Category: Asia and Pacific

MOSCOW SUMMIT ON KARABAKH FALLS SHORT OF KREMLIN’S GOALS

By Vladimir Socor

Tuesday, November 4, 2008

Presidents Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, and Serge Sarkisian of Armenia met on November 2 near Moscow to discuss the current state of negotiations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. With those negotiations moving slowly forward at several levels and on their own momentum, Medvedev initiated this summit hoping to lift Russia into the driver’s seat of the process.

The Kremlin hoped to capitalize on the political effects of its recent invasion of Georgia and seizure of that country’s territories through military occupation and diplomatic “recognition.” The Georgia crisis served to demonstrate that Russia can and does act decisively, brutally, and with impunity in the South Caucasus, while the United States was drifting toward strategic disengagement and the European Union failed to fill the vacuum. The moment seemed ripe for Russia to display “regional leadership” by taking the initiative in negotiations to settle the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Moscow also hoped to display a capacity for conflict resolution through diplomacy, not just through force. One major goal of this exercise in diplomacy, however, is to deploy Russian troops in this conflict theater as “peacekeepers” or “guarantors” at some stage of the settlement.

The summit’s only apparent result, however, was a joint declaration that fell clearly short of Moscow’s goals (www.kremlin.ru, Arminfo, www.day.az, November 3, 4). The Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents first held a two-hour, face-to-face session and were then joined by Medvedev for finalizing the declaration. Signed by the three presidents in front of TV cameras, then read out to the media by Medvedev, the five-point declaration does not commit the signatory parties to any specific approaches or actions within the continuing negotiating process. If the Kremlin wished to show “forward movement” after hosting this summit, its hopes were in vain.

The declaration’s preamble underscores the continuity of direct dialogue between the two countries with the mediation of the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs (Russia, the United States, and France).

Point 1 envisages a “political settlement of the conflict based on the principles and norms of international law.” This, however, neither resolves nor circumvents the dilemma between territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of internationally recognized borders on one hand and national self-determination on the other hand. This dilemma has been created and maintained artificially on the Armenian side as a means to freeze the post-1994 situation, with Azerbaijani territories occupied and the Azeri population forced out.

Point 2 reaffirms support for the ongoing and future mediation by the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs, “taking into consideration their meeting with the parties on November 29, 2007.” The reference is to the three co-chairs’ joint proposals presented during the OSCE’s 2007 year-end ministerial conference in Madrid. The Armenian side interprets that document as elevating the national self-determination principle to the same level as territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. Yerevan therefore prefers to cite “the Madrid principles” as a point of departure for further negotiations. Azerbaijan, however, argues for the primacy of the territorial integrity principle in OSCE and other international documents of normative character. The Moscow declaration downgrades the significance of Madrid to a mere “meeting,” not principles and not even a document for further reference. This undoubtedly comes as a disappointment for Yerevan.

Point 3 stipulates that the “peaceful resolution should be accompanied by legally binding international guarantees in all aspects and stages of settlement.” Russia and Armenia insist on such guarantees: Yerevan refers to the security of the Armenian population of Upper Karabakh while Moscow needs an excuse for deploying Russian “peacekeeping” or “guarantor” troops. For its part, Azerbaijan does not oppose international guarantees but does insist that any such guarantees be in line with Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

Point 4 records Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s intention to continue their efforts for a political settlement of the conflict, at the level of the presidents and ministries of foreign affairs, and through cooperation with the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs.

Point 5 “emphasize[s] the importance of creating conditions that will contribute to the consolidation of trust, within the framework of efforts aimed at settling the conflict.” However vague, this point clearly does not imply that Azerbaijan ought to agree to Armenia’s inclusion in regional energy and transport projects in order to facilitate the resolution of the conflict.

During the last few years, the European Union and even the United States have attempted to persuade Azerbaijan to include Armenia in regional projects before the Armenian forces withdraw from occupied territories, presumably in order to advance efforts for peace. Ideologically, this argument is a late legacy of the classical liberal belief that trade in and of itself promotes peace (“pipelines for peace” is a latter-day incarnation of that belief). On a more mundane level, that argument reflects the influence of political lobbies in Brussels and Washington, which has resulted in withholding funds from projects of Western interest in Western-oriented Azerbaijan. For its part, Azerbaijan is open to such cooperation with Armenia after the Armenian forces vacate the occupied territories and the refugees are free to return home.

November 5, 2008
Karabakh Peace Agreement Impossible Without U.S. Involvement

By Harry Tamrazian

Meeting in Moscow on November 2, the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia signed a document pledging their continued commitment to resolving the Karabakh conflict peacefully. It was the first time that officials from Armenia and Azerbaijan had signed such a joint document since Russia mediated a cease-fire agreement in 1994, putting an end to one of the deadliest wars in the former USSR.

The so-called Moscow Declaration of Intent on Nagorno-Karabakh was an important diplomatic event in the 15-year long negotiating process. But it was much more important for Moscow, which thus reminded everyone that it holds the key to a solution to this conflict. The joint declaration was co-signed only by Russia, despite the fact that other two Minsk Group co-chairs, the United States and France, were also present.

A closer look at the declaration leaves no doubt that much of what was discussed during the closed-door talks was not reflected on paper. The declaration is just another expression of intent by the two leaders that they are serious about seeking a peaceful solution and that the military option can no longer be considered an alternative to peaceful diplomacy.

In short, both sides agreed on paper to tone down harsh military rhetoric and expedite the peace process. However, taking the text at face value would be overly optimistic.

Questions Arise

Every time Russia steps up its mediation efforts, questions arise about its motives for doing so. The simple answer in this case would probably be that it wants at least to preserve the level of influence that it had in Armenia, and more importantly in Azerbaijan, which has long been suspicious about its real intentions in the region.

Now that Georgia is out of the Russian sphere of influence, at least for the foreseeable future, Moscow will do all in its power to keep the two remaining South Caucasus countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan, under its control.

The only way to do that is to act as an honest broker to bring about a settlement of the frozen, and potentially deadly, Karabakh conflict. Moscow’s mediation could also be seen as an attempt to restore its credibility in the region following the war with Georgia, which further eroded its relations with the United States.

Depending on who wins the U.S. presidential election, Moscow will try to showcase its good behavior to the new leadership in Washington. There is one important line in the joint declaration, which shows that Moscow will not mediate the potential peace deal alone, bypassing its American and French partners in the OSCE Minsk Group. The declaration clearly states that the peace process will proceed within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group based on the “Madrid Principles” endorsed by the OSCE Ministerial Council, which envisage the return of occupied Azerbaijani territories and the possibility of holding a referendum on the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

High Expectations

It is hard to imagine that a Karabakh peace deal could be achieved without the United States, one of the major players in the OSCE Minsk Group. Azerbaijan and Armenia will not easily bow to Moscow’s pressure without the approval of the new administration in Washington. It would therefore be premature to expect a breakthrough in the talks before January 2009, when the next U.S. president is sworn in.

Armenians have high expectations for Democratic Senator Barack Obama, hoping that, if he is elected president, he will support their cause.

“I will promote Armenian security by seeking an end to the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades, and by working for a lasting and durable settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that is agreeable to all parties,” Obama said in one of his campaign promises to Armenian-Americans.

The Armenian government will seek help from the United States if it is pressured to give up Azerbaijani territories without obtaining guarantees that the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians will be able to hold a referendum on their future status.

Some experts in Azerbaijan and Armenia believe that Russia might try to secure a substantial military presence in the conflict zone as part of the future peacekeeping force that is to be deployed once a peace agreement is signed. Azerbaijan will most probably seek support from the United States in ensuring that Russian troops do not return to Azerbaijan.

The Georgian experience has demonstrated that once they come, they are unlikely to leave peacefully.

Haryy Tamrazian is director of RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

November 4, 2008
Tehran — with Moscow’s Backing — Seeks to Expand its Role in the Caucasus

Paul Goble

Vienna, November 3 – The big winner at the summit among the presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan yesterday may be a country was not there: Iran, whose return to an active role in the Caucasus, something the US opposes and the Minsk Group was organized to prevent, now appears to enjoy the active support of both Moscow and Yerevan.
Yesterday, following their meeting in Moscow, Presidents Dmitry Medvedev, Serzh Sarksyan, and Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration on their commitment to continuing to pursue “a peaceful regulation” of the Karabakh conflict by means of talks, including within the framework of the Minsk Group (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1232473.html).
While Russian commentators celebrated this document not only as a major contribution to the peace in the Caucasus and a confirmation of Russia’s newly expanded role there, in fact, neither that declaration nor the meetings of the foreign ministers on Friday or their joint session with the Minsk Group on Saturday broke much if any new ground.
But a statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Friday suggests that the diplomatic landscape in the Caucasus may be changing quickly, albeit in ways that may not lead to any resolution of the conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan or between Georgia and the Russian Federation.
Lavrov said that Iran had expressed an interest in creating a security zone in the Caucasus, a step that would appear to challenge both the Minsk Group which was created to exclude Iran from having a role in the region and Turkey which has proposed creating a Platform of Security and Stability in the Caucasus (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1232455.html).
The Russian foreign minister said that he had spoken with Iranian officials about their desire to be included “in discussions” about the Caucasus, a move that appears to be the product of both Moscow’s own desire to promote a north-south axis through the Caucasus and two developments earlier this fall.
On the one hand, Yerevan indicated that it was not prepared to talk about Turkey’s proposal for security unless Iran was involved (kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1229327.html). And on the other, Tehran offered itself as an intermediary for possible talks between Moscow and Tbilisi (kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1089720.html).
The Russian foreign minister said that Moscow has still not received any concrete proposals from Tehran in this regard, but earlier last week, the Iranian news agency IRNA quoted an Iranian deputy foreign minister to the effect that Tehran is currently “completing” work on them.
It is, of course, entirely possible that Iran’s proposals, even if they do find support in Moscow and Yerevan, will go no further than Turkey’s have in resolving some of the neuralgic disputes of the South Caucasus. But just like the Moscow meeting itself, Iran’s new involvement represents a kind of tectonic shift there.
Since the end of the Soviet Union, the United States has taken the lead in trying to keep Iran from having any role in the region. That is of course why Washington promoted the creation of the Minsk Group, a product of the only international organization in which all the regional players were members except Iran.
But that group has not succeeded in squaring the circle on Karabakh, a dispute in which the positions of the two sides are not really any closer than they were a decade or more ago. And consequently, those immediately involved have become increasingly frustrated and are willing to explore different venues and negotiating partners.
Such frustrations have given an opening to Iran. And as Lavrov’s remarks in Moscow on Friday indicate, Tehran is ready and willing to get involved, a development that the Russian government gives every indication of welcoming whatever its Minsk Group and American “partners” may think.

November 3, 2008
No Karabakh Deal Announced After Moscow Summit

By Aza Babayan in Moscow and Tigran Avetisian

The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan pledged to step up the prolonged search for a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but did not announce any concrete agreements after weekend talks hosted by their Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev.

Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliev met in a tête-à-tête format and were later joined by Medvedev at the Meiendorf Castle outside Moscow on Sunday amid fresh international hopes for a breakthrough in Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks mediated by Russia, the United States and France

“The presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to continue work, including during further contacts on the highest level, on agreeing a political resolution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and ordered their foreign ministers to intensify further steps in the negotiating process in coordination with the co-chairs of the OSCE’s Minsk Group,” the three leaders said in a joint declaration read out by Medvedev.

The declaration stressed the importance of continued efforts by the group’s American, French and Russian co-chairs to work out the basic principles of a Karabakh settlement acceptable to the conflicting parties. But it only vaguely alluded to a framework peace accord that was formally put forward by the co-chairs in November 2007.

Armenia and Azerbaijani are understood to have agreed to most of the key points of the proposed settlement. The mediators hoped before the Moscow talks that the two sides will overcome their remaining differences before the end of this year.

The mediating troika, including U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, held separate talks with Aliev and Sarkisian at Meiendorf later on Sunday. No details of those talks were made public and the mediators issued no joint statements afterwards.

Speaking to RFE/RL just before those talks, Yuri Merzlyakov, the Minsk Group’s Russian co-chair, described the trilateral declaration as a “historic” document that will speed up the peace process. He noted that Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders have jointly put pen to paper for the first time since the signing in May 1994 of a Russian-mediated truce that stopped the war in Karabakh.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry appeared to downplay the document’s significance, though. “One should not look for anything new in the signing of the document,” a ministry spokesman, Khazar Ibrahim, told journalists in Baku on Monday, according to the Trend news agency. “Negotiations are still going on and their significance is reflected by the declaration. The groundwork needs to be laid for the transition to the next phase of the negotiations.”

A senior official in Yerevan seemed in a more buoyant mood. Eduard Sharmazanov, a spokesman for the governing Republican Party of Armenia, pointed to the declaration’s emphasis on a “political settlement” of the Karabakh conflict. “This runs counter to bellicose statements that were made by Azerbaijani officials,” he told RFE/RL.

Sharmazanov also pointed out that the declaration makes clear that the Minsk Group will remain the main mediating body in Karabakh talks. He said this disproved opposition allegations that Sarkisian is ready to let Armenia’s arch-rival Turkey take on a mediating role in the peace process.

Armenia’s main opposition alliance, meanwhile, declined to comment on the Moscow talks on Monday. Levon Zurabian, a senior member of the Armenian National Congress, told RFE/RL that the top leader of the alliance, Levon Ter-Petrosian, will issue a special statement on Tuesday.

November 3, 2008
Moscow Declaration – A Victory For Armenia

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (right) with his counterparts from Armenia, Serzh Sarkisian (center), and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev.

November 03, 2008

By Liz Fuller

The Declaration On Regulating the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict signed by the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia following their talks in Moscow on November 2 can be regarded as a victory for Armenia in three key respects.

First, the three presidents reaffirmed their shared commitment to seeking a political solution to the conflict “on the basis of the norms and principles of international law and of the decisions and documents adopted within that framework,” and with the stated objective of “creating a more healthy situation in the South Caucasus.”

In other words, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who has previously warned on numerous occasions that if mediation by the Minsk Group, created by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE), fails to yield a solution to the conflict, Azerbaijan will have no option but to resort to the use of military force to bring Nagorno-Karabakh under the control of the central government, has formally pledged not to begin a new war.

Second, the declaration stresses the importance of the ongoing mediation effort by the OSCE Minsk Group, and specifically of the so-called Madrid Principles, the basic blueprint for resolving the conflict.

In other words, the declaration effectively precludes any effort by Turkey to promote an alternative peace proposal that might be more in line with Azerbaijan’s vision of the optimal solution than are the Madrid Principles. Visiting Yerevan two months ago, Turkish President Abdullah Gul affirmed Turkey’s readiness to “assist” in resolving the Karabakh conflict.

And third, the three presidents agreed that the search for a peaceful solution should be accompanied by “legally binding international guarantees of all its aspects and stages.”

From Yerevan’s viewpoint, the primary weakness of the so-called Madrid Principles is that they require Armenia to relinquish its most important bargaining chip and withdraw from the seven districts of Azerbaijan bordering on Nagorno-Karabakh that it currently controls before any decision has been made on the future status of the unrecognized republic vis-a-vis the central Azerbaijani government in Baku. That issue is to be decided by means of a referendum that may not take place until years after the Armenian withdrawal.

‘Confidence-Building Measures’

Many Armenians are therefore concerned that, having regained control of the seven districts, the Azerbaijani government might then block the holding of the planned referendum.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutiun threatened on October 31 to quit the coalition government if President Serzh Sarkisian betrays “national interests” by agreeing to cede the occupied territories. One day earlier, on October 30, a group of prominent Armenian intellectuals and public figures announced the launch of a new movement, named Unification National Initiative, that will similarly actively oppose any territorial concessions to Azerbaijan.

The proposed “legally binding international guarantees” are presumably intended to prevent any such perfidy on Baku’s part, and thus reduce domestic political pressure on Sarkisian. The final point of the declaration similarly stresses the importance of “confidence-building measures.”

The international guarantees would presumably also encompass commitments by various states to provide international peacekeepers to be deployed in the seven liberated districts and the strategic Lachin corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, too, can be pleased with the outcome of the November 2 talks, insofar as the declaration affirms a commitment by Russia to a positive role, promoting peace and stability in the South Caucasus in the wake of the August war with Georgia.

November 3, 2008
Turkish FM Upbeat On Normalizing Relations With Armenia

dpa

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ali Babacan on Friday expressed optimism that long-running disputes between Turkey and Armenia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan can be resolved and that Turkey was determined to push forward in the interests of regional peace.

“These two tracks could move fast because there is good political will,” Babacan said at a meeting of the World Economic Forum in Istanbul.

“Imagine a region in which you have totally new relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Armenia and Turkey. The consequences for trade, for communications, for transport, for energy and the opportunities are huge, so we will do our best to normalize the situation as soon as possible,” Babacan said.

Turkey and Armenia do not have any diplomatic relations and the land border between the two countries was closed by Turkey in 1993 in protest at the Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijan territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Relations are also strained by Turkey’s refusal to accept as genocide the deaths of up to 1.5 million ethnic Armenians in the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey says that while there were massacres of ethnic Armenians, the events do not constitute genocide and were instead the result of a civil uprising during the First World War.

Hopes have risen in recent months that after a groundbreaking visit by Turkish President Abdullah Gul to the Armenian capital Yerevan where he attended a World Cup qualifying match between the two countries.

Babacan on Friday said that the recent events in Georgia increased the incentive and need for regional cooperation and said that Turkey was ready to use its perceived position as a “balancing power” to contribute to peace and stability.

November 1, 2008