On August 27–28, 2024, Moscow hosted the IMBRICS FORUM — the VI International Municipal Forum of the BRICS Countries.
The event has become an important platform for exchanging experiences and ideas between representatives of regional and municipal governments from the BRICS countries. It also helped build effective business communications with entrepreneurs from Russia and other partner countries.
The forum included a round table discussion on the role of extracurricular education and international cooperation in children’s and youth education. Experience of BRICS cities and municipalities, which was devoted to discussing issues of children’s and youth recreation in camps, as well as extracurricular education. The event was attended by representatives of legislative and executive bodies of state power in Russia, heads of Russian and foreign children’s camps and non-profit organizations. In particular, the event was attended by Boris Chernyshov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Natalya Agre, Director of the Department of State Policy in the Sphere of Education, Supplementary Education and Children’s Recreation of the Ministry of Education of Russia, Sandra Goulart Urioste, Director of English Camp (Brazil), Fahrettin Gozet, President of the Canadian NGO International Camping Fellowship (ICF) Fahrettin Gozet (Turkey) and Nie Aijun, President of the Board of The Institute for Camp Education in China . The speakers delivered reports, shared their experience in organizing the area of activity under consideration, and discussed existing initiatives to expand the activities of the camp movement and extracurricular education, including in the BRICS countries.
The particular focus was on the Turkish speaker Fahrettin Gozet, who delivered a report on “Collaborative Initiatives Among BRICS Countries: Strengthening Youth Engagement”. In his report, he noted ICF as a key participant in strengthening cooperation between youth camps around the world, including the BRICS countries, whose mission is to strengthen youth engagement through joint initiatives. He explained how ICF programs and initiatives create opportunities for cooperation among BRICS countries in the field of youth engagement, using the strengths and resources of its international network. Fahrettin Gozet also gave examples of cooperation carried out with the assistance of ICF, such as a partnership between Russian and South African camps aimed at developing leadership skills and cultural exchange, promoting the involvement of youth across borders.
As a result, the participants agreed on further interaction with each other, the implementation of joint projects aimed at developing extracurricular education.
China’s Man-Made Islands in the Spratly’s and Why It’s Rising Concern Throughout the Region
Sümeyra Betül COŞKUN Bursa Uludağ University
The South China Sea is believed to be rich in oil and gas and is important for fishing reasons for the countries surrounding it. It is also crucial for its strategic location, as it is one of the world’s busiest waterways. For these reasons, it is subject to several overlapping territorial disputes which include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Among all these countries, China is seen as the most aggressive state among them. It is believed that China is aiming to create a strategic triangle within the South China Sea which could result in China gaining full control over the region. Such control is perceived as a direct threat for the US, most of the South China Sea states and US allies within the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, China’s man-made islands located in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratly archipelago, has raised attention both regionally and worldwide. At first, China started off with land reclamation in the area which started raising questions and caused tension on some level. These man-made islands are the result of China’s salami- slicing tactics at which it is very successful at. Then, China militarized its artificial islands and turned them into advanced military bases. As of today, China has 7 artificial islands located in the Spratly archipelago. When added to the islands in the area in which China has seized control over, it is possible to say that China has emerged as a serious strategic force in the region and is seen as a threat to mostly all whom directly have interest in the South China Sea.
KEY WORDS: China, South China Sea, Man-made Islands, Soil Reclamation, Spratly Islands
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to put forth a general introduction on China’a man-made islands in the Spratly’s and why these islands are raising concern both in the region and beyond the region. To better understand this topic, the importance of the South China Sea was touched upon first. In this part of the study, the importance of energy resources, fishing and shipping lanes in the South China Sea were briefly mentioned. After a brief introduction of the region, how China achieved building and militarizing these seven man-made islands in the Spratly’s are discussed followed by a general evaluation of these artificial islands according to international law. Lastly, why these islands are raising concern both in the region and beyond the region were touched upon.
The Importance of the South China Sea, Both On A Regional and Global Level
⦁ The South China Sea
The South China Sea is the largest body of water after the five oceans. It is estimated to be around 3.700.000 square kilometers. It connects to the East China Sea with the Taiwan Strait and the Philippine Sea with the Luzon Strait. It also connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean with the Strait of Malacca, which also is the regions most important waterway. The South China Sea is important for it’s energy resources, which consist of oil and gas, for fishing and for it’s shipping lanes. Generally speaking, it is important in terms of economic and strategic factors, which form the basis of the South China Sea conflicts.
Figure 1. The South China Sea
Energy Resources
The South China Sea is believed to contain important amounts of energy resources, although when the regions estimated energy reserves are taken into consideration, the region does not contain energy resources as much as other oil and natural gas-rich regions. Even so, it is still considered to be a crucial aspect for states within the region, hence is of great importance for the economies and policies of the states in the region. Therefore, energy resources are among the elements that form the basis of South China Sea conflicts. It is possible to say that these disagreements will become even
⦁ South China Sea.org, Hydrographic Boundaries of the South China Sea, http://www.southchinasea.org/files/2013/02/South-China-Sea-hydrographic-boundaries.png⦁ ,⦁ 27.07.2019.
more important as the energy consumption of developing Asian countries is expected to double by 2030, and half of this growth is expected to be generated by China alone.1
⦁ Oil
There is believed to be around 11 billion barrels of oil in the South China Sea, although this amount can vary from state to state. For example, according to the US, there are around 15.6 billion barrels of oil while according to China, there around 105- 213 billion barrels of oil.2 As one can see, the the amount increases massively, which is why the South China Sea is also sometimes referred to as “The Second Persian Gulf”. Chinese researchers hope to increase drilling investment interest in the region may be a possible explanation for the difference in claims. Another reason for the changing claims could be the media’s misunderstood interpretation of “resource estimates” (which predict the total amount of oil) and the “reserve estimates” (the generally recoverable amount, which is typically estimated at 10%).3 Lastly, the increasing tension between the South Sea states could be another reason researchers and potential oil drilling companies face, which may be a deterrent for investment.4 Thus, the question of how much oil is found in the South China Sea may continue to remain unanswered for the time being. If China’s estimates are correct, China and other South China Sea states energy demand from the Middle East and through the Strait of Malacca will be reduced.
⦁ Gas
Gas is another important energy resource in the region. In fact, according to estimations, the region is believed to be richer in gas reserves than oil reserves. It is believed that there is a total of 266 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the open sea basins of the South China Sea.5 It is also estimated that natural gas consumption in the region will increase by 5% per year compared to other fuels and reach 20 trillion cubic feet per year in the next 20 years. 6 This makes gas reserves in the region even more crucial for region states. When we examine the chart below (Figure 2), we can see that the South China Sea is nearly 5 times richer in gas than the Gulf of Mexico and very close to the amount of gas reserves found in the North Sea Region. However,
1 Robert D. Kaplan, “Why the South China Sea is so crucial”, Business Insider Austrailia, 20.02.2015, , 30.05.2019. 2 Matthew R. Costlow, Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea, (MSU Graduate Thesis), Springfield: Defense and Strategic Studies, 2012, p. 5. 3 Matthew R. Costlow, Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea, (MSU Graduate Thesis), Springfield: Defense and Strategic Studies, 2012, p. 5. 4 Costlow, op.cit, pp. 5-6. 5 Tim Daiss, “South China Sea Energy Politics Heat Up”, Oil Price, 02.03.2019, , 30.05.2019. 6 Global Security, South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas, , 30.05.2019.
if we were to take a closer look, we see that the South China Sea’s gas production is half of what the Gulf of Mexico produces and a fourth of what is produces in the North Sea Region. This result shows the lack of infrastructure within the South China Sea region.
Figure 2. Comparison of Energy Reserves by Region
⦁ Fishing
Fishing is important both on a regional and global level for both economic and military reasons. Economically, about 50% of fishing ships in the world pass through the South China Sea which come to show how important just fishing is for the region.7 A large portion of the income of region states rely on fishing which has led to an overfishing problem. This is why in 1995, The United Nations (UN) formed the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. This agreement has opened the door to a number of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) to cope with the excessive use of highly valuable but also highly mobile fish stocks that cross EEZ boundaries. This is the importance of fishing ecconomically. On the other hand, the importance of fishing militarily is due to Chinese fishermen carrying out paramilitary activities on behalf of
⦁ Ibid. 7 Gregory B. Poling, “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets”, Stephenson Ocean Security Project, 09.01.2019, fishing-fleets/, 31.05.2019.
their state; these fishermen are also referred to as “fishermen soldiers”.8 These fishermen soldiers have emerged as the largest power at sea (within the region), especially around the Spratly Islands. These fishermen carry the possibility of triggering at least as severe a conflict as the armed forces of China within the region; in fact, it is even more likely because a significant number of fishing boats in the region that are engaged in full-day handline fishing to function are a direct branch of the state through official marine militants.9 This is why these soldiers are a big threat to everyone who has interest in the region.
⦁ Shipping Lanes
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 80% of global trade is carried out by the sea, and 60% of this trade passes through Asia; of this percentage (80%), the South China Sea carries out a third of global maritime trade, and China carries out 60% of its trade by sea.10 The Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait are some of the important strait in the region. Of these straits, the Strait of Malacca is the most important. The reason this strait is the most important is because it provides the shortest, therefore, the most economical transition between the Pacific and Indian Ocean. To better comprehend the importance of this strait, a comparision with the Suez Canal and Panama Canal can be made. The Strait of Malacca carries out three times the amount of oil carried out by the Suez Canal and fifteen times more than the Panama Canal, and this is only an example of oil carried out through the strait.11 When the amount of other goods and energy resources that are carried out through the canal are taken into consideration, it is possible to say that the Strait of Malacca is not just important on a regional level, but also on a global level.
⦁ China’s Man-made Islands in the Spratly’s
⦁ China’s Salami-Slicing Tactics
Salami-slicing tactics, also known as the “cabbage strategy” in the military, was first used in the 1950’s by the Communist Party in Hungary. It was used as a strategy by the communist party for non-communist parties in Hungary. Today, China is amoung, if not the most, the most successful user of this strategy. China is the only state that
8 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia”, CNA, S. 7, , 22.06.2019. 9 Yamaguchi, “Strategies of China’s Maritime Actors in the South China Sea: A Coordinated Plan under the Leadership of Xi Jinping?”, p. 24. 10 China Power, How much trade transits the South China Sea?, transits-south-china-sea/, 31.05.2019. 11 Robert D. Kaplan, “Why the South China Sea is so crucial”, Business Insider Austrailia, 20.02.2015, , 30.05.2019.
has expanded its borders in the region after World War II, both on land and at sea, despite of its neighbors.12 China has used these tactics in 1974, when it occupied the Paracel Islands, right after the US withdrew from Vietnam. It also used the same tactics on the Spratly’s in 1988. During that time, both the US and the Soviet Union had other things on their agenda. China used this towards its own benefit and occupied some land in the Spratly archipelago. Another example that could be given is when China occupied Mischief Reef in 1995; however, this time China actually attracted unwanted attention from the US. This unwanted attention led to the first US South China Sea policy, however, this attraction is not significat at all when compared to the 2011 US South China Sea (Rebalance) policy.
China not only uses this strategy in the South China Sea but also the East China Sea, Taiwan and the border of India. So how does China use this strategy? First of all, it starts off by claiming rights over a region and repeats its claim on the region on all the possible platforms. Subsequently, it propagates in response to the claim of the other party, this way the region in question is considered to carry a dispute between China and the other party; at this point, China then uses its military and diplomatic power to resolve the conflict.13 This way China can constantly repeat and increase the power of its actions and have a permanent presence in the claimed region.
⦁ China’s Man-made Islands in the Spratly’s
Although China first occupied the majority of its seven reefs in 1988, it first started building its man-made islands in the Spratly’s in December of 2013. China drained sand from the bottom of the ocean and piled the drained sand on top of the reef, hence forming an artificial island. China continued its soil reclamation activities in 2014. Towards the end of 2014 and in 2015, it started militarizing the islands. The main reason China started militarizing the islands were due to the US control of international trade in the Indian and Pacific Ocean. As of today, there are seven artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago; Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson South Reef, Hughes Reef and Cuarteron Reef (see Figure 3). China built short-range air defense systems with large anti-aircraft guns on each of these islands. The distance of these reefs/man-made islands to mainland China is more than 800 km. It is estimated that 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 cubic meters of gas are in the waters surrounding these artificial islands.14 Subi Reef, Fiery Cross
12 Prabhash K Dutta, “What is China’s salami slicing tactic that Army chief Bipin Rawat talked about?”, India Today, 07.09.2017, general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07, 25.06.2019. 13 Prabhash K Dutta, “What is China’s salami slicing tactic that Army chief Bipin Rawat talked about?”, India Today, 07.09.2017, general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07, 25.06.2019. 14 David Brennan, “U.S. Could ‘Take Down’ Man-Made Islands In South China Sea If It Needed To Says Pentagon Official”, Newsweek, 06.01.2018, islands-south-china-sea-if-it-needed-says-pentagon-952451, 24.05.2019.
Reef and Mischief Reef are amoung the biggest and most equipped of these seven artificial islands. These three islands also form a triangle. Subi Reef is located in the North part of the Spratly archipelago, while Fiery Cross Reef is located in the southwest and Mischief Reef is located in the southeast of the archipelago. Together, it can be said that they form a strategic triangle in the Spratly archipelago. Gaven Reef is located in the center of this triangle while both Johsnon South and Hughes Reef are located amoung the south border of the triangle. Cuarteron Reef is located to the southwest, outside of the triangle but holds great importance strategically.
Figure 3. China’s Artificial Islands in the Spratly Archipelago
Subi Reef is one of the three big and advanced artificial reefs in the are. It is located on the North part of the Spratly archipelago and is 25 nautical miles (nm) from the
⦁ BBC News, China media denounce US warship in South China Sea, 28.10.2015, ⦁ https://www.bbc.com/new⦁ s/world-asia⦁ -china-34655845, 24.05.2019.
Philippines.15 It is a low-tide island that is normally under sea level. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, Philippines and Vietnam. It was first occupied by China in 1988. Later, in 1990, China started construction on the island. In 2014, China started soil reclamation. As of today, the island is home to an access channel, eleven temporary loading piers, a 3000 meter airfield, a large facility, seven possible satellite communication antennas, a possible security watchtower with a radome, reinforced sea walls, a helipad, a pre-existing military facility and three power plants.16
Figure 4. Subi Reef
Fiery Cross Reef is the second of the three advanced artificial islands. It is located on the West part of the Spratly archipelago. It happens to be the most advanced artificial reef in the area. It is estimated to be around 2.740.000 m² and is claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. China started the islands soil reclamation in 2014. The same year, it started the construction of an airfield and completed it by 2015. To better protect the navigation and transportation security in the South China Sea, China also announced it had established a South China Sea Rescue Center in 2019.17 Currently on the reef there is an airfield, a port (630,000 square meters) large enough to accommodate tankers and large surface fighters, multiple cement plants, multiple support buildings, nine temporary loading piers and a pre-existing pier, pre-existing air defense weapons, a possible radar tower under construction, eight possible weapon sites, anti-frogman defense systems, communication equipment, a greenhouse, two heliports, a military facility, a new multi-storey administrative facility adjacent to the airstrip, two lighthouses and ten possible satellite communication antennas.18
15 The Strait Times, Before and after satellite images: What has been built on the reefs that China occupies in the Spratlys, 29.02.2016, images-what-has-been-built-on-disputed-islands-in-the-south, 25.05.2019. 16 Southfront, Island Building in South China Sea, china-sea-review/, 25.05.2019. ⦁ Subi Reef, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, , 05.25.2019. 17 MAREX, “China Establishes South China Sea Rescue Center”, The Maritime Executive, 29.01.2019, , 25.05.2019. 18 Southfront, ibid.
Figure 5. Fiery Cross Reef
Mischief Reef is the last of the three advanced artificial islands that form the triangle and is 129 nm from the Philippines. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It was first occupied by China in 1995, as mentioned before, when it’s salami tactics first attracted unwanted international attention. It is located on the east of the Spratly archipelago. China started soil reclamation on the island in 2015. The island is around 5.580.000 m² and is believed that China is expanding the entrance of the reef to build an naval air station on top of it.19 There is currently an access channel, a fortified sea wall, nine temporary loading docks, nine cement plants, two pre- existing military facilities, a pre-existing shelter for fishermen, and three possible satellite communications antennas on the Mischief Reef.20 Frigate and coast guard ships have also been identified in the surrounding waters, and a huge array of antennas have been established, which is thought to enhance China’s ability to monitor the environment.21
⦁ BBC News, Flying close to Beijing’s new South China Sea islands, 14.12.2015, ⦁ https://www.bbc.com/news/⦁ magazine-35031313⦁ , 24.05.2019; New York Times, What China has been building in the South China Sea, 27.10.2015, ⦁ https://www.nytimes.co⦁ m/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south- china-sea.html,10.05.2018. 19 Southfront, ibid. 20 Southfront, ibid. 21 CNBC, China builds new military facilities on South China Sea islands: think tank, 30.06.2017, , 24.05.2019.
Figure 6. Mischief Reef
Cuarteron Reef is located to the southeast of the “triangle” in the Spratly archipelago. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It was occupied by China in 1988, construction on the island started in 1990 and soil reclamation started in 2014. Although Cuarteron Reef is located outside of the triangle, it is believed to be strategically important. Experts believe that Cuarteron Reef improves China’s abitility to monitor air and sea traffic in the South China Sea, especially in the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, Cuarteron Reef is considered to be strategically significant for the South China Sea. Currently, the reef is equipped with a 125-meter wide access channel, breakwaters, multiple support buildings, three power stations, two heliports and reinforced sea walls.22 Although it is not certain, it is assumed that there are five possible communication antennas, a radar facility, two radar towers under construction, missile sites, a pre-existing large multi-level military facility and a satellite communication antenna.23 It is also thought to contain some kind of short- range ship air defense system with an anti-aircraft.24
⦁ BBC News, https⦁ ://www.bbc.com⦁ /news/⦁ magazine-35031313 and Daniel Bishton, Mischief-Reef- Analysis-1, Spatial Source, 06.03.2018, ⦁ https://www.spatialsource.com.⦁ au/gis-data/satellite-images- reveal-completed-military-bases-spratly-islands/attachment/mischief-reef-analysis-1. 25.05.2019. 22 Southfront, ibid. 23 Amanda Macias, “This satellite image of Chinese construction in South China Sea is a wake-up call to us all”, Business Insider, 14.07.2016, 2016-7, 24.05.2019. 24 AMTI, China’s New Spratly Island Defenses, 13.12.2016, island-defenses/, 25.05.2019.
Figure 7. Cuateron Reef
Gaven Reef is located in the middle of the “triangle”. It is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It is located on the Tizard Banks. It was occupied by China in 1988. There used to just be an old and small facility on the reef but after China’s soil reclamation on the island, it built an artifical island on the bank and connected it with the small facility (see Figure 8.). The reef is believed to contain an anti-aircraft defense system and other small objects; although the objects cannot be identified, they are thought to be a kind of short-range ship air defense system that provides protection against cruise missile attacks.25
Figure 8. Gaven Reef
Johnson South Reef is the sixth reef and is located along the south line of the “triangle”. It is located on Union Bank and is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. It was occupied by China in 1988 after a battle with Vietnam. On the reef there is a 125 meter wide access channel, a concrete plant, defense towers, desalination pumps, a fuel tank, a multi-level military facility, a possible radar facility, a small port and two loading stations, a 3,000 m² port area, four possible gun towers, a lighthouse and a possible solar power farm that contains 44 panels, a pre-existing communication facility, a pre-existing garrison building, two heliports, Ro-ro (roll on, roll off) ports, a large pre-existing military multi-level military facility, a pre-existing pier, reinforced sea walls, three possible satellite
communication antennas, two possible radar towers under construction and two wind turbines.26
Figure 9. Johnson South Reef. The red area indicated in the first photo is the area focused on in the subsequent photos.
The last of the seven reefs is Hughes Reef. Hughes Reef is also located on Union Bank and is to the east of Johnson South Reef. Like Johnson South Reef, it is claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam but unlike Johnson South, it is also claimed by Malaysia. It is normally a low-tide reef and is around 76.000 m². It was occupied by China in 1988 and soil reclamation started in 2014. On the reef there is an access channel, coastal walls, four defense towers, a port of 292,000 m², a 35,350 m² pier, a multi-level military facility, a possible radar facility, a pre-existing helicopter runway, a pre-existing lighthouse, reinforced sea walls and a cement factory.27
Figure 10. Hughes Reef
26 Southfront, ibid. ⦁ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Johnson Reef, , 05.25.2019. 27 Southfront, ibid. ⦁ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Hughes Reef, , 05.26.2019.
⦁ The Evaluation of China’s Artificial Islands in terms of International Law
If we were to evaluate China’s man-made islands according to international law, in this case The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), we can see that these artificial islands are not considered as islands and cannot benefit from an islands legal status. Article 121. Regime of Islands, subparagraph 1 of UNCLOS states that an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide.28 China’s artificial islands are not naturally formed and is not above water at high-tide. Before moving on to the second subparagraph of this article, it is better to move on to subparagraph three to better comprehend subparagraph two of Article 121. Subparagraph three of Regime of Islands state that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own should not have an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.29 From this subparagraph we understand that an island needs to sustain human habitation or have an economic life of their own. Since the word ‘or’ here instead of ‘and’, it indicates that one is enough for a piece of land to be considered as an island. Although China’s man-made islands do not sustain human habitation or economic life on their own, therefore they do not have the right to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. The second subparagraph of Articile 121 states that “Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory”.30 The notions of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf are important here. From this, we can understand that an island has the same marine jurisdictions as any land area, including 12 nm of territorial waters, 200 nm of EEZ and a continental shelf that can exceed 200 nm.31 On the other hand, while it states that states dominating the islands may declare EEZ around the island, artificial islands do not have any rights to maritimes zones besides the 500 meters of security.32
⦁ Why China’s Man-made Islands are Raising Concern ⦁ Conflicts within the Region with South China Sea States
As we mentioned before, the South China Sea is important for its energy resources, fishing and shipping lanes. These are all factors that are both economically and
28 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, PART VIII. REGIME OF ISLANDS, Article 121 (1), p. 66. 29 Ibid., Art. 121 (3). 30 Ibid., Art. 121 (2). 31 Robert C. Beckman, et.al., Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the Joint Developement of Hydrocarbon Resources, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013, p. 55. 32 Cemre Pekcan, “Uluslararası Hukuk Çerçevesinde GÇD Krizinin Değerlendirilmesi”, ANKASAM, Vol. 1 (3) , December 2017, p. 59.
strategically important for South China Sea states, hence they form the basis of the South China Sea territorial conflicts. The five big islands that are located in the South China Sea and are subject to these conflicts are the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Pratas Island and Macclesfield Bank. China claims sovereignity on all of these islands and the waters surrounding them. In fact China claims to have rights on almost all of the South China Sea with it’s “nine-dash line” policy (see Figure 11). Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea are exactly the same as China’s claims, as it’s claims are based on the same elements as China’s claims. Vietnam also claims to have rights on all islands, but unlike China and Taiwan, it doesn’t claim any rightson Pratas Island. The Philippines and Malaysia claim rights on only some features located in the South China Sea. Currently, Brunei doesn’t claim any of the features except for Louisa Reef located in the Spratly archipelago which actually falls within it’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The South China Sea conflicts are and have been a hot topic for awhile within the region between region states, and because China’s man-made islands are located in such a strategic point that gives China the upperhand, China’s man-made islands raise a big concern for region states.
Figure 11. Controversial islands in the South China Sea
If we were to look at these claims accordingly with international law, we can see that the Spratly archipelago only falls within the EEZ zone of the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam (see Figure 12). Some of the islands in the Spratly archipelago actually isn’t located in any states EEZ zone and falls under international waters. China on the
⦁ Some changes were made on map, for original map, see: Craig HILL, “America warns China about South China Sea claims”, China Daily Mail, 03.06.2017, warns-china-about-south-china-sea-claims/, 03.03.2018.
other hand claims to have rights on all of the Spratly archipelago and most of the South China Sea based on it’s “nine-dash line” policy. Some of the South China Sea states openly objected to China’s historical claims and nine-dash line policy and brought this subject to the UN Arbitration Court. On July 1 of 2016, The Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague came to decision that China’s nine-dash line policy, which China used to determine the boundaries of China’s claims in the South China Sea, were not based on a legal basis and China’s actions are contrary to international law.33 However, China rejected the court’s decision and although China is a party to UNCLOS, it had refused to participate in arbitration from the beginning, so the court’s decision does not directly have any binding on China.34
Figure 12. EEZ zones in the South China Sea and China’s Nine-Dash Line Policy
33 Euan Graham, “The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence?”, Council on Foreign Affairs, 18.08.2016, , 23.05.2019. 34 Ibid. ⦁ DW, China keeps building infrastructure on disputed islands in South China Sea, 15.12.2017, ⦁ https://www.dw.com/e⦁ n/china-keeps-⦁ building-infras⦁ tructure-on-disputed-islands-in-south-china-sea/a- 41805980, 17.05.2018.
⦁ China’s Man-made Islands on a Global Level
⦁ China’s ‘Strategic Triangle’ in the South China Sea
The Spratly archipelago consists of 12 island groups with a total of over 100 islands. Half of these islands have been occupied by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam.35 As we mentioned above, China has seven man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago and these seven man-made islands are all located in a way that benefits China. China has also occupied the Paracel Islands and has established 20 advanced outpost on the islands. The biggest island in the Paracel Islands is Woody Island, which China first occupied in 1955. China started soil reclamation activities on the island in 2014 and started militarizing the island in 2015; that being said, China’s military activities on the Paracel Islands are no where near as advanced as it’s military activities in the Spratly Islands. China also has a general control over the Scarborough Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a high-tide reef claimed by China, Taiwan and the Philippines. There are no building built on the reef, but China, which has consistently maintained a coast guard around the reef since 2012, effectively controls the reef.36 The biggest concern here for global dominant states and region states, is the fear of the South China Sea becoming a huge “Chinese Lake”.37 If China were to militarize all three of these island groups, the Spratly’s, Paracels and Scarborough Shoal, then it could form a “strategic triangle” in the South China Sea (see Figure 13). In this case, China would have the ability to control the region under an air defense identity that would cover most of the South China Sea, effectively transforming the sea into a “Chinese lake”, which would pose a serious threat to all region states and global dominant powers such as the US.
35 CIA, The World Factbook, Spratly Islands, world-factbook/geos/pg.html, 03.03.2018. 36 AMTI, Scarborough Shoal, , 02.06.2019. 37 Jesse Johnson, “China planning ‘monitoring station’ on hotly contested South China Sea shoal”, The Japan Times, 17.03.2017, monitoring-station-hotly-contested-south-china-sea-shoal/#.XPfrf4gzY2w, 02.06.2019.
Figure 13. The Strategic Triangle in the South China Sea
⦁ The Strait of Malacca
Another important matter globally is the Strait of Malacca. It is believed that China is building a new strategic maritime route by building artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago and installing land-to-air missiles on the Paracel Islands. The importance of the Strait of Malacca globally for both economic and strategic matters was mentioned earlier. After passing the Strait of Malacca, ships would have to pass by Spratly Archipelago and the Paracel Islands in order to pass through the South China Sea. Therefore, the dominant power or state controlling this region would be the dominant power of the South China Sea in general. The dominant power of the South China Sea would also be considered a global power at seas, as a third of the world’s
maritime trade passes through it. This is why China’s man-made islands in the Spratly’s, especially Cuarteron Reef for this matter, is important for the future of the Strait of Malacca.
⦁ China’s Progress in the Region
Last of all, China’s man-made islands raise a global concern for the island chains in the Asia-Pacific. China currently has a general control over the Spratly archipelago and the Scarborough Shoal which are along the south part of the First Island Chain. If China were to have control over Taiwan too, it would be the dominant power within the First Island Chain (see Figure 14). This is something the US and Japan especially want to prevent because then China would move on to the Second Island Chain. This is why both countries are closely involved with China’s actions towards Taiwan.
Figure 14. The Island Chains in the Asia-Pacific
⦁ Right Side News, The United States Should Lead with Power and Purpose on China, 29.12.2013, ⦁ https://www.rightsidenews.com/us/hom⦁ eland-security/the-united-states-should-lead-with-power-and- purpose-on-china/, 25.06.2019.
Conclusion
China’s man-made islands are a concern both regionally, for South China Sea states, and globally, for dominant powers at sea. These artificial islands are a result of China’s successful salami-slicing tactics. The artificial islands are strategically located in an area which gives China a great advantage for both economical and strategical reasons and complete China’s wish to gain control over the South China Sea, which it sees as it’s own ‘backyard’. These islands give China the mobility it desires in the Spratly archipelago. Combined with other islands China has control over, they form the South China Sea into what can be referred to as a “Chinese Lake”. Because of this control, China is currently the dominant power in the South China Sea and it’s man-made islands are one of the main reasons China is where it is.
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China is at once a continental power and a maritime power (haiyang daguo) and it possesses broad maritime strategic interests…These achievements have laid a solid foundation for building a strong maritime power (haiyang qiangguo).
Xi Jinping
International community and scholar’s discussion now the post-Cold War world as we know it is coming to an end that great power politics is back, consequently the role of naval forces national navies will continue to grow. Indeed, the XXI st century will be the rise of China’s dramatic economic growth over the past two decades has fundamentally changed the global and regional geo-economic and geo-political landscapes its wider implications for international politics form the most important issue in our time. The main goal of Xi’s signature initiative- Belt and Road Initiative- BRI, with current estimates ranging between $1 to $8 trillion and some 70 countries involved -is to expand Chinese global political and economic networks and to secure a more active position in “global governance” without waiting for the West to give China more roles and responsibilities in existing institutions. In spite of historical Chinese foreign policy objectives mainly focused on land territories; new strategic doctrine of the Chinese is organized around the will to make the Pacific Sea and to expand its immediate maritime interests. Beijing has been serious changing policy objectives recently toward solidifying a sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific. China also has expanded its maritime reach as it modernizes its navy and air force. China’s ongoing maritime transformation from a traditional land power to a sea power. As Andrew Erickson argues, “China’s naval build-up is only part of an extraordinary maritime transformation-modern history’s sole example of a land power becoming a hybrid land-sea power and sustaining such an exceptional status. Underwriting this transition are a vast network of ports, shipping lines and financial systems, and-of course-increasingly advanced ships.” At the beginning of 2017, the Chinese Navy had 328 ships. It now possesses nearly 350 ships and is already larger than the U.S. Navy. China is the largest ship-producing country in the world and at current production rates could soon operate 400 ships. Its commissions nearly three submarines each year, and in two years will have more than 70 in its fleet. The Chinese Navy also operates growing numbers of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, all equipped with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Between 2013 and 2016, China commissioned more than 30 modern corvettes. At current rates, China could have 430 surface ships and 100 submarines within the next 15 years. China’s leaders are laying both the intellectual and material groundwork for out-of-area ventures. As a result,
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chiefs aim to guaranteed passage about access from the time a ship leaves harbor China sea and the Pacific in East Asia until the time it docks in an Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, or European seaport. Unfortunately for Chinese leaders and national-level documents characterize the goal of becoming a maritime power as essential to China’s national development strategy. China making a quick move to secure a military or strategic advantage in the Pacific region. The international community has been viewing China’s recent moves challenge the status quo relating to the seas as representing “maritime expansion,” and the Chinese themselves have come to talk about making their country a maritime power. The 18th Party Congress thus marks an important defining moment. China’s future is to be a haiyang qiangguo-that is, a strong or great maritime power. However, China has also been cooperating with neighbors to establish codes of conduct to reduce conflict in the maritime arena.
The Chinese navy justifies itself to its neighbors, necessarily worried, by the necessity of escorting the commercial vessels essential to the economy of the country; but it is known that the priority of the new strategies. Beijing considers the majority of the South China Sea to be its sovereign territory, a claim that is disputed by international law. China’s military have been turning what were once small rocks and reefs into heavily fortified remote military installations. These installations give China a strategic advantage. The installation on the Spratly Islands, for example, has the capacity to deploy fighter aircraft that could control key shipping lanes. The commander of US forces in the Indo-Pacific, Admiral Philip Davidson, said during his confirmation hearing that China is capable of dominating the South China Sea in “all scenarios short of war.” This academic article aim to briefly analysis that will transition China’s passivity naval modernization policy into maritime power.
The nation of Israel is galloping blindly toward Bar Kochba’s war on the Roman Empire. The result of that conflict was 2,000 years of exile.
By Shabtai Shavit
Menachem Begin before an image of David Ben-Gurion
From the beginning of Zionism in the late 19th century, the Jewish nation in the Land of Israel has been growing stronger in terms of demography and territory, despite the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. We have succeeded in doing so because we have acted with wisdom and stratagem rather than engaging in a foolish attempt to convince our foes that we were in the right.
Today, for the first time since I began forming my own opinions, I am truly concerned about the future of the Zionist project. I am concerned about the critical mass of the threats against us on the one hand, and the government’s blindness and political and strategic paralysis on the other. Although the State of Israel is dependent upon the United States, the relationship between the two countries has reached an unprecedented low point. Europe, our biggest market, has grown tired of us and is heading toward imposing sanctions on us. For China, Israel is an attractive high-tech project, and we are selling them our national assets for the sake of profit. Russia is gradually turning against us and supporting and assisting our enemies.
Anti-Semitism and hatred of Israel have reached dimensions unknown since before World War II. Our public diplomacy and public relations have failed dismally, while those of the Palestinians have garnered many important accomplishments in the world. University campuses in the West, particularly in the U.S., are hothouses for the future leadership of their countries. We are losing the fight for support for Israel in the academic world. An increasing number of Jewish students are turning away from Israel. The global BDS movement (boycott, divestment, sanctions) against Israel, which works for Israel’s delegitimization, has grown, and quite a few Jews are members.
In this age of asymmetrical warfare we are not using all our force, and this has a detrimental effect on our deterrent power. The debate over the price of Milky pudding snacks and its centrality in public discourse demonstrate an erosion of the solidarity that is a necessary condition for our continued existence here. Israelis’ rush to acquire a foreign passport, based as it is on the yearning for foreign citizenship, indicates that people’s feeling of security has begun to crack.
I am concerned that for the first time, I am seeing haughtiness and arrogance, together with more than a bit of the messianic thinking that rushes to turn the conflict into a holy war. If this has been, so far, a local political conflict that two small nations have been waging over a small and defined piece of territory, major forces in the religious Zionist movement are foolishly doing everything they can to turn it into the most horrific of wars, in which the entire Muslim world will stand against us.
I also see, to the same extent, detachment and lack of understanding of international processes and their significance for us. This right wing, in its blindness and stupidity, is pushing the nation of Israel into the dishonorable position of “the nation shall dwell alone and not be reckoned among the nations” (Numbers 23:9).
I am concerned because I see history repeating itself. The nation of Israel is galloping blindly in a time tunnel to the age of Bar Kochba and his war on the Roman Empire. The result of that conflict was several centuries of national existence in the Land of Israel followed by 2,000 years of exile.
I am concerned because as I understand matters, exile is truly frightening only to the state’s secular sector, whose world view is located on the political center and left. That is the sane and liberal sector that knows that for it, exile symbolizes the destruction of the Jewish people. The Haredi sector lives in Israel only for reasons of convenience. In terms of territory, Israel and Brooklyn are the same to them; they will continue living as Jews in exile, and wait patiently for the arrival of the Messiah.
The religious Zionist movement, by comparison, believes the Jews are “God’s chosen.” This movement, which sanctifies territory beyond any other value, is prepared to sacrifice everything, even at the price of failure and danger to the Third Commonwealth. If destruction should take place, they will explain it in terms of faith, saying that we failed because “We sinned against God.” Therefore, they will say, it is not the end of the world. We will go into exile, preserve our Judaism and wait patiently for the next opportunity.
I recall Menachem Begin, one of the fathers of the vision of Greater Israel. He fought all his life for the fulfillment of that dream. And then, when the gate opened for peace with Egypt, the greatest of our enemies, he gave up Sinai – Egyptian territory three times larger than Israel’s territory inside the Green Line – for the sake of peace. In other words, some values are more sacred than land. Peace, which is the life and soul of true democracy, is more important than land.
I am concerned that large segments of the nation of Israel have forgotten, or put aside, the original vision of Zionism: to establish a Jewish and democratic state for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel. No borders were defined in that vision, and the current defiant policy is working against it.
What can and ought to be done? We need to create an Archimedean lever that will stop the current deterioration and reverse today’s reality at once. I propose creating that lever by using the Arab League’s proposal from 2002, which was partly created by Saudi Arabia. The government must make a decision that the proposal will be the basis of talks with the moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
The government should do three things as preparation for this announcement:
1) It should define a future negotiating strategy for itself, together with its position on each of the topics included in the Arab League’s proposal.
2) It should open a secret channel of dialogue with the United States to examine the idea, and agree in advance concerning our red lines and about the input that the U.S. will be willing to invest in such a process.
3) It should open a secret American-Israeli channel of dialogue with Saudi Arabia in order to reach agreements with it in advance on the boundaries of the topics that will be raised in the talks and coordinate expectations. Once the secret processes are completed, Israel will announce publicly that it is willing to begin talks on the basis of the Arab League’s document.
I have no doubt that the United States and Saudi Arabia, each for its own reasons, will respond positively to the Israeli initiative, and the initiative will be the lever that leads to a dramatic change in the situation. With all the criticism I have for the Oslo process, it cannot be denied that for the first time in the conflict’s history, immediately after the Oslo Accords were signed, almost every Arab country started talking with us, opened its gates to us and began engaging in unprecedented cooperative ventures in economic and other fields.
Although I am not so naïve as to think that such a process will bring the longed-for peace, I am certain that this kind of process, long and fatiguing as it will be, could yield confidence-building measures at first and, later on, security agreements that both sides in the conflict will be willing to live with. The progress of the talks will, of course, be conditional upon calm in the security sphere, which both sides will be committed to maintaining. It may happen that as things progress, both sides will agree to look into mutual compromises that will promote the idea of coexisting alongside one another. If mutual trust should develop – and the chances of that happening under American and Saudi Arabian auspices are fairly high – it will be possible to begin talks for the conflict’s full resolution as well.
An initiative of this kind requires true and courageous leadership, which is hard to identify at the moment. But if the prime minister should internalize the severity of the mass of threats against us at this time, the folly of the current policy, the fact that this policy’s creators are significant elements in the religious Zionist movement and on the far right, and its devastating results – up to the destruction of the Zionist vision – then perhaps he will find the courage and determination to carry out the proposed action.
I wrote the above statements because I feel that I owe them to my parents, who devoted their lives to the fulfillment of Zionism; to my children, my grandchildren and to the nation of Israel, which I served for decades.
Nov 21 (Reuters) – If Turkey buys a missile defense system from China, it would not be able to integrate it with NATO or U.S. systems and would miss out on decades of training, support and upgrades that come with U.S. systems, a top U.S. official said at the Dubai Airshow.
Heidi Grant, Air Force deputy undersecretary for international affairs, said Turkey was a sovereign country and had the right to spend its funds on whatever it liked.
But U.S. officials have explained to Turkey that proceeding with a decision to purchase a system made by a Chinese firm under U.S. sanctions would reduce its ability to coordinate missile defense activities with NATO and the United States.
“If they select a system that’s not inter-operable, that’s their choice. They’ve chosen not to be inter-operable,” Grant told Reuters in an interview. “Our role is to make sure they’re informed of our recommendation of the best systems to be inter-operable with the U.S.”
Grant said military officials around the world were clamoring for increased ability to operate in coalitions with the United States and other partners.
“In the dialogues I have, the partners want to be part of us,” Grant said. “They know that our technology is the most capable technology. They know that we’ll be there for 20-plus years for the sustainment, for the training, for the (concept of operations), and for the upgrades. We’re a trusted partner.”
General Akin Ozturk, the head of the Turkish air force, on Saturday told an air chiefs conference his country’s decision to buy a $3.4 billion missile defense system from a Chinese company was not final, and could still change.
Turkey announced in September it had chosen the FD-2000 long-range air and missile defense system built by China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corp over rival offers from Franco-Italian Eurosam SAMP/T and Raytheon Co.
It said China offered the most competitive terms and would allow co-production in Turkey, but the decision caused alarm in NATO countries worried about China’s growing clout. The Chinese firm is also under U.S. sanctions for violating the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
Reuters reported last week that Raytheon and Lockheed Martin Corp are considering ways to sweeten their offer to build a Patriot missile defense system for Turkey, although no decisions had been made.
Industry executives familiar with the matter this week told Reuters that U.S. government officials had been very pro-active in terms of trying to understand Turkey’s decision and what changes could be made to the U.S. offering.
“The question is what does Turkey want, what does Turkey need to change the decision. That’s really the root of the issue and that is being assessed by the U.S. government right now. It’s truly government led,” said one industry executive who was not authorized to speak publicly.
Industry executives said Raytheon’s Patriot offering was over $1 billion more expensive than the Chinese system chosen by Turkey, but China also offered higher levels of technology transfer and co-production.
“The gap is uncloseable with a price reduction,” said one of the executives.
Turkey’s choice of a Chinese system is complicated by the fact that the manufacturer is under U.S. sanctions for shipping equipment to banned countries.
Turkey has dismissed the notion that any of its defence firms would be blacklisted if they work with CPMIEC.
Murad Bayar, Turkey’s Undersecretary for Defence Industries, told Reuters at a NATO industry forum last week that Turkish firms had worked with China on past weapons deals and he did not expect them to face sanctions given strict rules aimed at ensuring compliance with NATO regulations.
“The procedures on clearance are seriously followed by these companies and we don’t see a big risk in this regard,” Bayar said, adding that Turkey “vigorously” applied the rules.
“The U.S. sanctions on CPMIEC are a result of U.S. legislation and concern the U.S.’s own procurement. This could only involve Turkish companies if there is a violation,” he said. “But … we don’t think such a risk would materialise.”
via AIRSHOW-Turkey’s Chinese missile system won’t work with US, NATO- US official | Reuters.
Turkey’s PM Tayyip Erdogan makes a speech during the Global Alcohol Policy Symposium in Istanbul (MURAD SEZER, REUTERS / April 26, 2013)
ALMATY (Reuters) – NATO member Turkey signed up on Friday to became a “dialogue partner” of a security bloc dominated by China and Russia, and declared that its destiny is in Asia.
“This is really a historic day for us,” Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said in Kazakhstan’s commercial capital Almaty after signing a memorandum of understanding with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretary General Dmitry Mezentsev.
“Now, with this choice, Turkey is declaring that our destiny is the same as the destiny of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) countries.”
China, Russia and four Central Asian nations – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – formed the SCO in 2001 as a regional security bloc to fight threats posed by radical Islam and drug trafficking from neighboring Afghanistan.
