Category: Azerbaijan

  • The Road Not Taken

    The Road Not Taken

    Decades before Herzl, Benjamin Disraeli wrote a novel that grappled with Zionism

    by Adam Kirsch

    An undated portrait of Disraeli

    By the beginning of 1830, when he was twenty-five, Benjamin Disraeli was tired of England. For three years, he had been suffering from acute depression, brought on by the triple fiasco that marked his entrance into public life. Before he turned twenty-two, Disraeli had lost thousands of pounds in stock-market speculations; alienated the publisher John Murray after their plan to launch a newspaper ended in failure; and caused a scandal with his first novel, Vivian Gray, a satirical roman à clef about high society. For the young Disraeli, already supremely ambitious, these reverses had come as a terrible shock, and it took him years to recover his nerve.

    Now, with his second novel completed and the advance in his pocket, Disraeli was set on traveling. But he did not want to follow the usual itinerary of the Grand Tour, which took rich young Englishmen to the churches of Rome and the salons of Paris. Instead, he set his sights on the East—Greece, Turkey, Egypt, and Palestine. In part, he was following the example of his beloved Byron, who had created a vogue for the East in his highly colored poems. But for Disraeli, a journey to Jerusalem had more than literary significance. Although he had been baptized at the age of twelve into the Church of England, Disraeli’s very name made clear that he was a Jew, and the experience of visiting the Jewish homeland was to transform the way he thought about himself, his ancestors, and politics in general. Almost fifty years later, when he was Prime Minister of England, it would be his destiny to redraw the maps of the countries he visited as a young man.

    The first fruit of Disraeli’s pilgrimage, however, was a novel—The Wondrous Tale of Alroy, published in 1833. Disraeli wrote that he had been “attracted” to the “marvellous career” of David Alroy even as a child. But Disraeli’s Alroy bears little resemblance to the minor figure mentioned by Benjamin of Tudela, the Spanish Jew whose Travels are a classic of medieval Hebrew literature. According to Benjamin, Alroy, a Kurdish Jew, raised a revolt against the Seljuk Turks in Azerbaijan around 1160 AD. He was credited with magic powers by his followers, who proclaimed him the Messiah, but this pretension won him the hostility of Jewish leaders in Baghdad, who begged him not to antagonize the Turks. Finally he was betrayed by his father-in-law and killed, probably without winning a single battle.

    Disraeli’s Alroy is a much grander figure, a kind of Jewish Alexander the Great. In his novel, Alroy wins victory after victory, conquers Baghdad, and comes close to establishing a new empire in the Middle East. Disraeli also provides his hero with a loyal sister, Miriam, and a lover, the Princess Schirene. There is also a good deal of what Disraeli called “supernatural machinery” in the novel, including a magic ring, a secret underground temple, and the Scepter of Solomon, which Alroy must claim if he is to conquer Jerusalem.

    Disraeli writes that all this is based on Jewish tradition—“Cabalistical and correct,” he puts it—but it is clear that the real sources of the novel’s mysticism lie in The Thousand and One Nights, the Eastern tales of Byron, and the quest poems of Shelley. In general, Alroy is better understood as high Orientalist fantasy than historical fiction. Even Disraeli’s prose, the emphatic rhythms and repetitions of which suggest that some sections started out as verse, is kitschily intoxicated: “‘Ah! bright gazelle! Ah! bright gazelle!’ the princess cried, the princess cried; ‘thy lips are softer than the swan, thy lips are softer than the swan; but his breathed passion when they pressed, my bright gazelle! my bright gazelle!’”

    But if Alroy seems impossibly overripe today, its psychological core remains entirely serious. Disraeli said that he began to write the novel in Jerusalem in 1831, at a moment when he was pondering the role Jewishness might play in his own life and career. And in his hands, the story of David Alroy becomes a veiled meditation on the state of the Jews in Europe, and a parable of his own possible future.

    From the beginning of the novel, Alroy, a scion of the house of David, rages against the degradation of the Jews under Muslim rule. But as Disraeli makes clear, the condition of the Jews is hardly unbearable. On the contrary, Alroy’s uncle, Bostenay, is a rich man, and enjoys the honorary title of Prince of the Captivity. “The age of power has passed; it is by prudence now that we must flourish,” he declares. He is, perhaps, Disraeli’s critical portrait of the wealthy English Jews of his own day—men like the Rothschilds and Montefiores, who had all the advantages of wealth, but none of the dignity of power.

    Alroy, like Disraeli himself, cannot be satisfied with making money. He is an ardent patriot, disgusted by the state into which his people have fallen: “I am ashamed, uncle, ashamed, ashamed,” he tells Bostenay. When he sees a Turkish official accost his sister, Alroy impetuously kills him and flees into the desert. He is about to die of thirst when he is rescued by Jabaster, a magician and fanatical Jewish patriot. When Alroy has a dream of being acclaimed by a vast army as “the great Messiah of our ancient hopes,” Jabaster decides that the young man represents his long-awaited chance to reestablish the kingdom of David. After a series of romantic adventures, Alroy begins to put Jabaster’s plan into action, scattering the Turks and conquering Baghdad.

    But in the meantime, Alroy acquires another advisor—Jabaster’s brother and mirror image, Honain. Honain represents the tempting path of Jewish assimilation: He has achieved wealth and honor, but only at the price of “passing” as a Muslim. In his own view, however, he has not betrayed his people, but simply effected his own liberation. “I too would be free and honoured,” he tells Alroy. “Freedom and honour are mine, but I was my own messiah.” Honain introduces Alroy to the beautiful Princess Schirene, the daughter of the Caliph, and though she is a Muslim he falls in love with her. (“The daughters of my tribe, they please me not, though they are passing fair,” Alroy admits—a sentiment Disraeli himself shared.)

    But now, at the height of his fortune, with an empire in his grasp and a princess for his wife, Alroy begins to succumb to Honain’s worldly counsel. Why, he asks, should he exchange rich Baghdad for poor Jerusalem? Why not rule over a cosmopolitan empire, rather than a single small nation? “The world is mine: and shall I yield the prize, the universal and heroic prize, to realise the dull tradition of some dreaming priest, and consecrate a legend?” Alroy asks. “Is the Lord of Hosts so slight a God that we must place a barrier to His sovereignty, and fix the boundaries of Omnipotence between the Jordan and the Lebanon?” Mischievously, Disraeli even makes Alroy begin to speak in the stock phrases of modern English liberalism: “Universal empire must not be founded on sectarian prejudices and exclusive rights.”

    From a portrait by Count D’Orsay, 1834

    Jabaster tries to recall his king to the righteous, Jewish path, but to no avail. At last he attempts a coup against Alroy, but he is defeated and sentenced to death. From that moment, however, God’s favor deserts Alroy. In his next battle he is defeated, and a Muslim king, Alp Arslan, takes him prisoner. Now Honain reappears with one last, Satanic temptation: If Alroy converts to Islam, his life will be spared. But the scion of the house of David has learned his lesson. His strength is not his own but his nation’s, and individual glory means nothing next to the redemption of the Jews. He taunts Alp Arslan with his refusal, and the king, in a rage, cuts off his head.

    For Disraeli, writing at the very beginning of his own career as an English politician, the moral of Alroy was deeply ambiguous. After all, David Alroy is a gifted youth like himself, but one who sacrifices worldly ambitions for love of the Jewish people, and is exalted by that love. The novel does not endorse the Jewish sectarianism of Jabaster—Disraeli expresses a Voltairean hatred of priestcraft—but it clearly repudiates the plausible assimilationism of Honain, which leads only to dishonor and disaster. Indeed, it is Disraeli’s distinction between Jewish belief and Jewish solidarity, and his insistence that it is possible to have the latter without the former, that makes Alroy a significant proto-Zionist text. If Disraeli had obeyed the novel’s logic in his own life, if he had tried to translate Alroy’s vision to the nineteenth century, he might have become a real-life Daniel Deronda.

    Source: www.nextbook.org, 08.26.08

    “The world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes.”

    –Benjamin Disraeli

  • All Quiet on the Southern Front

    All Quiet on the Southern Front

    Comment by Sergey Markedonov
    Special to Russia Profile

    Despite Having Been Affected by the Russo-Georgian Squabble, Both Armenia and Azerbaijan Cautiously Abstain From Taking Sides

    The events of the “five-day war” in South Ossetia demonstrated that countries of the Southern Caucasus largely act according to their own national interests, and not on the assurances of “eternal friendships.” Thus, both Armenia and Azerbaijan behave in a careful and calculated manner, realizing that getting involved in the Russian-Georgian conflict bears a lot of “hidden reefs” which could prove to be more dangerous than the status-quo that is so despised by Baku and so cherished by Yerevan.

    Georgia’s attempts to “restore the constitutional order” in South Ossetia and the harsh Russian response have altered the politico-legal and power configurations in the CIS, and not only in the two “hot spots.” They had a serious impact on the entire ethno-political situation in Eurasia. In this regard, it is crucial to consider the consequences of this “security deficit” in the South Caucasus, especially because in recent weeks, Armenia and Azerbaijan have remained in the shadows. What lessons were Baku and Yerevan able to draw, having been brought to a conflicted state by the events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the “hot August” of 2008?

    Let’s consider the horizontal links among the three former Caucasus republics, all of them now independent states in the South Caucasus region. Georgia considered Azerbaijan its natural ally. Baku was ready to reciprocate the sentiment. Let’s recall that the day before the new escalation in South Ossetia, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili called Azerbaijan no less than the “guarantor of independence” of his country. Typical theatrics of the Georgian leader aside, we should recognize a few important points. First, Georgia and Azerbaijan are members of an organization whose stated goal is to play a peculiar anti-CIS role—GUAM. After Georgia officially left the CIS, GUAM remains the sole structure in which Tbilisi can realize its integration projects (another question is how successfully) within Eurasia.

    Secondly, Azerbaijan has always supported the territorial integrity of Georgia. Unlike Ukraine, Azerbaijan itself lost some 13 percent of the land that is recognized as its integral part, and hence its support, along with political reasons, has emotional and psychological grounds (which in politics, especially in the Caucasus, is extremely important). Thirdly, there is the economic cooperation. In 2005, during the energy crisis, it was Azerbaijan that provided gas for Georgia. “The Georgian people will never forget this,” Saakashvili said in a statement during the groundbreaking opening ceremony for the Turkish section of the “Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars” railway on July 24 (only two weeks remained before the Tskhinvali tragedy). The two Caucasian states were also united by two pipelines (oil and gas). Baku also often served as a profitable and reliable sponsor for Tbilisi.
     
    Unlike Azerbaijan, Georgia never considered Armenia as a strategic partner and even less as a “guarantor of security.” There have been a lot of sensitive issues in their bilateral relations. These include the position of Armenians in Georgia (in the Armenian populated Samtskhe-Javakheti and in Tbilisi itself, considered to be an important cultural center for all Armenians), and the role of the Armenian community in the Abkhaz events. During the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, the Bagramyan battalion fought on the side of the “aggressive separatists” (as they call them in Tbilisi). There were far fewer Armenian participants on the Georgian side (largely from the aforementioned Tbilisi). In present-day Abkhazia, the Armenian community is represented both in the government and in business, and is generally loyal to the leadership of the de facto state. The irritating factors are compounded by the military partnership between Armenia and the Russian Federation (particularly the military base in Gyumri, to which, among others, Russian military units from Georgia were moved). Prior to the withdrawal of the Russian military base from Akhalkalaki, there were many local ethnic Armenian residents employed there. Also, Georgia (along with Iran) is Armenia’s window to the world (because of the land blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan). Hence, Yerevan does not want to move past certain milestones in its relations with Tbilisi. Armenia also realizes that its gateway to Russia is through Georgia, and that is why the dependence on the dynamics of Russian-Georgian relations is an extremely sore point for Armenia. In turn, given the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Tbilisi is more cautious in dealing with the “Armenian question.” The Georgian leadership cannot ignore that, unlike the Abkhazians or Ossetians, Armenians have strong support in the United States and the EU (similarly from France).

    Indeed, the given dispositions have determined the attitude that Georgia’s neighbors have toward the “hot August” events. Despite its commitment to a strategic alliance with Russia, Armenia preferred to abstain from sudden moves and categorical statements. There are many reasons for this. There is a reluctance to either clearly align their actions with the Russians or to spoil their relations with the West. They are already uneasy in connection with the events of March 1 in Yerevan. It is understandable that Serzh Sargsyan is no Alexander Lukashenko, to whom the United States and the EU have long ago given their “blessing” of more freedom in his interpretation of events.

    Armenia, which has such a vulnerable place as the Karabakh, was also not overly interested in anchoring the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to Russian-Georgian relations. Besides, even earlier, both Armenia and the NKR leadership distanced themselves from an openly pro-Ossetia and pro-Abkhazia position. This is why representatives of Armenia’s Ministry of Defense hastened to declare on August 10 that raids on the Georgian airbases were not being conducted from the Russian base located in Armenia: “The 102nd military base in the city of Gyumri has no military aircraft capable of committing acts such as these bombings,” they claimed.

    The position of Armenia in connection with the heated Russian-Turkish relations is another sensitive issue. Mild support by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan for the Russian Federation’s position is creating a feeling in Yerevan (as well as in the Armenian Diaspora in the West) that the two great powers can agree with each other to the detriment of Armenia (in particular, on the Karabakh issue). Recall that on August 13 Erdogan stated: “The situation in South Ossetia gives us cause to review the relationship between our countries, whose solidarity in this region is of great importance.” Here is what Karapet Kalenchyan, an expert at the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, wrote on this matter: “Seeing that Russia is once again entering the South Caucasus, Turkey gives it its full support in exchange for certain concessions on the part of Russia. What kind of concessions could these be? Armenians have often worried that such concessions might be made at the expense of our interests.”

    Prudence (only in the opposite direction) is also what set apart Azerbaijan’s position. Representatives of various political parties of the republic (including the ruling party) were more open in expressing their positions. According to Mubariz Gurbanly (the ruling “Yeni Azerbaijan” party), the “Georgian authorities’ actions to restore the country’s territorial integrity are fully merited. These actions were undertaken in accordance with the UN Charter.” Note that this idea (the legality of actions to punish separatists) had so far been far more popular in Azerbaijan than in Georgia. The chairman of the Supreme Majlis of the “Musavat” (opposition forces) party, Sulhaddin Akper, stated that Georgia “was forced to conduct the operation against the separatists in South Ossetia.” However, Baku was officially much more cautious than, for instance, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and the Foreign Ministry of his country (which, unlike Azerbaijan, does not have such serious interests in the region).

    The statement by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs from August 8 in support of Georgia’s territorial integrity (approved by the Georgian diplomats) contained general statements on the validity of the Georgian operation under “international law,” but was not further clarified.

    Five leaders of states that expressed their solidarity with Georgia were present at a rally in Tbilisi on August 12. There were leaders of the three Baltic countries, Poland, and Ukraine, but Ilham Aliyev, the head of the state which Saakashvili called the “guarantor of independence” less than a month earlier, was not there. Baku preferred caution, given their interest in maintaining stable relations with Russia. Unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is not based on a rigid confrontational manner. In Baku, they consider Russia to be a counterweight to the West (which does not have such unambiguous relations with Azerbaijan as it does with Georgia). Azerbaijan is also afraid of being drawn into the “Iran game,” where it is destined to play a role as either a runway or the target of “Tehran’s retaliatory shot.” Hence the desire to appreciate the generally friendly, albeit difficult, relations with Russia.

    The opposition is trying to take advantage of this situation. Isa Gambar, the leader of the “Musavat” party (who received second place in the last presidential elections) believes that the official Baku reaction to the events in South Ossetia is inadequate. But what level of influence does Isa Gambar, or other opposition figures (Eldar Namazov or Ali Keremli), enjoy today that he can alter the position of the president’s team? That is a rhetorical question. Let’s consider a hypothetical situation. Tomorrow either Gambar or Namazov replace Ilham Aliyev. I think that they would also strictly separate rhetoric and realistic politics, guided by the national interests of Azerbaijan. Note that if such a scenario were to be repeated in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku would receive a much tougher reaction from the West. There would even be talk of the consolidated opinion of the United States, Russia, and leading EU countries. And that is why the Azerbaijani police prohibit protests at the Russian embassy in Baku, and prevents anti-Russian hysteria from sweeping the country.

    Sergey Markedonov Ph.D., is the head of the Interethnic Relations Department at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

  • Oskanian Urges ‘More Public’ Foreign Policy

    Oskanian Urges ‘More Public’ Foreign Policy

     

     

     

     

     

    By Emil Danielyan

    Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian signaled his disapproval of Armenia’s low-key stance in the Russian-Georgian conflict on Wednesday, saying that Yerevan should have been more vocal in articulating its neutrality.

    In an interview with RFE/RL, Oskanian also said rising tensions between Russia and the West will make it harder for Armenia to carry on with its long-standing “complementary” foreign policy.

    “Armenia certainly can not choose [between the two warring sides,]” he said. “Nor can it be indifferent. We should be able to find the right balance and I think that can be achieved through an upgraded complementarity.” “That means our foreign policy should be much more public,” he added.

    The Armenian government barely reacted to the August 8 outbreak of fighting in South Ossetia that developed into a full-scale Russian-Georgian war, with President Serzh Sarkisian refusing to cut short his vacation in China despite strong criticism from his political opponents. Sarkisian held a meeting of Armenia’s National Security Council only on his return to Yerevan on August 14. He also discussed the festering crisis in separate phone conversations with the presidents of Russia and Georgia.

    “Saying nothing when the situation is difficult might be a solution,” said Oskanian. “What the authorities have done in connection with the latest developments is understandable. I don’t want to voice any criticism.”

    “But my preference would have been somewhat different,” he said, adding that Yerevan should have displayed a “more public neutrality.”

    “I think that as soon as this problem arose we could have … publicly told Russia and the U.S. that what is happening does not stem from anybody’s interests, is bad for the region and in the global political sense,” continued Oskanian. “Armenia would have had a clearer stance by telling everyone that Armenia is not going to choose between its two allies. Indeed, if Russia is our strategic ally, Georgia is our natural ally.”

    According to Oskanian, the Sarkisian administration’s “silence” could also reflect negatively on Armenia’s negotiating position in the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He said Russia’s decision to unilaterally recognize Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s de facto independence from Georgia will erode Western support for the principle of peoples’ self-determination championed by the Armenian side.

    “As I said, our silence or low-key stance on the other issue is understandable. But I think that we could lag behind on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue,” warned the man who served as Armenia’s foreign minister and chief Karabakh negotiator from 1998-2008.

    “If we fail to enter these processes and clearly express our position on Karabakh’s self-determination, I’m afraid we will find it harder to achieve results desirable to us,” he said.

    Oskanian went to on to imply that Armenia should draw parallels between the conflicts over Karabakh and Kosovo and exploit Georgia’s botched attempt to win back South Ossetia for stressing the importance of non-use of force in the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani disputed. He said Yerevan should also go as far as to threaten to formally recognize Karabakh as an independent state if Baku rejects international mediators’ existing peace plan.

    The plan calls for a gradual settlement of the conflict that would enable Karabakh’s predominantly Armenian population to determine the disputed territory’s status in a referendum. It was drawn up by U.S., Russian and French diplomats co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group. The crisis in Georgia and its geopolitical implications have left observers wondering whether Russia and Western powers will continue to work together in trying to have the conflicting parties accept the framework peace deal.

    “This is also a problem,” admitted Oskanian. “Those countries have frequently said that the Karabakh issue unites them and that they have no differences on that issue. I am really concerned that those disagreements [on Georgia] could also manifest themselves in their positions on the Karabakh conflict.”

    Oskanian reiterated in that regard his calls for Russia, the U.S. and the European Union to help create a “regional security pact” comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In an article published by “The International Herald Tribune” on Monday, he made a case for a “nonaligned Caucasus, free of security memberships and adversarial alliances.”

    When asked by RFE/RL whether that means Armenia should be ready to end its military alliance with Russia, Oskanian said, “That should be discussed by those six players, in the 3 plus 3 format. Other neighbors — and Turkey in particular — should also be involved.”

  • Ilgar Mamedov: “The decision of the Russian president to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia threatens the security system in the world”

    Ilgar Mamedov: “The decision of the Russian president to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia threatens the security system in the world”

    The decision of the Russian president to recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia affects the security system in the world, said famous political scientist Ilqar Mamedov in his interview to Day.Az.

    “The security and cooperation in Europe were challenged even following the factual recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The first, deep concern for the future of OSCE appeared at that time. And now after Russia has recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we are dealing with the second, destructive influence on the security system of the world. (more…)

  • Call of the civil society representatives upon the Governments in Ankara, Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan

    Call of the civil society representatives upon the Governments in Ankara, Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan

    17:26 23/08/2008

    A number of Civil Society Organizations from Armenia, Turkey, Georgia and the USA have signed a statement urging to open the Turkish-Armenian border for at least 10-15 days.

    “Open up to your neighbors!”
    Call of the civil society representatives upon the Governments in Ankara, Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan.

    The war in Georgia has left the countries of the South Caucasus struggling with substantial risks and challenges. As a consequence of the recent crisis, which further exacerbated an impasse created by the existence of the protracted conflicts, the region is deprived of a vital vain to transport goods through the countries of the region. That is a matter of our strongest concern. The railroad running through Georgia is practically useless today because of the destruction of the bridge near Gori, whereas reconstruction is being delayed for different reasons. This situation and its consequences threaten to deprive people in our countries of their basic rights and endanger their hopes for stability, security and prosperity.

    This crisis should make us assess the situation realistically and initiate a new age of cooperation. The Governments in Ankara, Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan have a unique chance to prove their credentials of good neighbors willing to contribute positively to the regional peace and stability. We request them to take a collective action and unblock immediately railroad communication networks in the region.

    We made our own calculations that we would like to share with the public. Any train can reach from Samsun on the Black Sea coast of Turkey to Yerevan in 34 hours, to Tbilisi in 36 hours and to Baku in 49 hours. From Mersin, which is on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, it will take 37, 39 and 52 hours respectively. This simple. The railroad can become functional in few hours, once a political decision is made.

    Thus, we urge to open the Turkish-Armenian border at least for 10-15 days to address the urgency in the Caucasus.
    For years we have been engaged in Track Two Diplomacy projects and have been able to build excellent working relations with our colleagues across those borders. Having enjoyed the positive experience of cooperation, we would like to take this opportunity to call upon the Governments in Ankara, Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan to reconsider their positions on that matter. We urge our leaders to demonstrate their statecraft in these times of turbulence and uncertainty and prevent possible escalation of distrust in this region.

    Signatories:
    Tevan Poghosyan, International Center for Human Development, Armenia
    Noyan Soyak, Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council, Turkey
    Natela Sakhokia, Strategic research Centre, Georgia
    David L. Phillips, Columbia University, Visiting Scholar, Center for the Study of Human Rights
    Co-Director, Study Group on U.S.-Russian and Georgian Relations, the USA
    Dr. Murat Cagatay, GAYA Research Institute, Turkey
    Artush Mkrtchyan, Chairman, Caucasian Center for Proposing Non-Traditional Conflict Resolution Methods, Gyumri, Armenia
    Guran Abashidze, Caucasus Business and Development Network, Tbilisi, Georgia
    Klara Galstyan, Director, Gyumri Development Foundation, Armenia
    Levon Barseghyan, “Asparez” Journalist Club, Gyumri, Armenia
    Alu Gamakharia, Caucasus Business and Development Network, Kutaisi, Georgia
    Betty J. Sitka, American University, Center for Global Peace, the USA ”

    Source: Panorama.am

  • ANKARA AND YEREVAN – Waiting and watching

    ANKARA AND YEREVAN – Waiting and watching

    Turkey and the Caucasus

    Waiting and watching

    Aug 21st 2008 | ANKARA AND YEREVAN
    From The Economist print edition

    A large NATO country ponders a bigger role in the Caucasus

     

    APErdogan plays the Georgian flag

    AT THE Hrazdan stadium in Yerevan, workers are furiously preparing for a special visitor: Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gul. Armenia’s president, Serzh Sarkisian, has invited Mr Gul to a football World Cup qualifier between Turkey and its traditional foe, Armenia, on September 6th.
    If he comes, Mr Gul may pave the way for a new era in the Caucasus. Turkey is the only NATO member in the area, and after the war in Georgia it would like a bigger role. It is the main outlet for westbound Azeri oil and gas and it controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles, through which Russia and other Black Sea countries ship most of their trade. And it has vocal if small minorities from all over the region, including Abkhaz and Ossetians.
    Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has just been to Moscow and Tbilisi to promote a ‘Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform’, a scheme that calls for new methods of crisis management and conflict resolution. The Russians and Georgians made a show of embracing the idea, as have Armenia and Azerbaijan, but few believe that it will go anywhere. That is chiefly because Turkey does not have formal ties with Armenia. In 1993 Turkey sealed its border (though not its air links) with its tiny neighbour after Armenia occupied a chunk of Azerbaijan in a war over Nagorno-Karabakh. But the war in Georgia raises new questions over the wisdom of maintaining a frozen border. 
    Landlocked and poor, Armenia looks highly vulnerable. Most of its fuel and much of its grain comes through Georgia’s Black Sea ports, which have been paralysed by the war. Russia blew up a key rail bridge this week, wrecking Georgia’s main rail network that also runs to Armenia and Azerbaijan. This disrupted Azerbaijan’s oil exports, already hit by an explosion earlier this month in the Turkish part of the pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan, in Turkey.
    ‘All of this should point in one direction,’ says a Western diplomat in Yerevan: ‘peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.’ Reconciliation with Armenia would give Azerbaijan an alternative export route for its oil and Armenia the promise of a new lifeline via Turkey. Some Armenians gloat that Russia’s invasion of Georgia kyboshes the chances of Azerbaijan ever retaking Nagorno-Karabakh by force, though others say the two cases are quite different. Russia is not contiguous with Nagorno-Karabakh, nor does it have ‘peacekeepers’ or nationals there.
    Even before the Georgian war, Turkey seemed to understand that isolating Armenia is not making it give up the parts of Azerbaijan that it occupies outside Nagorno-Karabakh. But talking to it might. Indeed, that is what Turkish and Armenian diplomats have secretly done for some months, until news of the talks leaked (probably from an angry Azerbaijan).
    Turkey’s ethnic and religious ties with its Azeri cousins have long weighed heavily in its Caucasus policy. But there is a new worry that a resolution calling the mass slaughter of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks in the 1915 genocide may be passed by America’s Congress after this November’s American elections. This would wreck Turkey’s relations with the United States. If Turkey and Armenia could only become friendlier beforehand, the resolution might then be struck down for good.
    In exchange for better relations, Turkey wants Armenia to stop backing a campaign by its diaspora for genocide recognition and allow a commission of historians to establish ‘the truth’. Mr Sarkisian has hinted that he is open to this idea, triggering howls of treason from the opposition. The biggest obstacle remains Azerbaijan and its allies in the Turkish army. Mr Erdogan was expected to try to square Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliev, in a visit to Baku this week. Should he fail, Mr Gul may not attend the football match—and a chance for reconciliation may be lost.