Category: Turkey

  • Talking Turkey

    Talking Turkey

    Talking Turkey

    Published: July 14 2008 18:39 | Last updated: July 14 2008 18:39

    The indictment of 86 people, including businessmen, journalists and retired army officers, on coup-plotting charges is clear evidence of the scale of the political crisis now gripping Turkey.

    The defendants are accused of planning an ultra-nationalist insurrection against the government of the ruling Justice and Development party, the Islamic AKP. Prosecutors are preparing cases against several others, including two ex-generals arrested this month. The investigators suspect the plotters of planning violent outrages to create conditions for army intervention.

    The probes coincide with constitutional court action by the prosecutor to ban the AKP for allegedly undermining Turkey’s secular constitution. The party’s Islamic agenda – including allowing women to wear headscarves at public universities – has provoked great disquiet in the traditional secularist establishment, not least the army.

    The legal actions must now run their course, free of political interference. But, more fundamentally, the secularists must reconsider their ill-advised efforts to bring down the popular AKP, which governs with a big parliamentary majority. The party should not have put headscarves so high on its agenda but overall it deserves praise for developing Islamic politics with a modern face. Its economic record, including boosting the incomes of the rural poor, speaks for itself. The secularists must accept that if democracy delivers Islamic governments, they must accept the voters’ verdict – as long as those governments do not themselves threaten democratic rights, which the AKP has not.

    As the country develops, Turkey’s Islamic and secularist leaders must find compromises – or risk harming the modern nation both sides want. A sensible deal over headscarves would be a good start.

    The crisis is also an indictment of the European Union for its lamentable failure to handle Ankara’s membership bid positively. If the union had given Turkey a clear set of conditions and timetable, both the generals and the AKP could have concentrated their energies on accession, not headscarves.

    The talk of coups, bombs and a cache of hand-grenades should remind the EU that, inside or outside the union, Turkey will not go away. Dealing with a violently unstable big neighbour would demand much more attention – and possibly more money – than managing the considerable difficulties involved in Turkey’s EU accession. The union must revive its faltering efforts to engage with Ankara before it is too late.

     

  • Albright had it right

    Albright had it right

    Albright had it right

    Of headscarves and hegemony

    Tulin Daloglu
    Tuesday, July 15, 2008

    OP-ED:

    In principle, U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey is consistent whether Republicans or Democrats are in office. The particulars of Turkey’s democracy, however, sometimes tests the relationship. The role of the Turkish military, as guardian of secularism, also defines the country’s unique understanding of democracy. In recent memory, Turkish armed forces have attempted to intervene in politics twice – on Feb. 28, 1997, and April 27, 2007. Both times, they came close to the brink of a coup because Islamic fundamentalism posed a threat to secular democracy. Both times, the headscarf issue spawned the intervention.

     

    The United States made it clear to Turkey that it does not approve of military challenges to civilian authority. Yet the different ways Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice have approached the subject is defining. In 1997, Mrs. Albright said that changes in Turkey “have to be in the democratic context with no extraconstitutional approach” – meaning no coup. It was essential, she said, that Turkey “continue in a secular and democratic way.” She also made clear that she was concerned about the government’s Islamic tendencies – including its relationship with Iran. Her approach kept the balance of Turkey’s domestic affairs intact. The Islamist-rooted prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, resigned soon afterwards.

     

    Unlike Miss Rice, Mrs. Albright never spoke directly either for or against the government, or any political party in Turkey. She made clear at all times that the relationship is one between two sovereign countries.

     

    Miss Rice, however, has strongly supported the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), not even acknowledging the thousands of people protesting in the streets to express their concerns about Islamist influences over the government – though she could. “Even though it is led by the AKP [Justice and Development Party], which has Islamic roots, it has been trying to integrate into Europe,” Miss Rice said at a May 2007 Senate Appropriations Committee hearing. She took her support one step further after meeting Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan at the State Department in June 2008. “[W]e’re going to continue to work with this government … with which we share common values,” she said.

     

    The AKP government is certainly pleased with such praise from Americans. Yet a case before Turkey’s constitutional court which alleges that the government is acting extraconstitutionally in its attempting to turn the regime away from secular democracy puts matters to a test. While Miss Rice goes out of her way to express U.S. support for the AKP – even saying that the Islamist-rooted AKP government’s embrace of democracy fits with American values – she has declared that if the court rules against the party and decides to shut it down or ban some of its members from politics, the United States will question it.

     

    Separately, Miss Rice distances herself from Turkey’s other notable court case, in which a state prosecutor aims to expose an ultra-nationalist group that is trying to bring down the government. The prosecutor legally labeled the group a “terrorist” organization, and arrested a number of Turkish military personnel and two prominent high-level retired officers.

    The fact is, both cases belong to the realm of Turkey’s domestic affairs. There should exist full trust that the country’s courts can bring about justice.

     

    Although the United States has never responded to challenges by quashing political parties or banning politicians, not all democracies are the same. There is no democracy on Earth like that of the United States. Taking sides based on this country’s democratic norms and perceptions creates confusion and disarray.

     

    The United States has effectively chosen to side with the AKP rather than Turkey, dismissing the fact that, in democracies, political parties come to power through elections, and their rule lasts from election to election. The state and its institutions have a longer life span.

     

    Turkey’s desire to become a member of the European Union did not start with the AKP government, nor will it come to reality under its reign. When Abdullah Gul arrived to Washington in 1997 as a state minister defending the Erbakan government, he was trying to ease the concerns of Mrs. Albright regarding secularism in Turkey. That government had done almost nothing compared to the AKP government regarding the headscarf issue and more.

     

    Furthermore, if Turkey were a democracy by American standards, Turkish President Abdullah Gul would not be talking to Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, the former chief of staff, about issues under investigation by the state prosecutor. Gen. Ozkok would be surrendering what he knows to the state prosecutor instead of the president. Last week’s meeting between Mr. Gul and Gen. Ozkok is the very picture of a state’s highest authority interfering in the judicial system. If Miss Rice thinks the Bush administration shares common values with the AKP government, those values can only be that neither is perfect or immune from making major mistakes.

     

    To be sure, democracy is chaotic, but it is vital to distinguish the chaos of democratization from the dissolution of social integrity and unity. That dissolution does not promise a more democratized state, but rather one that is doomed to deeper trouble. And the rule of the AKP government has brought Turkey to the brink of such polarization and dissolution.

     

    Tulin Daloglu is a free-lance writer.

  • “New Action Plan for Southeastern Turkey” from SETA

    “New Action Plan for Southeastern Turkey” from SETA


    New from SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research:
    Policy Brief No.18, July 2008


    “New Action Plan for Southeastern Turkey ”

    by Taha OZHAN,
    Coordinator, Economic Research, SETA


    . org/document/ Policy_Brief_ No_18_Taha_ Ozhan.pdf

    Currently, GAP is a regional development project that covers nine southeastern provinces extending over the wide plains in the basins of the lower Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Political and economical instability in Turkey in the 1980s diverted attention from the GAP Project and led to consecutive failures in meeting official targets for its progress within the initial time framework. Within the last five years, Turkey has undergone a significant social and economic transformation whereby fiscal discipline, effective inflation control and an average of greater than 7% growth have been achieved ahead of many expectations. Turkish government launched its long-awaited plan for the GAP Project, now scheduled for completion by 2012 at an expected cost of around 27 billion YTL ($20 billion). The government described its action plan to boost social and economic development in the country’s southeast as “a turning point for Turkey .” The GAP Project was designed not only as a rural development plan but also as an economic initiative intended to have positive social and political consequences for Turkey ’s Kurdish issue. However, although it is certain that the Kurdish issue has an important socioeconomic dimension; it would be a mistake to reduce the issue to the economic backwardness of the region alone.

    Please find attached a copy of SETA Policy Brief No. 18, “New Action Plan for Southeastern Turkey “.

    Please click on the following link to download the document:

    . org/document/ Policy_Brief_ No_18_Taha_ Ozhan.pdf


    SETA FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH
    Resit Galip Caddesi Hereke Sokak No: 10 GOP, Cankaya 06700 Ankara , Turkey
    Tel: +90 312 405 61 51 Fax: +90 312 405 69 03
    www.setav.org
    info@setav.org

  • ABDULLATIF SENER: A DIVISIVE FACTOR OR THE NEW POLITICAL LEADER OF TURKEY?

    ABDULLATIF SENER: A DIVISIVE FACTOR OR THE NEW POLITICAL LEADER OF TURKEY?

    ABDULLATIF SENER: A DIVISIVE FACTOR OR THE NEW POLITICAL LEADER OF TURKEY?

    By Emrullah Uslu

    Monday, July 14, 2008

     

    As the decision of the Constitutional Court on whether the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) should be shut down gets closer, new political figures have started forming alternatives. The expectation that the constitutional court will shut down the AKP has led various politicians to fill the gap that will be left behind. In addition to the continuing political discussions that have taken place with the participation of well-known former politicians and ministers under the name of Patalya Hotel Meetings (Sabah, July 12-13), former Minister of Labor and Social Security Yasar Okuyan has also formed the New Party. (Hurriyet, June 28)

    Perhaps the most interesting formation among those newly formed parties, however, is Yeni Olusum Hareketi (YOH), which was founded by a former deputy prime minister from the AKP government, Abdullatif Sener, one of the four founders of the AKP in 2002. Sener recently resigned from the AKP to found the new party (www.yeniolusumhareketi.org).

    Unlike other parties, the YOH successfully attracted the attention of the Turkish media. Several factors explain this. First is Abdullatif Sener’s firm stance against corruption. Sener had protested against his own party on this issue and withdrew his nomination to be a member of the parliament in the general election of July 2007. Second, when he was deputy prime minister he successfully reached out to secular segments of the society, which made him an alternative political leader who could fill the gap in case the Constitutional Court bans Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdogan from participating in politics. Opinion polls indicate that after Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, both of whom may be banned by the court, Sener is one of the most widely supported political leaders on the center-right of the political spectrum (Vatan, July 13).

    There are conflicting opinions about whether Sener could successfully turn his positive image into political capital and carry his party to parliament. On the one hand, Sener has so far successfully organized several public gatherings: one in his hometown of Sivas (Hurriyet, April 19) and another more recently in Konya, the heart of the Islamist National Outlook Movement that gave birth to the AKP in 2002. More than three thousand people welcomed him, chanting “Prime Minister Sener” (Vatan, July 13). On the other hand, despite his positive image and some media support from Dogan Media Group, the most powerful media cartel, political observers are not so optimistic about Sener’s success in an election (Perihan Magden, Radikal, July 13, Ahmet Hakan, Hurriyet, July 9, Ahmet Kekec, Star, July 8). One of the major reasons why Sener may not be able to convert his prestige into electoral success is because most of the moderate Islamist groups consider that he betrayed them by associating himself with the “social engineering projects” of those who want to harm the ruling AKP (Zaman, July 13).

    Regardless of his success in the short term, in the long run even his presence could significantly damage the ruling AKP’s positive image among ordinary people. In his first rally in Konya, Sener harshly criticized the AKP government (Anadolu Agency, July 13). If the Constitutional Court decides to shut down the AKP or ban Prime Minister Erdogan from party politics, which is highly likely, then Sener’s position in politics in the forthcoming weeks will be very important, because it is no secret that 60 former AKP MPs and many current MPs would join Sener’s party (Bugun, July 13). Right after the Supreme Court prosecutor opened the lawsuit demanding the AKP’s closure, Sener used his connections within the AKP to organize private meetings with AKP MPs to form the new political party (Vatan, April 28).

    It seems that Sener’s role in short-term politics will be to divide the ruling party, but it is not clear how deep a political wound he might leave on the face of the AKP, since there is absolutely no sign as to what Erdogan’s plan will be if the court shuts his party down. Sener is in a critical position and must play the right cards at just the right time. Sener could become Erdogan’s Brutus or, with the help of the political climate and a bit of luck, he could be the next leader of Turkey.

  • George Bush, Osama Bin Laden in MISSION ISTANBUL

    George Bush, Osama Bin Laden in MISSION ISTANBUL

    Joginder Tuteja, Bollywood Trade News Network  

    Apoorva Lakhia and Suneil Shetty are really thinking BIG for their upcoming project MISSION ISTANBUL.

    The film is being promoted extensively with each of the actors getting a fair dose of limelight for himself. While Zayed Khan is being the common factor amongst all the film’s promos (since he plays the central protagonist), even Nikiten Dheer (who did loose his share of pie in JODHAA AKBAR in spite of being pitted against Hrithik Roshan) has been making quite an impression with his physique standing tall over anyone else in the frame.

    Vivek Oberoi too doesn’t have a reason to complain since he has not just become much more prominent in the promotional plans of the film but now also has an item song all for himself. No wonder, he is giving tough competition to Abhishek Bachchan who has been roped in as an item boy for MISSION ISTANBUL.

    But are you aware that apart from Zayed Khan, Vivek Oberoi, Suneil Shetty and Nikiten Dheer, there are two more characters which form an integral part of this action packed thriller? And these two men are not fictional but belong to real life!

    We are talking about the characters of George W. Bush and Osama Bin Laden, who would feature in this most ambitious venture of Apoorva Lakhia.

    Of course, one can’t expect the two men to be facing the camera for a feature film and hence the makers of MISSION ISTANBUL have roped in look alikes of Bush and Osama for their film. While Brent Mendenhall, an exact look-alike of U.S President George W. Bush, appears in the film as Bush, the part of Osama Bin Laden would be enacted by Khalil Ahmed.

    In a film that has been shot in Turkey and exposes behind the scenes games of media and terrorism coming together, MISSION ISTANBUL is indeed generating quite some heat for itself. Also starring Shabbir Ahluwalia, Shriya Saran and Shweta Bhardwaj, MISSION ISTANBUL is a co-production of Popcorn Motion Pictures and Balaji Telefilms Ltd. and is all set for a 25th July.

  • The Not-So-Historic Talabani-Barak Handshake

    The Not-So-Historic Talabani-Barak Handshake

    Sunday, 13 July 2008, 2:54 pm

    Column: Ramzy Baroud

    A Kodak Moment:

    The Not-So-Historic Talabani-Barak Handshake (Photo: AFP)

    By Ramzy Baroud

    Most people would not have even realised that the 23rd congress of the Socialist International was being held near Athens were it not for the moment when Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak shook the hand of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.

    An Associated Press report, published in the Israeli daily Haaretz, dubbed the handshake “historic”. History was supposedly made in Athens on 1 July 2008. Centred in a photo, featuring a widely grinning Barak and Talabani, is Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who was credited for introducing the two.

    The three individuals involved are members of political establishments that are largely funded and sustained by the US government. Both Abbas and Talabani are at the helm of puppet political structures that lack sovereignty or political will of their own, and are entirely reliant on scripts drafted in full or in part by the Bush administration.

    As for Israel, which enjoys a more equitable relationship with the United States, normalisation with the Arabs is something it covets and tirelessly promotes, granted that such normalisation doesn’t involve ending its occupation of the Palestinian territories, or any other concessions.

    One might suggest the happenstance handshake and very brief meeting was not accidental at all. This is what Haaretz wrote, rewording Barak’s comments on the handshake. He “said that Israel wished to extend its indirect peace talks with Syria to cover Iraq as well.” That was a major political declaration by Israel — one surely aimed at further isolating Iran, as Israel’s newest moves regarding Syria, Lebanon and Gaza clearly suggest. But the fact is Israel’s ever-careful leaders could make no such major political announcement without intense deliberation and consensus in the Israeli government prior to the “accidental” handshake.

    Talabani owes Barak more than a reciprocal handshake; a heartfelt thank you is in order for his newly found fortunes as Iraq’s sixth president starting in 2005. Indeed, over time, pointing the finger at Israel’s leading role in the Iraq war — as it’s now being replayed in efforts to strike Iran — has morphed from being a recurring discussion of writers and analysts outside the mainstream media, to US government and army officials.

    In a recent commentary, US writer Paul J Balles brings to the fore some of these major declarations, including those of Senator Ernest Hollings (May 2004) who “acknowledged that the US invaded Iraq ‘to secure Israel’, and ‘everybody knows it.’Retired four-star US army general and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark is another: “Those who favour this attack (against Iraq) now will tell you candidly, and privately, that it is probably true that Saddam Hussein is no threat to the United States. But they are afraid at some point he might decide if he had a nuclear weapon to use it against Israel,” he was quoted in The Independent as saying.

    In his recent review of Michael Scheuer‘s Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq, Jim Miles wrote, “It is not so much the Israeli lobby itself that he [Scheuer] criticises, but the ‘Israeli-firsters’, those of the elite who whole-heartedly adopt the cause of Israel as the cause of America. He describes them as ‘dangerous men… seeking to place de facto limitations on the First Amendment to protect the nation of their primary attachment [Israel].

    Scheuer, an ex-CIA agent who primarily worked on gathering information on Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, wrote in his book, “to believe that relationship is not only a burden but a cancer on America’s ability to protect its genuine national interests… equates to either anti- Semitism or a lack of American patriotism.”

    Not only is Israel directly and indirectly responsible for a large share of the war efforts (needless to say media propaganda and hyped “intelligence” on Iraq’s non-existing nuclear programme), but it also had much to say and do following the fall of the Iraqi government in March 2003.

    In a comprehensive study entitled “The US War on Iraq: Yet Another Battle To Protect Israeli Interests?” published in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs in October 2003, Delinda C Hanley discussed Israel’s involvement following the invasion of Iraq. The article poses an important question, among others: did Bush’s Israel-first advisers invade Iraq in order to assure that Israel would have easy access to oil? — a question that is not predicated on a hunch, but rather statements made by top Israeli officials, including the country’s national infrastructure minister at the time Joseph Paritzky, who “suggested that after Saddam Hussein’s departure, Iraqi oil could flow to the Jewish state, to be consumed or marketed from there.” A 31 March 2003 article in Haaretz reported on plans to “reopen a long-unused pipeline from Iraq’s Kirkuk oil fields to the Israeli port of Haifa.”

    Israel’s interest in Kirkuk’s oil, and thus Iraqi Kurds, didn’t merely manifest itself in economic profits, but extended far beyond. Seymour M Hersh wrote in The New Yorker, 21 June 2004: “Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s government decided… to minimise the damage that the war was causing to Israel’s strategic position by expanding its long-standing relationship with Iraq’s Kurds and establishing a significant presence on the ground in the semi- autonomous region of Kurdistan…
    Israeli intelligence and military operatives are now quietly at work in Kurdistan, providing training for Kurdish commando units
    and, most important in Israel’s view, running covert operations inside Kurdish areas of Iran and Syria.”

    Perhaps Talabani is the president of Iraq, but he is also the founder and secretary-general of the major Kurdish political party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). His advocacy for Kurdish political sovereignty spans a period of five decades. Thus, it is also difficult to believe that the influential leader didn’t know of Israel’s presence and involvement in northern Iraq. Ought one to understand the Athens handshake as a public acknowledgment and approval of that role?

    To suggest that the Barak-Talabani handshake was “historic” is completely unfounded, if not ignorant. What deserves scrutiny is why the governments of Tel Aviv and the Green Zone decided to upgrade their gestures of “good will” starting in 2003 to a public handshake. Is it a test balloon or is there a more “historic” and public agreement to follow?

    *************

    -Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in many newspapers and journals worldwide. His latest book is The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle (Pluto Press, London).

    Source: PalestineChronicle.com,