Category: Turkey

DID PRESIDENT SARGSYAN BLAZE A TRAIL TO THE SEA VIA IRAN?

Haroutiun Khachatrian 4/15/09

Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s two-day visit to Iran produced a potential breakthrough deal that could ease Armenia’s economic isolation.

Sargsyan and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad signed eight agreements during the Armenian leader’s two-day stay in Tehran on April 13-14. Two of those pacts stand to give a big boost to Armenian foreign trade. The first provides a blueprint for the construction of a 470-kilometer railroad between the two countries and the second would lower Iranian trade barriers to Armenian exports.

At present, Armenia’s only viable overland routes to the outside world run through Georgia. That conduit has proven unreliable for Yerevan in recent years, though, given the long-running tension between Russia and Georgia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Turkey and Azerbaijan currently maintain an economic blockade against Armenia, and although there has been much talk lately of a re-opening of the Turkish-Armenian frontier, the normalization of Turkish-Armenian ties, as well as a political settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, do not appear imminent. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The proposed outlet to Iran would not bring immediate economic benefits to Armenia. Under terms of an agreement finalized April 15 by the transport ministers of Armenia and Iran, construction of the railway would take an estimated five years, and cost upwards of $1.8 billion. The first stage of the construction process involves a feasibility study, which is due to be completed by the end of the summer.

Almost seven-eighths of the railway would lie on Armenian territory, stretching from the northern city of Sevan to Meghri on the Iranian border. The question of financing evidently was not addressed during Sargsyan’s Iran visit.

In another potentially significant deal, the two countries agreed to cooperation on the construction of a hydropower station on the Arax River.

One political analyst, Garnik Asatrian, an Iranian studies expert at the Yerevan State University, characterized President Sargsyan’s visit as a “historic step” for Armenia. But other experts were more circumspect. The global economic downturn, they emphasized, makes it impossible to say whether promises made today can be fulfilled tomorrow. Alexander Iskandarian, the director of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan, pointed out that already some erstwhile financial heavyweights in the Caucasus, especially Russia, are now finding it difficult to come up with the cash to meet assistance obligations. “Some previously adopted programs are now short of money,” he told EurasiaNet.

Sevak Sarykhanan, an expert with the Noravank Foundation, a Yerevan-based think tank, suggested that the Iranian rail project is, in effect, an insurance policy for Yerevan. If the Turkish-Armenian border reopens in the near future, then Yerevan would have rail access to the Middle East and Gulf regions via the existing Gyumri-Kars rail link. In that case, the Sevan-Meghri-Iran rail route would not make financial sense.

Editor’s Note: Haroutiun Khachatrian is a freelance writer based in Yerevan.

April 16, 2009
EU Urges Turkey To Reopen Armenia Border

Georgia — Peter Semneby, EU’s special envoy to the South Caucasus, in Tbilisi, 08Sep2008

15.04.2009

A top European Union official urged EU aspirant Turkey to reopen its border with Armenia, piling pressure on Ankara to normalize ties with Yerevan after U.S. President Barack Obama made a similar call last week.

Peter Semneby, the EU’s special envoy for the South Caucasus, said normalizing Turkish-Armenian ties would benefit the region and would help Turkey’s hopes of joining the bloc.

“Fundamentally this would be a development that I think could lead to further positive developments that would in return benefit us, benefit the region and would therefore benefit Turkey and the European Union,” Semneby told a panel interview including Reuters late on Tuesday. “It (opening the border) will certainly not hurt Turkey’s EU perspectives,” he said.

Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 to lend support to its traditional Muslim ally Azerbaijan. Armenia and Turkey trace their own dispute to 90-year-old claims that Ottoman Turks committed genocide against Armenia in World War I.

Semneby said the EU is not putting pressure on Turkey to recognize the mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915 as genocide, a claim which Ankara strongly denies. “I can only talk on the behalf of the European Union, and there is absolutely no such pressure, absolutely not. This is not an issue of ours. We are not involved on that issue.”

Obama, in a visit to NATO ally Turkey earlier this month, also pressed Ankara and Yerevan to complete talks soon. But Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has said the deadlock over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, over which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war in the late 1980s and early 1990s, must be resolved before Turkey and Armenia strike a deal.

Azerbaijan, which sells gas and oil to Turkey, opposes its ally opening the border because such a deal could take away the incentive for Armenia to negotiate over Nagorno-Karabakh.

In a related development, the International Crisis Group (ICG) said on Tuesday that Turkey should open its borders and normalize relations with Armenia without waiting for a settlement to Armenia’s long dispute with Azerbaijan. “The politicized debate whether to recognize as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum” in the talks, the ICG said.

The ICG offers governments advice and policy proposals on how to bring an end to conflicts. Armenia has said that Turkish recognition of the genocide is not a precondition for opening diplomatic relations.

“The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia,” the report said. “Bilateral detente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate,” it said.

(Reuters)

April 15, 2009
War, Oil and Gas Pipelines: Turkey is Washington’s Geopolitical Pivot

by F. William Engdahl

Global Research, April 14, 2009

The recent visit of US President Obama to Turkey was far more significant than the President’s speech would suggest. For Washington Turkey today has become a geopolitical “pivot state” which is in the position to tilt the Eurasian power equation towards Washington or significantly away from it depending on how Turkey develops its ties with Moscow and its role regarding key energy pipelines.

If Ankara decides to collaborate more closely with Russia, Georgia’s position is precarious and Azerbaijan’s natural gas pipeline route to Europe, the so-called Nabucco Pipeline, is blocked. If it cooperates with the United States and manages to reach a stable treaty with Armenia under US auspices, the Russian position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe opens up, decreasing Russian leverage against Europe.

For Washington the key to bringing Germany into closer cooperation with the US is to weaken German dependence on Russian energy flows. Twice in the past three winters Washington has covertly incited its hand-picked President in Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko to arrange an arbitrary cut off of Russian gas flows to Germany and other EU destinations. The only purpose of the actions was to convince EU governments that Russia was not a reliable energy partner. Now, with the Obama visit to Ankara, Washington is attempting to win Turkish support for its troubled Nabucco alternative gas pipeline through Turkey from Azerbaijan which would theoretically at least lessen EU dependence on Russian gas.

The Turkish-EU problem

However willing Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan might be to accommodate Obama, the question of Turkish relations with the EU is inextricably linked with the troublesome issue of Turkish membership to the EU, a move vehemently opposed by France and also less openly by Germany.

Turkey is one of the only routes energy from new sources can cross to Europe from the Middle East, Central Asia or the Caucasus. If Turkey — which has considerable influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine, the Middle East and the Balkans — is prepared to ally with the United States, Russia is on the defensive and German ties to Russia weaken considerably. If Turkey decides to cooperate with Russia instead, Russia retains the initiative and Germany is dependent on Russian energy. Since it became clear in Moscow that US strategy was to extend NATO to Russia’s front door via Ukraine and Georgia, Russia has moved to use its economic “carrot” its vast natural gas resources, to at the very least neutralize Western Europe, especially Germany, towards Russia. It is notable in that regard that the man chosen as Russia’s President in December 1999 had spent a significant part of his KGB career in Germany.

Turkey and the US Game

It is becoming clear that Obama and Washington are playing a deeper game. A few weeks before the meetings, when it had become obvious that the Europeans were not going to bend on the issues such as troops for Afghanistan or more economic stimulus that concerned the United States, Obama scheduled the trip to Turkey.

During the recent EU meetings in Prague Obama actively backed Turkey’s application for EU membership knowing well that that put especially France and Germany in a difficult position as EU membership would allow free migration which many EU countries fear. Obama deliberately confronted EU states with this knowing he was playing with geopolitical fire, especially as the US is no member of the EU. It was a deliberate and cheap way to score points with the Erdogan government of Turkey.

During the NATO meeting, a key item on the agenda was the selection of a new alliance secretary-general. The favorite was former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Turkey opposed him because of his defense of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish magazine. NATO operates on consensus, so any one member can block Rasmussen. The Turks backed off the veto, and in return won two key positions in NATO, including that of deputy secretary-general.

Turkey

thereby boosted its standing in NATO, got Obama to vigorously defend the Turkish application for membership in the European Union, which of course the United States does not belong to. Obama then went to Turkey for a key international meeting that will allow him to further position the United States in relation to Islam.

Obama has a Grand Strategy to use Turkey to isolate Russia via Nabucco pipelines through Georgia and Armenia to the EU

The Obama Erdogan talks were perhaps the most strategic of the recent Obama tour

During US-Russian talks there had been no fundamental shift by Obama from the earlier position of the Bush Administration. Russia rejects Washington’s idea of pressuring IUran on their nuclear program in return for a bargain of an undefined nature with Washington over US planned missile and radar bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. The US claimed it need not rely on Russia to bring military and other supplies into Afghanistan, claiming it had reached agreement with Ukraine to transship mililtary supplies, a move designed by Washington to increase friction between Moscow and Kiew. Moreover, the NATO communique did not abandon the idea of Ukraine and Georgia being admitted to NATO. The key geopolitical prize for Washington remains Moscow but clearly Turkey is being wooed by Obama to play a role in that game.

Germany will clearly not join Obama in blocking Russia. Not only does Germany depend on Russia for energy supplies. She has no desire to confront a Russia that Berlin sees as no real immediate threat to Germany. For Berlin, at least now, they are not going to address the Russian question.

At the same time, an extremely important event between Turkey and Armenia is shaping up. Armenians had long held Turkey responsible for the mass murder of Armenians during and after World War I, a charge the Turks have denied. The US Congress is considering a provocative resolution condeming “Turkish genocide” agianst Armenians. Turkey is highly sensitive to these charges, and Congressional passage of such a resolution would have meant a Turkish break in diplomatic relations with Washington. Now since the Obama visit Ankara has begun to discuss an agreement with Armenia including diplomatic relations which would eliminate the impact of any potential US Congress resolution.

A Turkish opening to Armenia would alter the balance of power in the entire region. Since the August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict the Caucasus, a strategically vital area to Moscow has been unstable. Russian troops remain in South Ossetia. Russia also has troops in Armenia meaning Russia has Georgia surrounded.

Turkey is the key link in this complex game of geopolitical balance of power between Washington and Moscow. If Turkey decides to collaborate with Russia Georgia’s position becomes very insecure and Azerbaijan’s possible pipeline route to Europe is blocked. If Turkey decides to cooperate with Washington and at the same time reaches a stable agreement with Armenia under US guidance, Russia’s entire position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe becomes available, reducing Russian leverage against Western Europe.

Therefore, having sat through fruitless meetings with the Europeans, Obama chose not to cause a pointless confrontation with a Europe that is out of options. Instead, Obama completed his trip by going to Turkey to discuss what the treaty with Armenia means and to try to convince the Turks to play for high stakes by challenging Russia in the Caucasus, rather than playing Russia’s junior partner.

The most important Obama speech in his European tour came after Turkey won key posts in the NATO political structure with US backing. In his speech Obama sided with Turkey against the EU and in effect showed Turkey Washington was behind her. Obama’s speech addressed Turkey as an emerging regional power, which was well received in Ankara. The sweet words will cost Turkey dearly if it acts on them.

Moscow is not sitting passively by as Washington woos Turkey. Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid a four-day visit to the Russian Federation this February, where he met with President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin, and also traveled to Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, where he discussed joint investments. Gul was accompanied by his minister for foreign trade and minister of energy, as well as a large delegation of Turkish businessmen. The stakes in this complex three-way Great Game for domination of Eurasia have been raised significantly following the Obama trip to Ankara. Turkey imports 65 percent of its natural gas and 25 percent of its oil from Russia. Therefore, Turkey is also developing a growing dependency on Russian energy resources, including coal.

On March 27, 2009, a memorandum was signed between the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR and Russia’s Gazprom. The memorandum includes a statement of deliveries, beginning in January 2010, of Azerbaijani natural gas to Russia.

Gazprom was particularly interested in signing such an agreement with Azerbaijan, not the least because Azerbaijan is the only state outside Iran or Turkmenistan, both of which are problematic, that could supply gas to the planned EU Nabucco pipeline, for transporting natural gas from Azerbaijan and the Central Asia states through Turkey to south-eastern Europe. In reality, gas may come only from Azerbaijan. Russia has proposed an alternative to Nabucco project, South Stream, also in need of Azerbaijani gas, so in effect Russia weakens the chances of realization of Nabucco. Obama strategy is clearly not less confrontational with Russia. It is merely playing with a slightly different deck of cards than did Cheney and Bush.

F. William Engdahl is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

https://www.globalresearch.ca/war-oil-and-gas-pipelines-turkey-is-washington-s-geopolitical-pivot/13171

The Russian Dimension

April 15, 2009
Turkish-Israeli Relations

A briefing by Soner Cagaptay
April 3, 2009

Multimedia for this item

Audio Recording

Soner Cagaptay is director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an expert on Turkish-Israeli relations. He earned his Ph.D. from Yale, taught at Princeton, and contributes regularly to leading news outlets. On April 9, Mr. Cagaptay addressed the Middle East Forum via conference call.

To illustrate how Turkey has changed under AK Party rule (the “Justice and Development” party), Soner Cagaptay highlighted the fact that, before the AKP came to power in 2002 elections, Turkey “worked as a normal country,” exhibiting qualities more in line with non-Muslim, secular nations.

For example, pre-AKP Turkey fostered a positive public relationship with Israel, exemplified by strong economic, intellectual, and even military ties. Moreover, Turkey was an important contributor to NATO, having participated in every NATO operation since joining the alliance in 1952. Finally, it exhibited a markedly pro-Western outlook and was being seriously considered for EU membership.

Soner Cagaptay

All three qualities have eroded under AKP leadership. EU accession talks have stalled as liberal democratic values are being undermined in Turkey. Media freedom and gender equality have suffered; there are now fewer women in public life. Turkey refused to allow U.S. troops to enter Iraq from the north in 2003 and is now cultivating links with Iran.

Nowhere has this transformation been more pronounced than in Turkey’s relationship with Israel. Prime Minster Erdoğan and his party have promoted anti-Semitism and hatred of Israel at home, suggesting that “God would punish Israel” and accusing it of having turned Gaza into a “concentration camp.” Turkey’s antagonism came to a head at the Davos meeting earlier this year when Erdoğan told Israeli President Peres, “You know very well how to kill people.”

Yet not all killing upsets Turkey. The day after returning from Davos, Erdoğan hosted the vice president of Sudan, who is currently wanted by the International Criminal court for waging a genocide against the non-Arab Muslim population. Cagaptay believes this is the “best proof that Erdoğan’s thinking and foreign policy is Islamist. Turkey’s opposition to Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen’s nomination to head NATO due to his defending the publication of the Muhammad cartoons is also telling.

Cagaptay fears that continued AKP influence will turn Turkish citizens against Israel and the West. This is a problem because Turkey is a democracy and “you cannot sustain a relationship that is not supported by the public.” Furthermore, as the AKP views world conflicts in terms of Muslims versus non-Muslims, its place within NATO could deteriorate further as the alliance launches new offensives in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

However, Cagaptay sees reasons for optimism. The AKP fared poorly in recent local elections and the economic downturn is bound to have a negative impact on its prospects. As professionals abandon the AKP, it will be left with an Islamist core, allowing outsiders more easily to identify it for what it is. Thus Erdoğan’s Davos outburst was a “blessing in disguise.”

Cagaptay counsels the Obama administration to define Turkey as a Western country that happens to be Muslim, thereby setting clear benchmarks for Turkish behavior both internally and on the world stage. Furthermore, America must not alienate ordinary Turks by passing resolutions condemning the Armenian genocide, a wildly unpopular topic in Turkey.

According to Cagaptay, the most important lesson from the Turkish experience over the past decade is: “Do not allow Islamist rule because they corrupt even the most liberal of Muslim societies.”

This is a lesson that many Palestinians may have come to learn the hard way.

Summary account by David Rusin and Raymond Ibrahim.

https://www.meforum.org/2117/turkish-israeli-relations

April 15, 2009
Global Commitments vs. Regional Balances

Deglobalizing U.S. military commitments will require the “civilianization” of defense policy.

Judah Grunstein | Bio | 09 Apr 2009
WPR Blog

More smart stuff from Sam Roggeveen, who points out that alert is not the same thing as alarmed, but nevertheless admits to a case of nerves:

The thing to remember is that China does not have to match the U.S. in global capability terms for U.S. allies in the Pacific to start getting nervous about the strategic balance. All China has to do is be a credible competitor in the region, and that is already the case.

Roggeveen goes on to argue that “. . . we have already passed the point at which the U.S. could militarily intervene in a Taiwan conflict at acceptable risk,” and that the coming years/decades will witness an inexorable expansion of that perimeter.

Click through to see what he’s got to say about whether the budget priorities as signaled by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, compared to the alternatives, are a good thing or not for Australia. You might be surprised.

The broader point here is that while the “American unipolar moment” might be drawing to a close, we’re still the only country that is forced to calculate in terms of global, as opposed to regional, military capability. That reflects the magnitude of our power, influence and interests. But while an advantage in a scenario of geologic resource scarcity, it becomes potentially problematic in a scenario of political resource scarcity and a distinct disadvantage in times of financial resource scarcity.

This reinforces the need for scaling down our commitments by involving regional powers more prominently in advancing our foreign policy objectives, what I call Middle Power Mojo™. France and Turkey were my illustrative examples before they both started acting out. But part of the initial concept was the idea of identifying regional players that have got their mojo working, so that’s inevitably going to evolve with time.

Perhaps most significantly, this provides a political context for U.S. defense policy. The limitations of discussing the U.S. defense budget without the context of a strategic vision have been pointed out elsewhere. But so far, that’s mainly been shorthand for, “Wait until the Quadrennial Defense Review comes out next year,” and reinforces the militarization of foreign policy. Deglobalizing America’s defense commitments, on the other hand, will require filling gaps with both friendly capability and stable regional security architectures. And that’s more of a long-term interagency project that will “civilianize” defense policy.

Source: www.worldpoliticsreview.com, 09 Apr 2009

April 14, 2009
Turkey’s ruling party rejects Azerbaijani MPs’ invitation

Baku. Ramil Mammadli – APA. The names of the Turkish parliamentarians, who will attend the international conference on the state of relations between the countries with participation of Azerbaijani and Turkish parliamentarians, are known, chairman of Motherland Party Fazail Agamali told APA.

He said that the representatives of Turkey’s ruling party will not attend the conference in Azerbaijani parliament on April 15. The members of Justice and Development Party (AKP) refused to attend the conference. The Turkish delegation includes: Yilmaz Atesh, Shukru Elekdag, Shahin Mengu from Republican People’s Party (CHP), Atilla Kaya and Turan Chirkin from Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Fazail Agamali said along with five parties organizing the meeting, other parties represented in the parliament, including New Azerbaijan Party and Musavat Party will also be invited to the conference. He said Turkish parliamentarians attending the conference will meet with speaker Ogtay Asadov and other officials.

Heads of Motherland Party, Citizen Solidarity Party, United Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, Great Establishment Party and Justice Party initiated to hold the conference.

April 13, 2009