly representing Russian media accredited in Baku, were invited, a decision the Azerbaijani news internet site day.az described as “the ambassador’s desire to evade tricky questions from Azerbaijani journalists”.

    Inevitably, Azerbaijanis have also drawn parallels between the war over South Ossetia and their own unresolved conflict with Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh. “The parallels between these conflicts are obvious,” said Hajizade. “The conflict between Georgia and Ossetia will definitely have an impact on the Karabakh conflict. If the conflict ends with Russia’s full control over Georgia, it will be very bad for Azerbaijan. Georgia is our only route for our energy and transport projects to reach the outside world.”

    Hajizade also believes that “many of those in Azerbaijan, who have called for a military solution to the Nagorny Karabakh conflict have learned what lies in store for a country which defies Russia but has no real allies. On the other hand, Hajizade sees one advantage in the current crisis, “The forgotten Caucasian conflicts have become a focus of attention of the world.”

    As the situation deteriorated, Georgia announced it was quitting the Commonwealth of Independent States and urged other countries to follow suit. But Azerbaijan was cautious on this. “The decision to leave the CIS is Georgia’s internal affair. Each country has the right to take decisions independently,” said Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister Hafiz Pashayev.

    The conflict over South Ossetia is hurting Azerbaijan economically. The country’s main oil export route, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, was shut down anyway on August 5 after an explosion in eastern Turkey claimed by the PKK Kurdish rebels. The conflict ensured the closure of the other pipeline via Georgia, Baku-Supsa. Azerbaijan was forced to rely only on the alternative, Baku-Novorossisk via Russia. According to the Caspian Alliance Group, every day that the pipelines do not operate Azerbaijan loses more than 70 million dollars.

    Energy experts and officials say this is a temporary disruption and that the pipelines via Georgia will soon be operating again.

    Political analyst Rasim Musabekov called Russia’s actions in Georgia “deliberate energy blackmail towards Europe and Azerbaijan”.

    “As soon as we started oil deliveries via the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, Russia started experiencing some problems,” he said. “This once again shows that the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline cannot be used as the main route to export Azerbaijani resources to Europe. Our main routes pass through Georgia. In the future we must pay more attention to their security.”

    Tamara Grigoryeva is an AFP correspondent in Baku.

  • Window on Eurasia: Moscow Expert Admits Russian Interest in Blocking Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline

    Window on Eurasia: Moscow Expert Admits Russian Interest in Blocking Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline

    Monday, August 18, 2008

     Paul Goble

    Vienna, August 18 – A leading Moscow State University expert on the post-Soviet states argues that the Russian Federation’s main goals in Georgia did not include blocking the flow of oil through the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, but she says that “the possibility cannot be excluded” that Moscow was pursuing “other goals” including that.
    In an interview to MGU’s Information-Analytic Center on the CIS countries, Natalya Kharitonova, the general director of that body, said that “considering the love” Russian and Western experts have for focusing on energy issues, “one ought to have expected” that there would be a discussion of oil in the Georgian conflict (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/1989/).
    Many experts, she points out, connected the August 6 PKK attack on the pipeline which stopped the flow of oil and the beginning of the military conflict, with some of them implying if not saying outright that either the one led to the other or that the two together were part of a general plan to force Azerbaijan to seek alternative routes for the export of its oil.
    “Baku, forced to significantly reduce the pumping of oil, immediately stopped using the Baku-Batumi and Baku-Kulevi rail lines again in connect with military actions in Georgia.” The Baku-Supsa line had already been stopped for “technical reasons,” Kharitonova says, but “in official versions are being invoked almost exclusively political reasons.”
    Now as a result, Azerbaijani hydrocarbons are flowing through Russian territory on the Baku-Novorossiisk line, but because Baku can export only 7 to 8 percent as much via this pipeline as via Baku-Ceyhan, she added, “Turkey intends to buy additional supplies from Russia and Iran” to compensate.
    Not surprisingly, given the impact all this is having on both the economic well-being and geopolitical relations in the region, the Moscow scholar says, Tbilisi has accused the Russian government of planning to disrupt such flows as part of its military effort, although such suggestions have been dismissed by Russian and Western specialists.
    But now other explanations are springing up. Some, Kharitonova notes, are saying that the disruption was the “work of Georgian provocateurs” who were looking for something to blame Russia that would attract the attention of the West, while others are saying this is yet another effort to disrupt the NABUCCO program.
    Most of those making these suggestions, however, offer little or no evidence to back up their claims, but the Moscow specialist points out that there are two obvious things going on. On the one hand, Iran is getting more active and is now talking about building a Neka-Dzhask pipeline to compete with Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and thereby increase Tehran’s influence.
    And on the other, Russia has two clear motives for an interest in the stopping of the BTC pipeline. First of all, it has never wanted to see the construction and operation of oil and gas pipelines that bypass Russian territory. And second, it has an interest in “forcing Western countries to put pressure on Georgia” to draw back so that the oil can flow.
    “There are a large number of versions” of why this has happened, Kharitonova notes, and she “suggests that one ought not to ignore any of them,” although she adds that it would be a mistake to fail to see that what has happened in Georgia and with the BTC may be nothing more than “a simple coincidence.”
    But she ends by acknowledging that “there are too many interests” intersecting in this part of the world to ignore the ways in which those who produce oil, those who transport it and those who consume it are in geopolitical competition. Indeed, she says, it is time to talk about “geo-economics” when it comes to oil, gas and politics in the Caucasus.

  • West is able to wait, or about nervousness among Dashnaks

    West is able to wait, or about nervousness among Dashnaks

    The Bureau of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation “Dashnaktsutun” has recently made a statement, calling the government of their country to raise the issue of signing a legal document on non-application of military force against Nagorno Karabakh.

    “Armenian side should protect its national and state interests in the negotiation process more clearly and demand from the parties to sign a document on non-application of force”, says the statement. (more…)

  • STRATFOR : Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    STRATFOR : Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

     

    Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (L) and Turkish President Abdullah Gul in Istanbul
    Summary
    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day trip to Ankara ended Aug. 15. While the Iranian government and state media have touted his trip as proof that Iran and Turkey are close allies, the Turkish government is far more concerned with containing the current situation in the Caucasus, which could have major implications for Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan.
    Analysis
    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrapped up a two-day trip to Ankara on Aug. 15. The Iranian government and state media have been hyping Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey for days in an attempt to showcase to the world the Iranian belief that Iran and Turkey, as the two principle non-Arab regional powerhouses, are close and natural allies.
    But while Iran is eager to forge closer ties with Turkey, the Turks do not have much time for Ahmadinejad right now. Ankara has bigger things on its mind, namely the Russians.
    Turkey is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended deep into the southern Caucasus region where Russia just wrapped up an aggressive military campaign against Georgia. Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the Caucasus have primarily been defensive in nature, focused on keeping the Russians and Persians at bay. Now that Russia is resurging in the Caucasus, the Turks have no choice but to get involved.
    The Turks primarily rely on their deep ethnic, historical and linguistic ties to Azerbaijan to extend their influence into the Caucasus. Azerbaijan was alarmed, to say the least, when it saw Russian tanks crossing into Georgia. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned, Baku could have been the next target in Russia’s military campaign.
    However, Armenia — Azerbaijan’s primary rival — remembers well the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Turks, and looks to Iran and especially Orthodox Christian Russia for its protection. Now that Russia has shown it is willing to act on behalf of allies like South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, the Armenians, while militarily outmatched by the Azerbaijanis, are now feeling bolder and could see this as their chance to preempt Azerbaijan in yet another battle for the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region— especially if it thinks it can look to Russia to militarily intervene on its behalf.
    The Turks and their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan are extremely wary of Russia’s intentions for the southern Caucasus beyond Georgia. Sources told Stratfor that Azerbaijan has learned that the Russian military jets that bombed Gori and Poti were based out of Armenia. This development not only signaled a significant expansion of Russia’s military presence in the southern Caucasus, but it also implied that Armenia had actually signed off on the Russian foray into Georgia, knowing that Russian dominance over Georgia would guarantee Armenian security and impose a geographic split between Turkey and Azerbaijan. If the Armenians became overly confident and made a move against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh, expecting Russian support, the resulting war would have a high potential of drawing the Turks into a confrontation with the Russians — something that both NATO member Turkey and Ru ssia have every interest in avoiding.
    The Turks also have a precarious economic relationship with Russia. The two countries have expanded their trade with each other significantly in recent years. In the first half of 2008, trade between Russia and Turkey amounted to $19.9 billion, making Russia Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Much of this trade is concentrated in the energy sphere. The Turks currently import approximately 64 percent of the natural gas they consume from the Russians. Though Turkey’s geographic position enables it to pursue energy links in the Middle East and the Caucasus that can bypass Russian territory, the Russians have made it abundantly clear over the past few days that the region’s energy security will still depend on Moscow’s good graces.
    Turkey’s economic standing also largely depends on its ability to act as a major energy transit hub for the West through pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was recently forced offline due to a purported Kurdish militant attack and the war in Georgia. Turkey simply cannot afford to see the Russians continue their surge into the Caucasus and threaten its energy supply.
    For these reasons, Turkey is on a mission to keep this tinderbox in the Caucasus contained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spent the last couple of days meeting with top Russian leaders in Moscow and then with the Georgian president in Tbilisi. During his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Erdogan pushed the idea of creating a Caucasus union that would include both Russia and Georgia. Though this organization would likely be little more than a talk shop, it is a sign of Turkey’s interest in reaching a mutual understanding with Russia that would allow both sides to maintain a comfortable level of influence in the region without coming to blows..
    The Iranians, meanwhile, are sitting in the backseat. Though Iran has a foothold in the Caucasus through its support for Armenia, the Iranians lack the level of political, military and economic gravitas that Turkey and Russia currently hold in this region. Indeed, Erdogan did not even include Iran in his list of proposed members for the Caucasus union, even though Iran is one of the three major powers bordering the region. The Turks also struck a blow to Iran by holding back from giving Ahmadinejad the satisfaction of sealing a key energy agreement for Iran to provide Turkey with natural gas, preferring instead to preserve its close relationship with the United States and Israel. Turkey simply is not compelled to give Iran the attention that it is seeking at the moment.
    The one thing that Turkey can look to Iran for, however, is keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict under control. Iran’s support for Armenia has naturally put Tehran on a collision course with Ankara when dealing with the Caucasus in the past. But when faced with a common threat of a resurgent Russia, both Turkey and Iran can agree to disagree on their conflicting interests in this region and use their leverage to keep Armenia or Azerbaijan from firing off a shot and pulling the surrounding powers into a broader conflict. In light of the recent BTC explosion claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey can also look to Iran to play its part in cracking down on PKK rebels in the region, many of whom have spent the past year fleeing a Turkish crackdown in northern Iraq by traversing through Iran to reach the southern Caucasus.
    While Iran and Turkey can cooperate in fending off the Russians, it will primarily be up to Turkey to fight the battle in the Caucasus. Russia has thus far responded positively to Turkey’s diplomatic engagements, but in a region with so many conflicting interests, the situation could change in a heartbeat.
  • Azerbaijan: The Stark New Energy Landscape

    Azerbaijan: The Stark New Energy Landscape

     

     

     

    August 15, 2008 | 1817 GMT

    Yoray Liberman/Getty Images

    Workers at the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline terminal in Turkey

    Summary

    Russia’s military defeat of Georgia puts Azerbaijan in a difficult position. With all of its existing energy export routes now back under Russian control, Baku faces a stark set of choices that may force it to reach an accommodation with Moscow.

    Analysis

    Related Links

    • Turkey: An Oil Pipeline Fire and the Russian Alternative
    • Russia: Courting Azerbaijan for Natural Gas
    • Global Market Brief: BP Takes a Hit in the Georgia Conflict

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    • Central Asian Energy: Circumventing Russia
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    • Crisis in South Ossetia

    Azerbaijan is losing some $50 million to $70 million per day due to the closure of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, the Caspian Energy Alliance said Aug. 14, adding that Baku’s total losses from the closure amounted to some $500 million. The 1 million barrel per day (bpd) BTC line, which passes from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, was shut down Aug. 6 following an attack on the Turkish part of the line, claimed by a Kurdish separatist group. If not for that attack, however, it might well have been shut down anyway amid the military conflict in Georgia that began two days later.

    Azerbaijan exports oil and natural gas to Western energy markets via three pipelines — all of which pass through Georgia, and all of which experienced cutoffs in the past several days. Two
    of them — the BTC and the 150,000 bpd Baku-Supsa — carry oil. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum line carries natural gas at 9 billion cubic meters per year. The pipelines were built to provide a transport route for Caspian Sea energy to reach Western markets without having to pass through Russia, which controls the majority of pipeline infrastructure into Europe. Now that Russia has established a firm military presence in Georgia, however, it is highly likely that all three lines will continue to operate, or not, at the pleasure of the Kremlin.

    This puts Azerbaijan in a predicament. With its export routes to the West blocked by the Russian presence in Georgia, Baku is carefully considering its options. Though other potential pipeline routes exist, they are plagued with problems that could prove insurmountable. Azerbaijan may have no real option but to try to reach some sort of accommodation with Moscow.

    Initially, Baku was excited by the conflict in Georgia’s South Ossetia region because it provided a possible blueprint for dealing with Azerbaijan’s own restive separatist enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh — and for potentially imposing a new military reality on Baku’s regional rival, Armenia.. If successful, such a campaign could have allowed Baku to use Armenian territory for a new energy export route. Sources tell Stratfor that, following the Georgian military’s Aug. 8 invasion of South Ossetia, Azerbaijan’s leadership convened an emergency meeting at which they reportedly gave serious consideration to invading Nagorno-Karabakh, contingent on the eventual success of the Georgian operation.

    However, the Georgian offensive not only failed, it resulted in the Russian invasion of Georgia proper — which has effectively suspended Tbilisi’s ability to control its own territory. Russia also used air bases in Armenia to assist in the Georgian intervention, which marked a significant change in the dynamic between Baku and Yerevan. Russia keeps military assets in both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and sells weapons to both — indeed, part of Moscow’s strategy in the Caucasus is to ensure that the two rivals remain distracted by their tense relations — but from Baku’s perspective, the Russian decision to activate its assets in Armenia means Moscow is choosing sides. However possible it might have been for Azerbaijan to invade its neighbor, it has suddenly become inconceivable.

    For Baku, this is the worst-case scenario. Its energy lifelines, intended to circumvent Russian territory, are now under the overt control of the Kremlin, while its alternative of forcing a new path through Armenia is completely taken out.

    Baku also suddenly found itself trying to block the flood of Azeri volunteers heading to Georgia to fight the invading Russians. Azerbaijan’s government did not want to provoke Russia, especially with Russian tanks only a couple of hundred miles from Baku itself. For that matter, with a presidential election set for Oct. 15, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev does not want a security crisis on his hands. Even though Azerbaijan has been using its energy revenues to build up its military in recent years, it is nowhere near ready to defend itself from a Russian invasion. Its security situation is in many ways even more dire than that of Georgia (or even Ukraine).

    Turkey, Baku’s strongest ally in the region, theoretically would not stand by if Russia invaded Azerbaijan — but then, Ankara has been silent on the Russian intervention in Georgia. To the Azeris, this is a sign that they cannot depend on the Turks to commit themselves to a fight with Moscow if push should come to shove. Also, now that Georgia is under effective Russian military control, the only route for Turkish aid to Azerbaijan is cut off — neither Iran nor Armenia would provide passage.

    With the Russians in control of Georgia and with domination of Armenia out of the picture, Azerbaijan’s only other feasible export route would be southward through Iran, hooking into existing Turkish pipeline infrastructure or sending exports out via the Persian Gulf. The problem with this option is one of timing: Any move into Iran would have to wait for an accommodation between Tehran and the United States over Iraq, which appears to be getting ever nearer but could still be derailed. At $50 million in losses per day, however, Azerbaijan does not have the time to wait for these pieces to fall into place and then build a new pipeline into Iran. A Russian move to cut off all three pipelines going through Georgia would make the cost unbearable. Baku counts on i ts energy export revenues in order to maintain military parity with Armenia, so a sharp drop in funding could quickly become a national security issue.

    That leaves one other option, which from Baku’s perspective is the least desirable but the most realistic: seeking accommodation with Russia.

    Russia now effectively controls the entire already-built energy transport infrastructure between Baku and Western markets. Russia could accommodate transport of Azeri energy through Georgia for the right price. That price would be both financial and political: Azerbaijan would need to align with Moscow on matters of import in order to keep the pipelines open. Baku also could ship its natural gas through Russia proper via pipelines such as Baku-Rostov-on-Don, which used to provide Azerbaijan with natural gas supplies before it became a net exporter. There also is the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, which has a capacity of nearly 200,000 bpd, although very little Azeri crude normally goes through it.

    Azerbaijan has tried to avoid shipping its energy exports through Russian pipelines while other feasible options were open. But Baku may have to reconsider now that Russia holds all the cards.

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