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  • Australian Macedonian Advisory Council and the falsification of Ancient Macedonian history Part 1

    Australian Macedonian Advisory Council and the falsification of Ancient Macedonian history Part 1

    Risto Stefov
    November 01, 2008

    This is a response to the Australian Macedonian Advisory Council in regards to the article entitled “Risto Stefov and the falsification of Ancient Macedonian history” published on October 29, 2008 at this link:

    My reply to you is “Two can play that game!” I too can provide you with just as many arguments that the Ancient Macedonians WERE NOT Greek. BUT!

    It is irrelevant, at least to me, if Modern Greeks claim that the Ancient Macedonians were Greeks or not, what is relevant here is that the Modern Greeks are not related to the Ancient Greeks or to the Ancient Macedonians. They call themselves “Greeks” but have nothing to do with the ancient Greeks or Ancient Macedonians because underneath their modern artificial Greek veneer is nothing more than Albanians, Vlachs, Turks and Macedonians, the same variety of Balkanites that exists throughout the entire southern Balkans. But, if they insist on accusing me of falsifying Ancient Macedonian history, then here is my rebuttal:

    “The modern Greek claim — that the ancient Macedonians were Greek — is politically motivated and is not supported by historical evidence. This political mythology was created in the late 19th century to advance territorial claims against Ottoman Macedonia. In its current incarnation it is used by Greece as an excuse to discriminate against its Macedonian minority.” (Gandeto)

    “I. What were a people’s origins and what language did they speak?

    From the surviving literary sources (Hesiod, Herodotus, and Thucydides) there is little information about Macedonian origins, and the archaeological data from the early period is sparse and inconclusive. On the matter of language, and despite attempts to make Macedonian a dialect of Greek, one must accept the conclusion of the linguist R. A. Crossland in the recent CAH, that an insufficient amount of Macedonian has survived to know what language it was. But it is clear from later sources that Macedonian and Greek were mutually unintelligible in the court of Alexander the Great. Moreover, the presence in Macedonia of inscriptions written in Greek is no more proof that the Macedonians were Greek than, e.g., the existence of Greek inscriptions on Thracian vessels and coins proves that the Thracians were Greeks.

    II. Self-identity: what did the Macedonians say or think about themselves?

    Virtually nothing has survived from the Macedonians themselves (they are among the silent peoples of antiquity), and very little remains in the Classical and Hellenistic non-Macedonian sources about Macedonian attitudes.

    III. What did others say about the Macedonians?

    Here there is a relative abundance of information from Arrian, Plutarch (Alexander, Eumenes), Diodorus 17-20, Justin, Curtius Rufus, and Nepos (Eumenes), based upon Greek and Greek-derived Latin sources. It is clear that over a five-century span of writing in two languages representing a variety of historiographical and philosophical positions the ancient writers regarded the Greeks and Macedonians as two separate and distinct peoples whose relationship was marked by considerable antipathy, if not outright hostility.

    IV. What is the nature of cultural expressions as revealed by archaeology?

    As above we are blessed with an increasing amount of physical evidence revealing information about Macedonian tastes in art and decoration, religion, political and economic institutions, architecture and settlement patterns. Clearly the Macedonians were in many respects Hellenized, especially on the upper levels of their society, as demonstrated by the excavations of Greek archaeologists over the past two decades. Yet there is much that is different, e. g., their political institutions, burial practices, and religious monuments.

    I will argue that, whoever the Macedonians were, they emerged as a people distinct from the Greeks who lived to the south and east. In time their royal court — which probably did not have Greek origins (the tradition in Herodotus that the Macedonian kings were descended from Argos is probably a piece of Macedonian royal propaganda) — became Hellenized in many respects, and I shall review the influence of mainstream Greek culture on architecture, art, and literary preferences.

    Finally, a look at contemporary Balkan politics. The Greek government firmly maintains that the ancient Macedonians were ethnic Greeks, and that any claim by the new Republic of Macedonia (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) to the name “Macedonia” and the symbols of ancient Macedonia is tantamount to an expropriation of Greek history. Moreover, it is claimed that there is no such thing as a distinct Slavic Macedonian identity and language separate from Bulgaria and Serbia.

    I shall review the evidence for the existence of a modern Macedonian ethnicity with reference to my recent work in a Macedonian ethnic community in Steelton, Pennsylvania. Both the gravestones in a local cemetery and US census reports from the early twentieth century provide evidence that émigrés from Macedonia who lived and died in Steelton in the early twentieth century considered themselves to be distinct from their Serbian and Bulgarian neighbours.” (Eugene Borza)

    Speaking of Eugene Borza, the American Philological Association refers to Eugene Borza as the “Macedonian specialist”. In the introductory chapter of “Makedonika” by Carol G. Thomas, Eugene Borza is also called “the Macedonian specialist”, and his colleague Peter Green describes Eugene’s work on Macedonia as “seminal.”

    Please read what P. Green thinks of Borza’s approach to the studies of ancient history, and of his method of abstraction of truth: “Never was a man less given to the kind of mean-spirited odium philologicum that so often marks classical debate. Gene could slice an argument to pieces while still charming its exponents out of the trees.”

    Ernst Badian from Harvard University writes: “It is chiefly Gene’s merit that recognizably historical interpretation of the history of classical Macedonia has not only become possible, but it is now accepted by all historians who have no vested interest in the mythology superseded by Gene’s work. Needless to say, I welcome and agree with that approach and have never disagreed with him except on relatively trivial details of interpretation.”

    Here are some excerpts from Borza’s writings regarding the Ancient Macedonians and the Ancient Greeks.

    On the matter of distinction between Greeks and Macedonians:

    1) “Neither Greeks nor Macedonians considered the Macedonians to be Greeks.”
    On the composition of Alexander’s army:

    2) “Thus we look in vain for the evidence that Alexander was heavily dependent upon Greeks either in quantity or quality.”

    3) “The pattern is clear: the trend toward the end of the king’s life was to install Macedonians in key positions at the expense of Asians, and to retain very few Greeks.”

    4) “The conclusion is inescapable: there was a largely ethnic Macedonian imperial administration from beginning to end. Alexander used Greeks in court for cultural reasons, Greek troops (often under Macedonian commanders) for limited tasks and with some discomfort, and Greek commanders and officials for limited duties. Typically, a Greek will enter Alexander’s service from an Aegean or Asian city through the practice of some special activity: he could read and write, keep figures or sail, all of which skills the Macedonians required. Some Greeks may have moved on to military service as well. In other words, the role of Greeks in Alexander’s service was not much different from what their role had been in the services of Xerxes and the third Darius.”

    On the policy of hellenization with Alexander’s conquest of Asia and the Greek assertion that he spread Hellenism:

    5) “If one wishes to believe that Alexander had a policy of hellenization – as opposed to the incidental and informal spread of Greek culture – the evidence must come from sources other than those presented here. One wonders – archaeology aside – where this evidence would be.”

    On the issue of whether Alexander and Philip “united” the Greek city-states or conquered them:

    6) “In European Greece Alexander continued and reinforced Philip II’s policy of rule over the city-states, a rule resulting from conquest.”

    On the ethnic tension between Macedonians and Greeks:

    Referring to the episode of Eumenes of Cardia and his bid to reach the throne: “And if there were any doubt about the status of Greeks among the Macedonians the tragic career of Eumenes in the immediate Wars of succession should put it to rest. The ancient sources are replete with information about the ethnic prejudice Eumenes suffered from Macedonians.”

    7) “The tension at court between Greeks and Macedonians, tension that the ancient authors clearly recognised as ethnic division.”

    On Alexander’s dismissal of his Greek allies:

    8) “A few days later at Ecbatana, Alexander dismissed his Greek allies, and charade with Greece was over.”

    On the so called Dorian invasion:

    9) The theory of the Dorian invasion (based on Hdt. 9.26, followed by Thuc. I.12) is largely an invention of nineteenth-century historography, and is otherwise unsupported by either archaeological or linguistic evidence.”

    10) “The Dorians are invisible archeologically.”

    11) “There is no archaeological record of the Dorian movements, and the mythic arguments are largely conjectural, based on folk traditions about the Dorian home originally having been in northwest Greece.

    12) “The explanation for the connection between the Dorians and the Macedonians may be more ingenious than convincing, resting uncomfortably on myth and conjecture.”

    On the Macedonian own tradition and origin:

    13) “As the Macedonians settled the region following the expulsion of existing peoples, they probably introduced their own customs and language(s); there is no evidence that they adopted any existing language, even though they were now in contact with neighbouring populations who spoke a variety of Greek and non-Greek tongues.”

    On the Macedonian language:

    14) “The main evidence for Macedonian existing as separate language comes from a handful of late sources describing events in the train of Alexander the Great, where the Macedonian tongue is mentioned specifically.”

    15) “The evidence suggests that Macedonian was distinct from ordinary Attic Greek used as a language of the court and of diplomacy.”

    16) “The handful of surviving genuine Macedonian words – not loan words from Greek – do not show the changes expected from Greek dialect.”

    On the Macedonian material culture being different from the Greek:

    17) “The most visible expression of material culture thus far recovered are the fourth – and third-century tombs. The architectural form, decoration, and burial goods of these tombs, which now number between sixty and seventy, are unlike what is found in the Greek south, or even in the neighbouring independent Greek cities of the north Aegean littoral (exception Amphipolis). Macedonian burial habits suggest different view of the afterlife from the Greeks’, even while many of the same gods were worshipped.”

    18) “Many of the public expressions of worship may have been different.”

    19) “There is an absence of major public religious monuments from Macedonian sites before the end of the fourth century (another difference from the Greeks).”

    20). “Must be cautious both in attributing Greek forms of worship to the Macedonians and in using these forms of worship as a means of confirming Hellenic identity.”

    21) “In brief, one must conclude that the similarities between some Macedonian and Greek customs and objects are not of themselves proof that Macedonians were a Greek tribe, even though it is undeniable that on certain levels Greek cultural influences eventually became pervasive.”

    22) “Greeks and Macedonians remained steadfastly antipathetic toward one another (with dislike of a different quality than the mutual long-term hostility shared by some Greek city-states) until well into the Hellenic period, when both the culmination of hellenic acculturation in the north and the rise of Rome made it clear that what these peoples shared took precedence over their historical enmities.”

    23) “They made their mark not as a tribe of Greek or other Balkan peoples, but as ‘Macedonians’. This was understood by foreign protagonists from the time of Darius and Xerxes to the age of Roman generals.”

    24) “It is time to put the matter of the Macedonians’ ethnic identity to rest.

    No matter how hard Modern Greeks try to prove otherwise, there is always more than one side to their story!

    To be continued.

    Many thanks to J.S.G. Gandeto for his contribution to this article.

    You can contact the author at rstefov@hotmail.com

  • BOOKS: How the trading hub was destroyed

    BOOKS: How the trading hub was destroyed

    Sunday, November 2, 2008

    SMYRNA 1922

    By Giles Milton

    Basic Books, $27.95, 426 pages, illus.

    REVIEWED BY MARTIN RUBIN

    On Wednesday, Sept. 13, 1922, the ancient city of Smyrna (now Izmir) on the Aegean Sea, which had long been a prosperous cosmopolitan trading hub, was a charnel house. Caught up in a 10-year cycle of war which had seen Greece and Turkey fighting for control of the region, the largely Greek city (its Hellenic population of more than 300,000 much larger then than Athens’) had been sacked by the Turkish forces under Mustafa Kemal, later known as Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern post-Ottoman Turkey.

    Scenes of almost unimaginable brutality and horror ensued: Untold rapes and cruel assaults – limbs, noses and ears hacked off -and murders by scimitar, bayonet and club. Not content with mayhem on this scale, the invaders scattered gasoline throughout the city and set it alight. Desperate to escape the inferno, much of the city’s populace streamed down to the harbor, a scene that must have merited the term indescribable if ever one did. But Giles Milton, a British writer, has managed the difficult task of harrowing the hell that Smyrna must have been 86 years ago and is capable of painting such scenes thus:

    “The Smyrna quayside had indeed become a scene of abject human misery. Almost two miles long – and wider than a football pitch – it was large enough to accommodate hundreds of thousands of homeless people. … By the time dusk fell on that terrible Wednesday, the quayside was crowded with almost half a million refugees.[Smyrna had a large Armenian as well as Jewish and European populations.] They stood in real danger of being burned alive for the fire had by now reached the waterfront – a scalding, pulsating heat that was transmitted from building to building by the liberal use of benzine. . . . The heat was soon so intense that the mooring lines of the ships closest to the waterfront began to burn. All the vessels moved 250 yards out from the quayside, yet the heat was still overwhelming. . . . The flames leaped higher and higher. The screams of the frantic mob on the quay could easily be heard a mile distant. There was a choice of three kinds of death: The fire behind, the Turks waiting at the side streets and the ocean in front … in modern chronicles, there has probably been nothing to compare with the night of September 13 in Smyrna.”

    If there was one thing that could make this hellish scene worse, it was the fact that Smyrna harbor was packed with warships from Britain, France, Italy and the United States, their crews witness to what was taking place but under strict orders not to intervene. (It is interesting to note that it has been reported that this book was on John McCain’s reading list and that he has singled it out as having resonated strongly with him.) The descriptions of these scenes of desperation as people struggled to reach the ships and were beaten back physically by the crews shamefully under strict orders to do so are literally sickening to read: What must it have been like to be the participants beggars even the most vivid imagination.

    from the book cover

    Milton tells his story unflinchingly and does not disguise his outrage. He is very good at providing the historical context for this dreadful episode: A complicated tale involving World War I and its aftermath, great power politics and adventurism, and a wildly expansionist Greece dedicated to restoring the lost grandeur of the Byzantine Empire. But although his goal is understanding the underlying causes for this incident, never does he fall into the trap of allowing any of this knowledge in any way to mitigate the unpardonable atrocities of those September days in Smyrna. He tries to find heroes and sometimes succeeds: Asa Jennings, a Methodist minister from New York newly arrived in Smyrna, managed eventually to overcome callous policy and bureaucratic hurdles to rescue many of those who managed to survive the fire but still faced deportation and certain death.

    The book justifies its title by summoning up the lost world of Smyrna, with its worldwide trade in dried apricots and the figs that bore its name. A bustling town where Jews, Christians and Muslims had lived in peaceful harmony for many centuries, Smyrna was also home to a group known as the Levantines: merchant families from Europe who had lived there for generations and made great fortunes from trading. Smyrna’s lost world of opera houses, luxurious hotels and splendid villas does seem paradisal in Mr. Milton’s account, although he may perhaps have been overly credulous in accepting the understandably rose-tinted accounts of those few eyewitnesses still living whom he assiduously tracked down. Still, he is not wrong in pointing out how so much can so quickly be destroyed in an orgy of destruction like this, no matter its origins: A cautionary tale indeed for John McCain – and for all of us.

    Martin Rubin is a writer and critic in Pasadena, Calif.

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  • Turkish FM Upbeat On Normalizing Relations With Armenia

    Turkish FM Upbeat On Normalizing Relations With Armenia

     

     

     

     

     

    dpa

    Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ali Babacan on Friday expressed optimism that long-running disputes between Turkey and Armenia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan can be resolved and that Turkey was determined to push forward in the interests of regional peace.

    “These two tracks could move fast because there is good political will,” Babacan said at a meeting of the World Economic Forum in Istanbul.

    “Imagine a region in which you have totally new relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Armenia and Turkey. The consequences for trade, for communications, for transport, for energy and the opportunities are huge, so we will do our best to normalize the situation as soon as possible,” Babacan said.

    Turkey and Armenia do not have any diplomatic relations and the land border between the two countries was closed by Turkey in 1993 in protest at the Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijan territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Relations are also strained by Turkey’s refusal to accept as genocide the deaths of up to 1.5 million ethnic Armenians in the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey says that while there were massacres of ethnic Armenians, the events do not constitute genocide and were instead the result of a civil uprising during the First World War.

    Hopes have risen in recent months that after a groundbreaking visit by Turkish President Abdullah Gul to the Armenian capital Yerevan where he attended a World Cup qualifying match between the two countries.

    Babacan on Friday said that the recent events in Georgia increased the incentive and need for regional cooperation and said that Turkey was ready to use its perceived position as a “balancing power” to contribute to peace and stability.

  • Azerbaijani-Turkish-American Foundation set up in Washington

    Azerbaijani-Turkish-American Foundation set up in Washington

    Baku. Nijat Mustafayev – APA-ECONOMICS. Azerbaijani-Turkish-American Foundation (ATAF) has been established with support from Ahmet Erentok, chairman of Azerbaijan Turkey Business Association (ATIB).
    ATIB’s International Projects Advisor Louette Ragusa was appointed as Chief Executive Officer of ATAF that is based in Washington.
    ATAF’s main objective is to coordinate lobbying activities of Azerbaijani and Turkish companies in the U.S., and provide them with legal and consulting services in market penetration.
    The US companies aspiring to do business in the region will also benefit from these services after a cooperation agreement is signed between ATIB and ATAF.

  • Destruction of Turkish Outpost by PKK Leads to Counterterrorism Reforms

    Destruction of Turkish Outpost by PKK Leads to Counterterrorism Reforms

    10/30/2008 – By Emrullah Uslu (from Terrorism Focus, October 30) – The PKK’s October 3 attack on the Aktutun military outpost sparked a controversy over whether Turkish counterterrorism strategy is on the right track. In its three decades old battle against the PKK, the Aktutun attack marked the first time the Turkish Armed Forces (Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri – TSK) was strongly criticized by mainstream media outlets. Two major factors played a role in the surprisingly harsh criticism. First, despite the fact that the PKK has organized four attacks on Aktutun outposts in the last year, the military failed to successfully defend its outpost, with 17 soldiers losing their lives. Second, the TSK failed to manage the sequence of events after the attack.

    Soon after the fatal attack, the Turkish press reported that Turkish military intelligence was aware of PKK intentions to attack Aktutun a month before it happened. Liberal daily Taraf published an intelligence report showing that the intelligence service detected and reported the details of the planning process. Along with the military intelligence reports, Taraf also published the three images from American satellite intelligence, which showed the preparation process of the attack (Taraf, October 14).

    The second source of criticism was the TSK’s failure to inform the public about what actually happened at Aktutun. On October 4, the PKK’s attack was posted on the TSK webpage, which announced 15 soldiers were killed and two were missing while 23 PKK fighters were killed in the clash (tsk.mil.tr., October 4). It turned out the PKK’s reported losses were inaccurate – only nine PKK bodies were found on the scene (cnnturk, October 5).

    On October 5, the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff informed the media that the TSK had planned a year ago to move five military outposts to geographically secure places to avoid such an attack. Because of financial shortages the posts haven’t been moved yet (Hurriyet, October 5). This information sparked a controversy over whether the government provides sufficient financial support to the military (Hurriyet, October 6). Even soccer fan clubs became involved in criticizing the government by offering financial help to build a better military outpost (antu.com, October 8). The Finance Ministry responded by releasing a statement denying allegations the military was not financially supported. On the contrary, the Finance Ministry stated that “the Military in 2007 did not use 250 millions Turkish Lira from its budget and returned it back to the treasury” (Aksam Gazetesi, October 9).

    In addition, an anonymous source told mainstream daily Hurriyet that since Turkey’s land operation in northern Iraq last February, America had stopped sharing its satellite intelligence (Hurriyet, October 6) This disinformation attempt by Turkish sources was immediately rejected by the U.S. embassy in Ankara. An embassy spokesperson told Hurriyet: “There is no such termination on the intelligence sharing program with Turkey. It continues as it should be” (Hurriyet, October 7). A further explanation claimed the terrorists who attacked the Aktutun outposts did not come from PKK bases in northern Iraq, but from Turkish territory. Because American satellite intelligence devices are not programmed to monitor PKK movements in Turkish territory, the gathering of 300 PKK fighters could not be detected (Hurriyet, October 13).

    While the TSK has been trying to cover its failure through the release of selected information to pro-state media outlets, Taraf reported that the commander of the Air Force, General Aydogan Babaoglu, was playing golf in Antalya while the soldiers in Aktutun were fighting in their posts. Even worse was the fact he was one of the last people to hear what happened in Aktutun, some 24 hours after the clash ended. As the press noted, some of the dead soldiers had already been buried before Babaoglu was informed of the attack (Taraf, October 7). The TSK released a press statement to deny the allegations raised by Taraf, though the statement confirmed that General Babaoglu was in fact not informed of the attack until his golf game ended on Saturday, October 5 (tsk.mil.tr, October 8).

    The revelations prompted an angry response from the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Ilker Basbug, who held a press conference to denounce the publication of classified information; “Those who present the actions of the separatist terrorist organization [a euphemism for the PKK] as successful acts are responsible for the blood that has been shed and will be shed… This is my last word: I invite everyone to be careful and to stand in the right place” (Today’s Zaman, October 14). While almost all mainstream Turkish media was critical of at least the format and the tone of General Basbug and his apparent threats against the media, he received unexpected support for his statements from Prime Minister Erdogan, who joined Basbug in criticizing Turkey’s news organizations; “There is no room in this fight [against terror] for weakness or hesitation. Nobody should dare to show our government or security forces as weak” (Taraf, October 17; Turkish Daily News, October 17). Erdogan’s comments were met with a sarcastic response in some parts of the Turkish media, to which the Prime Minister replied; “Some people in the media are trying to provoke us. Where this is coming from is the question that we have the right to ask” (Turkish Daily News, October 18).

    The TSK insisted that the aerial photos published by Taraf were in fact from Kandil (125 kilometers away from Aktutun) and Kerintepe (20 kilometers away). A publication ban was imposed on further reproduction of the images on the grounds that it might jeopardize the investigation into who leaked the photos to the press (Bianet, October 17; Turkish Daily News, October 18).

    Taraf’s reporting opened the door for the mainstream media to question what went wrong at Aktutun. Even well known Kemalist intellectuals, who almost always support the TSK, began questioning whether Turkish counterterrorism policies work (Radikal, October 7; Sabah, October 8). Kemalist Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi -CHP) leader Deniz Baykal blamed the military’s failure on the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP); “There were almost no terrorist actions or attacks [before the AKP took power in 2002]. Terrorism has significantly risen since 2002. The government has either been unable to understand the term ‘terrorism’ or it has chosen not to understand it. It has not grasped the significance of the fight against terrorism” (Aksam, October 8; Today’s Zaman, October 8).

    Such questioning led the TSK and the government to take a series of new steps. First, the TSK, for the first time in its counterterrorism history, openly invited counterterrorism experts to give their opinion (Vatan, October 8). In a counterterrorism meeting between military generals and the government, the generals requested extended powers and the creation of an institution to better coordinate the fight against terrorism (Radikal, October 10) Another significant development is the decision of the Turkish National Police (TNP) to send seven thousand men of its Special Forces units to the ethnic-Kurdish region of southeastern Turkey. During the 1990s the Police Special Forces were a leading element in the fight against the PKK, but during the February 28, 1997 political crisis between the Turkish military and the civilian government, the generals put pressure on the government to withdraw police forces from the region (Yeni Safak, October 10).

    On October 15 the government released its plan to reorganize government institutions in Ankara to better coordinate counter-terrorism efforts (Today’s Zaman, October 15). Furthermore, in the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu -MGK) meeting the government’s plan to reorganize the bureaucracy in Ankara to better coordinate state institutions in the fight against the terrorism was approved (Vatan, October 21).

    The new plan calls for the military to relinquish control for domestic security to the civilian Interior Ministry and its police and gendarmerie units (the latter are now under the effective, if not official, control of the TSK). The government is planning to coordinate all the state institutions to concentrate their efforts on counterterrorism problems by addressing the economic, social and educational aspects of terrorism. It was also announced that the Chief of Staff will be briefing government cabinet members about counterterrorism efforts. This marks the first time in three decades that the Chief of General Staff will brief civilian cabinet members. Prime Minister Erdogan revealed the “briefing will be about the details of the counterterrorism efforts to see what the government can do to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts for today and the future” (Anadolu Ajansi, October 24; Hurriyet, October 28). One consequence of the transfer of responsibility for counterterrorism efforts is the civilian government will now be accountable when there is a failure such as Aktutun.

    After two stormy weeks for the Turkish military, politicians and media, what seemed evident was that most of Taraf’s initial reporting was accurate. Indeed, despite the fact that the TSK received intelligence from various sources, it failed to prevent the PKK from attacking. Making matters worse, the TSK also failed to handle the aftermath of the Aktutun attack, harming its image in the process. By supporting General Basbug, Prime Minister Erdogan has lost his credibility in the eyes of Turkish Kurds and faced protests in his last visit to the predominantly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, where Erdogan’s AKP was expecting to be successful in next March’s regional elections (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 24).

    On the positive side, however, there is now a clear effort to reorganize the state bureaucracy to better address the terrorism problem and, most importantly, the civilian government will finally be actively involved. Turkish diplomacy is at work and new channels of communications are being established with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq to uproot PKK bases from in its territory. Following the disaster at Aktutun, it appears the civilian government and the military are finally on the same page in Turkey’s war on terrorism.

  • Commission hails Turkey’s role in regional stability

    Commission hails Turkey’s role in regional stability

    ELITSA VUCHEVA

    Today @ 09:15 CET

    EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS – Turkey’s role as promoter of regional stability has improved in the last year, Brussels says in a draft report on Turkey and the western Balkans’ progress towards the EU, while stressing that Ankara still has a lot to do in a number of areas before being judged fit to join the EU club.

    “Turkey has played a constructive role in its neighbourhood,” Brussels says (Photo: EUobserver.com)

    “Turkey has played a constructive role in its neighbourhood and the wider Middle East through active diplomacy,” reads the draft of the annual report seen by EUobserver.

    “Following the crisis in Georgia, [Turkey] proposed a Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform to promote dialogue between the countries of that region. [Turkish] President Gul paid a visit to Yerevan, the first visit ever of a Turkish president since the independence of Armenia. Turkey undertook efforts as a mediator between Israel and Syria and conducted a dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue,” the draft report goes on.

    Ankara has itself been stressing its role in maintaining regional stability and has been multiplying initiatives in that respect lately – including setting up the Caucasus Platform in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia conflict.

    It says the platform’s objective is to establish regional conflict resolution mechanisms and broader economic co-operation among the five countries involved – Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

    The EU has always insisted that good neighbourly relations are an important pre-condition for any EU hopeful.

    Additionally, “the development in the southern Caucasus also highlighted Turkey’s strategic significance for the EU energy security, particularly by diversifying supply routes, and underlined the importance of closer energy co-operation between Turkey and the EU,” the commission says.

    Nabucco – the EU-backed planned natural gas pipeline designed to reduce energy dependency on Russia by transporting natural gas from Turkey to Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary – “is a key element for this,” Brussels underlines.

    Same problems remain

    Turkey has been an official candidate to join the EU since 1999 and opened accession negotiations with the bloc in 2005.

    But besides the progress noted, the commission says Ankara still has a lot to do in many areas in order to be ready for EU membership.

    Notably, “there has been no progress towards normalisation of bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has not fully implemented the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and has not removed all obstacles to free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus.”

    In 2005 Ankara signed a protocol to extend its customs union with the EU to the 10 states that joined the bloc in 2004 – but still refuses to open its ports to Cypriot ships. Several negotiations chapters with the EU remain suspended because of this.

    Turkey does not recognise the Greek government in the southern part of the divided island, while at the same time is the only country to recognise its northern Turkish section.

    Earlier this year, commission President Barroso called the issue “the main obstacle for significant progress in Turkey’s accession process.”

    In addition, reads the report, the country has still a lot to do to fight corruption and organised crime. It has made “no progress on alignment with European standards” as regards minority rights and it needs to push administrative and political reforms further.

    “Full civilian supervisory functions and parliamentary oversight of defence expenditures need to be ensured. Senior members of the armed forces have continued to make statements on issues going beyond their remit,” Brussels also says. The central role of the military in Turkish society is often raised as a concern by the EU executive.

    The final version of the report will be presented by the commission on 5 November.