Category: Turkey

  • Invitation to Remembrance Ceremony to Honor Atatürk…America Ataturk Society

    Invitation to Remembrance Ceremony to Honor Atatürk…America Ataturk Society

    Invitation to Remembrance Ceremony to Honor Atatürk

    IN REMEMBRANCE OF ATATÜRK
    On the 77th anniversary of the death of the greatest Turk of them all, we mourn Atatürk’s death, as well as the assault on his creation, the secular Republic of Turkey by the present government. Losing sight of his prescient vision for Turkey represents a lost opportunity for his Nation and the rest of the world.

    Reason over Dogma
    Peace over War
    Enlightenment over Ignorance

    Remembering Atatürk…
    Sunday, November 15th, 2015,  1:00 pm

    Welcome Message 

    Statement by Atatürk Society of America (ASA)
    by Burak Şahin, Board Member of ASA

    Lecture on “Gallipoli, Command Under Fire
    by Professor Ed Erickson, Guest Speaker

    Documentary Film: “The Name of the Sun, Kemal Atatürk”

    Atatürk’s Address to the Youth

    *******
    Location of the Event:
    American University
    School of International Service
    3401 Nebraska Avenue, NW
    Washington, DC 20016
    (At the intersection of New Mexico and Nebraska Ave.)

    Complimentary parking under the building
    Shuttle bus service between Tenley Town Metro Station and University

    Followed by Refreshments
    Open to the Public

    Founded 1995 in Washington DC, the Atatürk Society of America (ASA) is a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization, dedicated to promoting the ideals of Atatürk.
    Celebrating 20th Year Anniversary!4731 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington DC 20016
    Phone: (202) 285-2979  info@ataturksociety.org

     

    Ataturk Society of America · 4731 Massachusetts Ave NW · Washington, DC 20016 · USA
    profile mask2
    Atatürk Society of America 10:55 PM (14 minutes ago)

    cleardot
    IN REMEMBRANCE OF ATATÜRK On the 77th anniversary of the death of the greates…
  • Turkey’s Troubling ISIS Game

    Turkey’s Troubling ISIS Game

    From: Demirtas Bayar [mailto:Demirtas@CelalBayar.org]

    Photo

    08cohen master675

    Kurdish protesters and Turkish riot police officers clashed in Diyarbakir on Nov. 1, after election results showed a clear victory for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist Justice and Development Party. Credit Bulent Kilic/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

    New York Times – NOV. 7, 2015
    SundayReview | Op-Ed Columnist
    Roger Cohen
    SANLIURFA, Turkey — ABOVE a restaurant specializing in sheep’s head soup, with steaming tureens of broth in the window, two young Syrian journalists took up residence in this ancient town in southeastern Turkey. They had fled Raqqa, the stronghold in Syria of the Islamic State, or ISIS, and devoted their time to denouncing the crimes of the barbarous jihadi group. Today, their second-floor apartment is a crime scene, with a red police seal on the door.
    On Oct. 30, the Islamic State beheaded Ibrahim Abdel Qader, age 22, and slit the throat of 20-year-old Fares Hammadi. They later posted a video of their handiwork, saying enemies “will never be safe from the blade of the Islamic State.” The killers have not been found; a new unease inhabits this bustling town about 30 miles from the Syrian border. “It was shocking to have a first beheading in Turkey,” Omer Yilmaz, the owner of the restaurant, told me. “We are used to bullets, but that, no. To slaughter a human like an animal is unthinkable.”
    The unthinkable is becoming conceivable in a combustible Turkey. Syrian violence has seeped over the border. The Islamic State is now entangled in the age-old conflict of Turks and Kurds. During several days near the Syrian border, often in areas with Kurdish majorities, I found simmering anger among Kurds and predictions of worsening bloodshed.
    The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, bolstered by the electoral triumph of his conservative Islamist Justice and Development Party, or A.K.P., has shown a troubling penchant for benign neglect toward the jihadi Islamists — enough for them to establish a Turkish network.
    What does Erdogan — in theory a key American ally leading a NATO state — see in the knife-wielding jihadis of the Islamic State? They are useful in confronting Turkey’s nemesis, the Kurds, who have taken over wide sections of northern Syria and established self-government in an area they call Rojava. That in turn has raised the specter of a border-straddling Kurdistan, the nightmare of the Turkish republic.
    Hence the unpersuasive Turkish balancing act that sees Erdogan offering the United States use of Turkish air bases to fight the Islamic State even as Turkey twice strikes the positions in Syria of Kurdish militias who, as my colleague Tim Arango put it, are the “most important allies within Syria of the American-led coalition fighting the Islamic State.” Hence, also, the bungling and inaction that produced, on Oct. 10 in Ankara, the worst terrorist attack in Turkish history.
    The Ankara suicide bombing followed another suicide bombing in the border town of Suruc that killed 33 pro-Kurdish activists in July.
    One of the Ankara suicide bombers was the older brother of the Suruc suicide bomber. Their father tried without success to alert the government to the danger. Almost three months elapsed between the bombings, both of which principally targeted Kurds, and Erdogan did nothing. After the Ankara attack, his prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, said the government had a list of potential suicide bombers but could not detain them because “as a country with rule of law, you can’t arrest them until they act.” (Not easy to do afterward either.) These words were uttered even as countless Kurdish militants were rounded up in the months between the June and November elections.
    The impression has been inescapable that, for the government, having Islamic State militants kill Kurds with impunity was a palatable option with the bonus of creating the climate of instability that secured the Nov. 1 electoral victory for Erdogan.
    For Erdogan’s A.K.P. government, the terrorist organization par excellence is the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., which has fought an intermittent insurgency against Turkey since the 1980s, is linked to the Kurdish militias in Syria and is designated a terrorist group by the United States. The president, infused with post-electoral vim, vowed this week to fight P.K.K. members until they would lay down their weapons “and pour concrete over them.” The Islamic State, by comparison, is the object of no such ruthless language or action.
    I found Gultan Kisanak, the mayor of Diyarbakir, the effective capital of Kurdish aspirations for autonomy within Turkey, watering roses on the terrace outside her office. There was not a cloud in the sky on a mild late-fall day. But her mood was grim. Kisanak is a member of the Kurdish-dominated Peoples’ Democratic Party, or H.D.P., which took over 70 percent of the vote in Diyarbakir but saw its national vote share fall to 10.7 percent from 13.1 percent in June as Erdogan’s fear tactics worked. “ISIS became such a large force thanks to an open-door policy from Ankara,” she told me. “Militants come and go. ISIS has been delegated to fight a proxy war against Kurdish Rojava, and all kinds of support has been given to them.”
    THE government dismisses such suggestions. Did Turkey not, in extremis and under great international pressure, allow arms to reach the Kurdish-held Syrian town of Kobani and so prevent its fall to the Islamic State? Are Turkish air bases not being used by the American-led coalition? Do the Kurds not have in the H.D.P. representation in Parliament, as well as control of many municipalities? What do the Kurds want that they do not already have unless it’s territory — and that Turkey will never give.
    “For us, ISIS and the P.K.K. have the same aim,” Abdurrahman Yetkin, a prominent businessman and Erdogan supporter in Sanliurfa, told me. “Both organizations are being used by external powers to destabilize Turkey.”
    You hear a lot of such talk from the Erdogan camp these days — talk that implausibly conflates Islamist jihadis and Kurdish militants, as in the official characterization of the Ankara bombing as a “cocktail” involving both. It is this sort of manipulation of the facts that undermines the government’s insistence that it’s in the Islamic State fight for real.
    Certainly it is targeting the Kurds. The P.K.K. made a big mistake by answering Suruc with the killing of two Turkish policemen. Violence could only serve Erdogan, who embarked on a fierce bombing campaign on P.K.K. strongholds in northern Iraq and has shown equal ruthlessness within Turkey. Diyarbakir and other majority Kurdish towns in the southeast have been under intermittent curfew. Attempts to establish autonomy in certain city districts have been crushed.
    Reeling back what he has unleashed after a dozen years in power is going to be hard for Erdogan. Power and money seem to have gone to his head. Turkey has veered into violence and polarization. “Erdogan is scared and he deals with it by making everyone more scared than he is,” Soli Ozel, a university lecturer, told me.
    The Turkish president needs to get back to the negotiating table with the Kurds, get serious about crushing the Islamic State in Turkey and beyond, ensure a transparent and credible investigation of the brutal killings in Suruc and Ankara (as well as the double murder in Sanliurfa) and stop his assault on a free press. President Obama should press his ally hard on all these fronts.
    Turkey, a heterogeneous nation, cannot be homogenized under the banner of Erdogan’s Sunni Islamist nationalism. Intolerance will backfire, as it has in Syria. “They don’t want the Kurds even to breathe,” Ahmet Turk, the mayor of the beautiful southern town of Mardin, told me. “Kurds do not want violence, but if Erdogan does not stop, things could get much worse.”
    In Sanliurfa, as night fell, I met Ahmed Abdel Qader, the older brother of the beheaded journalist. He told me, “The guys who did this killing are now threatening me.” His dark eyes seemed haunted. Turkey’s tide of violence, cynically cultivated, must now be curbed. It won’t be easy.

  • Statistical study of Turkey’s general election suggests widespread vote manipulation

    Statistical study of Turkey’s general election suggests widespread vote manipulation

    Ben Aris

    A statistical study of the voting patterns in Turkey’s November 1 general election found strong evidence that is “consistent with widespread voting manipulation”.
    That was the conclusion of a paper released by assistant professor Erik Meyersson at Stockholm School of Economics entitled “Digit Tests and the Peculiar Election Dynamics of Turkey’s November Elections”, and released on November 4.
    The result of the elections came as a shock as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s defied the almost universal polling consensus and won some 9 percentage points more than expected – just enough to rule alone, but not quite a constitutional majority.
    Some have speculated that faced with external and internal instability Turks have turned to a strong leader to see them through uncertain times in what might be called a “Sultan complex”. However, drilling down into the voting statistics Meyersson concludes that Sunday’s result was not so much an AKP victory as a defeat for the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP).
    “As in last elections, much of the change in voting seems to have occurred among nationalist as well as Kurdish voters, with this election seeing a difference of priority among them. Whereas June’s election was HDP’s to win, this one appears to have been to a large extent the nationalist MHP’s to lose,” Meyersson said in his paper.
    Meyersson concentrated on the differences between June’s election and this one, where that time AKP was the recipient of the shock and had its majority grip on power broken after HDP entered parliament for the first time.
    “Plotting the difference in vote share between November and June, the AKP’s gain appears to come predominantly at the expense of MHP. In some other cases, the vote swing seems to be driven by voters in Kurdish provinces leaving the other main opposition party pro-Kurdish and left-leaning Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) for AKP,” says Meyersson.

    1115 turkey politics elections results regional differnces

    ​ The main statistical test the paper explores is the use of the so-called Benford’s Law that is a widespread statistical technique for spotting cheating in polls and has a big body of academic literature behind it.
    The way it works is simple: in a fair vote the last number of the final tally for each polling station should be randomly distributed. As humans are very bad at generating random numbers if the vote count has been tampered with then this randomness is destroyed and a discernable pattern emerges.
    Fun fair owners use Benford’s law and count the small change in the till in much the same way to catch attraction staff who have their hands in the till: dishonest employees tend to steal round numbers of notes and coins. The Benford distribution of final digits in the numbers should look something like this:

    1115 gbl politics benfords law

    A similar technique was used to show that Russia’s Duma election in 2011 was fixed and the authorities added an estimated 12% to the winning, and now ruling, United Russia party. Instead of a smooth Benford curve, the statistical analysis found there were spikes in the tally results ending with a 5 or a 0. The crooked vote counters naturally, and without thinking, were rounding up results in United Russia’s favour. The same spikes were seen in the votes for Just Russia (aka Fair Russia), the leading opposition party, which strongly suggests its votes were stolen and gifted to United Russia.
    That result was so clearly unfair it led to the first mass street protests Russia has seen since president Vladimir Putin came to power more than a decade earlier.

    1212 russia politics duma elections voting parties

    Meyersson’s study finds a very similar thing seems to have happened last weekend. The analysis was complicated by the fact that some ballots only produced 300-350 ballot papers, which is too small a number to be a good statistical sample. To get round this problem Meyersson decided to use the June vote as the basis of the comparison for the randomness of the last number – but that also assumes the summer’s vote was free and fair.
    Those caveats aside, the results are striking. As the chart below of the frequency of each of the appearance of the numbers from 0-9 in the last place of the final tally clearly show there are too few zeros in the AKP party vote counts and too many for MHP.  The same is true for HDP, but the number of zeros at the end of the tally for Republican People’s Party (CHP) were the same in both elections and conforms to the Benford distribution above.

    1115 turkey politics elections results statistics 0

    These charts would be consistent with election officials stealing votes from MHP, and to a lesser extent from HDP, and giving them to AKP, but leaving the CHP vote tally untouched. Other charts in the paper suggest that unlike the Russian 2011 election, officials were rounding MHP results down to the nearest whole number and giving the difference to AKP.
    Meyersson goes on to drill into more detail and compares the votes in the five biggest cities as well as look at a sample of vote results in small rural cities and towns were election observers are less likely to go. The same results are repeated at all levels. Finally, Meyersson looked at the voting in the 35 provinces where MHP won more than 20% last time round, against its 10% share of the overall election.
    “In this ‘nationalist sample’, even though the AKP’s last digits do not differ systematically from the previous elections, both that of CHP and MHP do. And as before, it shows abnormally large occurrences of lower last digits and smaller occurrences of larger last digits, Meyersson concluded.
    Finally as a control Meyersson tested these results with another test based on separate research by Beber and Scacco, which show that in fixed elections officials have a habit of number pairs in adjacent places when making up results (12, 34, 65, etc) when again the distribution of numbers inside the final tally result should be random.
    In a table that measures this frequency of number pairs Meyersson found that, “In all but one cases does  the occurrences of adjacent digits change between November and June for the MHP, and for the HDP there is a statistically significant change in the five largest provinces sample.”
    “Overall, this analysis shows evidence that would be consistent with widespread voting manipulation, not proof of it, both in terms of the change in the distribution of last as well as adjacent digits,” Meyersson concludes the paper with.
    Sunday’s landslide victory by the AKP represents a remarkable comeback for a government that according to the overwhelming majority of polling companies looked set to repeat its June loss. Many are now pointing fingers at these pollsters (and analysts overall) asking how they could have been so wrong. But what if they weren’t?”
    story/statistical-study-turkeys-general-election-suggests-widespread-vote-manipulation

    Digit Tests and the Peculiar Election Dynamics of Turkey’s November Elections

    Posted on November 4, 2015 by Erik
    Sunday’s elections in Turkey were a landslide for the ruling AKP. Its vote share rose nearly 9 percentage points from what it received in June. One interpretation is that AKP’s political strategy since its summer defeat has paid off, a chilling evaluation of one that has at times seemed both divisive and violent, not to mention authoritarian.
    As in last elections, much of the change in voting seems to have occurred among nationalist as well as Kurdish voters, with this election seeing a difference of priority among them. Whereas June’s election was HDP’s to win, this one appears to have been to a large extent the nationalist MHP’s to lose. As the below figure shows, plotting the difference in vote share between November and June, the AKP’s gain appears to come predominantly at the expense of MHP. In some other cases, the vote swing seems to be driven by voters in Kurdish provinces leaving HDP for AKP (likely the poor and pious I have discussed in this blog before).
    provdiffshr
    Part of the story could be explained by turnout. After all, several provinces show significant changes in turnout compared to the June elections. Several Kurdish provinces like Agri, Batman, Hakkari show substantial reductions in turnout, likely a result of the ongoing conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state.turnoutprov
    Election night was particularly embarrassing to Turkish pollsters who in unison (almost, at least) were predicting a repeat of the June elections. In fact, using the mean and standard deviations of this sample of pollsters, predictions were off by an incredible 4.9 standard deviations.
    There were of course curious aspects of this election. The media raids just days before the election, making sure government-controlled agencies would have effective control over information dissemination on election night. Then there was the speed at which vote counts occurred, the very early victory declaration in government press. Moreover, the 670,000 new valid votes that appeared in Istanbul as the share of invalid ballots shrank back five percentage points from June (which can be seen in the figure above) was quite noteworthy. But so far, there have been relatively few accusations of voter fraud or manipulation (although this could change).

    Digit tests

    A common method for detecting election irregularities is digit tests. This rests on the assumption that a particular digit of a number (say the last or the second digit in a vote count) should, if the election was done fairly, be randomly distributed according to some underlying distribution (see for example the very interesting work by Beber and Scacco (here for an analysis of Nigerian elections, and here for an analysis of Iranian elections) as well as that of Walter Mebane. The specific underlying distribution depends on the order of the digit, which in statistics is often referred to in broader terms as Benford’s Law. This Law specifies specific distributions for each digit depending on the order in which it appears.
    The idea behind digit tests rests on people effectively being unable to randomize numbers, and so demonstrating that an empirical distribution is not of the relevant benchmark distribution is taken as a sign that something is wrong. (Although there is some criticism against digit tests ability to discover election fraud, see here and here).
    Applying digit tests to Turkey and its ballot boxes that rarely include more than 300-350 votes, it’s not obvious which digit distribution should be the benchmark one. If one focuses on the last digit it would seem straightforward to assume that digit ought to follow the uniform distribution (with each number being equally likely), but if the sample includes many vote counts below 100 the last digit would then also be the second digit, which carries with it another benchmark distribution. As such, simply testing whether ballot box-level vote counts follow the uniform distribution would then likely result in a false positive.
    A somewhat different approach I’ll employ here is to remain agnostic about the true underlying benchmark distribution and instead use the past election as the benchmark. The relevant benchmark distribution is thus not whether the last digits of vote counts in the  November elections match either the standard last, second, or first-digit distribution stipulated by Benford’s Law, but rather whether it’s fundamentally different from the corresponding distribution in the June elections.
    Whereas this cuts around the issue of which Benford’s Law distribution to expect is the correct one, it instead requires two different but quite critical assumptions. The first is that the June 2015 election is not subject to fraud or any other severe irregularities that could affect its distribution of digits. The second is that the change in voting is not by itself large enough to change the underlying benchmark distribution. For example, if in one election all vote counts for party X are between 10-99, and in the second election they are all between 0-9, a naive test of the difference in digit distributions would reject the null hypothesis, and proclaim something is wrong when there isn’t. As such, the size of the vote counts could matter by itself. In order to accommodate for this, I will adjust for this directly in the statistical testing (see next paragraph) and I will also examine different subsets of the Turkish electorate where the relative size of the vote counts across parties differ.
    In order to investigate this, I below plot the distribution of the last digit in vote counts for the AKP, CHP, HDP, and the MHP respectively for the whole dataset of 174,648 ballot boxes in November 2015 and 174,220 in June 2015 comparing the November 2015 and the June 2015 elections. Accompanying each plot are two p-values. One is from a simple test of whether the mean of the last digit for the vote count of party X is the same across the two elections.  The second p-value is from the coefficient estimated in a regression of the last digit of party X’s vote count on a dummy for the November election. This regression further includes three dummy variables for whether the district (ilce) median of party X’s vote count is in the single-, double-, or third digits. (For example, if a district’s median vote count for the AKP is 98, then only the second dummy variable is equal to one. If the median vote count had been 156, only the third dummy variable is equal to one etc.). This additional regression control method adds robustness to the test has area-level voter support for party X could be correlated with both the November election dummy as well as the last digit.
    Before I present the results, bear in mind:
    1. This statistical analysis is preliminary, and the particularly version of the digit tests method I use is not a standard one.
    2. The data used for the November elections is not (yet) official.
    3. Any rejection of the null hypothesis could, in principle, be due to other factors than voting manipulation (just not anyone I can think of at the moment).

    Results

    Below I plot the last digit distributions for the ballot-box-level AKP, CHP, HDP, and MHP vote counts using the entire sample of elections in the November and June elections.

    digits_2015_all

    Clear from the figure of the last digit distribution of the AKP vote count is how few cases there are where the vote count ended with a one or a zero.  Furthermore, the two p-values from two tests described above reject the null hypothesis that the average last digits are the same across the two elections. Whereas the AKP vote count tends to have too few zeroes, both the HDP and the MHP tends to have too many last digits ending with zeroes than in the June elections. The bottom right graph for the CHP shows no systematic differences – its last digits is not statistically different from that of the earlier election.
    Below I repeat this analysis for different subsamples of the Turkish electorate. Specifically, I look at the fourteen predominantly Kurdish provinces in the southeast, thirty-five provinces where the MHP scored above twenty percent of the province-level vote share, the five largest provinces in terms of population, as well as the sample of provinces excluding these largest five.

    Kurdish provinces

    digits_2015_k

    These figures uphold the finding that last digit distributions are statistically different in the two elections. What is particularly useful about this is that, whereas in the overall sample AKP vote counts are large and HDP tends to be small, in this subsample the positions are reversed having the relatively smaller vote counts and HDP the larger. (I’ve excluded the CHP and MHP as these parties have so few votes in the region to make the last digit test irrelevant).

    Provinces with relatively stronger MHP support

    digits_2015_n

    These provinces are the thirty-five provinces where the MHP won more than twenty percent in the November election. Thus, they include nationalist storngholds like Adana, Mersin, Antalya, but also several central Anatolian provinces such as Afyonkarahisar, Kayseri, and Konya.  (In this subsample I have excluded HDP as its median vote share in this region tends to be too small to make the digit tests relevant.)
    In this ‘nationalist sample’, even though the AKP’s last digits do not differ systematically from the previous elections, both that of CHP and MHP do. And as before, it shows abnormally large occurrences of lower last digits and smaller occurrences of larger last digits.

    The Big 5

    digits_2015_l
    If we only include the five most populous provinces in Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, and Adana, none but the HDP’s last digits are significantly different from the June election.

    Excluding the Big 5

    digits_2015_s

    In the final subsample, I exclude the five largest provinces, and the result shows rejection of the null hypothesis of equal digit means for all parties but the CHP. As such, the evidence that “something might be wrong” (I prefer this term rather than the f-word at present) seems mainly driven by constituencies outside the largest cities.
    Many tend to disregard all but the largest cities at times of election, thinking that the main shifts occur in places like Istanbul or Ankara. But it’s important to remember that the five largest provinces in Turkey only account for about a third of all the voters in Turkey. And most independent election monitors are unlikely to venture outside the largest cities in any meaningful numbers. So, if you were going to rig an election and wanted to avoid detection, it would probably be easiest to do so in these areas.

    Adjacent Digits

    The above-mentioned paper by Beber and Scacco note that “laboratory experiments demonstrate a preference for pairs of adjacent digits, which suggests that such pairs should be abundant on fraudulent return sheet.” Such adjacent digits (like whether the vote count was 12 or 23) provide another way to test for voting manipulation.
    Below is a table where each cell represents the p-value from a test of whether the frequency of occurrences with adjacent last and penultimate digits are statistically different between the November and June elections. The rows represent the tests by party vote count and the columns represent the samples as described above.

    adjacent_tests

    In all but one cases does do the occurrences of adjacent digits change between November and June for the MHP, and for the HDP there is a statistically significant change in the five largest provinces sample.

    Robustness Checks

    One possibility is that differences in last or adjacent digits between the two elections are driven by shifts from one underlying type of a distribution to another (for example if there are more single-digit party vote counts  in one election than another). Another issue could be that bunching large groups together, either the entire Turkish electorate or different subsets of it, could result in a comparison across very different constiuencies. For example, the underlying distribution for the last digit of the HDP vote count in Manisa is bound to be very different from that in Diyarbakir, and so the unconditional comparison of means may not very informative.
    For this purpose, I below present results from regressing  last digits and adjacent digits respectively of party specific vote counts with a number of different control strategies. In particular I now add fixed effects for whether the vote count of a specific party has a single, double, or triple digit, turnout, the invalid share of ballots, and the log number of registered voters. I also add a number of geographic fixed effects for district and neighborhoods.
    regs_lastdigits
    This table shows that even if we control for whether the party count has one or several digits, geographic fixed effects, the results this hold. The distribution of the last digit changed systematically between the November and the June election. In some cases, such as for the HDP, the effects are not trivial. Using the third column in Panel C, the mean of HDP’s last digit increased by around 15 % relative to the mean once neighborhood-level fixed effects are accounted for. Moreover, in more nationalist provinces (where the MHP had more than twenty percent of the province-level vote share) the relative effect is around 7 %.
    Applying the same regression methodology to the adjacent digit case, now only including observations with more than one digit in the party vote count (this is why the number of observations change across panels), the results for the MHP are quite robust, and the results for HDP are significant in a few more cases than in the simple comparison above.

    regs_adjacentdigits

    Concluding Remarks

    Overall, this analysis shows evidence that would be consistent with widespread voting manipulation, not proof of it, both in terms of the change in the distribution of last as well as adjacent digits. But this requires both the assumption that the last digit distributions of the June 2015 elections were not somehow affected by voting manipulation, as well as that the change in votes were not so large so as to change the benchmark distribution of the digits themselves. If any of these assumptions are violated, then the difference in last digit distributions is not informative of voting manipulation.
    Something that stands out particularly strong is the degree to which MHP’s vote counts appear to have been adversely affected. The MHP is also the part that lost the largest vote share (4.4%). But the AKP and HDP vote counts also show evidence consistent with some form of tampering. The CHP vote count, on the other hand, shows predominantly little change across the different tests.
    Sunday’s landslide victory by the AKP represents a remarkable comeback for a government that according to the overwhelming majority of polling companies looked set to repeat its June loss. Many are now pointing fingers at these pollsters (and analysts overall) asking how they could have been so wrong.
    But what if they weren’t?
    Digit Tests and the Peculiar Election Dynamics of Turkey’s November Elections
    image

    Digit Tests and the Peculiar Election Dynamics of Turkey…

    Sunday’s elections in Turkey were a landslide for the ruling AKP. Its vote share rose nearly 9 percentage points from what it received in June. One interpretation i…
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  • Here’s The Latest Potentially Fatal Flaw In Obama’s ISIS Strategy

    Here’s The Latest Potentially Fatal Flaw In Obama’s ISIS Strategy

    Washington’s increasing coziness with the Syrian Kurds has made Turkey nervous.

    <span class='image-component__caption' itemprop="caption">Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG, fighters rest in Tal Abyad, Syria on June 19, 2015.</span>CREDIT: AHMET SIK/GETTY IMAGESKurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG, fighters rest in Tal Abyad, Syria on June 19, 2015.

    ISTANBUL — The U.S. acknowledged on Wednesday that it has been supporting Kurdish forces in Syria with American aircraft deployed in Turkey, adding another tangle to its strategy to defeat the Islamic State group that hints at the precariousness of the entire campaign.

    Col. Steve Warren, a spokesman for the U.S. campaign against the extremists in Iraq and Syria, detailed that decision in a press briefing on Wednesday. The U.S. announced on Oct. 30 that it had based A-10 fixed-wing aircraft at Turkey’s Incirlik air base in the country’s southeast, Warren said. Those aircraft have since provided air support for Syrian fighters in a Kurd-Arab coalition in battles against Islamic State positions in northeast Syria’s Al-Hawl region.

    Though the U.S. has launched airstrikes to help Kurdish fighters in Syria fight the Islamic State since last fall, Warren’s comments appear to be the most public admission that it is doing so from a base in Turkey — a NATO ally that is skeptical of the Syrian Kurds and only granted the U.S. full flight capabilities at its Incirlik base this past July. Col. Christopher Garver, a public affairs officer for the anti-ISIS campaign, told HuffPost in a Friday email that U.S. flights out of Incirlik have previously aided Kurdish fighters as well.

    Warren was careful to note that the ground forces the U.S. was supporting were under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a recently formed alliance of Kurds, Arabs, Turks and Syrian Christians announced just last month. The Arab component of those forces was involved in the anti-IS offensive, which “is important because Al-Hawl is predominantly an Arab area,” Warren specified.

    But that Kurd-dominated coalition is widely seen as a politically convenient invention, cobbled together so the U.S. can funnel significant support to effective Kurdish fighters and their allies — as it did with an Oct. 12 airdrop — while saying it is engaging Sunni Arabs, the majority community in Syria.

    KOBANE, SYRIA - JUNE 20: (TURKEY OUT) A Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG women fighters pose as they stand near a check point in the outskirts of the destroyed Syrian town of Kobane, also known as Ain al-Arab, Syria. June 20, 2015. Kurdish fighters with the YPG took full control of Kobane and strategic city of Tal Abyad, dealing a major blow to the Islamic State group's ability to wage war in Syria. Mopping up operations have started to make the town safe for the return of residents from Turkey, after more than a year of Islamic State militants holding control of the town. (Photo by Ahmet Sik/Getty Images)
    KOBANE, SYRIA – JUNE 20: (TURKEY OUT) A Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG women fighters pose as they stand near a check point in the outskirts of the destroyed Syrian town of Kobane, also known as Ain al-Arab, Syria. June 20, 2015. Kurdish fighters with the YPG took full control of Kobane and strategic city of Tal Abyad, dealing a major blow to the Islamic State group’s ability to wage war in Syria. Mopping up operations have started to make the town safe for the return of residents from Turkey, after more than a year of Islamic State militants holding control of the town. (Photo by Ahmet Sik/Getty Images)

     

    CREDIT: AHMET SIK/GETTY IMAGESYPG fighters pose as they stand near a checkpoint in the outskirts of the destroyed Syrian town of Kobane on June 20.

    Talk of the new force gave Washington cover to send arms that could be used against IS without angering Turkey, a State Department official told The WorldPost soon after the airdrop. One administration official called the approach a “ploy” in a conversation with Bloomberg View. And a New York Times reporter who visited the northern Syrian regions home to the new alliance published a damning report on Nov. 2 that said the loosely aligned Syrian Democratic Forces exist “in name only.”

    While Turkey and the Syrian Kurds share the goal of undermining the Islamic State, the two U.S. partners deeply mistrust each other. Turkey accuses the dominant political group among Syria’s Kurds, the PYD, of being a branch of a Kurdish militant organization called the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. The PKK has waged war on Ankara for three decades in the name of Kurdish rights.

    Many Kurds, meanwhile, believe Turkey has aided the rise of extremists during the Syrian civil war and note that Kurdish forces have done more to damage IS on the ground than any Turkish action has. Though these tensions have mostly been expressed verbally, Turkey shelled Syrian Kurdish positions on Oct. 27

    Analysts worry Washington’s new maneuver could lose either the support of the Kurds — who are reportedly attempting to strengthen ties with Russia, now a key player in the Syrian war — or the Turks, whose military and geographic position make them key to any effort to change the situation in Syria.

    Washington’s balancing act between Turkey and the Kurds has worked thus far. But its willingness to now publicly acknowledge support for the PYD from Incirlik could force it to choose between reducing support to the Kurds, the strongest anti-IS force, or placing more pressure on the Turks, who have great influence over the situation in Syria.

    CREDIT: ASSOCIATED PRESSTurkish soldiers hold their positions with their tanks on a hilltop on the outskirts of Suruc, at the Turkey-Syria border, overlooking Kobani, Syria, during fighting between Syrian Kurds and ISIS last year on Oct. 10, 2014.

    “We’re not trying to cover anything up,” Warren said during his briefing when asked by a reporter to respond to the New York Times report. “We’re providing weapons, or in this case, ammunition, to the Syrian Arab coalition. That’s what we said we’re doing, that’s actually what we’re doing.”

    A Turkish official made clear to The WorldPost that his government remains worried about the Kurds in Syria.

    “We are deeply concerned about the PYD’s links to the PKK,” the official said. Turkey ended a ceasefire with the PKK in July and has been striking the group in Turkey’s Kurdish-majority southeast and in Iraq ever since. The Kurdish militants have claimed responsibility for frequent attacks on police forces and soldiers. Today, the PKK formally ended a one-month ceasefire, citing the state’s “war policy.”

    Ankara shows no evidence of letting up after Sunday’s election, in which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party won back majority rule after painting the campaign as a choice between chaos and stability. Erdogan has vowed to “liquidate” every PKK fighter.

    Turkey’s government was not yet prepared to comment on the U.S. strikes launched from Incirlik, however, the official added.

    “Another concern is that divisions among opposition forces will ultimately serve the regime’s interest,” the official added, vocalizing a commonly reiterated state allegation that the Kurds care more about their own interests than the broader future of Syria.

    Turkey is a staunch opponent of Syrian dictator President Bashar Assad, and it supports a range of Syrian Arab groups that are trying to bring down his regime. Ankara and many members of those Syrian opposition groups are wary of the Kurds because they have allowed some regime forces to remain in the Kurdish city of Hasakah, and because they believe the Kurds want a de facto break-up of Syria.

    <span class='image-component__caption' itemprop="caption">Firefighters extinguish the fire after a car bomb attack on YPG headquarters in Hasakah, Syria on September 15, 2015. At least nine people were killed and other 30 people wounded after the attack.</span>CREDIT: ANADOLU AGENCY/GETTY IMAGESFirefighters extinguish the fire after a car bomb attack on YPG headquarters in Hasakah, Syria on September 15, 2015. At least nine people were killed and other 30 people wounded after the attack.

    Arabs in areas captured by the Kurds with U.S. support have also reported abuse at the hands of Kurdish forces, in interviews with outlets including The WorldPost and advocacy organizations like Amnesty International. Those allegations suggest that the Turks may have a point: If Washington does empower the Kurds without real engagement with Sunni Arabs, it could push many Arabs into the embrace of the Islamic State or other extremist, anti-Western groups in Syria.

    The U.S. appears to be managing Turkey’s concerns by tacitly agreeing that Syrian Kurdish forces will not be allowed to pass into areas west of the Euphrates river, according to Aaron Stein, a Turkey expert at the Atlantic Council.

    Turkey is nervous that the success of the Syrian Kurds will inspire Kurds in Turkey to try and carve out their own statelets, and it pointed to the Euphrates as a red line when announcing its  recent attacks on the Syrian Kurds. Ankara fears Syrian Kurdish forces will connect the areas they control in northeast Syria to their third region, or canton, in the northwest, thereby creating a powerful Kurdish corridor along the Turkey-Syria border.

    The focus on vanquishing the Islamic State, which U.S. officials say will only happen with help from the Syrian Kurds, puts Turkish policymakers in a difficult position.

    “In any case, Turkey is certainly indirectly aiding the YPG’s advance east of the Euphrates,” Stein told The WorldPost, using the acronym for the Syrian Kurds’ fighting force. “American drones provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance for these missions, and tankers based at Incirlik most certainly refuel U.S. bombers flying from Qatar.”

    Max Hoffman, a policy analyst at the Center for American Progress, told The WorldPost that the U.S. seems largely willing to pursue its goal of bringing down IS regardless of Turkish sensitivities.

    “It seems unlikely to me that coalition air controllers would ignore a credible ISIS target relayed by YPG on the ground, or divert coalition aircraft from further away, just because the closest coalition airplane was launched from Incirlik,” Hoffman wrote in a Wednesday email. “But I have no way of confirming that, and it’s certainly in the U.S. interest to allow Turkey to preserve that useful political fiction [that the Kurds are not supported from Incirlik] (if it is, in fact, a fiction).”

    <span class='image-component__caption' itemprop="caption">YPG fighters in downtown Tal Abyad, Syria on June 19, 2015.</span>CREDIT: AHMET SIK/ GETTY IMAGESYPG fighters in downtown Tal Abyad, Syria on June 19, 2015.

    The U.S has struggled to find reliable partners against the Islamic State on the ground other than the Kurds and an array of Arab-dominated groups the CIA has armed to fight Assad. In early October, the Obama administration announced that a $500 million Pentagon program to train anti-IS Syrian rebels had largely failed and was being restructured.

    The White House’s approach now seems to be to support the Kurds and nationalist Arabs in the north as intensely as possible. It announced on Oct. 30 that President Barack Obama would deploy dozens of American special operations forces to northern Syria to coordinate airstrikes and arms supply.

    The war in Syria has claimed at least 250,000 Syrian lives. With no end in sight to the conflict, IS remains in control of large tracts of land and the Assad regime continues to kill civilians daily, prolonging a conflict that has forced millions to seek refuge in neighboring countries and fueled the largest mass migration of people since World War II.

    International players involved in the conflict — either supporting Assad or the opposition to him — are holding negotiations to work out whether the dictator can be removed so that a more stable Syria can be established, but those talks have yet to bear fruit.

    The latest round, involving the U.S., Turkey, and states like Russia and Iran that are helping Assad, concluded without significant progress last week.

    This story has been updated to include Garver’s comments about ealrier U.S. aid to Kurdish fighters. 

    Sophia Jones reported from Istanbul and Akbar Shahid Ahmed reported from Washington.

  • Top European court’s decision should make Pope Francis blush

    Top European court’s decision should make Pope Francis blush

    By Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.

    AVİM, Center for Eurasian Studies

    October 26, 2015

    When Pope Francis, during a Mass in St. Peter’s Basilica on April 12, 2015, pronounced the word “genocide” in reference to the 1915 events in Ottoman Anatolia a century ago, it was patently clear that he was delving into territory he should not have. It was a meeting where the pontiff and top Armenian clerics and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan had gathered in what was apparently a show of Christian solidarity.

    By recognizing “Armenian genocide,” and calling the Armenian victims “confessors and martyrs for the name of Christ,” the Pope was asserting an unproven event, revealing his prejudice, or at the vey best, his misjudgment. The recent decision from the Grand Chamber of the prestigious European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is a testimony to the Pope’s wrongful and deplorable stance on Armenian allegations.

    In its milestone decision announced on October 15, 2015, the Grand Chamber, by a majority vote, agreed with the Second (lower) Chamber’s 17 December 2013 decision that Switzerland had violated Turkish politician Doğu Perinçek’s right to freedom of expression when it imposed penalty on Perinçek in connection with his “denial of Armenian genocide.” Hoping to have the lower chamber’s decision reversed, Switzerland, under intense Armenian lobbying, had appealed that decision to Grand Chamber – obviously to no avail.

    The Grand Chamber’s decision had two equally important ramifications. By letting stand the lower chamber’s decision, the Grand Chamber in effect affirmed that: (a) “Armenian genocide” is controversial and unproven, (b) there can be no comparison between the 1915 events and Holocaust.

    The court’s position is consistent with the provisions of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide (ratified in 1951), which first codified this term. According to this Convention, genocide is a legally construed special crime, and it can only be established through a judicial process in a duly authorized court – an international court or a court where the alleged crime was committed. Without a verdict from such a court, labeling an event as genocide lacks legal validity. In other words, it is merely an opinion.

    To date there exists not a single court verdict characterizing the 1915 events as genocide. The UN has also refused to call the 1915 events genocide. When he decided to recognize “Armenian genocide,” the Pope should have been aware of these legal boundaries. ECHR is an organ of the 47-member Council of Europe.

    So, one must ask, absent a judicial verdict, what gave the Pope the authority to call the 1915 events “genocide”?

    In its February 3, 2015 ruling (Croatia v. Serbia), the International Court of Justice in The Hague also concluded that forced relocation, which is what happened in Anatolia in 1915, even if it results in killings, cannot be called genocide unless specific intent (dolus specialis) to harm or kill is proven. The court also held that the provisions of the 1948 Convention cannot be applied retroactively, i.e., judgments as to past events not permissible.

    In the U.S. the Bill of Rights protects a party from being labeled guilty of a crime without due process; i.e., the alleged crime must be adjudicated in a court of law. The old, venerable adage, “Innocent until proven guilty,” must be respected.

    It is obvious that by labelling the 1915 events as genocide the Pope exceeded his authority and violated both the European and American due-process standards. The same standards, in fact, also bind parliaments that have so far recognized “Armenian genocide.”

    To date, the Armenian side, out of fear it would lose, has refrained from litigating its case in a court of law, preferring to influence the public opinion through propaganda instead.

    A case in point is the 17 December 2003 order of the European Court of First Instance on a lawsuit lodged by a group of Armenian-French citizens against three European institutions including the Council of the European Union. The applicants had sought compensation for non-material damage suffered on account of, inter alia, recognition of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the EU without Turkey’s prior acknowledgment of Armenian genocide. The court found that the applicants’ action was without legal merit and dismissed the claim, adding that the European Parliament’s 1987 resolution calling on Turkey to recognize “Armenian genocide” was purely political, without any binding consequences. Appeal of the ruling to the higher court was dismissed.

    The case was a legal defeat for the Armenian side, also reaffirming the fact that Armenian “g” resolutions passed by parliaments are no more than political opinions.

    Such realization should prompt parliaments that have recognized Armenian “g” to date to re-think their stance and rescind their decisions. The 1948 Convention does not make a distinction between “political” and “legal” recognition of genocide.

    The Pope, of course, has the right to express his opinion on the 1915 events; but this is not the same thing as denouncing these events as proven genocide.

    Speaking of opinion, in 1985 69 U.S. historians and researches signed a declaration, published in New York Times and Washington Post, stating that in their opinion the 1915 events do not constitute genocide. Among the signatories were eminent scholars such as Bernard Lewis. Surely, the Pope should have been aware of this declaration. Hence, even as regards opinion, there is no consensus among the scholars on “Armenian genocide.”

    The Pope apparently is also not aware that in 1920 his predecessor Pope Benedict XV had pleaded with the British to release some of the high-ranking Ottoman officials who were being held on the Island of Malta on suspicion of complicity in massacring Armenians. Benedict XV, who had direct contact with the Ottoman authorities, obviously did not think the Ottoman government had murderous or genocidal intentions toward the Armenians. All 244 Malta detainees, in fact, were released by the British for lack of evidence and returned to Turkish soil.

    So, one must ask the Pope: What did he know about the 1915 events in 2015 that his predecessor Benedict XV did not know almost a century earlier?

    Human rights issue

    The Pope, while recognizing “Armenian genocide,” astonishingly did not express any compassion for more than half a million civilian Muslims that lost their lives at the hands of renegade Armenian bands during the 1915 Armenian revolt.

    In a gesture of humanity, the Pope could have also offered condolences to the relatives of 42 Turkish diplomats and 4 foreign diplomats that were assassinated by Armenian terrorists in the 1970s through 1990s – including Turkish ambassador to Vatican Taha Carım in 1977. Three years later, in 1980, Carım’s successor Vecdi Türel and his driver were wounded by the terrorists.

    Likewise, the Pope could have expressed his compassion for the memory of the more than 600 Azeri civilians massacred by Armenian forces in the town of Khojaly in 1992.

    The Pope’s “humanity” should not be limited by race, religion or ethnicity.

    The 1.5 million Armenian victims alluded to by the Pope is also a grotesque exaggeration. The Armenian losses in Anatolia during World War I from all causes including fighting on the sides of the Allies were roughly 300,000, some 57,000 of which were during the relocation itself, most of them due to disease, famine and chaos.

    Double standard

    When he visited Sarajevo in June 2015, His Holiness, while denouncing the massacres inflicted upon the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, refused to use the term “genocide.” This, despite the fact that two UN courts have unequivocally called the Srebrenica massacres genocide. The Pope ignored the appeals of Bosnian academics and representatives of war victims to recognize the massacres as genocide. Srebrenica in a sense is a stone-throwing distance from the Holy See.

    Reflecting a shameful double standard, the Pope could not bring himself to use the word “genocide” when the perpetrators are Christian and the victims Muslim.

    In conclusion, His Holiness should deal with matters of faith and stay away from highly-charged historical issues that sow discord and hatred in society. He should not readily accept Armenian “g” allegations presented to him on a gold platter by the Armenian side. Otherwise, his call for inter-faith and inter-communal dialog becomes shamefully hollow.

  • Statement by Liberal Party of Canada Leader Justin Trudeau on the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide

    Statement by Liberal Party of Canada Leader Justin Trudeau on the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide

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    OTTAWA – The Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, Justin Trudeau, today issued the following statement on the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide:

    “Today, we commemorate the centennial anniversary of the Armenian Genocide; an event which saw the destruction of the national and personal freedom of over a million people during and after the First World War.

    “By recognizing the atrocities of the Armenian Genocide, we are reminded of the pain and suffering endured by those affected, as we endeavor to achieve peace and reconciliation for the people of Armenia, and a stable and prosperous future for all of its citizens.

    “While the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide is a time for solemn remembrance, it also provides us with the opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to never again be indifferent to hatred and genocide, nor remain silent to those who discriminate against others based on characteristics such as race, gender, or sexual orientation.

    “On behalf of the Liberal Party of Canada and the entire Liberal Caucus, I stand with Canadians across the country as we honour the memories of the victims of the Armenian Genocide.”

    Kaynak: » Statement by Liberal Party of Canada Leader Justin Trudeau on the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide – liberal.ca