POOR RICHARDS REPORT
Chapter 15
Ringing the Bell or Trumpets are Blowing
Or How to Survive to Coming Panic
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 is probably the most important law of the 21st century. We must follow the guidelines that were followed by the members of Congress who voted for this to be law.
The reforms that I suggest will send the market into a temporary tailspin, but if they are followed completely only the speculators will crash.
For openers, the banks who have been hording all the QE distributions must now share them with their depositors and give a greater portion to the younger depositors because they need it the most. They will also spend their portion, which will kick start the economy.
Next, the Congress should form a standing committee of 16 members to review all the reforms to our financial system. The members should be equally divided from each party and have the highest respect among their peers. Seniority or power should not be considered. Ethics should be of the highest order.
Finally they should have a unanimous vote before it comes before the entire house. This was a stipulation when the committees met for the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. It took them 6 months. The Congress voted December 22, 1913: 298 yeas and 60 no’s and 76 not voting. On December 23, 1913 in the morning vote, there were 43 yeas and 25 no’s with 27 no votes. (Back then there were only 95 senators).
That afternoon President Woodrow Wilson signed the act into law.
1. The Federal Reserve shall raise All Margin rates to 100% for a period of 6 months to a year.
2. The Security Exchange Commission (SEC) shall ban all corporate share buybacks. (All this does is increasing the earnings per share and enables the officers to receive a higher price for their options).
Instead, the monies should be distributed to the shareholders so all can share the wealth – not a privileged few.
This should create new buyers that should offset the sellers.
3. “Banks” should start returning the QE funds they have been hording over the past few years to their depositors. This should be done with the younger ones with families receiving a greater portion. Then staggered depending upon one’s earning power. The higher the earning power the less money received. This should increase the velocity or turnover of money. Some corporations will fail while others will prosper due to some changes in buying patterns.
4. Ban High Frequency Trades (HFT’s) entirely. They break all the rules for fair play and only benefit the owners. The public be damned; damn them.
5. Derivative trades are set up for fees and is a form of gambling. Most derivative trades are hard to follow and most financial disappoints (a nice word) evolve some forms of derivatives. The best way out of this mess is to just let them mature.
6. Trash the Dodd- Frank ACT and make the new one simple to understand.
7. Trash the Investment Company Act of 1940. It covers mutual funds. Exchange Traded Funds (ETF’s) have quietly been replacing mutual funds. With computers and their size most of these laws are anachronisms.
8. Clean up the ads. Most ads today give the hint of casino gambling. Insert a clause for risk.
9. Go back to the fraction system for stocks. This will allow the market maker to support his market during normal times and also kill off HFT’s and stop firms offering the first “free” trades.
10. Reinstate the Short Sell Rule. This is very important because it will stop gambling and stop computer hacking in the market place.
To do a legitimate Short sale one must first get permission from the back office of the firm one is doing business with. (They have the security to deliver to a buyer when you sell short). Then one must wait for an uptick in the price of the stock before the sale can take place. The order is also marked “Short Sale”.
Today I believe short sales are made willy nilly and no uptick is involved. I also believe that after a sale is done they look for stock to deliver.
These reforms that I have listed so far will cause all hell to break loose among the heels of the business. They will be the losers while the public will gain confidence in the system and regain some of their tax dollars.
Investors will be able to make intelligent decisions based upon facts and knowledge instead of charts and soothsayers and false prophets.
By Adriano Bosoni and Mark Fleming-Williams
The European Court of Justice announced Sept. 22 that hearings in the case against the European Central Bank’s (ECB) bond-buying scheme known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) will begin Oct. 14. Though the process is likely to be lengthy, with a judgment not due until mid-2015, the ruling will have serious implications for Germany’s relationship with the rest of the eurozone. The timing could hardly be worse, coming as an anti-euro party has recently been making strides in the German political scene, steadily undermining the government’s room for maneuver.
The roots of the case go back to late 2011, when Italian and Spanish sovereign bond yields were following their Greek counterparts to sky-high levels as the markets showed that they had lost confidence in the eurozone’s most troubled economies’ ability to turn themselves around. By summer 2012 the situation in Europe was desperate. Bailouts had been undertaken in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, while Italy was getting dangerously close to needing one. But Italy’s economy, and particularly its gargantuan levels of government debt, meant that it would be too big to receive similar treatment. In any event, the previous bailouts were not calming financial markets.
ECB President Mario Draghi never actually had to step in because the promise of intervention in bond markets convinced investors that eurozone countries would not be allowed to default. But Draghi’s solution was not to everyone’s taste. Notable opponents included Jens Weidmann, president of the German Bundesbank. Along with many Germans, Weidmann felt the ECB was overstepping its jurisdictional boundaries, since EU treaties bar the bank from financing member states. Worse, were OMT ever actually used, it essentially would be spending German money to bail out what many Germans considered profligate Southern Europeans.
In early 2013, a group of economics and constitutional law professors from German universities collected some 35,000 signatures and brought OMT before the German Constitutional Court. During a hearing in June 2013, Weidmann testified for the prosecution. In February 2014, the court delivered an unexpected verdict, ruling 6-2 that the central bank had in fact overstepped its boundaries, though it also referred the matter to the European Court of Justice. Recognizing the profound importance of this issue, the court acknowledged that a more restrictive interpretation of OMT by the European Court of Justice could make it legal.
The German judgment suggested that three alterations to OMT would satisfy the Constitutional Court that the mechanism was lawful. Two of the three changes, however, are problematic at best. One alteration would limit the ECB to senior debt, a change that would protect it against the default of the sovereign in question but also risk undermining the confidence of other investors who would not be similarly protected. The second alteration would make bond buying no longer “unlimited,” constraining the bank’s ability to intimidate bond traders by leaving it with a rifle instead of a bazooka.
A New German Political Party
The group of academics who organized the petition kept busy while the court deliberated. The Alternative for Germany, a party founded in February 2013 by one of their number, economics professor Bernd Lucke, and frequently known by its German acronym, AfD, has made significant gains in elections across Germany. Founded as an anti-euro party, the party came very close to winning a seat in the Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament, in the September 2013 general elections, a remarkable feat for a party founded just six months before. It made even larger gains in 2014, winning 7.1 percent of the vote in European Parliament elections in May and between 9.7 and 12.2 percent in three regional elections in August and September.
Germany is currently ruled by a grand coalition, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s center-right Christian Democratic Union party (and its sister party, the Bavaria-based Christian Social Union) sharing power with the center-left Social Democratic Party. This has resulted in the Christian Democratic Union being dragged further to the center than it wanted to be, creating a space to its right that the Alternative for Germany nimbly entered.
Originally a single-issue party, the Alternative for Germany has begun espousing conservative values and anti-immigration policies, a tactic that worked particularly well in elections held in eastern Germany in the summer. Its rise puts Merkel, a European integrationist, in a quandary that will become particularly acute if the Alternative for Germany proves capable of representing Germans uncomfortable with the idea of the country financially supporting the rest of Europe.
Since the beginning of the European crisis, Merkel has proved masterful at crafting a message that combines criticism of countries in the European periphery with the defense of bailout programs for those same countries. But while Merkel has become accustomed to criticism from left-wing parties over the harsh austerity measures the European Union demanded in exchange for bailouts, she had not counted on anti-euro forces mounting serious opposition in Germany. Merkel is not alone in this, of course: center-right parties across Europe, from David Cameron’s coalition in the United Kingdom to Mark Rutte’s People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands, have seen Euroskeptical populism emerge to their right, eating into their traditional voter platforms.
This anti-ECB sentiment in Germany has swelled during 2014, as Draghi’s attempts to increase the eurozone’s low inflation have departed further and further from economic orthodoxy. German conservatives have greeted each new policy with displeasure. The German media has called negative interest rates “penalty rates,” claiming they redistribute billions of euros from German savers to Southern European spenders. On Sept. 25, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble spoke in the Bundestag of his displeasure with Draghi’s program to buy asset-backed securities. Judging from the German hostility to even “quantitative easing-lite” measures, the ECB’s attempts to rope Germany into further stimulus measures could prove troublesome indeed.
Institutional and Political Challenges for Berlin
All of the measures the ECB has announced so far, however, are mere appetizers. Financial markets have been demanding quantitative easing, a broad-based program of buying sovereign bonds in order to inject a large quantity of money into the market. Up to this stage, three major impediments have existed to such a policy: the German government’s ideological aversion to spending taxpayers’ money on peripheral economies; the political conception that quantitative easing would ease the pressure on peripheral economies to reform; and the court case that has been hanging over OMT (the only existing mechanism available to the ECB for undertaking sovereign bond purchases). Notably, the OMT in its original guise and quantitative easing are not precisely the same thing. In the original conception of OMT, the ECB would offset any purchases in full by taking an equivalent amount of money out of circulation, (i.e., not increasing the money supply itself). Nonetheless, any declaration that OMT is illegal would severely inhibit Draghi’s room for maneuver should he wish to undertake full quantitative easing.
This confluence of events leaves Merkel nervously awaiting the decision of the European Court of Justice. In truth, she is in a no-win situation. If the Luxembourg court holds OMT illegal, Draghi’s promise would be weakened, removing the force that has kept many sovereign bond yields at artificially low levels and permitting the desperate days of 2011-2012 to surge back. If the European Court of Justice takes up the German court’s three suggestions and undercuts OMT to the extent that the market deems it to be of little consequence, the same outcome could occur. And if the European Court of Justice rules that OMT is legal, a sizable inhibitor to quantitative easing will have been removed, and the possibility of a fully fledged bond-buying campaign will loom ever closer, much to the chagrin of the German voter and to the political gain of the Alternative for Germany.
When analyzing the significance of this case, it is important to bear in mind that Germany is an export-driven power that must find markets for its exports to preserve cohesion and social stability at home. The eurozone helps Germany significantly — 40 percent of German exports go to the eurozone and 60 percent to the full European Union — because it traps its main European customers within the same currency union, depriving them of the possibility of devaluing their currencies to become more competitive.
Since the beginning of the crisis, Germany has managed to keep the eurozone alive without substantially compromising its national wealth, but the moment will arrive when Germany must decide whether it is willing to sacrifice a larger part of its wealth to save its neighbors. Berlin has thus far been able to keep its own capital relatively free of the hungry mouths of the periphery, but the problem keeps returning. This puts Germany in a dilemma because two of its key imperatives are in contradiction. Will it save the eurozone to protect its exports, writing a big check as part of the deal? Or will it oppose the ECB moves, which if blocked could mean a return to dangerously high bond yields and the return of rumors of Greece, Italy and others leaving the currency union?
The case will prove key to Europe’s future for even deeper reasons. The European crisis is generating deep frictions in the Franco-German alliance, the main pillar of the union. The contrast between Germany, which has low unemployment and modest economic growth, and France, which has high unemployment and no growth, is becoming increasingly difficult to hide. In the coming months, this division will continue to widen, and Paris will become even more vocal in its demands for more action by the ECB, more EU spending and more measures in Germany to boost domestic investment and public consumption.
This creates yet another dilemma for Berlin, since many of the demands coming from west of the Rhine are deeply unpopular with German voters. But the German government understands that high unemployment and low economic growth in Europe are leading to a rise in anti-euro and anti-establishment parties. The rise of the National Front in France is the clearest example of this trend. There is a growing consensus among German political elites that unless Berlin makes some concessions to Paris, it could have to deal with a more radicalized French government down the road. The irony is that even if Berlin were inclined to bend to French wishes, it would find itself constrained by institutional forces beyond its control, such as the Constitutional Court.
Germany has managed to avoid most of these questions so far, but these issues will not got away and in fact will define Europe in 2015; the Alternative for Germany, for example, is here to stay. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court will keep challenging EU attempts at federalization even if this specific crisis is averted, and the Bundesbank and conservative academic circles will keep criticizing every measure that would reduce German sovereignty to help France or Italy. Though it is impossible to predict the European Court of Justice’s final ruling, either way, the dilemma will continue to plague an increasingly fragile European Union.
Editor’s Note: Writing in George Friedman’s stead this week are Stratfor Europe Analyst Adriano Bosoni and Economy Analyst Mark Fleming-Williams.