Turkish Forum

Category: Asia and Pacific

  • ANA service to Istanbul and expanded partnership with Turkish would need balance with Lufthansa

    ANA service to Istanbul and expanded partnership with Turkish would need balance with Lufthansa

    Asian airlines are expanding partnerships and collaboration with new hubs. Following Singapore Airlines’ expanded partnership with Turkish Airlines and Cathay Pacific’s with Qatar Airways, All Nippon Airways – now Japan’s largest international carrier – is likely to open a service from Tokyo to Istanbul and deepen its partnership with fellow Star carrier Turkish Airlines. This would be the first Japanese service to Turkey, complementing those from other Asian countries including Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. It would also be the first strategic partnership between a Japanese carrier and an airline from a new hub in Turkey/the Gulf.

    The rationale is clean cut. Turkey has become a popular tourist point for Japanese passengers, who would pay a premium to fly on a Japanese carrier to Istanbul. ANA can use Istanbul to open new destinations in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa that it and competitor Japan Airlines cannot reach but Middle East Gulf carriers can.

    ANA’s challenge is tapping these new markets while sustaining its important relationship with the Lufthansa Group, whose seven daily flights to Japan are under a JV with ANA. An expanded Turkish Airlines partnership would have sensitivity in its overlap with Lufthansa, which has recently very publicly terminated most of  its cooperation with Turkish as the fast growing “fourth Gulf airline” increasingly challenged its hub role.

    via ANA service to Istanbul and expanded partnership with Turkish would need balance with Lufthansa | CAPA – Centre for Aviation.

  • Turkey to ban alcohol at Gallipoli

    Turkey is looking to crack down on boozy Aussies and Kiwis at Gallipoli by banning alcohol in the historic area.

    Turkish politicians have backed plans to ban alcohol for Aussies and Kiwis at the Gallipoli site. (AAP)

     

    Turkish politicians have backed plans to ban alcohol for Australians and New Zealanders who come every year to honour those killed in the World War I Gallipoli campaign.

    Thousands of Antipodeans, many of them young backpackers, gather every April at the historic Gallipoli peninsula to honour their ancestors killed in the 1915 battle of Gallipoli.

    A parliamentary committee on Wednesday voted in favour of a bill introduced by the Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) that would change the status of the Gallipoli peninsula from a national park to a historical area, where consuming alcoholic drinks is strictly banned.

    The bill still needs to be passed by parliament, but the AKP holds a comfortable majority there, a parliamentary source told AFP.

    The dawn ceremony on April 25 marks the first ANZAC landings at the Gallipoli peninsula in the ill-fated Allied campaign to take the Dardanelles Strait from the Ottoman Empire.

    In the ensuing eight months of fighting, about 11,500 ANZAC troops were killed, fighting alongside British, Indian and French soldiers.

    Close to 4500 people made the journey this year for the commemorations, with many spending a boozy night on the beach as they waited for the moment the first shots were fired.

    The proposed bill imposes a fine of 5000 Turkish liras ($A2600) against offenders who drink alcohol outside licensed venues.

    The AKP, which has angered secular Turks by restricting alcohol sales, said the move was in keeping with global standards.

    “We just want to follow the international standards in the ceremony, which is attended by the leaders of 39 countries every year,” Culture Minister Omer Celik said, without elaborating.

    But Ali Saribas, from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), accused the government of not respecting the culture of people “who come all the way from Australia”.

    “Drinking wine is part of their culture, it’s their heritage. But the government has no respect for it,” he told AFP.

    “I am sure they can find a way of allowing people to make their commemorations as they want, but I doubt they will.

    “These people have been coming here for years and have never bothered the locals. They will either stop coming or try to cover their wine or beer bottles, which will make Turkey look very ridiculous,” he said.

    via Turkey to ban alcohol at Gallipoli | SBS News.

  • The Initiative of the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov on Establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia Implemented

    The Initiative of the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov on Establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia Implemented

    On May 6, 2014 a truly historical event took place at the United Nations headquarters in New York – for the first time since the United Nations was established the representatives of the «five» nuclear states – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia have unanimously and simultaneously signed the most important international document – the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. This step served as a completion of full realization of the initiative put forward by the Presidenimages (1)t of the Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly in 1993 and makes enormous contribution to consolidating regional security and reinforcing the global regime of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

    Since the early years of independence Uzbekistan chose the path of peaceful and creative development based on the values of humanism and peace. Proceeding from the deep comprehension of community of interests and destinies of all countries and peoples of Central Asia, as well as indivisibility of regional and global security, the Republic of Uzbekistanrenders all of its international efforts to ensuring peaceful and sustainable development of the region.

    Today in the conditions when the confrontations and armed conflicts are on the rise, the problems of terrorism, extremism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other threats disrespecting national borders worsen in various parts of the world, including in Central Asia, the life itself does confirm the reasonableness and foresight of Uzbekistan’s consistent policy. Preserving and consolidating peace and stability in Central Asia, turning the region into security and sustainable development zone have been enshrined as priority tasks in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

    It should be admitted that many initiatives put forward by President of Uzbekistan enjoy a deserving support of the international community. From among such initiatives – the idea of creating the International Center for combating terrorism proposed by President Islam Karimov at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, which was implemented as establishment of the UN Security Council’s Counter-terrorism committee in September 2001. On the proposal of President Islam Karimov enunciated during the visit of the UN Secretary-General to Uzbekistan in October 2002, the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center for Combating the Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC) was established.

    The initiatives of the President of Uzbekistan aimed at putting an end to the many-year-long bloody war in Afghanistan, which brought enormous calamities to the Afghan people and became a source of grave threats for the entire region, drew a special attention of the international community. Yet in 1993 speaking at the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly President Islam Karimov has literally «tolled the tocsin» calling upon the international community to actively assist the resolution of Afghanistan’s problem. In 1995 at the 50th Session of the UN General Assembly Uzbekistan articulated the idea to introduce arms embargo to Afghanistan and proposed the model of creating the coalition government to achieve the national reconciliation in this country. In 1997 on the initiative of the Uzbekistan’s Leadership the «6+2» Contact Group began operating under auspices of the United Nations. Thanks to it, on July 21, 1999 the «Tashkent Declaration on Fundamental Principles of Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict in Afghanistan» was inked. In 2001 President of Uzbekistan addressed the UN Secretary-General with a proposal to include to the Security Council agenda the issue on Afghanistan’s demilitarization. At the NATO/EAPC Summit in 2008 in Bucharest President Islam Karimov proposed to renew the activity of the Contact Group in a new format «6+3» aiming to jointly seek the political settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan, lowering the level of conflict potential in this country and rendering it a coordinated economic assistance.

    In the process of further development of events around Afghanistan it were those states brought together in this format that have found themselves to be more involved in international efforts in terms of addressing the ways to resolve the Afghan crisis.

    Uzbekistan’s proposals on maintaining environmental and socio-economic sustainability as a core of secure development of the region are gaining a broad support in the world. On the initiative of President Islam Karimov the heads of five Central Asian states founded in 1993 the International Fund to Save Aral Sea to bring together the efforts to overcome the consequences of one of the most devastating and large-scale ecological catastrophes of modern time – the Aral crisis.

    Undoubtedly, the idea of establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ) put forward by President Islam Karimov on September 28, 1993 at the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly occupies a special place among large international initiatives of Uzbekistan, which gained a broad recognition and support in the world. Speaking from the UN rostrum, President of Uzbekistan said: «In today’s modern world the security of one country cannot be ensured at the expense of another and the regional security cannot be viewed apart from the problems of global security. Proceeding from this, Uzbekistan is for full liquidation of a nuclear weapon, for effective actions and term-less prolongation of Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Uzbekistan is a staunch supporter of announcing the Central Asian region a nuclear-free zone».

    The CANWFZ Treaty took final international legal shape following the signing by the five nuclear powers of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia on May 6, 2014 at the United Nations headquarters in New York during the Third Session of the NPT Preparatory Committee and Review Conference. In his special statement on this issue the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Russian Federation undertook legal obligations to respect and observe the status of a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia, and not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon against any party to the treaty. The UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane put it as follows: «Signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia marks an important milestone for reinforcing both regional security in Central Asia and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime». Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation T.Countryman said that signing by the United States of Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia is «an acknowledgment of sincere and praiseworthy efforts by the states of Central Asia on keeping their region free of a nuclear weapon». The representatives of other nuclear powers have also highly praised the establishment of the CANWFZ as a cornerstone of international non-proliferation regime and ensuring peace and security in the region.

  • Borderlands: The View from Azerbaijan

    Borderlands: The View from Azerbaijan

    By George Friedman

    Azerbaijan, constantly changing world affairs and here is what George Friedman who is publicly know as shadow CIA has to say about Azerbaijan and history.

    I arrive in Azerbaijan as the country celebrates Victory Day, the day successor states of the former Soviet Union celebrate the defeat of Germany in World War II. No one knows how many Soviet citizens died in that war — perhaps 22 million. The number is staggering and represents both the incompetence and magnificence of Russia, which led the Soviets in war. Any understanding of Russia that speaks of one without the other is flawed.

    As I write, fireworks are going off over the Caspian Sea. The pyrotechnics are long and elaborate, sounding like an artillery barrage. They are a reminder that Baku was perhaps the most important place in the Nazi-Soviet war. It produced almost all of the Soviet Union’s petroleum. The Germans were desperate for it and wanted to deny it to Moscow. Germany’s strategy after 1942, including the infamous battle of Stalingrad, turned on Baku’s oil. In the end, the Germans threw an army against the high Caucasus guarding Baku. In response, an army raised in the Caucasus fought and defeated them. The Soviets won the war. They wouldn’t have if the Germans had reached Baku. It is symbolic, at least to me, that these celebrations blend into the anniversary of the birth of Heydar Aliyev, the late president of Azerbaijan who endured the war and later forged the post-Soviet identity of his country. He would have been 91 on May 10.

    Azerbaijan
    Azerbaijan

    Baku is strategic again today, partly because of oil. I’ve started the journey here partly by convenience and partly because Azerbaijan is key to any counter-Russian strategy that might emerge. My purpose on this trip is to get a sense of the degree to which individual European states feel threatened by Russia, and if they do, the level of effort and risk they are prepared to endure. For Europe does not exist as anything more than a geographic expression; it is the fears and efforts of the individual nation-states constituting it that will determine the course of this affair. Each nation is different, and each makes its own calculus of interest. My interest is to understand their thinking, not only about Russia but also about the European Union, the United States and ultimately themselves. Each is unique; it isn’t possible to make a general statement about them.

    Some question whether the Caucasus region and neighboring Turkey are geographically part of Europe. There are many academic ways to approach this question. My approach, however, is less sophisticated. Modern European history cannot be understood without understanding the Ottoman Empire and the fact that it conquered much of the southeastern part of the European peninsula. Russia conquered the three Caucasian states — Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan — and many of their institutions are Russian, hence European. If an organic European expression does exist, it can be argued to be Eurovision, the pan-continental music competition. The Azerbaijanis won it in 2011, which should settle any debate on their “Europeanness.”

    But more important, a strategy to block Russia is hard to imagine without including its southern flank. There is much talk of sanctions on Russia. But sanctions can be countered and always ignore a key truth: Russia has always been economically dysfunctional. It has created great empires and defeated Napoleon and Hitler in spite of that. Undermining Russia’s economy may be possible, but that does not always undermine Russia’s military power. That Soviet military power outlived the economically driven collapse of the Soviet Union confirms this point. And the issue at the moment is military.

    The solution found for dealing with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was containment. The architect of this strategy was diplomat George Kennan, whose realist approach to geopolitics may have lost some adherents but not its relevance. A cordon sanitaire was constructed around the Soviet Union through a system of alliances. In the end, the Soviets were unable to expand and choked on their own inefficiency. There is a strange view abroad that the 21st century is dramatically different from all prior centuries and such thinking is obsolete. I have no idea why this should be so. The 21st century is simply another century, and there has been no transcendence of history. Containment was a core strategy and it seems likely that it will be adopted again — if countries like Azerbaijan are prepared to participate.

    To understand Azerbaijan you must begin with two issues: oil and a unique approach to Islam. At the beginning of the 20th century, over half the world’s oil production originated near Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. Hence Hitler’s strategy after 1942. Today, Azerbaijani energy production is massive, but it cannot substitute for Russia’s production. Russian energy production, meanwhile, defines part of the strategic equation. Many European countries depend substantially on Russian energy, particularly natural gas. They have few alternatives. There is talk of U.S. energy being shipped to Europe, but building the infrastructure for that (even if there are supplies) will take many years before it can reduce Europe’s dependence on Russia.

    Withholding energy would be part of any Russian counter to Western pressure, even if Russia were to suffer itself. Any strategy against Russia must address the energy issue, begin with Azerbaijan, and be about more than production. Azerbaijan is not a major producer of gas compared to oil. On the other side of the Caspian Sea, however, Turkmenistan is. Its resources, coupled with Azerbaijan’s, would provide a significant alternative to Russian energy. Turkmenistan has an interest in not selling through Russia and would be interested in a Trans-Caspian pipeline. That pipeline would have to pass through Azerbaijan, connecting onward to infrastructure in Turkey. Assuming Moscow had no effective counters, this would begin to provide a serious alternative to Russian energy and decrease Moscow’s leverage. But this would all depend on Baku’s willingness and ability to resist pressure from every direction.

    Azerbaijan lies between Russia and Iran. Russia is the traditional occupier of Azerbaijan and its return is what Baku fears the most. Iran is partly an Azeri country. Nearly a quarter of its citizens, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are Azeri. But while both Azerbaijan and Iran are predominantly Shiite, Azerbaijan is a militantly secular state. Partly due to the Soviet experience and partly because of the unique evolution of Azeri identity since the 19th century, Azerbaijan separates the private practice of Islam from public life. I recall once attending a Jewish Passover feast in Baku that was presided over by an Orthodox rabbi, with security provided by the state. To be fair, Iran has a Jewish minority that has its own lawmaker in parliament. But any tolerance in Iran flows from theocratic dogma, whereas in Azerbaijan it is rooted in a constitution that is more explicitly secular than any in the European Union, save that of France.

    This is just one obvious wedge between Azerbaijan and Iran, and Tehran has made efforts to influence the Azeri population. For the moment, relations are somewhat better but there is an insoluble tension that derives from geopolitical reality and the fact that any attack on Iran could come from Azerbaijan. Furthering this wedge are the close relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. The United States currently blocks most weapons sales to Azerbaijan. Israel — with U.S. approval — sells the needed weapons. This gives us a sense of the complexity of the relationship, recalling that complexity undermines alliances.

    The complexity of alliances also defines Russia’s reality. It occupies the high Caucasus overlooking the plains of Azerbaijan. Armenia is a Russian ally, bound by an agreement that permits Russian bases through 2044. Yerevan also plans to join the Moscow-led Customs Union, and Russian firms own a large swath of the Armenian economy. Armenia feels isolated. It remains hostile to Turkey for Ankara’s unwillingness to acknowledge events of a century ago as genocide. Armenia also fought a war with Azerbaijan in the 1990s, shortly after independence, for a region called Nagorno-Karabakh that had been part of Azerbaijan — a region that it lost in the war and wants back. Armenia, caught between Turkey and an increasingly powerful Azerbaijan, regards Russia as a guarantor of its national security.

    For Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh remains a critical issue. Azerbaijan holds that U.N. resolutions have made it clear that Armenia’s attack constituted a violation of international law, and a diplomatic process set up in Minsk to resolve the crisis has proven ineffective. Azerbaijan operates on two tracks on this issue. It pursues national development, as can be seen in Baku, a city that reflects the oil wealth of the country. It will not endanger that development, nor will it forget about Nagorno-Karabakh. At some point, any nation aligning itself with Azerbaijan will need to take a stand on this frozen conflict, and that is a high price for most.

    Which leads me to an interesting symmetry of incomprehension between the United States and Azerbaijan. The United States does not want to sell weapons directly to Azerbaijan because of what it regards as violations of human rights by the Azerbaijani government. The Americans find it incomprehensible that Baku, facing Russia and Iran and needing the United States, cannot satisfy American sensibilities by avoiding repression — a change that would not threaten the regime. Azerbaijan’s answer is that it is precisely the threats it faces from Iran and Russia that require Baku to maintain a security state. Both countries send operatives into Azerbaijan to destabilize it. What the Americans consider dissidents, Azerbaijan sees as agents of foreign powers. Washington disputes this and continually offends Baku with its pronouncements. The Azerbaijanis, meanwhile, continually offend the Americans.

    This is similar to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Most Americans have never heard of it and don’t care who owns it. For the Azerbaijanis, this is an issue of fundamental historical importance. They cannot understand how, after assisting the United States in Afghanistan, risking close ties with Israel, maintaining a secular Islamic state and more, the United States not only cannot help Baku with Nagorno-Karabakh but also insists on criticizing Azerbaijan.

    The question on human rights revolves around the interpretation of who is being arrested and for what reason. For a long time this was an issue that didn’t need to be settled. But after the Ukrainian crisis, U.S.-Azerbaijani relations became critical. It is not just energy; rather, in the event of the creation of a containment alliance, Azerbaijan is the southeastern anchor of the line on the Caspian Sea. In addition, since Georgia is absolutely essential as a route for pipelines, given Armenia’s alliance with Russia, Azerbaijan’s support for Georgian independence is essential. Azerbaijan is the cornerstone for any U.S.-sponsored Caucasus strategy, should it develop.

    I do not want to get into the question of either Nagorno-Karabakh or human rights in Azerbaijan. It is, for me, a fruitless issue arising from the deep historical and cultural imperatives of each. But I must take exception to one principle that the U.S. State Department has: an unwillingness to do comparative analysis. In other words, the State Department condemns all violations equally, whether by nations hostile to the United States or friendly to it, whether by countries with wholesale violations or those with more limited violations. When the State Department does pull punches, there is a whiff of bias, as with Georgia and Armenia, which — while occasionally scolded — absorb less criticism than Azerbaijan, despite each country’s own imperfect record.

    Even assuming the validity of State Department criticism, no one argues that Azerbaijani repression rises anywhere near the horrors of Joseph Stalin. I use Stalin as an example because Franklin Roosevelt allied the United States with Stalin to defeat Hitler and didn’t find it necessary to regularly condemn Stalin while the Soviet Union was carrying the burden of fighting the war, thereby protecting American interests. That same geopolitical realism animated Kennan and ultimately created the alliance architecture that served the United States throughout the Cold War. Is it necessary to offend someone who will not change his behavior and whom you need for your strategy? The State Department of an earlier era would say no.

    It was interesting to attend a celebration of U.S.-Azerbaijani relations in Washington the week before I came to Baku. In the past, these events were subdued. This one was different, because many members of Congress attended. Two guests were particularly significant. One was Charles Schumer of New York, who declared the United States and Azerbaijan to be great democracies. The second was Nancy Pelosi, long a loyalist to Armenian interests. She didn’t say much but chose to show up. It is clear that the Ukrainian crisis triggered this turnout. It is clear that Azerbaijan’s importance is actually obvious to some in Congress, and it is also clear that it signals tension over the policy of criticizing human rights records without comparing them to those of other countries and of ignoring the criticized country’s importance to American strategy.

    This is not just about Azerbaijan. The United States will need to work with Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary — all of whom have been found wanting by the State Department in some ways. This criticism does not — and will not — produce change. Endless repetition of the same is the height of ineffectiveness. It will instead make any strategy the United States wants to construct in Europe ineffective. In the end, I would argue that a comparison between Russia and these other countries matters. Perfect friends are hard to find. Refusing to sell weapons to someone you need is not a good way to create an alliance.

    In the past, it seemed that such an alliance was merely Cold War nostalgia by people who did not realize and appreciate that we had reached an age too wise to think of war and geopolitics. But the events in Ukraine raise the possibility that those unreconstructed in their cynicism toward the human condition may well have been right. Alliances may in fact be needed. In that case, Roosevelt’s attitude toward Stalin is instructive.


    Edited By Tolga CAKIR

  • Forging the past: OUP and the ‘Armenian question’

    Forging the past: OUP and the ‘Armenian question’

    Jeremy Salt, January, 2010, Eurasia Critic – In 2005 Oxford University Press published Donald Bloxham’s The Great Game of Genocide. Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians. The first hardback edition was followed by a paperback version in 2007. The book is more of a prosecutor’s brief than a balanced study of the fate of the Ottoman Armenians during the First World War, but forgery and not balance is the point of this article.

    The forged picture that is being spread on the net with the caption: "Turkish official teases starving Armenian children by showing them a piece of bread during the Armenian Genocide in 1915."
    The forged photograph that is being spread on the net with the caption: “Turkish official teases starving Armenian children by showing them a piece of bread during the Armenian Genocide in 1915.”

    The book includes nine photographs printed on glossy paper. Eight of the photographs are credited. One is not. It shows a man in an unbuttoned jacket and tie standing in front of a circle of ragged children and one apparent adult with something in his hand. The caption reads: ‘A Turkish official taunting starving Armenians with bread’.

    Even a cursory glance is enough to show there is something wrong with this photo. One side of the man’s jacket is darker than the other. A ragged line clearly runs between the two halves. The wall in the background abruptly disappearsn ito a blank white space behind the standing man. A child lying on the groud ins lraising an emaciated arm. If stretched out to its full length it would fall beow mhis knees. His scarcely visible other hand and wrist seem quite plump by coparison. The little boy sitting to the right of the standing man seems to be clutching something in his hand but it is impossible to tell what it might be.

    Suspicions aroused, the photograph is taken to a photographic analyst in Ankara. He is not told what the subject matter of the photograph is supposed to be. He subjects the photo to a 2400-fold pixel magnification. The pixels come up like little crosses. It takes him ten minutes to conclude that this is not a ‘photograph’ at all but a photographic soup, composed of bits and pieces taken from other photographs.

    The technical giveaway is the pixels. Were the photograph genuine they would have to be homogeneous but they are not. They are leaning in various different directions. Otherwise the analyst concludes that the man’s right arm does not belong to the body. It has come from somewhere else. His right leg seems to have disappeared altogether. The boy sitting on the ground on the man’s right is not clutching anything at all. The forger simply did not take enough care when cutting the paper around the fingers in the photograph from which his figure was taken.

    The man in the caption obviously cannot be a ‘Turkish official’ as there was no Turkey at the time the photo was apparently taken (i.e. during or shortly after the First World War). A similar reference to ‘Turkish soldiers’ appears in the caption of one of the other photographs.

    Having finally been told what the photograph of the standing man is supposed to be, the analyst points out the obvious, that no Ottoman memur or civil servant would be dressed in an unbuttoned jacket over a shirt with a collar and tie. He would be wearing a collarless shirt buttoned up to the neck. Almost certainly (definitely for a photograph) he would have a fez on his head, and it is hardly likely that an Ottoman memur would pose for such a photograph anyway.

    Furthermore, given the cumbersome equipment photographers had to carry around with them early in the 20th century, even if the photographer arrived on the scene just as this ‘Turkish official’ was tormenting starving children with a piece of bread he could not have taken the photograph unless the standing man and the starving children agreed to hold their poses or to reenact the tableau when he was ready.

    Oxford University Press had already been informed (by the writer of this article) that the ‘photograph’ was a forgery when Servet Hassan, the General Coordinator of the Federation of Turkish Associations in the UK followed up with a complaint in October. Responding to her protest, in an e-mail sent on October 19, Christopher Wheeler, OUP’s history publisher, conceded that that the ‘photograph’ was a forgery. ‘Existing stock’ of the book had been destroyed but the ‘photograph’ had been retained in a new printing with the following caption:

    ‘This photograph purports to be an Ottoman [sic.] official taunting starving Armenians with bread. It is a fake, combining elements of two (or more) separate photographs: a demonstration were one needed of the propaganda stakes on both sides of the genocide issue with evidence of all sorts manipulated for latterday political purposes. The photograph was also included when the book was first published but then was believed to be genuine. It had previously been used in Gérard Chaliand and Yves Ternon’s Le Genocide des Arméniens (1980), which shows that prior use is no substitute for rigorous investigation of a picture’s provenance – and in the absence of clear provenance, for a minutely detailed examination of the picture itself. It is a cautionary tale for historians, many of whom are better trained in testing and using written sources than in evaluating photographic evidence. The publishers and author are grateful to have had the forgery drawn to their attention’.

    In a follow-up letter written on November Mr Wheeler, describing the forgery as a ‘composite photograph’, said OUP regarded republication of the ‘photograph’ with a fresh caption as ‘a more effective rejoinder to the forger than silently dropping his or her photograph from the book’. Although the unknown provenance of the ‘photograph’ could have created suspicions, ‘it is by no means uncommon for photographs from this period to lack one. And while the forgery is no masterpiece, without magnification it does not deceive the naked eye. These are not excuses for having been ‘taken in’ but they are mitigation’. The letter ends with a reference to forgeries going back to the Donation of Constantine and the need for historians and publishers to be vigilant. There is no mention of what could and should be done about copies of the book already sold, particularly those on the shelves of libraries around the world.

    The caption in the new printing slides over all the important issues. Of course, there is propaganda on ‘both sides’, but there is nothing on the Turkish ‘side’ (as far as this writer is aware) to compare with the textual and photographic forgeries manufactured on the Armenian ‘side’. It is very difficult to take at face value the statement that when the book was first published the photograph ‘was believed to be genuine’. Nine photographs were published. Eight were properly sourced and one was not sourced at all, not even to the Chaliand and Ternon book. This suggests that someone must have had doubts about the authenticity of this photograph (which until 2008 at least was displayed prominently in the Museum of the Armenian Genocide in Yerevan. It can also be found online in the US Library of Congress – again without a source). Over and above all of this, it does not take a ‘minutely detailed examination’ or magnification to see that this ‘photograph’ is most probably and almost certainly a fake. OUP is usually meticulous in its sourcing. In his message to Servet Hassan on October 19 Mr Wheeler admits that there was no ‘clear provenance’ for the photograph. This implies that someone must have had misgivings. So why did the book’s editors allow this fake to go to press?

    Forgeries have been part of the ‘Armenian question’ since the 1920s, produced with the intention of proving what could not otherwise be proved. The most notorious of them is the Andonian papers, a collection of ‘telegrams’ and other ‘documents’ purporting to show that the CUP government (and especially Talat Paşa) deliberately set out to exterminate the Armenians. These were shown to be forgeries more than 20 years ago but still surface from time to time, most notably in the writings of the journalist Robert Fisk.

    Another ‘document’, appearing during the British occupation of Istanbul, is the ‘ten point plan’, supposedly drawn up by the CUP government sometime late in 1914 or early in 1915, according to which all male Armenians under 50 were to be exterminated, with girls and women converted to Islam.
    The ‘plan’ was handed to the British by an Ottoman functionary. Then looking for evidence against the prisoners they were holding in Malta, the British did not make use of it. Taner Akcam, a Turk who has adopted the Armenian version of history in all its essential details, utilises the plan in the text of his own tendentious book ?1, observing only in a footnote that the British were ‘skeptical’ of its authenticity. Bloxham himself has described the ‘plan’ as ‘dubious at best and probably a fake’.?2 In fact, the ‘plan’ certainly is a fake.

    In short, no serious historian could possibly take this plan as gospel truth, but this is exactly what Ben Kiernan, an Australian who is now Professor of Genocide Studies at Yale University, does in his recent publication Blood and Soil. A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (Yale University Press, 2007). The ‘plan’ is the platform for his brief examination of the fate of the Ottoman Armenians and the accusations he makes that the Ottoman government drew up a plan to exterminate them.

    What is extraordinary here is that it would have taken no more than a cursory check to establish that this ‘plan’ is suspect at least, is almost certainly a fake and is worthy of a footnote at most. Did no one at Yale University Press think of asking Ben Kiernan to come up with a better source than his only source for this accusation, Vahakn Dadrian, a committed Armenian national historian and propagandist for the Armenian cause?

    It is often said that there are none so blind as those who will not see. Everyone knows what happened to the Armenians, everyone has the right to say whatever they want except the Turks. They are kept out of this debate altogether. Barack Obama, members of the US Congress, members of European parliaments and parliaments elsewhere, even of the South Australian parliament, which recently passed a genocide resolution, apparently know more of Turkish and Ottoman history than the Turks do. There could hardly be a clearer example of neo-Orientalism. It would be far too much to say that the members of these parliaments know little of late Ottoman history. It would only be accurate to say that they know next to nothing of Ottoman history apart from what they have been spoon-fed by lobbyists or have read in books such as those written by Ben Kiernan, Taner Akçam or Donald Bloxham. Very few books or articles are allowed into the western cultural mainstream as a counter-narrative. The Armenian question as it has been written into the western narrative has long since passed from history into theology. It has been sacralized and history, in this instance the need to deconstruct this issue on the basis of all the known ‘facts’ and not just some of them, suffers as a result. This, it seems, is how forgeries such as those described in this article get into print.

    1 Taner Akcam A Shameful Act. The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (London: Constable and Robinson, 2007).2 History Today, July 2005, issue 7, p. 68, Bloxham’s reply to a letter to the editor following the publication of his article ‘Rethinking the Armenian Genocide’ in the June, 2005, issue. I wish to thank Erman Şahin for drawing this letter to my attention.

    *Prof Jeremy Salt teaches in the Department of Political Science at Bilkent University Ankara. He is the author of Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians 1878-1896 (London: Frank Cass, 1993) and The Unmaking of the Middle East. A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

    eurasiacritic.co.uk

  • Open letter on Perinçek v. Switzerland case

    Open letter on Perinçek v. Switzerland case

    Open letter (slightly revised) rebutting Armenian claims submitted by Ferruh Demirmen to Swiss Interior Department on ECHR’s decision on Perinçek v. Switzerland.

    February 24, 2014

    An Open Letter to:
    Madame la Conseillère fédérale
    Simonetta Sommaruga
    Cheffe du Département fédéral de justice et police (DFJP)
    Palais fédéral ouest
    CH-3003 Berne, SWITZERLAND

    Dear Madame Sommaruga,

    This open letter is being submitted by a concerned citizen as a rebuttal of an open letter sent to you by a group called “concerned genocide scholars” regarding the December 17, 2013 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on Perinçek v. Switzerland.

    In their February 16, 2014 letter, the “scholars” take issue with ECHR’s position that genocide is a precisely defined legal concept that is not easy to prove, and that the historical record on the 1915 events is a matter of debate. The “scholars” argue that the 1915 events constitute “genocide,” and request that you re-examine the Court’s judgment. This letter will endeavor to establish that the arguments advanced by the “scholars” are incomplete and specious.

    The “scholars” assert that Ottoman “mass killings” of Armenians conform to the definition of Article 2 of the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). But such assertion is based only on a partial reading of the Convention. That Convention, in fact, is the Achilles’ heel of the “Armenian genocide” thesis. For Article 2, while describing genocide as, in part, killing or causing serious harm to the members of a group, makes two additional provisos: (1) there must be intent, (2) the targeted victims should belong to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group. The “scholars” conveniently ignore these two provisos.

    Ottoman government archives contain incontestable evidence that the relocation of Armenians in 1915 was not related in any way to nationality, religion, etc., but to military exigency in time of war, which was being fought on multiple fronts. Rebellious armed Armenian groups were aiding and abetting the enemy and sabotaging the Ottoman army from behind, and the government had to intervene. In other words, Armenians were subjected to relocation not because of their religion or ethnicity, but because they posed grave security threat in time of war. Armenians in the western part of Anatolia were spared from relocation orders because they did not pose a security threat. The central government orders to local authorities made it clear that the security of Armenian convoys during relocation should be ensured, and that all necessary precautions should be taken to meet their needs during and after relocation.

    There was no intent to harm the Armenians; but war conditions including lawlessness, chaos, disease, and famine, gave rise to tragic events on both sides.

    The fact that Armenians in the western part of Anatolia were spared from relocation orders belies accusations that the 1915 events were religion or ethnicity-related.

    Russian archives also reveal that religion and ethnicity were not causal factors behind the relocation orders, that relocation was conceived as a measure of self-defense by the Ottoman government, and that the tragic events were inter-communal in nature.

    Considering the above facts, and viewed in its fuller context, Article 2 of the 1948 Convention negates the genocide argument advanced by the “scholars.” The “scholars” cannot pick and choose a portion of Article 2 and ignore the rest.

    Equally important, the 1948 Convention contains a stipulation, in Article 6, that those charged with the crime of genocide should be tried by a competent tribunal in the state where the act was committed, or by an international penal tribunal whose jurisdiction is recognized by the contracting parties. In other words, to establish the crime of genocide, a court verdict is a sine qua non. The judgments by the Nuremberg Tribunal post-World War II, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) more recently on the Rwanda and Srebrenica events are examples to such verdicts.

    There exists no court verdict, however, on alleged “Armenian genocide.” The Malta Tribunal, convened by the victorious British after World War I to prosecute 144 high-ranking Ottoman officials on charges of killing Armenians, yielded not a single conviction. Among those detained for trial were cabinet ministers, the Grand Vizier and Army Commanders. The Armenian Patriarchate at Istanbul was the principal source of information against the accused, but the evidence was too flimsy for formal prosecution. Even the search of the U.S. State Department files in Washington failed to produce incriminating evidence. After two years of investigation, all Malta detainees were released and returned to Turkish soil.

    It is interesting that in referring to the opinions of France, the United Kingdom and Russia in their 1915 joint declaration, the “scholars” do not mention the Malta Tribunal. The Malta Tribunal drew its jurisdictional authority from these three powers, and its findings were binding on the three powers.

    So, Article 6 of the 1948 Convention also negates the genocide assertions of the “scholars.” What Article 6 establishes, in principle, is that neither parliaments nor a group of academics can pass judgment on an alleged genocide crime. A verdict by a duly authorized court of law is a must. The “scholars” ignore this very fundamental precept contained in the 1948 Convention.

    In conclusion, the 1948 Convention, which is the fundamental international covenant bearing on genocide determination, completely vitiates the genocide thesis when viewed in its entirety. The “scholars do not have the luxury to use only a portion of the covenant to establish their case.

    The “scholars” note that in 1997 the “International Association of Genocide Scholars” passed a resolution recognizing the Ottoman massacres of Armenians as genocide. That may be so, but a large number of scholars hold the opposite view. In 1985, for example, 69 U.S. historians and researchers passed a unanimous resolution, addressed to members of the U.S. House of Representatives and published in New York Times and The Washington Post, refuting Armenian allegations. These were academicians specializing in Turkish, Ottoman and Middle Eastern studies. Many of these academicians were subsequently harassed or intimidated by the pro-genocide camp.

    The conclusion is inescapable, as ECHR observed, that there is no consensus among historians and scholars on the 1915 events. And that is not taking into account the views of Turkish researchers and historians.

    In their letter the “scholars” indirectly draw an analogy between Holocaust and the 1915 events. Such analogy is not only grotesque, but more bluntly, obscene. Jews of Nazi Germany did not rise in armed rebellion against the state, did not embark on a rampage of violence against the local population, did not join the ranks of an invading army, did not sabotage the German army behind the front lines, and in general did not engage in perfidious acts. Their only “crime” was not being of the “Aryan race.” Race was the motive behind the killings.

    The Nazis did not court-martial those implicated with wrongdoing against the Jews, as did the Ottomans prosecute those accused of mistreating Armenians during relocation. Nor did the Nazis deliberately spare Jews as “good citizens” in some parts of the Reich, or award meritorious awards to Jews, as did the Ottomans to Armenians. The Ottomans, having long embraced Armenians in high-ranking positions in the government, including generals and cabinet ministers, did not spread racist, scurrilous lies about the Armenian minority. And the Armenians certainly did not perish in gas chambers.

    To broaden their horizon on the 1915 events, the “scholars” should perhaps read, if they have not already, the admissions of Boghos Nubar Pasha at the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, and the manifesto issued by Johannes Kachaznuni at the Dashnak convention in Bucharest in March 1923. It would be like hearing the truth from the horse’s mouth. More than half of a million Muslims lost their lives at the hands of Armenian guerillas who fought a losing battle relying on false promises of imperial Western powers and the Tsarist Russia. Even the Russian officers on the scene were troubled by the severity of violence inflicted by the Armenian guerillas on Muslims.

    And the terror inflicted was not confined to Muslims. As stated by Albert J. Amateau, a rabbi born in Turkey and later emigrated to America, in a testimony sworn before a notary public in California in 1989, Armenian atrocities also extended to Jews, and even to Armenian families who refused to cooperate with the armed guerillas.

    In their letter the “scholars” attempt to link the tragic murder of Hrant Dink to genocide controversy, and claim that Turkey has “one of the worst” records on human rights “over the past decades.” This is a slanderous attack aimed at Turkey, and it is deplorable. Dink was murdered by a deranged fanatic, and the facts behind the assassination are still unknown. More than 100,000 Turkish people took to the streets in Istanbul to protest Dink’s murder. Mention of human rights by the “scholars” is particularly ironic, considering that their list of signatories is headed by none other than Taner Akçam, an ex-convict and a prison escapee who advocated violence and was imprisoned for terrorist activities in Turkey. Akçam is now a protégée and beneficiary of the Armenian lobby.

    And speaking of human rights, it is curious that the “scholars” failed to mention the ASALA/JCAG terror that took more than 40 innocent lives, most of them Turkish diplomats, during 1973-1991. Not only did the committees funded by Armenian organizations pay for the legal defense of the majority of terrorists, but several prominent Armenians and pro-Armenian “scholars” testified in the trials of the terrorists. One terrorist, after his release from the French prison, was welcome as a hero in Armenia. So much about concern for “human rights”!

    Incidentally, how many Armenians took to the streets to protest the killing of Turkish diplomats and their families by the ASALA/JCAG terror?

    It is a known fact that Turkey and Armenia cannot agree on legal characterization of the 1915 events. That being the case, one wonders why the “scholars” have not urged Armenia to file a complaint with the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Established in 1945, ICJ is the primary judicial arm of the U.N. to settle legal disputes submitted by states. A court case undertaken by ICJ would require all historical archives to be open, due process to apply, and the evidentiary material scrutinized for probity. The only reasonable explanation for the stance of the Armenian side is that it finds a judicial process too risky for its taste.

    The Armenian side, instead, has over the years relied on propaganda in public arena, where bias and prejudice play a large role, and financial resources can be deployed aplenty.

    It is refreshing that the “scholars” make a concession in their letter: They agree with the notion of freedom of expression articulated by ECHR. It is impossible not to be sarcastic about their newly-found concern for this basic human right. Over the years these “scholars” attended conferences where presence of academics opposing their genocide thesis was not welcome. Did the “scholars” express any freedom of expression concern when, in 1995, a French court fined historian Prof. Bernard Lewis because he did not subscribe to the genocide thesis, or when, in 2007, Dr. Doğu Perinçek was convicted by a Swiss court for the same reason? And what was the reaction of the “scholars” when the French Senate passed a bill in 2011 (later overturned) that criminalizes denial of “Armenian genocide”?

    One additional comment in this context is noteworthy. The “scholars” use the word “denialist” to refer to those who reject their genocide assertions. “Denialist” is a pejorative term, and its use is a breach of academic decorum. It is also a sign of arrogance. How would the “scholars” like if their colleagues in the opposing camp call them “distortionists” or “fabricators”?

    To wrap up, characterization of the 1915 events as “genocide” is incompatible with the definition of this term as prescribed in the 1948 U.N. Convention. “Genocide” is a legal construct, and should not be used to further political aims. The suffering on the Armenian side in the 1915 events cannot be denied; but the suffering on the Turkish side also deserves recognition. After a century, it is time for the two sides to reconcile their differences without further recrimination, and move on. We don’t need new generations poisoned with “genocide” controversy.

    It is hoped that the Swiss government will accept the judgment of ECHR as final.

    Respectfully yours,

    (hard copy signed)

    Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.
    (address)

    Appendix
    SIGNATORIES TO MAY 19, 1985 STATEMENT ADDRESSED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS PUBLISHED IN NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST:

    RIFAAT ABOU-EL-HAJ
    Professor of History, California State University at Long Beach
    SARAH MOMENT ATIS
    Professor of Turkish Language & Literature, University of Wisconsin at Madison
    KARL BARBIR
    Associate Professor of History, Siena College, New York
    ILHAN BASGOZ
    Director of the Turkish Studies, Department of Uralic & Altaic Studies, Indiana University
    DANIEL G. BATES
    Professor of Anthropology, Hunter College, City University of New York
    ULKU BATES
    Professor of Art History, Hunter College, City University of New York
    GUSTAV BAYERLE
    Professor of Uralic & Altaic Studies, Indiana University
    ANDREAS G. E. BODROGLIGETTI
    Professor of Turkic & Iranian languages, University of California at Los Angeles
    KATHLEEN BURRILL
    Associate Professor of Turkish Studies, Columbia University
    RODERIC DAVISON
    Professor of History, George Washington University
    WALTER DENNY
    Associate Professor of Art History & Near Eastern Studies, University of Massachusetts
    DR. ALAN DUBEN
    Anthropologist & Researcher, New York City
    ELLEN ERVIN
    Assistant Professor of Turkish Researches, New York University
    CAESAR FARAH
    Professor of Islamic & Middle Eastern History, University of Minnesota
    CARTER FINDLEY
    Associate Professor of History, Ohio State University
    MICHAEL FINEFROCK
    Professor of History, College of Charleston, South Carolina
    ALAN FISHER
    Professor of History, Michigan State University
    CORNELL FLEISCHER
    Assistant Professor of History, Washington University (Missouri)
    TIMOTHY CHILDS
    Professorial Lecturer at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
    SHAFIGA DAULET
    Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut
    JUSTIN MCCARTHY
    Associate Professor of History, University of Louisville, Kentucky
    JON MANDAVILLE
    Professor of the History of the Middle East, Portland State University, Oregon
    RHOADS MURPHEY
    Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern Languages & Cultures & History, Columbia University
    PIERRE OBERLING
    Professor of History, Hunter College, City University of New York
    ROBERT OLSON
    Associate Professor of History, University of Kentucky
    DONALD QUATAERT
    Associate Professor of History, University of Houston
    WILLIAM GRISWOLD
    Professor of History, Colorado State University
    WILLIAM HICKMAN
    Associate Professor of Turkish, University of California at Berkeley
    JOHN HYMES
    Professor of History, Glenville State College, West Virginia
    RALPH JAECKEL
    Visiting Assistant Professor of Turkish, University of California at Los Angeles
    JAMES KELLY
    Associate Professor of Turkish, University of Utah
    PETER GOLDEN
    Professor of History, Rutgers University, New Jersey
    TOM GOODRICH
    Professor of History, Indiana University of Pennsylvania
    ANDREW COULD
    Ph.D. in Ottoman History, Flagstaff, Arizona
    MICHAEL MEEKER
    Professor of Anthropology, University of California at San Diego
    THOMAS NAFF
    Professor of History & Director, Middle East Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM OCHSENWALD
    Associate Professor of History, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
    WILLIAM PEACHY
    Assistant Professor of the Judaic & Near Eastern Languages & Literatures, Ohio State University
    HOWARD REED
    Professor of History, University of Connecticut
    TIBOR HALASI-KUN
    Professor Emeritus of Turkish Studies, Columbia University
    J. C. HUREWITZ
    Professor of Government, Emeritus, Former Director, Middle East Institute (1971-1984) , Columbia University
    HALIL INALCIK
    Member of the of Arts & Sciences, Professor of Ottoman History, University of Chicago
    RONALD JENNINGS
    Associate Professor of History & Asian Studies, University of Illinois
    KERIM KEY
    Adjunct Professor, Southeastern University, Washington, D.C.
    DANKWART RUSTOW
    Distinguished University Professor of Political Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York
    STANFORD SHAW
    Professor of History, University of California at Los Angeles
    METIN KUNT
    Professor of Ottoman History, New York University
    AVIGDOR LEVY
    Professor of History, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts
    DR. HEATH W. LOWRY
    Institute of Turkish Studies Inc. Washington, D.C.
    JOHN MASSON SMITH, JR.
    Professor of History, University of California at Berkeley
    ROBERT STAAB
    Assistant Director of the Middle East Center, University of Utah
    JAMES STEWART-ROBINSON
    Professor of Turkish Studies, University of Michigan
    FRANK TACHAU
    Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago
    DAVID THOMAS
    Associate Professor of History, Rhode Island College
    WARREN S. WALKER
    Home Professor of English & Director of the Archive of Turkish Oral Narrative, Texas Tech University
    WALTER WEIKER
    Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Jersey
    MADELINE ZILFI
    Associate Professor of History, University of Maryland
    ELAINE SMITH
    Ph.D. in Turkish History, Retired Foreign Service Officer, Washington, DC
    EZEL KURAL SHAW
    Associate Professor of History, California State University, Northridge
    FREDERICK LATIMER
    Associate Professor of History (Retired), University of Utah
    BERNARD LEWIS
    Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern History, Princeton University
    GRACE M. SMITH
    Visiting Lecturer in Turkish, University of California at Berkeley
    DR. SVAT SOUCEK
    Turcologist, Oriental Division, New York Public Library
    JUNE STARR
    Associate Professor of Anthropology, SUNY Stony Brook
    DR. PHILIP STODDARD
    Executive Director, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.
    METIN TAMKOC
    Professor of International Law and Regulations, Texas Tech University
    MARGARET L. VENZKE
    Assistant Professor of History, Dickinson College, Pennsylvania
    DONALD WEBSTER
    Professor of Turkish History, Retired, Beloit College, Wisconsin
    JOHN WOODS
    Associate Professor of Middle Eastern History, University of Chicago