Category: Turkey

  • Turkey’s diplomatic missions will provide services to Azeri citizens

    Turkey’s diplomatic missions will provide services to Azeri citizens

    turk-azerTurkey’s diplomatic missions will provide services to Azeri citizens. Turkey’s Ambassador in Baku, Hulusi Kılıç, said that in countries where Azerbaijan has no diplomatic mission Azeri citizens could receive diplomatic services from Turkish missions. Elhan Poluhov, spokesman for the Azeri Foreign Ministry, said that Turkey’s friendly proposal for providing services to Azeri citizens was  accepted by his ministry.

    Source:  Newspot, No 95, June 2009

  • Stuttgart court convicts three members of Turkish terror organization

    Stuttgart court convicts three members of Turkish terror organization

    The Stuttgart state court Friday convicted three men for being members of a banned Turkish leftist group and of supporting its terrorist activities.
    The Stuttgart ruling is another blow for the DHKP-C

    The Stuttgart state court Friday convicted three men for being members of a banned Turkish leftist group and of supporting its terrorist activities.

    The court ruled that the three were all high-ranking members in the outlawed Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), a group which investigators say seeks to overthrow the present Turkish government and replace it with a Marxist one.

    Membership in a foreign terror organization carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.

    The group features on the terror lists of Turkey, the European Union and the United States.

    As part of a plea agreement in which they confessed to involvement with the group, Hasan S. (46) was sentenced to two years and 11 months in prison. Mustafa A. (52) and Ilhan D. (40) who were also convicted of forging documents, were given five years and three-and-a-half years respectively. Hasan S. and Mustafa A. are Turkish nationals. Ilhan D. is a German national of Turkish origin.

    After the sentencing, Mustafa A. and Ilhan D. walked free from the courtroom as they had already served their time in detention before and during the trial which lasted 15 months.

    The DHKP-C is believed to have orchestrated attacks on Turkish institutions in Germany as well as on purported “enemies” of the group until it was banned in August 1998.

    The following year, the group’s general secretary, Dursan Karatas, said that it would no longer use violence to achieve its political aims.

    The DHKP-C is also accused of masterminding a wave of hunger strikes among left-wing prison inmates and their friends and families in Turkey that has resulted in nearly 70 deaths in four years.

    Convictions follow extradition of regional leader

    The convictions in Stuttgart come after Hasan Huseyin K., the suspected leader of a regional chapter of the DHKP-C in Germany, was extradited to Germany from the Netherlands in June.

    He was accused of belonging to a terrorist organization and also faced charges of extortion and of beating and shooting two political dissidents in a Hamburg restaurant.

    The DHKP-C is believed to have some 650 members and supporters in Germany.

    nda/AP/dpa

    Editor:  Susan Houlton

    Source: www.dw-world.de, 07.08.2009

  • The call of the pipes: Putin in Turkey

    The call of the pipes: Putin in Turkey

    15:48 07/08/2009

    MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin) – Things are now so mixed up in the pipe and gas business that it is difficult to see where pipes begin and politics ends.

    Vladimir Putin’s one-day visit to Ankara was balanced on precisely such pipe and politics considerations. Plus the peaceful atom: Russia will now be building for Turkey its first nuclear power plant near Akkuyu on the Mediterranean coast.

    To judge from the scale and trend of the documents signed, Ankara will soon turn into a huge energy-handling hub between Russia and the European Union in the southern sector. Now in the north we have Germany and Nord Stream, and in the south, Turkey and South Stream. Two friendships, Nordic and Ottoman.

    Turkey has long been a regional heavyweight, and Porte’s added “gas weight” will only strengthen it in this role. In recent years Ankara has been increasingly urging Russia to join in a regional forum it conceived for solving crucial Caucasian issues.

    The Caucasus war greatly puzzled Ankara, which has close economic ties both with Georgia and Russia. As a NATO country, Turkey “quietly” supported Georgia, to which it sent its military instructors and is now supplying equipment. But Turkey does not want to lose, let alone reduce or weaken, its ties with Russia either, especially in the current hard economic times. After all, Moscow satisfies 64% of Turkey’s requirements in gas, and can deliver even more.

    If that is not enough, let us bear in mind that more than one million Russians visit Mediterranean Turkish resorts every year, leaving more than $1.42 billion there. Moscow is Turkey’s top foreign economic partner – last year Turkey’s trade with Russia totaled $38 billion. In the next four years, Ankara hopes to bring the figure to $100 billion. One should not mess about with such things.

    By offering itself as a regional platform for settling Russia’s “Caucasian problems,” Ankara is perfectly aware that the Kremlin will not conduct parleys with Mikheil Saakashvili.

    But the Turks, offering their mediating services, very much hope to get Russia’s help in an area where such help cannot be dispensed with: That is a settlement in Nagorny Karabakh and normalization of relations with Armenia. In its turn, this means the involvement of Azerbaijan, which Turkey is also proposing to include, “on the kinship principle,” in the membership of the Caucasian regional forum. Unless the Nagorny Karabakh issue is settled, Turkey will be unable to normalize its relations with Armenia.

    Turkey is being prodded in the same direction by the European Union, or rather Turkey’s hope for admission to the EU (one of Brussels’ conditions is settlement of relations with Armenia), and its own regional economic interests. But the way to a Turkish-Armenian diplomatic thaw is blocked by Azerbaijan, which has long staked out its claim: It will not welcome Turkish diplomatic overtures to Armenia as long as the Nagorny Karabakh issue remains unsolved.

    Only Russia, and this is something everyone realizes, can push Armenia to a softer stance on Nagorny Karabakh. True, Russia will never nudge Armenia to surrender all its interests in Nagorny Karabakh, implying its return to Azerbaijan with broad autonomy rights. That is especially true in the wake of recognizing Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence. So, whether we like it or not, our friendship will only thrive on gas, oil and the peaceful atom.

    South Stream will make Russia and its customers less dependent on transit countries, in particular, Ukraine, because Turkey will not be a transit country technically. In 2013, the pipe will transport 63 billion cubic meters of gas. Investments in the project are estimated at 25 billion euros. Contractors are Russia’s Gazprom and Italy’s ENI, acting on a parity basis. In fact, South Stream’s inauguration ceremony was an affair for three: Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also arrived for the occasion.

    The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

  • Turkey is part of Europe. Fear keeps it out of the EU

    Turkey is part of Europe. Fear keeps it out of the EU

    tariq

    Sarkozy’s argument won’t wash. This great nation, a crucial link with the Muslim world, would be a major asset for the union

    Tariq Ramadan

    When on his recent visit to Turkey President Obama called for Turkish entry into the European Union, he put his finger on a strategic and cultural sore spot. The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking for the majority position in Europe, was quick to respond: Turkey may one day enjoy a privileged relationship with the EU, but full membership is out of the question. Turkey is not European – geographically or culturally.

    Interpretations of the US stance are numerous and contradictory, but they highlight deep tensions within Europe on the issue. Some believe the US is concerned primarily with securing access to the energy reserves of the Caspian basin; others suspect Washington of using Turkish alignment with American policy (by way of Nato) to exert pressure on its European allies; still others see an attempt to weaken Europe by placing a Turkish economic, demographic and cultural millstone around its neck.

    None of these hypotheses is wholly accurate or inaccurate. Nevertheless, they do reveal Europe’s continuing contortions over its identity and its future. The Turkish question rarely figures in the foreground of European debate today, yet its spectre hovers over discussions of “European identity”, “immigration” and the “Muslim question”.

    Political parties that call for an increasingly narrow view of Europe are gaining ground. These parties promote a strictly Judeo-Christian perspective of European history, mistrust of Islam, repressive hardline immigration policies and reject a Turkey they claim is overpopulated and excessively Muslim.

    Europeans have become fearful. Economic crisis has brought with it calls for greater security and for protection of purchasing power, and from “foreigners” and “immigrants”, who are seen as threatening financial stability and cultural homogeneity. Seen from this perspective, the Turkish question reveals both centripetal (a sense of “standing together” against outside threats) and centrifugal (a lack of shared strategic or foreign policy orientations) forces within the EU.

    The arguments that locate Turkey outside European history and geography cannot withstand analysis. For more than four centuries the Ottoman empire shared and shaped the political and strategic future of the continent. During the late 19th and early 20th century, it became the “sick man of Europe”. Even today, Turkey’s historical and economic influence continues to be substantial.

    No one is likely to be fooled by attempts to redraw the geographical boundaries of Europe for ideological or political purposes. If we were to apply the same criteria across the board, Cyprus would not be part of Europe. Such artificial distinctions ignore history, just as they ignore the realities of European society itself, where national origins, memories and cultures have long met and blended. Approximately 40% of Turkey’s population is of European origin; millions of Turks have already acquired the nationality of a European country.

    We must look elsewhere for the real issues, and we must look them in the eye. Instead of being obsessed by the question of culture and religion, European leaders would be better advised to develop a forward-looking strategic vision. Given its close ties with Iran, Syria, Iraq and central Asia, Turkey simply cannot be ignored. Its economic and military clout should be integrated into a European policy based on good-neighbourly relations and stability in Asia and the Middle East.

    On two recent occasions the Turkish government has refused to bow to Washington, demonstrating a distinct capacity for independent action. Europe can hardly fault the US for its unilateral behaviour while failing to develop an autonomous foreign policy of its own. Where there should be a unified European voice, there is a discordant chorus. The US, China and India have no reason to fear European power. Divided, lacking a common policy, Europe succeeds only in working against itself.

    Meanwhile, commercial ties between Turkey and the European countries have continued to expand. Between 1990 and 2003, Turkish imports from Europe grew threefold, while exports quadrupled. Better trade management within the framework of an EU-wide economic policy should make these ties stronger and more competitive. The countries of Europe are facing an acute, long-term manpower shortage. Writing in internal EU publications, some specialists now argue the labour market will require an additional 15 million workers in the next 20 years. Europe needs immigration. Instead of adopting restrictive immigration policies that would criminalise both undocumented and legal immigrants, the EU should be moving toward realistic and responsible regulation. In this light Turkey, with its human resources, would prove a powerful ally.

    It is time for the countries of Europe to overcome their fear of Islam; time for them to stop turning Turkish EU membership into a cultural battleground. The only criteria to membership should be those of Copenhagen (1993) – and a European commission report (2004) mentioned that Turkey is very close to satisfying them. European politicians are ready to ignore their countries’ long-term socioeconomic needs in order to respond to the short-term religious and cultural fears of their constituencies. Millions of women and men are already European and Muslim; Turkish EU membership would be nothing new, and present no dangers. Islam is, de facto, a European religion; culturally, politically and economically, Turkey forms an integral part of its future.

    We need courageous European politicians who will develop a new vision of Turkish-EU relations, who will remind their citizens that Turkey, by virtue of its economic power, geography, history and natural position as go-between with the “Muslim world”, is a major asset for Europe and for its future. Instead of waiting until historical necessity forces the EU to incorporate Turkey, European statesmen should be working together to develop a clear, reasonable policy leading to Turkish membership – one that would respect political principles and recognise cultural and religious diversity. Welcoming Turkey into the EU would mean Europe would have to reconcile itself with its own principles: the principles it has all too often betrayed in practice.

    Source: www.guardian.co.uk, 06.08.2009

  • Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    Turkey and Russia Conclude Energy Deals

    a1Published: August 6, 2009

    ISTANBUL — Russia and Turkey concluded energy agreements on Thursday that will support Turkey’s drive to become a regional hub for fuel transshipments while helping Moscow maintain its monopoly on natural gas shipments from Asia to Europe.

    Turkey granted the Russian natural gas giant Gazprom use of its territorial waters in the Black Sea, under which the company wants to route its so-called South Stream pipeline to gas markets in Eastern and Southern Europe.

    In return, a Russian oil pipeline operator agreed to join a consortium to build a pipeline across the Anatolian Peninsula, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and Gazprom affirmed a commitment to expand an existing Black Sea gas pipeline for possible transshipment across Turkey to Cyprus or Israel.

    Energy companies in both countries agreed to a joint venture to build conventional electric power plants, and the Interfax news agency in Russia reported that Prime MinisterVladimir V. Putin offered to reopen talks on Russian assistance to Turkey in building nuclear power reactors.

    The agreements were signed in Ankara, the Turkish capital, in meetings between Mr. Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Italy’s prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, who has joined Mr. Putin on several energy projects, attended the ceremony. The Italian company Eni broke ground on the trans-Anatolian oil pipeline this year.

    While the offer of specific pipeline deals and nuclear cooperation represented a new tactic by Mr. Putin, the wider struggle for dominance of the Eurasian pipelines is a long-running chess match in which he has often excelled.

    As he has in the past, Mr. Putin traveled to Turkey with his basket of tempting strategic and economic benefits immediately after a similar mission by his opponents. A month ago, European governments signed an agreement in Turkey to support the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline, which would compete directly with the South Stream project.

    By skirting Russian territory, the Nabucco pipeline would undercut Moscow’s monopoly on European natural gas shipments and the pricing power and political clout that come with it. That may explain why Nabucco, which cannot go forward without Turkey’s support, has encountered a variety of obstacles thrown up by the Russian government, including efforts to deny it vital gas supplies in the East and a customer base in the West.

    Turkey and other countries in the path of Nabucco have been eager players in this geopolitical drama, entertaining offers from both sides. Turkish authorities have even tried, without much success, to leverage the pipeline negotiations to further Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, while keeping options with Russia open, too.

    “These countries are more than happy to sign agreements with both parties,” Ana Jelenkovic, an analyst at Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, said in a telephone interview from London. “There’s no political benefit to shutting out or ceasing energy relations with Russia.”

    Under the deal Mr. Putin obtained Thursday, Gazprom will be allowed to proceed with seismic and environmental tests in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone, necessary preliminary steps for laying the South Stream pipe, Prime Minister Erdogan said at a news conference.

    After the meeting, Mr. Putin said, “We agreed on every issue.”

    The trans-Anatolian oil pipeline also marginally improves Russia’s position in the region. The pipeline is one of two so-called Bosporus bypass systems circumventing the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, which are operating at capacity in tanker traffic.

    The preferred Western route is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which allows companies to ship Caspian Basin crude oil to the West without crossing Russian territory; the pipeline instead crosses the former Soviet republic of Georgia and avoids the crowded straits by cutting across Turkey to the Mediterranean.

    Russia prefers northbound pipelines out of the Caspian region that terminate at tanker terminals on the Black Sea. The success of this plan depends, in turn, on creating additional capacity in the Bosporus bypass routes. Russia is backing two such pipelines.

    Mr. Putin’s offer to move ahead with a Russian-built nuclear power plant in Turkey suggests a sweetening of the overall Russian offer on energy deals with Turkey, while both Western and Russian proposals are on the table.

    The nuclear aspect of the deal drew protests. About a dozen Greenpeace protesters were surrounded by at least 200 armored police officers in central Ankara on Thursday.

    Andrew E. Kramer contributed reporting from Moscow.

    The New York Times
  • In Their Own Words: PKK Leaders on Peace, Dialogue, and the United States

    In Their Own Words: PKK Leaders on Peace, Dialogue, and the United States

    By Soner Cagaptay and Ata Akiner
    July 29, 2009


    Intent on resolving its ongoing Kurdish problem, Turkey launched a peace initiative last spring that includes measures to disarm the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a group listed by the State Department as a foreign terrorist organization. But does the PKK want peace? The following statements by top PKK leaders provide insight into the group’s intentions, the prospects for peace, and the implications for the United States.

    On Violence and Peace
    • “Some intellectuals and writers are renewing calls for the disarmament of the PKK and pulling it outside Turkey’s borders. But what they do not understand is that the most that can happen is a ceasefire, and for a ceasefire to take place, there must be the desire to do so.”

    — Abdullah Ocalan, founder and leader of the PKK, currently imprisoned in Turkey, January 4, 2009

    • “If a solution does not develop, I will withdraw myself from the process. In a month or month and a half, things might take a different direction. Until autumn, much might change. If a war breaks out, ‘Kurdistan’ will secede. We defend peace, and those who do not bring peace will be responsible. The Kurds cannot accept the status quo in Turkey. A war would cause both sides to lose, the people would lose. Afghanistan and Pakistan’s situation is clear, for example.”

    — Abdullah Ocalan, July 17, 2009

    • “On the other hand, surrendering weapons is not even a subject of discussion. The guerillas [his term for PKK members] will never surrender their weapons. Within a democratic system, guerillas would take up a position of responsibility and duty. This is because guerillas are the true defense forces of the Kurdish people. If the guerillas gave up their weapons, then we will go back to the situation thirty years ago, to the time before the PKK.”

    “Without an indigenous defense — in other words, without the guerillas — the Kurdish people would surrender themselves to imperialists and murderers. The Kurdish people would, of course, never accept that.”

    “If a general amnesty would include giving leader Apo [Abdullah Ocalan] his freedom, then the PKK might consider a ceasefire, like in 1999, but it will not give up its weapons.”

    — Duran Kalkan, senior PKK leader, June 23, 2009

    • “We always talk about the struggle for peace. The people are leading the fight for peace, they call for peace. Our stance has been and remains: ‘The road to peace goes through resistance in the mountains.’ Those who want to win peace must take to the mountains. I believe the situation is very clear. If there are peace talks now, this is only because there has been freedom fighting in the mountains, and they derive from the strength of the guerillas. Therefore, for peace to win, the guerilla forces must become even stronger.”

    — Duran Kalkan, June 24, 2009

    • “First off, such a thing as disarmament is meaningless. Instead of disarmament, we can talk of undertaking new duties. Within this framework, the reorganization of the guerillas can be kept on the agenda . . . [and] of course the Kurdish people will always need to be defended. In order to live free and democratically, to be organized, to ensure their survival, to look toward the future securely, they need their own defense forces. Without this, how can our community defend itself?”

    — Duran Kalkan, March 18, 2009

    • “Our people must prepare for 2009 as if it is going to be a year of war, and get ready for all out resistance against attacks meant to destroy and massacre them. Our people must build on their inherent defense knowledge and organization to prepare themselves.”

    “We have never asked to be pardoned, and do not want to be either.”

    — Feyman Huseyin (Bahoz Erdal), top military leader in the PKK, January 2, 2009

    On What the PKK Wants
    • “Either the Kurds will become independent or not live at all. This is the decision reached by the Kurdish people.”

    — Cemal Bayik, senior PKK leader, June 18, 2009

    • “So if there are Kurds and a Kurdish problem, then this is a problem on a societal level. It is now being said that this problem will be solved not at such a level but as an individual rights problem. Besides that, they say the PKK is a terrorist organization and must be eliminated by force. . . . this means war.”

    — Murat Karayilan, acting leader of the PKK, June 8, 2009

    On the U.S. and International Role
    • “If the will of resistance of the Kurds is broken, Europe, Turkey, the United States, and Israel are waiting in ambush. They would finish us off.”

    — Abdullah Ocalan, June 19, 2009

    • “The United States and England are still trying to conduct politics over my back. They might bring more dangerous and effective leaders against us [Kurds]. The conspiracy continues, and this bothers me greatly.”

    — Abdullah Ocalan, July 17, 2009

    • “Capitalism has turned human beings into donkeys. . . . What about this system is defensible? The United States and Europe are those responsible for this order. They have caused a situation worse than the Greek occupation.”

    — Abdullah Ocalan, July 10, 2009

    • “If Turkey had realistic politicians, they would ask themselves and consider why the United States and France do not want a solution to the [Kurdish] problem. Instead, Turkish politicians think, ‘how nice, these countries are supporting us.’ They think that with the military, economic, and political support given to them they can dispatch the PKK. But I must respond to them that you cannot eliminate the PKK; this is impossible. . . . Those who support Turkey know very well that the PKK cannot be destroyed. Their goal is to ensure that the status quo remains, so that things remain unresolved. It is for this reason that they support Turkey.”

    — Murat Karayilan, June 27, 2009

    • “The Turkish government already has a joint political agenda with ‘Southern Kurdistan,’ the United States, and Iraq. Purportedly in the south there are currently efforts being made to make the PKK either lay down their arms or destroy them.”

    — Cemal Bayik, June 19, 2009

    • “We are doing everything we can in the name of dialogue and a peaceful resolution. But against us is an approach that does not accept peace for the Kurds. And the United States wants things to stay unresolved, to stay as they are. They are to blame for this.”

    — Murat Karayilan, June 16, 2009

    Policy Implications for the United States
    The PKK’s anti-Americanism, an often overlooked phenomenon rooted in the group’s persistent communist pedigree, has led the PKK to ratchet up its rhetoric against the United States. Washington should continue to monitor the group, as the PKK’s anti-Americanism will only grow stronger given that the United States does not support its stance.

    Ultimately, it is up to Turkey to decide how to deal with the PKK. Washington, however, might be well served to stay out of the current initiative. If the United States is seen as shepherding the process while PKK violence continues in the background, Turks may perceive — however falsely — that a U.S.-supported peace initiative is a sham. Washington should be careful not to take ownership of the current initiative to prevent the already debilitated U.S. image from being further damaged in Turkey.
    =============================================================
    Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. Ata Akiner is a research intern in that program.

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