Category: Turkey

Uighur Leader Raises New Accusations

By ANDREW JACOBS and MARTIN FACKLER Published: July 29, 2009

In the weeks since ethnic bloodletting claimed nearly 200 lives in the northwest Chinese region of Xinjiang, the government has been waging a global propaganda war against Rebiya Kadeer, the exiled Uighur leader it accuses of instigating the violence.

Yuriko Nakao/Reuters

The exiled Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer in Tokyo on Wednesday, where she leveled new accusations at the Chinese government.

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Times Topics: Rebiya Kadeer | Uighurs

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Uighur Leader Calls for Probe

Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer is calling for an international investigation into what she says is the disappearance of 10,000 Uighurs during a protest in Urumqi.

As a result, Ms. Kadeer, who spent more than four years in a Chinese prison and now lives in the United States, has emerged as the international face of the Uighur cause. On Wednesday, she ratcheted up the war of words during a visit to Japan, where she claimed that “nearly 10,000” Uighurs had disappeared “overnight” in Urumqi, the Xinjiang capital.

“Where did they go?” she asked during a news conference, according to The Associated Press. “Were they all killed or sent somewhere? The Chinese government should disclose what happened to them.”

Ms. Kadeer did not provide evidence to back up her assertion, which stands in stark contrast to government figures that place the numbers of those arrested at 1,200.

But her comments infuriated China, which summoned Japan’s ambassador in Beijing to express “strong dissatisfaction” with the decision to grant her a visa.

China’s Foreign Ministry demanded that Japan “take effective action to stop her anti-China, splittist activities.” The Japanese government declined to intervene, saying that Ms. Kadeer was visiting as a private citizen.

The true story of what happened in Urumqi may never be known. But Ms. Kadeer’s and the Chinese government’s dueling, sometimes hyperbolic, accounts have sowed confusion and created an even wider chasm between the government and those pressing for greater Uighur autonomy.

“This has become an exercise in influence-building and image management,” said Russell Leigh Moses, a Beijing-based analyst of Chinese politics. “As each side scrambles to push their version of events, the chances for dialogue are rapidly receding. Xinjiang could very well reignite, but instead of fire prevention, each party seems bent on trying to prove the other side is the one with the lighter fluid.”

China has not minced words in its approach to Ms. Kadeer, 62, who heads the World Uighur Congress, which advocates for Uighur self-determination. Editorial writers, government officials and even normally staid diplomats have described her as “a terrorist” and “a criminal” who caused the death of 197 people, most of them Han Chinese. As proof, they cite a phone call she made to her brother in Urumqi shortly before the strife began, warning him to stay off the streets. Ms. Kadeer does not deny making the call but says she was just looking out for his safety.

On Wednesday, Chinese officials delivered a DVD to the offices of The New York Times in Beijing titled “Xinjiang, Urumqi, July 5 Riots: Truth.” The 20-minute film, with versions in Arabic, Turkish, English and other languages, begins with idyllic scenes of Uighurs and members of other ethnic groups who inhabit the region and goes on to show graphic images of beatings that it says were “incited and controlled” by Ms. Kadeer.

According to the state-run Xinhua news agency, the July 5 mayhem was orchestrated through text and e-mail messages. Gangs of killers, it said, were sent to 50 locations in Urumqi after protesters gathered at a downtown square to express anger over a brawl at a south China toy factory during which two Uighurs were beaten to death by Han Chinese co-workers.

In the official accounting of how events unfolded on July 5, security officials described mysterious women in “long Islamic robes” who issued orders to the rioters. One woman, they said, even passed out clubs.

Such assertions, however, are difficult to verify, and the government has yet to provide proof showing that Ms. Kadeer or her organization had a hand in planning the chaos.

In recent weeks Ms. Kadeer has given a very different narrative. She says that most of the dead were Uighur, not Han, and that as many as 1,000 people were killed, many of them peaceful demonstrators shot dead by security officials who chased them down dead-end streets and opened fire after turning off street lamps.

She has not provided evidence to back up such claims, saying to reveal her sources would put them in peril. Interviews with both Han and Uighur residents in Urumqi, however, have not yielded any witnesses who can corroborate such accounts.

Ms. Kadeer’s next trip, to the Melbourne Film Festival in Australia, is sure to produce a fresh round of invective. A documentary about Ms. Kadeer’s life, which will be shown on Aug. 8, has already prompted three Chinese filmmakers to pull out of the festival. Last weekend, after a Chinese consular official told organizers to drop the film, the festival’s Web site was overrun by hackers, who replaced film schedules with a Chinese flag and slogans denouncing Ms. Kadeer.

July 31, 2009
New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda

Joseph Sywenkyj for The New York Times
Last week, a Kurdistan Democratic Party building in Sulaimaniya, Iraq, displayed a poster of Massoud Barzani in his youth, right.

By SAM DAGHER
Published: July 28, 2009
ERBIL, Iraq – The president of the semiautonomous Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, on Tuesday rejected proposals by the United Nations to resolve Iraq’s explosive internal border disputes, and reiterated his determination to proceed with a contentious local constitution.

Khalid Mohammed/Associated Press
In Erbil, Iraq, supporters of Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish regional leader, on Sunday celebrated a projected election victory.

Mr. Barzani, newly empowered after winning an estimated 70 percent of the vote in the region’s presidential and parliamentary elections on Saturday, made the remarks in his first interview with the news media since the vote.

“Regrettably, the recommendations of the United Nations are unrealistic,” Mr. Barzani said, referring to a report by the United Nations in April outlining options for the settlement of territorial disputes that threaten Iraq’s fragile stability. They included making Kirkuk Province – including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk that is claimed by Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Turkmens – into an autonomous region.

American officials have repeatedly stated their support for a United Nations-brokered solution.

“We will not accept that the United Nations or anyone else present us with alternatives to Article 140,” he added, referring to the clause in Iraq’s national Constitution that calls for a census followed by a referendum to settle the fate of areas including Kirkuk.

Tensions have been aggravated by the presence of Kurdish troops in parts of the contested areas. The situation worsened in June when the region’s Parliament, overwhelmingly controlled by the two governing parties, including Mr. Barzani’s party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, approved a draft constitution that enshrined Kurdish rights to the disputed territories.

Although the document states that the final demarcation of the region’s boundaries is subject to Article 140, it is unequivocal in its assertion that the disputed territories are inseparable from the “geographic and historic entity” called Iraq’s Kurdistan region.

Mr. Barzani said one reason he agreed to put off a referendum on the regional Constitution that was to have been held during Saturday’s elections was a request this month from Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and other American officials.

“They asked if it was possible to postpone it because the timing was inappropriate,” he said.

Mr. Barzani said he was determined to put the constitution to a referendum this fall. Such a move would place him on a collision course not only with the central government, which opposes the document in its current form, but also with a new Kurdish political coalition that did surprisingly well on Saturday.

Shaho Saeed, a top official in the coalition, Gorran, said his movement filed a complaint this month with Iraq’s federal court in Baghdad that questioned the legitimacy of the process that the previous regional Parliament adopted to approve the constitution.

Mr. Saeed said Gorran opposed the document because it gave powers to Mr. Barzani “that exceed the powers of Parliament and the judiciary.” Gorran wants the proposed constitution redrafted, he said.

Although the region’s two governing parties, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, retain a comfortable majority to form the next government, Gorran appeared to have clinched at least 25 of the new Parliament’s 111 seats, according to preliminary results.

With the two parties expected to remain firmly in control of Parliament, Mr. Barzani said that no one has the two-thirds majority needed to redraft the document.

“The new Parliament has no right to redraft the constitution,” he said. “It is over.”

Mr. Barzani said he welcomed the emergence of an opposition movement like Gorran, but issued a warning to those who might interpret it as a loosening of the grip of the two parties that control the region’s security forces, economy and patronage network.

“If any regional country or even Baghdad interferes in an internal matter, or any individual inside the region conspires against the region’s security and well-being,” he said, “actions will be taken in accordance with the law against those who want to undermine the unity of the Kurdish house.”

July 30, 2009
The World Is Tilted

Soner Cagaptay and Ata Akiner
Hurriyet Daily News
July 29, 2009

Tom Friedman is right, the world is flat. New communication technologies and globalization have created a flat world, erasing most social and political inequalities among nations. However, in this flat world, there is a new trend: from Italy and Turkey to Russia, Iran and China, where the governments control the media and the new communication tools, the world is tilted in favor of governments. What is more, this tilted world is not so equal, especially when it comes to politics.

Take Italy and Turkey, for instance. Both are democracies. Yet in both countries, the governing parties control much of the media, often distorting political debate in their favor.

In Italy, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who was a powerful media mogul when he entered politics, today controls much of the Italian media. According to Reuters, Mr. Berlusconi holds sway over 90 percent of Italy’s broadcast media through his private media holdings and by exercising political power over the state television networks. It should not come as a surprise that Italy was rated as “partly free” in Freedom House’s 2009 survey — in “Western Europe” only Turkey shared this ranking with Italy.

Mr. Berlusconi’s power over the media allows him shape the debate in favor of his government, as well as escape scandals that could finish him off politically. Mr. Berlusconi wins elections despite all odds and despite the shifting-sands nature of Italian politics. In Italy, the world of politics is tilted.

In Turkey, too, where the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan happens to be a close friend of Mr. Berlusconi, control over the media helps the ruling party shape the political debate in its favor. Since 2002 when the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, came to power, the government has used legal loopholes to confiscate ownership of independent media and sell it to its supporters. In 2002, pro-AKP businesses owned less than 20 percent of the Turkish media; today pro-government people own around 50 percent.

The AKP’s new found control over the media is not without consequences. A review of the newspapers and networks reveals a split country. AKP-affiliated media reports on Turkey as a perfect country, if not for the serious allegations of coup plots against the government. Meanwhile, media unaffiliated with the AKP portrays an imperfect country wrought with corruption and ineffective governance. The media divisions, among other reasons, have caused Turkey to be cut in half, split between AKP’s supporters and opponents. Still, as long as the AKP maintains control over half of the Turkish media, it will enjoy strong support. In Turkey, the world of politics is tilted.

Then, there is Russia, an effective single-party state. Russian leader Vladimir Putin, a close friend of Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Berlusconi, runs a state in which all media, with the exception of a few independent outlets, belongs to pro-government businesses or is in the hands of the Russian state. To put things in perspective, of the 26,000 newspapers, 16,500 magazines, 1,400 radio stations and 2,200 TV stations in Russia, the number of independent media outlets is in the single digits. Russian authorities regularly raid independent media offices and arrest journalists. Sometimes, even this is not enough: the flag bearer of Russian opposition Novaya Gazeta has tragically lost four journalists in the past eight years under mysterious circumstances.

This near absolute control over the media has allowed Putin to consolidate power in ways previously unthinkable in Italy and Turkey. United Russia, Mr. Putin’s party, regularly wins landslide victories in elections, most recently pulling in almost three-quarters of the electoral support in the 2007 Russian legislative election. Analysts often ask why Russia is unable to produce an effective political opposition to Mr. Putin. The roots of this problem lie in Mr. Putin’s monopoly over the Russian media: the more tilted the political world in favor of a government, the more the ruling parties can consolidate their power, ultimately preventing any opposition from gaining support. Mr. Putin must make his friends jealous for in Russia, the world of politics is almost irreversibly tilted.

Then, there is authoritarian Iran and China, where the world of politics is so tilted it cannot even be scaled. In these countries, the government controls not only traditional media, such as newspapers and TV networks, but also new tools of communication, such as the internet and cell phone communication.

When demonstrators took to the streets in the aftermath of Iran’s recent presidential elections alleging electoral fraud, the government blacked out media access and shut down the web and cell phone networks, effectively cutting Iran off from all media sources. Briefly, the internet and cell phones allowed the Iranian demonstrators to organize. However subsequently, the government’s ability to shut down the internet and cell phone communications provided the kiss of death for the anti-government protests, preventing the demonstrations from growing — in Iran, the world is sharply tilted in favor of the regime.

The same story repeated itself in a more perfect form during the recent riots in China’s East Turkestan (Xinjiang) region. Soon after the riots began, the government shut down internet access in the Uygur province, ending the demonstrators’ hope of using the web to organize. This step was followed by a total shut down of cell phone communications, including text messaging; isolating East Turkestan from the rest of the world -in Turkestan, the new world is so tilted that the Uygurs cannot even see beyond it.

The flat new world is better off in many ways compared to the world of the past. Yet, ironically the same forces that are flattening the world can also tilt it, empowering authoritarian states, and allowing undemocratic trends to take roots in democratic societies. In the 21st century, one hopes that the world is not only flat, but also, and more importantly, that it is also even.

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. Ata Akiner is a research intern in that program.

July 29, 2009
Discrepancies in the Kurdish constitution disregard feelings of the Iraqis

Date: July 13, 2009
No: Rep.17-G1309

The constitution of Kurdish region is described by Sunni and Shiite Arab parliamentarians as running counter to Iraq’s national constitution. It has created outrage among Arab and Turkmen political factions. Chaldeo-Assyrian politicians say that it undermines their national interests. The Yazidi parliamentarian condemns it. The Shabak’s deputy considers it challenging the feelings of the Iraqis. Almost all non-Kurdish Iraqi politicians have criticized it, even several Kurdish politicians. According to Prime Minister al-Maliki, it is provocative, upsetting and risks damaging relations. The Obama administration has also appeared surprised and troubled by it.

Since the occupation of Iraq in 2003, Iraqis have been engaged in confronting numerous critical challenges. Meanwhile, the Kurdish authorities have been wholly engaged in collecting interests that in many occasions are at the expense of Iraqis and Iraqi state. Noting worth that the Iraqis were in an awful situation, due to 12 years of economical embargo during which they suffered from hanger and its catastrophic outcomes, fortunately, the Kurdish region averted that disasters.

Benefiting from the absence of centralized state power and lack of experienced opposition politicians, with the backing of the occupation forces, the Kurdish actors imposed their interests on the Iraqi state’s constitution. The result has been the drafting of an internally inconsistent constitution that weakened the Iraqi state.

Serious restrictions on the power of central state authorities, contradictory articles, vague terminology, granting independency to the federal authorities in many important state’s power, the living of future decisions in non-treated fields to the regional authorities and the sharing of the regional governments in almost all the authorities of the central government have meant that the Iraqi constitution has lost many of its federalist characteristics. This has, at the same time, damaged the influence and workability of the state as a whole.

Moreover, despite the enormous advantages that the Kurds obtained from the Iraqi constitution, the Kurdish authorities continue to violate its articles. Today, it is clearly visible to the international community that the Kurdish authorities are the major obstacle to constitutional amendments, which according to article 142 of the Iraqi constitution, should have been initiated in the four months following its adoption in 2005.

In addition, the recently published Kurdish constitution (KC) contains all the organs and mechanisms of an independent state, it:

A. Risks the Ignition of existing animosities and decreases the opportunities for reconciliations.
B. Clarifies what is a continuation of the opportunistic attitude of Kurdish actors and their nationalist agenda.
C. Shows clearly the expansionist attitude of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

The followings are discrepancies in the Kurdish constitution:

A. Introduction
i. The Kurdish nation and the Kurdish country are purposely stressed. Furthermore, it stresses the creation of a united Kurdistan, which doesn’t exclude neighboring countries.
ii. It details the suppression of the Kurdish people by successive Iraqi governments, and glorifying the braveness and fighting of Kurdish rebels, whilst ignoring the Kurdish Peshmerga militias that attacked the Iraqi state for decades and killed thousands of Iraqi soldiers. Thousands of Iraqi children were subsequently orphaned and women widowed.
Selections from Introduction: “We the people of Iraq’s Kurdistan” “valuing the leaders and the symbols of the liberation movement of Kurdistan, who strugglers, the Peshmerga, its immortal martyrs and their sacrifice for our freedom, safeguard our dignity, defend our country and call for recognition of our right to self-determination by our absolute free will, and remaining loyal to the message, values and objective for which they were martyred, namely to establish a civilized Kurdistan community, ———–, releasing the energy of its generations to establish Kurdistan as unified homeland for all, ———–.“

B. Article 2,
i. Item 1, without any historical bases the constitution wrongly defines a region called Kurdistan and includes vast Iraqi lands and large numbers of districts.
Item 1: “Iraq’s Kurdistan is a geographical and historical entity constituting Duhok province with its present administrative boundaries, and the provinces of Kerkuk, Sulaymaniya, Erbil, and the districts of Akra, Shakhan, Sinjar, Tilkeyf, Kara Kus and the sub-districts of Zummar, Ba’ashiqa, Eski Kelek from the province of Nineveh, and the districts of Khanaqin and Mendeli of Diyala province, but with the boundaries of 1968”
ii. Item 2, despite that Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution lost its applicability; the Kurdish constitution demands its application.
iii. Item 3, prohibiting Creation of regions, it contradicts with the Iraqi Constitution and discovers the double standard of the Kurdish actors, who strongly asks federalism for Iraq but refuse it for their regions.
Item 3: “the establishment of new (federal) regions inside the boundaries of Kurdistan region doesn’t be allowed”

C. Article 3,
i. Item 1 clearly rejects the authority of the Iraqi Constitution, except those given in Article 110.
Item 1: “Authority is sourced from the people, who are the base for its legitimacy, and authority must be exercised through its constitutional institutions. The Kurdistan constitution and laws have sovereignty and superiority over all the laws which are made by the Iraqi government, excluding the exclusive authorities of the federal government provided in Article 110 of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Iraq”
ii. Item 2 almost completely rejects the authority of the central government, even that of Article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution.
Item 2: “Application of Article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution, which is related to the exclusive authorities of federal law, does not detract from the sovereignty and superiority of the Constitution and laws of Kurdistan region, and does not limit the powers of regional authorities contained in article in Article 115 and Item 2 of the Article 121 of the federal Constitution”

D. Article 7,
i. The Kurdish Constitution leaves the possibility open for separation from Iraq and determines stipulations for separation.
Article 7: “The people of Iraq’s Kurdistan have the right to determine its fate and the people of Iraq’s Kurdistan chose by free will to be included as a region in the federal Iraq, as long as the federal, democratic, parliamentary and pluralistic system and individual and collective human rights are guarded, as is detailed in the federal Constitution”

E. Article 8,
i. Item 1 gives absolute power to the so-called Kurdish Parliament to hold international treaties and conventions contradicting Item 1 of the Article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution
Item 1: “the international treaties and conventions which the Iraqi government holds with any state or foreign party touching the status of or rights of the region of Kurdistan, will be implanted within the region when the parliament of Iraq’s Kurdistan accepts it by absolute majority of its members”
ii. Item 2 grants the right to the so-called Kurdish Parliament to reject various international treaties and conventions that the Iraqi state holds.
Item 2: “the international treaties and conventions which the Iraqi government holds with the foreign states will not be applicable in Kurdistan region, if the parliament of Iraq’s Kurdistan does not accept it by absolute majority of its members, excluding the exclusive authorities of the federal government provided in the Article 110 of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Iraq”

F. Article 9,
i. Item 1 requests a share from all types of incomes of the Iraqi state for the Kurdish region, while Item 1 of the Article 17 keeps the incomes of Kurdish region for the Kurds only. This is supported by Item 7 and 9 of Article 74.
Item 1: “the region has basic constitutional rights against the federal authorities in:
A fair share from the federal incomes of international grants, aids and loans according to the principles of equivalency and population proportion, taking into consideration the policies of genocide, arson, destruction and denial to which the people of Iraq’s Kurdistan were subjected during the years of former Iraqi governments, in accordance with the Article 106 and 112 of the federal Constitution”.

ii. Item 2 requests fair Kurdish participation in administration of the Iraqi state, various missions, fellowships and delegations and regional and international conferences. The participation of Iraqis in the Kurdish region is ignored.
Item 2: “According to the principles of equivalency and the population proportion, there should be fair participation in the administration of different federal institutions of state, missions, scholarships, delegations to regional and international conferences, and conferring career degrees to the peoples of the region in the federal offices in Kurdistan region in accordance with the Article 105 of the federal Constitution”

G. Article 10 allows the Kurdish authorities to continue absorbing Kerkuk city into Kurdish region and to retain it as a capital.

H. Article 13 clearly contradicts with Item 3 of the Article 110 of Iraqi Constitution and gives right to the so-called Kurdish Parliament to enact fiscal and custom laws.
The Iraqi Constitution presents vague information (Item 3 of Article 110 and Item 1 of Article 114) about who will manage custom revenue. Item 3 of Article 110 considers it the exclusive right of the central government, but in Item 1 of the Article 114 shares it with regional authorities.
Article 13: “Nor can any fee or tax be imposed, modified or exempted in Kurdistan region without approval of the enacting laws in the Kurdistan parliament”

I. The underground wealth law which the Iraqi Constitution holds the central government as the major organizer is vaguely presented in Item 1 of the Article 17 in the Kurdish Constitution. It holds the Kurdish authorities as the organizers of Hydrocarbon law in Kurdish region.
Item 1: “Resources and public sources of natural wealth and surface and underground water and unexploited minerals and quarries and mines are the public wealth whose exploitation and administration are organized by law to preserve it for the interest of present and future generations”

J. Item 1 of the Article 18 of the Kurdish Constitution regulates the executive, legislative and judicial powers without consideration of the Iraqi constitution, while Item 1 of the Article 121 states that regulation of aforementioned powers should be in accordance with the Iraqi constitution.
Item 1: “Legislative, executive and judicial authorities of Kurdistan region abide by the fundamental rights of this Constitution considering its basic provisions, and these should be applied and implemented as of being the fundamental rights of citizens of Kurdistan”

K. Item 2 of the Article 23 holds the central government of Iraq to compensate from the Iraqi budget the victims of Kurdish uprisings against the successive Iraqi governments, while the Kurdish regional government obtains 17% from the Iraqi budget, which is approximately twice the proportion of the Kurdish population in Kurdish region. Noting that the central government will also compensate large numbers of Iraqi victims out of Kurdish region from Iraqi budget. If all victims of Ba’ath regime should be compensated from Iraqi budget, then the victims of Kurdish region should logically be compensated from the budget of Kurdish region.

L. Article 35 of the Kurdish Constitution grants the right to institute a federal region depending on the sect and ethnicity.

M. Article 40 marginalizes the Iraqi Constitution and considers the so-called Kurdish parliament the only legislative power.
Article 40: “the parliament of Iraq’s Kurdistan is the legislative authority and the reference to decide on the crucial issues about the people of Kurdistan region, its members are elected by direct secret free general vote”

N. In the constitutional oath in Article 44 and Article 71, the members of the so-called Kurdish Parliament swear to work only for the peoples of Kurdish region.

O. Item 1 of the Article 55 restricts the freedom of expression of parliamentarians.

P. In the constitutional oath in Article 63, the president of Kurdish region and his deputies swear to work only for the peoples of Kurdish region.

Q. Article 64 leaves the door open for Masoud Barzani to rule the Kurdish region for life.

R. Article 65,
i. Item 11 and Item 6 of the Article 70 empowers the president of the Kurdish region with an authority of Prime Minster of Kurdish region.
ii. Item 12 severely restricts the movement of the Iraqi army in Kurdish region, which oppose the Item 2 of the Iraqi Constitution.
Item 12: “To allow (president of the region) federal armed forces to enter the territory of Iraq’s Kurdistan where necessary, after winning the approval of Parliament of Iraq’s Kurdistan on the entry of those forces with the identification of its functions and place and duration of stay in the Territory”
iii. Item 13 oppose the Iraqi Constitution and grant to the Kurdish Peshmerga militias the characteristics of an army.
Item 13: “To send (president of the region) forces of Territory’s guard the (Peshmerga) or the internal security forces to outside the Territory with the consent of Parliament”
iv. Paragraph 4 of Item 14 grants the authority to the president of Kurdish region to marginalize the so-called Kurdish parliament, by authorizing a non-elected prime minster.
v. Item 21 oppose the Item 4 of the Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution by giving the right to President of Kurdish region to establish offices for the Kurdish region out of the Iraqi embassies. At the same time Item 14 of the Article 74 gives right to the council of ministers of Kurdish region to establish such offices in the Iraqi embassies.

S. Item 8 of the Article 74 violates the oil and gas law of the Iraqi Constitution (Article 111 and Item 1 and 2 of the Article 112) and grants the right of oil exploitation in Kurdish region to the so-called Kurdish parliament.
Item 8: “Joint work with the Federal Government to formulate strategic policies necessary for the development of the wealth of oil and gas, combined with the consent of Parliament in everything concerning the wealth of the Territory.”

T. Article 77 violates Item 1 of the Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution by stating that the juridical authorities are independent in Kurdish region.
Article 77: “The judicial authority is independent in the territory of Kurdistan, consists of the Council of the judiciary, the Constitutional Court, and the Cassation Court, and the committee of judicial supervision, the public prosecution, and the courts in different degrees, types of organs, and organizes composition, procedures and conditions of appointment of its members and their accountability by law”

U. Item 1 of the Article 111 demands a share from the Iraqi underground wealth, while in the Item 4 opens the possibility to save the income of the underground wealth for the Kurdish region only.

V. Article 115 complicates any future authorities of the Iraqi constitution on the constitution of the Kurdish region.

By refusing discussion of the Kurdish constitution in the Iraqi parliament, the Kurdish authorities not only violate the Iraqi constitution, they break the simplest bases of democracy and federal system.

The spirit of this constitution reflects the unproductive and offensive policy of KDP and PUK since, which illustrates that they have not rid themselves of pre-1991 rebel mentality. The Kurdish politicians irritate feelings of the Iraqis, abases the Iraqi state. This trend has potentially long-lasing grave implications for the whole Middle East.

July 28, 2009
The Hague statement on the constitution of Kurdish Region: It doesn’t augur well for the national and regional stability

Unrealistic objectives and aggressive nature of the Kurdish revolts brought decades of instability to the region and exhausted the states where the Kurds live and exposed the Kurds in particular to disasters. The interests of, and the conflicts between regional and international powers negatively influenced the course of these revolts. Since the turn of the 20th century, international and regional disputes were the main factor in determining the extent and nature of assistance given to the Kurdish rebels. The international press also gave the revolt a great deal of coverage. A century of uninterrupted need of the conflicting powers to the Kurdish uprisings made the Kurdish rebels maintain the violent characteristics.

The geopolitical changes of the 1990s brought the Kurdish militant parties down from the mountains and granted them the administration of northern Iraq. A decades-long life of violence and the absence of qualified elements within the Kurdish rebels started to be reflected in the tribal nature of the administration, its disregard of human rights principles, hunger for land and inflexible policies.

With the absolute support of the occupation forces from 2003, the Kurdish actors grasped important positions in the Iraqi state, ruled their regions increasingly independently, suppressed the large number of non-Kurdish communities, imposed their interests on the Iraqi constitution, violated the pro-Kurdish Iraqi constitution and Kurdish Peshmerga militias invested almost all of northern Iraq.

In the recently published constitution of Kurdish region, the Racist Kurdish authorities:
 Announce clearly their ambition to establish an independent state based on Kurdish ethnicity.
 Violate openly the Iraqi constitution
 Reveal their land-grabbing characteristics by absorbing hundreds of kilometers of Iraqi lands.

The Kurdish constitution opens the door for two unceasing and fierce conflicts in the region which certainly will destabilize the Middle East for centuries and result in disastrous outcomes:
 In the introduction of the constitution, the establishment of united Kurdistan is openly stressed. This is interfering with internal affairs of Turkey, Iran and Iraq.
 Vast lands out of the Kurdish region, inhabited mainly by non-Kurdish population (Shabaks, Yazidis, Chaldo-Assyrians, Turkmen and Arabs) are wrongly considered historical and geographical part of so-called Kurdistan. These non-Kurdish communities are vehemently against the inclusion of their lands under Kurdish administration. The Iraqi state will certainly reject seizing of these vast Iraqi lands by the Kurdish authorities and surely support the different Iraqi communities in those regions. In this case long lasting brutal quarrels is unavoidable.

However, in the present dramatic situation of Iraq, despite the unconstructive and inflexible policy of Kurdish nationalist authorities, many international powers still maintain their political and economical supports to the racialist Kurdish political parties.

We therefore address to:
 those powers which base their support to the Kurdish Regional Government on the economical or political interests, and
 the international community which developed sympathy to the Kurdish case due to the exposure to disasters which resulted from revolts against the states in which they live

That their support to the Kurdish Regional Government strengthens the latter’s selfish and racist policies and encourage them:
 to continue absorbing the Iraqi lands where all the components of Iraq’s ethnic mosaic live
 to drag the region into fierce ongoing quarrels which will bring further disasters to already exhausted peoples
10 July 2009
Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation (SOITM)
Assyrian Human Rights Organization – Europe (AHRO-EU)
Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress
Shabak Democratic Assembly (Human Rights Office)

July 28, 2009
The Hague statement on the constitution of Kurdish Region:

Unrealistic objectives and aggressive nature of the Kurdish revolts brought decades of instability to the region and exhausted the states where the Kurds live and exposed the Kurds in particular to disasters. The interests of, and the conflicts between regional and international powers negatively influenced the course of these revolts. Since the turn of the 20th century, international and regional disputes were the main factor in determining the extent and nature of assistance given to the Kurdish rebels. The international press also gave the revolt a great deal of coverage. A century of uninterrupted need of the conflicting powers to the Kurdish uprisings made the Kurdish rebels maintain the violent characteristics.

The geopolitical changes of the 1990s brought the Kurdish militant parties down from the mountains and granted them the administration of northern Iraq. A decades-long life of violence and the absence of qualified elements within the Kurdish rebels started to be reflected in the tribal nature of the administration, its disregard of human rights principles, hunger for land and inflexible policies.

With the absolute support of the occupation forces from 2003, the Kurdish actors grasped important positions in the Iraqi state, ruled their regions increasingly independently, suppressed the large number of non-Kurdish communities, imposed their interests on the Iraqi constitution, violated the pro-Kurdish Iraqi constitution and Kurdish Peshmerga militias invested almost all of northern Iraq.

In the recently published constitution of Kurdish region, the Racist Kurdish authorities:
 Announce clearly their ambition to establish an independent state based on Kurdish ethnicity.
 Violate openly the Iraqi constitution
 Reveal their land-grabbing characteristics by absorbing hundreds of kilometers of Iraqi lands.

The Kurdish constitution opens the door for two unceasing and fierce conflicts in the region which certainly will destabilize the Middle East for centuries and result in disastrous outcomes:
 In the introduction of the constitution, the establishment of united Kurdistan is openly stressed. This is interfering with internal affairs of Turkey, Iran and Iraq.
 Vast lands out of the Kurdish region, inhabited mainly by non-Kurdish population (Shabaks, Yazidis, Chaldo-Assyrians, Turkmen and Arabs) are wrongly considered historical and geographical part of so-called Kurdistan. These non-Kurdish communities are vehemently against the inclusion of their lands under Kurdish administration. The Iraqi state will certainly reject seizing of these vast Iraqi lands by the Kurdish authorities and surely support the different Iraqi communities in those regions. In this case long lasting brutal quarrels is unavoidable.

However, in the present dramatic situation of Iraq, despite the unconstructive and inflexible policy of Kurdish nationalist authorities, many international powers still maintain their political and economical supports to the racialist Kurdish political parties.

We therefore address to:
 those powers which base their support to the Kurdish Regional Government on the economical or political interests, and
 the international community which developed sympathy to the Kurdish case due to the exposure to disasters which resulted from revolts against the states in which they live

That their support to the Kurdish Regional Government strengthens the latter’s selfish and racist policies and encourage them:
 to continue absorbing the Iraqi lands where all the components of Iraq’s ethnic mosaic live
 to drag the region into fierce ongoing quarrels which will bring further disasters to already exhausted peoples
10 July 2009
Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation (SOITM)
Assyrian Human Rights Organization – Europe (AHRO-EU)
Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress
Shabak Democratic Assembly (Human Rights Office)

Emblem of SOITM

July 28, 2009