Category: Turkmenistan

  • Foreign Business in Turkmenistan: to be or not to be

    Foreign Business in Turkmenistan: to be or not to be

    turkmenbusBy Merdan Shakhnazarov

    Open Door policy announced by Ashkhabad strongly increased the flow of foreign investors, hoping either to enter new market with their product or to profit from work contracts in formerly closed Turkmenistan. Evidently the power sector attracts the most foreign interest.  But experts of oil and gas market often underestimate the risks of their business in Turkmenistan, and after first taste of the local reality give up their plans of conquering the market. Among the factors that influence the decision not to come to Ashkhabad are the following: imperfection of laws, corruption and lawlessness of public servants, financial difficulties, non-disclosure of information about failure of foreign investors on the local market. We shall consider some of these.

    Corruption

    International nongovernmental organization Transparency International regularly includes Turkmenistan in the list of most corrupted countries.   This estimation should be some kind of indicator for foreign investors, wishing to start their business in that central Asian republic.

    Evidences of corruption are to be traced not only in the state structure but in all the spheres of life. On one hand it seems to ease the process of getting contracts, while bribery makes communication with  paper pushers easier. But it often turns out that businessmen spend a lot of money to establish contact with Turkmenian authorities but finally back at the bottom of the ladder.

    In some cases foreign investors who came across with local reality are no more capable of doing business in such conditions. According to a businessmen from UAE, who planned to invest  in development of Avaza resort, before he even started his activity he  faced severe retaliatory measures of local law-enforcement authorities, who confiscated his immovable property.

    At meanwhile the nephew of the President under cover of the name of G. Berdimukhamedov started to squeeze money from the Arabian businessman. These circumstances forced the businessmen to refuse from his plans in that country.

    It is difficult for a western businessmen, used to transparent and open business to negotiate with Turkmenian partners, who are vivid representatives of eastern civilization with its contrivances and half-words. There have occurred some cases, when Turkmen representatives of authority agreed to sign a contract with foreign company,  but the procedure of signing extended for an indefinite period.

    Ashkhabad financial difficulties

    Despite of launching Turkmenistan-China pipeline, expending gas pipeline in Iran, cutting down the volume of gas sales  in Russia caused decrease of revenue side of the state budget. In that regard Ashkhabad tries to decrease the budgetary gap, cutting down the expenses for second-term projects, and in some cases putting them on hold at all.

    For instance according to one of the employees of “Sekhil”, Turkish company, many of his nationals experience problems with financing in Turkmenistan now. For that reason the project of recreational resort in the resort area Avaza, developed by Sekhil by the order of Turkmenbashy complex of oil refinery plants is at risk.

    Some other companies, including Ozaylar and Ichkale experience same problems. Of course the management of Turkish companies is strongly unsatisfied with arrears in payments by Turkmen authorities, for it forces them to carry on the works at their own cost or take credits.

    Another indicator of financial difficulties, experienced by Ashkhabad, is borrowing funds from strategic partners. For instance in may of the previous year during his visit to PRC President Berdimukhamedov negotiated a grand from Beijing in the amount of $ 10 Mln.

    This amount even though granted on non-repayable basis and without any interest, still has its aim to secure economical preferences and to strengthen PCR’s position on the national market.

    Financial difficulties also force Turkmenistan to pay back foreign companies, carrying out important projects in Turkmenistan, by gas supply contracts. For example investments of the Iran Railways into construction of the a section of the railway Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan –Iran is to be repaid by Ashkhabad by supplying liquefied gas for 4 years.

    Non-disclosure of information about failures of foreign investors

    For foreign business considers the power sector to be the most attractive, it is important to notice, that investment into hydrocarbon field development is not always self-liquidate.

    For example in 2002 American ExxonMobil decided to stop works in Turkmenistan and close representative offices in Balkanabad and Ashkhabad. This was due to failed drilling in Garashsyzlyk, one of Turkmenistan’s biggest minefields. American company was operating the «Garashsyzlyk-2» project, the respective production-sharing contract for 25 years was signed in 1998. Low commercial impact of the block forced Americans to cancel the contract halfway in spite of the discontent and pressure of the Turkmenistan party.

    It’s also known, that in the beginning of 2000s TPAO, Turkish corporation experienced failure on one of the blocks, it had to scale down its activity and live the country.

    Therefore only those foreign companies shall obtain a place in the hot Turkmen sun near gas jets, who are ready to make immense material and moral investments, fight the pressure of the «guardians of law» and to fall on hard times. At the same time they have to be ready to patiently wait for repayments and possibility of inefficient Turkmen field development.

  • Big Powers May Not Save Kyrgyzstan

    Big Powers May Not Save Kyrgyzstan

    If Kyrgyz-style violence should radiate across borders in Central Asia, the result could be a rise in Islamic militancy that would directly threaten Russia and the United States.
    Diplomatic Memo

    Value to Big Powers May Not Save Kyrgyzstan

    MEMO articleLarge

    Bryan Denton for The New York Times

    Roza Otunbayeva, the head of the provisional government in Kyrgyzstan, landing by helicopter in the southern city of Osh on Friday, after days of ethnic fighting there.

    By ELLEN BARRY
    Published: June 18, 2010

    MOSCOW — A year and a half ago, the world’s great powers were fighting like polecats over Kyrgyzstan, a landlocked stretch of mountains in the heart of Central Asia.

    Related

    • Some Refugees Begin Returning to Kyrgyzstan (June 19, 2010)
    • Times Topic: Kyrgyzstan

    The United States was ferociously holding on to the Manas Air Base, a transit hub considered crucial to NATO efforts in Afghanistan. Russia was so jealous of its traditional dominance in the region that it promised the Kyrgyz president $2.15 billion in aid the day he announced he was closing Manas. With the bidding war that followed, Kyrgyzstan could be forgiven for seeing itself as a global player. And yet for the past week, as spasms of violence threatened to break Kyrgyzstan apart, its citizens saw their hopes for an international intervention flicker and die. With each day it has become clearer that none of Kyrgyzstan’s powerful allies — most pointedly, its former overlords in Moscow — were prepared to get involved in a quagmire. Russia did send in several hundred paratroopers, but only to defend its air base at Kant. For the most part, the powers have evacuated their citizens, apparently content to wait for the conflict to burn itself out. The calculus was a pragmatic one, made “without the smallest thought to the moral side of the question,” said Aleksei V. Vlasov, an expert in the politics of post-Soviet countries at Moscow State University. “We use the phrase ‘collective responsibility,’ but in fact this is a case of collective irresponsibility,” he added. “While they were fighting about whatever — about bases, about Afghanistan — they forgot that in the south of Kyrgyzstan there was extreme danger. The city was flammable. All they needed to do was throw a match on it.” He referred to the city of Osh, which suffered days of ethnic rioting. Kyrgyzstan might have unraveled anyway, but competition between Moscow and Washington certainly sped the process. To lock in its claim on the base after the threat of expulsion, the United States offered President Kurmanbek S. Bakiyev $110 million to back out of his agreement with Russia, which had already paid him $450 million. Congratulating itself on its victory, Washington raised the stakes by announcing the construction of several military training facilities in Kyrgyzstan, including one in the south, which further irritated Moscow. This spring, the Kremlin won back its lost ground, employing a range of soft-power tactics to undermine Mr. Bakiyev’s government. Mr. Bakiyev was ousted by a coalition of opposition leaders in April, and conditions in Kyrgyzstan’s south — still loyal to the old government — hurtled toward disaster. “Let’s be honest, Kyrgyzstan is turning into a collapsing state, or at least part of it is, and what was partially responsible is this geopolitical tug of war we had,” said Alexander A. Cooley, who included Manas in a recent book about the politics of military bases. “In our attempts to secure these levers of influence and support the governing regime, we destabilized these state institutions. We are part of that dynamic.” Last week, as pillars of smoke rose off Osh and Jalal-Abad, citizens begged for third-party peacekeepers to replace local forces they suspected of having taken part in the violence. Roza Otunbayeva, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s interim government, asked Moscow for peacekeepers, and when that request was denied, for troops to protect strategic sites like power plants and reservoirs. She asked Washington to contribute armored vehicles from the base at Manas, which she said would be used to transport the dead and wounded, she told the Russian newspaper Kommersant. So far, Moscow and Washington have responded mostly with humanitarian aid pledges — late on Friday, Russia’s Defense Ministry said that Ms. Otunbayeva’s request was still under consideration. The United States, overextended in Afghanistan and Iraq, has neither the appetite nor the motivation for a new commitment. Russia, the more obvious player, sees the risks of a deployment outweighing the benefits. Russian troops would enter hostile territory in south Kyrgyzstan, where Mr. Bakiyev’s supporters blame Moscow for his overthrow, and Uzbekistan could also revolt against a Russian presence. Mr. Vlasov, of Moscow State University, said: “Who are we separating? Uzbeks from Kyrgyz? Krygyz from Kyrgyz? Kyrgyz from some criminal element? There is no clearly defined cause of this conflict. It would be comparable to the decision the Soviet Politburo made to invade Afghanistan — badly thought through, not confirmed by the necessary analytical work.” If the explosion of violence was a test case for the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an eight-year-old post-Soviet security group dominated by Russia, it seems to have failed, its leaders unwilling to intervene in a domestic standoff. In any case, neither the Russian public nor the county’s foreign policy establishment is pressing the Kremlin to risk sending peacekeepers. “If you send them, you have to shoot sooner or later,” said Sergei A. Karaganov, a prominent political scientist in Moscow. “Then you are not a peacekeeper, but something else.” Though it seems that the worst of the violence has passed, great challenges remain. Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis is an unstable state at the heart of a dangerous region. The Ferghana Valley, bordering Afghanistan, is a minefield of religious fundamentalism, drug trafficking and ethnic hatreds. If Kyrgyz-style violence should radiate across borders in Central Asia, the result could be a rise in Islamic militancy that would directly threaten Russia and the United States. The failure of international institutions last week should alarm both capitals. President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia began their relationship with the crisis over the Manas base, and as they grope toward tentative collaboration in the post-Soviet space, Kyrgyzstan has dominated their conversation. Now, Kyrgyzstan needs help building a stable government that knits together the north and the south. Dmitri V. Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, suggested that NATO should be working with the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to develop a mechanism for collective action. The next time a Central Asian country is wobbling at the edge of a precipice, he said, someone must be prepared to accept responsibility. “You can abstain from a local conflict in Kyrgyzstan,” Mr. Trenin said. “You can close your eyes to it — it’s bad for your conscience — but you can live with it. If something happens in Uzbekistan, you will not be able to just let it burn out.”

  • Debate on Caspian Sea and future of Nabucco gas pipeline project

    Debate on Caspian Sea and future of Nabucco gas pipeline project

    Nabucco gas pipeline, which emerged in the recent history of energy, can create new opportunities for the EU countries to check the monopoly of Russia over their gas supply. This project is not only important for the diversification of gas supplies of the EU countries, but also will bring new advantages and stakes to the different countries while passing them through. Some of these countries are the post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan that intend to provide the natural gas resources for the following project. As obvious, these gas providers are the littoral Caspian Sea countries that legally dispute over the demarcation of the mentioned sea. Will it create difficulties for the realization of the Nabucco project? Or intentions of these states to join Nabucco will ease the dispute and push them towards concessions? 

    KEY WORDS: Nabucco gas pipeline, the Caspian Sea, demarcation, legal status, International Court of Arbitration, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, the EU

     Introduction

    The Nabucco gas pipeline is one of the hot issues among the planned projects those are on the agenda. The main problem that has been discussing till today is the natural gas sources of the following project. The first planned gas will come from Caspian Sea sources where the legal status of the sea is not solved completely yet. For that reason, all the issue of Caspian Sea legal status which related with the Nabucco project will analyze in this research paper. In the first part will analyze potential resources of the project and their opportunity in order to join the Nabucco pipeline. In this perspective there mainly will investigate Caspian Sea resources. Then in the second part will focus on the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea and its negotiation process. At the result of the negotiation there were signed the agreement between Caspian littoral states which also will analyze in second part. Later, in the third part will investigate sectoral dispute between two costal states of Caspian Sea –Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan around the same oil and gas fields in the sea border of the two countries. Moreover, Ashgabat decide to send the issue to International Court of Arbitration which it can influence the realization of the Nabucco gas pipeline project. On the other hand, there are also will examine the intentions of Baku and Ashgabat toward the Nabucco project.

    The thesis of this paper is that the realizing of Nabucco project mainly depends on the Central Asian gas resources. To active this project, Trans-Caspian pipeline must not be forgotten. Since, there is a strong relationship between these two lines. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could not be realized it due to possible Russian influence. Thus, they need at least one of the Western countries or US guarantee to realize it. Because of the construction of these pipelines can influence to Russian gas monopoly all over the Europe. However, problem is that today EU counters could not construct a union energy policy which they try to make it individually with Russia or others.

    In order to analyze every part of the issue, firstly it was used traditional method in which historical development is based on. Additionally, there were online resources which including official statements, and other reliable academic papers.

    Potential resources and problem overview of Nabucco project

    The Nabucco project represents a new gas pipeline connecting the Caspian region, Central Asia, Middle East via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary with Austria and further on with the Central and Western European gas markets[1]. In order to realize the project, the Caspian Sea gas resources are very essential, as the first stage of the project gas will come from Azerbaijan, which there is only Azerbaijan gas guarantee until now. Moreover, staying of the instability in the Middle East decreases the opportunity of this region in order to join the project and increases the importance of the Caspian Sea resources. On the other hand, for connecting the Iraq gas to Nabucco gas pipeline there is a need for a new pipeline between Turkey and Iraq which is a part of the Arab Gas pipeline. Besides, Iran is one of the alternative gas providers to Nabucco project with its enormous reserves but there is a problem about its underdevelopment gas infrastructure that needs huge investment. Also, the US is against the participation of Iran in the Nabucco project until solving the nuclear problems in this country. Because of all these reasons the Caspian Sea reserves are fundamental for realizing this project.

    Despite of the expectations of the European Union, there is a problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which from 1991 till today could not be solved by the littoral states in this region. There is another problem as well. The Trans-Caspian pipeline that is planned to transport Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Baku has not been constructed yet, which will be joined Nabucco gas pipeline. Additionally, on July 2009 increasing dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan around the Caspian Sea oil and gas fields, where Turkmenistan has decided to send the issue to International Arbitrage, could create another difficulty for realization of the Nabucco project. This dispute stems from the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea that will be discussed bellow.

    The unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea 

    The Caspian region is one of the main energy bases and one of the major economic assets in the world. There are huge oil and gas reserves here, which are currently attempted to be fully improved and be transported to the world markets. Its oil reserves estimated to be 18-35 billion barrels that near to the United States (22 billion) and the North Sea (17 billion barrels) oil reserves.[2] Additionally, the region has a huge capacity of gas reserves as well, which is approximately 236-337 trillion cubic feet[3].   

    After the establishment of the USSR, the legal status of the Caspian Sea is defined by the agreement between the Soviet Russia and Iran (Persia) without participation of the other Caspian littoral states. This agreement was signed between these two states on 26 February 1921. Another agreement on Trade and Navigation between the USSR and Iran was signed on 25 March 1940[4]. Later, in 1949, the Soviet Union began to use the Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources in the offshore area centered in the costal part of the Caspian Sea of Azerbaijan. It is worthwhile to mention that before the exploration in the fields of Siberia of the USSR in 1960s, the most productive region was Azerbaijan in the Soviet Union[5].On the other hand, until 1970, the USSR part of the Caspian Sea was used as a common sea among Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. After that in 1970 according to the new amendment, this area was divided among the Soviet littoral states[6]. According to this amendment, Kazakhstan got 29%, Azerbaijan 20%, Russia 19%, Turkmenistan 18% and Iran 14% of the Caspian Sea[7].

    After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the Caspian Sea littoral states got their independence, they intended to determine the new status of Caspian Sea. In this period every littoral state’s perspective was different from others and they couldn’t achieve an agreement. Because, this process took place without pre-planning and, obviously, the littoral states were not ready for that in 1991-1992.  From the beginning, Azerbaijan was an only state that proposed the sectoral division via the median line method of the Caspian Sea, which now is accepted by the all other littoral states of the Caspian Sea but only except Iran.[8]

    Despite of the disagreement between the coastal states, Azerbaijan signed the “Contract of Century” in 1994 with the largest oil companies in the world in order to corporate and explore the Caspian Sea off shore fields in the Azerbaijan sector. With this event, the Caspian Sea became one of the major geo-strategic areas and energy sources of the world. However, in this period the Caspian Sea was not a part of the economic plans of Iran and Tehran considered the fact of the occurrence of the western oil companies in the Caspian Basin as a political danger to its national security. Moreover, Russia also could not accept this agreement because of the old imperialistic ambitions in the South Caucasus[9].

    After, singeing of the “Contract of Century” the Caspian littoral states could make an agreement and it was the first phase of the negotiations period. Russia and Kazakhstan could come to the agreement on the division of the northern part of the Caspian Sea to realize sovereign rights on subsoil use from July 6, 1998[10]. Later than, Azerbaijan also joined the contract, where at the beginning of the negations process her propose was the same. The signing of this agreement was very important, because the Caspian Sea costal states found a solution to the main legal problem of the Caspian Sea about its status and ways of the using it. The basin’s sectional division was admitted by all littoral states, except Iran.  Additionally, this agreement put a quota on the fishery and bioresearches in the Caspian Sea because of the threat of extinction[11].

    With the signing of the agreement, a dispute occurred between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan because of the distribution of the Caspian three oil and gas fields – Kapaz (Turkmenistan calls it Serdar), Azeri (Omar) and Chirag (Osman).  Even, in 2001 the Embassy of Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan was closed. Nevertheless, the relationship of two states began to normalize in the time of new and current President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, and there were signed some good intention documents[12]. Then, bilateral negotiations constantly started between the two sides in order to solve the problem in the sea borders of the two states.   

    The bases of the bilateral negotiations have been constructed in the middle line principle and it was taken as a basis, which is also accepted in the international practice. The middle line concludes from the last costal point of territory of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. However, the problem is that, Ashgabat suggests that “Absheron peninsula and Chilov Island should not be taken into consideration while delimitating the Caspian Sea between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.[13]” If the two states border are delimitated from the Absheron peninsula and Chilov Island, there are two oil and gas fields – Azeri (Omar) and Chirag (Osman), which should be included into Azerbaijani territory of the Caspian Sea. Conversely, if these territories should not be taken into consideration while delimitating the Caspian Sea borders between these two states, these two oil and gas fields will be included into Turkmenistan area of the Caspian Sea.

    Despite of these expectations of Ashgabat, there is no any international practice like this, which one territory should not be taken into consideration while delimitating the sea borders between two or more states. Besides, Absheron peninsula is not a small territory in the Caspian Sea that can be ignored while measurement. It lies down nearly 60 km towards the Caspian Sea, in which approximately 1/3 population of Azerbaijan lives. Additionally, the capital city of Azerbaijan is placed at the same area[14].

    Moreover, there is another dispute around the field of Kapaz (Turkmenistan calls it Serdar), where, according to Ashgabat, belonged to Turkmenistan sector of the Caspian Sea during the Soviet period. However, according to Baku- after the 1970 amendment in the USSR’s Caspian Sea law, the border line passed through from the center of Kapaz (Serdar) field. Furthermore, this filed is revealed by Azerbaijani oilman in the Soviet time and today Baku wants to extract it from Turkmenistan.

             The International Court of Arbitration and the intentions of Baku and Ashgabat

    On the other hand, the bilateral negotiations has been continuing from 1999 till today between two parts and last meeting was realized in Baku on July 15-17 2009. After the last meeting, President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow ordered to address the international experts and high-degree lawyers to learn the Azerbaijan’s claims over the disputed fields in the Caspian Sea and legality of the foreign oil-gas companies operating in those fields, and then, intent to send the documents to the International Court of Arbitration.  It should be also mentioned that before this statement, in the meeting of governments on July 10, Berdimuhamedow stressed that they (Turkmenistan) want to participate in Nabucco project[15], where there is seemed a contradiction between his two statements. Because, sending the dispute issue to an international court can cause a problem for realization of Nabucco project[16] from the point of view prestige. Since, may be an investments would not want to put investment to the project which its source in the International court.

     Nevertheless, Ashgabat decide to send issue to the International Arbitration may be there is different intention of Berdimuhamedow. Because, Turkmenistan is one of the largest global reserves and it is the largest producer of gas in the region with production of 2.0 tcf/yr, it accounts for almost two-thirds gas output of the region[17]. When Berdimuhamedow came to power, one of his priorities in the foreign policy was the diversification of energy transport roots to the world market. There is an attractive opportunity- is the Nabucco project, which completely depends on Turkmen gas to be realized at the end, because, Azerbaijani gas is not enough to fulfill the Nabucco gas pipeline.

    There is one of the main obstacles for Ashgabat to join Nabucco project is the unconstructed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline that aims to transfer Turkmen gas to Baku. Moreover, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan could not realize it together, because there are needs the Western encouragements to the both sides[18]. One can assume that the unexpected Turkmen move at this time aimed “specifically at attaining some more concessions from the West, especially given the current huge interest of the latter to get the Nabucco project swiftly implemented”[19].

    Meanwhile, there is a similarity between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in energy transportation policy toward the Nabucco project. It is a very important project for these two countries, because, both sides want to transport energy reserves to the world market without the bypassing Russia. Despite of those two Caspian littoral states’ intentions to this project, there is European Union diminished policy to realize the Nabucco project. As every EU country has its own national energy policy, as a result, they cannot construct a common and harmonized EU energy policy. At the result of inattention of EU, Baku singed the gas agreement with Gasport for selling Shah- Deniz II field’s gas to Russia .The amount of gas agreement was not huge, just 500 mil but it was the signal of Baku to the EU for to be more active. 

    On the other hand, four months ago, there was an explosion in the natural gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Russia, where the natural gas flow has failed to resume yet[20]. Besides, as a result of the global financial crisis, there is a decrease in the natural gas demand in Europe. Thus, Russia wants to re-negotiate the volume-and-dollar terms for its gas. However, Turkmen has protested that a contract is a contract and Turkmenistan is losing $1 billion in a month in revenue[21].

    Meanwhile, the unbearable Russian position to Turkmen gas export still is in progress. In addition, there is imperceptible European Union view to Nabucco project which both of them speed up the construction of China Turkmenistan gas pipeline. The pipeline 1,833-kilometer gas pipeline starts at the gas plant near this border town in Turkmenistan and runs through central Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan before entering China at the border pass of Horgos in the northwest region of Xinjiang.  The pipeline, starting near a Chinese-developed gas field in eastern Turkmenistan, is expected to reach full annual capacity of 40 billion cubic metres by 2012-13 and help Beijing propel its explosive economic growth[22].

    Then again, the both of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan want to create a center of attention of the United State’s interest to this gas pipeline project. Because, the Nabucco project is the one of the big project in the world that there need full politically and financially supporting for the supplier counters and European counters. It’s too hard for European Union countries to realize the Nabucco project without the US supporting. Moreover, the “Nabucco is an integral part of a US strategy of total energy control over both the EU and all Eurasia”[23]. On the other hand, the role of the US lobbying for successfully realizing of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline which it began from Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, which opened in 2005[24] also be a magnet for Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

    Eventually, the legal status of the sea should solve according to International Law and International practices with the providing of costal states interests because, the Caspian Sea is one of the major geo-strategic areas and energy sources of the world but not only for littoral states. On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan should compromise each other in order to realizing of the Nabucco project because the both states are interest with this project.

    Conclusion

    The potential resources of the Nabucco project are under the question. There are some problems in the Middle East also Caspian Sea as well which it can influence the realization of project. On the other hand, there is unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea that it began after the collapse of the Soviet Union until today. Moreover, at the result of negotiation process there was signed the agreement between Caspian Sea littoral states about the sartorial division of sea according to middle line principle. Nevertheless, signed agreement for sartorial division of Caspian Sea, there is no fully solution of the problem. Additionally, increasing dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan around the Caspian Sea oil and gas fields, where Turkmenistan has decided to send the issue to International Arbitrage, could create another difficulty for realization of the Nabucco project.


    [1] Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, “Project Description ,Pipeline Route,” (accessed August 15,2009)

    [2]CaspEcoProject Management and Coordination Unit, Caspian Sea Environment Program  “General background”   http://www.caspianenvironment.org/NewSite/Caspian-Background.htm /  (accessed 27 August 2009)

    [3] Bernard A. Gelb, Terry Rayno Twyman, The Caspian Sea Region and energy resources (New York: Hauppauge, 2004)

    [4] Kepbanov A. Yolbar,” The New Legal Status of the Caspian Sea Is The Basis of Regional Co-Operation and Stability ,” Journal  of International Affairs, Vol.2 Num. 4  (December 1997-February 1998)

    [5] Kamyar Mehdiyoun” International Law and the Dispute Over Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in Caspian Sea”  The American Society of International Law. (2000)

    [6] Kepbanov A ..” The New Legal Status of the Caspian Sea …”

    [7] Meftun Metin”HAZAR Politik ve Bölgesel Güç”( İstanbul: IQ kültür sanat yayıncılıq 2004) 148

    [8] Yusifzade B. Khoshbakht, “The Status of the Caspian Sea Dividing Natural Resources between Five Countries,” Azerbaijan International, vol.8:3 (2000) (accessed September 10, 2009).

    [9] Rustam Mamedov “International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Issues of Theory and Practice” (working paper, Ankara University journals database, 32 DOI: 10.1501/Intrel_0000000041,2001)

    [10] Kazakhstan Today, “Russia ratified Russian-Kazakhstan Caspian sea division agreement” March 11.2007,   (accessed September 19, 2009).

    [11] Mamedov “International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea…

    [12] Michael P. Croissant, Bülent Aras, “Oil and geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region‎” ( Peaeger Publisher,  Westport USA, 1999) 34.

    [13] APA , “Turkmenistan Foreign Ministry: Absheron peninsula and Chilov island should not be taken into consideration while delimitating the Caspian Sea”  August  04, 2009 (accessed September 20, 2009)

    [14]  Gennadiĭ Illarionovich Chufrin , The security of the Caspian Sea Region ,( Stockholm International Peace Research Institute OXFORD 2001) 64

    [15] APA , “Turkmenistan Foreign Ministry: Absheron peninsula and Chilov island….

    [16] Jackson Alexander, “The Implications of the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan Dispute”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol. 42, August 10, 2009 (accessed September 19.2009)

    [17] Hooman Peimani , The Caspian pipeline dilemma: political games and economic losses, (Peaeger Publisher, Westport USA, 2001) 15

    [18] Ibrahimov Rovshen, “Turkmenistan need Western encouragement”( Qafqaz University lessons  Baku, Azerbaijan August 27,/2009 )

    [19] Jackson “The Implications of the Turkmenistan…..

    [20] David Trilling” Turkmenistan: Pipeline Spat With The Kremlin Turns Into A Political Test Of Strength” EURASIA INSIGHT 4/15/09  (accessed Dismember  25, 2009).

    [21]Steve Le Vine “Nabucco and Trans-Caspian: Times Change, Pipeline Politics Goes On” JULY 30, 2009, (accessed September 23, 2009).

    [22] Xinhua reports “Chinese, Turkmen, Kazakh, Uzbek presidents unveil gas pipeline”

    [23]Hearing, Energy supplies in Eurasia and implications for U.S. energy security (Washington USA: DIANE Publishing, 2007) 60

    [24] Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Pennsylvania USA: University of Pen… Press, 2009) 53

     Famil QURBANOV – Baku Qafqaz University

  • Uzbek, Turkmen Reps Skip Turkic-Speaking Assembly

    Uzbek, Turkmen Reps Skip Turkic-Speaking Assembly

    88867A0E 1BC8 48F2 9BAF 840C6057122D mw203 sThe Uzbek parliament building in Tashkent (file photo)
    October 02, 2009
    BAKU — Uzbek and Turkmen deputies did not attend the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking countries in Baku, RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani and Uzbek services report.

    Azerbaijani political analyst Ilgar Mammadov told RFE/RL that a possible reason the deputies skipped the September 22-23 session is because Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan lack “genuine parliaments” and were prohibited by their governments from attending.

    He added that the parliaments in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan have turned into “notary’s offices” that rubberstamp bills put forth by their governments. Mammadov said that among the Turkic-speaking countries some degree of “genuine parliamentary activity” can be found only in Turkey.

    Uzbek political analyst Farhod Tolipov told RFE/RL that Uzbekistan did not attend the assembly for “subjective reasons.” He explained that slogans such as “Turkestan is our home” — a reference to a pan-Turkic entity — could be frequently heard in Uzbekistan, but in recent years Central Asian countries have become more nationalistic and distanced themselves from each other.

    Initiated by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev in 2006, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries is designed to gather delegates from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the five Central Asian countries. The next meeting of the assembly is to be held in Astana in 2010.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/Uzbek_Turkmen_Reps_Skip_TurkicSpeaking_Assembly/1842008.html
  • Anger China or defend Uighurs? Turkey walks fine line.

    Anger China or defend Uighurs? Turkey walks fine line.

    Beijing urged Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to retract his statement that China is committing “genocide” against its Muslim minority.

    Developments in China’s restive Xinjiang Province and the attacks against the minority Muslim Uighurs there may not have led to vocal protests in most of the Muslim world. But in Turkey, the events in western China have led to large protests in the streets and strong words from Turkish officials.

    The comment raising the loudest outcry has been Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s accusation last week that China is committing “genocide” against the Uighurs, a statement that Beijing is now pressuring him to retract.

    Experts say that taking its criticism of China too far could backfire on Ankara, which has been working to improve both its diplomatic and trade relations with Beijing.

    An estimated 184 people have died in the recent violent clashes between Uighurs and ethnic Han Chinese in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. Chinese officials have claimed that most of those killed have been Han.

    Turkey’s minister of industry and trade, Nihat Ergun, last week called for a boycott of Chinese goods, while Mr. Erdogan, speaking on television last Friday, said: “The incidents in China are, simply put, tantamount to genocide. There’s no point in interpreting this otherwise.”

    Uighurs as ‘brothers’

    “There is a lot of sensitivity among the Turkish public about the Uighurs. They consider them as real brothers,” says Sami Kohen, a political affairs columnist for Milliyet, a Turkish daily.

    “Turks originally came from that part of Asia to Anatolia, and the language that Uighurs use is much closer to the language that Turkey speaks than others in Central Asia,” he continues.

    The Turkish president’s official flag, for example, has 16 stars on it, representing “Turkish states” established throughout history. One of the stars commemorates the Uighur state that existed around the 8th century.

    Adds Mr. Kohen: “There is quite a large Uighur community in Turkey, and they are quite strong. They have a lobby and they have been quite strong in defending their cause.”

    Turkey raises its global profile

    Turkey has, in recent years, been working to raise its foreign policy profile and establish itself as a regional political and economic power. Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gul, actually visited Urumqi as part of a recent state visit shortly before the violence broke out there. Turkey signed a reported $1.5 billion worth of trade deals during the visit.

    But analysts say Ankara’s criticism could lead to a rupture with Beijing.

    “The Turks really have a tough decision to make, whether they keep this going or back off. This is a major test for Turkey’s new foreign policy,” says Bulent Aliriza, director of the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “This is a serious problem for the Turks from every angle.”

    Ankara now also needs to decide if it will grant a possible request to visit Turkey by Rebiya Kadeer, a Uighur diaspora activist based in the United States whom China has accused of being behind the violence in Xinjiang.

    “All hell is going to break loose if she shows up in Turkey, especially after the comment that Erdogan made,” Mr. Aliriza says.

    Take it back, China says

    The Chinese government now appears to be pushing back against Turkey. A Tuesday editorial in the government-controlled English-language China Daily urged Erdogan to “take back his remarks … which constitute interference in China’s internal affairs.”

    Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, in a phone conversation with his Turkish counterpart, blamed the violence in Xinjiang on “three evil forces,” state news agency Xinhua said, referring to “extremism, separatism, and terrorism.”

    For Turkey, which has had its share of domestic violence and terrorism, both from Islamic extremists and Kurdish separatists, these are not meaningless words.

    The Christian Science Monitor

  • MASSACRE IN EASTERN TURKISTAN by Hasan Celal Guzel

    MASSACRE IN EASTERN TURKISTAN by Hasan Celal Guzel

    Columnist Hasan Celal Guzel comments on the unrest in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. A summary of his column is as follows:

    “Do you know what place, outside Turkey itself, has the world’s largest Turkish population? Eastern Turkistan… There are nearly 38 million Uighur Turks living in eastern Turkistan now, despite the genocidal policies they have faced. The Uighur Turks are the grandchildren of a great culture and civilization which established the Hun, Gokturk, Uighur and Karahanli states, and they are our kin. Did you notice the flag a Uighur Turkish woman was carrying in news reports from Urumchi (the region’s capital) this week? This flag is the same as ours, except for its color. The Uighur Turks in eastern Turkistan have a highly developed Turkish consciousness.

    Eastern Turkistan voluntarily attached itself to the Ottoman Empire during the Yakup Khan era (1820-1887). Yakup Bey sent his son, Yakup Khan Tore (Hodja Tore), to seek help from the Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz, who then dispatched ships and weapons to Eastern Turkistan. Unfortunately, the region was invaded by the Chinese after Yakup Bey’s death in 1878, but in the 1930s the Uighur Turks rejected the occupation and, after a series of battles, declared the Eastern Turkistan Islam Republic in 1933, and the Eastern Turkistan Republic in 1944. But following communist China’s 1949 invasion, the territory was renamed the Xinjiang (Sincan) Uighur Autonomous Region, and Eastern Turkistan Turks have been trying to survive China’s occupation, captivity and atrocities ever since.

    The late Uighur Turkish leader Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who was my close friend, said that forces have tried to silently erase the Eastern Turkistan Turks from history. The massacre of Uighur Turks by the Chinese army and paramilitaries in Urumchi is happening in front of the eyes of the entire world. Although the official death toll is 156, we know that more than 1,000 Turks have been killed and 6,000 Uighur young people who were detained are being threatened with death. Even as the region’s Chinese governor said that the Turks protesting the cruel regime would be executed, he guaranteed protection to migrant Chinese Hans living there. What’s happening in Eastern Turkistan is no mere massacre, but a genocide. Muslim Turks are used as guinea pigs in nuclear tests; babies are killed due to obligatory abortions; everybody who seeks the right to a humane life and liberty is executed without due process; Chinese militant migrants are being systematically settled in the region year after year; and hundreds of thousands of young people are forced to work in torture work camps. In short, there are widespread and blatant violations of human rights.

    In our country, Turks are called to account for Armenians who were made to emigrate 100 years ago, but nobody talks about the millions of Turks who were massacred in Rumeli, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. Some 800,000 Iraqi Turks who were killed and forced to migrate following the US invasion of Iraq are now all but lost. Think about it: if even a small fraction of the events in Eastern Turkistan had happened somewhere else in the world, how loud would the criticism be? Seyit Tumturk, head of the East Turkistan Culture and Solidarity Association, told me that Uighur Turk leader Rabia Kader might be brought from Washington to Ankara to address the Uighur Turks at a press conference and calm down the situation. We welcome this suggestion. If we stay silent in the face of this massacre so as not to ruin our relations with China, we would be culpable in the eyes of the Turkish nation and history. The remarks made so far from Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu are praiseworthy. But they need to do more. Alptekin wrote shortly before his death that as long as the Eastern Turkistan issue isn’t solved humanely and the sun of liberty doesn’t rise in his country, a stain will forever mark his people. He added that he hoped Turkey would work to solve the Eastern Turkistan issue. We all should second this wish.”

    Turkish Press Review, 9.7.2009

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