Category: Asia and Pacific

  • Russia Proposes Hosting Karabakh Summit

    Russia Proposes Hosting Karabakh Summit

    Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will host a summit on Nagorno-Karabakh next month

    October 22, 2008
    By Liz Fuller

     

    The brief August war between Georgia and Russia served to highlight the destabilizing potential of unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus and thus lent a new urgency to ongoing efforts to find a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    Speaking on October 21 during a visit to Yerevan, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev argued that one of the lessons to be drawn from the fighting over South Ossetia is that such conflicts can and must be resolved peacefully, through negotiations.

    To that end, Medvedev offered to host a summit in Moscow early next month between Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and his newly reelected Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev in order to seek a solution to the Karabakh conflict “based on international principles.”

    Basic Principles

    The September visit to Yerevan by Turkish President Abdullah Gul fuelled hopes for a normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia that could in turn facilitate an accord on Karabakh. At the same time, some analysts construed Gul’s statement that Ankara is ready to help mediate such a solution as a bid, possibly supported by Russia, to sideline the OSCE’s Minsk Group. And some political figures in Yerevan fear that under pressure from both Russia and the West, Sarkisian might agree to compromises they consider unacceptable and detrimental to Armenia’s long-term interests.

    A framework agreement for resolving the Karabakh conflict already exists, in the form of the so-called Madrid Principles presented by the French, U.S., and Russian Minsk Group co-chairmen to the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Madrid in November 2007. That blueprint in turn was based on the so-called Basic Principles for the Peaceful Solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, which were made public in June 2006.

    The Basic Principles envisage the phased withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territories contiguous to Nagorno-Karabakh, including the district of Kelbacar and the strategic Lachin corridor that links Armenia and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR); the demilitarization of those previously occupied territories; the deployment of an international peacekeeping force; demining, reconstruction, and other measures to address the impact of the conflict and expedite the return to their homes of displaced persons; and, finally, a referendum among the NKR population to determine the region’s future status vis-a-vis the central Azerbaijani government in Baku.

    Meeting for the first time on the sidelines of a CIS summit in St. Petersburg in June, Sarkisian and Aliyev gave the green light for their respective foreign ministers to continue talks on ways to resolve the conflict on the basis of the Madrid Principles. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who traveled to Yerevan in early October for talks with Sarkisian and Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian, was quoted by “Rossiiskaya gazeta” on October 7 as saying that all three co-chairs see “a very real chance” of resolving the conflict, assuming that agreement can be reached on the “two or three” still unresolved issues.

    Lavrov added that the main obstacle is lack of consensus on the future of the Lachin corridor. The Azerbaijani website day.az back on April 1 quoted Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov as saying Azerbaijan has no objections to both Armenia and Azerbaijan using the corridor, provided it remains territorially a part of Azerbaijan.

    Resolution Hopes

    Visiting Yerevan on October 17, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried was even more upbeat than Lavrov. He told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service that a breakthrough in the conflict-resolution process in the coming weeks is “possible,” given that “the war in Georgia reminded everyone in this region how terrible war is” and thus made a resumption of hostilities less likely. But, Fried went on, “possible does not mean inevitable, and there are hard decisions that have to be made on both sides. If this conflict were easy to resolve, it would have been resolved already.”

    Fried did not mention any heightened role for Turkey in the peace process. But meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian (no relation to Serzh) in Washington on October 14, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice discounted speculation that the Minsk Group would be superseded as the mediating body.

    Speaking to journalists in Yerevan on September 17, French Minsk Group co-Chairman Bernard Fassier similarly sought to dispel the perception that Turkey was seeking to torpedo the work of the Minsk Group. Fassier explained that since Turkey is one of the 12 members of the OSCE Minsk Group, “its efforts directed at providing assistance to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict do not imply a change in the format of negotiations.” He said that Turkey “has always shown a constructive approach, supporting the activities of the three co-chairmen,” and that “any proposal made to support the negotiations, in particular from Turkey, is desirable and welcome,” RFE/RL’s Armenian Service reported.

    (Click map to enlarge)

    Former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian nonetheless argued at a rally of his supporters in Yerevan on October 17 that the West is trying to squeeze Russia out of the Karabakh peace process as part of a broader effort to minimize Russian influence in the South Caucasus, RFE/RL’s Armenian Service reported.

    Ter-Petrossian accused President Sarkisian (after whom, according to official returns, he polled second in the February 19 presidential ballot) of being ready to “put Karabakh up for sale” and renounce Armenia’s long-standing political and military alliance with Russia in an effort to legitimize his rule in the eyes of the international community. By doing so, Ter-Petrossian continued, Sarkisian is in effect entrusting the West in general, and Turkey in particular, with achieving a “unilateral settlement” of the Karabakh conflict.

    Even the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutiun (HHD), a member of the four-party coalition government, is uneasy at the prospect that, under pressure from the international community, President Sarkisian might make unacceptable concessions over Karabakh. HHD parliament faction secretary Artashes Shahbazian told journalists in Yerevan on October 13 that his party, and Armenian society as a whole, opposes the return to Azerbaijan of the districts currently under the control of Armenian forces, Noyan Tapan reported.

    Asked on October 20 why the HHD remains in government if it rejects President Sarkisian’s Karabakh policy, senior HHD member Kiro Manoyan explained that “it is the chance to convince our partners and influence them that keeps us in the coalition,” Noyan Tapan reported. Manoyan added that if the HHD concludes that it no longer wields any influence, it will quit the coalition.

  • Rothschild and the daughter of one of the world’s most brutal dictators

    Rothschild and the daughter of one of the world’s most brutal dictators

    By Daily Mail Reporter

    Last updated at 12:26 AM on 25th October 2008

    He is used to having glamorous women on his arm, but this picture of controversial financier Nathaniel Rothschild will raise some eyebrows.

    His companion is Gulnara Karimova, billionaire daughter of one of the world’s most brutal and bloodthirsty dictators, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.

    Like his friend, Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska, she has had problems with the American authorities.

    Controversial: Nat Rothschild pictured with Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov

    Deripaska is refused a U.S. visa for reasons the FBI has not fully explained.

    Gulnara, a 36-year-old Harvard graduate, was made the subject of an arrest warrant after she defied a court and took her two children by a U.S. man of Uzbek origin back to her homeland.

    The picture was taken in March 2007 at an Uzbek fashion show in Paris, intended to improve the country’s reputation after a massacre two years earlier ordered by Karimov in which hundreds or even thousands perished.

    Gulnara is a martial-arts black belt, fashion designer, poet and performer of a number one hit single in her homeland.

    Craig Murray, former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, said: ‘This woman is not just the daughter of one of the most violent tyrants on Earth, she is also directly implicated in atrocities and the major beneficiary of the looting of the Uzbek state.

    ‘I am stunned that Rothschild would want to pose with her.’

    Source: www.dailymail.co.uk, 25th October 2008

  • Karabakh Mediators Set To Resume Shuttle Diplomacy

    Karabakh Mediators Set To Resume Shuttle Diplomacy

     

     

     

     

     

    By Emil Danielyan

    International mediators plan to visit Armenia and Azerbaijan next week to keep up the momentum in their efforts to broker a framework peace agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh before the end of this year.

    The U.S., Russian and French diplomats co-chairing the OSCE’s Minsk Group met with the two countries’ foreign ministers in New York less than a month ago. The talks reportedly focused on the possibility of holding another meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents shortly after Azerbaijan’s October 15 presidential election.

    “The elections are over and I think we can continue to work on the points of interest to us,” the group’s French co-chair, Bernard Fassier, the Azerbaijani APA news agency on Tuesday. “For that reason the Minsk Group co-chairs plan to visit the region next week. But I can not yet give the precise date of the visit.”

    The Armenian Foreign Ministry did not confirm the information, with a spokesman saying that no dates have been agreed for the co-chairs’ trip yet.

    The mediators hope that President Serzh Sarkisian and his reelected Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliev, will bridge their differences on the basic principles of a Karabakh settlement that were formally proposed by mediating troika in November last year. Russian Foreign Sergey Lavrov said earlier this month that that Aliev and Sarkisian need to work out “two or three unresolved issues,” notably the future of the Lachin corridor linking Armenia to Karabakh.

    Russia on Tuesday indicated its desire to take the initiative in the Karabakh peace process when its President Dmitry Medvedev publicly expressed hope that the next Armenian-Azerbaijani will take place in his country and in his presence “very soon.”

    “This is a very interesting idea, but we need to discuss everything,” Fassier said, commenting on the Medvedev’s remarks statement made during an official visit to Yerevan.

  • TURKEY COURTS CENTRAL ASIA

    TURKEY COURTS CENTRAL ASIA

    By John C. K. Daly

    Wednesday, October 22, 2008

     

    In the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian confrontation, Ankara sees an opportunity to expand its trade relations with Central Asia, particularly the rising petro-states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Seeking to capitalize on the changing geostrategic environment for Caspian energy exports, Turkish Parliamentary Speaker Koksal Toptan, accompanied by other MPs, has undertaken a tour to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. On October 19 Toptan began his tour with a four-day official visit to Astana (Aksam, October 20).

    Not surprisingly, energy was a major theme of Toptan’s visit. Turkey has already profited from Astana’s commitment to use the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, as BP-Azerbaijan executives announced that later this month Kazakhstan would begin pumping Kazakh oil from its massive Tengiz field into the BTC (UPI, October 15).

    Under the arrangement, Kazakh tankers will ship about 98,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Tengiz oil, or slightly less than 10 percent of BTC’s one million bpd throughput capacity, across the Caspian to the BP-led consortium’s Sangachal Terminal on Azerbaijan’s Abseron Peninsula for pumping into the BTC pipeline and transmission to Turkey’s Mediterranean port at Ceyhan. Building on the Kazakh commitment, Toptan told a group of Kazakh academicians and students at the Public Administration Academy, “I invite Kazakhstan to participate in big energy projects such as the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Ceyhan refinery”(Anadolu Ajansi, October 21). Following his discussions with Toptan, Nazarbayev in turn urged Turkish businessmen to invest in Kazakhstan.

    The 345-mile-long, 1.5 million bpd Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline (SCP, also known as the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline) is designed to link Turkey’s Black Sea port of Samsum with Ceyhan. It will parallel the BTC by using its corridor from Sariz, and has an added advantage of providing an alternative route for Russian and Kazakh oil exports from Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The SCP, given that its throughput capacity would be 50 percent greater than BTC, could greatly ease the tanker traffic through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, a rising environmental and security concern for Turkish officials.

    Toptan’s trade agenda is hardly limited to energy issues, however. During his meeting with Kazakh Parliament Senate Chairman Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Toptan told a press conference, “Our trade volume currently stands at $2.5 billion. We aim at bringing it up to $5 billion by the year 2010. Direct investments by Turkish businessmen in Kazakhstan amount to $2 billion, and their construction services total $8.5 billion”(Anadolu Ajansi, October 20).

    Turkey’s trade with Kazakhstan’s eastern neighbor Turkmenistan is also growing. According to Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov, Turkish investment in Turkmenistan has slowly and steadily increased, reaching $2.7 billion in the past 18 months. Berdimukhamedov noted, “Our countries have always had good relations. In the new stage of its development, Turkmenistan plans to make cooperation with Turkey more intensive” (EDM, October 8).

    In Ankara’s calculations it is critical to diversify its energy imports in order to sustain the economic growth of the last four years, during which the Turkish economy has grown annually by more than 7 percent, making the country the 6th biggest trading partner of the European Union and giving Turkey the world’s 20th largest economy (www.deik.org.tr).

    While current Turkish trade with Central Asia is dwarfed by its $38 billion annual turnover with Russia, the energy assets of former Soviet republics Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are impelling Ankara to make a determined effort to acquire a significant portion of their energy assets, or, failing that, to ensure that they transit Turkey on their way to the global market.

    Furthermore, despite the three nation’s long association with Moscow, Turkey has the added negotiating advantage of deep linguistic, cultural, and religious ties that Russia signally lacks. The most notable sign that Turkey is determined to play its cultural card is the fact that Nazarbayev and Toptan discussed the efforts of Turkey and Kazakhstan to establish a Parliamentary Assembly of Turkish Speaking Countries, first broached by Nazarbayev in November 2006 (EDM, February 29).

    Turkey’s other rising rival for Caspian energy assets is China. According to Guoxiang Sun, the Chinese ambassador to Ankara, in 2007 bilateral trade between Turkey and China totaled $14.26 billion, and Beijing “expects it to increase by 50 percent” (www.deik.org.tr).

    Further east in the “Stans,” distance and geographical isolation serve to diminish Turkish trade ties, resulting in less than a quarter of Ankara’s trade with Kazakhstan. In Uzbekistan there are over 470 Turkish-Uzbek joint ventures, with annual bilateral trade between Uzbekistan and Turkey now standing at about $600 million per annum (Informatsionnoe Agenstvso, www.fergana.ru, August 31, 2007). Tashkent’s conservative fiscal policies have combined with the country’s geographical isolation from Turkey to limit a dynamic increase in bilateral trade for the foreseeable future.

    Turkish-Tajik bilateral trade is also growing slowly, hampered by Tajikistan’s geographic isolation, political and economic instability, corruption, and an underdeveloped domestic financial system. In 2007 bilateral trade between Tajikistan and Turkey reached $500 million, only a 16 percent increase over the previous year (Avesta, July 7). In 2006 Turkish-Tajik bilateral trade totaled $420 million (Avesta, January 10, 2007). Tajikistan nevertheless remains keenly interested in cooperating with Turkey in the economic, hydroelectric power generation, and tourism sectors; but the aforementioned constraints will preclude dynamic growth.

    Kyrgyzstan has the smallest trade turnover with Turkey of all the “Stans.” Speaking last month in Ankara at the Fifth Turkey-Kyrgyzstan Joint Economic Commission, Turkish Minister of Industry and Commerce Zafer Caglayan noted, “Although relations with Kyrgyzstan are improving in all areas, we do not think they have reached adequate levels,” commenting that while bilateral Turkish-Kyrgyz trade would reach $250 million by the end of 2008, “There is nothing stopping us from reaching an annual trade volume of $1 billion” (Zaman, September 6).

    While Turkey’s pressing needs for energy import diversification have in the short term led it to focus its attention on the westerly “Stans” with the most abundant energy resources, both Ankara and the Central Asian nations share a common interest in resisting both Moscow’s influence and China’s growing economic dominance.

    Given that Turkey and the “Stans” share a common linguistic, religious, and cultural heritage, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkish Speaking Countries, which by its very definition would exclude Russian and Chinese membership, may well develop a dynamic of its own among the politicians in Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

    As NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization increasingly stake out their claims to Eurasian spheres of influence, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkish Speaking Countries, by concentrating on cultural and economic issues, may well prove a haven for its members who might well wish to sit out the opening stages of the new Great Game.

  • Turkish and Armenian historians met in Yerevan

    Turkish and Armenian historians met in Yerevan


    Monday, 20 October 2008

    It is learned that Turkish and Armenian scientists met in Yerevan after President Abdullah Gul’s Armenia visit. Scientists decided to study for a project together and publishing Armenian and Turkish archives side by side and making public opinion researchs in both countries. President of the Turkish committee of scientists, Professor Dr. Dogu Ergil said, “We started an second channel diplomacy. And as being parties we will leave decision to the Turkish and Armenian people”.

    Ergil replied the questions of daily journal “aksam” about the meeting in Yerevan. Ergil stated that the organization is arranged by German DVV International foundation which is centered in EU and doing studies in Caucasia. Ergil said that German foundation was studying about Turkish-Greek reconciliation for years. “They came to me with this idea, and we attended to the meeting in Yerevan. We were four scientists from Turkey, in the meeting” said Ergil. Ergil said that it is always said for Historians to solve the issue, and they were in there to do that. He said that scientists from Sabancı and Bilgi Universities attended to the meeting, who have international degrees on their branches.

    Ergil said, “This is second channel diplomacy that is started by President Abdullah Gul. We think that this door is opened and we are hopeful about the process. Project is being prepared and studies may start in 2009”.

    www.historyoftruth.com

  • Forward To The Past: Russia, Turkey, And Armenia’s Faith

    Forward To The Past: Russia, Turkey, And Armenia’s Faith

    Russia, too, must deal with Armenia in good faith.

    October 21, 2008
    By Raffi K. Hovannisian

     

    The recent race of strategic realignments reflects a real crisis in the world order and risks triggering a dangerous recurrence of past mistakes. Suffice the testimony of nearly all global and regional actors, which have quickly shifted gears and embarked on a collective reassessment of their respective strategic interests and, to that end, a diversification of policy priorities and political partnerships.

    It matters little whether this geopolitical scramble was directly triggered by the Russian-Georgian war and the resulting collapse of standing paradigms for the Caucasus, or whether it crowned latently simmering scenarios in the halls of international power. The fact is that the great game — for strategic resources, control over communications and routes of transit, and long-term leverage — is on again with renewed vigor, self-serving partisanship, and duplicitous entanglement.

    One of the hallmarks of this unbrave new world is the apparent reciprocal rediscovery of Russia and Turkey. Whatever its motivations and manifestations, Turkey’s play behind the back of its trans-Atlantic bulwark and Russia’s dealings at the expense of its “strategic ally” Armenia raise the specter of a replay of the events of more than 85 years ago, when Bolshevik Russia and a Kemalist Turkey not content with the legacy of the great Genocide and National Dispossession of 1915 partitioned the Armenian homeland in Molotov-Ribbentrop fashion and to its future detriment.

    Time To Face Up

    Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh, in Armenian) was one of the territorial victims of this 1921 plot of the pariahs, as it was placed under Soviet Azerbaijani suzerainty together with Nakhichevan. That latter province of the historical Armenian patrimony was subsequently cleansed of its majority Armenian population, and then of its Armenian cultural heritage. As recently as December 2005, Azerbaijan (like Armenia, a member of the Council of Europe) completed the total, Taliban-style annihilation of the medieval Armenian cemetery at Jugha that contained thousands of unique cross-stones.

    Nagorno-Karabakh, by contrast, was able to turn the tide on a past of genocide, dispossession, occupation and partition and defend its identity, integrity, and territory against foreign aggression. In 1991 — long before Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia became buzzwords — it declared its liberty, decolonization, and sovereignty in compliance with the Montevideo standards of conventional international law and  with the Soviet legislation in force at that time.

    Subsequent international recognition of Kosovo, on the one hand, and the later withholding of such recognition for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other, demonstrate that there exists no real rule of law applied evenly across the board. On the contrary, such decisions are dictated by vital interests that are rationalized by reference to selectively interpreted international legal principles of choice and exclusivist distinctions of fact which, in fact, make no difference.

    It’s time to face up to the farce — and that goes for Moscow and Ankara too, judging by recent pronouncements by high-level officials. And if the two countries are driven by the desire for a strategic new compact, then at least their partners on the world stage should reshift gears and calibrate their policy alternatives accordingly. Iran, the United States, and its European allies might find here an objective intersection of their concerns.

    What Is Needed

    Russia and Turkey must never again find unity of purpose at the expense of Armenia and the Armenian people. The track record of genocide, exile, death camps, and gulags is enough for all eternity.

    These two important countries, as partners both real and potential, must respect the Armenian nation’s tragic history, its sovereign integrity and modern regional role, and Nagorno-Karabakh’s lawfully gained freedom and independence.

    Football diplomacy is fine, but Turkey can rise to the desired new level of global leadership and local legitimacy only by dealing with Armenia from a “platform” of good faith and reconciliation through truth; lifting its illegal blockade of the republic and opening the frontier that it unilaterally closed, instead of using it as a bargaining tool; establishing diplomatic relations without preconditions and working through that relationship to build mutual confidence and give resolution to the many watershed issues dividing the two neighbors; accepting and atoning, following the brilliant example of post-World War II Germany, for the first genocide of the 20th century and the national dispossession that attended it; committing to rebuild, restore, and then celebrate the Armenian national heritage, from Mount Ararat and the medieval capital city of Ani to the vast array of churches, monasteries, schools, academies, fortresses, and other cultural treasures of the ancestral Armenian homelands; initiating and bringing to fruition a comprehensive program to guarantee the right of secure voluntary return for the progeny and descendants of the dispossessed to their places and properties of provenance; providing full civil, human, and religious rights to the Armenian community of Turkey, including the total abolition the infamous Article 301, which has served for so long as an instrument of fear, suppression, and even death with regard to those courageous citizens of good conscience who dare to proclaim the historical fact of genocide; and finally, exercising greater circumspection in voicing incongruous and unfounded allegations of “occupation” in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh’s David-and-Goliath struggle for life and justice, lest someone remind Ankara about more appropriate and more proximate applications of that term.

    As for Russia, true strategic allies consult honestly with each other and coordinate their policies pursuant to their common interests. They do not address one another by negotiating adverse protocols with third parties behind each other’s back; they do not posture against each other in public or in private; and they do not try to intimidate, arm-twist, or otherwise pressure each other via the press clubs and newspapers of the world. Russia, too, must deal with Armenia in good faith, recognizing the full depth and breadth of its national sovereignty and the horizontal nature of their post-Soviet rapport, its right to pursue a balanced, robust, and integral foreign policy, as well as the nonnegotiability — for any reason, including the sourcing and supervision of Azerbaijani oil — of Nagorno-Karabakh’s liberty, security, and self-determination.

    The Armenian government, in turn, must of course also shoulder its share of responsibility for creating a region of peace and shared stability, mutual respect and open borders, domestic democracy, and international cooperation. An ancient civilization with a new state, Armenia’s national interests can best be served by achieving in short order a republic administered by the rule of law and due process, and an abiding respect for fundamental freedoms, good governance, and fair elections, which, sadly, has not been the case to date.

    Armenia urgently needs a new understanding with its neighbors that will preclude once and for all its being cast again in the role of either fool or victim.

    Raffi K. Hovannisian served from 1991-92 as foreign minister of the Republic of Armenia. He is the founder of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies and represents the opposition Heritage Party in the Armenian parliament. The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL