Category: Turkey

  • Tony Blair’s former protection officer is killed while competing in French cycling race

    Tony Blair’s former protection officer is killed while competing in French cycling race

    ian-bashfordTony Blair’s former protection officer is killed while competing in French cycling race when he is hit by a support car just 200 metres from the finish

     

    •  Ian Bashford, a former PC, died in the 35th Duo Normand cycle race 
    •  He was sprinting towards the finish when his bike collided with a car
    •  The 61-year-old once worked protecting VIPs such as ex-PM Tony Blair 

    According to Dailymail, a retired British policeman died when he was hit by a car just 200 metres from the finish line of a cycle race in France.

    Police are investigating the death of former Police Constable Ian Bashford, 61, after a support vehicle in the 35th Duo Normand race allegedly swerved into his path.

    The keen amateur cyclist, from Croydon, was peddling at around 35mph as he sprinted to the finish line in the town of Marigny in Normandy.

     The 27-year-old driver of a van, which was supporting one of the other teams, was taken to hospital suffering from shock, while attempts to revive Mr Bashford failed.

    It is understood the van driver was from Guernsey in the Channel Islands.

    Mr Bashford was a retired Metropolitan Police officer whose job involved protecting high profile politicians, including Tony Blair.

    He was a member of the Old Portlians Cycling Club, which was founded in 1921 as a club for former pupils of Portland Road School in south-east London.

    Julian Hutchings, the secretary of the Old Portlians, said Mr Bashford had been a member of the club for around 20 years and had taken part in the Duo Normand at least six times before. 

    Mr Hutchings said: ‘Ian and his partner Peter were coming into town, they were about a quarter of a mile from the finish. Having headed downhill they would have been doing 30mph to 35mph.

    ‘A van – which was following a pair of cyclists coming towards them – swerved to the left, probably to overtake some other cyclists and catch up with their own cyclists.

    ‘There are cones, but the cones are spaced widely enough so that cars can go through, so the van swerved left on to Ian and Peter’s side of the road.

    ‘Peter and Ian tried to avoid it. Peter went to his right, into the gutter.

    ‘He crashed and came off but wasn’t badly hurt, but the vehicle crashed into Ian.’

    Mr Hutchings, who arrived on the scene 15 minutes after the incident, said emergency services worked for half an hour to attempt to resuscitate Mr Bashford.

    He said there had been accidents on the same stretch of the course in previous years but never a fatality.

    ‘There are questions to be asked about the organisation of the event, in the sense that you have cyclists going back and forth on the same stretch of road, with cars able to travel on that stretch of road and overtake on that stretch of road,’ said Mr Hutchings.

    He described Mr Bashford as a ‘passionate cyclist’ who ‘would help anybody’.

    Mr Hutchings added: ‘He was the best cyclist in the club and he was well-known, well-liked not only by everybody in the club, but an awful lot of people in the cycling community in south London, southern England, and beyond.’

    The Duo Normand is a time-trial race, on a 33-mile circuit in Normandy, and has been won three times by Britain’s Olympic champion Chris Boardman.

    The organisers said that, after a discussion with Mr Bashford’s friends, it was decided to complete the race, which was won by Antony Bleasdale from Guernsey.

    The Foreign Office has been in contact with local authorities and will provide assistance to his family.

    British Cycle Sport tweeted: ‘Our thoughts with the wife and family of Ian Bashford killed while taking part in the Duo Normand team time trial (France).’

     

  • The policy of Christianization of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus

    The policy of Christianization of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus

    russian-empire-armenian-peopleThe XVIII-XIX centuries were a turning point in the history of the Caucasus. The centuries-old struggle of the leading states of the world for the region ended with the victory of the Russian Empire, which under Peter I turned into a maritime power. Opening a “window” to Europe, the emperor-reformer sought to expand the boundaries of the empire in the southern direction. However, in the beginning of the XVIII century, the matter of access to the Black Sea was closed for Russia and Peter I turned his attention to the Caucasus.

    As a result of the Caspian campaign of Peter I (1722), the western shore of the Caspian Sea had been conquered, and the Istanbul Treaty (1724) consolidated these Russian conquests in the international system. However, regime of “bironovshchina”, established in Russia after the death of the Emperor, not interested in the Caucasus issue, signed Rasht (1732) and Ganja (1735) treaties and abandoned Peter’s conquests. But the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna purposefully continued the work of her parent. During her reign, the Black Sea problem and the issue of the Caucasus has become a top priority ofRussian foreign policy. Over time, already under Catherine II, after the Russian-Ottoman war of 1768-1774, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) has strengthened Russia’s position in Crimea and on the Azov coast, completely incorporating Kabardia into the Russian Empire, thus expanding the scope of its influence in this horonime.

    The struggle for the Caucasus continued even after the ratification of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. In 1783, Crimea became part of Russian, and it gained dominance in northern Black Sea Coast.  In the same year it strengthened its position in the South Caucasus, by concluding the Treaty of Georgievsk with the ruler of the kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti Heraclius II, who recognized its patronage and abandoned his right to independent foreign policy.  With the accession of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti in 1801, Romanov’s Russia, without hiding its true intentions, set foot on Azerbaijani soil. The Qajars, which tried to oust Russia from the mega-region with the support of Western countries, began military operations, but the two Russian-Iranian wars ended with the victory of the RussianEmpire, and after the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) the autocracy included the South Caucasus to its political and geographical space.

    To subdue the Caucasus, the tsarist government has been implementing a colonial policy already in the process of conquests, the essence of which was the assimilation of the local population and the transformation of the mega-region into an integral part of the Russian Empire. The main components of this strategic course were the Christianization and immigration policies.

    While launching a campaign to conquer the Caucasus, Russia has clearly realized that the captured Muslim region will be the weak link in the country, because confessionally alien population will not tolerate foreign invasion. The ruling circles of the Empire clearly understood: a recalcitrant region can be controlled not at the point of a bayonet, but with the help of religious rapprochement between mother country and colony, to be exact – the infiltration and enforcement of Christianity. Therefore, at the end of the eighteenth century, they created the Ossetian Theological Commission in Tbilisi, defining its main task as the spread of Orthodox Christianity among the Muslims of the Caucasus for its rapprochement with Russia. At the same time, representatives of Non-Orthodox faiths were also engaged in missionary activity in the Caucasus. Society of Scottish Missionaries, established in Astrakhan, June 22, 1815 by decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs, conducted their activities in a narrow geographical area, in the coastal strip of the Caspian Sea, and its main objectives were spreading and preaching of the Gospel on the mentioned territory.

    Along with Scottish Christian missionaries, Basel Christian missionaries also operated in the Caucasus, activities of which covered the territory between the Black and Caspian seas. Basel Evangelical Society has set the goal before missionaries: to spread Christianity in the Caucasus. However, the activities of foreign Christian missionary societies did not produce the expected results. Indigenous peoples of the Caucasus have not shown interest in Christianity (except for some cases) that did not meet the policy of Christianization of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus. As a result, its official representatives concluded: missionaries sent by Edinburgh and Basel societies do not benefit the Power in enforcing and spreading Christianity on the conquered outskirts. The ruling circles ofRussia, not taking into account the mentality of the indigenous population of the Caucasus, whereIslam was the determining factor of the identity of the people of this mega-region, created a “Society for the restoration of Orthodox Christianity in the Caucasus”, and the Ossetian Theological Commission was abolished due to inefficiency. Russian Empire, deliberately spreading Christianity in the Caucasus and relying on Orthodoxy, entrusted the new society with the task of restoration and maintenance of the ancient Christian churches and monasteries in the Caucasus, construction of new churches, parochial schools, and distribution of the Books of Holy Scripture in there.

    Source: The Caucasus and Globalization. Issue №5 / Volume 1/ 2007 pp. 152-160

    Hajar Verdiyeva Doctor of Historical Science

  • Omar Mansoor LFW S/S ‘17  ‘’Royae Shahdokht’’ (Dreams of a princess)

    Omar Mansoor LFW S/S ‘17 ‘’Royae Shahdokht’’ (Dreams of a princess)

     

     

    _dsc2044Omar Mansoor returns with his 12th collection at LFW featuring ready to wear dresses inspired by the ancient Persian symbol of the Faravahar deriving from Zoroastrian traditions and Navy Blue. 

    From the start of the 20th Century, the Faravahar icon found itself in public spaces and became a known icon among all Iranians. The Faravahar is a national symbol rather than a religious icon. Nowadays, it represents both the modern and ancient Iranian State. 

    The symbol first appears on Royal inscriptions and it is thought to represent the “Divine Royal Glory” of the King. The winged discs which are usually blue in colour have a long history in the art and culture of the ancient near and Middle East.

    The Navy Blue is the inspiration and colour scheme for Omar Mansoor’s Collection. “Navy Blue” which describes both a bright and dark shade of Azure Blue combined with the tradition in European Art and ancient Persia. Omar Mansoor marries both points of inspiration thus drawing on his heritage and European traditions. 

    The collection features full and short length dresses made up of vintage laces, Crepe and Chiffons.  

    By combining vintage fabrics alongside modern fabrics, Omar creates an elegant look for a woman, who embodies the self-confidence, high spirits and splendour.

    Concept and Styling: Arshia Tousi 

    Sales: Donna Llewellyn timelessdonna@gmail.com 

    Instagram: omar.mansoor   Twitter: @omarmansoor  Email: info@omarmansoor.com   

     

  • View of the history Azerbaijani-Chechen interaction

    View of the history Azerbaijani-Chechen interaction

    sevinc-israfil Sevinj Aliyeva, PhD Institute of History Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences
    On November 15, 2012, head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov paid a visitto Azerbaijan to discuss prospects for cooperation between the two republics. Thevisit of the Chechen leader to Baku was not the first contact between Azerbaijan and Chechnya. AZPROMO, the Azerbaijani Foundation for Supporting Exports andInvestments, on April 4, 2012, organized in Baku a presentation on investment possibilities in the Chechen Republic. The presentation was attended by a Chechendelegation headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Chechen Republic and Finance Minister Ali Isayev. Among others in the delegations were alsothe Industrial and Trade Minister of Chechnya Galas Taymaskhanov and CultureMinister Dikalu Muzakayev. The delegation met both with members of theAzerbaijani government and with the countrys business circles, in which they with a view to laying the groundwork for mutually profitable economic cooperationbetween the two sides proposed projects in various segments of the economy.
    [1]This elicited interest from the Azerbaijani side, which prepared a draft agreement oncultural and economic cooperation. The Chechen delegation also visited majorindustrial objects of the country, and an agreement was reached on a visit by anAzerbaijani delegation to Chechna at a later point. Still earlier, in November 2011, an Azerbaijani delegation headed by Economic Development Minister ShahinMustafayev visited Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. [2]An interest to foster bilateral relations is shared by both sides, with ChechenPresident Kadyrov having emphasized that, [w]e must strive for all-sidedstrengthening of contacts with Azerbaijan. [3] Azerbaijan, in turn, which now hostsa representation office for Daghestan and Chechnya, has been expanding itscooperation with a range of republics and oblasts  of the North Caucasus, includingChechnya. With the latter, BakuÕs relations have been advancing both in the tradeand economic sectors and in the military and political directions.
    Baku  engagement with the Chechen people is far from a new phenomenon andtraces back to many decades ago in history. By early 20th century, Baku emergedas the center not only of religious, spiritual and cultural life of the Muslim peoples ofthe Caucasus, but also a focal point of the ethnically varied work force of the region.In 1917, 999 North Caucasians lived in Baku, including Chechens, Daghestanis,Osetins, and others. Baku got to know quite a handful of prominent Chechens andIngush in the 20th century who lived and developed their activity in the Azerbaijanicapital, including enlightener Adil-Girei Dolgiyev; ethnographer, regionalist andfolklorist Chakh Akhriyev; public teacher Tashtemir Eldarkhanov; famous composerand pedagogue Muslim Magomayev, and others. The daughter of Chakh Akhriyev,Tamara (Gul-Bahar khanum) Akhriyeva received her education in Bakus St. Ninafemale academic institute and stayed to teach in Baku afterwards. In 1911-1915,she worked as the head of the female Russian-Muslim Aleksander Institute. [4]In the second half of the 19 th century, Azerbaijani oil specialists would share theirexperience in the development of all aspects of the oil industry in Grozny, which wasthe main oil centre in the North Caucasus. One of the well-known oil industrialistsinvolved in the Grozny works was A. Akhverdov. [5]
    The improvement of rail,highway, sea and air communications in the 20 th  century to a still greater degreemade possible the close economic and cultural ties of the regions of the Caucasus.A new stage of Azerbaijani-Chechen relations set in following the February 1917revolution: National Councils and various political organizations came to surface.The Chechen Congress in Grozny sent a telegram to members of the Ozakom M.Yu.Jafarov and M.I. Papadzhanov requesting that the Ozakom send the inspector of theGoychay higher educational institution Eldarkhanov to serve as inspector of primaryschools in Chechnya. [6]Following the February 1917 revolution, virtually in all regions of the former RussianEmpire the tsarist administration began to be disbanded and replaced by all-nationalinstitutions, the latter dominated by bourgeois nationalist parties. The nationalbourgeoisie and intelligentsia, the Cossacks, and various strata of the population,having supported the democratic transformation in the country, began to insist uponfreedom of speech and the press, the creation of national schools and a nationaladministration.Cooperation between the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-20) and theMountaineer Republic included the dispatch of Azerbaijani military units to the latter.Azerbaijani-Turkish forces, supplemented by native gortsy  forces, occupied the coastbetween Derbent and Petrovsk. On 7 November 1918, Petrovsk was seized.
    Theterritory of Daghestan and Chechnya was freed from the Bolsheviks and powerpassed to the Mountaineer Government. Turkish forces let by Col. Ismail Haki-bey, together with Azerbaijani units and others from the North Caucasus, began an attackagainst the Denikin-led Armed Forces of White Russia. Ismail-pasha was sent toDaghestan and Chechnya, while Shukri-bey went to the Terek and Kuban regions.However, as a result of the defeat of the German bloc in World War I and thewithdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the war in November 1918, Turkish forceshad to quickly leave the territory of Daghestan and the South Caucasus.In these conditions, an independent Mountaineer Republic was proclaimed at ageneral assembly of representatives of the peoples of Daghestan and Chechnya.
    According to the representative of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Mountaineer Republic, A. Akhverdov, there were no political parties in the latter, which onlyfeatured national fractions instead, such as the Ingush, Chechen, Kumyk, and thelike; and the majority of the members of the Union Council were spiritual leaders andinfluential people. [7]A delegation of the Mountaineer Republic, together with the Azerbaijani delegation,set off for the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 to seek internationalrecognition. However, the White Army occupied Chechnya and Ingushetia.
    Thesenior commander of the units of the Volunteer Army in the Caucasus, Maj.Gen.Shatilov, sent the Azerbaijani Government a letter on February 13, 1919, in which heassured the latter about the voluntary nature of the subordination of these two North Caucasus regions to the Volunteer Army and about the introduction in these placesof self-administration. He consequently recommended that the MountaineerGovernment yield its authority given the lack of demand for it. The Chechen delegation visited the diplomatic representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in theMountaineer Republic, described in detail their republicÕs fight with the White Armyand declared that if it did not receive support, it would be forced to surrender sinceits supplies and materiel were near exhaustion.In his proclamation, Shatilov noted that the command of the Volunteer Army knewabout the preparation of the Azerbaijan Republic to support the Chechens with itsown forces and about the disinformation of the Chechens by statements that theWhite Army wanted to subordinate Chechnya to the Cossacks.
    Regarding theCossacks, he gave assurances that the White Army intended to make peace with theChechens. [8] One should note that after the occupation of the Terek oblast byDenikinÕs army, a dubious attitude toward the events could be seen. The ChechenNational Council headed by Chulikov supported the appointment as ruler of ChechnyaVoluntary Army General Iris-Khan Aliyev. But part of the population of Chechnyaspoke out against the occupation of its territory by the White Army. On April 26, A.Kantemir, at the direction of the chairman of the Mountaineer Government P. Kotsev,sent the government of Azerbaijan and the allied command a note of protest againstthe actions of the White Army on the territory of Chechnya. The commander ofBritish forces in Petrovsk responded that Denikin would not continue his militaryactions and would make peace with the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, and Osetins andawait the decision of the Peace Conference on the independence and borders ofstates formed on the ruins of the Russian Empire.
    In exchange, he wrote, theMountaineer Government must allow the White Army to struggle against theBolsheviks on the territory of the Mountaineer Republic.Following the defeat of the forces of the Mountaineer Republic, a powerful uprisingled by the local spiritual leaders broke out in Chechnya and Daghestan. In hismemoirs, Denikin described this as follows: In its search for a way out, theMountaineer Parliament began to seek political union with Azerbaijan in the name of  the defense of religion and the unique qualities of Daghestan  The MountaineerGovernment continued its agitation and set to mountainous Chechnya small Daghestani units and Azerbaijani volunteers. [9] A. Akhverdov, in turn, was askingthe Azerbaijani Government to send Azerbaijani officers to provide help to theChechens, because Òthis could have  a moral impact on those who are fighting.ÓAkhverdov also asked Baku to send a small unit toward Khasavyurt.
    A detachmentunder the command of Kazim-bey was dispatched for the defense of the MountaineerRepublic. Representatives of the Ingush met with told Akhverdov that they had assembled a serious force and were preparing an attack from three sides:Ingushetia, Chechnya ad the Georgian military highways. According to Akhverdov, Òthe Chechens also were inclined to unite with Azerbaijan. It was particularlyemphasized that the head of the Noth Caucasus Emirate Uzun-Haji also called for joining with Azerbaijan. [10]
    The White Army at that time was engaged in battles onthe territory of the Terek region, in particular in Ingushetia and in Chechnya. As iswell known, Denikin set as his main task the liquidation of all newly formedsovereign states and the restoration of a single and indivisible Russia.ÓFollowing the seizure of Gudermes station by Denikin, the English colonel Rowlandson officially declared to Chechen governor Col. Jafarov about the inclusionof the North Caucasus into the sphere of influence of the White Army and of Daghestan into the English sphere of influence. In response, a session of the inter-party commission in Baku adopted an appeal to the citizens of Azerbaijan in which itdeclared, In the North Caucasus, the freedom-loving mountaineers true to thebehest of their ancestors and the principles of freedom and independence of smallpeoples, is shedding blood in an unequal battle with the reactionary forces of Denikin and company it is the responsibility of every Muslim to provide help to the fraternalmountaineers in a timely fashion. The Inter-party commission set on the formationof an Azerbaijan Volunteer Detachment under the leadership of experienced officersto provide such help.Uzun-Haji, the head of the North Caucasus emirate, sought to achieve via thediplomatic channels of Georgia and Azerbaijan recognition of his monarchy by theworld powers. He asked Akhverdiyev to convey from him a message of greetings tothe Azerbaijani government.
    In the middle of May 1919, it was reported that UzunHaji, together with Akhverdov, was getting ready to come to Baku for talksconcerning Chechnya. However, it appears that he sent as his representatives thebrother of Mogamed Efendi Dibir-Magomayev and the honorary Chechen MagomedPiralov, while he himself went to Chechnya. According to a dispatch from A.Akhverdov, Òafter the seizure of Petrovsk, Daghestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia willrecognize the authorities of Azerbaijan; they are prepared for this. After this, theMountaineer Republic can be reestablished under the protectorate of Azerbaijan.Ó[11]At the beginning of June 1919, Azerbaijani agents were dispatched to Temir-Khan-Shura, Shamil-Kala (Petrovsk), Grozny and Vladikavkaz in order to follow the actionsof the Volunteer Army. According to Akhverdov, the population of Daghestan andChechnya impatiently awaited the arrival of Azerbaijani forces. Uzun-Haji fromBotlikh reported about the readiness of the Avar and Andi districts to rise againstDenikins army.
    The residents of the auls  of mountainous Chechnya reachedagreement about not subordinating themselves to Denikin. And already at acongress in Shali, the Chechens resolved to defend the interests of the mountaineersto the last drop of blood and to preserve their freedom, and not to help in any waythe Volunteer Army. Akhverdov sent two letters to Baku from the Chechen people – one written in Arabic and one in TurkicÑreporting about the situation in Chechnyaand the destruction of villages there by the Denikin forces. In July, intense battlesagainst the Denikin forces and the Cossacks were conducted by Ingush and Chechenmutineers in the directions of Vladikavkaz and Grozny. They cut the Grozny-Beslanline.
    The Ingush National Council organized a rising against Denikin, which seizedthe lower portions of Ingushetia in the middle of July 1919. On June 28, AbubakarPliyev, the representative of the Ingush people and a member of the United Councilof the Mountaineer Republic, sent a special letter to the Chairman of the Parliamentof the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic requesting assistance and left for Baku. [12]In September 1919, a new wave of the national liberation movement of the peoplesof the North Caucasus began. The national movement in Daghestan was headed byN. Gotsinsky, that in Chechnya by Uzun-Haji, and that in the Northwestern Caucasusby Sultan Klych Girey. Meanwhile, members of the Mountaineer Government,located provisionally in Tiflis, reached agreement on forming a Committee ofMountaineers consisting of 12 people under the chairmanship of A. Tsalikov. Theconduct of foreign policy was entrusted to Dzhabagiyev.
    They appealed to Vekilovwith a request to the Azerbaijani government for subsidies and the transfer of theactivities of this Committee to Baku. Vekilov transferred to Dzhabagiyev a 250,000rubles loan for the needs of the Mountaineer organization. [13]In November 1919, the Azerbaijani government sent Nuri Pasha to Daghestan as thecommander in chief of the North Caucasus front. He and his Turkish officers formeda regular division in Daghestan and a cavalry division in Chechnya. Nuri-pashaorganized negotiations between the commanders and the leaders of Daghestan andthe North Caucasus, Ali Haji Akushinsky, Ibrahim-Haji, Kazim-bey, N. Gotsinsky, andK. Alikhanov. Nuri-pasha promised military assistance from Azerbaijan. He plannedfirst to liberate the territories of Daghestan, then to establish a new provisionalgovernment and together with Uzun Haji occupy the Terek district. He also plannedto conclude an agreement with the parliament of the Mountaineer Republic.
    Following the recognition of the Azerbaijani Republic by the major powers and thenon-recognition by them of the Mountaineer Republic, Azerbaijan continued tosupport the North Caucasus peoples in their struggle for independence. [14]Following the victory of the Red Army in Azerbaijan and in the North Caucasus, thepower of the Bolsheviks was established, but even during Soviet times, relationsbetween the Azerbaijani and Chechen peoples did not break off and continued withinthe framework of the Soviet state, the latter having promoted a mutual enrichmentof cultures and the establishment of cultural links. According to the 1989 census,456 Chechens lived in Azerbaijan.
    Following the war in Chechnya, the number ofChechen refugees there reached 4,700. And Azerbaijan took them in despite theproblems it had with its own refugees as a result of the occupation of Azerbaijanilands by Armenian forces. If the Azerbaijani refugees had somewhere to retreat to,the Chechens did not.Consequently, in the 1990s and 2000s, a new wave of resettlement ofrepresentatives of many North Caucasus peoples to Azerbaijan was under way. Theyfound work, sought education, and received local residence permits (Rasulov 2005,pp. 42-43). In 1995, a Cultural Center of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria was openedin Baku.
    Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev considered the political problem of Chechnya as an internal affair of Russia, but the Chechen issue as a humanitarianproblem. For the resolution of the problems of Chechen refugees, the main office ofthe plenipotentiary representative of Chechnya to the Muslim countries, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, was opened in Baku. The number of Chechen refugees in Azerbaijangrew to 10,000 by the year 2000. Despite its own problems with refugees,Azerbaijan could not close its borders to suffering people who were hostages tolarger political games. And most of the latter found refuge and a better life there.The situation changed in the fall of 1999. According to Azerbaijani political scientistR. Musabayov, the watershed became the explosions of the fall of 1999 when theChechen resistance turned to terrorism. Azerbaijani society could not find a justification for this type of action, which discredited the Chechen resistance. In July2000, the office of the representation of the Government of Ichkeria in MuslimCountries was suspended. Pressure from Russia played an essential role in thatdecision. With the coming to power in Russia of Vladimir Putin, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia improved. According to the director of the
    Chechen humanrights center in Baku, Mairbek Taramov, after the events of September 11, theinternational Islamic foundations which were operating in Baku in 1999-2000 underpressure from the US, Russia and Azerbaijan, ceased their activities and assistanceto the Chechens.As a result, in March 2001, the Chechen refugees turned to President Heydar Aliyevwith an open letter, noting that they did not want to be returned to Russia andinsisted on their rights under the 1951 convention. These refugees indicated thatthey were encountering difficulties in obtaining the necessary documentation,because Azerbaijani officials were referring them to the Russian embassy. Theyasked that their problems be referred to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) and that their position in Azerbaijan be regularized. As a result, they wereissued a form of UNHCR identification, which legalized their status only in Azerbaijan,but stayed short of guaranteeing the provision of financial, humanitarian, medical,and other kinds of assistance. At the present time, there are 4,930 Chechenrefugees in Azerbaijan.
    They continue to complain about problems with the police,obtaining documents for themselves and their children, and access to education.These minor problems notwithstanding, the Chechen refugees in Azerbaijan have notlost hope and continue to support the position of an independent Azerbaijan in allquestions and share the feelings of Azerbaijani refugees and martyrs who just likethemselvesÑsuffered in the early 1990s. Thus, the Council of Chechen Refugeesexpressed its solidarity with Azerbaijan and sympathies on the occasion of thetragedy of January 20, 1990: ÒJanuary 20 in the history of the Caucasus will alwaysremain a day of loss and gaining: patriots died and a worthy Republic was born- The Chechen, sympathetic to the ideas of freedom and independence and having sufferedenormous losses on this path have a deep understanding of what is taking placetoday on the territory of Azerbaijan. We will never forget the asylum offered toChechen refugees on this land, the warmth and tolerance of the Azerbaijani people.
    The glorious action by the Azerbaijanis was among the first and served as a worthyexample for the continuation of the national liberation war of the Caucasus. At thepresent time in Baku, there is a Chechen school, various committees established forwork with mountaineers arriving from the North Caucasus, and a womenÕscommittee of Chechnya. There are also representations of Daghestan andChechnya, as well as other organizations.Indeed, the Azerbaijani population, despite its own far from simple position,continues to show tolerance and friendship toward its North Caucasus neighbors.There is no ethnic discrimination or hostile attitude toward other ethnoses inAzerbaijani society. The North Caucasus population in Azerbaijan is involved in trade and transit through the country. Now, thanks to the stabilization of the situation inAzerbaijan itself, the efforts of individual extremists have been blocked. Chechensare living in a stable environment, and everything is being done to ensure that they,like all the other ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan, can continue to do so.
    In the post-Soviet period, several projects for the integration of the peoples of theCaucasus have been developed. On August 26, 1989, at a congress of mountainpeoples of the Caucasus in Sukhumi, on the initiative of the Popular Front ofAbkhazia, the Assembly of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was established, withKabardin Yury Shanibov as its president. In the fall of 1991, General D. Dudayevtook the Assembly under his protection. In November of the same year, thatorganization was transformed into the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of theCaucasus. The confederation united in its midst the Chechens, Kabardins, Cherkess,Adygeys, Abaza, Abkhaz, and others.
    The Ingush did not joint it, nor did the Turkiclanguage mountain peoples (the Kumyks, Balkars, and Karachays) save AkhyskTurks. The Nogays and Azerbaijanis who were living on the territory ofcontemporary Daghestan also refused to join that group. Instead, they entered theAssociation of Turkic Peoples.A round table on a common Caucasus home took place in Grozny on September 4-5, 1992. Participants proclaimed the creation of a Higher Religious Council of thePeoples of the Caucasus and a Single Information Center of the Caucasus.Allahshukur Pashazade, sheikh-ul-Islam and head of the Muslims of Azerbaijan, waselected chairman of the religious council. In the declaration of this meeting,reference was made to Òthe necessity of creating a confederation of Caucasusstates.Ó On September 27, 1992, the International Forum of the Caucasus Homewas established in the Chechen Republic, and a program was developed for theunification of the peoples of the Caucasus. On October 19, 1992, at the initiative ofDzh.Dudayev, the Confederation of the Mountaineer Peoples of the Caucasus wasreformed as the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus. The group discussedthe participation of the Cossacks and the possible formation of Cossack autonomiesin places where the Cossacks lived together. This congress was created in oppositionto the CIS. Its second conference was scheduled for Baku in the fall of 1993, but itwas not held.
    References
    Rasulov M.A. (2005) Embployment and Labor Market in Daghestan (1991-2001 .),in Russian, Makhachkala: Epoch.
    Notes
    [1] See (accessed 13 April2013).[2] Ibid.

    [3] See (accessed 13 April2013).13

    [4]  [The first generalcensus of the population of the Russian empire], 1897,
     [Bakuprovince], 1904, pp. 52-53.
    [5]  Kaspi, No. 222, 12 September 1893;  Kaspi, No. 81, 16 April 1895
    [6]  Baku, No. 137, 27 June 1906;  Kaspi, No. 66, 23 March 1917.
    [7] State Archive of the Azerbaijan Republic (henceforth SAAR), f. 897, op. 1, d. 22

    Kaspi, No. 74, 9October (26 September) 1918.

    [8] SAAR, f. 970, op. 1, d. 23, l. 9-10; SAAR, f. 970, op. 1, d. 59, l. 1-3.
    [9]  (Georgia), No. 55, 11 March 1919;  (Georgia), No. 39, 20 February 1919;  (Georgia), No. 93, 3 May 1919;  (Georgia), No. 54, 9 March 1919.
    [10] SAAR, f.970, op.1, d.59, l.13-16ob., 17 ob., 21, 25, 26, 26 ob.

    [11] SAAR, f.894, op.10, d.62, l.37ob., 40; SAAR, f.970, op.1, d.59, l.5ob.-16, 28,31;

     (Georgia), No. 93, 3 May 1919.
    [12] SAAR, f.894, op.10, d.62, l.41, 41ob., 62-63; SAAR, f.970, op.1, d.46, l.6-6 ob.
    [13]  (Dawn of Russia), No. 25, 14 (27) September 1919.
    [14]  (Struggle), No. 82 (637), 14 April 1920
    AZERBAIJAN IN THE WORLDADA Biweekly Newsletter
    Vol. 6, No. 8April 15, 2013
  • Iraq: An Oil Deal Drives Kurdish Parties Further Apart

    Iraq: An Oil Deal Drives Kurdish Parties Further Apart

     

    Iraq: An Oil Deal Drives Kurdish Parties Further Apart

    (Stratfor)

    Discord is spreading through Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), this time because of a recent oil deal between Arbil and Baghdad. Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, a senior figure of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the wife of former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, sent a letter to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi on Sept. 7 threatening to halt the flow of oil out of Kirkuk. Ahmed criticized a revenue-sharing agreement struck in August between al-Abadi’s administration and the Kurdish government to jointly export 150,000 barrels of oil per day from the disputed Kirkuk region through Turkey, claiming the deal lacks transparency. She added that the accord, which splits oil revenue evenly between Arbil and Baghdad, was crafted without her party’s input.

    Ahmed’s ability to follow through with her threat is limited, but her allegations signal the growing strain between the PUK and the Kurdish government’s ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Since the parties’ political alliance crumbled earlier this year, the KDP has taken steps to marginalize the PUK in the KRG’s decision-making process. In fact, the Kurdish delegation that brokered the recent oil deal was made up primarily of KDP members. The Kurdish Ministry of Natural Resources, moreover, has accused the PUK of illegally selling Kirkuk’s oil to Iran, which has long been an influential partner of the PUK. Ahmed has denied the ministry’s claims that people and companies affiliated with her party have sent 30,000 bpd to Iran to the tune of $30 million.

    But a dispute with the KDP, though problematic, is not the PUK’s most pressing concern at the moment. On Sept. 1, the PUK’s secretary-general announced the formation of a decision-making body intended to put an end to the monopoly on authority held by a small cadre in the party. Though the move is widely considered illegitimate within the PUK’s ranks, it reflects the deepening internal divides threatening to tear the party apart. Hidden differences among party members began to emerge in 2012, as Talabani’s health deteriorated, and the contention has worsened ever since.

    The intra- and inter-party bickering will only further destabilize the Kurdish government, which is already struggling to overcome mounting tension between the ruling KDP and the Gorran movement (Iraqi Kurdistan’s largest opposition party). Ahmed’s latest statement will make it even more difficult for Iraqi Kurdistan’s political parties to work together to solve the financial and security problems piling up against them.

  • Turkey’s new role: From NATO lapdog to Emerging Empire

    Turkey’s new role: From NATO lapdog to Emerging Empire

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    Turkey’s new role: From NATO lapdog to Emerging Empire

    Gearóid Ó Colmáin

    The recent Turkish coup attempt marks a turning point in NATO’s war on Syria. An emerging empire and portal to the orient, Turkey has always played a key role in NATO’s ‘Drang Nach Osten’- the drive to encircle Russia, destroy its client-states Syria and Ukraine, and serve as a bulwark against other emerging powers such as Iran. But now it seems Turkey may no longer be carrying out its designated role.

    That the United States was behind the coup attempt there is little doubt, though some prominent analysts such as Thierry Meyssan disagree that the coup was orchestrated by Gülenists. Fethullah Gülen is known to be close to the CIA and the U.S. obmutescence during the coup was typical of standard procedure during U.S. covert regime change operations. While Erdoğan is unquestionably a war criminal who is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocents in Syria and Libya and heavy repression at home, nonetheless, as in the case of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, the Turkish leader seems to have fallen out of favour in the West. The media have already begun the predictable, clichéd demonisation process – publishing pictures of the Turkish incumbent’s opulent palaces etc. Turkey desperately needs a new, progressive regime, which would contribute to peace in the Middle East. But if the choice is between a monster the CIA wants out and a monster the CIA wants in, the latter is the best option as it weakens U.S. imperialism.

    Turkey’s strategic imperatives

    Stratfor director George Friedman claims Turkey is now a world power whose military is more powerful than the French or British. The U.S. strategy for Europe was to force Turkish entry into the EU – most recently through weapons of mass migration. The policy worked in Turkey’s favour. But the British decision to exit the European Union changed the balance of power. Moscow took the opportunity to extend the hand of friendship once more to Ankara. Just before the July 19th coup attempt, there were reports of a possible détente between Turkey and Syria.

    U.S./Turkish relations have soured considerably since 2013 when U.S.-based billionaire Fethullah Gülen fomented the Gezi Park protest movement against the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan regime. Though there was certainly popular discontent in the country with Erdoğan’s Islamisation policies and his support for terrorism in Syria, the Gezi Park protests were really about pushing Gülen’s attempt to destabilise the regime and take over. Fethullah Gülen is the founder of a vast empire of private prep schools throughout the world. He promotes an extremist form of Islam.

    Though originally close to Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), Gülen’s movement Hizmat (service) is less nationalist and therefore more amenable to U.S./Zionist interests. The Gülenist network operates as a fifth column in Turkey, a para-state operating at the highest levels of the military, intelligence and judicial apparatuses. I was asked by Russian state media RT to comment on the Turkish shooting down of a Russian jet in November 2015. I said then that the Turkish government was acting against the national interest. It has since transpired that the attack was carried out by Gülenist military personnel who have been prosecuted for the crime. President Erdoğan recently apologised to Russian President Vladimir Putin for the attack. In fact, Turkey had indicated on July 13th that it intended to normalise relations with Syria, thus ending the war against Assad. Contacts between Ankara and Damascus have been growing in recent months and it now looks like Russia and Turkey may have begun to mend relations. Southstream, Russia’s plan to pipe oil to Europe through Turkey, had to be abandoned last year due to U.S. pressure on Ankara. There is now a possibility of renegotiation recommencing between Moscow and Ankara. Recent Turkish/Iranian contacts also indicate that the Kurdish question is forcing Ankara to re-calibrate its foreign policy.

    Although secret talks have reportedly been taking place between Ankara and Damascus, the two countries remain at war in Syria and there is no change yet in the official position of either state.

    The geopolitical theories of Greek turkologist Dmitiry Kitsikis have had a major influence on Turkish foreign policy. Kitsikis is famous for promoting the notion of Turkey as a civilisation-state which naturally encompasses the region stretching from North Africa, through the Balkans and Eastern Europe; Kitsikis refers to this as the ‘Intermediate Region’. Turkey’s previous ‘good neighbourly’ policy seemed to be in accordance with Kitsikian geopolitics but was sabotaged by Ankara’s treacherous collaboration with U.S. chaos strategy in the Middle East since the U.S.- fomented ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011.

    U.S. policy towards Turkey has always been to support the regime as a strong regional power to wield against Russia while at the same time supporting the Kurdish YPG (people’s defense units) in Syria. U.S. support for the Kurds is part of the long-term geopolitical remodeling of the region – the creation of what former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice at the start of the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in 2011 referred to as the “New Middle East”. The U.S. and Israel want to carve out a Kurdistan in the region, which would become a client-state of Israel; thus providing the Zionist regime with an effective proxy army against its Arab enemies – once the Da’esh-fomented genocide has created the requisite Lebensraum.

    Erdoğan’s ambitions of reviving the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East ultimately threaten U.S. hegemony. The United States Navy rules the waves. The U.S. will not allow another major maritime power to threaten its global control. Rapid economic growth and the paying off of its IMF debt in 2013 have seen Turkey emerge more and more as a strategic regional power with increasing independence and political assertiveness. Turkish investment in Africa has increased more than ten-fold since 2000. The Turks have opened embassies all over Africa. Ankara is selling the notion of ‘virtuous power’ in Africa with infrastructural development projects and investments designed to compete with China and the United States. Turkish involvement in Somalia has turned the East African nation into a veritable client-state of the emerging Turkish Empire. In 2015 Turkey opened a military base in Somalia. Turkey will henceforth have a strategic reach in the Gulf of Aden, one of the most important oil choke-points in the world. Ankara also has plans to establish military bases in Azerbaijan, Qatar and Georgia.

    The Turkish regime has been attempting to oust the presence of the Gülenist movement in many African countries by offering to supply state funds for education programmes. A recent statement by a Turkish government spokesman alluded to Ankara’s desire to counter Western ‘neo-colonial’ interests in Africa. The statement clearly shows that Turkey intends to join the new ‘scramble for Africa’ as part of neo-ottoman imperialism.

    Turkey in Central Asia and China

    Turkey has considerable power and influence in Central Asia where many Turkic-speaking people reside. In 2009, Turkey helped found the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States. Turkish investment has been increasing in Central Asia. Ankara has also been training military personnel in Central Asian states. The oil-rich Turkmenistan is one nation which has received visits in recent years from the ‘Sublime Porte’. During its spat with Moscow, Ankara sought to deepen ties with Turkmenistan in hopes of enticing that state to participate in the Trans-Caspian Pipeline – a project to pipe gas from the Caspian Sea through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Turkey to Europe, thereby bypassing Russia. Turkey also has considerable influence in Turkic speaking regions of the Russian Federation such as Tartarstan. Though relations with Moscow have now improved, Ankara’s links in Central Asia remain key strategic levers in the renaissance of Turkish imperialism.

    Turkey’s links with Uighur terrorists in China’s troubled Xinjiang (East Turkestan) province has led to diplomatic rows with Beijing. Many of the Uighur terrorists operating against China have been trained and facilitated by Turkey in Syria. Although Turkey’s support for Uighur terrorists in Xinjiang complies with NATO policy towards China, it shows once again the potential reach of Turkish power.

    Turkey’s drive for world power status, together with the decline of Europe as a political entity, means that Ankara will continue to flex its muscles in the international arena. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault has said that Turkey is no longer a reliable partner in NATO’s fight against the Islamic State. Of course, Ankara was never a partner in the war against the Islamic State as the Turkish regime has been arming and training the Islamic State terrorists along with its NATO partners and has been caught in flagrante delicto on several occasions. But what the French Foreign Minister’s remarks mean is that Turkey may no longer be as sanguine in its support for terrorism in Syria, due to the West’s support for the Kurds; rapprochement with Moscow and Damascus, and now more than ever after the failed U.S.-backed coup attempt.

    Israel’s double game

    The situation is further complicated by Israel’s stance towards the Turkish coup attempt and its aftermath. The Turkish regime thanked Israel for its help quashing the coup. Relations between Tel Aviv and Ankara have improved, in spite of the current dispute with Washington. One should not overlook the fact that, although the Israeli Lobby exerts considerable control over U.S. foreign policy, Israel often adopts a friendlier attitude to many of America’s so-called enemies. Israel’s relationship with Belarus has always been generally good, in spite of repeated U.S. aggression. Israel’s relationship with Azerbaijan has been good, in spite of major diplomatic rows with the U.S..

    Israeli/Russian relations are far better than Moscow’s relationship with Washington. Israel has always had a more nuanced oriental policy than the U.S. The Israelis are masters at playing both sides off each other in international conflicts. During the Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s, the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein’s regime while Israel eventually provided Israel covert supplies of weapons to Iran with on U.S. approval. The Israelis had established ties with Iranian fifth columnists Mir-Hossein Moussavi and Hachemi Rafsanjani. The aforementioned Stratfor director George Friedman has said that the Iran/Iraq war would be a template for dealing with the rise of Turkey as a world power.

    A rising maritime power in trouble?

    Turkey will pay dearly for the folly of abandoning its ‘good neighbourly’ regional policy, which showed some promise until 2011. It had a glorious opportunity then to exercise ‘virtuous power’. Now the country could be facing civil war. The purge of Gülenists in the Turkish regime has already led to hundreds of arrests of top military and government personnel. If Turkey is to emerge as a regional empire, it will have to leave the Zionist axis and find a solution to the Kurdish question in conjunction with Syria and Russia. It is currently beginning to appear that previous secret plans agreed upon by Ankara and Paris to carve out a Kurdish state in Northern Syria may have to be abandoned. As the French escalate bombing of Raqqa in Syria in the wake of the Nice terrorist psyops, Turkey could be facing an acute state of emergency.

    The United States cannot tolerate the emergence of a major maritime power like Turkey which, since the Cold War, has been used as a tool against Russia. Turkey’s Incirlik Airbase holds up to 80 percent of Washington’s nuclear arsenal in Europe. A significant oriental shift in Ankara’s foreign policy would signal the end of America’s prospects of ‘full spectrum dominance’, creating the conditions for a new imperial division of the world- a geopolitical reconfiguration some might imagine as falling in with conjectures of a Moscow/Constantinople axis or, in mytho-historical terms, a ‘Third Rome’.

    It is possible that the U.S. already sees that a reconfiguration of imperialist alliances is necessary with the influential former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advocating a détente in U.S. relations with Russia and China. What is clear from recent events in Turkey is that the world imperialist system is going through seismic changes, with old military alliances breaking down and new configurations of imperial power emerging. What prospect exist for global,working-class liberation in a period of deepening capitalist crisis and war remain to be seen.

    Ahttp://www.gearoidocolmain.org/

    bout Gearóid Ó Colmáin

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    Gearóid Ó Colmáin is an Irish journalist and political analyst based in Paris. His work focuses on globalisation, geopolitics and class struggle.