Category: Asia and Pacific

New Geopolitics of the South Caucasus
Caucasian Review of International Affairs

From Vol. 4 (2) – Spring 2010

pp. 184-186

Abstract

The article examines new trends and development in the South Caucasus. The author identifies five factors which affect the foreign policy of regional countries as well as regional powers. These factors are the Georgian-Russian war of 2008, the US-Russian “reset”, the global financial crisis, the political transformation in the countries which have undergone “color revolutions”, and the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. The author believes that the change in the geopolitical layout of the region will turn the countries of the South Caucasus further from the West. At the same time, they are not going to be fully embraced by Russia. A balancing act between the US, EU and Russia will be most likely their policy choice.

Keywords: South Caucasus, geopolitics, US, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus region was opened up for the global market as well as competition among global powers. The dominance of Russia which had lasted for 200 years was questioned by new actors, primarily the United States, Turkey and Iran. The South Caucasus, with its vital links to the Black Sea, Central Asia and Middle East, and its rich natural resources (primarily oil and gas in the Caspian Sea) became a complex battleground aggravated by internal problems such as the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan due to territorial claims of the former with regard to the latter’s Nagorno-Karabakh region.

While the geopolitical conditions of the 1990s were defined internally by ethnic conflicts, the creation of statehood, and the transition from communism to a market economy, external factors were connected with the arrival of the new powers – the US, EU, Turkey, Iran on one side, and efforts by Russia to maintain control on the other. A wave of “colour revolutions” in 2003-2005 further changed the political landscape of the regional states and increased the possibility of ending Russian influence in post-Soviet space. However, despite losing its influence in the 1990s, Russia, due largely to enormous profits from oil, gained the momentum to strengthen its position by 2008.

New Geopolitical Factors

The last three years have brought forth a new set of conditions which is likely to affect the states of the region and their foreign policy agenda. Domestically the states of the region continued to suffer from ethnic conflicts, but they managed to build viable statehood, and make progress on market reforms with

Azerbaijan as the leading economic power. However, internationally, five major developments have been reshaping the region:
- Georgian-Russian War, 2008
- US-Russian Reset, 2009
- Global Financial Crisis, 2009
- Decolourization of Colour Revolutions, 2010
- Armenian-Turkish Rapprochement and its impact on Azerbaijan-Turkey and Azerbaijan-US relations, 2009-2010
The Georgian-Russian War had adverse effects on the image of the West in the region. The verbal support from the US, EU and NATO was not enough to counter the Russian offensive. Russia showed assertively that it would resort to force rather than yield its influence in the South Caucasus. Accordingly, attempting to secure NATO membership by regional countries has posed a direct threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Post-Soviet countries realized that Russia is still a mighty power, and the West is not willing to confront her for the sake of small post-Soviet states.

Further, the US-Russian “reset” declared by the Obama administration sent a clear message that relations with Russia are much more significant for the American administration and its Western allies than relations with other former communist states. However, many experts might not agree with that conclusion as they point out that the West continues to boost its relations with post-Soviet countries through the EU’s new Eastern Partnership initiative, NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and other political and economic channels, the treatment of US allies like Azerbaijan and Georgia in regards to the April 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit speaks for itself.

On the other side, Russia’s bold foreign policy in its so-called “near abroad”, in various political and economic manifestations, was seriously damaged by the global financial crisis. The Russian economy endured great losses which affected its ability to sponsor its allies or show its influence as an economic power. Thus, the former Soviet countries appreciated the importance of economic relations with the West and the need for reform of their economies. Exclusive reliance on Moscow proved to be shaky. Even the new president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich, a staunch Russian ally, paid his first foreign visit to Brussels, exhibiting the desire of the new Ukrainian leadership to move closer to the West in terms of its economic preferences.

The victory of Yanukovich in the latest elections in Ukraine changed the colour of the 2004 “Orange Revolution” which brought his predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, to power. A similar development took place in Kyrgyzstan, which has recently seen the overthrow of the victor of the “Tulip Revolution”, Kurmanbek_Bakiyev. Though it would be an overstatement to assert the failure of the “colour revolutions” – since the elections in Ukraine manifested the democratic changes in the country – nevertheless, we can speak about, at least, the decolourization or change of colour of past revolutions. The latest trend shows that post-Soviet countries cannot be reformed quickly, and a change is not simply about the removal of one leader for the sake of another. The process of democracy requires a profound transformation of all layers of society, the gradual modification of political and social institutions, and comes with generational shifts.

Last, but not least, the South Caucasus is knotted in a web of territorial, ethnic and identity conflicts, which have to be dealt in a complex manner. These problems have a new buzz word – protocols. The desire of the Obama administration to disconnect the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement from the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has already damaged the relations between Azerbaijan and the US and affected Azerbaijani-Turkish relations, and might have an effect on energy projects between Azerbaijan and the West. The disappointment in Azerbaijan regarding the US policy on the Turkish-Armenian protocol is not only about the prospect of the resolution of the conflict with Armenia – it is also about disillusionment with Western democracy where powerful lobbies like the Armenian Diaspora seriously affect the countries’ decision making.

Moreover, it is about a widening gap between Christians and Muslims, as almost every Western news agency in its description of the Armenian-Azerbaijani-Turkish conflicts emphasizes the religious affiliation of the relevant ethnic groups. However, these conflicts have no religious connotations.

For two decades Azerbaijan has been conducting a pro-Western foreign policy both politically and economically. Though subjected to criticism on human rights, the country’s leadership declares that it envisions a better future but through gradual reformation and improving economic well being, rejecting foreign recipes and revolutions.

Over the last decade the country has manifested more balancing acts by promoting better relations with its immediate neighbours, first of all, with Russia and Iran. Azerbaijan has concluded important security and energy agreements with these countries. However, both countries – Russia and Iran – have close links with Armenia which outweigh their relations with Azerbaijan. It is no accident that during a trip to the occupied Azerbaijani territories in April 2010, the new Russian mediator for the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict Igor Popov discussed with Armenian separatists the possibility of constructing of a new airport in Nagorno-Karabakh. The historical Russian-Armenian alliance will not be affected by Russia’s renewed interest in Azerbaijan.

Conclusion

A number of the above-mentioned factors and developments make a balanced foreign policy a viable choice for regional states. The experience of post-Soviet countries proved that blatant pro-Western or anti-Russian stances or vice versa (as the Serbian experience taught us) does not produce positive results. This is a new reality of the geopolitics of the South Caucasus.

Fareed Shafee holds master’s degrees from the School of History, and the School of Law of Baku State University, Azerbaijan, and Kennedy School of Government of the Harvard University, USA. His research interests include conflict resolution and ethnic studies.

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May 12, 2010
ARMENIAN ATTROCITIES UPON OTTOMAN MOSLEMS

By Erkan Esmer, Ph.D., Prof. Engineer

Armenians prospered greatly under the protection of Ottoman Turks. They were dubbed as the “Loyal Tribe” by the Ottoman Sultans. The Ottomans were late in accepting the Industrial Revolution. They preferred to stay as soldiers, farmers, and bureaucrats as was fashionable at the feudal era. They left the services, trade, banking, and industrial production to their Christian subjects (Greeks and armenians) who were a small segment of the population in Anatolia (Asia Minor). This made them very wealthy and powerful. Russian General Maievski’s 1890 map is presented in Figure 1 in the ensuing page, clearly shows that they were a small minority. Of course, the Russians naturally would inflate the Greek and armenian populations within the empire, because they had invented the so called “Eastern Problem”. They under the pretext of protection of Christian Ottoman citizens, vied for conquest of Ottoman lands.

When Russians attacked the Ottomans in 1877, they along with concurrence of European powers established Principality of Bulgaria. They advised the armenians that they could establish their own country in Eastern Anatolia. I doubt that they would ever allow them to have their own country. They had no intensions to do so, but wanted to use the armenians. Czarist Russia along with the help of American missionaries armed the armenians all over Anatolia. These terrorist forces were stationed all over the Turkish mainland. {Fig. 2-15} These above mentioned facts are confirmed by August 23, 1895 New York Times article. They were united under the command of armenian terrorist groups Dashnaks and Hunchaks. The armenians’ barbaric atrocities and heinous crimes upon the Moslems were unspeakable. {Fig. 16-29} These massacres naturally angered the authorities and Moslem population who defended themselves. They knew that this would bring the wrath of European powers (super powers of the era), because Europeans wanted to dismember the Ottoman Empire for its fertile land, valuable mineral and oil resources (Iraq, Saudi Oil Fields). They finally achieved this goal at the end of World War I.

During World War I, all of Turkish and Moslem young men were not home, but were fighting for their homeland in many different fronts. Only Women, children, and old Men lived in Ottoman Anatolian provinces, then. All of them were unarmed!!! Many of the armenians who were inducted into Ottoman forces, ran away with their weapons. The armenian cowards butchered these unarmed civilians. They acted as scouts/vanguards for the Russian forces. They ambushed Ottoman forces, cut down the telegraph lines, which caused a lot of havoc at the time. The Ottoman government had to relocate them from the war zone to provinces where there were no fighting with the means available to them at the time. {Fig. 30-33}. Many armenians migrated to other countries such as USA, France, and England, enhancing their lives tremendously. Since this barbaric tribe of armenians left the corpses of Moslems rot in open air, since they drowned them in wells, or threw the corpses in creeks or rivers, this caused a severe cholera epidemic which took many lives, including their own. Even though armenians and Russians massacred about 2,500,000 Moslems, where as, armenian losses were between 36,000 and 125,000, this is the so-called “ARMENIAN GENOCIDE”.

“Photographs are from Turkish Armed Forces archives or my own post card collection”

May 8, 2010
Newsletter of the Embassy of Azerbaijan

N E W S L E T T E R Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan 275 Slater Street, Suite 904. Ottawa ON K1P 5H9 CanadaTel: (613) 288 0497 Fax: (613) 230 8089E-Mail: azerbaijan@azembassy.ca

President Aliyev on Military Build-Up

Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan held a meeting on building-up of the army at the Defense Ministry on April. President Aliyev said that building up the armed forces has always been in spotlight. “It is a main issue for us because Azerbaijan territories have been under occupation for many years,” said the Head of State, adding that Azerbaijan’s intensively beefing up its military comes from the need. President Aliyev noted that Armenia’s and its supporters’ invasion of Azerbaijani lands was accompanied by brutalities. “Khojaly genocide is a striking example of this. Armenia grossly violates all legal norms”. Though the UN Security Council adopted four resolutions on the liberation of occupied Azerbaijani lands, Armenia did not fulfill these decisions. The Azerbaijani leader noted that the updated Madrid principles could be a basis for preparation of final proposals. President Aliyev pointed out that Armenia does not want to leave occupied lands as it drags out peace talks. “Our biggest compromise is that Azerbaijan has been committed to the peace process for 20 years,” he said. According to the President, the international community must respect its own decisions and no problem can be solved in the region without resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, as the conflict seriously affects the whole region.

Azerbaijan Signed Protocol with Georgia on WTO Admission

Georgia and Azerbaijan signed a protocol on bilateral negotiations on admission of goods and services of two countries to the markets within the framework of Azerbaijan’s joining the World Trade Organization (WTO).The protocol was signed by Mr. Zurab Pololikashvili Georgian Economic Minister and Mr. Shahin Mustafayev Azerbaijani Minister of Economic Development. The two sides expressed confidence that working out of the protocol will give a new impetus to the intensification of trade relations between the two countries. The Georgian-Azerbaijani business forum was also held during the Azerbaijani delegation’s visit. Since 1997, Azerbaijan has been represented at the World Trade Organization as an observer. At present, negotiations have been completed and protocols signed with Turkey, the Sultanate of Oman, United Arab Emirates and Georgia. The country is on the stage of signing the protocol with Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. Azerbaijan also carries negotiations with the United States, Japan, Brazil, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, European Union, Norway, India, South Korea, and Switzerland.

Azerbaijan and Turkey Agreed on Gas

According to Mr. Natiq Aliyev, Minister of Industry and Energy the talks on gas prices between Azerbaijan and Turkey have been completed. Mr. Aliyev pointed out that an agreement between the countries will be signed soon. The Minister said that Azerbaijani companies (about 500 in Turkey) increased their investments into Turkey’s economy. The European Union welcomes Azerbaijan-Turkey agreement on gas transportation, said Mr. Guenther Oettinger, EU Energy Commissioner. “Turkey and Azerbaijan are our indispensable partners for the realization of the Southern Corridor. This agreement between such two important partners opens the way for a strategic allocation of gas that will underpin the Southern Corridor and provide energy security to Turkey and the EU”. Under the current contract, Turkey must receive 6.6 billion cubic meters of gas from Shah Deniz in the first stage of the field’s development. Shah Deniz reserves are estimated at 1.2 trillion cubic meters. The contract to develop the offshore Shah Deniz field was signed on June 4, 1996 and included: BP (operator), Statoil Hydro, NICO, Total, LukAgip, TPAO, and SOCAR.

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May 8, 2010
Ankara-Yerevan Accords Point toward Armenia’s Withdrawal from the Occupied Territories

foto -geography.about.com

Gulnara Inandzh
Director
International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus
The emotions, whipped up by commentaries which followed the signing on October 10 of the protocols between Turkey and Armenia, have prevented a logical analysis of the situation. In order to begin such an analysis, we need to recognize that at the roots of the signing of these accords lie a multi-sided game of significance far beyond the South Caucasus region.

If at the outset, the opening of the borders with Armenia was one of the conditions on Turkey’s path toward joining the European Union, then at the present time, the rapprochement of the two countries depends on the geopolitical situation and Ankara’s participation in these processes. Immediately after the signing of the Turkish-Armenian accords, as one should have expected, the EU put forward some new demands for Turkey, about which the latter could not have but known about in advance. This means that Turkey signed the agreements with Armenia not as part of its effort to join the EU, something that provides one of the points of departure for understanding why Turkey decided to reach an agreement with Armenia.

At the same time, we must not ignore the pressures on Turkey both direct and behind the scenes. And those came from more places than just the capitals of the countries which were represented at the signing ceremony. (Here, we intentionally are not touching on the role of Israel in all these complicated political games, the situation around Iran, the transportation routes for Iraqi oil and the Kurdish element in Iraq, as each of these represent a distinctive subject for discussion).

Turkey, who bear the genetic code of the Ottoman Empire as far as great power games are concerned, will not agree to play the role of a defeated country even under the pressure of world powers. Ankara is not in such a weak geopolitical situation that it has to act in ways that harm its national interests. Not long ago, we should remember, Turkey felt itself strong enough to refuse the United States the right to use the military base at Incirlik for the supply of the anti-Saddam operations of the coalition forces in Iraq.

When pointing to the harm the protocols between Ankara and Yerevan create for Azerbaijan in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, one must not forget that the Armenian diaspora has terrorized Turkey with the issue of the so-called “Armenian genocide.” In its turn, Turkish diplomacy, which connects this question with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict until recently took a position absolutely the same as Azerbaijan both because of their common Turkishness and because of Turkey’s own national interests. These two issues also served as a factor which united the Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora, which resisted recognition of “the Armenian genocide” by pointing to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani lands.

Viewed from that perspective, it would seem that Turkey, which has little to gain economically and politically by reaching an accord with Armenia, signed the protocols in a way that both undercut its own interests and angered its fraternal and strategic relationship with Azerbaijan.

Of course, in contrast to the 1990s, Azerbaijan today is not the weak “younger brother” who needs support but an equal state that is confident in its own forces and demands respect on that basis. This cannot entirely please the current Turkish powers that be, but it is not the occasion for a break with a reliable partner. Differences in the question of the transportation of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey also cannot be the subject for speculation on such a strategic question as the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border.

During the entire period of talks with Armenia, official representatives of Turkey at various levels repeated that the relationship Ankara sought would not harm the interests of Azerbaijan and that the Turkish-Armenian borders will not be opened until the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Among those who have constantly said this are Turkish President Abdulla Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu, members of the parliament, opposition figures and others both before and after the signing of the protocols.

At the same time, every step of Armenian-Turkish negotiations was discussed with Baku, and talks about the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue continued in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.

And in this context, the declaration of Turkish President Gul concerning the impact in “a short time” of the Armenian-Turkish accords on “the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” merits attention and should calm many of the concerns in Azerbaijan.

At the present time, when Azerbaijan has acquired major geopolitical importance, ignoring its interests on such an important issue is impossible. Consequently, the interests of Baku were taken into consideration. Note that immediately after the signing in Switzerland of the Armenian-Turkish agreement Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev arrived in Zurich where the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was discussed. Further, a short time after the signing of the agreement with the very same mission, Tina Kaidanow, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia arrived in Baku, and in the framework of the meetings of the foreign ministers of the Black Sea countries, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with President Ilham Aliyev and his foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov. And the visit to Baku of General Ishyk Koshaner, commander of Turkish ground forces, to meet with Azerbaijani Defense Minister Col. Gen. Safar Abiyev is yet another confirmation of this.

Taken together, it is clear that this cycle of visits was not a matter of chance.

And if there were any doubt about this, the reaction both within Armenian society and also in the diaspora to the accord which should allow Armenia to escape from the blockade has been negative. Evidently, Armenian society and politicians recognize that they will have to free the occupied territories, because otherwise no one intends to save Armenia. It is not accidental that after the signing of the Zurich agreement, all sides represented at the ceremony except for Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan did not hide their satisfaction with what had taken place.

In other words, everything shows that the Zurich agreement will have a positive consequence on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Judging by the presence at the signing ceremony of the representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group, it is possible to assert that all interested sides are informed about this process and about its impact on the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

If under the pressure of the diaspora Armenia will not ratify the agreement, Azerbaijan and Turkey will return to where they were before. If the Turkish and Armenian parliaments all the same give legal force to the agreement, then Armenia will have to free Azerbaijani territories in order to secure the opening of the Turkish borders. Otherwise, Ankara, responding to public pressure in Azerbaijan and in Turkey will not be able to open the borders with Armenia. In that case, Azerbaijani and Turkish public opinion will be in a position to increase international pressure on Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora regarding the liberation of the occupied territories.

If Armenia does not follow through, then Turkey will always be in a position to find reasons to close the borders. In such a case, Azerbaijan will be left with only one choice – the liberation of the occupied territories by military means; and the countries involved in the division of spheres of influence in the region will have to agree with this. Otherwise Azerbaijan, using its status as “the most reliable country for the transportation of gas,” will have every reason for refusing to allow the Nabucco project to pass through its territory.

Every country has its own interests and priorities, and in this case, that means that there is no chance that Turkey will sacrifice its relations with Azerbaijan for new ties with Armenia.

May 6, 2010
Why Turkey is right in demanding the end to occupation in Karabakh

VUSALA MAHİRGİZİ

In order to continue the “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations, it has become the major stipulation to bring the protocols signed in Zurich, Oct. 10, onto the agenda of the two parliaments.

There are reports that in the meetings held in Washington on April 12-13, Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan faced pressures to immediately bring the Zurich protocols onto the agenda of the Turkish Parliament. Some media outlets in the West and Turkey have strongly criticized Erdoğan for linking the “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations to the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” and thus, “blocking up” the way of the process. While assessing from several aspects the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” in the process of the “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations, we see that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement in the Azerbaijani parliament on May 13, 2009, is in line with the principles of the international law and human rights.

Armenia does not want the factor of “releasing Karabakh from occupation” to be put into circulation; because if this factor is put into circulation, Armenia will be constantly viewed as an “aggressor state” in the international arena. On the other hand, former president of Armenia Robert Kocharian and incumbent president Serge Sarkisian came to power in Yerevan with the dynamism caused by the wave of Karabakh’s occupation – having the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” on the table in the discussions with Turkey means their admitting the stain of being an aggressor. Therefore, the present authorities of Armenia will not want to hold discussions by admitting the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” – i.e. start the game with a score of 1-0.

In this respect, we should underscore that Prime Minister Erdoğan has taken the rather right step by including the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” into the process of “normalization.” This “stipulation” has been put into the agenda because of the protest against the violation of international law and human rights in the region, not because of the loyalty to the principle “one nation, two states” between Turkey and Azerbaijan as stated by Armenia and the West. What could Erdoğan cite to while putting forward the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” in Turkey-Armenia discussions, if not to the fact of the occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territories and displacement of one million Karabakh residents of Azerbaijani origin? The solution to the regional conflicts requires divine justice: conscience and justice require it before the friendship and brotherhood between the countries.

Therefore, it is impossible to understand why some in the West, Armenia and Turkey have criticized Erdoğan for this “stipulation.” Which position seems more just: to release the occupied territories and send one million refugees to their native lands, or to ignore the displacement of one million people from their native lands and switch on the green lights for 146,000 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to establish a monoethnic structure?

As soon as the issue on releasing the occupied Azerbaijani territories was brought into the agenda in Turkey-Armenia discussions, Armenian authorities led by Sarkisian tried to put into circulation “the right of Karabakh Armenians to self-determination.” If so, who will ensure the self-determination of one million Azerbaijanis that lost everything as a result of the occupation?

By putting into circulation “the right of Karabakh Armenians to self-determination” soon after the issue of “releasing of Karabakh” was included into the agenda in the process of “normalization,” Armenia is acting unfairly toward Azerbaijan, Turkey and the historical truths of the region.

The occupation of Azerbaijani regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia with the support of outside forces, posed threat to the peace processes in the region. Just after this occupation, Armenian and Azerbaijani intellectuals, who gathered to speak about peace late in the 80s and early in the 90s, were deprived of this opportunity. If we make an excursion into history we can see Azerbaijani poet Sabir, who realized that outside forces backed the misunderstanding between Armenians and Turks in 1905 in Karabakh, wrote a poem “Beynelmilel” (International).

Hovhannes Tumanyan, who did not want a contradiction between the two nations in Karabakh, visited the Armenian villages holding a white flag, explained the situation to the people and succeeded in calming down the situation. Outstanding Azerbaijani playwright Jafar Jabbarli depicted the background of those happenings in his play “1905-ci ilde” (In 1905).

Viewing the happenings from the historical perspective we see that the separatism in Nagorno Karabakh and occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territories left no place for the intellectuals and politicians of the two countries to maneuver. Therefore, the Turkish prime minister’s inclusion of the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” into the process of “normalization” of Turkish-Armenian relations becomes more important.

Actually, the foundation of the future national conflict was laid when a referendum was held by Stalin on July 7, 1923, for Armenian autonomy in Karabakh. The plebiscite was scheduled the same day for the Turks in Armenia’s Zengezur region to “realize their self-determination,” but the plebiscite was not held, and in 1948-1952 approximately 500,000 Azerbaijani Turks were deported from Armenia.

The process of Azerbaijanis’ deportation from Armenia took place in the Soviet Union, the “example of peoples’ friendship and brotherhood.” The last of the Azerbaijani Turks in Armenia was deported in March-June, 1988 – again during Soviet times. It was the last ring in Armenia’s turning into a monoethnic country.

The autonomy given to Nagorno-Karabakh in 1923 contained the maximal rights that the present autonomous regimes in the world may envy. They managed themselves; headed their parliament, the great majority of the state agencies were led by Armenians; they had representatives in Azerbaijani government; the persons, who represented them in the Soviet parliament, were Armenian; they had school, university, radio, TV channels, newspapers and magazines in their language; even the labels of the products made there were in Armenian.

With the rights of which autonomy can you compare the large rights of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh that was 120,000 approximately 25 years ago? We can see that “the right of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to self-determination” was the biggest injustice against Azerbaijan.

A question arises: if as claimed by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, they were indeed oppressed by Azerbaijan’s pressure in the autonomous province and passed a decision to unite with Armenia, can they show an example that during the 65-year autonomy an Armenian was injured on an ethnic basis?

It is inadmissible that in the international discussions Armenia showing “Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination” tries to force Azerbaijan to the referendum in the monoethnic Nagorno Karabakh region with a population of 146,000.

The question is not the “right of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to self-determination,” but the unification of a part of Azerbaijan to Armenia by occupation. Therefore, Prime Minister Erdogan’s inclusion of the stipulation “to release Karabakh from occupation” into the process of “normalization” of Turkey-Armenia relations is an initiative serving to establish fair peace in the region, and should be necessarily supported in terms of international law and human rights.

Armenian leaders, who are carrying on propaganda among the world community for opening the border with Turkey, constantly reiterate the following:

“It is not normal that in the 21st century the border with the neighbor is closed.”

If this remark is admitted, then how would the world community answer Azerbaijan’s right question: “Is it normal in the 21st century to occupy the territories of the neighbor, displace 1 million people, unite a part of the neighbor’s territories to its lands?”

Assessing the matter in terms of the inactivity of the UN Security Council and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, it becomes more important that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan included the factor of “releasing Karabakh from occupation” into the “normalization” of the relations between Turkey and Armenia, while the international organizations are paralyzed concerning the occupation of Azerbaijani territories.

* Vusala Mahirgizi is the director general of Azeri-Press Agency, or APA.

Hurriyet Daily news

May 6, 2010
Azerbaijan, Turkey round off gas talks

Azerbaijan and Turkey rounded off gas talks, Azerbaijani Industry and Energy Minister Natik Aliyev said at the 13th Eurasian Economic Summit in Istanbul.

The Minister stated that both countries will sign a relevant agreement in the near future, Azertag news agency reports.

Aliyev noted that Azerbaijani companies have increased investments in Turkey’s economy, adding that over 500 Azeri companies invested in various sectors.

He also stressed that after SOCAR purchased a 51% share of Turkish petrochemical giant Petkim, it plans to invest additional $3-5 bn in the company.

A.G.

News

May 6, 2010