Armenia believes the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is a key issue in the continuing search for a settlement in the long-running Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute and regards the Armenian-controlled territories surrounding the enclave as a guarantee of its population’s security, the country’s leader said in an interview with a leading European newspaper.
The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung quoted President Serzh Sarkisian in its Monday issue as saying that Azerbaijan’s recognition of the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh’s population can be followed by solutions to other issues.
“The control over territories is not an end in itself for us, but is aimed at Karabakh’s security. Today we need to negotiate over principles of settlement, which can be followed by the basic peace accord. We still have a long way to go,” Sarkisian said, according to the text of his interview disseminated by the presidential press office Tuesday.
Earlier this month Sarkisian met with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliev in Moscow and following tête-à-tête talks signed a joined declaration along with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev pledging to step up efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
The signing of the nonbinding document came amid growing international hopes for a breakthrough in internationally mediated Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks.
Sarkisian commented that the Moscow declaration was important for the Armenian side due to its exclusion of a military way of resolving the dispute.
“Of course, it is just a declaration, and we would be very glad to reach an agreement. Anyway, I do not mean to underestimate the importance of that document,” Sarkisian told the German paper. “I am also glad that Azerbaijan signed a document that assumes all principles of international law as a basis for a solution to the conflict and not only the principle of territorial integrity.”
Nagorno-Karabakh, a mostly Armenian-populated autonomous region in Soviet Azerbaijan, broke free of Baku’s control after the demise of the USSR, prompting a bloody war that claimed thousands of lives on both sides.
After nearly three years of fighting, Karabakh Armenians managed to establish control over the most part of the region and expand into surrounding areas to form a security zone.
Since 1994, when hostilities ended after a Russia-brokered ceasefire, negotiations between the former warring sides over the future of the region have been conducted through the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) jointly chaired by the United States, France and Russia.
The parties to the conflict have so far been unable to reconcile the two seemingly conflicting principles of international law, i.e. territorial integrity of states and the right of nations to self-determination. The stalemate that until recently had been observed in the peace process led to increased war rhetoric and petrodollar-backed military buildup in Azerbaijan as well as questions over the efficiency of the format of negotiations.
“I also positively evaluate the fact that despite critical assessments of the effectiveness of the Minsk Group’s activities made of late, the document [signed in Moscow] underscores the importance of the Group’s format and the role of the United States, Russia and France as mediators,” Sarkisian said.
The Armenian leader also effectively excluded a status of Karabakh implying its dependence on Baku as he said that history proves Armenians cannot develop in a safe environment under Azerbaijani rule.
“We have never thought that Karabakh can remain within Azerbaijan with any status,” he said.
The election of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States last week was welcomed around the world as an end to the unpopular Bush presidency and the chance to rebuild America ’s standing in the world. Expectations are, of course, going to be disappointed, both domestically and internationally. For all the significance of a US president with a Kenyan heritage and a Muslim middle name, President Obama will still have to face tough and unpopular decisions in the world.
On November 5, the day after election day, Moscow announced that it would deploy a number of short-range missiles in Kaliningrad , the Russian exclave between Lithuania and Poland , as a means to ‘neutralise – if necessary – the planned US missile defence system in eastern Europe. The decision was announced by President Dimitri Medvedev in his first state of the nation address, and was a clear warning that the Kremlin will not be appeased by a mere change of occupant in the White House.
Is it viable to expect a significant shift in policy towards Russia and the Caucasus once Obama is inaugurated? It is unlikely. Much has been made of John McCain’s hard-line policy approach to dealing with Moscow , and Obama’s relative inexperience in the area, and it is true that domestic opinion in the region tended to favour McCain, especially in states nervous about Russian adventurism such as Georgia and Ukraine . But in reality the room for maneuver will not allow a radical departure from the Bush administration, for both a general reason and a number of specific ones. The exception might seem to be Nagorno-Karabakh.
The general reason is that, for all the talk after the Georgian war of a new (albeit ‘19th-century’) geopolitical order in Eurasia, the relationship with Russia is not the incoming administration’s top priority. The economy is a far more pressing concern. And even within the sphere of foreign affairs, negotiations with European and Chinese leaders on the world financial crisis will take up a lot more time than Russia and the Caucasus . Much will of course depend on President Obama’s personnel selection, in particular the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, but for a while at least we are likely to see policy towards Eurasia as a secondary concern.
The specific reasons vary, but boil down to the fact that there is only so much that the US can do without breaking its prior commitments or undertaking a major volte-face on its whole foreign policy front which Mr Obama has neither the experience nor the desire (despite his commitment to multilateralism) to countenance. Firstly, the missile defence shield. By November 7, Mr. Obama had spoken to Lech Kaczynski, the Polish President, affirming his commitment to the project, which includes interceptor missiles based in Poland . A telephone call whilst President-elect, of course, does not equate to a policy whilst President. But it is nonetheless difficult to imagine Mr. Obama withdrawing from the missile shield project during his tenure, although it may be modified to make it less unpalatable to the Kremlin.
Secondly, Georgia . Mr Obama criticized Russia ’s invasion of the country in August and called Russia ’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia “deeply troubling”. He has warned Moscow that a failure to abide by the ceasefire will lead to difficulties in its attempts to gain membership to the World Trade Organisation, as well as dialogue frameworks such as the NATO-Russia Council. So far, so orthodox. He has expressed support for Georgia and Ukraine in their NATO aspirations, and declared in September that Tbilisi was ready for a Membership Action Plan, although it will be interesting to see how far he is willing to push it. He may be less willing to antagonize European leaders by insisting on this explosive issue than President Bush (or indeed Mr. McCain), especially if he has been cooperating closely with them over the financial crisis.
Thirdly, Nagorno-Karabakh. The clearest sign of a presumed change here could be Mr. Obama’s relationship with the huge Armenian diaspora in the United States : during his election campaign he welcomed their support and promised to find a resolution to the Karabakh conflict that is based upon “principles of democracy and self determination”. He has also expressed strong support for formally recognizing the so-called “Armenian genocide” of 1915, a notoriously controversial issue, and has stated that he will seek an end to the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades of Armenia (imposed on Armenia by the latter after the Armenian forces occupied the territories of Azerbaijan in 1992-1993). Vice President-elect Joe Biden is also known for his strong support of Yerevan . However,it is now to be watched how far Obama as a president will be able to go to keep his promises in this regard.
On the ground, Turkey ’s recent moves to thaw relations with Armenia will be looked on favorably by the Obama White House, which must try and keep the momentum going. However, if Obama’s administration chooses to lean on Armenia , it could prove detrimental to the détente process currently taking place in the Caucasus ( Turkey has already warned Obama of breaking off therapprochement process with Armenia in case if the US recognizes the “Armenian genocide”) and grant Russia a perfect opportunity to gather disaffected players to itself. In particular, in case of obvious US support for Armenia, Baku could find the warm relationship it has fostered with the Bush Administration cooling somewhat and find that its interests are better served by Moscow. Russia has already started taking important steps in that direction making use of the “lame-duck situation” in Washington . By holding a trilateral meeting of presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan last week in Moscow as a result of which a declaration on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process (first time since the cease-fire agreement of 1994) was signed by the presidents, Russia, frequently accused of wishing the continuation of frozen conflicts in the region, has intended to send a signal of its “good will” in the Caucasus, thus aiming on the one hand to rectify its damaged image after its invasion of Georgia, and on the other hand to have an upper hand in case of an ultimate settlement of the conflict. It is noteworthy that the only international mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – the OSCE Minsk Group (including beyond Russia , US and France as well), paralyzed after the Georgia war, was totally excluded from the above-mentioned meeting. Russia ’s attempts to pose itself as a mediator being capable to produce “tangible results” (e.g. the above-said declaration) cannot but cause great suspicions and concerns in Washington .
If Moscow exploits the opportunity further and begins to push for a resolution which emphasizes territorial integrity above all others (as unlikely as this may be), and if President Obama keeps his above-mentioned promises, we could begin to see a serious alteration of the Baku-Washington relationship which could potentially introduce significant changes to the present geopolitical order in the region. So if the new administration wants to avoid heightened tensions, it must try to balance regional interests and avoid alienating key players as the Bush Administration has repeatedly done. President Obama must attempt to find a solution to the problem that satisfies Turkey , accommodates Azerbaijan and Armenia , and circumscribes Russia .
We should not expect a new era under Obama. The Russian bear is not about to abandon its suspicion of the American eagle just because of a new face, and the feeling is mutual. The Georgian conflict was a significant rupture in relations and has created a potential for the emergence of a new geopolitical situation in the region. Despite his pre-electoral calls for a Russia policy based on “cooperation instead of confrontation”, Obama will have to continue the US support for the pro-American government in Tbilisi , no matter how much Saakashvili might have bothered him. It is obvious that if Georgia is gone, it will not last much till the region will be gone as well.
In the Caucasus , as elsewhere, it looks as if President Obama will have to start lowering expectations.
TURKEY DEVELOPS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH AZERBAIJAN
By Saban Kardas
Monday, November 10, 2008
On November 5 and 6, after his reelection last month, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev visited Turkey, where he discussed the developments in the Caucasus, relations with Armenia, and deepening cooperation between the two countries.
On November 5 he attended a dinner given by his host President Abdullah Gul and attended by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other ministers (Anadolu Ajansi, November 6). On the second day of his visit Aliyev addressed a session of the Turkish Parliament (www.cnnturk.com, November 6). The two presidents emphasized the close friendship between their countries and the importance of Turkey-Azerbaijan cooperation for peace and stability in the Caucasus. The leaders repeated the oft-heard motto of “one nation, two states” and made references to historical and cultural ties between the two countries. Aliyev remarked that no other countries had such close relations as those between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and this must be seen as a great asset. Aliyev also thanked Turkey for supporting Azerbaijan in difficult times.
The main item on Aliyev’s agenda was the situation in the Caucasus. Having commended Turkey’s constructive efforts to solve problems in the region, Aliyev repeated Azerbaijan’s support for the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP), initiated by Turkey (EDM, September 2). On the issue of Azerbaijan-Armenia relations, Aliyev made a firm statement of the Azerbaijani position that the current situation of the Karabakh conflict remains the main obstacle to peace in the Caucasus. He criticized Armenia’s occupation of 20 percent of Azeri lands and its policy of ethnic cleansing. He reiterated that a solution to the problem rests on the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and Armenia’s compliance with the resolutions of international organizations including the United Nations (ANKA, November 6).
Aliyev’s visit comes in the wake of a meeting between Aliyev and his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarkisian in Moscow on November 2, sponsored by Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev. Despite their pledge in a joint declaration to pursue a political settlement, the two leaders failed to specify any concrete steps with regard to confidence-building measures, which fell short of the Kremlin’s expectations (EDM, November 4). Nonetheless, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) welcomed this declaration and viewed it as a successful example of multiple parties working toward a common goal. Some Turkish observers interpreted Russia’s growing involvement in the resolution of the Azerbaijan-Armenia dispute as a loss of leverage for Ankara and criticized Turkey’s reactionary policy (www.asam.org.tr, ASAM Daily Brief, November 6).
A press release by the MFA emphasized that Turkey’s past efforts—such as the proposal for the CSCP and the trilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia sponsored by Turkey—had paved the way for the Moscow talks (Press Release: 189, www.mfa.gov, November 5). In his meeting with Aliyev, Gul received first hand information about the Azeri-Armenian talks in Moscow. Gul praised the declaration as the beginning of a new era for bringing peace to the region (Anadolu Ajansi, November 5). It is a common practice for the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan to inform each other about any meetings with Armenia not involving the other party (Star, September 11).
The Turkish daily Zaman ran a story that maintained that Gul had proposed another trilateral summit in Istanbul, which would bring together Gul, Aliyev, and Sarkisian. Having received a positive response from Aliyev, Gul was reportedly going to extend an invitation to the Armenian side. Speaking to Zaman, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov also confirmed that such a proposal had been made (Zaman, November 7). The Turkish MFA spokesperson, however, issued a statement refuting the idea that it had proposed hosting a trilateral meeting (www.cnnturk.com, November 7). Zaman nonetheless insisted on its story and criticized the confusing information over the proposal coming out of the MFA (Zaman, November 8). The Turkish officials’ stance might have been a result of an attempt to achieve reconciliation with Armenia through secret diplomacy and their preference for keeping such a proposal confidential before all the details are worked out.
Another major issue on the agenda during Aliyev’s visit was the growing volume of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries, in particular in the energy sector. Azerbaijan and Turkey have developed a partnership in energy transportation, which has led to the flourishing of economic ties in other fields. Turkish entrepreneurs have had a vibrant presence in Azerbaijan. The growing Azerbaijani wealth created by oil revenues, however, has altered the direction of investments. Recently, Azeri companies started investing in Turkey, especially in privatization projects. The CEO of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (Socar) announced the company’s plans for new investments of up to 10 billion dollars in Turkey (Yeni Safak, January 10). SOCAR and the Palmali Group recently bought 50 percent of Tekfen Insaat, one of Turkey’s largest construction firms, for $520 million (Ihlas News Agency, September 8). Aliyev emphasized that such investments reflected the growing self-confidence of the Azeri economy and gave indications that they would continue in the future. Aliyev also emphasized the high value his administration attaches to integrating Azerbaijan with the rest of the world. He noted, however, the importance of achieving full independence in the economy, which was a prerequisite for political independence (Cihan News Agency, November 6).
President Gul is due to visit Baku on November 14 to attend the forthcoming fourth international summit on energy, which will bring together several heads of state from the region as well as representatives from the European Union and the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza (Zaman, November 7; Azeri Press Agency, November 7). In the wake of the conflict in Georgia, discussions on the secure flow of energy from the region, as well as alternative pipelines carrying oil and gas, will be on the agenda of the summit.
Between Russia and the Middle East, the Caucasus is one of the world’s most diverse regions – and as recent fighting in South Ossetia and Abkhazia showed, still boiling with ethnic tensions. Norman Stone reviews a history which makes sense of this complexity
The surrender of the Circassian leader Sheikh Shamil to the tsarist forces in 1859
The Ghost of Freedom: a History of the Caucasus
Charles King
OUP, 219pp, £17.99
A Georgian professor came to my (Turkish) university a few years ago and said: “People who live in mountains are stupid.” You probably hear such things often enough in the Caucasus, but it is not the sort of remark that you expect professors to pass. However, there is maybe something in it, a point made by the crazy loyalism of the Jacobite Highlanders of the Forty-Five, or for that matter of the Navarrese Carlists: brave and romantic, certainly, with their own codes of honour, but not very bright.
A French sociologist, André Siegfried, developed this theme a century ago, because he had noticed that voting patterns depended on altitude; in the valleys, people got on with normal lives, but, the further up you went, the less this was true. The diet was very poor, the economy was sheep-stealing or smuggling, resentment simmered against the valley settlers, and religion of a wild sort reigned. The Caucasus also fits Siegfried’s pattern, with the difference that, the further uphill you went, the more weird languages you hit on. In Charles King’s words, “the north-east harbours the Nakh languages . . . as well as a mixed bag of disparate languages that includes Avar, Dargin and Lezgin”.
He has missed out the Tats, who are mountain Jews, and he has mercifully missed out a great deal else, because the whole region is a kaleidoscope, and the ancient history is very complicated, with an Iberia and an Albania in shadowy existence; the Ossetians, of whom the world recently heard so much, are apparently what is left of the Alans, one of the barbarian tribes that swept through the later Roman Empire (and ended up in North Africa).
Charles King’s great virtue is that he is a very proficient simplifier and misser-out; he writes well, and can read the languages that matter (for some reason, quite a number of the important sources are in German; Germans were especially interested in the Caucasus, and in 1918 even had plans to shift U-boats overland to the Caspian). All the important themes are here, with some interesting additions.
King concentrates on the modern history of the Caucasus, roughly from 1700, when Russia began to take over the overlordship from Persia and the Ottoman Empire. In 1801, she annexed much of Georgia. This was relatively easy, since it is a very divided country (and the language – so difficult that even Robert Conquest, writing his biography of Stalin, found it impossible – itself sub-divides). It was also Christian, the nobility on the whole glad to come to terms with the tsar, and it could easily be reached from the sea, whereas other parts of the Caucasus, given the very mountainous and forested terrain, were much more difficult. The various Muslim natives of the northern Caucasus were then generally known as “Circassians” (the present-day Chechens are related) and they put up an extraordinary resistance to Russian penetration.
Cossacks came in, as the 19th century went ahead, and a line of forts was established; but a ferocious tribal-religious resistance grew up, under a legendary figure, Sheikh Shamil. Combining mystical-religious inspiration with an extraordinary astuteness as to guerrilla tactics, Shamil kept the Russians pinned down for a whole generation. (King’s bibliography is very solid and useful, but he might have mentioned a classic book about this, Sabres of Paradise, by Lesley Blanch, who went on to write The Wilder Shores of Love about the erotic Orient.)
In the event, the Russians “solved” the problem of the Circassians by mass-deportation. About 1,250,000 of them were forced out, and King is very good at describing their fate, as a third of the deportees died of disease or starvation or massacre, and the rest scattered over the Near and Middle East. Settling in eastern Anatolia, they encountered the Armenians, and bitter conflict resulted. A generation later much the same fate occurred to the Armenians of eastern Turkey. King quite rightly makes the parallel.
Shamil was at long last captured, but the Russians treated him well, and part of his family faded into the tsarist aristocracy. This is incidentally a dimension of matters that King could have explored: the relations of Russia and Islam. He has a good chapter about the image of the Caucasus in Russian literature (Lermontov and Tolstoy especially) but both Pushkin and Dostoyevsky were fascinated by Islam, and the Russians, whether tsarist or communist (and even nowadays) were quite adept at dealing with Muslims. The Tatars have turned into rather a plus: Nureyev and Baryshnikov, whose names mean “light” and “peace” in Turkish, being a case in point.
In fact, as the 19th century went ahead, the Caucasus was opened up, and many of the Muslims became loyal subjects of the tsar. Tiflis, the Georgian capital (why must we use these wretched “Tbilisis” and “Vilniuses” for places so well marked on the historic map?), was the seat of a viceroyalty that stretched from Kars in eastern Anatolia to the Caspian, and the railways, or the military roads, snaked ahead. Oil was struck on the Caspian side, and Baku, the capital of today’s Azerbaijan, grew up as a boom town, much of the architecture rather distinguished in late- Victorian style. One of the great mansions has been spectacularly restored as a historical museum.
To this day, the solid architecture of Kars, now in eastern Turkey, is impressive, and though the town went through a very bad period, when the Cold War was going on, it is doing much better now, as the oil pipeline to Baku pumps away, and the old railway links are restored. Even now, despite the gruesome climate, the inhabitants of Kars are notably sharper and better-educated than those of Trabzon or Erzurum, which remained under Ottoman rule. According to Orhan Pamuk’s novel on the town, Snow, its theatre was very good, but if you needed Islamic female costumes you had to send off to Erzurum, which was (and is: the calls to prayer are frequent and deafening) very provincial-pious. In its way, Kars shows in miniature that pre-1914 period which is the great might-have-been of Russian history: 1914 aborted a period of growing prosperity even, if you like, a bourgeois revolution. The revolution of 1917 finished all of that.
There was a pathetic episode, as the three nations of Transcaucasia – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – established a shadowy independence, even though the peoples of each were (and to some extent still are) intermingled. Baku and Tiflis had large Armenian populations, and Yerevan, the territory of today’s Armenia, was roughly half Muslim, whether Azeri or Kurdish. “Ethnic cleansing” then went ahead, the Armenians especially becoming megalomaniac, and even, as a first act on independence at Christmas 1918, invading Georgia. To this day, much of the Armenian diaspora seems never to have forgiven the west for failing to support their cause: hence these strange and persistent demands for the tragedy to be recognised as genocide. Perhaps it was, but as King shows, Armenians were not the only victims – not by any means – and it is rather to the credit of the Circassians’ (and others’) descendants that they are not demanding similar recognition of genocide from Congress or the Assemblée Nationale or Cardiff City Council or the Edinburgh City Fathers etc.
Sovietisation of the Caucasus then happened, and it was the communists’ turn to find out just how difficult the national question was going to be: eventually, it destroyed them. Communism had a very strong appeal to begin with when it came to the national question: who, looking at the Caucasus (as with Yugoslavia) would not be desperate for anything that would stop the rise of vicious tinpot nationalism? Many stout communists, beginning with Stalin himself, came from the Caucasus, and Stalin in the end had recourse to deportation (of the Chechens and many, many other peoples) as the only solution. That created the counter-hatreds that have made post-Soviet life so difficult. The Armenians repeated their fantasy of 1918 and invaded a neighbour – Azerbaijan – in pursuit of a fantasy. They victoriously set their standards afluttering over Karabakh, with much swelling of diaspora bosoms. The effort, and the isolation it brought them, caused nothing but economic trouble to what was already a poor, land-locked little place, and the original population, three million, is now, from emigration, below two: independence, in other words, having done more damage than ever the Turks did. The Georgians had an 18th-century ruler who described himself as “The Most High King, by the Will of Our Lord King of Kings of the Abkhaz, Kartvelians, Kakhetians and Armenians and Master of All the East and the West”: more megalomania with a contemporary ring, in other words. Charles King has written a very instructive and interesting book about it all.
Norman Stone’s most recent book is “World War One: a Short History”, now available as a Penguin paperback (£7.99)
The dark Islam image on Occident infuriates and infuriates Eastern-Muslims. When I went to Mecca . I said to the Muslims who were angry about that image that they were the guilty of the things like that. Because, as they haven’t explained Islam enough, unfortunately the ones who listens to these made up things can think that they are true. The looseness , even quietness, of Eastern Muslims about explaining the real Islam has created such a blank of knowledge that in Occident a religion explaiter can come out and lead our people to a wrong way.
Fourty years before that Malcolm X who had reflected the dark Islam image to us had explained the deterioration of reputation which Islam was going to experience and he had warned us at that time and adviced us, Muslims, to show the real Islam to the Occident by creating a close dialoge with them.
Malcolm X was the asistant of Elijah Muhammad, the leader of Nation of Islam, who told that the real religion of black race was Islam and he was the most renowned one to explain Islam in United Nations. But the Islam which Elijah presented to Americans was wholly untrue and it was presented to people as a religion interpereted by himself. As there han’t been any religious leader, any Muslim country or any Muslim communty to explain Islam to America until that time, Elijah, who told that he could adjust an imported religion , was consedering himself a savior who was sent by Allah to Occident and was stating this as a condition to be accepted by people who are converting to Islam.
Working hard in the way of his religion by aiming Allah, even without being in the right way, Malcolm X had learned that only truth from Elijah: “Black race is superior to the other races, white people are the Devil, and Islam is peculiar to them, the African black people.”
After years, Malcolm X goes to Mecca for the duty of piligramage and when he sees that people white,blonde,reddish and black from every color, from every race come together and perform the namaz in the same order and have meal on the same dinner table, he experiences a great shock. From then on, his opinions,his beliefs and point of view on the world nations had exactly changed. In such a conditin he realizes the Islam spreading in America is in a wrong style and in interviews he reproaches not to the ones spreading Islam in a wrong style in America but to the Islam community:
The dark Islam image on Occident infuriates and infuriates Eastern-Muslims. When I went to Mecca . I said to the Muslims who were angry about that image that they were the guilty of the things like that. Because, as they haven’t explained Islam enough, unfortunately the ones who listens to these made up things can think that they are true. The looseness , even quietness, of Eastern Muslims about explaining the real Islam has created such a blank of knowledge that in Occident a religion explaiter can come out and lead our people to a wrong way.
Due to the people trying to impose their own ideologies by using Islam in first half of 20th century the spreading of Islam had become harder, a wall of prejudice had been erected and that important happening had got late until years later. Constitutions with wrong mentality have a share of guilt but biggest share of guilt is the Islam community’s in this situation.
When we look at the world thoroughly the religion dominating the Continent of America is christianity. In these territories the proclamation of Islam hasn’t been achieved, contrary to that the ideology of “the dislike of Islam” has spread out from here. As to the Far-East, by Europeans a hundred years ago priests were sent by ships to the Far-Easterns who were already in an emptiness and to fill that empitiness with critianity was aimed. As a matter of fact official numbers show that cleary: In Japon and South Korea %25 of people are christian. But there is such a strange situation that, when we look at the history books, in this direction, last century we will come across an opportunity which shouldn’t have been missed. In short, in the times we priests were sent to the Far-East… In the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid IInd Japan wants hodjas from us to learn Islam. Japan’s prince says that “You send seven persons for us to learn Islam and we shall send officers to you to be assigned in your defence.” Sultan Abdulhamid who was extremely sorry for not being able to response positively to this dialoge says this:“I would send not seven persons but seven hundred persons if it wasn’t for the matters of Anatolia which is full of disorder like a den of gossip.”
The ideal of ancestors was “to enter to the entered place for human” As a matter of fact at the moment when we look at the territories where our ancestors conquered centuries ago and ruled for centuries; it can be seen that the inhabitants of these places weren’t harmed and important protection acts were made and cities have been kept alive until that time, saving their name exactly the same.
Allah has created human in such a beatiful way that, He tells us in every case of univers(sas) regards human as such an important being that he goes to Ebu Cehil for hundred times, of whose disbeliefs we are sure in order that he would not be in the ones who suffre the sage of Allah. He says that when entering Mecca the ones who enter Kaaba and the hause of Ebu Sufyan will be saved. That means, then, he gives such a value to a person who orders who doesn’t believe, ith the hope that his last would be saluation. We are the community of a Prophet who orders a companion of him, not to perform a behiviour which will offend his mother who tries to stop his unbelieving mothers hinderings. How meaningful those lines of Ahmet Yesevi are:
“It is Sunna; don’t offend anyone even if he is an infidel
Allah is complaining about the heartless and offender ones.”
In this century, in which the humanity is being polorized, in which the anarchy and terrorism has become daily happenings and the value of humanity is being tried to be lost; the acts of tolerance on the way of which Muslims, already realizing some beauties tries hard, has started to blossom and the groud for acting collectively has been completed. Having attended the symposium named “Recontruction of Islam ideology in 20th century and Bediüzzaman” in 1992, Assit. Prof. Visula Spuler states the scene which she sees and wants to see about that subject like this: “Turks in Koln sent a worthy greeting message, the influence of the Pope who is originally Polish, on the liberation of East Black from communism was stated. And as a collective strugle against communism, Muslims getting Russians out of Afghanistan was stated. The massage was continuing like that: “At the same time, we know that our duty hasn’t come to on and after all these happenings. As you have stated humanity needs faith and the new world order.” That Easter greeting was written with the thinking system of Said Nursi sent a very beatiful handwriting work of himself to the Pope of that time in 1951. Spuler, who was grateful for Muslims’ beatiful impessions, continued her speech like that: “Again Bedüizzaman, in his work Munazarat, states that friendships can be achieved with the Jews or Christians by remaining Muslim. He saw christians and Germany, who was shaped with a good christian tradition, as a great friend in, against the all religion enemies troughout the world.
The explanation of Safa Mursel, who was in the same syposium, will enlighten us about what to do: “if uniting of religions will be thought, Christianity can be firstly expected to need that. These statements are enough to give required opinions:
The Christianity will either fade out or give up his weapon against the Islam. The Christianity broke up several times, transformed to the Protestantism. Protestantism broke up too. It approached to unification. It prepares to break up again. It will either profit and fade out or see the truth of Islam who is connective for the principal of the Christianity opposite of his himself and surrender. And the real religion of Christians, who converted to Islam and who will give up his superstitions, agree and help to Islam.
Timely, we are in a very important position. We are in a more important position from the point of view of the happenings which humanity experienced. We have all opportunities, to say shortly by thinking all the world history in the “Golden Period of Time” with the all opportunities we have, we can conduct to the integration of all of the subjects that is signed by from our Master to the last savant in a unique way. In the “Golden Period of Time”, Allah removes all obstacles against the people, what they intend to do. As long as our intention is pure. “The intention of Muslim is better than his act.”
International mediators plan to visit Baku and Yerevan next week to try to build on progress which they believe was made by the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents at their weekend meeting in Russia, Washington’s chief Nagorno-Karabakh negotiator said late Thursday.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza also insisted that the outgoing U.S. administration still hopes to broker a framework peace accord on Karabakh before handing over the reigns of power to President-elect Barack Obama on January 20.
“It’s absolutely possible,” he said, commenting on chances for the signing of an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement in the coming weeks. “I’m not predicting that it will happen. I’m just saying it is possible and I want to do everything I can to make it a reality.”
Bryza spoke to RFE/RL by phone from Vienna where he met earlier on Thursday with the two other co-chairs of the OSCE’s Minsk Group representing France and Russia. The mediators discussed their further steps four days after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev hosted talks outside Moscow with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts. In a joint statement, they said those talks gave them “reason for cautious optimism.”
“We will make a trip to the region, I hope some time next week, and consult with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to figure out how to translate the momentum, that we felt in Moscow and that our French colleagues felt in Paris when President Sarkisian visited [on Tuesday,] into a finalization of the basic principles [of a Karabakh settlement,]” Bryza said.
He said the co-chairs will then meet the foreign ministers of the two countries on the sidelines of a high-level OSCE meeting in Helsinki due early next month. “Depending on how much progress we will make, we will see whether we can get the presidents to meet again soon,” he added.
In a joint declaration with Medvedev, Presidents Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliev pledged to intensify the protracted search for peace but stopped short of announcing any concrete agreements. The lack of specifics in the declaration is construed by some observers as a sign that a breakthrough in the Karabakh peace process is not on the cards.
Bryza insisted, however, that the Moscow summit did bring Aliev and Sarkisian closer to agreement. “First of all, they developed a better sense of trust in each other and respect for each other’s needs, for what they need to do to sell the agreement back home,” he said. “Number two, in terms of substance, it sounds like they began a process of narrowing their differences on the remaining few issues that have to be resolved over the basic principles. So both in terms of mood and substance, they moved forward.”
Former President Levon Ter-Petrosian, the leader of Armenia’s main opposition alliance, went further on Tuesday, saying that Aliev and Sarkisian have “officially” accepted the basic principles of a Karabakh settlement which the mediators presented to the conflicting parties in Madrid in November 2007. Ter-Petrosian predicted that the two presidents will likely seal a peace deal in the United States as early as next month.
“Actually, it’s a great idea, a great aspiration,” commented Bryza. “I hope we could get to that. But we don’t have any concrete plans like that yet.
“It’s an ambitious goal that the former President Ter-Petrosian has set. I’d like to work toward it but it may be a little more ambitious than reality would allow right now.”
Bryza indicated that the parties have yet to fully agree on some of they provisions of the proposed framework agreement, notably a future referendum on Karabakh’s status. He said they are still trying to reconcile the internationally principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. “It’s not agreed on yet but it’s under discussion,” he said. “And I sense that the two sides, especially the presidents, are talking things through and thinking things through with regard to that issue and others.”
The Minsk Group’s existing peace proposals seem to entitle Karabakh’s predominantly Armenian population to determining the disputed territory’s status in a future referendum. However, Aliev has repeatedly stated, most recently on October 24, that Azerbaijan will never come to terms with the loss of Karabakh. The Armenian side, on the other hand, maintains that Azerbaijani recognition of the Karabakh Armenians’ “right to self-determination” is a must.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov singled out late last month the future of the so-called Lachin corridor, which provides for the shortest overland link between Karabakh and Armenia proper, as the main stumbling block in the negotiating process. He did not elaborate, though.
“Everybody knows that that issue has to be resolved,” Bryza said, referring to Lachin. “It’s an important one. We’re working on that and getting closer to that.”
The U.S. official further reiterated that Washington has no problem with Moscow seemingly taking the initiative in the Karabakh peace process of late and does not fear being sidelined by the Russians. He argued that he and the Minsk Group’s French co-chair, Bernard Fassier, were invited to the November 2 summit held at Meiendorf Castle outside Moscow.
“We don’t consider it so much a Russian initiative because we were invited from the beginning to come to Moscow,” he said. “If the Russian president decides he wants to apply his influence and his energy to moving the process forward, that’s positive.”
The U.S. and Russia are willing to continue to work together on Karabakh despite their “very sharp differences” over the recent conflict in Georgia, concluded Bryza.
