Category: Turkey

  • Iraq Turkmen Participated in Turkic Forum in United Kingdom

    Iraq Turkmen Participated in Turkic Forum in United Kingdom

    Iraq Turkmen Participated in Turkic Forum in United Kingdom

    By Mofak Salman Kerkuklu

    On the 6th of December, the Turkmens of Iraq have participated in the Turkic forum in United Kingdom that was held at the Azerbaijani House, London, United Kingdom.

    The event was commenced with an introduction, networking and refreshments of Turkish food and Turkish cuisine and then the opening speech was started by Dr. Ali Tekin Atalar the Chairman of Azerbaijan House in UK by welcoming the Turkish participants from different countries to the Azerbaijan House and congratulating all the participant for their dedication and enthusiasm that have shown by making the effort to attend this most important meeting.

    After that, Dr. Ali Atalar started by given a brief an introduction about the Azerbaijan House in the UK. The Azerbaijani centre was officially opened its doors on the 14th of November with the aim of severing the Azerbaijani community that are living in UK. The Azerbaijani House has been established by the initiative of individual intellectuals, professionals and student living in UK. The organisation and Turkic Forum are strictly non political non profit making organisation and aiming to serve as a community centre, promoting culture activities and friendship between Azerbaijanis and host community.

    Azerbaijan Hose aims to become a registered charity at the earliest time possible. Dr. Ali Atalar also kindly stated looking forward to the support of Azerbaijani members and friends towards achieving this goal. Moreover, he revealed that Azeri people feel privileged by being able to tackle the initiative and establish this centre which can be considered as a first permanent home that has been established by a Turkic community in the UK.

    He sincerely hoped that this will motivate Azeri’s friends and brothers from the Turkic communities to establish similar centres. If more cultural centres are established by the Turkic community it would lead without doubt to a stronger community link and as a result of this a better service could be provided to our community. In addition to, in recent years huge numbers of Turkic speaking people getting together in London  have been organizing cultural events and looking for  opportunities to meet and interact with each other and members to enhance the Turkic cultural from different groups.

    Furthermore he stated that he had many wonderful groups of people, Turkmens from Kerkuk, Tatars from Kazan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmen from Turkmenistan, Uzbek, Bulgarian Turks, Kazakhs, Uigurs and many more. All groups are very enthusiastic and anxious to meet regularly, support each other and express their culture. Finally he has expressed his gratitude and thanks to Mr Şener Sağlam, the President of the Federation of Turkish Associations UK. Who is one of the most active members in organizing this event in London, being one of the most diverse and multicultural cities in the world which is home to a huge variety of ethnic communities. Within this hustle and bustle these communities attempt to represent their culture and traditions and act as a platform to lobby for their respective countries of origin while trying to overcome many difficulties and problems this great city brings.

    Turkish Cypriot and Azerbaijani communities have identified needs amongst the various Turkic communities for raising cultural awareness and cultivating friendship and solidarity between different Turkic groups living in Britain. Our aim is to build a strong community in the UK by working on specific projects such as creating media organisations, opening cultural centres and  libraries, organising various events, meetings and forums so that common cultural traditions and languages can be shared and celebrated.

    It is a fact that a strong and organised community can contribute far more to society in Britain and as a result gain more support from local authorities and government. It would therefore make sense to unite our strength and abilities, to share our experiences and knowledge, to work together on various opportunities and thus obtain more successful results.

    When we take into account that there are many other Turkic communities like Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmens from Turkmeneli, Turkmen from Turkmenistan, Kyrgyz but a few, we can identify a huge potential. If we can succeed in bringing together all these related groups into one big and powerful Turkic family then whenever necessary we can move and act together as one and be far more effective in achieving our aims within the UK.

    It is for this reason that we have come together to organize the “Cultural Forum of Turkic Communities in Britain” as the first step. We wish to meet and share ideas so as to find ways to direct our activities and that will lead us to become one of the most influential communities in Britain. Moreover, Mr Levent Hassan highly contributed in the translation into English language and the discussion that was held during the event in order to facilitate the understanding the meaning of the discussion to participatents who did not speak the Turkish language.

    Moreover, Mr Altan Ataturk, the representative of the Republic of South Azerbaijan gave an introduction Azeri population and he had revealed the suffering and oppression of the Azeri on the hand of the Iranian government and also explained the culture and language similarity between the Azeri population in the Republic of South Azerbaijan and other Turkic Estates.

    The meeting also has covered the discussion of the election of management committee, representative’s committees, Auit committee and Nevruz celebration committee. The Turkic Forum event was extremely fruitful and beneficial for all the participants and considered as a stepping stone for bring all Turkic spoken people together and working as team under one umbrella. The goal and the objective of the Turkic forum can be fully utilized for lobbying for the cultural and political right for Turkic people whom are residents in the United Kingdom.

    The established Turkic forum would greatly enhance the integration of the Turkish into the British society especially by contributing with a rich Turkish culture from various Turkic countries.

     

    Mofak Salman Kerkuklu

    ireland

  • Turkey’s crisis – Financial woes threaten economy

    Turkey’s crisis – Financial woes threaten economy

    Tulin Daloglu
    Tuesday, December 9, 2008 OP-ED:

    https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/09/turkeys-crisis/
     
    Many people are directly feeling the effects of the recession –- and the ramifications reach far beyond the United States.
     
    According to the International Labor Organization, the current global financial crisis could cause as many as 20 million people worldwide to lose their jobs and cause extreme poverty to afflict as many as 40 million people. This crisis will test the ability of elected officials to make difficult decisions that their people may not agree with. That is, however, the weakest point in today´s democracies.
     
    Take Turkey as an example. It is accustomed to coping with financial crises. When the markets toppled in February 2001, and thanks to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, the economy recovered. But the worldwide financial turmoil is again jeopardizing Turkey’s economy, and this time the Turkish government seems reluctant to agree to the IMF’s conditions.
     
    According to a recent public opinion poll by CNBC-e, more than 60 percent of Turks do not want their government to enter into a new agreement with the IMF. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan strongly agrees –- and has used some inflammatory rhetoric to make his point.
     
    Last month, he accused the IMF of “squeezing Turkey’s throat by curbing needed spending” and said the country doesn’t need another IMF program. It may make some Turks feel better to hear their prime minister speak with such attitude. But the way Mr. Erdogan’s government is negotiating with the IMF could bring about a different kind of reality. Truth be told, it´s Turkey rather than the IMF that needs the agreement.
     
    Last week, however, IMF spokeswoman Caroline Atkinson said that “there has been no formal request from the Turkish authorities for a program.” Yet prior to that statement, Turkish officials leaked claims to the media either that the IMF would not ratify a loan for the amount that Turkey needs or that an agreement is near. Those reports were then followed by an official statement from the Turkish Treasury confirming Ms. Atkinson´s statement. A responsible government should have foreseen the inevitable nervousness that it would create with such mixed messages. It’s good that the Turkish stock market will be closed this week for a religious holiday.
     
    Separately, the government is expecting the Gulf countries to invest $10 billion to $20 billion in Turkey. But that money will either go toward buying land or on the construction business, which has little or no effect on a country’s growth rate. In other words, this is not investment in industry. It does not contribute to the real economy. Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) seems to object to the IMF program because it wants the country’s growth rate to decline.
     
    But the IMF program is crucial for Turkey. It commits the country economically to accountability and credibility. It guarantees a continuous flow of money into a market in a time when global liquidity is drying up and investors have almost no appetite for risk. The Turkish government has not shown the expected GCC money as an alternative to the IMF program. But it certainly is keeping it in mind as it negotiates with the IMF –- and its method of negotiation does not fit the mold of credible business dealings.
     
    The point of Mr. Erdogan’s harsh rhetoric about the IMF could be that he really believes what he says –- that “the worst of the economic crisis was now past.” Yet U.S. President-elect Barack Obama said that “the economy seems destined to get worse before it gets better.” More, Mr. Erdogan recently said that the global financial crisis will not harm Turkey and proudly noted that on his watch no Turkish bank has gone bankrupt.
     
    Technically, Mr. Erdogan bought some time. But the crucial point remains that the IMF is demanding that the Turkish government take control of its budget. The program is meant to focus on the budget on a macro level, but its application will certainly impact the micro level. Given that municipality elections are fast approaching in March, many Turks are debating as to whether the government wants to maximize gain in the elections, which is why it will not accept the IMF demand about budget control.
     
    One of the key elements in the success of AKP –- or any Islamic movement –- is they do take care of their supporters. The party has distributed coal to people in the winter, as well as food –- creating a specific kind of relationship between constituents and the government. Over the long term, however, this means of operating actually puts down the people. But it certainly wins elections.
     
    Right now, Turks are unsure as to how to judge the AKP’s success in managing the financial storm. On that point, the local elections are critical for the AKP. The party has invested a lot in its establishment, but if it can’t win a significant number of new municipalities, there has to be a political interpretation. It could signal a possible coalition government in the upcoming general elections, which hopefully will turn back the rising power of political Islam in Turkey.
     
    Tulin Daloglu is a free-lance writer.
  • ANOTHER SMALL STEP FOR NABUCCO

    ANOTHER SMALL STEP FOR NABUCCO

    Caucasus Update, Issue 13, December 8, 2008

    Released by Caucasian Review of International Affairs (www.cria-online.org)

     

    In late November a trilateral summit was hosted in the city of Turkmenbashi , on Turkmenistan ’s Caspian coast. In attendance were President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov, the host; President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan , and President Abdullah Gul of Turkey . Apart from a number of cultural and transportation agreements, the three leaders were there to discuss the much-hyped Nabucco project. Nabucco would transport Central Asian and Azerbaijani gas to Europe, via an undersea pipeline in the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan , Georgia and Turkey . The project would do for gas what the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline did for oil – tap into Central Asian resources bypassing Russian territory.

     

    The concluding statements emerging from the summit were typically vague. However, Vladimir Socor at the Jamestown Foundation has suggested that the official line was to avoid publicly naming particular projects for fear of offending Russia (although the Kremlin can hardly have doubted the topic of discussions). This explains the oblique reference to Azerbaijan and Turkmeniatan’s “common position on the policy of diversification of exports of energy resources to the world”, and President Gul’s ‘keen interest’ in energy collaboration. Similar rectitude with the name of Nabucco was observed during a recent oil and gas conference in Ashgabat.

     

    Such reluctance on the part of the Turkmen government was to be expected, however frustrating to Western energy pundits. The country’s secretive attitude towards its oil and gas wealth is a reflection of its isolationist political stance. It is highly unlikely that President Berdimuhammedov will be prepared to publicly back a project of Nabucco’s size without cast-iron guarantees on transit infrastructure, destination markets, and prices. However, the references to energy diversification and the role of the Caspian region’s energy potential as a bridge between Asia and Europe are extremely significant, signalling that, in principle at least, Turkmenistan is on board.

     

    Where would this leave Moscow ? Russia currently accounts for almost all of Turkmenistan ’s gas exports, and has been staging a rearguard action – or a determined offensive, depending on your viewpoint – against Nabucco for months. In November 2007 Gazprom struck a gas deal with Turkmenistan in which the Russian gas corporation would pay $130 per thousand cubic metres (tcm) in the first half of 2008, and $150tcm in the second half. This was a major rise from the 2007 level of $100, but it pales into significance next to the deal that Gazprom chief Alexei Miller made with Ashgabat in July. This would raise the price to around $350tcm: according to Mr Socor, once an expected rise in transit fees by other states is accounted for, Turkmenistan would still pocket between $225 and $295/tcm. An attractive offer. But President Berdimuhammedov remains unwilling to place all his eggs in one basket, however financially appealing, hence his moves towards Nabucco. It is not implausible that Gazprom will offer to pay even higher prices, since the July deal was already underpinned by political, rather than economic, motives. Pushing the price even higher would be a gamble for the Kremlin, already reeling from the financial crisis. In any case, even a price hike will not be enough to tempt Turkmenistan , provided that Nabucco’s other backers, principally the EU and Azerbaijan , remain committed. Azerbaijan has not yet given a positive response to Russia ’s offer to buy its whole gas at European prices, judging that such a Faustian pact would cost more in political terms than it would provide in economic terms. President Aliyev has insisted that, since Azerbaijan lacks the reserves to fill Nabucco alone, “this is not only our project”, implying that the West must apply pressure to Ashgabat instead of Baku .

     

    The EU is a different matter. The Union’s backing of Nabucco has been, like much of the EU’s policy towards the former Soviet Union , fitful and patchy. In mid-November President Berdimuhammedov made an unprecedented visit to Germany and Austria . As at the Turkmenbashi summit, no concrete plans were formally announced, but much noise was made about the chances for co-operation in the energy sector amongst others. Germany’s reputation as something of an apologist for Russia within the EU (certainly in the eyes of Britain and Scandinavia) makes these statements of intent rather interesting, suggesting that Berlin is willing to throw its weight behind Nabucco (the growing German support for Nabucco could also be linked to the ongoing difficulties with the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline from Russia to Germany). This probably reflects growing support for Nabucco amongst the Union as a whole. For instance, EU special representative to Central Asia Pierre Morel announced, after talks with President Berdimuhammedov on December 3, that the Union would take “concrete steps” towards including Turkmenistan in Nabucco (somewhat undermining the official veil of silence on the project in Ashgabat). It may take a dramatic event, such as an escalation of the current Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, to underline the urgent need for supply diversification and prod Europe into action.

     

    It would be unfair to characterise the EU as the only obstacle to Nabucco, however. Turkey has been surprisingly obstructive for a country so eager to portray itself as a regional energy hub. The prices it has offered for Azeri gas are unacceptably low for Baku , and it has also allegedly demanded 15% of the project’s supply to feed its own rising demand. In the light of Russia ’s ongoing offer to buy Azeri gas, this is a move that could conceivably backfire on Ankara . Although it will calculate – correctly – that Azerbaijan ’s commitment to Nabucco will force it into concessions regarding Turkish transit, this would sour relations at a time when Azerbaijan is already wary of Turkey ’s diplomatic overtures to Armenia .

     

    Energy analyst Andrew Neff has argued that planned gas links between Iran and Turkey will allow Ankara to use Iranian gas for domestic consumption and therefore allow Turkmen and Azeri gas to pass to Europe : the political complications with such an approach are obvious. This situation would create an uncomfortable scenario in which Europe was indirectly reliant on Tehran for the security of its gas security, since any cuts in supply to Turkey would draw off Azeri and Turkmen gas from the European route to feed Turkey ’s internal consumption.

     

    Nabucco still has a long way to go before becoming reality. Although there is a tendency to overstate the political, as opposed to economic, risks involved in any trans-national pipeline project, in this case the tendency seems justified. The problems with implementing Nabucco tap into a whole range of wider (geo)political issues – the EU’s relationship with Turkey , the future of the landlocked Central Asian states, Russia ’s role in Eurasia, and the isolation of Iran – of profound significance. One should not, therefore, underestimate the importance of the Turkmenbashi summit. Although it produced no clear victories for Nabucco, negotiating these obstacles will only be possible one small step at a time.

  • The US road through Turkey

    The US road through Turkey

    The two countries share strategic concerns. They should work more closely together.

    By The Monitor’s Editorial Board

    To celebrate Barack Obama’s election as the 44th US president, villagers in a remote province of Turkey sacrificed 44 sheep. It was a small gesture in a faraway land, but one with a big message: hope for a revived relationship.

    Polls show this NATO ally and Middle East powerhouse holds opinions of America that are among the lowest in the world. That’s mostly due to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and related issues. The incoming Obama administration would do well to repair ties with this secular Muslim democracy, and take greater advantage of Turkey’s role in a tense region where the countries’ interests overlap.

    To Turkey’s north lie authoritarian Russia and the Caucasus states, site of frozen and hot conflicts. To the east sit the energy-rich Caspian Sea basin, Iran and its nuclear program, and, beyond that, Afghanistan. Directly south are Iraq and Syria, two troubled states in the region.

    Ankara, the capital, has taken on the ambitious goal of “zero problems” on its borders and is trying to become a neighborhood troubleshooter. After Moscow rolled over Georgia in August, for instance, Ankara proposed a regional dialogue, but Georgia wasn’t interested in talking to the Russian bear that nearly swallowed it whole.

    Turkey has brought Syria and Israel together to negotiate over the Golan Heights. Last week, it hosted the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan for antiterrorism talks. It is at long last reaching out to Armenia – despite a controversial history over the 1915 massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. Now it’s offering to mediate between the US and Iran, and has been elected to a temporary seat on the UN Security Council – center stage for the Iran stalemate.

    Turkey has offered its land for an alternative gas pipeline network for Europe and the Middle East, has greatly increased trade with its neighbors, and is opening about a dozen embassies in Africa.

    Call this diplomatic and economic expansion “Ottoman Lite.”

    The US has much to gain from Turkey’s emerging role, including a region-altering breakthrough in talks between Israel and Syria that need a big push from a President Obama. And Turkey will be an important player as the US pulls out of Iraq. Ankara has faulted the US for not doing enough to halt attacks on Turkey from Kurdish terrorists in northern Iraq.

    Even if the two countries smooth over tensions, though, the road ahead will be as hilly as the Turkish capital.

    At US election time, Turkish television obsessed over the prospect of the new US Congress passing a resolution – with Mr. Obama’s blessing – that recognizes the Armenian massacres as genocide. Turkey staunchly denies the claim. Yet in focusing on this, Turkey makes the genocide controversy America’s problem, when it’s really Turkey’s to resolve. The obsession hints at other issues to work out, including human rights abuses.

    The US, on the other hand, must not expect Turkey to be the automatic ally of cold-war days. Russia has become its largest trading partner, and the Muslim party now in power feels a greater kinship with its Muslim brothers in the region.

    Turkey is attempting to balance its allegiance with the West with a new attentiveness to its neighbors. It is a tricky balance indeed, but one that can also benefit Washington.

  • Mumbai attacks put spotlight on Lashkar-e-Taiba

    Mumbai attacks put spotlight on Lashkar-e-Taiba

    The evidence pointing to the Pakistan-based group’s hand in the rampage in India’s financial hub raises the question of whether Pakistan’s elite spy agencies continue to nurture militant groups.
    By Laura King
    December 5, 2008 From

    Reporting from Islamabad, Pakistan — Lashkar-e-Taiba, the self-styled “Army of the Pure,” has left its footprints in the snows of Kashmir, the back alleys of Lahore and Karachi, the harsh terrain along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier — and now, investigators say, in Mumbai, India, the scene of last week’s horrific rampage by gunmen.

    The growing case against the Pakistan-based militant organization speaks directly to a doubt that has plagued U.S.-Pakistani relations since the two countries became allies after the Sept. 11 attacks: whether present or former officials in Pakistan’s powerful security establishment continue to nurture radical Islamic groups.

    Pakistan’s relatively weak civilian government, in power less than a year, has shown a degree of reluctance to forcefully confront militant groups or to assert control over the intelligence establishment — a pattern that could bode ill as fallout from the attacks on India’s financial capital poisons relations between the two nuclear-armed countries.

    Lashkar-e-Taiba’s alleged social wing, which gained prominence after Lashkar was officially banned in 2002, operates openly on a sprawling campus outside the eastern Pakistani city of Lahore. Its head, Hafiz Saeed, was one of the founders of Lashkar and is on a list of about 20 militant suspects India has demanded be handed over.

    Pakistan’s government vehemently denies involvement in the Mumbai attacks, which left more than 170 people dead and 300 injured, and U.S. officials say no formal links between the attackers and Pakistani officialdom have been found.

    However, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Pakistani officials during a visit Thursday that the evidence gathered so far by Indian and Western investigators against Pakistan-based militants was compelling enough that Islamabad should be acting on it.

    Successive Pakistani governments have tolerated and abetted Lashkar-e-Taiba, which for much of its two-decade history was used by Pakistan’s intelligence service as a proxy for fighting Indian rule in the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir.

    Pakistani officials insist that in recent years the country’s premier spy agency, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI, has been purged of militant sympathizers. But as recently as four months ago, U.S. intelligence officials alleged that the ISI aided militants who struck another Indian target, its embassy in the Afghan capital, Kabul.

    “You could argue that if you have 20 years of active sponsorship, it takes time for these linkages to disappear from the state apparatus,” said Ishtiaq Ahmad, a professor of international relations at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad.

    Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari assured Rice that he would take “strong action” against anyone in Pakistan found to have taken part in the Mumbai attacks. But the government has largely brushed aside investigators’ allegations — some gleaned from the confessions of the sole suspect captured, some from Western intelligence — that the assailants trained at Lashkar-e-Taiba camps in Pakistan, began their sea journey from the Pakistani port of Karachi and conferred with Pakistani handlers in the midst of the assault.

    Indian officials, who are being assisted in their investigation by Scotland Yard and the FBI, also say they believe two known Lashkar-e-Taiba commanders masterminded the attack. Pakistani politicians from across the spectrum say India is motivated in its allegations by the long standing enmity between the neighbors.

    Lashkar-e-Taiba has maintained an unbroken presence in Pakistan since about 1990 — sometimes operating clandestinely, and sometimes brazenly. Its most visible presence is through Jamaat ud-Dawa, the self-described political and religious movement that U.S. officials believe maintains active ties with Lashkar.

    On Thursday, Jamaat took journalists on a tour of its extensive complex in Muridke, outside Lahore. Followers showed off classrooms and dormitories, though they did not allow photos. They insisted that the group is an educational and charitable institution and nothing more. A spokesman, Abdullah Muntazir, told reporters that there was “no link” to Lashkar-e-Taiba.

    Saeed, speaking to Pakistan’s GEO television this week, declared that he was not involved in militant activity. But he has never disowned the Islamist beliefs he regularly espouses in fiery sermons.

    Pakistan has indicated that it will not comply with India’s demand to extradite the 63-year-old former professor.

    The investigation of the Mumbai attacks is complicated, analysts say, by the fact that much of Lashkar-e-Taiba’s operational capability has migrated from the Pakistan-controlled slice of Kashmir to the lawless tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan, where many of its camps and training centers are now believed to be.

    Tariq Naqash, a journalist in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani Kashmir, says the group has dramatically lowered its profile in the area.

    “You don’t hear their name these days,” said Naqash, who has written extensively about Lashkar-e-Taiba.

    Even the Jamaat, which provided extensive relief aid in Pakistani Kashmir after a devastating earthquake in 2005, largely disappeared from view after a dispute with locals last summer, Naqash said.

    Analysts say Lashkar began fragmenting, and to some extent reinventing itself, after Pakistan and India agreed to a Kashmir border truce in late 2003, which stemmed guerrilla infiltration of the Indian side. Feeling that the Kashmiri jihad had lost its momentum with Pakistani peace overtures to India, some adherents, while maintaining ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba, turned their attention to global jihad.

    “The tribal belt has attracted a lot of militants who were shunted out of their own organizations, or left in the cold, as they saw it,” said Talat Hussain, a prominent Pakistani television journalist.

    Many longtime observers of the group say that although the Mumbai attackers’ military prowess and pinpoint coordination are hallmarks of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group in all likelihood did not act alone. In recent years, evidence has emerged, according to current and former U.S. and allied counter-terrorism officials, that the group has been working more closely with Al Qaeda and other extremist groups.

    “In my opinion, this is an Al Qaeda-planned attack using local surrogates in order to relieve pressure on them in [the tribal areas],” said Ahmed Rashid, a Lahore-based author who writes about Pakistani militant groups. “What better way to do that than create a conflict between India and Pakistan?”

    The Kashmir struggle left Pakistani groups well-schooled for carrying out attacks like those in Mumbai, Rashid said.

    “They were well-versed in urban surveillance and urban terrorism — these are not Pashtun tribesmen and mullahs,” he said. “These were well-trained, sophisticated guys with 15 years of battle experience.”

    Indian investigators have said that the captured suspect told them that at least one former Pakistani military officer took part in training the gunmen — a credible scenario, in the view of some observers.

    “Some handlers of these organizations, intelligence officials, didn’t wear a uniform,” said Hassan Abbas, a former Pakistani law enforcement official who is a research fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center. “Even if they’ve been thrown out of their agency, their clients might not know; they meet in a small mountain town, and their clients don’t really know whether they are current or former ISI.”

    But even if the attack is tied indirectly to the ISI, the main thrust at the agency’s top levels appears to be to disassociate itself from militant activity, in an attempt to rehabilitate its tarnished image.

    “I’m not sure it’s become a moral organization overnight, but when you already have a ‘rogue agency’ label stuck on your forehead, you’re going to be busy trying to rip it off,” said Hussain, the TV journalist.

    “They are trying to curry favor with Washington and build an institutional linkage with them,” he said. “So the advantages of being associated with something like this are hugely outweighed by the disadvantages.”

    King is a Times staff writer.

    laura.king@latimes.com

    Special correspondent Anjum Herald Gill in Muridke contributed to this report.

  • Gul Hosts Karzai and Zardari for a Trilateral Summit in Istanbul

    Gul Hosts Karzai and Zardari for a Trilateral Summit in Istanbul

    Gul Hosts Karzai and Zardari for a Trilateral Summit in Istanbul

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 232
    December 5, 2008 02:19 PM Age: 3 hrs
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Turkey, Foreign Policy
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey is hosting another major international gathering, marking its growing profile in regional and international diplomacy. Turkish President Abdullah Gul has brought together Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari in a trilateral meeting being held in Istanbul on December 5 (www.cnnturk.com, December 5).

    This is the second such trilateral summit that Turkey has arranged. The presidents of Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan met for the first time on April 29 and 30, 2007, in Ankara. At that time the Pakistani and Afghan leaders issued the so-called Ankara Declaration, which underlined their intention to take concrete steps toward regional development and the fight against terrorism. Following the meeting, the parties agreed to form a joint working group to follow up on the conclusions of the summit and maintain the trilateral process (Stratejik Analiz, June 2007; www.asam.org.tr).

    Gul extended his invitation for a new meeting to his counterparts during the UN General Assembly in September 2008, and they accepted. After deliberations over the scheduling, the three heads of state finally decided to meet in Istanbul. The main items on the summit agenda are cooperation in security and the economy. The joint working group composed of senior-level officials met the day before to discuss the specific areas set in the first trilateral meeting. Given Turkey’s experience, the parties are expected to reach an agreement to train Afghan and Pakistani officers in Turkey’s anti-drug trafficking and anti-terrorism educational centers. The joint declaration prepared by the working group will be approved by the leaders and made public. Moreover, representatives of the business sector met within the framework of the Istanbul Forum founded by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) with it’s the equivalent bodies from Afghanistan and Pakistan (www.cankaya.gov.tr, December 3; www.cnnturk.com, December 5).

    The inclusion of the private sector and economic issues as a separate group reflects Turkey’s recent foreign policy philosophy that a comprehensive solution to political problems can be built on the foundations of strong economic cooperation.

    Some Turkish observers nonetheless criticize the fact that the real purpose of such a “trilateral” mechanism has never been clear, and the details of such talks have not been made public (ANKA, December 4). Several bilateral contacts undertaken as part of the wider event are significant. On the sidelines of the summit Karzai and Zardari are holding bilateral talks with each other, and each is meeting separately with Gul.

    By initiating this trilateral process, Turkey is seeking to increase trust between the two neighbors through high-level contacts, as well as build an infrastructure for cooperation (www.trt.net.tr, December 5). Turkey’s main asset is its positive bilateral relations with both neighbors and its relatively neutral position toward their bilateral problems. Turkey has traditionally considered Pakistan a sister nation and maintained close ties with Islamabad, despite the occasional changes in each country’s domestic politics. Turkey has had a similar relationship with Afghanistan. It has played an active role in international efforts to rebuild Afghanistan and has supported the central government since the U.S. invasion. Turkey has been part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since its inception.

    Moreover, as a Muslim country integrated into Western security architecture, Turkey is in a unique position to facilitate cooperation between these countries and the Western powers. Turkey’s new role from January 2009 as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council is likely to also augment its leverage in this area.

    Turkey’s bilateral meetings with Pakistan and Afghanistan further highlight its attempts to become involved in the current sensitive issues of South Asian diplomacy. Prime Minister Erdogan visited New Delhi in November (EDM, November 25). Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa was in Turkey on December 2 as Gul’s official guest, and several bilateral agreements were signed during his stay (www.cankaya.gov.tr, December 3).

    Turkey’s activism in the region is particularly welcome to Pakistan. Pakistani sources praised the contribution of past Turkish efforts in “removing misunderstandings and enabling the two countries [Pakistan and Afghanistan] to focus on collaborative measures for bringing stability to the region.” Pakistani foreign office officials also expect the trilateral meeting to contribute to progress and prosperity in the region (Associated Press of Pakistan, December 4; www.thearynews.com, December 4).

    Islamabad is also taking advantage of Turkish mediation in other countries. The United States and Afghanistan have criticized Islamabad for failing to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas. When U.S. missile strikes and American incursions into Pakistani territory raised tension in the region, Pakistan approached Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to use his county’s influence among NATO members and the United States to stop these military operations (www.dunyabulteni.net, November 3).

    After the deadly terror attacks in Mumbai severed relations between India and Pakistan, Erdogan and Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan engaged in extensive telephone diplomacy with Pakistani and Indian officials, contributing to worldwide efforts to ease tension between the two nuclear nations. At his Pakistani counterpart’s request, Erdogan spoke with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, calling on them to prevent tension between India and Pakistan from escalating. An additional asset here was Turkey’s good relations with India (Zaman, December 1).

    Turkey’s role in initiating this trilateral dialogue highlights its new role as a peace-broker in regional disputes. Turkey has successfully asserted itself as a mediator in the talks between Syria and Israel and between the Palestinians and Israel. It has proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and has offered its services to mediate in the Iranian nuclear issue. This new activism has earned Turkey applause. U.S. President George W. Bush recently called Gul to congratulate him for his country’s efforts in fostering cooperation between the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Turkey’s constructive role in Iraq (Anadolu Ajansi, December 4).

    https://jamestown.org/program/gul-hosts-karzai-and-zardari-for-a-trilateral-summit-in-istanbul/