Category: Asia and Pacific

  • The Turkish-Armenian Thaw and Azerbaijan

    The Turkish-Armenian Thaw and Azerbaijan

    A7752D8A 116D 44CA BDD8 09AA923EB05D w393 s

    Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has criticized the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement

    April 14, 2009
    By Abbas Djavadi

    U.S. President Barack Obama’s recent visit was a big boost for Turkey. But a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was in the works even before Obama was elected president.

    Now Baku is upset that Ankara and Yerevan are about to formalize a deal sidelining Azerbaijanis’ main concern: restoring sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions of Azerbaijan that have been occupied by Armenian forces since early the 1990s. Are the days when both Turks and Azeris used to say they were “one nation with two state” gone for ever?

    Ankara and Yerevan intensified their negotiations in August 2007 when their diplomats started to regularly meet in Geneva to discuss the details of establishing “good-neighborly” relations. Once the “technical preparation” was almost complete, President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Yerevan in September last year to attend a Turkish-Armenian soccer match, and the meeting between Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in January 2009 on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos signaled the political will of both sides to proceed.

    Diplomats have confirmed to the Turkish media that Baku was not only fully informed about the progress and details of those talks, but even “in agreement” with the way Ankara has been approaching the rapprochement issue.

    Dozens of rounds of talks between the Turkish and Azerbaijani presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers preceded this climax in the Turkish-Armenian thaw. Cengiz Candar, a Turkish journalist who accompanied President Gul to Tehran on March 11, reports that Gul and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, met in the Iranian capital specifically to discuss the issue.

    What an irony of history that now a Turkish government with an Islamic background and an Armenian government led by a former nationalist fighter from Nagorno-Karabakh are close to a breakthrough

    Turkish leaders seem to be surprised by the outrage with which President Aliyev, other Azerbaijani officials, and the Azerbaijani media have responded to the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Some Turkish analysts maintain that Baku’s “demonstrative dismay” is meant primarily for internal consumption, while others speculate that the intention is to make clear to Moscow, Yerevan’s main supporter, Baku’s readiness to include it in all political processes in the southern Caucasus.

    Whatever the reason for Baku’s anger, the Turkish leadership seems to have concluded that having no diplomatic relations with one of its neighbors and keeping its border closed have not produced, and will not produce, any positive movement on three key issues that have frozen the status quo for nearly 17 years.

    The first of those is Yerevan’s insistence that the mass killings of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 should be recognized as “genocide.”

    The second is Ankara’s demand that Yerevan clearly recognize the current Turkish-Armenian border, and refrain in future from referring to eastern Turkey as “western Armenia.”

    And the third is concluding an agreement between Baku and Yerevan on Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azerbaijani  territories occupied by Armenian forces.

    Referring to serious disputes on all these three points, Turkey “acknowledged” Armenia’s independence in 1991 but declined to extend formal diplomatic recognition. And following the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces, Ankara closed its borders with Armenia in 1993.

    For the past 15 or more years, Yerevan has been demanding the opening of the border and the establishment of diplomatic relations “without any precondition.” Ankara, on the other hand, has made both those demands contingent on the resolution of the three main disputed issues. Endless and exhausting talks have been held between all parties involved: Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the “Minsk Group,” consisting of Russia, the United States, and France, to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    But those talks yielded no concrete results. What an irony of history that now a Turkish government with an Islamic background and an Armenian government led by a former nationalist fighter from Nagorno-Karabakh are close to a breakthrough in what was long enough considered a “frozen conflict.”

    With technical details reportedly worked out and political will evident in both Ankara and Yerevan, the next few weeks may bring breaking news about the beginning of a historical rapprochement between Turks and Armenians. There are also reports that the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict may be “very close to a settlement,” although the players in each of these two distinct but intertwined dramas apparently don’t want to wait for the other game to be played out first.

    The public, however, still doesn’t know much about what the agreements would produce, either with regard to the “genocide,” or the recognition of the Turkish-Armenian border, or how the Armenian-Azerbaijani territorial dispute will be resolved. “Having good relations with Armenia is very good,” said Tulin Kanik, a student of political sciences from Ankara. “But what will happen with their claims on eastern Turkey or with the districts of Azerbaijan still occupied by Armenian forces?”

    That both Ankara and Yerevan look confident indicates that people on both sides of Mount Ararat will probably soon hear something they can not only live, but also be happy with. Both Erdogan and Sarkisian know that they have to present their respective populations with a win-win deal. And they also know that, however enthusiastic and supportive the West may be or Russia may become, their own constituencies must accept that deal if they want to survive as national leaders.

    Abbas Djavadi is associate director of broadcasting with RFE/RL. The views expressed in this commentary are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

    http://www.rferl.org/content/The_TurkishArmenian_Thaw_and_Azerbaijan/1608216.html 
  • Turkish-Armenian Dialogue on the Verge of Collapse

    Turkish-Armenian Dialogue on the Verge of Collapse

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 71
    April 14, 2009 12:55 PM Age: 38 min
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Turkey, Armenia, Home Page, Foreign Policy
    By: Emil Danielyan

    Abdullah Gul (left) and Serzh Sarkisian

    The nearly year-long negotiations between Armenia and Turkey look set to prove fruitless after Ankara has revived its long-standing linkage between the normalization of bilateral ties and a resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly made clear this month that his government will not establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan and re-open the Turkish-Armenian border without Azerbaijan’s consent. In Armenia and especially amongst its worldwide diaspora, meanwhile, there are growing calls for President Serzh Sarkisian to abandon the Western-backed talks.

    The success of those talks seemed a foregone conclusion in the weeks leading up to President Barack Obama’s visit on April 6-7. According to reports in both the Turkish and Western media, Armenia and Turkey have finalized an agreement on gradually normalizing their strained relations and setting up inter-governmental commissions dealing with various issues of mutual interest. Some of those reports quoted unnamed Turkish officials as saying that the agreement could be signed during or shortly after Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian’s trip to Istanbul on April 6. The resulting outcry in Azerbaijan (EDM, April 10) suggested that Ankara and Yerevan were indeed very close to cutting a far-reaching deal. 

    Erdogan called into question the possibility of such a deal when he told a news conference in London on April 3 that Turkey cannot reach a “healthy solution concerning Armenia” as long as the Karabakh dispute remains unresolved (Today’s Zaman, April 4). He reaffirmed the linkage on April 8, two days after Obama stated in Ankara that the Turkish-Armenian negotiations were “moving forward and could bear fruit very quickly, very soon.” The Turkish premier went as far as demanding that the U.N. Security Council denounce Armenia as an “occupier” and called for Karabakh’s return under Azeri rule (Hurriyet Daily News, April 9).

    Any doubts about the practical implications of these statements were dispelled by Erdogan during his holiday in southern Turkey on April 10: “We will not sign a final deal with Armenia unless there is agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Karabakh,” he told journalists (Anatolia news agency, April 10). In an interview with the Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo published the following day, the deputy chairman of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, Haluk Ipek, said the Turkish-Armenian border will remain closed for at least ten more years. Ipek dismissed speculation over its impending re-opening as “dishonest” Armenian propaganda aimed at driving a wedge between the two Turkic nations. Turkey’s more dovish President Abdullah Gul likewise underscored the importance of Karabakh’s peace when he commented on Turkish-Armenian reconciliation in an interview with The Financial Times on April 8.

    That the Turkish-Armenian dialogue is reaching an impasse was effectively acknowledged by Sarkisian at an April 10 news conference: “Is it possible that we were mistaken in our calculations and that the Turks will now adopt a different position and try to set preconditions? Of course it is possible,” he said (Armenian Public Television, April 10). The Armenian leader insisted that Karabakh has not been on the agenda of that dialogue. Indeed, Ankara was clearly ready to stop linking Turkish-Armenian relations with a Karabakh settlement acceptable to Baku when it embarked on a dramatic rapprochement with Yerevan last summer. The two countries’ foreign ministers would have hardly held numerous face-to-face meetings since if it was not.

    For his part, Sarkisian signaled his acceptance, in principle, of a Turkish proposal to form a joint commission of historians tasked with examining the 1915-1918 mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. One of the Turkish-Armenian commissions which the governments reportedly agreed to form would conduct such a study. The idea was floated by Erdogan in 2005 and rejected by then Armenian President Robert Kocharian as a Turkish ploy designed to scuttle greater international recognition of what many historians consider the first genocide of the twentieth century. Turkish leaders have made no secret of using the fence-mending negotiations with the Sarkisian administration to discourage Obama from making good on his election campaign promise to describe the slaughter of more than one million Ottoman Armenians as genocide.

    The almost certain collapse of the talks has left Armenian politicians and pundits questioning the wisdom of further Armenian overtures to the Turks. “If Turkey suddenly succumbs to Azerbaijan’s threats and these negotiations yield no results soon, then I think the Armenian side will not carry on with them,” said Giro Manoyan, a senior member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, a nationalist party represented in Sarkisian’s coalition government (Hayots Ashkhar, April 10). Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian likewise advocated, in an April 7 interview with RFE/RL, Yerevan’s pullout from the reconciliation process if the sixteen year Turkish blockade of Armenia is not lifted.

    Such views are indicative of the dominant mood in the Armenian diaspora and, in particular, the influential Armenian community within the United States. Harut Sassounian, a prominent community activist and commentator, criticized Armenia’s policy on Turkey, effectively blaming it for Obama’s failure to publicly use the word “genocide” during his visit to Turkey. “In view of these developments, it is imperative that the Armenian government terminates at once all negotiations with the Turkish leaders in order to limit the damage caused by the continued exploitation of the illusion of productive negotiations,” Sassounian wrote in an April 9 editorial by his Los Angeles-based newspaper California Courier.

    Sarkisian insisted on April 10 that the dialogue with Turkey can be deemed beneficial for the Armenian side even if it produces no tangible results. He said Armenia will “emerge from this process stronger” in any case because the international community will have no doubts that “we are really ready to establish relations [with Turkey] without preconditions.”

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-armenian-dialogue-on-the-verge-of-collapse/

  • Nabucco Hucksterism, Iran Pollyanishness, and a $5 Billion Bribe. The Oil and Glory Interview: Steven Mann

    Nabucco Hucksterism, Iran Pollyanishness, and a $5 Billion Bribe. The Oil and Glory Interview: Steven Mann

    A Blog on Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus

    Saturday, April 11, 2009

    On Thursday, a ceremony in the State Department will mark the retirement of Steven Mann, Coordinator for Eurasian Energy Diplomacy, after 32 years with the U.S. diplomatic service. The 58-year-old Mann served most of the last 17 years in senior positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia: He opened the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan in 1992, was ambassador to Turkmenistan, and tried to negotiate a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh. For the last several years, Mann was America’s man on the spot in the New Great Game on the Caspian Sea.

    I visited Mann at his Chevy Chase home. Amid stacked up magazines and books, Mann told me that Europe’s “energy security” is not necessarily at peril. And, for O&G readers, he broke one bit of historical news: Remember the demise of the trans-Caspian pipeline in the chapter An Army for Oil? The one in which then-Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov persisted in demanding a $500 million bribe of the Bechtel-General Electric consortium? It turns out that Niyazov originally requested $5 billion. The edited interview:

    Q – Does the U.S. need a high-level ambassador on Eurasian energy? And what is your advice going forward?

    A – Yes it is helpful. But we also have to get away from Nabucco hucksterism.

    Q – What is that?

    A – In terms of the wrong lessons learned from [the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline], the wrong lesson learned is to adopt a project and attempt to bring it about through political will. I think so much of the governmental activism on both sides of the Atlantic the last few years has been devoid of a commercial context. There have been quite a number of officials who know very little about energy who have been charging into the pipeline debate. Nabucco is a highly desirable project, don’t get me wrong. But there are other highly desirable projects besides Nabucco. And the overriding question for all these projects is, Where’s the gas?

    Q – South Stream was Putin’s response to Nabucco. Did the U.S. blunder by promoting Nabucco before having the commercial context?

    A – In terms of whether we are talking EU or US diplomacy, I think you have to be credible. All too often we’ve gotten out ahead of the commercial realities of Nabucco. You have to be able to point to an upstream supply. You have to have a commercial champion. And governments don’t build successful pipelines. Consortia do. The object of any envoy should be to get all those stars aligned before you give the full embrace to any project.

    I think Secretary Clinton will bring a more unified focus to the U.S. effort. In the previous administration, we had six special envoys on energy in the State Department, and three deputy national security advisers on the [National Security Council] staff.

    Q – Is that too many?

    A – It’s four too many in State. And three too many at NSC.

    Q – The stated reason for Nabucco is to diversify Europe’s energy supply. Is that a valid enough reason for U.S. involvement? And is European energy security a genuine issue?

    A – Anyone who makes that argument knows very little about energy. And I often heard those arguments in the White House Situation Room. Diversification is an objective good. But it can be achieved in ways other than pipelines. The best thing Europe could do for its security is to link its energy grid, which it’s already doing.

    Q – Is there alarmism on the subject?

    A – The January cutoff of gas through Ukraine only affected 2-3% of European consumers.

    Q – So it is overplayed.

    A – Yea, I think it was overplayed. What also was underplayed was how successful the Europeans were in shifting gas, linking grids. That’s the untold story of [the January cutoff].

    Q – The corollary – that Russian domination of supply equals a political threat in Europe – is that also alarmist?

    A – With the EU, I think it’s hard to make that case. That’s the kind of argument that has to be dissected on a country-by-country basis. But Gazprom has been an extremely reliable supplier for 25 years. And I think Gazprom will continue to be an extremely reliable supplier to Europe.

    Q – So really one should not be vexed if and when Nord Stream and South Stream are built? And if it takes some time for the ducks to be lined in a row for Nabucco, so be it?

    A – Basically, yes. I think Nabucco is far more important to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan than it is to the EU.

    Q – In the late 1990s, there was the initial effort by Bechtel and GE Capital to build a trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to Baku.

    A – What happened was that Niyazov, with his Soviet mentality, demanded so-called preliminary financing. That is, an upfront payment to do the project. [The consortium] already paid a signing bonus of $10 million. But then Niyazov demanded in the range of $5 billion. Then it came down to $3 billion. And the consortium said, ‘This is utterly unrealistic.’ Niyazov thought they were bargaining. So he dropped the demand to $1 billion; then it came down to $500 million. The consortium said, You have until March 2000 or we walk. And at that time, they walked.

    The fundamental problem, and it’s relevant today, is that a foreign investor cannot rely on a governmental entity [in Turkmenistan] to supply the upstream, to supply the product.

    Q – Was it ever realistic that Niyazov was going to hook up with the East-West Corridor?

    A – It was and it is realistic. Without alternatives to the Gazprom monopoly, Turkmenistan has to accept the price that Gazprom is willing to pay. There is a powerful commercial logic to a trans-Caspian pipeline.

    Q – What is the best way today for a Caspian republic to get along in the region?

    A – Kazakhstan is a good model of how to develop a Eurasian energy sector. You’re good partners with Russia, but you take advantage of foreign technology and capital.

    Q – Does Russia have a role in helping to create a thaw between the U.S. and Iran?

    A – Every time there is a substantial political change in the U.S., the oil and gas industry gets up on its tip-toes and says, ‘Aren’t we about to have a change in policy?’ You saw this with the Bush-Cheney election in 2000; the industry thought now was the time it would happen. You saw it after the [2001] invasion of Afghanistan, with certain cooperation and contact between the U.S. and Iran. You’re seeing it now with the advent of the Obama administration. So this is something that the oil and gas industry is always waiting for – that change.

    Q – You are saying that this is nothing new.

    A – It is nothing new.

    Labels: Azerbaijan, Caspian, Kazakhstan, Nabucco, nord stream, oil, south stream

    http://oilandglory.com/

  • Iran offers Armenia energy line of credit

    Iran offers Armenia energy line of credit

    TEHRAN, April 14 (UPI) — Meeting with the visiting Armenian energy minister Tuesday, Iranian finance officials pledged to support the energy sector in Armenia with a line of credit.

    Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsisyan met with Iranian Finance Minister Shamseddin Hosseini to discuss trade issues and Iran’s offer of economic assistance, Iran’s official Islamic Republic News Agency reports.

    Movsisyan expressed his gratification for a line of credit offered through the Export Development Bank of Iran, saying the move was part of an expanding trade relationship between both countries.

    Armenia in March announced it had begun construction on a 186-mile pipeline to bring oil products from the Tabriz refinery in northern Iran in exchange for electricity.

    The project would bring 81 billion cubic feet of natural gas from refineries in Tabriz each year, which is about the same amount Armenia imports from Russia currently through Georgia.

    Movsisyan was part of a high-level delegation from Armenia that arrived in Tehran on Monday to discuss bilateral ties.

    https://www.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2009/04/14/Iran-offers-Armenia-energy-line-of-credit/UPI-27631239717538/

  • Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders

    Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders

    Europe Report N°199
    14 April 2009

    To access the media release of this report in Turkish, please click here.

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over Turkey’s European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half, relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about history at a critical and promising time.

    Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising, bipolar views of history are significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be healed. Most importantly, the advance in bilateral relations demonstrates that a desire for reconciliation can overcome old enmities and closed borders. Given the heritage and culture shared by Armenians and Turks, there is every reason to hope that normalisation of relations between the two countries can be achieved and sustained.

    Internal divisions persist on both sides. Armenia does not make normalisation conditional on Turkey’s formal recognition as genocide of the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. But it must take into account the views of Armenians scattered throughout the global diaspora, which is twice as large as the population of Armenia itself and has long had hardline representatives. New trends in that diaspora, however, have softened and to some degree removed demands that Turkey surrender territory in its north east, where Armenians were a substantial minority before 1915.

    Over the past decade, Turkey has moved far from its former blanket denial of any Ottoman wrongdoing. Important parts of the ruling AK Party, bureaucracy, business communities on the Armenian border and liberal elite in western cities support normalisation with Armenia and some expression of contritition. Traditional hardliners, including Turkic nationalists and part of the security services, oppose compromise, especially as international genocide recognition continues and in the absence of Armenian troop withdrawals from substantial areas they occupy of Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan. These divisions surfaced in events surrounding the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. That the new tendencies are gaining ground, however, was shown by the extraordinary outpouring of solidarity with Armenians during the Dink funeral in Istanbul and a campaign by Turkish intellectuals to apologise to Armenians for the “Great Catastrophe” of 1915.

    The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia on recognition, borders and establishment of bilateral commissions to deal with multiple issues, including the historical dimension of their relations. Azerbaijan has strong links to Turkey based on energy cooperation and the Turkic countries’ shared linguistic and cultural origins. Ethnic Armenian forces’ rapid advance into Azerbaijan in 1993 scuttled plans to open diplomatic ties and caused Turkey to close the railway line that was then the only transport link between the two countries. For years, Turkey conditioned any improvement in bilateral relations on Armenian troop withdrawals. Baku threatens that if this condition is lifted, it will restrict Turkey’s participation in the expansion of Azerbaijani energy exports. While Azerbaijani attitudes remain a constraint, significant elements in Turkey agree it is time for a new approach. Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate.

    Outside powers have important interests and roles. The U.S. has long fostered Armenia-Turkey reconciliation, seeking thereby to consolidate the independence of all three former Soviet republics in the south Caucasus and to support east-west transit corridors and energy pipelines from the Caspian Sea. Washington was notable in its backing of efforts that kick-started civil society dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. The Obama administration is working hard at repairing the damage done to U.S. relations with Turkey by the war in Iraq. Although Obama repeatedly promised on the campaign trail to formally recognise the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide, he should continue to steer the prudent middle course he has adopted as president. The U.S. Congress, which has a draft resolution before it, should do the same. At this sensitive moment of Turkish-Armenian convergence, statements that focus on the genocide term, either to deny or recognise it, would either enrage Armenians or unleash a nationalist Turkish reaction that would damage U.S.-Turkish ties and set back Turkey-Armenia reconciliation for years.

    U.S. support for Turkey-Armenia reconciliation appears to be mirrored in Moscow. Russian companies have acquired many of Armenia’s railways, pipelines and energy utilities and seek to develop them; Russian-Turkish relations are good; and Moscow is looking for ways to mitigate the regional strains produced by its war with Georgia in August 2008. If sustained, the coincidence of U.S.-Russian interests would offer a hopeful sign for greater security and prosperity in the South Caucasus after years of division and conflict. All sides – chiefly Armenia and Turkey but potentially Azerbaijan as well – will gain in economic strength and national security if borders are opened and trade normalised.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    To the Government of Turkey:

    1.  Agree, ratify and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; cultivate a pro-settlement constituency among Armenians; and avoid threatening or penalising Armenia for outside factors like resolutions or statements in third countries recognising a genocide.

    2.  Avoid sacrificing implementation of the normalisation package to demands for immediate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and seek opportunities to show Baku that by easing Yerevan’s fears of encirclement, normalised Turkey-Armenia relations may ultimately speed up such an Armenian withdrawal.

    3.  Make goodwill towards Armenia clear through gestures such as joint work on preserving the ancient ruins of Ani, stating explicitly that Turkey will recognise and protect Armenian historical and religious heritage throughout the country.

    4.  Encourage universities and institutes to pursue broader research on matters pertaining to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Armenian and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and increase funding for cataloguing and management of the Ottoman-era archives.

    To the Government of Armenia:

    5.  Agree, ratify, and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; and avoid statements or international actions relating to genocide recognition that could inflame Turkish public opinion against the current process.

    6.  Agree together with Azerbaijan to the OSCE Minsk Group basic principles on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement; then start withdrawals from Armenian-occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and pursue peace with Azerbaijan in full consciousness that only in this way can normalisation with Turkey be consolidated.

    7.  Make clear that Armenia has no territorial claim on Turkey by explicitly recognising its territorial integrity within the borders laid out in the 1921 Treaty of Kars.

    8.  Encourage universities and institutes to pursue more research on matters relating to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Turkish and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and organise the cataloguing of known Armenian archives pertaining to the events in and around 1915 wherever they may be located.

    To the United States, Russia and the European Union and its Member States:

    9.  Avoid legislation, statements and actions that might inflame public opinion on either side and so could upset the momentum towards Turkey-Armenia normalisation and reconciliation.

    10.  Raise the seniority and intensify the engagement of the U.S., Russian and French co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group until Armenia and Azerbaijan reach final agreement on Minsk Group basic principles for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    11.  Back up Turkey-Armenia reconciliation with projects to encourage region-wide interaction, heritage preservation and confidence building; and support as requested any new bilateral historical commission or sub-commission, development of archive management and independent Turkish- or Armenian-led scholarly endeavours to research into aspects of the 1915 events.

    Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, 14 April 2009

  • Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

    Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

    Deglobalizing U.S. military commitments will require the “civilianization” of defense policy.

    Judah Grunstein | Bio | 09 Apr 2009
    WPR Blog

    More smart stuff from Sam Roggeveen, who points out that alert is not the same thing as alarmed, but nevertheless admits to a case of nerves:

    The thing to remember is that China does not have to match the U.S. in global capability terms for U.S. allies in the Pacific to start getting nervous about the strategic balance. All China has to do is be a credible competitor in the region, and that is already the case.

    Roggeveen goes on to argue that “. . . we have already passed the point at which the U.S. could militarily intervene in a Taiwan conflict at acceptable risk,” and that the coming years/decades will witness an inexorable expansion of that perimeter.

    Click through to see what he’s got to say about whether the budget priorities as signaled by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, compared to the alternatives, are a good thing or not for Australia. You might be surprised.

    The broader point here is that while the “American unipolar moment” might be drawing to a close, we’re still the only country that is forced to calculate in terms of global, as opposed to regional, military capability. That reflects the magnitude of our power, influence and interests. But while an advantage in a scenario of geologic resource scarcity, it becomes potentially problematic in a scenario of political resource scarcity and a distinct disadvantage in times of financial resource scarcity.

    This reinforces the need for scaling down our commitments by involving regional powers more prominently in advancing our foreign policy objectives, what I call Middle Power Mojo™. France and Turkey were my illustrative examples before they both started acting out. But part of the initial concept was the idea of identifying regional players that have got their mojo working, so that’s inevitably going to evolve with time.

    Perhaps most significantly, this provides a political context for U.S. defense policy. The limitations of discussing the U.S. defense budget without the context of a strategic vision have been pointed out elsewhere. But so far, that’s mainly been shorthand for, “Wait until the Quadrennial Defense Review comes out next year,” and reinforces the militarization of foreign policy. Deglobalizing America’s defense commitments, on the other hand, will require filling gaps with both friendly capability and stable regional security architectures. And that’s more of a long-term interagency project that will “civilianize” defense policy.

    Source:  www.worldpoliticsreview.com, 09 Apr 2009