Category: Turkey

  • Most Turkish people are positive about the future

    Most Turkish people are positive about the future

    bayrak-kalpANKARA – Research carried out by the Turkish Statistic Institute, or TurkStat, has shown that in Turkey every 60 people in 100 have a positive outlook on their future. Results highlight that the higher the level of education and household income level, the more content and confident people are about their future.

    The research project titled “Living Satisfaction” has shown that men, women, rich and poor alike generally adopt a positive approach in regard to their future. The results state that 73.9 percent of men and 66.5 percent of women in the higher education bracket are hopeful about their future. Moreover, 77.7 percent of households with a minimum monthly income of 2,501 Turkish Liras are also positive about their future. The research that was carried out in 2008 by TurkStat found that of the 60.4 percent of people who said they have a positive outlook, 4.5 percent said they would have a bright and secure future.

    The percentage of women who take a negative outlook toward their future is considerably higher than men who feel the same. Twenty-six percent of women are negative about their future, compared to 8.6 percent of men. The research shows that people that have completed secondary education are more ambitious and have an idea of what they want to make of their future.

    Source:  www.hurriyet.com.tr, june 27 2009

  • BOSTON TEA—RR—COFFEE PARTY… TURKISH COFFEE, THAT IS

    BOSTON TEA—RR—COFFEE PARTY… TURKISH COFFEE, THAT IS

    Attorney at Law, Harvey A. Silverglate of Cambridge and Boston, Massachusetts, has issued the following statement on Jun 11, 2009 after Judge Mark Wolf of the federal district court in Boston dismissed, on technical grounds, the complaint filed by a number of Massachusetts high school teachers and students, along with the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, seeking to reverse the censorship of the state-issued curricular guide that currently contains a one-sided selection, produced by political pressure, of historical materials on the question of whether the violent events during the World War One era in the fading Ottoman Empire constituted a genocide:

    “ The Supreme Court and the various courts of appeals have in a number of opinions asserted that it is a violation of the First Amendment for public officials to remove books from a library simply because pressure groups have agitated for removal of politically incorrect or ideologically controversial points of view. Judge Mark Wolf of the federal district court in Boston has ruled against our clients – public school teachers and students – on the mistaken assumption that theMassachusetts Curricular Guide is more like a classroom textbook than like a school library. That is clearly wrong. The Massachusetts Department of Education provided the materials contained in the Curricular Guide in order to give teachers a wide variety of supplemental instructional materials from which they could choose – or decline to choose – resources to use in their classrooms. This is precisely the role that a school library performs. The judge missed this point because he failed to see that, in the 21st century, school libraries are on-line, not necessarily on book shelves. The electronic nature of these supplemental instructional materials does not change the fact that they are more like library books than like classroom curricula. The Curricular Guide is in effect a school library in cyberspace.

    We believe that the Court of Appeals will reverse Judge Wolf’s order because that order is stuck in an earlier century. The on-line nature of the materials do not condemn them to less constitutional protection than the books in a library have traditionally been accorded. We will seek the support of a variety of civil liberties and educational organizations in seeking to reverse this overly narrow view of how the First Amendment applies to speech in the current century. This case is not about whether the historical events involved are correctly or incorrectly characterized as a “genocide.” That is a subject for scholars and educators, not politicians and pressure groups, to decide. This case is about censorship, pure and simple, at the hands of special-interest pressure groups that do not want both sides of the debate to be aired. The school teachers and students who are plaintiffs in this case will be making a decision over the next few days as to how to proceed. An appeal is likely. “
    Despite this written statement, when Harvey A. Silverglate was still misquoted, or quoted out of context, he had this to say about it:

    “… I’m afraid that the Boston Globe reporter reported part of what I said, but not enough of what I said to put it into proper context. It is, in fact, undeniable that many Armenians died at the hands of the Turks, and that many Turks died at the hands of the Armenians. It was a war situation (World War One). The Armenian population within the Empire took the side of the Empire’s war enemy. The question debated is whether there was or was not a genocide. The most authoritative and fair account I know of is Guenter Lewy’s book, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (University of Utah Press, 2005)… I’ve given it to some reporters, but I doubt any have read it. The Globe statement is unbalanced; I pointed out that the killing went in both directions; it was wartime. It may have been the reporter. It may have been his editor. I don’t write the stories. I did send a written statement … and my written statement contains no such slanted statements, as you can see.”
    In another communication, Harvey A. Silverglate made it clear that this case was about censorship. He wrote, if scholarly opposing views are included initially in the curriculum on their academic merits and later on removed upon Armenian pressure, that is censorship. Here are his exact words: “… if (contra-genocide) materials are initially included on their educational merits, removal under pressure is not lawful…”
    Can any reasonable, dispassionate, and fair person disagree with attorney Harvey A. Silverglate?

    And here is my take on all this:

    Firstly, I thank Harvey A. Silverglate, the plaintiff in the censorship case described above, for his principled stand against the aggressive, irrational, and fanatic Armenian lobby, on the manner in which the controversial Turkish-Armenian conflict should be taught in Massachusetts high schools. Silverglate wants all relevant views, facts, and figures included, without attempting to censor—just to appease some nagging Armenian pressure groups—those responsible, opposing views and scholarly counter arguments.

    Secondly, one should be aware that this case is not about whether or not a genocide took place, but how a controversial subject, such as the Turkish-Armenian conflict, should be taught to our sons and daughters in high schools.

    In view of the facts that Armenian terrorism claimed four innocent Turkish lives in America alone, including one in Boston—Orhan Gunduz, a Turkish-American businessman, assassinated by Armenian terrorists on 5 April 1982—not to mention hundreds of bombings, bomb threats, assaults and batteries, acts of intimidation and harassment, death threats and others directed at those who challenge the Armenian version of history nationwide, indeed worldwide, I must applaud Silverglate for his spirited fight and truly grand vision.

    Finally, realizing the irony that the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (i.e. Protestant Missionaries, since 1810,) Armenian Revolutionary Federation World Headquarters (ARF,) and the Boston Globe newspaper (1876,) all with deep-routed and slef-documented anti-Muslim, and anti-Turkish prejudices are located in Boston, Silverglate’s mission becomes all the more significant, courageous, and even revolutionary.

    What’s a more brilliant tribute to Boston, the city of that revolutionary tea party of 1773, than a (Turkish) coffee party of 2009, as in the lawsuit challenging the bias, bigotry, and taboos in American education, media, and politics.

    This was round one. Everyone is already on notice that hate-inspired groups (Armenian or others) can no longer dictate that their one-way propaganda material be taught as settled history to our impressionable, young sons and daughters. We, Americans of Turkish descent, simply shall not allow it. We shall fight it in courts, in academia, in media, in politics, and wherever there is anti-Turkish bias and bigotry. Just like anti-Semitism is quickly identified, condemned, litigated, and punished, all within the confines of the law, so shall be anti-Turkism. Next time you say genocide, you’d better be prepared to prove it with a court order, just like Nuremberg’s, otherwise you might be served one.

    Even if the Turkish government comes to some sort of agreement with Armenia, and even opens borders with Armenia one day, we shall resist any such agreement if our history, culture, and/or heritage are disfigured, distorted, or even so much as disrespected in the slightest manner, under that nagging, deceptive, and hateful Armenian pressure.

    Any history that does not address the six T’s of the Turkish-Armenian conflict [i.e. tumult (rebellions), terrorism, treason, territorial demands, the Turkish victims of Armenian war crimes (caused by the first four T’s) and, finally, TERESET (temporary resettlement order of May 30, 1915) triggered as a response to the first five T’s but not genocide] shall be challenged down to its last comma and period.

    Period!

    Ergun Kirlikovali
    www.ethocide.com

  • Turkey Bets on Regional Influence as EU Hopes Fade

    Turkey Bets on Regional Influence as EU Hopes Fade

    By Hans-Jürgen Schlamp, Daniel Steinvorth and Bernhard Zand

    spiegelFrustrated by European opposition to its EU membership bid, Turkey is looking instead to its eastern and southern neighbors in a bid to flex its regional muscles. But will courting the Arab street actually bring Ankara any benefits?

    At the Sütlüce Cultural and Congress Center on the Golden Horn in Istanbul, experts and officials from around the world have come together to talk about water. The thousands attending the event include water experts, presidents and ministers, and they are here to talk about the Euphrates, the Nile and the Tigris, about major dams and about the privatization of entire rivers. One of mankind’s future problems is being debated, and it is the Turks who are hosting the event. A coincidence?

    Ankara, the Ataturk Mausoleum: Two men pay their respects to the founder of the Turkish republic, one wearing a brown robe with a sheepskin cap, the other wearing a suit. They have many problems in common, chief among them the fact that they are both leaders of states on the brink. The two men are Pakistani Prime Minister Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Turkish President Abdullah Gül, of all people, has brought them together. A coincidence?

    In Ankara, US President Barack Obama is addressing the Turkish parliament. He has nothing but good things to say about Ataturk and his political heirs, the government’s reforms and Turkey’s geopolitical importance — precisely the sorts of things for which the country, desperate for recognition, has been waiting so long. Ankara, of all places, is the last stop on Obama’s first trip abroad as president. This, at least, is no coincidence.

    Presidents and militia leaders, diplomats, military chiefs of staff and the heads of intelligence services from the Middle East are choosing the city on the Bosporus as a meeting place, and economic delegations are visiting Turkey. Even Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant, chooses to visit Ankara, because he knows that he will not get a lecture there.

    The Turks, who always used to complain to their Western allies about their rough neighborhood, apparently no longer have any enemies in the east. Turkey’s old rival Russia has since become its most important energy and trading partner. Syria and Iraq, two countries with which Ankara has in the past been on the brink of war, are now friends of Turkey, and relations are even improving with Armenia. The Arabs, who never truly took to the successors of the Ottomans, now look with admiration to what they call the “Turkish model,” a dynamic, open country that has a better handle on its problems than they do. But what caused the transformation?

    Europe is to blame. When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan assumed office in 2003, he planned to lead Turkey into the European Union. But Europe was unmoved by this vision, and it has also lost much of its appeal within Turkey. According to Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a think tank linked to the center-left Social Democratic Party, as the Europeans have become weary of expansion, Turkey has lost interest in joining the EU. Indeed, what Erdogan meant when he spoke of Turkey’s “alternative” to becoming an EU member is becoming increasingly clear.

    Critics and supporters alike describe this new course as “neo-Ottomanism.” Ankara remains formally committed to its European ambitions. However, frustrated by the open rejection with which it has long been met in Paris, Vienna and Berlin, and which it has been facing once again during the EU election campaign, Turkey is focusing increasingly on its role as a peacekeeping power in a region it either ruled or dominated for centuries.

    Turkey’s change of course raises fundamental questions for Europe. Is it a good thing or a bad thing for Turkey to be looking more to the south and east than to the west these days? Does this shift speak in favor of or against the eternal EU candidate? And wouldn’t the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy be a welcome excuse to conveniently bury the unpopular project of Turkish EU membership for good?

    The architect of Turkey’s new foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoglu, 50, would certainly disagree. Davutoglu is a short man with a moustache who is a professor of political science and, since the beginning of May, the country’s new foreign minister. He has not yet broken with the West: Only recently, he told his counterparts in Brussels that his country would be “not a burden but a boon for Europe.”

    But Davutoglu, the author of the remarkable book “Stratejik Derinlik” (“Strategic Depth”), in which he discusses “multidimensional policy” at length, follows a different compass than his predecessors, most of whom were the sons of civil servants from Ankara and western Turkey, drilled in Kemalist ideology and focused entirely on Nato, Europe and the United States.

    Davutoglu, like President Gül, is from Central Anatolia and a member of a new elite influenced by Islamic thought. He completed his secondary-school education at a German overseas school, learned Arabic and taught at an Islamic university in Malaysia. He believes that a one-sided Western orientation is unhealthy for a country like Turkey.

    Davutoglu is convinced that Ankara must be on good terms with all its neighbors, and it cannot fear contact with the countries and organizations branded as pariahs by the West, namely Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. He believes that Turkey should have no qualms about acknowledging its Ottoman past — in other words, it should become a respected regional power throughout the territory once ruled by the Ottoman Empire (see graphic).

    The Turkish press touts Davutoglu as “Turkey’s Kissinger,” and even Erdogan and Gül refer to him as “hoca” (“venerable teacher”). The country’s foreign policy increasingly bears his signature. For example, at his suggestion, Turkish diplomats revived talks between Syria and Israel that had been discontinued in 2000, leading to secret peace talks that began in Istanbul in 2004. However, the talks were temporarily suspended in late 2008 because of parliamentary elections in Israel and the Gaza offensive.

    The Turks say that they achieved more during the Gaza conflict than Middle East veterans like Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, arguing that Hamas’s willingness to accept Israel’s ceasefire offer was attributable to Ankara’s intervention. They also say that the fact that Erdogan angrily broke off a discussion with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Summit in Davos cemented his reputation in the Islamic world as a friend of the Palestinians. When street fighting erupted in Lebanon between supporters of the pro-Western government and of Hezbollah in May 2008, Erdogan intervened as a mediator.

    Ankara is also seeking to reduce tensions in the Caucasus region, where the Turks have often acted against Russia, prompting Moscow to accuse Turkey of being sympathetic to the Chechen cause. After the war in Georgia last summer, the Erdogan government brought together officials from Tbilisi and Moscow. Turkey and Armenia are now seeking to overcome long-standing hostility by establishing diplomatic relations and reopening their shared border.

    Off the Horn of Africa, the US Fifth Fleet turned over the leadership of Combined Task Force 151, which is responsible for combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, to the Turkish navy. At the same time, a man paid an official visit to Ankara who had not appeared in public since 2007: Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, the head of the notorious Mahdi Army militia. Davutoglu had sent a private jet to bring him to Turkey from his exile in Iran.

    Compared with the cool treatment Turkey gave its southern and eastern neighbors for decades, this is a stunning about-face. But not everyone approves. Critics like political scientist Soner Cagaptay describe Ankara’s foreign policy as “pro-Arab Islamist.” In a recent op-ed for the Turkish daily Hurriyet, Cagaptay argued that Turkish diplomats, who had once “looked to Europe, particularly France, for political inspiration” have now fallen for the Arab world, and generally for Islamists — in other words, for Hamas instead of secular Fatah, or Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood instead of the government in Cairo. “However, being popular on the Arab street is not necessarily an asset for Turkey, since in autocracies popularity on the street does not translate into soft power in the capitals,” Cagaptay argues.

    Diplomats like Hakki Akil, the Turkish ambassador in Abu Dhabi, disagree. According to Akil, Turkey has acquired “soft power” by expanding its sphere of influence from the Balkans to Afghanistan, transporting Russian, Caspian Sea and Iranian oil and gas to the West, and building housing and airports in Kurdish northern Iraq. Europe, says Akil, ought to be pleased with Ankara’s course. As Akil’s boss Davutoglu said in Brussels, political stability, a secure energy corridor and a strong partner on its southeastern flank are all “in the fundamental interest of the EU.”

    In truth, everyone involved knows that Turkey doesn’t stand a chance of becoming a full member of the European club in the foreseeable future — and probably never will. Of course, no one in Brussels is willing or able to admit this. The EU stands by the accession negotiations without limitations, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso repeats on a regular basis.

    But these very negotiations are hardly moving forward. According to a recent internal European Commission report, Turkey has made “only limited progress.” Some EU countries have already abandoned the idea of accepting Turkey into their midst. In Bavaria, conservative Christian Social Union campaigners promote a message of “No to Turkey” as they make the rounds of beer tents. At a televised campaign appearance in Berlin, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy made their opposition to EU membership for Turkey clear.

    Ironically, Turkey’s strategic importance for Europe “is even greater today than in the days of the Cold War,” says Elmar Brok, a German member of the European Parliament for the conservative Christian Democratic Union who specializes in foreign policy issues. And then there is the paradox of the fact that the more intensively Turkey, out of frustration with Europe, engages with its eastern neighbors, the more valuable it becomes to the West. According to Brok, the West must “do everything possible to keep Ankara on board.”

    Brok and other members of the European Parliament envision making so-called “privileged partner” status palatable to Turkey. It would enable Turkey to have a similar relationship to the EU as Norway does today and to enjoy many of the benefits of EU membership, including access to the European single market, visa-free travel, police cooperation and joint research programs. But it would not, however, become a member.

    Source:georgiandaily.com, JUNE 04, 2009

  • Sarkozy and Obama continue to disagree over Turkey

    Sarkozy and Obama continue to disagree over Turkey

    ELITSA VUCHEVA

    US president Barack Obama’s visit to France on Saturday (6 June) to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the D-Day landings in Normandy saw a convergence of opinion with his French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy on several international policy issues, except Turkey’s EU aspirations.

    Following a private talk on the margins of the ceremony, both politicians said they agreed on opening a dialogue with Iran, but were strongly critical of Tehran’s refusal to suspend its nuclear programme. They also judged North Korea’s recent tests in that respect “extraordinarily provocative.”

    They expressed similar sentiment on the Middle East as well, saying that a two-state solution was needed in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

    “Perhaps never in the history of our countries have the United States and France been that close on the big dossiers and on the big topics,” Mr Sarkozy said at a joint press conference after the meeting.

    But when it comes to Turkey’s EU membership bid, Washington and Paris remained poles apart. While Mr Obama believes Ankara should join the EU, Mr Sarkozy remains firmly against the idea.

    “I’ve said publicly that I think Turkish membership of the EU would be important,” Mr Obama said.

    “What the US wants to do is just to encourage talks and discussions where Turkey can feel confident that it has a friendship with France, with the United States, with all of Europe and to the extent that it defines itself that it has an opportunity to be a part of that,” he added.

    For his part, Mr Sarkozy said he agreed on the general principle of having strong and friendly relations with Turkey, as well as of having the country as “a bridge between East and West.” But he reiterated his opposition to letting Ankara enter the EU as a full member.

    “I told President Obama that it’s very important for Europe to have borders. For me Europe is a stabilising element in the world that I cannot allow to be destroyed,” the French president said.

    EU candidate Turkey opened membership talks with the bloc four years ago, but they have been progressing only slowly, with just 10 of the 35 chapters of its negotiations package having been opened so far.

    ‘A tight schedule’

    While Mr Sarkozy has been preparing for the meeting for months, French media pointed out that it turned out to be much shorter than he hoped, with Mr Obama preferring to spend time in Paris with his family and at the American ambassador’s residence, rather than accepting an invitation for a meeting with Mr Sarkozy at the Elysee presidential palace.

    “Can one stay in the capital of an allied country without saying hello to your neighbour?” daily Le Figaro asked Saturday, referring to the fact that the American ambassador’s residence is just metres away from the Elysee.

    Mr Obama, who was visiting the Notre-Dame Cathedral with his wife and two daughters on Saturday evening, did “the minimum service” with regards to meeting Mr Sarkozy, writes Le Parisien.

    The paper adds that on top of that, Mr Obama’s team had tried to arrange a meeting with Jacques Chirac, Mr Sarkozy’s predecessor. Mr Sarkozy and Mr Chirac’ dislike for one other is well-known.

    Asked at Saturday’s press conference why he had made his visit that short, Mr Obama said he had only allocated four hours to Mr Sarkozy because he had “a tight schedule.”

    “I think it’s important to understand that good friends don’t worry about the symbols and the conventions and the protocols,” he said.

    “I would love nothing more than to have a leisurely week in Paris, stroll down the Seine, take my wife out to a nice meal, have a picnic. Those days are over, for the moment,” he added.

    For his part, Mr Sarkozy denied being frustrated by the affair.

    “We’re not here, watch in hand, saying, ‘How much time did you spend with so-and-so?’ ” he said at the press conference.

    “I understand that you should put the question, but frankly, do you think people are just waiting to see us hand-in-hand sitting here looking into one another’s eyes? Of course not.”

    Mr Obama will leave France on Sunday, but his wife Michelle and his daughters, who will be staying a day longer, will have lunch with Mr Sarkozy and his wife Carla in the Elysee palace.

    Source: https://euobserver.com/eu-political/28255

  • FRANCE’S SARKOZY APPOINTS TURKEY BACKER TO CABINET

    FRANCE’S SARKOZY APPOINTS TURKEY BACKER TO CABINET

    sarkozy_israeli_tuneFrench President Nicolas Sarkozy yesterday appointed Pierre Lellouche, a deputy known for backing Turkey’s European Union accession, as secretary of state for European affairs.

    /Star/

    Turkish Press Review, 25.06.09

  • MANY SCHOLARS CHALLENGE THE ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE: PART II

    MANY SCHOLARS CHALLENGE THE ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE: PART II

    I find it important to mirror this work here to help truth-seekers gain one more access the information which is denied them by aggressive Armenian falsifiers, their usually anti-Turkish sympathizers, and other thinly veiled Turk-haters. Hate-based-propaganda and intimidation should not be allowed to replace honest scholarship and reasoned debate.

    Nothing less than the freedom of speech of those who hold contra-genocide views are at stake. Tools most used to advance censorship of contra-genocide views are hearsay, forgeries, harassment, political resolutions, editorial freedom, and consensus, among others. The key to resolving this controversy is more knowledge as in more honest research, more truthful education, and more freedom to debate… not less.

    Those scholars who take Armenian claims at face value urgently need to ponder these simple questions:

    1) How can one study a country’s history properly without researching that country’s very own archives? Can one study China’s history without using Chinese archives? Or Russia’s past without using Russia’s documents? Or America’s history without researching American records? Or Ottoman Empire’s past without using Ottoman archives? Why were the Ottoman archives almost never used in Armenian arguments and claims? Are language barriers, bureaucratic hurdles, cost, and/or others convincing enough excuses in scholarly studies that span over decades? Or is it instant gratification that these (genocide) scholars who ignore Turkish archives really seek, not the truth?

    2) How can one study a controversy by confining one’s views to only one side? Can one logically, fairly, or ethically argue that only one side of any controversy, say the abortion issue, is absolutely correct, flawless, and worthy of knowing, and that the other side should be totally ignored, even censored, and dissenters intimidated? How about gun control? Immigration? Taxes? Iraq War? Gay rights? and many other such controversial issues? Can one be confined, or asked to limit oneself, to only one side of the debate and categorically and eternally dismiss the other? Can this be turned into a discriminatory policy, as it is often attempted in the Turkish-Armenian conflict and controversy? Where exactly does the freedom of speech come into play here? If I, as an individual, who holds a contra-genocide view, am slandered, intimidated, and harassed by “cyber bullies”, physically threatened for my views by some “opinion thugs”, and often censored by “consensus mobs”, then is this not a blatant attack and destruction of my constitutional right to freedom of speech? Does consensus make such mental persecution right and claims allowed to stand truthful? In short, does might make right?

    3) Why do those conceited genocide scholars who love to get on their high horses and preach good morals to others, fail to scream murder in the face of that terrible human tragedy in Azerbaijan which victimized a million Azeris, including women and children, in Karabagh and western Azerbaijan? Is it because the perpetrator of this inhumanity is Armenia (their client state,) and the Armenians ( their paymasters) that they choose to look the other way?

    4) If the study of genocide is designed to teach humans how to recognize, avoid, and fight back against potential genocides, then why do these genocide scholars not take their client, Armenia and Armenians, to task about the genocide in Khodjaly on 19 February 1992? (Since a genocide verdict by a competent tribunal –as the 1948 UN Convention requires— does not exist, yet, and for consistency, let me re-name this tragedy man’s inhumanity to man and pogrom.) The question remains, why did all the genocide study in the world fail to stop Armenia from committing one between 1992-1994? Can you see the heart wrenching irony here?

    Here is what truly honest scholars and historians say about the bogus Armenian genocide:
    —————–

    Part II

    YOUSSEF COURBAGE

    Director of Research, National Institute of Demographic Studies, Paris, France.
    Major Publications:

    * Christians and Jews under Islam, (1992), Fayard
    Relevant Publications:
    * Christians and Jews under Islam, (1992), Fayard

    Source: Philippe Fargues, Youssef Courbage “Christians and Muslims under Islam”, (1992)

    “The Turkish argument, recently put forward, acknowledges that deportation took place but describes it as “relocation”. It also admits the size of the operation – 703,000 people of both sexes and of all ages according to the official Ottoman source – that is almost 70 per cent of Armenians.” However, it regards the deportation as a fact of war, inevitable given the Armenian collusion with the Russian enemy. This argument also accepts that more than 300,000 Armenians died, but disputes that they did so at the hands of Turks. Far from being a massacre orchestrated from on high, the deaths were a side-effect of the war, a consequence of epidemics or debilitation during the exodus, or a result of battles between armies and rival militias.” Pp. 110-111

    ***

    PAUL DUMONT

    Director of the Turkish Studies Department of Marc-Bloch University of Strasbourg.
    Prof. Dumont was director of the French Institute of Anatolian Studies from 1999 to 2003, and is co-editor of the review Turcica.

    Major Publications:
    * Jewish Communities in Turkey During the Last Decades of the Nineteenth Century in the Light of the Archives of the Alliance Israelite Universelle , in B. Braude and Bernard Lewis (ed.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, vol. I, New York, Holmes & Meier Publishers, pp. 209-242.
    * Mustafa Kemal invente la Turquie moderne, Bruxelles-Paris, Complexe, 1983.
    Économie et société dans l’Empire ottoman, Paris, éditions du CNRS, 1983 (co-edition with Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont).
    * ‘La période des Tanzimat et La mort d’un Empire’ (with François Georgeon), in Robert Mantran (ed.), Histoire de l’Empire ottoman, Paris, Fayard, 1989, pp. 459-522 et pp. 577-528
    * Les Sociaux-démocrates bulgares et le Bureau socialiste international. Correspondance. 1900-1914, Sofia, Mikom, 1996.
    * Vivre ensemble dans l’Empire ottoman. Sociabilités et relations intercommunautaires. XVIII e – XIX e siècles, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997 (co-edition with François Georgeon).
    * Du socialisme ottoman à l’internationalisme anatolien, Istanbul, Isis, 1998.
    * Ottomanism, National Movements and Freemasonry, Yapı ve Kredi Yay, 2000; second edition, 2007 (in Turkish).
    Relevant Publication:
    * La mort d’un Empire (with François Georgeon), in Robert Mantran (ed.), Histoire de l’Empire ottoman, Paris, Fayard, 1989
    Source: The Death of an Empire (1908-1923), in Robert Mantran (ed.), Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman, Paris, Fayard, 1989

    “Tracking down, within the multitude of papers from both sides about this question, the inaccuracies, questionable assertions, or even forgeries, is not very difficult. In particular, it seems established today that some of the essential objects put in the file by the accusation [i.e. the Armenian side] – for example, the Blue Book prepared for the British government by Bryce and Toynbee or the Memories of Na’im Bey published with the aid of Aram Andonian – can not in any way be considered as irrefutable documents. Didn’t Toynbee himself admit the Blue Book had been ‘published and spread only as war propaganda’? And the authenticity of the alleged telegrams of Ottoman government, ordering the destruction of Armenians is today seriously contested. […]

    However, it is important to underline that the Armenian communities are not the only ones to have been ground down by the plague of the war. In the spring of 1915, the tsarist army moved to the region of the lake of Van, dragging behind it battalions of volunteers composed of Caucasus and Turkish Armenians. […] For each of the provinces which suffered from the Russian occupation and from the Armenian militias’ acts of vengeance, an important demographic deficit appears in the statistics (of Muslims) of the post-war years — adding up to several hundred thousands of souls.” Pp. 624-625

    ***

    BERTIL DUNÉR

    Senior Researcher, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Major Publications:
    * The Global Human Rights Regime, Studentlitteratur, 2002
    * World Community and the Other Terrorism, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007
    * Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970’s, Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 1985.
    Relevant Publications:
    * What Can Be Done About Historical Atrocities? The Armenian Case . . . [See Appendix 5 A] . . . What Can Be Done About Historical Atrocities . . . , International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 217–233, Summer 2004

    Source: What Can Be Done About Historical Atrocities? The Armenian Case. International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 217–233, Summer 2004.

    “Turkey does not deny the reality of massacres, although it maintains that the campaign has seriously exaggerated the death toll. However, Ankara categorically refutes the accusation of genocide. It maintains that the Armenians were victims of inter-communal conflict during the Ottoman Empire’s dying years in the midst of the First World War and stresses that Turks as well died en masse in this internecine war. Moreover, it maintains that there is no proof that the killings were organized or financed by the state: on the contrary, it suggests that the lack of central organization was to blame.” Pp. 219-220

    “However what happened at the Sub-commission meeting in 1985 was not (UN) recognition of the Armenian genocide, although it is frequently portrayed that way – far from it. The special rapparteur’s does not seem to stick to the definition study. The special rapparteur’s study also lacks weight for a different, perhaps even more important, reason. It should be emphasized that neither was there any recommendation to the superior Commission on Human Rights to adopt a resolution.” P. 222

    “The Armenian campaign seems to go against the principle of universality. Note that this is not to question that it is easier to exercise pressure on some, relatively weak, states than on others, and that the strength of the target and the power resources available have to be considered when the kind of action to take is decided upon. Here we are talking only of manifested interest, in terms of resolutions and statements, which is not a matter of strength and resources available.” P.224

    “However a link in the reverse direction should perhaps not to be excluded, the Armenian question being an instrument rather than a goal. For instance, the president of the rightist movement for France has stated that: “Turkey’s obstinate refusal to recognize the massacres of 1915 is an additional element upon which to refuse Turkey’s entry into the European Union. It can be assumed that for this organization the more pressing question is to keep Turkey out of EU and the Armenian question is an instrument to this end.” P.225

    “A well known French political figure, Phillip Douste-Blazy has stated “I believe that today an ambiguity should be raised: recognition of the responsibility of the government of 1915, does not lead to the culpability of the Turks of 1999. There does not exist in [the body of criminal laws], even for most odious of the crimes, those against humanity, of hereditary culpability.” P.223

    “Another well-known French politician Bertrand Delanoe makes a similar point “Modern Turkey cannot evidently be held as the party responsible for the facts which have occurred in the convulsions at the end of the Ottoman Empire.“ P.228

    ***

    GWYNNE DYER

    Historian, military analyst and journalist, Ph.D. in Ottoman military history, The King’s College London.
    Gwynne Dyer is one of the few Western scholars to have done research in Ottoman military archives. Dyer has worked as a freelance journalist, columnist, broadcaster and lecturer on international affairs for more than 20 years, but he was originally trained as an historian. Born in Newfoundland, he received degrees from Canadian, American and British universities, finishing with a Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the University of London. He served in three navies and held academic appointments at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Oxford University before launching his twice-weekly column on international affairs, which is published by over 175 papers in some 45 countries.
    Major Publications:
    * War: 1985, documentary television series
    * Ignorant Armies: Sliding Into War in Iraq (2003)
    Relevant Publications:
    * The Turkish Armistice of 1918, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May, 1972), pp. 143-178
    Source: Turkish ‘Falsifiers’ and Armenian ‘Deceivers’: Historiography and the Armenian Massacres

    “When more work is completed on the period, I believe that historians will come to see Talat, Enver and their associates not so much as evil men but as desperate, frightened, unsophisticated men struggling to keep their nation afloat in a crisis far graver than they had anticipated when they first entered the war (the Armenian decisions were taken at the height of the crisis of the Dardanelles), reacting to events rather than creating them, and not fully realizing the “tent of the horrors they had set in motion in ‘Turkish Armenia’ until they were too deeply committed to withdraw. As for the complicity of ordinary Turks with their leaders, hatred and revenge and blind panic were the motives for the behaviour of the Ottoman army and the Muslim Population of eastern Anatolia in the Armenian massacres, scarcely creditable motives, nor ones an Armenian is likely to forgive, but common enough in all nations and even understandable in the Turkish situation in the East in 1915. The ‘final solution’ attempted by the Ottoman government at the end of 1915, and all the succeeding bouts of mutual slaughter between Turks and Armenians down to 1922 grew out of those original decisions in early 1915, the history of which is yet to be written.” P. 107

    Source: The Turkish Armistice of 1918, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May, 1972)

    ***

    EDWARD J. ERICKSON

    Researcher, Birmingham University, retired Lieutenant-Colonel, PhD in Ottoman Military History, The Leeds University. Erickson is the author of numerous books and articles on the Ottoman Army during the early twentieth century.
    Major Publications:
    * Ordered To Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (2000)
    * Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans 1912-1913 (2003)
    * The Sultan’s Army: A History of the Ottoman Military, 1300-1923 (forthcoming)
    Relevant Publications
    * Ordered To Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (2000)
    * Armenian Massacres, New Records Undercut Old Blame, The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. XIII, Number 3, Summer 2006
    * The Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy, War in History, Spring 2008
    Source: Ordered To Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (2000)

    “There is a huge body of historical literature concerning the “Armenian genocide” that maintains that the Young Turks, in particular, Enver, Talat, and Cemal, intentionally sought to exterminate the Armenian citizens of the Ottoman Empire. This case against the Young Turks rests on the premise that they intended to racially purify the empire by purging or exterminating its minorities, particularly the troublesome Christian Armenians. Moreover, the literature maintains that under the pretext of wartime emergencies and threats to national security, the Young Turks took advantage of circumstances to conduct genocide against the Armenians. Using a combination of methods ranging from massacre to starvation, the Young Turks then deliberately and intentionally caused the deaths of several million Armenians. Much of this literature is emotionally charged and a large percentage of it is directly generated by the descendants of the survivors of the events. The genocide itself has, over the past eighty years, become a highly political issue in most western countries, as Armenian descendants seek legislative condemnation of the modern Turkish Republic. Because of this trans-generational campaign to establish that an Ottoman genocide (defined as an intentional and systematic attempt to exterminate a people or a race) against its Armenian subjects occurred, balanced and objective discourse on this subject becomes difficult.” P. 95

    “Compounding the implementation of these policies was the continuing Armenian Rebellion, which included bombings, assassinations, and the wholesale slaughter of Muslim Turkish villages. In some places the rebels even gained the upper hand. The rebels in the city of Van were ultimately relieved by advancing Russian forces. At Musa Dag in Cilicia, highly organized Armenians fought the Turks for forty days. These events were bound to inflame an already angry Turkish population and bureaucracy. In spite of this, the Ministry of the Interior continued to muddy the organizational waters by establishing further regulations that safeguarded the homes of the deportees. According to the ministry, the homes of the deportees were to be sealed and possessions left behind were to be cared for. If the Armenians’ homes were used as temporary lodging for Balkan immigrants, the new occupants would be liable for any accrued taxes and for damages. Certainly there were many mixed messages with all of their associated and unsaid complexities to be found in the rapidly evolving legal mechanisms which governed the deportation and relocation of the eastern Anatolian Armenians. The ponderous and complex wheels of the relocation process now began to grind the Armenians into dust.” P. 103

    “In the end, hundreds of thousands of Armenians died during the Armenian Rebellion and deportation of 1915-1916. A similar number of Muslim Turks also died during the Armenian revolts and during the Russian occupation of Erzurum, Van, Erzincan, Trabzon, and Malazgirt. To be sure, many Armenians, particularly leaders and men of military age were immediately killed or massacred early on before entering the deportation flow. Many more, especially the elderly and the infirm, died en route from apathy and neglect, or were murdered outright, as the deportees were passed from local official to local official in an ambulatory pipeline that resembled a decaying daisy chain. Finally, the geographic constraints imposed on where the Armenians could ultimately be allowed to settle imposed long term starvation as they were sent to arid locations outside the fertile and well-watered route of the Baghdad Railroad. It was a recipe for disaster with profound historical, moral, and practical consequences which persist into the present day.” P. 103

    Source: “Armenian Massacres, New Records Undercut Old Blame”, The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. XIII, Number 3, Summer 2006

    “Clearly, many Armenians died during World War I. But accusations of genocide demand authentic proof of an official policy of ethnic extermination. Vahakn Dadrian has made high-profile claims that Major Stange and the Special Organization were the instruments of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Documents not utilized by Dadrian, though, discount such an allegation.”
    Source: The Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy: War in History, Spring 2008

    “In fact, armed revolts by the Armenians soon broke out in many areas of south-eastern Anatolia. There is no question that the Russians supported the Armenians inside the Ottoman Empire with money, weapons and encouragement. Externally the Armenian National Council formed druzhiny (or regiments) from the enthusiastic volunteers, who were eager to invade the Ottoman Empire. The ‘Ararat Unit’ composed of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Druzhiny was assigned to capture the lakeside city of Van. The events most associated with the beginning of the insurrection occurred when insurgents seized the most of Van in a fierce attack on 14 April 1915.” P. 153

    ” Beginning in July 1915, the full-blown insurgencies erupted in Antep, Antioch, Karahisar, Maraş, Urfa, and Zeitoun. This forced the Ottomans to move large-scale (regimental and divisional level) counter-insurgency operations using inexperienced forces. The newly formed 41st Infantry Division was diverted from coastal and area defense duties to counter-insurgency missions to deal with these and later participated in the famous assault of Musa Dagh. The following month, the equally inexperienced 23rd and 44th Infantry Divisions would join in attacks on Zeitoun, Urfa and Tarsus. Later, troops were sent to Karahisar to quell an uprising there.” P. 165

    “The Ottoman leadership and staff knew a great deal about the Armenian threat prior to 30 May, 1915 (the date of region-wide relocation order). They knew that the British, French and Russians were in direct contact with the Armenian revolutionary committees and were planning coordinated combat operations against the Ottomans. The Ottomans had solid evidence on large Armenian weapons caches in key city locations. There were number of terrorist incidents and guerilla attacks by Armenians on Ottoman lines of communications. There were reports of Armenian desertions from the army and thousands of armed Armenians were reported in the hills. There was an uprising in Zeitoun. An Armenian insurrection began when well-organized insurgents seized the city of Van, and Armenian regiments with the Russian army assisted in its capture. The Allies landed at Gallipoli on 25 April and in early May the Russians began a major offensive toward Erzurum supported by Armenians. Armenian agents had come ashore numerous times on the Mediterranean coast. Lastly, the Ottomans knew that their local forces and jandarma were unable to quell the gathering insurgency. […]

    The records show that the Ottoman leadership and military staff engaged in a kind of threat-based thinking based on Armenian capabilities. Was there reason for concern and threat-based thinking? The record indicates that the Ottoman lines of communications in Eastern Anatolia were acutely vulnerable and that the Armenians had the capacity to destroy those lines. Any interruption to the flow of logistic, even for a short time, to front-line forces in combat would have been a critical concern for the Ottoman army. The records also clearly shows that the Ottomans were unprepared to deal with a large-scale insurrection and shifted from a localized to a generalized campaign of counter-insurgency warfare. Finally, with so few regular forces available to suppress the insurrection, a strategy for the relocation of the civilian population was consistent with the counter-insurgence practices of that period. […]

    Nothing can justify the massacres of the Armenians nor can a case be made that the entire Armenian population of the six Anatolian provinces was an active and hostile threat to Ottoman national security. However, a case can be made that the Ottoman judged the Armenians to be a great threat to the 3rd and 4th Armies and that genuine intelligence and security concerns drove the decision. It may also be stated that the Ottoman reaction was escalatory and responsive rather than premeditated and pre-planned. In this context, the Ottoman relocation decision become more understandable as a military solution to a military problem. While political and ideological imperative perhaps drove the decision equally, if not harder, these do not negate the fact that the Armenians were a great military danger.” Pp. 166-167

    ***

    PHILIPPE FARGUES

    Professor, American University in Cairo-Egypt, PHD in Sociology ,Sorbonne University
    Major Publications:
    * Christians and Jews under Islam, (1992), Fayard
    Relevant Publications:
    * Christians and Jews under Islam, (1992), Fayard
    Source: Philippe Fargues, Youssef Courbage “Christians and Muslims under Islam”, (1992)

    “The Armenian community was in 1915-16 brutally deported from Turkey to the Arab periphery. If any Armenians remained in Anatolia after the deportation and slaughter, the erroneous policies of the Russians, Americans and French at the war soon hastened their disappearance.” P. 109

    “An American scholar who reconsidered the issue in the 1980s has carefully examined the Ottoman data with the aid of modern demographic methods. He estimated the Armenian population at 1.6 million and concluded that there had been no deliberate falsification, but rather a normal under-estimate arising from enumeration techniques of the time. If we deduct this from the 77,000 Armenians counted in the 1927 census, we find that the population was reduced by about 1.5 million people as a result of the massacre itself as well as emigration (whether enforced or voluntary) and conversion.” P. 110

    “The Turkish argument, recently put forward, acknowledges that deportation took place but describes it as “relocation”. It also admits the size of the operation – 703,000 people of both sexes and of all ages according to the official Ottoman source – that is almost 70 per cent of Armenians.” However, it regards the deportation as a fact of war, inevitable given the Armenian collusion with the Russian enemy. This argument also accepts that more than 300,000 Armenians died, but disputes that they did so at the hands of Turks. Far from being a massacre orchestrated from on high, the deaths were a side-effect of the war, a consequence of epidemics or debilitation during the exodus, or a result of battles between armies and rival militias.” Pp. 110-111

    ***

    MICHAEL M. GUNTER

    Professor of political science, Tennessee Technical University, PhD in International Relations, The Kent State University.
    Gunter has written more than 75 articles in scholarly journals and books including Middle East Journal, American Journal of International Law and World Affairs. He has authored nine books about the Kurdish people of Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Iran, and two of those books were among the first analyses in English of the Kurdish unrest in the Middle East. Gunter’s forthcoming publication is on the Armenian issue.
    Major Publications:
    * The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey (2007)
    Relevant Publications:
    * Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People: A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism (1986)
    * Turkey and the Armenians in Multidimensional Terrorism: Ed. by Martin Slann & Bernard Schechterman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1987), pp.57-71.
    * The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey: Orient (Deutsches Orient-Institut) 24 (December 1983), pp.610-637.
    Source: “Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People”: A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism

    “Outraged over the alleged genocide of some 1.5 million Armenians by the Turks during WW I and the resulting loss of their ancestral homeland, Armenian terrorists in the past decade have murdered 30 Turkish diplomats or members of their immediate families, including 4 in the United States.” Pp. 1

    “In a later study Professor Toynbee, although not denying the accuracy of the Blue Book, did write that it had been “duly published and distributed as war propaganda.” Pp. 14

    “The Armenian claim that they were victims of a premeditated genocide does not ring true, however. Rather, what appears more likely is that there was an honest, though inaccurate, belief among the Turkish leaders that they were faced with a widespread and coordinated Armenian uprising from within at the very time their state was in mortal danger from without. Decades of what the Turks saw as Armenian provocations and even treason during previous wars, armed revolutionary activity between the wars, the creation of Russian-Armenian guerrilla groups in the invading Russian army during the present war, the defection of certain Ottoman Armenians to the enemy, the armed resistance to conscription on the part of Armenians in Zeytun, incidents of revolutionary acts and sabotage in the countryside, and the Armenian uprising in Van in reaction to the unjustified but probably unofficial policies of the local governor-all led the Turks to conclude they were in real danger from a fifth column. (Similarly, a much better organized U.S. government unjustly interned its citizens of Japanese descent at the start of World War II.)” P. 17
    Source: The Politicizing of History and the Armenian Claims of Genocide, March 13, 2009, Letter to the Editor to New York Times

    “Without denying the tragic massacres the Armenians suffered during World War I, it is also important to place them in their proper context. When this is done, the application of the term “genocide” to these tragic events is inappropriate because the Turkish actions were neither unilateral nor premeditated. As the testimony of Hovhannes Katchaznouni, the first prime minister of Armenia after World War I makes clear, some Armenians killed as many Turks as they could in a misguided attempt to strike for independence. Additional Armenian writers such as Louise Nalbandian, James Mandalian, and Armen Garo, among others, have also detailed how some Armenians had long fought against the Turks in the lead up to the massacres of World War I. Furthermore, such distinguished Western scholars as William Langer, Arnold Toynbee, and Walter Laqueur, among others, have also concurred with this judgment. Their positions along with others demonstrate that the Turkish actions were not unilateral, that the Armenians were not always innocent victims, and that what befell the Armenians was not entirely unprovoked. Sabrina Tavernise’s recent article in the New York Times “Nearly a Million Genocide Victims, Covered in a Cloak of Amnesia” jumps to the unwarranted conclusion of genocide because the number of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire declined by some 900,000 from 1915-17. However, this does not mean that all of these 900,000 Armenians died. Indeed, many survived as refugees, and eventually settled in other countries. Therefore, Tavernise misleads her readers by implying that Talaat Pasha’s figures documented that they all died.

    As for the necessary attribute of premeditation to demonstrate genocide, there are no authentic documents that prove guilt. Although there are countless descriptions of the depravations suffered by the Armenians, they do not prove premeditation. The so-called Andonian documents that purport to demonstration premeditation are almost certain fabrications. As for the Armenian contention that the huge loss of Armenian lives illustrates premeditation, what then should be said about the enormous loss of Turkish lives among civilians, soldiers, and prisoners-of-war? Were these Turkish deaths also genocide or rather due to sheer incompetence, neglect, starvation, and disease? And if the latter were true of the ethnic Turkish population, all the more were they the fate of an ethnic group that had incurred upon itself suspicion of acting as a fifth column in a time of war. Even so Armenian communities in such large western cities as (Istanbul) and (Izmir) were spared deportation probably because they were not in a position to aid the invading Russians. Is it possible to imagine Hitler sparing any Jews in Berlin, Munich, or Cologne from his genocidal rampage for similar reasons? If as the Armenians allege the Turkish intent was to subject their Armenian victims to a premeditated forced march until they died of exhaustion, why was this tactic not imposed on all of the Armenians? More logically, the huge task of relocating several hundred thousand Armenians in a short period of time and over a highly primitive system of transportation proved simply beyond the capacity of the Ottoman government. Therefore, until historians can agree on exactly what happened, it seems reasonable not to politicize history with unsubstantiated claims of genocide.”

    ***

    PAUL HENZE

    Ph.D., Harvard University. Paul B. Henze served at the US embassy in Ethiopia, from 1968 to 1972. He left the administration in 1980, and became a consultant for the Rand Corporation and the Smithsonian Institution.
    Major Publications:
    * The Plot to Kill the Pope, 1983.
    * Soviet Strategy and Islam, 1989 (with Alexandre Bennigsen and George K. Tanhman)
    * The Horn of Africa, 1991.
    * Turkey and Atatürk’s Legacy: Turkey’s Political Evolution, Turkish-US Relations, and
    Prospects for the 21th Century, 1998.
    * Layers of Time. A History of Ethiopia, 2001, 2nd edition 2004.
    Relevant Publications:
    * The Roots of Armenian Violence. How Far Back Do they Extend?, in International Terrorism and the Drug Connection, Ankara University Press, 1984
    Source: “The Roots of Armenian Violence”, 1984

    “Bulgaria gained independence. Bulgarians were a people whom Armenians regarded as having a much less distinguished history than their own. If Bulgaria deserved to be independent, why not Armenia? Revolutionary nationalists who embraced such argumentation in the 1880s and 1890s willfully avoided facing the essential difference between their situations and that of the Bulgarians. Though there was serious controversy about Bulgaria’s proper boundaries, and though Bulgaria contained sizable minorities, the newly independent country was nevertheless a coherent geographical entity inhabited by a majority of Bulgarians. Nothing comparable existed in territories claimed by the Armenians. They were outnumbered by Muslims in every one of the six eastern provinces traditionally called Armenian. In the city of Erzurum, which many nationalists regarded as their natural capital, Armenians were a distinct minority. […]

    So by the end of the 1880s, we see the roots of Armenian violence — and violence against Armenians — in full view. Violence became inevitable because the Armenian demands which were most vigorously pressed had become irrational, impossible of attainment. The irrationality did not deter the Czarist government from supporting Armenian extremists for their own political purposes even as they increasingly restricted the activities of Armenian nationalists in their own territories. […]

    For an Ottoman bureaucracy pressed to meet demands for political and administrative reform among subject peoples as well as Turks, maintenance of order in outlying regions became increasingly difficult. Once clashes began to occur and other down, no one — government or local communities — possessed the physical strength, the political skill or the powers of persuasion to contain disaster. It was not only Armenians of the Ottoman Empire who were affected, but Muslims as well. Everyone lost.” Pp. 199-200

    “When war broke out in 1914, the Russians again encouraged Armenian expectations and exploited the eastern Anatolian Armenians as a fifth column. In the end they did not intervene to protect Armenians when Ottoman authorities, in a life-and-death wartime situation, moved to deport them, nor were the Russians able to protect their collaborators against the vengeance of local Muslims when Ottoman authority collapsed. As had happened so often before during the preceding 150 years, Russia was willing to exploit Armenians for her own purposes but unprepared to make sacrifices on their behalf.

    Armenian embitterment and chagrin at the disaster which intemperate and irrational nationalism brought on the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire have perished through three generations. Violence against Turkish officials in the 1920s proved to be a less characteristic reaction than the publicity campaigns and lobbying which long prevented resumption of U.S.-Turkish relations, though the U.S. had never actually declared war on the Ottoman Empire. […] They are many reasons to suspect that the campaign [of terrorism, after 1973] is a part of the massive effort to destabilize Turkey and destroy democracy there to which the Soviet Union devoted major resources during the 1970s — and which may still not have been entirely abandoned.

    Armenian communities in many parts of the world — notably in France and the U.S. — have been remarkably equivocal about (if not openly supportive of) such terrorism. The terrorists are remembered in Armenian Church services and large sums are collected in Armenian communities for their defense when they are put on trial. The climate of this astonishing advocacy of violence is maintained by an emotionalized version of Armenian history which is propagated in the ethnic press, taught in cultural programs and pressed on school authorities for inclusion in curricula. Even in the 1970s it has been hard to find a more extreme version of what one American historian called ‘creedal passion’, which provokes populations to irresponsible behavior. Armenian-origin intellectuals and journalists have become viciously intolerant of non-Armenian-origin colleagues who do not accept their biases and who venture to question Armenian statistics or try to examine Armenian, Ottoman and relevant Russian historical records according to recognized standards of objectivity and respect of methodology.

    One is driven to wonder, for example, whether an essentially honest example of scholarship such as Louise Nalbandian’s Armenian Revolutionary Movement, which originally appeared [in 1963] would even be published by a scholar of Armenian origin today.” Pp. 201-202

    ***

    (To be continued)