Originally Answered: Which country do you prefer, Turkey or Azerbaijan, as a an Armenian?
I find it amusing that this question is meant for Armenians and yet Turks and Azerbaijanis are answering it.
There is no choice really. Hundreds of Armenians travel in and out of Turkey every day (including from Armenia). Nearly no Armenians travel in and out of Azerbaijan. This “voting with feet” should answer the question.
The Republic of Turkey does not discriminate against Armenians entering and traveling the country. The Republic of Azerbaijan nearly universally denies all Armenians of the world entry. As a result, many Armenians (myself included) travel to Turkey and have fond associations and experiences there, where as such a thing is not possible with Azerbaijan.
On 24th April each year Yerevan issues its standard message commemorating the “Armenian Genocide” of 1915. This is usually a matter of routine. But not this year. The statement issued by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has led to him being called a “denialist” by the Armenian diaspora and the Genocide industry in the US and elsewhere in the West.
Here are the relevant parts of Pashinyan’s statement that have attracted the ire of those with a stake in the Genocide accusation:
“Dear people, dear citizens of the Republic of Armenia,
Today we commemorate the memory of 1.5 million victims of the Armenian Genocide, the Meds Yeghern, who were put to the sword in the Ottoman Empire since 1915 for being Armenians.
This large-scale tragedy took place during the years of the World War I, and the Armenian people, who had no statehood at the time, having lost their statehood centuries ago, had essentially forgotten the tradition of statehood, and became victims of geopolitical intrigues and false promises, lacking first of all a political mind capable of making the world and its rules understandable.
Meds Yeghern became a nationwide tragedy and grief for us, and without exaggeration, is now a predetermining factor for our socio-psychology. Even today, we perceive the world, our environment, ourselves under the dominant influence of the mental trauma of the Meds Yeghern, and we have not been able to overcome that trauma.
This means that… we often relate and compete with other countries and the international community in a state of mental trauma, and for this reason, sometimes we cannot correctly distinguish the realities and factors, historical processes and projected horizons confronting us.
Maybe this is also the reason why we receive new shocks, and relive the trauma of the Armenian Genocide as both a legacy and as a tradition… When talking about the Armenian Genocide, the Meds Yeghern, we always talk to the outside world, but our internal conversation never takes place on this event.
What should we do and what should we not do in order to overcome the trauma of genocide and exclude it as a threat? These are questions that should be the key subject of discussion in our political and philosophical thinking, but this kind of point of view of dealing with the fact of the Meds Yeghern is not common among us.
This is an imperative, an urgent imperative, and we must evaluate the relations between the Meds Yeghern and the First Republic of Armenia, we must relate the perception of the Meds Yeghern with the vital interests of the Republic of Armenia, our national statehood…
We must now stop the searches for a “national homeland” because we have already found that homeland, our Promised Land, where milk and honey flow. For us, the commemoration of the martyrs of the Meds Yeghern should not symbolize the “lost homeland”, but the found and real homeland, in the person of the Republic of Armenia, whose state… policies can prevent a repetition.
Never again! We should not say this to others, but to ourselves. And this is not an accusation against us at all, but a point of view where we, and only we, are responsible for the directing of our destiny and we are obliged to have enough mind, will, and depth of knowledge to carry through that responsibility in the domain of our sovereign decisions and perceptions.
May the martyrs of Meds Yeghern and all our other martyrs be consoled in their permanent sleep by the Republic of Armenia.
And long live the Republic of Armenia.”
It has been noticed that in his statement of April 24th, 2024, the Armenian Prime Minister chose to continually refer to the event the diaspora has been promoting for the last 50 years as “the Armenian Genocide” as Meds Yeghern or “the Great Crime”. He used the Genocide term extremely sparingly, almost in derogatory fashion against its diasporan promoters. Meds Yeghern is the term that Armenians used until the 1940’s to describe the events of 1915 before the term Genocide was coined by Raphael Lemkin and applied by the Armenian diaspora in its campaign for reparations against the Turkish state since the 1970s. Since then, there has been an insistence that the proper and legal term that should be used is “Genocide” or Tseghasbanoutyoun, in Armenian.
What Pashinyan seems to be suggesting is that Armenia should stop its myth-making and deal with the realities of situations as they present themselves. In other words it should stop treating propaganda as fact because propaganda is a poor basis for policy and Armenia’s recent disasters are very much connected with this tendency. In line with this he has suggested, in line with Azerbaijan President Aliyev’s demand, that Armenia adopt a new constitution deleting the references to “Artsakh” and “the Armenian Genocide”.
One of Pashinyan’s top lieutenants’ has also made the suggestion of making a list of all “1.5 million victims of the Armenian Genocide”. This has been seen by the Armenian diaspora as an indirect way of questioning the veracity of the “Armenian Genocide” and part of a policy of appeasment toward Azerbaijan and Turkiye.
The Lemkin Institute, horrified that its raison d’etre has been questioned by the Armenian Prime Minister, no less, issued a very lengthy and detailed statement saying:
“While we do not generally involve ourselves in domestic affairs of states unless there is an internal threat of genocide, we must address concerns stemming from recent statements made by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan that appear to diverge from fundamental principles of genocide prevention, genocide recognition, and transitional justice, and that directly relate to issues of Armenian national security.”
The Lemkin Institute statement then seeks to refute Pashinyan’s own statement published on April 24th:
“Perhaps most striking about Pashinyan’s statement on the genocide was the absence of any mention of aggressors. In paragraph three, for example, Pashinyan — discussing the period in the Ottoman Empire leading up to the 1915 genocide — cryptically asserted that “…the Armenian people, who had no statehood, had lost their statehood centuries ago, and essentially had forgotten the tradition of statehood, became victims of geopolitical intrigues and false promises, lacking first of all a political mind capable of making the world and its rules understandable.” This statement seems to assert that Armenians mysteriously experienced genocide due to their own witlessness. By asserting that Armenians were solely “victims of geopolitical intrigues and false promises,” Pashinyan further disregards the long-term and multi-layered historical oppression of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as well as the deep and visceral contempt for Armenians among members of the Committee of Union and Progress, the ruling party during the genocide. In other words, Pashinyan’s statement fails to recognize the role played by the ethnic, religious, and cultural animosity for Armenians in the Turkic supremacist campaign of extermination that targeted Armenians during World War I.
Furthermore, instead of attributing blame for the genocide to the leaders of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Pashinyan redirects attention towards Armenians, and specifically their apparent incapacity to understand politics at the time. He appears to be referencing the actions of the Russian Empire and Western powers during that era, who promised to protect Armenians but did not follow through, which aggravated the Ottoman leaders’ sense of external threat to the empire and drew negative attention to the Armenians as ‘foreign agents’. However, he does not state this outright; instead he seems to believe that Armenians brought the genocide upon themselves by misunderstanding the political terrain. Pashinyan’s talking points in this passage seem ironic, given that he has himself embraced Western offers to save Armenia from its hostile neighbors. Yet, his talking points also echo the official position of Türkiye regarding the Armenian Genocide which justified it by contracting “against an onslaught of external invaders and internal nationalist independence movements”. By parroting the Turkish narrative of the events of 1915-1923, the Armenian Prime Minister risks absolving Türkiye of its responsibility for the Armenian Genocide, downplaying all previous acknowledgment efforts. Further, it may substantially hamper the continuing work on international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and Turkish accountability – something that the worldwide Armenian diaspora, as well as genocide scholars and activists, have been fighting for.
Pashinyan’s argument that “Armenian people, who had no statehood, had lost their statehood centuries ago, and essentially had forgotten the tradition of statehood” inexplicably plays into the denialist agenda of Türkiye and Azerbaijan by obliquely mischaracterizing Armenian efforts to gain equal rights and human security in the Ottoman empire with foolish attempts to exercise a quest for independent statehood for which they had no capacity. The vast majority of Armenians under Ottoman rule were not seeking secession, but rather security and justice. Pashinyan’s words directly echo the official Turkish view of the Armenian people as rebellious “traitors” who collaborated with hostile European powers to bring about the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and who therefore betrayed the country. In fact, in this passage, Pashinyan seems to be making the case that Armenians can only avoid future genocides by capitulating to present-day Türkiye’s expansionist designs.”
It must be admitted that the Armenian Prime Minister has a better understanding of Armenian history than the propagandists in the Genocide industry.
Just after the Great War of August 1914 began in Europe a delegation of Young Turks attended the 8th Dashnak Congress held at Erzurum, in Ottoman eastern Anatolia. There they made an offer to the Armenians to secure their loyalty in the event of the War coming to the Ottoman territories – so as to preserve stability in the territories in which the Armenians lived.
That the Ottomans should have hosted the Dashnak Congress as the Great War was beginning reveals something about the good intentions of the Committee of Union and Progress (New/Young Turks). For most of the previous decade the Dashnaks had sat in the Ottoman parliament, Armenians had been Ottoman ministers and there had been genuine attempts at reform, which were to be supervised by International inspectors, in the eastern vilayets where the Armenians mostly lived.
At this Congress the Ottomans offered the Dashnaks the thing they had been struggling for over the previous 30 years – autonomy.
The Ottoman Government sent a delegation of 28 CUP members, representing all the ethnic groups of the Empire, including important individuals like Behaeddin Shakir and Naji Bey, to make an offer to the Armenians – who were observed to be moving toward supporting a Russian assault on the Empire.
There is a detailed account of the offer made to the Dashnaks at their Congress in Erzurum in a book written by Morgan Philips Price, a pro-Armenian British Liberal, who later became a Labour M.P. He acted for C.P. Scott as The Manchester Guardian’s Caucasus correspondent during the Great War:
“At the outbreak of the European war the Committee of Union and Progress became all-powerful, and all reform schemes and reconciliation plans fell to the ground. The Armenian party, “Dashnaktsution”, happened to be holding a conference at Erzerum when the war began. Turkey had not yet entered; but at the beginning of August Hilmi Bey, Behadin Shekir Bey, and Nedji Bey were delegated by the Committee to make certain proposals to the Armenians in the event of war with Russia. These delegates arrived at Erzerum at the end of the month, and their first proposal was that the Armenians should observe complete neutrality, the population of Armenia and the Trans-Caucasus doing its military duty, to whatever Empire it owed allegiance.
This the Armenians accepted, and all seemed to point to an agreement. But a few days later the Turks suddenly made another proposal. Turkey, they said, could never be secure until there was a chain of buffer States between her and her arch-enemy, Russia, and they claimed that, if war broke out, the Armenians should assist them in carrying out their plan. They then produced a map of the Middle East in which the following political divisions were made. Russia was to be pushed back to the Cossack steppes beyond the main range of the Caucasus. Tiflis and the Black Sea coast, with Batum and Kutais, were marked as belonging to an autonomous province of Georgia. The central part of the Trans-Caucasus, with Kars, Alexandropol and Erivan, were to be joined to the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, and East Erzerum, as an autonomous Armenia. Eastern Trans-Caucasia, including Baku, Elizabetopol and Dagestan were to become an autonomous province of Shiite Tartars. The Armenians, feeling the impossibility of the Ottoman Empire ever being able to realize such a grandiose scheme… refused to have anything to do with the proposal. So the Young Turk delegates, unable to make any impression in Erzerum, proceeded to Van, where they met with no greater success.
According to statements made to me during 1915 by prominent Van Armenians, it is clear that the action of the Tiflis Dashnakists, about which the Committee of Union and Progress had doubtless been informed by the end of August, was the principal cause of these Turkish demands. Early in August 1914 the Tiflis Armenians seem to have decided that a Russo-Turkish war was inevitable, and thereupon the Dashnakist leaders there at once offered 25,000 volunteers to assist the Russians in conquering the Armenian vilayets.
This offer was made before the outbreak of the war with Turkey, and in the interval the volunteers were busy training and forming at the various centres in the Caucasus. At the end of October, when Turkey came into the war, preparations had been so far advanced that Andranik, the famous revolutionary leader from Turkey, at the head of the first volunteer battalion, took part with the Russians in the advance through North-west Persia, capturing Serai early in November. Meanwhile five more battalions had been formed and were ready to leave for the front, as soon as they could get rifles and equipment. Fifty per cent, of these volunteers were Armenians who had left Turkey, Bulgaria and Roumania since the outbreak of the European war, and had come to the Caucasus to offer their services.
There can be little doubt that this volunteer movement, started under the auspices of the Caucasus Armenians, was the cause of the Young Turk demands on the Armenians of Erzerum, Van and Bitlis for a similar volunteer movement against Russia, and of the subsequent persecution when this demand was refused. Prominent Armenians, whom I met in Van, told me how the attitude of Djevdet Pasha towards them and their people became much more unfriendly as soon as the news arrived that Armenian volunteers were on the front fighting against the Turks. He at once demanded the return of a number of Armenian deserters, whose absence had hitherto been winked at. He accused them of going over to the volunteers with the Russians, and commenced the policy of forcing the Armenians into special labour battalions, where they had very hard work and bad food. Thus the Van Armenians were at the mercy of the Turks, who avenged on them all the rash acts of their kinsmen in the Caucasus.
That their conduct was keenly resented by the Turkish Armenian refugees in the Caucasus, was made clear by some articles in the Van Tosp, the organ of the Van Armenians in Tin as early in 1916. In its issue for January 9th, 1916, Professor Minassian took the Dashnaktsution party to task for having entered into negotiations with the Russian authorities without consulting its kindred societies in Turkish Armenia. It had spread, he said, baseless rumours of a Russian promise of autonomy for Armenia, and then had proceeded to organize volunteer battalions, regardless of the effect that this would have on their kinsmen in Turkey, whose position under the nose of the Turks was very precarious and required tactful handling. He denied that there was any serious negotiation with the Russian Government about Armenian autonomy, and said that the Dashnaktsution leaders of the Caucasus were pretending to represent responsible opinion, whereas they really only represented a group. The Orizon, the organ of the Dashnaktsution in Tiflis, defended itself by saying that the massacre would have happened in any case, and that Prince Vorontsoff Dashkoff had not only verbally promised Armenian autonomy in return for the service of the volunteers, but had actually signed a document to this effect. Whether this document ever existed is however exceedingly doubtful.” (War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia, pp.243-6)
The Armenians turned the Ottoman offer down and instead joined the Tsarist invasion and mounted an insurrection against the Ottoman state. That proved to be a fateful effor with the most tragic of results.
The CUP mission offered the Armenians autonomy in 2 and a half vilayets of East Erzurum, Van and Bitlis plus “Russian Armenia” in return for service in the Ottoman army in the event of war and support from their brethren in Russian territory, who would then, in the event of victory, be part of the larger autonomous region. The offer would be guaranteed by the German Government. The CUP delegation proposed that the Dashnaks aid the Ottoman State by mounting attacks on any Russian invasion behind the lines in Transcaucasia, where an autonomous Armenian state could be founded.
In the 2 and a half vilayets of Turkish Armenia this would have placed around 1 million Muslims under the authority of an autonomous Armenia containing only around 400,000 Armenians. So it was undoubtedly a generous concession on the Ottoman side (see Justin McCarthy, Turks and Armenians: Nationalism and Conflict in the Ottoman Empire, p.10) According to the 1897 Tsarist figures the Armenian population of the autonomous area would have been increased by another 1 million from the Kars, Erivan and Alexandropol Russian guberniyas (although this area would have also contained a sizeable amount of Muslims. By 1917 the Russians counted 1.4 million Christians in Russian Armenia and 670,000 Moslems).
So, an Armenian autonomous region, with “Russian Armenia” included, under Ottoman sovereignty would have perhaps been made viable by a small majority of Armenians – something that all the Armenian territorial claims were incapable of delivering without the extensive ethnic cleansing of Muslims.
This was the concrete realisation, to all intents and purposes, of the deal the Dashnaks had concluded with the Young Turks in 1907. It was more realistic and realisable than the choice the Dashnaks subsequently took in throwing in their lot with Russian expansionism and British Imperialism.
It could be said that the Dashnaks backed the wrong horse, believing it to be the more powerful one, more likely to win. They were taken in by the promises and propaganda of the Triple Entente – Britain, France and Russia – and paid an awful price for it.
Prime Minister Pashinyan, therefore, has a point. Armenians should grasp this historic opportunity to forget altogether about the myths around “Greater Armenia” and instead concentrate all efforts in improving the lives of Armenians living in the actual Armenia. The ideology of “Greater Armenia” and the “Armenian Genocide” combined, at the collapse of the USSR, to impel Armenia to seize a large portion of Azerbaijan where there was a sizeable Armenian population and which Armenian history had taught was a part of “historic Armenia”. In the course of this conquest there were fearsome massacres of Azerbaijani civilians and over 750,000 were driven from their homes to become internally displaced persons in other parts of Azerbaijan. And the US diaspora volunteeers, led by Monte Melkonian, conducted the notorious Khojaly massacre.
The seizure of Karabakh and the surrounding regions and ethnic cleansing of its population was justified not only on irredentist grounds but with reference to the events of 1915. Azerbaijani Turks could not be allowed to live in Karabakh because these “Turks” were, after all the same Turks as 1915!
The “Armenian Genocide” narrative also chained Armenia to its Russian “protector” after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Armenia was in need of a “protector” after what it did in Karabakh in the early 1990s and Moscow was indeed happy to oblige. This had a consequent retarding effect on Armenia’s post-Soviet national independence and development when the route to the West went through Turkiye. Pashinyan is very aware of this.
One of the first acts of the current US President upon coming to power was to recognise the “Armenian Genocide.” And now that same “caller out” of genocides is the essential facilitator of the clearest case of attempted genocide seen in modern times.
Perhaps that is concentrating the mind of the Armenian Prime Minister and making him into something of a statesman.
In a lengthy article published in the Irpmedia.irpi.eu in Italian on March 27, 2024, titled, “How Vatican helped legitimize the Aliyev autocracy in Azerbaijan,” Simone Zoppellaro exposes Vatican’s pro-Azerbaijan tilt due to financial donations, despite Armenia being a Christian nation, while Azerbaijan is Islamic.
On Feb. 22, 2020, the autocratic leader of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, and his wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, the country’s Vice President, paid a state visit to the Vatican. They were received officially by Pope Francis, Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin, and Secretary for Relations with States Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher. Mrs. Aliyeva was at the Vatican to receive the highest honor awarded to a lay person by the Holy See: “The Grand Cross.” The award is proposed by the Diocesan Bishops “as a sign of appreciation and gratitude for services to the Church or to society reserved for Heads of State, ministers, ambassadors, and royalty.” However, the driving force behind Vatican’s interest in Azerbaijan is the financial support provided by the Heydar Aliyev Foundation.
Ironically, despite Azerbaijan’s intolerance of minorities, dissidents and other religions, the Holy See expressed its appreciation to “Azerbaijan’s openness and peaceful attitude towards different faiths.”
Fearing the loss of Azerbaijan’s donations, the Vatican has been reluctant to allow any criticism of Baku, particularly by its own clergy. “Father Georges-Henri Russyen was expelled from the Pontifical Oriental Institute because he was critical of those who did not want to use the formula ‘Armenian genocide.’”
Given the expectations of benefiting from Azerbaijan’s “Caviar Diplomacy,” the Vatican has not been willing to say anything more substantial than emphasizing “the importance of intercultural and inter-religious dialog in favor of peaceful coexistence among different religious and ethnic groups,” meaning Armenians and Azeris. The Pope prayed for the inhabitants of Karabakh, hoping “that the talks between the parties, with the support of the international community, will foster a lasting agreement that will end the humanitarian crisis,” Even during the 2020 War, “the Church was unable of going beyond generic appeals for moderation ‘to all the parties involved and to the international community’ to ‘lay down their weapons.’”
On October 24, 2023, Prime Minister Nikol Pahinyan received from the Apostolic Nuncio José Avelino Bettencourt the same award given three years earlier to Aliyeva, Azerbaijan’s Vice President. However, there was a major difference. While Aliyeva received her award directly from the Pope, Pashinyan was honored by an Apostolic Nuncio. There were also other differences which “helped consolidate the power of the Aliyev family, despite human rights violations in Artsakh.”
“Cardinal Gianfranco Ravasi, honorary president emeritus of the Pontifical Council for Culture and chairman of the Pontifical Commission for Sacred Archaeology, is the highest Vatican official who has made the most efforts to open a dialog with Azerbaijan.” He was awarded the Order of Friendship in 2013 by the Azerbaijani authorities — a high honor offered for a “special contribution to the development of friendly, economic and cultural relations between Azerbaijan and a foreign state.”
Cardinal Claudio Gugerotti is considered “the protagonist of the privileged channel” established between the Vatican and Baku. “Highly educated and polyglot, ambitious and lover of power, Cardinal Gugerotti has known the Aliyev family since 2002, when Pres. Heydar Aliyev, in power since 1969, was still alive.”
“In the early 2000s, Gugerotti met with the Azerbaijani authorities as Nuncio for the Southern Caucasus, a position he assumed in 2001. Before then this nunciature for the Holy See included only Georgia and Armenia. Those were the years in which Russia guaranteed a ceasefire in the region, after Armenia had defeated Azerbaijan in the first conflict. The ethnic hatred that is still fuel for the conflict was beginning to settle, but Nuncio Gugerotti called Azerbaijan a ‘country [that] is a symbol of peaceful coexistence between people of different religions.’”
“Ten years after he began his mission as Apostolic Nuncio in 2011, Gugerotti signed the historic agreement which, for the first time, regulated relations between Baku and the Catholic Church. At the time of ratification, recalls a 2019 book produced by the Foundation for the Promotion of Moral Values from Baku entitled ‘Christianity in Azerbaijan,’ Gugerotti expressed gratitude to the (Azeri) government for creating the conditions that made possible [the agreement], emphasizing that our country always remained committed to the principles of tolerance, and noting that the agreement was the first document of its kind, because the Vatican had never signed such an agreement with any state before.”
According to Gugerotti, “Azerbaijan has once again demonstrated its tolerance. Now the whole world is witnessing it. I am sure that this document will receive a positive response in the international world and will be remembered as a great historical event. The reaction of the press from day one proves us right. On behalf of the Holy Throne and the Crown, I extend my deep thanks for all this to President Ilham Aliyev and the Government of Azerbaijan.”
Since 2009, the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, headed by Mehriban Aliyeva, has funded various activities in the Vatican: restoration projects, exhibitions and concerts. Other projects funded by Azerbaijan included: the Roman catacombs, the Vatican Museums, the Vatican Apostolic Library, and Catholic churches in France and Azerbaijan. These donations amount to one million euros.
In 2013, Gugerotti received the Movses Khorenatsi Medal — the highest Armenian honor — from the then president Serzh Sargsyan for his important contribution to Armenian studies, but also the effort aimed at strengthening relations between Yerevan and the Holy See.
The author of the article concluded that the close relationship between the Vatican and Azerbaijan has had the effect, perhaps unintended, of strengthening the hegemonic role of the Azeri autocracy… which may contribute to a diplomatic normalization that would put in the background, or erase, crimes and aggressions committed by the Azeri autocracy.
Recently, a number of official sources have published the information confirming that the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan has purchased a multi-channel VARAN complex from Seven Hills LLP. The VARAN system is mainly known for wiretapping phones, intercepting and jamming any radio signals. Nothing could seem extraordinary at first glance, given the deal value at modest 340K tenge (800 USD).
However, regardless the most possible scenario that the supply is going to be on a regular basis, it is not the prices that draws attention to the deal, but the sides involved in it. The manufacturer and chief executor of the contract is the Ukrainian company Ualeks (www.ualeks.com) that produces similar equipment for the Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
One may wonder why such important and needed equipment in the war-torn country is being sold abroad, and why do the Ukrainian authorities allow it? Needless to say, that Ukraine has been fighting desperately with almost no resources of its own. The aid from the Western countries that was generous at first months of the special military operation is now very limited, as the United States may no longer support Kyiv due to many other strategic operations it is pursuing in the Middle East.
Ukraine is better to tight up the belts and concentrate on its national tasks rather than search for blur profit and support by former CIS countries in return of technologies. At the moment, Ukraine needs them more. Unless the country’s government is only interested in getting quick money and short-term profit.
I believe that this information will be of interest to our esteemed readers. That’s why I’m reprinting it. The information below is not my investigation. It was published by one of the X users and as I see seems very trustworthy. I do deal with the issues in our region, especially with the problem of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I know quite well the roots of the Karabakh conflict as well. And I’m aware of Ruben Vardanyan’s illegal activities in the territory of Azerbaijan.
For those who need a bit more information, Ruben Vardanyan alongside other criminal separatist elements of Karabakh was stopped and brought to Baku to be investigated. He is among those who fueled ethnic hatred between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. He was arrested after a 1-day local anti-terror operation led by the Azerbaijani military on September 19-20, 2023. Before that, he and others were called to lay down arms and cease. But they continuously ignored peaceful calls. Then Azerbaijan had to launch an anti-terror operation, which resulted in success.
Now let’s see who this friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin and a perpetrator of crimes even in Ukraine Ruben Vardanyan is.
Backed by Kremlin Ruben Vardanyan was very sure that he will not be punished…
GENERAL INFORMATION
Ruben Vardanyan, born in Yerevan on 25 May 1968, is a Russian oligarch of Armenian descent, a billionaire, and former minister of the state of the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”, an entity not recognized anywhere in the world.
Vardanyan was the initiator, one of the founders, and the first president of the Moscow School of Management in Skolkovo. President Vladimir Putin attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the campus in 2006.
According to the Washington Times, Vardanyan is a friend of Vladimir Putin.
Ruben Vardanyan with the Russian President Vladimir Putin
Vardanyan was once the head and main partner of Troika Dialog, an investment company that created an extensive network of offshore companies involved in money laundering from Russia. Since 2011, Forbes has included him in its ranking of Russia’s richest people.
In September 2021, Ruben Vardanyan renounced his Russian citizenship but continued to actively participate in Russian business, where his partner is the head of ROSTEC, Sergei Chemezov. Together they hold positions on the Board of Directors of KAMAZ OJSC and receive significant payments for their work. In addition, Vardanyan owns a stake in the car manufacturer KAMAZ through a consortium of investors in which ROSTEC also participates.
In 2018, Vardanyan’s foundation and a subsidiary of ROSTEC invested in facial recognition technology by buying shares in the company. In addition, Vardanyan was a former co-owner of Avtovaz, but sold his stake for $180 million in 2013, remaining in partnership with ROSTEC.
SKOLKOVO PROJECT
Back in 2009, well-known Russian opposition actor Alexei Navalny (now dead) investigated Skolkovo’s financing scheme and noted in his blog that, despite Vardanyan’s statement about the charitable nature of Skolkovo, the school’s project was estimated at $500 million, with half of that amount coming from the founders’ donations and the remaining $250 million coming as a loan from Sberbank.
“The loan was granted under unclear conditions and with unclear guarantees. Both the Skolkovo school and Sberbank categorically refuse to disclose the terms of the loan,” Navalny said.
“The construction of the Skolkovo school was financed from the funds of the state-owned Sberbank, and no one was going to pay back the money, but Vardanyan and the rest of the gang of tycoons told the naive public and journalists that this was a very “cute” commercial project”, Navalny added.
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT (OCCRP) ABOUT TROIKA DIALOG
For more than two decades, Ruben Vardanyan was the face of Western-style investment banking as the founder of Troika Dialog during the birth of Russian capitalism, with successes that earned him billionaire status and ties to the Kremlin.
The system dubbed the Troika Laundromat by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, involved at least 75 offshore companies and exported about $4.8 billion between 2006 and 2013, often through fictional deals, with the help of a now-defunct Lithuanian bank, according to the OCCRP’s investigative journalists.
Sergey Roldugin, a cellist and friend of Vladimir Putin, was among the ultimate recipients of the funds.
While Vardanyan wasn’t personally accused of wrongdoing, he was president, chief executive officer, and chairman of Troika during this period, as well as its main partner. According to the OCCRP, he used the bank to pay millions of dollars in personal expenses.
In March of 2019, the European Parliament members wrote a letter to the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, in which they stated the need to introduce sanctions against the ex-owner of Troika Dialog Ruben Vardanyan and others linked to Troika Dialog’s “offshore eco-system”. The letter was signed by 22 MEPs representing Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, Germany, Great Britain, and other countries.
VARDANYAN’S INVOLVEMENT IN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE
Known for his active pro-Russian stance, Ruben Vardanyan was included in the Ukrainian “Peacekeeper” sanctions database for his assistance to the Russian invaders and his involvement in crimes committed by the Russian authorities against Ukraine and its citizens. He is also accused of denying and publicly justifying Russian aggression and financing military actions in the post-Soviet space. The list designates him as a person subject to “immediate arrest and transfer to the law enforcement authorities of Ukraine and NATO countries”.
Bob Blackman, a Conservative member of the British parliament, said Vardanyan was an accomplice to aggression against Ukraine. “We have to understand that this is someone who has been sanctioned as part of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, and it is believed that Russia is trying to strengthen its capabilities in terms of its war effort. His companies have been well used and well involved in the whole process of expanding the military presence in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh”, the British MP said.
Vardanyan also has links with Tehran, which is helping Moscow in its regular attacks on Ukraine. His ties to Iran can be traced through Russia’s Gorchakov Foundation, which organizes events in various countries, including Armenia, with government-approved speakers from Tehran.
In September 2022, Vardanyan renounced his Russian citizenship to avoid Western sanctions, but Ukraine included him on its sanctions list for providing logistical support to the Russian occupation army.
IN THE TERRITORY OF AZERBAIJAN
After renouncing his Russian citizenship to avoid Western sanctions, Vardanyan came to “power” in Karabakh and illegally seized copper, molybdenum, and gold deposits in the region, which belongs to Azerbaijan. The resources, guarded by the Russian peacekeepers, were plundered in violation of environmental regulations. The Azerbaijani authorities demanded that experts be given access to the deposits, but this was repeatedly blocked.
According to Canada’s Geopolitical Monitor, the Kremlin appointed Vardanyan to the post of “Minister of State of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” in order to thwart the European Union’s potential success in reaching a peace agreement.
Bulgarian National Radio noted that Vardanyan was engaged in active propaganda that did not contribute to the resolution of the conflict between Baku and Yerevan.
There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Vardanyan has committed offenses under Articles 214-1 (Financing terrorism), 279.3 (Participation in the creation and activities of paramilitary groups or groups not provided for by law), and 318.1 (Illegal crossing of the state border of Azerbaijan) of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.
Over the recent years, Russian and international media have been actively writing about various contracts of Uzbekistan for the purchase of Russian military equipment, some of them are the most modern, and the other part are a legacy of the USSR. The numerous deals indicate Tashkent’s determination to take arms sales talks with Moscow to a higher level. In 2017, Uzbekistan committed to modernizing its armed forces as part of a five-year development strategy. Another factor that may have spurred Uzbekistan’s Defense Ministry recently was the intra-Afghan conference in Qatar, which resulted in the adoption of a nascent peace resolution. Tashkent has a lot at stake in this process, since any withdrawal of Western (particularly American) troops as a result of the resolution will have direct security consequences. Thus, Uzbekistan will take sole responsibility for protecting its border with Afghanistan.
In addition, in 2019, Uzbekistan purchased 12 Mi-35M military helicopters. These transport helicopters, which can also be used to attack ground targets, have been in production since the 2000s. Besides, Uzbekistan has ordered an unspecified number of BTR-82A armored personnel carriers (APCs), capable of carrying three crew members and seven soldiers. Previously, Tashkent also purchased “several dozen” special-purpose armored vehicles VPK-233136 “Tiger”, capable of transporting up to seven military personnel (according to TASS).
In addition to modernizing equipment for its ground forces, Uzbekistan plans to enter into contracts for the Air Force and order new fighter jets and a radar system. In particular, Tashkent is negotiating the purchase of Su-30SM multirole fighters, which Russia has deployed in Syria. Uzbekistan has also expressed interest in acquiring Sopka-2 radar systems, which monitor airspace, as well as upgrading the country’s existing military radars to Sopka-2 levels.
Closer-than-usual military cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan began with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s first trip to Moscow in April 2017 and President Vladimir Putin’s return visit to Tashkent in October 2018. During these meetings, the parties discussed issues of military cooperation and modernization of Uzbekistan’s military equipment using Russian assets; the real details of these conversations are only surfacing now. And, no doubts, Uzbekistan’s recent purchases of Russian weapons, along with ongoing negotiations between the two sides, are directly related to these aforementioned summits.
A number of factors indicate that Uzbekistan’s efforts to update its military arsenal are related to the dynamically developing situation in Afghanistan. Earlier this year, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan, Major General Pavel Ergashev, spoke about the movement of “centres of instability” in northern Afghanistan (i.e. areas close to or bordering Uzbekistan), which, in his opinion, threatens stability in Central Asia. The fact that these purchases came after intense peace negotiations in Afghanistan, which were supported by Uzbekistan, is not a mere coincidence. Assuming a subsequent withdrawal of US troops from the theater of operations in the short to medium term, the burden of defending the Afghan-Uzbek border will now fall solely on Tashkent.
Despite the fact the Turkish drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 have become extremely popular due to their successful deployment in multiple conflicts around the globe and have also popped up in Central Asia, Uzbekistan seems to rely more on the Russian drone system. In August 2021, Uzbek armed forces performed a readiness drill with Russian-made drones in an area near the country’s southern border. The Yug-2021 exercise was held jointly with the Russian army against the backdrop of worsening stability in neighboring Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan has tried to develop domestic defense capabilities elsewhere too. In October 2021, the State Defense Industry Committee announced it had developed its own remote-controlled heavy machine gun. A month later, the same body said it had begun production of a domestically designed light-armored vehicle called Qalqon (Shield).
It is much more profitable for Uzbekistan to purchase military equipment from Moscow rather than from NATO for a number of reasons. Firstly, in the current conditions of logistical difficulties, the delivery of military equipment from Russia is much safer and cheaper than from NATO countries. Secondly, given Uzbekistan’s Soviet past, many standards and the language of instructions for Russian equipment are clearer than Western ones. Thirdly, the United States is gradually curtailing its geographic scope of military operations, since it cannot support them financially, and accordingly, supplies of depleted equipment to Uzbekistan will cost more, and their effectiveness is quite low. Finally, Uzbekistan is also aware of the strategic risks of purchasing military equipment from NATO – ultimately this will lead to the deployment of NATO military bases on the country’s territory under the pretext of “maintaining and monitoring” equipment in proper condition, joint exercises, etc.
Thus, these factors and global changes are motivating Uzbekistan to quickly acquire military equipment from the country where most of its obsolete military equipment originally came from.
