Turkish Forum

Category: Turkey

  • Low-income Turks take early crisis blows

    Low-income Turks take early crisis blows

    Turkey Pulse
    Mustafa Sonmez September 17, 2018
    Article Summary
    Turkey’s economic turmoil is already bruising millions of minimum wage earners, who are grappling with a flurry of price hikes and the prospect of losing jobs.

    Following six consecutive quarters of high growth rates, Turkey’s economy appears to be coursing toward stagnation and, ultimately, contraction, as all leading indicators have been pointing to a slowdown since July. For decades, Turkey has had one of the world’s most unfair income distributions. The working classes have taken the hardest blow during times of economic turmoil, responding by voting against the ruling party in the first elections.

    Though Turks went to the polls as recently as June, economic grievances did not figure prominently in the votes of roughly half of the electorate, which backed President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Yet, popular discontent has grown fast since then amid surging inflation, company bankruptcies, loan repayment woes and uncertainty over what the country’s economic future holds. Ankara’s extensive control of the media and judiciary — and the more oppressive nature of the presidential system that took effect in June — are discouraging street protests and other public expressions of discontent, but an undercurrent of resentment is clearly growing.

    The muttering in low-income groups is rising primarily over the flurry of price hikes that Turks have come to encounter at the markets. Year-on-year consumer inflation hit nearly 18% in August, becoming increasingly ossified in a way that Turkey has not witnessed in many years.

    Producer inflation is even higher, standing at 32%, which is an omen that consumer prices could rise even further in the coming months. Retailers say they have done their best to minimize the effect of producer hikes on consumer prices, but note they have reached the limit, reinforcing expectations that inflation would hit 20% by the year-end.

    Among emerging economies, Turkey’s inflation is comparable only to that of Argentina, which is already under the watch of the International Monetary Fund. While prices soar, few Turks can hope for pay hikes matching the inflation rate. Out of the 19 million wage earners who make up 70% of the labor force, only about 3 million public employees enjoy some inflation-related pay adjustments, in addition to about 10 million pensioners. For the remaining 16 million wage earners in the private sector, such an adjustment facility does not exist. Moreover, only about 1 million of them are unionized, standing a chance of some organized effort to secure pay hikes. The overwhelming majority of 15 million wage earners are on their own.

    Worse, more than 60% of wage earners work for the minimum wage of 1,600 Turkish liras or even less, according to the micro data of labor statistics by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). This is equivalent to $246, based on the dollar’s average price of 6.5 liras this month — a 42% decrease from the $426 that the minimum wage was worth at the beginning of the year.

    According to the TUIK, the average home rent in Turkey is 1,000 liras, including related fees. Hence, a wage earner’s family needs the equivalent of at least two minimum wages to scratch along or second jobs for extra income or other forms of support. But even this is not enough to protect their purchasing power against 18% inflation, meaning that those families are growing relatively poorer.

    The gloomy picture is now compounded by the risk of losing jobs. The growth rate is falling fast in sectors such as construction, agriculture, tourism and services, where minimum wage earners are heavily employed. Despite the 5.2% overall growth rate in the second quarter announced this week, the agricultural sector regressed by 1.5%, and the construction sector grew only 0.8%. The momentum loss in the manufacturing industry was also significant. Official figures for the third quarter are not yet available, but the pace of growth is known to be sharply falling.

    Non-agricultural unemployment currently stands at more than 12.5%, and it will hardly be a surprise if the figure reaches 14-15% when the figures for August and September are released. The real fears, however, are about the fourth quarter, when a sharper contraction and layoffs are expected. For many families, losing jobs would mean an intolerable situation.

    On top of all those risks, low-income groups are grappling with debt woes stemming from a loan bonanza that Turks had until several years ago as the banking sector was able to borrow for cheap from abroad. A significant increase in credit card use and consumer loans has saddled Turkish households with a hefty debt burden. According to figures by the Turkish Banks Association, the credit card and loan debt of households stands at some 567 billion Turkish liras ($92.5 billion). Setting aside the 244-billion-lira debt linked to car and home loans (which are presumed to belong to the more well-off), the debt in credit cards and personal finance loans — which is generally considered to belong to lower income groups — emerges as 323 billion liras ($52.7 billion).

    Non-performing loans are already close to 6%, and litigations are on the rise. For both debtors and banks, the repayment problem raises the grave prospect of sequestration, which could lead many to lose homes, cars and even domestic appliances.

    In sum, although the crisis has only reared its head, low-income groups are already under severe strain. It is important to note that those groups represent an important segment in the AKP electorate. How long their credit to the AKP will last or how much patience they will show is hard to predict. Yet, local elections are looming in March 2019. Will the voters punish the AKP at the ballot boxes? Could the government temper the crisis until March? These are a few of the questions that will hover in the coming months.

    Found in: Turkish economy

    Mustafa Sonmez is a Turkish economist and writer. He has worked as an economic commentator and editor for more than 30 years and authored some 30 books on the Turkish economy, media and the Kurdish question.

  • China, U.S.: The Trade Fight Escalates With New Rounds of Tariffs

    China, U.S.: The Trade Fight Escalates With New Rounds of Tariffs

    Sep 19, 2018 | 14:44 GMT

    snapshot asia pacific 142
    The Big Picture

    Trade frictions between the United States and China have intensified during the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. As Stratfor’s 2018 Fourth-Quarter Forecast indicated, Trump added to a series of tariffs, which, along with other pressure tactics, are part of the broader U.S. strategic competition with China. But despite its slowing economy, China has proved willing to respond with tariffs and non-tariff measures alike. Although both sides have indicated their willingness to negotiate, neither has backed away from the fight.

    What Happened

    The trade war between China and the United States has escalated yet again. Just hours after U.S. President Donald Trump said he was following through on his threat to slap new tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, China responded by announcing tariffs on $60 billion in U.S. products. The U.S. tariffs, 10 percent on a range of goods including electronic and machinery products that are part of the Made-in-China 2025 program targeted by Trump, as well as some consumer products such as furniture and household appliances, would take effect Sept. 24 and would increase to 25 percent on Jan. 1, 2019. As he announced the latest round of tariffs on Sept. 17, Trump added that if China responded in kind, he would begin the process of authorizing tariffs on a further $267 billion in Chinese imports. Thus, with China’s announcement the next day, it appears that their battle over trade is likely only to intensify.

    Since the White House first proposed this round of U.S. tariffs in July, the list of goods it would affect has been adjusted to exclude some more sensitive consumer goods such as smartwatches and Bluetooth devices, sensitive consumer safety items like car seats, and critical raw materials like rare earth metals. China, meanwhile, lowered its own threatened tariff rates from an original 5 to 25 percent, to 5 to 10 percent. But those tariffs still will affect agricultural and chemical products, metals and other exports designed to inflict pain on U.S. farmers, and they will still target the industrial and pharmaceutical sectors. China is also pursuing non-tariff methods to retaliate against U.S. trade pressure, including imposing lengthy cargo inspections for U.S. imports, slowing customs clearance times and undertaking cumbersome regulatory approvals of U.S. businesses hoping to operate in China. Chinese officials have also proposed adding export restrictions on certain metals critical to U.S. industries.

    Why It Matters

    With both the United States and China upping the ante, and with the United States pursuing a long-term strategic economic competition to balance against China, their trade battle is unlikely to end anytime soon. Two rounds of negotiations since May aimed at settling their differences have failed. Last week, the U.S. Treasury Department proposed holding another round of talks, and the Chinese government was reportedly considering the plan. But the latest tariff round could take those talks off the table. Both the White House and Beijing have said they remain open to negotiations, but their positions on trade remain far apart.

    The Trump administration has calculated that as trade tensions escalate, China’s cooling economy would make Beijing more willing to consider concessions and agree to structural economic reforms. After all, in earlier talks, Beijing offered to take steps to reduce the U.S.-China trade deficit and to loosen market access restrictions, allowing U.S. companies to compete in such sectors as banking, security and insurance. But Beijing has steadfastly refused to budge on Washington’s core demands for structural economic reforms. Instead, in a bid to strengthen its negotiating position as the trade tension escalates, Beijing instead has chosen to impose greater costs on U.S. companies operating in China and to further restrict their access. More importantly, Beijing increasingly is taking the view that the trade war is just one part of the overall U.S. strategy to contain China’s rise and prevent it from gaining the upper hand in technology.

    Political pressure is mounting on Chinese President Xi Jinping to hold firm against making significant concessions to the United States. China is likely hoping that the pinch of higher prices for U.S. consumers and industries as midterm U.S. elections near will compel the White House to change tactics. But given Trump’s ideological opposition to trade deficits and the internal divisions within his administration in dealing with China, Beijing’s approach may instead only complicate potential talks down the road.

    What To Look for Next

    • China has yet to publicly decline the Treasury Department’s proposal for a third round of trade talks, to which Beijing had considered sending Vice Minister of Commerce Wang Shouwen. The timing and nature of China’s response to the U.S. invitation and who, exactly, would be chosen to represent the U.S. side will determine whether the talks offer any chance to de-escalate the trade dispute.
    • It will be important to note whether China pursues even more aggressive non-tariff measures against U.S. companies operating there and to watch for signs that U.S. and foreign companies are rethinking their supply chain strategy.
    • U.S. business groups could pursue possible legal challenges to the White House’s approach to tariffs, saying that additional tariffs would violate the administration’s statute authority under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The administration has used that law to justify tariffs on China on national security grounds. Instead, the groups argue, any further rounds of tariffs would first require an entirely new Section 301 investigation to have legal authority.
  • A Deal Between Turkey and Russia Won’t Stop the Crisis in Idlib

    A Deal Between Turkey and Russia Won’t Stop the Crisis in Idlib

    Sep 19, 2018 | 09:00 GMT

    This photo, taken on Sept. 9, 2018, shows destruction in the town of al-Habit on the edges of rebel-held Idlib province.
    (OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP/Getty Images)
    Highlights
    • A deal over Syria’s Idlib province will prevent Russian-backed loyalist forces from launching an offensive there and will defuse the growing crisis between Turkey and Russia.
    • The Syrian government, Iran and the jihadist factions among the rebels will try to undermine the agreement.
    • As a result, Idlib will remain unstable and the threat of military operations around the province will continue.

    Russia and Turkey have come to an agreement over Syria’s last rebel stronghold, Idlib. Following their latest round of talks in Sochi, Russia, on Sept. 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced their deal to set up a 15- to 20-kilometer (9.3- to 12.4-mile) jointly patrolled demilitarized zone around the province by mid-October. The agreement, which will prevent Russian-backed loyalist forces from launching a major offensive to reclaim Idlib from the rebels, stands to ease tensions between Russia and Turkey. Nevertheless, the standoff over Idlib is far from resolved, and numerous obstacles remain that could undermine the deal.

    The Big Picture

    The fate of Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in the Syrian civil war, will help determine the future of the conflict. Not only could Idlib make or break Turkey’s relationship with Russia, but it could also draw in external powers and drag the war beyond Syria’s borders.

    Reaching a Compromise

    Russia agreed to the deal out of a desire to preserve its relationship with Turkey. The Turkish government opposed the Russian-backed operation on Idlib, which would have deprived it of a buffer zone in northern Syria while also driving millions of Syrian refugees into its territory. To try to avert the operation, Ankara reinforced its 12 observation posts in and around Idlib and promised its rebel allies in the region more supplies and support. Russia still could have maintained its backing for the Syrian military attacks on the province, striving to avoid a direct confrontation with Turkish forces by steering clear of their observation posts. But given the high risk of accidental strikes on Turkish troops — and the damage they would cause relations with Turkey — Moscow instead opted for a compromise with Ankara. By avoiding significant offensive operations in Idlib, moreover, Russia reduced the chances that the Syrian government would carry out another chemical attack on Idlib’s rebel forces, thereby warding off dangerous strikes from the United States and its allies.

    Though the agreement accomplished Ankara’s goal of deterring a major assault on Idlib, it is not without its costs for Turkey. Turkey, for instance, has openly promised to work to drive out rebel forces from the demilitarized zone around Idlib as part of the deal. In addition, it has probably assured Moscow privately that it would do more to crack down on the extremist groups still operating in the province, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria. These groups and their regional affiliates not only include many Chechen and Uighur militants among their ranks — a source of concern for Russia and China, respectively — but they also have spearheaded attacks against Russian forces in Syria. In several strikes, for example, they used drones to drop rudimentary explosives onto the Russian air base at Latakia.

    Complications

    The extremist groups’ reaction to the deal will pose the most immediate obstacle to its success. Having maintained their ties with Turkey, jihadist organizations like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkistan Islamic Party will face considerable pressure from Ankara to withdraw from Idlib. Their cooperation is hardly guaranteed, however. The groups have long been wary of Turkey’s intentions and are aware of its efforts to set up a rebel coalition, the National Front for Liberation, to balance and eventually replace them in the fight. Furthermore, giving up front-line positions and quietly withdrawing from the demilitarized zone would contradict their hard-line ideological stance in the fight against the Syrian government. By compromising their beliefs in this way, the groups could risk further splintering and lose recruits to al Qaeda affiliate Hurras al-Deen or to lingering Islamic State cells in the region.

    On the other side of the zone, Russia’s allies Iran and the Syrian government will also challenge the deal. Tehran and Damascus have been keen to get Russia’s backing for a full-scale offensive on Idlib and will not be pleased with the agreement, though they may publicly endorse it. Motivated to destroy the deal and weaken Russia’s relationship with Turkey, the Syrian government could, with Iran’s help, start skirmishes with rebel forces or even launch its own attacks in the region under the pretense of responding to strikes by the extremist groups there. All these constraints mean that violence and instability will continue to grip the region, even without the prospect of a major offensive on Idlib.

  • Turkey Room for Reconciliation With Washington? – Diverging Interests in Syria –

    Turkey Room for Reconciliation With Washington? – Diverging Interests in Syria –

    TURKEY AS SEEN BY BY DG RICHARD

    • The recent summit in Tehran between the Iranian, Russian and Turkish leaders revealed the shortcomings in Turkey’s strategy in Syria, which has strained its alliance with the United States.
    • The Turkish government may be able to ease tensions with Washington if it releases Andrew Brunson and the other U.S. citizens it has detained.
    • Nevertheless, the damage of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s risky international and economic policies has already been done, and it will continue to add up if the leader continues his personalized approach to governing.

    The limits and detriments of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s one-man rule are becoming increasingly clear. Under Turkey’s new executive presidential system, Erdogan has faced a barrage of crises. Turkey’s shaky alliance with Russia has shown signs of strain, and its relations with the United States have continued to falter. U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, in fact, stands ready to impose more sanctions on Turkey if Erdogan’s government fails to release American detainees by mid-October. For the beleaguered Turkish economy, the additional sanctions could be crippling — though in the meantime, Erdogan continues to pressure the central bank not to raise interest rates, against the recommendations of his economic advisers. The net result of Ankara’s posture has been the devaluation of the national currency, the lira, by about half this year.

    Given the costs of his foreign and economic policies, Erdogan’s recalcitrant stance and obstreperous persona on the international stage seem to run counter to Turkey’s interests. But not to Erdogan’s. The Turkish president is acting out of little more than a desire to appear strong and to defy perceived opponents, including allies. His objective is to preserve his image at home as a leader who can overcome any problem and thwart any challenge to Turkey’s global ambitions.

    Diverging Interests in Syria

    The Tehran summit, a meeting on Sept. 7 between Russian, Turkish and Iranian leaders to discuss the Syrian civil war, revealed the rifts among the three participating countries. As Syrian government forces, with support from Russia and Iran, prepare for an impending military operation on the last rebel stronghold in Idlib, Turkey fears that a fresh wave of refugees will cross its borders to flee the offensive. It is also concerned that the operation will destroy the Free Syrian Army, a rebel outfit Turkey has been supporting in an effort to prevent Kurdish forces from establishing an autonomous region. With these issues in mind, Erdogan proposed a cease-fire in Idlib to halt the attacks on rebel forces. But Russia is eager to end the Syrian civil war by eliminating the insurgent forces and restoring control of all territory in the country to President Bashar al Assad. As a result, Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected and mocked Erdogan’s suggestion at the summit, in front of video cameras broadcasting the event live.

    Erdogan, in turn, has warned of “consequences” for the Idlib offensive. The threat, however, is an empty one. Turkey will not fight back against Syrian government forces because Russia and Iran support them. In addition, Moscow controls the skies over Idlib. The United States, meanwhile, has signaled that its only red line on the Idlib battle is the use of chemical weapons. Turkey has a lot at stake in Syria, whether in the number of refugees coming across its border, in the threat of Kurdish separatist movements or in the economic opportunities that postwar reconstruction has to offer Turkish companies. But in the drama unfolding around Idlib, Ankara will probably face a scenario where al Assad reasserts his authority over Syria with no guarantee that his government will consider how its actions affect Turkey.

    Reacting to these developments, Erdogan has blasted the United States and its support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, also known by its Kurdish initials as the YPG, which it blames entirely for Turkey’s failures in Syria. The move is intended only to satisfy the Turkish public and to portray Erdogan as a principled and steadfast leader. In the process, though, it has ensured that Turkey cannot achieve its desired goals in Syria, while isolating Ankara from the United States and Russia alike.

    Room for Reconciliation With Washington?

    Turkey may still be able to turn its relationship with the United States around if it heeds the Trump administration’s calls to free the Americans Ankara has detained. The case of Andrew Brunson — an American pastor arrested in Turkey nearly two years ago in the wake of the country’s failed military coup — is of particular interest to Trump and to his evangelical support base. The next hearing in the case is scheduled for mid-October, at which time Ankara is expected to release Brunson. Judicial officials recently replaced the judge overseeing Brunson’s case, suggesting that Erdogan is working to facilitate his release. Brunson, however, is just one of the detained U.S. citizens whose release Washington has demanded. (For that matter, the detainees are but one of several issues straining the U.S.-Turkish alliance, including Ankara’s plans to purchase the Russian-made S-400 air defense missile system.)

    The U.S. citizens’ arrests, with no credible evidence to support them, were political from the start; Erdogan believed that he could use the captives as a bargaining chip against Washington. By holding out so long on the Brunson case, and those of the other American detainees, Erdogan demonstrated his strength against U.S. pressure while also sending domestic audiences the message that the Turkish judiciary remains independent. But now that the Trump administration has threatened unprecedented sanctions on Turkey, Erdogan’s back is up against a wall. Ankara is quickly running out of options to maintain its credibility on the global stage and to salvage its domestic economy. Though it has tried palliative measures, such as rhetorical overtures to convince the European Union of its enduring interest in joining the bloc, these are impulsive rather than strategic moves. Erdogan’s insistence on noninstitutional, personalistic and norm-defying leadership has come at a heavy cost to Turkey — one that is only getting steeper.

  • Russia’s Ekaterinburg joins the final race to host EXPO 2025

    Russia’s Ekaterinburg joins the final race to host EXPO 2025

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    In less than 50 days the EXPO-2025 Committee will name the Planet’s Exhibition host city. Among the final candidates are Russia’s Ekaterinburg, Azerbaijan’s Baku and Japan’s Osaka. While demonstration concepts of Baku and Osaka are designed to present the city innovations, the exposition of Ekaterinburg will show the best solutions and technologies of Russia as a whole.

    Why does Russia need EXPO?

    The choice of Russia’s candidate city Ekaterinburg is truly deliberate. Located on the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Ekaterinburg is seen as a geographical center of Russia. As Russia’s political and economic compass is set to the East, hosting the planet’s exhibition in Ekaterinburg will help Moscow strengthen its economic and trade ties with China, Japan and other global economies in the East. Moreover, Russia’s officials say they are going to keep the exposition after the Expo is over and turn Ekaterinburg into a global museum that will attract thousands of tourists. Some experts believe that Ekaterinburg has higher chances to win the Planet’s Expo as it recently showed its capacity and excellent organization to host global events during the World Cup. Due to the city’s compact and convenient infrastructure, Ekaterinburg was able to receive up to 40K tourists a day during the FIFA WC-2018.

    City 4.0

    The EXPO venue will host the Ural Engineering School, e.g. the innovations booths for scientific research and investigation in math, physics, biology and other sciences. “The concept of such booths is attractive both for experienced scientists and small children who are in search of their vocation”, said Ivan Burtnik, the head of the project office of the EXPO-2025 Committee. “There are 17 million people in the world today who live in contaminated areas, 2.4 million do not have access to drinking water, 800 million live in poverty and another 360 million are children who will never have chance to go to school. We must think of it and focus on decreasing these terrific numbers. Today’s global challenge is to keep pace with the industrial development and creating a new formation urban infrastructure, the cities where everyone is healthy and happy. And Ekaterinburg is going to be such model city that will continue its development and growth the World Exhibition”, he added.

  • It’s Time to Hold Myanmar Accountable

    It’s Time to Hold Myanmar Accountable

     

    A year after the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya began, the United States is still dragging its feet.

    By Michael H. Fuchs

    | August 31, 2018, 12:36 PM

    A man stands under an umbrella as monsoon rains arrive in Balukhali refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, on Aug. 28. More than 700,000 Rohingya refugees have fled to Bangladesh. (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)

    The Holocaust. Rwanda. Bosnia. Darfur.

    And now Myanmar, according to a new United Nations report, which accuses the country of carrying out a genocide. It is time for the United States and the world to act.

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    In 2017, Myanmar’s military began a ruthless campaign against Rohingya Muslims, killing thousands and displacing more than 700,000 to Bangladesh. Last week, a year after the massacres, the U.N. fact-finding mission on Myanmar found that the “crimes in Rakhine State [in Myanmar’s west], and the manner in which they were perpetrated, are similar in nature, gravity and scope to those that have allowed genocidal intent to be established in other contexts.”

    Min Aung Hlaing, the commander in chief of Myanmar’s military, made the army’s intentions clear: “The Bengali problem was a long-standing one which has become an unfinished job despite the efforts of the previous governments to solve it. The government in office is taking great care in solving the problem,” he said in a Facebook post during the crackdown. (In Myanmar, Rohingya are commonly referred to as Bengali, although they have lived in Myanmar for generations.) The newly released report recommends the “investigation and prosecution” of senior members of the Myanmar military to “determine their liability for genocide.”

    This genocide took place against the backdrop of Myanmar’s recent steps toward democratic transformation. After decades of repressive military rule, the armed forces began freeing political prisoners, including opposition icon Aung San Suu Kyi, and allowing economic and political reforms—and in 2015, the country held real elections. Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy, won control of the civilian government. Life in Myanmar seemed to be improving. But the democratization process did not reach everyone. The military retained extraordinary powers. And the Rohingya—long persecuted by the majority Buddhist population—remained outsiders, vulnerable to the cruelty of the government.

    The United States supported the democratization process as the best way to promote broad-based progress in Myanmar. After decades of sanctions and isolation, the Obama administration decided to meet action with action, dropping sanctions and providing support for reform each time Myanmar took another positive step, with the intent of supporting the country as long as it remained on that path.

    Today, it is clear that Myanmar is no longer on that path. Whatever good may be accruing for some there through the political reform process must not be bought with the price of genocide. The world must respond.

    There is no guarantee that concerted international action can change Myanmar’s policies—but we must try. The crisis is ongoing, with hundreds of thousands living in refugee camps and thousands more in danger in Myanmar. And after standing by in the face of the crisis a year ago, the world is now also faced with establishing justice and showing Myanmar—and other countries—that genocide will be punished unequivocally, and that the country must change.

    First, the United States must go to the U.N. Security Council to seek a global arms embargo on Myanmar, sanction top military officials, and demand equal legal protections for the Rohingya, the safe return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, and access to Rakhine by international nongovernmental organizations and the U.N.

    Second, the United States should immediately make clear that the civilian government of Myanmar, including Aung San Suu Kyi, will be held to account if it does not take these steps to improve the situation for the Rohingya soon. While the military is the prime mover of these atrocities, as the U.N. report put it, “Through their acts and omissions, the civilian authorities have contributed to the commission of atrocity crimes.”

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    Third, Myanmar should be at the top of the agenda when the United States meets with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations at their semi-annual summit meetings in November. As the State Department official charged with steering the U.S.-ASEAN relationship on a daily basis for three years, I recognize this is a difficult task—ASEAN members will want to protect Myanmar from what they perceive as outside criticism, just as I watched the nations rally around Thailand after the 2014 coup. But these atrocities cannot be swept under the rug, and Muslim-majority ASEAN countries may be inclined to apply more pressure—Indonesia has already raised the issue, and Malaysia has now taken in more than 100,000 Rohingya refugees.

    Fourth, the United States must fundamentally rethink its relationship with Myanmar. In May, Mark Green, the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, said of the Rohingya crisis, “This is a country that I think has tremendous potential. There’s an impediment to that work—and that is the crisis that we’re talking about—but we believe that in the long-term future we can address this impediment.” While a return to the international isolation of previous decades is unlikely to achieve results and should not be on the table, the United States can no longer act as though the Rohingya are but one of many issues Myanmar is struggling with as part of its reform process.

    The international community should shun Myanmar’s military brass and work to ensure the benefits of economic assistance and trade do not go to the military’s coffers, and the United States should make clear that this will continue until persecution of the Rohingya ends.

    The Trump administration has been behind the curve for a year and is likely to keep dragging its feet. Support for more pressure is growing in Congress, but many still fear weakening Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. Furthermore, many senior Trump administration officials view everything in Asia through a lens of competition with China, and the argument that the United States cannot lose influence in Myanmar is likely to hold sway. If the Trump administration does not move quickly, Congress may need to force the administration to act by moving legislation on its own, as it did when it passed sanctions on Russia over Trump’s objections in 2017.

    Looking back, I believe that the United States was right to embrace Myanmar’s political transformation as a genuine opportunity that held promise to improve the lives of millions. The United States consistently pressed Myanmar to improve its treatment of the Rohingya in meetings and in public, but it is clear that it should have done more in the years prior to 2017. The United States failed miserably in responding to the horrors as they unfolded over the course of August and September 2017, when the latest crackdown began. It is difficult to know if a different U.S. policy at any point would have helped prevent the atrocities. But what matters today is that the United States must change course.

    In my time working in the East Asia bureau at the U.S. State Department, I traveled many times to Myanmar and worked closely with colleagues in the civilian government as the country undertook its process of democratization. Citizens and officials I met wanted more reform, more openness, and more opportunities to engage with the United States. I wanted the country to succeed. I still want it to succeed.

    But the Myanmar government has failed not only its Rohingya people—it has failed its entire population. For Myanmar to have a chance to succeed in the future, leaders must be held responsible, and policies must fundamentally change. The United States and the world should not rest until justice is done.

    Michael H. Fuchs is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. From 2013 to 2016, he was a deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.