Category: Turkey

Turkish-American relations under a new U.S. president

Committed to Change, or Changing Commitments?

by Soli Ozel*

Those who rejoiced in the presidential victory of Barack Obama expect him to hold Turkey to higher standards on human rights, democracy, and rule of law.”

ISTANBUL — Two weeks prior to the U.S. presidential election, the October survey of Metropoll found that nearly 39 percent of Turks wanted Barack Obama to be the next U.S. president and only 14.1 percent wanted John McCain. Of those surveyed, 45 percent were either not interested or thought it did not matter who was elected the next U.S. president.

On the eve of election night, as talk shows on the U.S. elections proliferated across television channels in Turkey, it transpired that many members of the punditry had a high discomfort level with an Obama presidency. Particularly, former diplomatic corps representatives openly displayed their displeasure with such a choice in fear that such a move could jeopardize bilateral relations.

As Amberin Zaman explained in “Turkey and the United States Under Barack Obama: Yes They Can,” indeed the only reason for such animosity was the president-elect’s open support for a genocide resolution. U.S. Senator and now Vice President-Elect Joe Biden’s record on Cyprus and the Armenian genocide resolution, as well as hisKurdophile views (his partiality for a highly autonomous if not independent Kurdistan in Iraq) was also duly noted.

Such a degree of insularity or self-centeredness cannot be very healthy for a country that wishes to play and will be asked to play an important role in regional affairs during the Obama presidency. On the one hand, Turkey and Turks from all walks of life desire to be taken seriously, take pride in their country’s recent performance as a mediator in regional conflicts, and support a more activist foreign policy. On the other hand, there is very little tolerance for acts or policies on the part of Turkey’s allies and friends that may not entirely satisfy Turks’ expectations. This intolerance is particularly accentuated on the issue of the Armenian genocide resolution and the fight against the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) when it comes to the United States.

Many Turks shared the world’s enthusiasm for the election results but this did not stop others from questioning either the authenticity of the president-elect’s image and views, or to doubt that he would make a difference. Some welcomed the change that the Obama administration promised to bring in both the domestic and foreign policies of the United States. They welcomed the possibility of a more cooperative approach to world politics on the part of the new U.S. administration. They also believed that the symbolism of the election for American democracy would help re-kindle the drive for democracy throughout the world that had been discredited under the Bush administration. In short, their logic was that a development that would be good for the world could not be bad for Turkey.

Those who rejoiced in the presidential victory of Barack Obama expect him to hold Turkey to higher standards on human rights, democracy, and rule of law. Precisely for this same reason, others are uncomfortable and would have preferred a Republican administration that would just pay lip service to such issues and shape its relations with Turkey on the basis of strategic and security concerns. Such a U.S. administration would have little to say about the ongoing hardening of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s policy vis-a-vis the Kurds, and its blatant disregard for freedom of expression and of the press. It would not raise the flag on rising police brutality and torture, and would not put undue pressure on the government to revitalize the moribund EU accession process.

No matter which way the Obama administration goes, there is no doubt that a new page will be turned in Turkish-American relations. These relations went through a turbulent period under U.S. President George W. Bush and have only begun to recuperate following the November 5, 2007 meeting between President Bush and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The U.S. president’s decision to provide the Turkish Armed Forces with actionable intelligence about the PKK went a long way in both improving the American image in the country and in re-establishing trust between institutions.

I argued in an earlier analysis piece that both the government and the armed forces were ready and willing to improve relations. On the American side there is recognition that Turkey’s cooperation will be necessary for almost all the thorny issues that the new U.S. administration will tackle, from Iraq to Afghanistan to the Caucasus. The two sides have a clear common interest in coordinating efforts for energy security and for stabilizing the Caucasus.

With such a loaded agenda, the United States and Turkey will need to understand one another’s motives, concerns, and perspectives clearly. Redefining the common interests of Turkey and the United States—a task that was due immediately after the end of the Cold War but was not undertaken—is a necessary step. In the wake of the Iraq war and the many failures of the Bush administration in its policies toward the Middle East, Turkey cannot be expected to put America’s global interests over its own regional interests.

Over the course of the past decade, Turkey’s policy toward the region has taken a new direction in reflecting political imagination for the region. Favoring diplomatic engagement, egalitarian relations, and regional initiatives, this latest political approach began to take shape at the end of the 1990s but found its full manifestation under the AKP government.

Turkey’s much-appreciated mediation between Syria and Israel, the opening to Armenia, and the desire to play a constructive role between Iran and the United States all stem from this approach.
Based on the president-elect’s preferences for diplomacy over confrontation, there should be plenty of room for the two allies to cooperate. Indeed, in Iraq when troop withdrawal begins, Turkey will be asked to be of assistance.

In Afghanistan, if a negotiated truce is reached that will include the Taliban, Turkey’s historical ties with that country and with Pakistan for that matter might come in handy for the arduous process of nation-building that is the only guarantor of peace and stability in the long-run.

However, it is also imperative that in this new period the mechanics of the relationship change as well. Rather than asking Turkey to cooperate with the United States on policies singularly decided upon in Washington, an effort should be made to devise policies in a more collaborative fashion. Turkey’s myriad connections in Russia and Iran ought to be taken into consideration before Ankara is asked to participate in policies that might harm its vital interests.

Turkish officials and the public in general will look for American support for fair resolution of the Cyprus conflict and for more committed American assistance in fighting the PKK in northern Iraq. Begrudgingly but steadily, Turkey has taken steps to recognize the political reality of the Kurdistan regional government. The chances are high that relations between Ankara and Erbil, the Kurdish regional capital, will not have to go through Baghdad in the near future. However, there are two preconditions for such a development. The first is the isolation, weakening, and elimination of the PKK in northern Iraq. The second is the continuation of the special status of Kirkuk, keeping that city out of sole Kurdish control.

Geopolitical realities seem to have once more elevated Turkey’s importance in American foreign policy decisions. In the past, Turkey’s strategic importance and America’s reliance on it had an inverse relation to the deepening of Turkish democracy. In other words, during the Cold War Turkey’s democratic deficits were not of much concern for Washington. Today, the stability of Turkey necessitates that the country maintain its democratic orientation and that all its political actors (the military, the judiciary, and all its political parties) commit themselves to this goal. One of the major tests of the Obama administration in its relations with Turkey may very well be whether it will treat Turkish democracy as a fundamental good or an expendable one.

If Washington continues to rigorously support Turkey’s EU accession process and insists forcefully that Ankara show the same enthusiasm as it did between 2002 and 2004, it will have passed the test.

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Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Sabah Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the national daily Sabah and is senior advisor to the chairman of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he is the editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).

About GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

November 18, 2008
Germany’s Green Party Elects First Ethnic Turk as Leader

November 17, 2008

By JUDY DEMPSEY

BERLIN — The Green Party, one of Germany’s main political parties, has elected the son of Turkish immigrants to its top political post, the first time any party here has chosen a leader with an ethnic Turkish background.

The election of Cem Ozdemir, 42, on Saturday represents a major turning point not only for the opposition Greens, but also for the country as a whole. He was born in southern Germany of parents who came from Turkey to work as gastarbeiter, or guest workers, during the 1960s.

Even though more than 2.6 million Turks live in Germany, accounting for 3 percent of the population, few have managed to make it to the higher ranks of many professions, including politics and the civil service.

But with a conservative party’s choice of Angela Merkel to run as chancellor in 2005 — a successful gambit — and now an ethnic Turk at the helm of an influential party, it appears that German society is slowly breaking with the past, when women were inconspicuous and immigrants’ voices were seldom heard.

Mr. Ozdemir, a social scientist who went to college in Reutlingen in the state of Baden-Württemberg, was elected as a Greens legislator to the lower house of the Bundestag, the German Parliament, in 1994. It was the first time anyone with a Turkish background had won such a mandate. He moved to the European Parliament in 2004 after he was forced to give up his parliamentary seat for using his publicly paid airline miles for private use.

With his comeback to domestic politics over the weekend, Mr. Ozdemir, who is married, has one child and speaks German with a slight southwestern accent, joins a handful of ethnic Turks in the Greens, the Social Democrats and the new populist Left Party who want to make the parties more representative of the ethnic composition of the German population.

“I want a society where everyone has an equal chance, regardless of where they come from,” Mr. Ozdemir said in his acceptance speech at the Greens’ congress in the central city of Erfurt. He won 79.2 percent of the votes and joined Claudia Roth as the co-leader of the Greens.

It is estimated that 660,000 Turks have taken up German citizenship since 1972, giving them a significant voice. According to the main political parties, more than half a million Turks were eligible to vote in the 2005 election; 75 percent voted for the Social Democrats, 9.2 percent for the Greens and less than 5 percent for the Christian Democrats.

With new leaders in place, the Green Party is now turning its attention to federal elections next September. Some analysts are asking whether the Greens, along with the pro-business Free Democrats, might win enough votes to become junior partners for Mrs. Merkel’s conservative bloc.

Such an idea was treated with ridicule until recently. But in February, the Christian Democrats chose to share power with the Greens in Hamburg. So far, the coalition, the first of its kind on the state level, has been working effectively, serving as a litmus test for other states.

Traditionally, the Greens have been allies of the Social Democrats. The party was the junior partner in the coalition led by ChancellorGerhard Schröder, a Social Democrat, from 1998 to 2005.

That coalition was defeated by Mrs. Merkel’s conservative bloc, which was forced to band together with the Social Democrats because neither of the big parties was strong enough to establish a coalition with its preferred smaller partners.

November 18, 2008
TURKEY AGREES TO TRAIN MULLAHS AND IMAMS FOR RUSSIA

The Turkish government has signed an agreement with the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR) to train imams and mullahs for Russian mosques. The SMR leadership hailed this decision because of what it described as the secular nature of Turkey and hence that country’s understanding of what Islam should be in a country like Russia (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=27334).

November 17, 2008
No restriction for expansion of Iran-Turkey ties: president

Tehran, Nov 17, IRNA

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Sunday evening that there is no obstacle in the way of further expansion of Tehran-Ankara all-out cooperation.

In a meeting with the visiting Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler, he expressed hope that bilateral relations would further boost in all areas.

Terming his August visit to Turkey as a crucial and determining visit, the president said the visit was in line with the two countries mutual interest.

During Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey, a joint statement was issued by the two sides stressing the importance of energy in economic development of the two states.

The two sides agreed to promote the level of cooperation in the fields of energy, gas and oil to the highest level and try to finalize agreements signed between the two capitals in 2007 and 2008 to this end.

Guler expressed his satisfaction with the current level of cooperation between the two neighboring states.

He reiterated that Ankara attaches great importance to expansion of ties with Tehran.

The Turkish energy minister further called for materialization of the agreements reached between the two sides.

Guler, heading a delegation, arrived in Tehran Saturday evening to finalize a gas accord with Iranian officials.

November 17, 2008
Turkey, a land of paradoxes

By CLAUDE SALHANI, UPI Contributing Editor

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 (UPI) — Turkey is a land of many paradoxes. While the Kemalist notions of secularism and the separation of mosque and state are taken seriously, at the same time the state provides funds for the building of mosques, keeps the Sunni clergy on the state’s payroll and allows school textbooks that teach that being a Sunni Muslim is part and parcel of the Turkish identity.

No less of a paradox is how Ankara hopes to adhere to the European Union as it promotes one branch of Islam while ignoring minorities, such as the Alevis, who constitute roughly 10 percent to 15 percent of the country’s population.

Still, Turks take their secularism to heart to the point that often the word “secularism” does not convey the sense of urgency felt in post-Ottoman Turkey to describe the notion of keeping religion separate from politics, as intended by Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk), the founder of modern-day Turkey. Instead, Turks often borrow the word “laicite” from the French.

Numerous factors play a part in making Turkey into the land of contradictions that it is today. Certainly its geographic location, as a nation straddling the borders of East and West, sitting along the periphery of the Judeo-Christian West and the Muslim Levant and beyond, counts for something. Turkey was a co-founder of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, whose charter defines its members as “Islamic countries committed to preserving Islamic principles, ethical, social and economic values.”

Writing in the October-November issue of the journal Survival published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in an article entitled “Turkey’s Latest Crisis,” Gareth Jenkins, an analyst based in Turkey, reports that “claims by opponents of the (ruling Justice and Development Party), or the AKP, that it wants to establish an Islamic state are probably exaggerated. But the AKP’s denials that it has a religious agenda are equally misleading.”

Yet, as Jenkins reminds us, “Women who believe the Koran requires them to cover their heads in public are banned from working in the civil service and are even forbidden from studying at universities on the grounds that doing so would be a violation of the secular nature of the Turkish state.”

And although Shariah law prohibits the lending of money for profit, there is hardly another country in either the East or the West with as many banks and as many branches of these banks.

Turkey’s cross-cultural exposure and its geographic position have resulted in some unique geopolitical assets.

Turkey, possibly more so than any other nation in Europe or the Middle East, understands the mindset of both the European and Levantine cultures. And as one of the rare countries in the region to enjoy relations with both the Arabs and Israel, Turkey in recent years has become involved in trying to mediate between Syria and Israel on the one hand, and Iran and the West on the other.

“Turkey is becoming more active in geopolitical affairs,” said Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a news conference in Washington last Friday.

“Turkey,” said Erdogan, “could also play a positive role if it were to act as a mediator in the stalled negotiations between Iran and the West over the controversial nuclear dossier.

“We are ready to be the mediator,” said the Turkish prime minister. “I do believe we could be very useful.”

Ankara announced earlier this year that it had begun to play an informal role in the talks between Iran and the group of six leading powers trying to talk Iran out of its nuclear ambitions — Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.

Replying to this reporter’s question, Erdogan reaffirmed that Turkey was not prepared to accept the possibility that Iran — right next door — could acquire nuclear weapons, but he did not elaborate as to what steps Turkey might take in that regard.

Erdogan said: “The world is going through a global political and economic crisis.”

Keeping in line with its paradoxical identity crisis, since Erdogan’s ruling party, the AKP, or the Justice and Development Party, came to power in 2002, as Jenkins reminds us, despite its Islamist leanings, there has been an absence of any explicit pro-Islamic legislation. Rather, there has been a “battery of liberalizing reforms” passed in hope of appeasing the European Union and gaining entry into the Brussels club, something Ankara has been pushing for almost 20 years now.

But continued refusal from some European countries, particularly France under the leadership of President Nicolas Sarkozy, who remains ardently opposed to Turkey’s accession to the EU, risks pushing Turkey off the fence and into the Islamist camp. At a time when the West needs all the friends it can get, alienating the Turks to the point where they would turn away from Europe and begin looking eastward once again would be an unforgivable mistake.

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(Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times.)

November 17, 2008
Memorandum to President-elect Obama, re: Turkey

Mark R. Parris, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTIONAs your Administration undertakes the Herculean task of restoring America’s footing and leadership abroad, some countries will be able to help-or-hurt-more than others. Turkey has the potential to place high on either list.

Under your predecessor, US-Turkish relations have been chronically dysfunctional, punctuated by periodic near and real disasters. We have to do better. That will require prompt steps to correct conceptual and structural handicaps that have harmed our approach to Turkey for decades, but which have become acute in recent years.

People wave Turkish national flags as they visit the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

Reuters/Umit Bektas

November 17, 2008