Category: Turkey

  • Turkey’s energy options

    Turkey’s energy options

    By JOHN C.K. DALY
    UPI International Correspondent

    WASHINGTON, July 30 (UPI) — World-high energy prices have blindsided many countries, including a number in the oil-rich Middle East, none more so than Turkey. In 2007 Turkish domestic production supplied a paltry 8.7 percent of the nation’s crude oil and 2.6 percent of its natural gas; price increases since the beginning of the year have severely constrained the growth of the Turkish economy, leaving Ankara to search for alternatives.

    Parallel with Turkey’s scramble to secure energy resources are its efforts to position itself as the prime energy transit corridor for burgeoning energy exports from the Caspian coterie of former Soviet republics. Ankara’s greatest success to date has been the $3.6 billion, 1,092-mile Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Opened in 2006, BTC has provided a cash bonanza for Turkey in transit fees; three months ago Energy and Natural Resources Minister Hilmi Guler told journalists that BTC transit revenues had already earned Turkey $2 billion.

    An added benefit of BTC for Turkey is that it relieves tanker traffic on the Turkish Straits, which connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean and are used by Russia and Kazakhstan as their maritime route for exports to the world market. Besides BTC, another alternative supported by Ankara is the 340-mile, $1.5 billion Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, also known as the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, first proposed in 2004, now being developed.

    But welcome as transit fees are, they do little to solve the country’s immediate energy needs. According to Turkish Petroleum Corp. Director General Mehmet Uysal, seven oil wells will be drilled in the Black Sea in the next three years. While Uysal believes Turkish Black Sea offshore wells ultimately will equal Azerbaijan’s riches, Black Sea production is years away from coming online, leaving Turkey with a rising import bill.

    Ankara accordingly is investigating any and all alternatives. Turkey is considering beginning construction of the country’s first two nuclear plants, to be operational by 2015. The first is proposed for the Mediterranean town of Akkuyu, where environmentalists have stalled the project since 2000, arguing the site is near a major seismic fault line. The second is proposed for the Black Sea town of Sinop; supporters argue the two new nuclear reactors could cover one-tenth of Turkey’s projected energy needs over the next 20 years.

    Wind power is also receiving serious consideration. On July 27 Energy Minister Hilmi Guler said Turkey now has 3,000 energy investors and that “Turkey has ranked 12th among the 32 countries in wind energy. We will rank the first or second in the future.”

    However, Turkey already has a rising indigenous source of electrical power — hydropower. While that is the good news, the bad news is that it severely complicates its relationships with downstream nations Syria and Iraq, as the majority of its hydropower is generated by facilities regulating the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the historical providers of water to the “Fertile Crescent” since antiquity, where most Western and Middle Eastern scholars believe “the cradle of civilization” was established nearly 7,000 years ago.

    Turkey, Syria and Iraq now share the Tigris and Euphrates’ 303,000-square-mile river basin watershed. The centerpiece of Turkey’s hydrological ambitions and its neighbors’ concerns is its Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (Southeastern Anatolia Project), a decades-old dream dating back to the 1930s, when Turkish Republic founder President Kemal Ataturk first proposed constructing dams on the Tigris and Euphrates. GAP is intended to provide sustainable development for the 9 million people living in southeastern Anatolia, home to the majority of the country’s Kurdish population and the country’s most impoverished hinterlands, while diminishing local support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which has waged a bloody separatist campaign against Ankara since the 1970s. While GAP’s final projected price tag is $30 billion, it is cheap compared with combating terrorism. Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek recently observed of the government’s fight against the PKK, “We have spent $300 billion fighting terrorism so far. That is equivalent to 10 GAPs.”

    Unfortunately for Turkey, Damascus and Baghdad do not see GAP in the same positive light. The Euphrates’ water flow is 88 percent controlled by Turkey, 9 percent by Syria and only 3 percent by Iraq. For the Tigris River, Turkey controls 56 percent, Iran 12 percent and Iraq 32 percent. GAP’s Ataturk Dam, completed in 1993, has cut the flow from the Euphrates by about a third.

    In mid-January 1990, when the Ataturk Dam’s first construction phase was under way, Turkey entirely blocked the flow of the Euphrates for a month to begin filling up the dam’s reservoir, the third-largest hydroelectric reservoir in Turkey, leading Damascus and Baghdad to complain Turkey was unleashing its “water weapon.” Turkey countered by insisting it had always supplied its southern neighbors with a promised minimum flow of 500 cubic meters per second and that Iraq and Syria actually benefited from the upstream dam’s regulating water flow, as all three riparian countries were now immune from seasonal droughts and floods. The issue has rankled relations ever since.

    Some progress is visible on the horizon, however, as in January Turkey, Syria and Iraq agreed to establish a water institute to coordinate their policies on the Tigris-Euphrates flow issues. Two months later Turkish Environment and Forestry Minister Veysel Eroglu said, “No war over water resources will erupt in the region. Instead of having problems over water with our neighbors, we prefer developing joint projects.”

    One can only hope that such initiatives are successful, as water disputes in the Middle East have a long history. Genesis 21:25 records a dispute over well water between the clan of Abraham and King Abimelech: “And Abraham reproved Abimelech because of a well of water, which Abimelech’s servants had violently taken away.” Surely creative minds in oil-poor but water-rich Turkey and oil-rich but water-poor Iraq can find a way to resolve their disagreements lest their hydrological resources be “violently taken away” yet again.

  • Turkish Government to Pay Compensations to Istanbul Terrorist Attack Victims

    Turkish Government to Pay Compensations to Istanbul Terrorist Attack Victims

    Turkey, Ankara, 2 August / corr. Trend News A.Aleskerov / Families of victims, who died in a terrorism act in a densely populated Gungeren district in Istanbul, will be paid pecuniary compensations. The decision was taken by the Cabinet of Ministers, which has already allocated the relevant sum, a governmental official said to NTV channel.

    The compensation totals 20,000 Turkish liras, which approximately makes up $16,630. Moreover, the Government undertook all hospital expenditures for those who were wounded in the terrorism act.

    A terrorism act in the Gungeren district in Istanbul left 17 dead and over 150 wounded people. Turkish police said that cameras recorded one of the men who implemented the blasts and at present the police are holding active search of the terrorist.

  • Byzantine Crimes

    Byzantine Crimes

    Enlightenment

     

    Reviewed by Jason Goodwin
    Sunday, August 3, 2008; Page BW06

    ENLIGHTENMENT

    By Maureen Freely

    Overlook. 398 pp. $24.95

    A journalist investigates the American arrest of her former Turkish lover.

    Maureen Freely is best known as the English translator of Nobel Prize-winning novelist Orhan Pamuk, but visitors to Istanbul may well recognize her as the daughter of John Freely, an American academic who has lived in Istanbul since the early 1960s and has written many useful guides to the city and its Ottoman past.

    That biographical detail is significant because Enlightenment is partly an autobiography. It’s also a psychological thriller, a murder story, a rumination on friendship and a political investigation. If that sounds like a lot of weight for a novel to carry, it is; and it’s a testament to Freely’s ability that the novel does, in large measure, succeed.

    When the story opens, a journalist named M learns that Sinan, a left-wing filmmaker who was her lover during their student days in Istanbul, has been arrested at the U.S. border by Homeland Security; his child has been taken into foster care. Sinan’s wife, Jeannie — the woman for whom he betrayed M so many years ago — appeals to M to publicize his case. But as M begins her own investigations, she finds herself running up against unexpected doubts, obstacles and characters from her past, including the surviving members of a left-leaning student activist group from the early 1970s. Then Jeannie disappears, leaving a 53-page document for M to read.

    Enlightenment is a fluent, evocative and uncomfortable read, deliberately so. Stories overlap, testimonies conflict, even the time frame is repeatedly broken and re-arranged so that it becomes difficult to know who, if anyone, is telling the truth. M and Jeannie — though formal rivals in love — are, in fact, remarkably alike. At first, I found this irritating — why two characters, when one would do? — until I began to suspect that this splitting acts as a protective disguise for Freely herself.

    Indeed, the shifting ground and viewpoints of the novel represent a layered approach to the underlying subject of Freely’s narrative: the so-called “deep state” that allegedly operates behind Turkish democracy. The nature of this state-within-the-state remains unclear, but, since the cold war in the 1970s, it’s been thought to involve high-ranking officials in the Turkish government and military opposed to Islamism. M begins to suspect that “extraordinary rendition” — state kidnapping — lies behind the disappearance of Sinan and his wife.

    Political opposition very often adopts the form, in shadow, of the substance it opposes. If the deep state is ambivalent, secretive and repressive, then so too are Jeannie and her friends, forging exploitative relations among themselves. Betrayals lurk like time bombs, primed to go off decades in the future, and lies beget lies. Enlightenment is a grimly ironic title for a story in which no one survives intact.

    Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the novel is its exploration of identity among the group of students at Robert College in Istanbul in the early 1970s. Freely examines the dislocated loyalties of these privileged young people, living between the strictures of the Turkish state and the blandishments of Western freedoms, learning to present different faces to all the people who have influence over their lives: free-thinking American professors, uptight Turkish businessmen and omniscient secret police.

    When trouble explodes — in this case, with the assassination of the Israeli consul — the American students can leave, but the Turkish students become targets of the new military government, in spite of their connections with Jeannie’s father, a CIA man who emerges, curiously enough, as the most sympathetic character in the novel.

    This is a story almost impossible to summarize but hard to forget. It’s remarkable for its descriptions of the city as it was in the 1970s and as it is now, after the break-up of the Soviet Union has released so much energy around the area. Freely is an almost perversely original writer, sharply observing the world she knows so well and upending all one’s suppositions and assumptions. One example I found touching: Her grown-up student radicals do not shower their youthful selves with middle-aged reproof; they still crackle with energy and purpose. Enlightenment may be too long and, at times, too opaque to win the audience it deserves, but it is a brave, unflinching work of art.

  • The Turkey Analyst

    The Turkey Analyst

     

    The Turkey Analyst

     

    Vol. 1 no. 11, 18 July 2008

    ANALYSIS

    Is a Secular Center-Right viable?
    Halil Magnus Karaveli
    The solution to Turkey’s regime crisis must logically be sought in the center of the political spectrum. However, the revival of the center-right force of Turkish politics represents a difficult challenge. For it to make a difference, the right must break with its tradition of playing with religion. An alternative must be formulated that is more stridently secular than what the center-right traditionally has been. But for it to be viable, such a centrist force needs simultaneously to be attractive to the conservative base of the centre-right, a challenging task.

    Finding a Place: The PKK’s Effort to Remain Relevant
    Svante E. Cornell
    In early July, the PKK terrorist organization abducted three German climbers on Mt. Ararat, in an apparent revenge for Germany’s decision to ban the PKK’s mouthpiece, Denmark-based television channel Roj TV. The episode points to the PKK’s continuous difficulties in maintaining its claim to represent Kurdish opinion, faced with multiple challenges – from both the Turkish military and governing party, who otherwise agree on little; as well as the EU’s refusal to grant the PKK legitimacy and the Iraqi Kurdish parties’ success in making Iraqi Kurdistan the beacon of Kurdish hope, eclipsing the PKK.  It remains to be seen whether the PKK will be successful in taking advantage of the current Turkish crisis.

    NEWS DIGEST: THE FORTNIGHT IN REVIEW

    I. What the Columnists Say

    What chance does Turkish democracy stand? There is a growing pessimism among secular columnists about the prospects of democracy surviving the ongoing turmoil. They see democracy as being squeezed between religious authoritarianism and military rule. The closure of the AKP is now not taken for granted. Columnists who support the government have become confident that the party will survive. And the issue of whether or not secularism has taken root in society continues to preoccupy.

    II. Domestic Politics
    Summary: The fortnights politics were dominated by four major issues: continued developments in the AKP closure case; AKP founder Sener’s decision to form a new center party; the attack on police outside the US consulate in Istanbul; and the roundup of prominent figures in the Ergenekon investigation. Click here for full digest.

    III. Foreign Relations
    Summary: Foreign minister Babacan took part in the D-8 summit, while Prime Minister Erdogan took part in the Mediterranean summit in Paris, having received assurances that French plans will not affect Turkey’s EU candidacy. Click here for full digest.


    RECENT ISSUES:

    July 4, 2008 Issue (Click HERE for PDF)
    The Turkish Military’s Puzzling Silence

    June 20, 2008 Issue (Click HERE for PDF)
    – Interview with Suleyman Demirel
    – What Went Wrong with Turkey’s Moderate Islamists?

    June 4, 2008 Issue (Click HERE for PDF)
    – Politics, Media and Power
    – Where Did the Secular Republic Fail?

    May 21, 2008 issue (Click HERE for PDF)
    Redefining Secularism? AKP Challenges Turks’ Modern Religiosity

    May 8, 2008 issue
    – The CHP Congress, Leeadership Cults, and Turkish Democracy

    April 23, 2008 issue
    (Click HERE for PDF)
    – Will Clinging to Atatürk and the EU save the AKP?
    – Turkey’s Energy Policy between Political Crises

    April 9, 2008 issue: (Click HERE for PDF)
    – What animates Turkey’s secular opposition?
    – Turkey and the EU: Beyond the Cyprus Imbroglio

    March 26, 2008 issue:
    (Click HERE for PDF)
    – Challenging Times for Turkey’s Democracy
    – Foreign Policy Implications of the Turkish Crisis

    March 12, 2008 issue:
    Erdogan’s Towering Role in the AKP

    February 22, 2008 issue:

    – Turkey in 2007: Key Developments
    – Can Turkey’s Regime Crisis be Diffused?


    The Turkey Analyst

    The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It is published weekly, and includes a topical analysis, as well as translations and summaries of selected Turkish news reports. It is edited and compiled under the supervision of Svante E. Cornell, Halil M. Karaveli, and M. K. Kaya.


    CLICK HERE
    FOR PDF VERSION

    The analyses appearing in the Turkey Analyst are unsigned, being the consensus view of the three Editors. The Turkey Analyst occasionally publishes signed guest analyses, which are normally solicited. To email the editors, click here.

    The Joint Center
    The Joint Center, created in 2005, is the product of the merger of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and the Silk Road Studies Program, at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy.

    The Turkey Initiative
    The Joint Center launched a Turkey Initiative in 2006 in order to improve understand of Turkish domestic and foreign affairs in Europe and the United States.

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  • Why Are Neocons Attacking Turkey?

    Why Are Neocons Attacking Turkey?

     

    Birkac ay once Michael Rubin’in AKP aleyhine yazdigi bir makalesi bazi Amerika’da yasayan Turkler tarafindan, Amerikan kongre ve senatosu uyelerine gonderilerek Turk Hukumeti aleyhinde propaganda yapilmisti. Bu yazi isin perde arkasinda Turkiye’ye oynanmak istenilen oyunu gozler onune seriyor; ama neden bazi Turk-Amerikalilarin bu oyuna dustuklerini izah etmiyor.  GTIecer@aol.com
     
    ***************************************
    Why Are Neocons Attacking Turkey?
     
    Global Research, July 31, 2008
    Foreign Policy In Focus – 2008-07-24
     
    Some neoconservatives in Washington are obsessed with attacking Iran before President Bush leaves office at the end of this year. Hence, they have been pushing the Bush administration for increased economic and political isolation of Iran in order to weaken its current regime. Crucial to this plan is the support of Turkey, a traditional U.S. ally and an increasingly critical player in the region.

    But to the enormous frustration of the neoconservatives, such an attack does not align with Turkey’s interests given its newly enhanced regional ties, maturing democracy, and new foreign policy. Instead, Turkey plays the negotiator role and favors diplomacy and direct talks to resolve the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program.

    With neoconservatives pressing for an attack on Iran and Turkey maneuvering to play a mediating role, which way will U.S. policy swing?

    Turkey’s Transformation Much has changed in Turkey’s approach to foreign policy in recent years. When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, it quickly broke the old patterns of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s role evolved from an introverted peripheral country to a significant country with a regional and global influence.

    According to this new policy, Turkey aims to play a more active and constructive role in developing relations with its neighboring regions and beyond. “As a major country with a historical and strategic depth in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified category. In terms of its sphere of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country all at the same time,” said Ahmet Davutoglu, the intellectual architect of the new multi-dimensional foreign policy, during an interview on CNN-Turk on January 2, 2008.

    A fundamental principle of the new approach is a “zero problems with the neighbors” rule, which has improved diplomatic relations with all of Turkey’s neighbors — most notably Syria, Georgia, and Bulgaria – and boosted trade volumes as well. The share of Turkey’s trade volume with neighboring nations increased from 6% of the total foreign trade volume in 2000 to 35% in 2007.

    In addition, a significant Turkish-Iranian rapprochement has taken place, not only because of Iran’s policy against the Kurdish separatists (PKK), but also because of Turkey’s growing energy needs. Trade volume with Iran alone increased from $1 billion in 2000 to over $8 billion in 2007. And in July 2007, the Turkish government signed an agreement with Iran to transport Iranian natural gas to Turkey and Europe and to develop the Iranian natural gas industry by investing $3.5 billion in its South Pars gas field. This figure reaches approximately $10 billion when other contracts, such as for electricity generation, are factored in.

    Although Turkey’s enhanced ties with Iran and Syria have caused concern in certain quarters of Washington, this change – stemming from a transparent diversification of the Turkish policy – has not distanced Turkey from the West and Israel. However, Turkey’s clear lack of interest in isolating Iran has prompted neoconservative hardliners, led by former assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle, to undertake a smear campaign against the ruling AKP.

    Neocon Attack Frank Gaffney, Daniel Pipes, and Michael Rubin, three leading neo-con writers, have published pieces equating Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan with far-right ultra-nationalist politicians such as France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen, Austria’s Joerg Haider, and even Osama bin Laden. They have accused the AKP and Erdogan not only of having a hidden agenda to turn Turkey into an Islamic state, but also of paving the way for an Iranian-style Islamic revolution by Fethullah Gülen, a prominent religious leader known for his moderate and progressive views. Moreover, Rubin defended both the case to shut down the ruling AKP and the coup launched by the Turkish military last year as democratic. These accusations and assertions against the AKP government were harsher even than those made by the government’s own critics. Rubin’s arguments went largely ignored in Washington, since they are in clear conflict with U.S. foreign policy. However, they were more than enough to rally his friends in the Turkish military.

    In addition to attacking the Erdogan government, Rubin claimed that Massoud Barzani, the president of the Regional Kurdish Government in Iraq, of selling U.S. arms to the Kurdish separatist group PKK. Rubin even went as far as to boldly suggest that Turkey should capture and imprison Barzani next to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in the Turkish island prison of Imrali in order to stop the PKK terror. Once again, although not taken seriously in Washington, Rubin’s arguments were applauded in Turkey by the hawkish wing of the military general staff. His surreal arguments were reflected as “American expert opinion from Washington” in Turkey’s anti-AKP media outlets to create an illusion of international support for their cause.

    The neoconservative campaign has had two main goals. The first has been to team up with non-democratic powers within Turkey, primarily some circles within the military as well as the state and the political system, to oust the democratically elected government. A less democratic Turkey with a more dominant and politically active military would be more susceptible to neocon pressure to support a U.S. attack on Iran. The second goal has been to strengthen the Israeli-Turkish alliance by boosting the influence of the more Israel-friendly military circles within the Turkish politics. Not surprisingly, in order to strengthen the position of the military in Turkish society, the neoconservatives have not hesitated to support something the Bush administration has been desperate to avoid: opening another front in the Iraq War by supporting a possible Turkish incursion into northern Iraq to hunt down PKK terrorists..

    Neoconservatives have had a deep and continuing interest in Turkey. In the past, Richard Perle has been involved in some lucrative consulting deals and has made some very high-level friends in Turkey. In 1986, he became the co-chair, along with the Turkish general staff, of the U.S.-Turkish consultative defense group. From 1989 to 1994, he worked as an adviser for the International Advisors Inc. (IAI), a lobbying firm started by Douglas Feith and registered as Turkey’s foreign agent with the Justice Department. Perle is also known as the key architect of the Israeli-Turkish alliance of the late 1990s. This alliance has resulted in close military cooperation between the two countries, and Turkey has been an important customer of Israel’s defense industry.

    Shifting Geopolitics Despite speculation that Turkey’s importance to the United States would decrease after the Cold War, Turkey remains pivotal to U.S. security interests. The United States depends on Turkey in an unstable region that intersects the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus as well as Central Asia. Turkey has continued its close cooperation with the United States through both NATO and the UN. It cooperated in the missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan and has participated as well in several key peacekeeping missions such as Sudan and Lebanon. It hosts the Incirlik Air Base, which provides logistical support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Seventy percent of U.S. air cargo bound for to U.S. troops in Iraq goes through Incirlik.

    But Turkey is no longer dependent entirely on the United States for its geopolitical position. It has demonstrated a willingness to position itself as a regional and global power. In addition to economic and military power, the appeal of Turkey’s soft power has increased thanks to its political and economic domestic reforms and its new perceived image in the neighboring regions as a good example of the coexistence of Islam with democracy and modernity.

    Turkey has been playing a key mediating role in several conflicts, including those between Syria and Israel, between Palestine and Israel, and in Lebanon. Syria and Israel just had their third round of indirect talks under Turkey’s mediation in Istanbul. Similarly, the Ankara Forum had several meetings so far and brought the private sectors of Israel and Palestine together to work on possible rapprochement. The Ankara Forum also hosted a meeting between the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli President Shimon Peres before the Annapolis summit in November 2007. After the 2006 Lebanon war, the AKP government decided to send 1,000 troops – one of the largest contributions – to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon despite harsh domestic opposition. Also, during the recent Lebanon crisis in May 2008, Turkey played the mediator role between the Shia opposition and the Sunni establishment thanks to its good relations with both parties. Its balanced policy toward each group also secured Turkey an active role in bridging the Sunni-Shia divide in Iraq in 2007. It has similarly worked behind the scenes in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan on peace-building efforts. In fact, Turkey is now the only country that enjoys good relations with every country in the Middle East.

    Turkey’s willingness to engage hasn’t just been limited to its immediate region. As a result of Turkey’s opening to Africa in 2005, the African Union declared Turkey a strategic partner after China, India, and Japan in January 2008. More importantly, Turkey is now a UN Security Council candidate for 2009-2010; this is an important position where Turkey can use its current experience as a promoter of stability and democracy on a broader level, especially in bridging the divide between East and West.

    Turkey’s good-neighbor policy doesn’t extend in every direction. Cross-border operations in Iraq, the Cyprus issue — despite a significant rapprochement with Greece — and the historical dispute with Armenia still pose major potential setbacks.

    Moreover, the transformation in foreign policy depends in part on continuity in domestic reforms. The biggest challenge is the high court’s recent attempt to shut down the governing AKP. The groups manipulating the high court to shut down the AKP are the same ones that favor an insulated and more autocratic Turkey. They see both the United States and the European Union as major threats to Turkey’s unity, and have very rigid positions on the Kurdish, Cypriot, and Armenian issues. Therefore, if the AKP is shut down, all of the aforementioned achievements and policy changes will be overturned. Put simply, if these pro-military and anti-AKP forces are successful, they will mark the end of an era of unprecedented reform in Turkish politics, second only to the period of the country’s modern leader, Kemal Ataturk.

    Future of U.S. Policy The teaming up of U.S. neoconservatives with pro-military and anti-AKP circles in Turkey in an effort to topple the Erdogan government is self-destructive and has little chance of success, given popular support for a stronger and more pluralistic democracy in Turkey. Moreover, such neoconservative manipulations taint the image of the United States in Turkey, even at a time now when the Bush administration is distancing itself from many neoconservative positions.

    The Bush-Erdogan summit in Washington in November 2007 marked the beginning of a new era in U.S.-Turkish relations. The Bush administration put pressure on Congress to squelch a resolution calling on Ankara to acknowledge the Armenian genocide, and Turkey got a more sympathetic audience for its security concerns related to the PKK in northern Iraq. Both sides now keep communication channels open in order to avoid the kind of dips in relations that have taken place in the past.

    It is in the U.S. interest for Turkey to play an expanded peacemaking role in the region. But for Turkey to do so, it must continue on its current path of democratic reform. By supporting the military’s return in Turkey and a more hardline approach to Iran, U.S. neoconservatives want to turn the clock back on Turkish reform and plunge the entire region into even greater chaos.

     


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  • Turkey’s Islamists Inspire a New Climate of Fear

    Turkey’s Islamists Inspire a New Climate of Fear

    By ZEYNO BARAN
    August 2, 2008; Page A11

    Istanbul

    This week’s verdict by Turkey’s Constitutional Court — which rejected an attempt to ban the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) for undermining the country’s secular foundations — has been hailed by the U.S. and the EU as a great step forward for democracy and rule of law. Fair enough. Banning a party that last year renewed its mandate in office with 47% of the vote would have been a huge setback for Turkey. But that doesn’t mean we should all sigh with relief and conclude that liberal democracy is flourishing under the Islamic-oriented AKP’s rule.

    Government surveillance of AK Party critics and leaks to media of personal phone conversations have created a climate of fear. There is concern among some liberals that the country is becoming a police state. The foundation of a healthy democracy — the right to dissent and hold an elected government accountable — is gradually being undermined.

    When asked about mass wire-tapping, Minister of Transportation Binali Yildirim gave a Kafkaesque response: “It is not possible to prevent being listened to; the only way is not to talk [on the phone]. If there is nothing illegal in our actions, we should not be concerned about such things.”

    Some examples of recent intrusive practices in Turkey include the appearance on YouTube of voice recordings of prominent figures either from the military or antigovernment circles. Several anti-Islamist senior military officers have reportedly resigned over the past few years when faced with the possibility that their private conversations would be leaked. The leaks involve some top-secret military documents, so they are also highly illegal and might pose a serious security breach for the NATO alliance.

    In this context, several aspects of the so-called Ergenekon trial are worth highlighting. Ergenekon is alleged to be a secret antigovernment organization named after a pre-Islamic Turkish myth. The case involves a network of ultranationalists — including journalists, military, business and civil society leaders — who allegedly have been involved in a range of terror attacks since the early 1990s, and most recently conspired to attempt a coup against the AKP.

    The investigation began in June 2007, when over two dozen hand grenades were found in an Istanbul house. The same type of grenade was used in the attacks on the Istanbul offices of the prominent anti-Islamist newspaper Cumhuriyet in 2006. At the time, many believed the attack against the newspaper was carried out by Islamists. Now, according to the prosecution, this and other such attacks were not carried out by Islamists, but by Ergenekon conspirators.

    The indictment reads like a Solzhenitsyn novel; it includes private conversations between suspects, who discuss their conversations with prominent figures, such as former president Suleyman Demirel and business tycoon Rahmi Koc. While these do not by themselves make a case, they are highly embarrassing when reprinted on the front pages of major newspapers. The message that many people took from the indictment is that those critical of the government are officially on notice.

    The case is built around retired Brig. Gen. Veli Kucuk, an alleged leader of Ergenekon, who is accused of a number of illegal activities, including some of the most shocking crimes in recent Turkish history. Ergenekon conspirators are also accused of planning to murder the current chief of the Turkish military’s general staff, Yasar Buyukanit, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Nobel Prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk (among others), and of planning attacks on NATO facilities.

    Most Turks would welcome the elimination of such furtive armed networks, and the clear restoration of the rule of law. However, the timing of this case, as well as the movie-like aspects of the indictment, have aroused suspicions that the AKP or its supporters are behind a campaign of intimidation — and that they are striking back in the legal arena against the same people who tried to ban the party.

    First, the timing. The Istanbul court declared its acceptance of the indictment and released the 2,455 page document on July 25 — the weekend prior to the start of the AKP closure case. While AKP and its supporters claim the two cases are not related, those in opposition see the two closely linked, and point to the headline of the strongly antimilitary daily Taraf the next day: “Founded in 1923, cleansed in 2008” — i.e., it declared the collapse of Mustafa Kemal’s secular Turkish Republic.

    Second, the leading opposition paper Cumhuriyet seems to be a key target. The phones of its senior journalists have been tapped, and some conversations deemed anti-AKP leaked to the press — including one involving a readout of an off-the-record conversation between the paper’s U.S. correspondent and members of U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s staff. The paper’s senior editor and columnist, Ilhan Selcuk, was arrested in March as a result of the information extracted from his private phone conversations. He is one of the leading figures among the 86 people charged with being a member of a “terrorist organization.”

    A third point made by those who managed to go through those 2,455 pages is that the indictment is full of unsubstantiated speculation, and that its attempt to blame all kinds of terror attacks and assassinations on Ergenekon is far-fetched. These include the killing of prominent anti-Islamist scholars and journalists, and what were thought to be Kurdish acts of terror and killings by the Islamist group Hezbullah (unrelated to the Lebanese organization).

    The Ergenekon trial has so far raised more questions than answers. If the allegations can be proven, it would be a huge success for the AKP for having the courage to tackle such a horrendous entity. If, however, it turns out to be mostly a show trial, then those concerned about Turkish democracy and rule of law need to reconsider where Turkey is headed.

    Ms. Baran, a native of Turkey, is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and director of its Center for Eurasian Policy.