Category: Turkey

Yalcin Ayasli …. Airline Intrigue With Mueller Tie Lands in US Court

February 21, 2019 ADAM KLASFELD

Yalcin Ayasli poses for a photograph in his New Hampshire office. On Feb. 18, 2019, Ayasli brought a federal racketeering lawsuit over the takeover of his now-shuttered Turkish airline BoraJet.

(CN) – Yalcin Ayasli, a Turkish-American entrepreneur who founded the now-defunct airline BoraJet, amassed a personal fortune that made him a formidable power broker in both his birth and adoptive countries.

That was before he crossed paths with Turkish businessman Sezgin Baran Korkmaz. Korkmaz has ties to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but he is known in the United States for giving testimony in the investigation of Special Counsel Robert Mueller.

On Tuesday, in a federal racketeering complaint replete with globe-spanning intrigue, Ayasli accused Korkmaz of taking over his airline through a campaign of violence, extortion and financial crime.

Korkmaz’s labyrinthine ties to the Turkish elite and the murky underworld of American financing can be encapsulated in a picture.

Taken in 2017, the same year Mueller subpoenaed him for a grand jury in Washington, the photograph shows Korkmaz standing between Erdogan and an accused white-collar criminal.

SBK Holding chief executive Sezgin Baran Korkmaz and Turkish President Erdogan stand from left to right in this September 2017 photo between Jacob Kingston, the chief executive of Washakie Renewable Energy, and Caglar Sendil, the president of Mega Varlik Corp. The U.S. Department of Justice charged Kingston and his brother one year later with cheating the U.S. Treasury out of more than half a billion dollars worth of tax credits, at least $210 million of which they are accused of funneling into Turkey. (Photo by Ihlas Haber Ajansı published with its permission.)

Along with his brother Isaiah, with whom he leads a polygamist Mormon sect, Jacob Kingston is awaiting trial on allegations that he cheated the U.S. Treasury out of more than half a billion dollars worth of tax credits, at least $210 million of which he allegedly funneled into Turkey.

Represented in his 127-page lawsuit by the law firms Jones Day and Sheehan Phinney, Ayasli accuses Korkmaz of running a thuggish campaign to devalue Borajet and then buy out the company with the illicit proceeds at a “fire sale” price using his Istanbul-based SBK Holdings.

The suit is filed in New Hampshire, where Ayasli says he maintains his primary residence in Hillsborough County. Contacted in Turkey via social media, Korkmaz defended his dealings with the now-indicted Kingston clan.

I will disgrace you before the eyes of the whole world.”

AYASLI V. KORKMAZ

“My local bank verified the source of the accounts through the U.S. Federal Reserve,” Korkmaz said. “I invested that money in completely legal companies in Turkey and took every precaution that can be reasonably expected to make sure everything was above board.”

For Korkmaz, the lawsuit against him is “transparent” payback by ex-BoraJet executives. “I have done absolutely nothing wrong other than objecting against being embezzled,” he insisted.

Sheehan Phinney attorney Robert Miller declined to comment on his suit with Ayasli, which accuses Korkmaz of assault, attempted bribery, and threatening to rape and murder Ayasli’s female executive.

Within a span of six months, Ayasli alleges that Korkmaz sent him 137 text messages, including WhatsApp warnings that “You and your wife will look for a place to hide” and “I will disgrace you before the eyes of the whole world.”

The tale told in Ayasli’s lawsuit intersects with two high-profile U.S. criminal cases, hopping across Istanbul, Utah and Virginia.

Born in Turkey’s capital of Ankara, Ayasli studied electrical engineering in his home city before obtaining advanced degrees at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1973. He would live in Massachusetts for about three decades and make his fortune founding Hittite Microwave Corp., a public company that he later sold for $2.45 billion.

“Dr. Ayasli is an individual with a deep sense of pride in his Turkish heritage,” his lawsuit states. “Accordingly, after selling his technology company, Dr. Ayasli invested substantial portions of the proceeds of that sale in domestic and foreign non-profit entities and businesses. He did this in pursuit of his overarching goals of promoting and educating people about Turkish culture worldwide and supporting friendly relations between Turkey and the United States.”

Those nonprofits, the Turkish Cultural Foundation and Turkish Coalition of America, remain among the most prominent charities of their kind in the United States. BoraJet had been intended as an expression of Ayasli’s national pride as well, connecting the world to parts of Turkey rarely accessible through air travel.

In the wake of the coup, the RICO enterprise used the Turkish media to spread lies, rumors, and accusations claiming that Dr. Ayasli had treasonous and conspiratorial ties to FETO and Gulen himself.”

Ayasli v. Korkmaz

Ayasli explains in his lawsuit how his circumstances turned dramatically around the time that roughly 250 people were killed on July 15, 2016, in attempted coup d’etat in Turkey.

Korkmaz and his coterie of associates and linked entities are described in this section of the complaint as the “RICO enterprise,” an abbreviation for the U.S. law passed to break up organized crime syndicates.

“Taking advantage of a deeply suspicious public and the ‘State of Emergency’ declared by the government, the RICO enterprise capitalized on its connections to and influence over various Turkish media outlets,” the complaint states.

Erdogan blamed the bloodshed on Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish-born Islamic preacher living in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, and Gulen’s movement has been rebranded in Turkey as the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization, often abbreviated as FETO.

Reflecting on the violence later, Erdogan would say that the aborted putsch was a “gift from God” that allowed him to purge his perceived political opponents. Korkmaz’s reaction was allegedly just as opportunistic.

“In the wake of the coup, the RICO enterprise used the Turkish media to spread lies, rumors, and accusations in the media linking Dr. Ayasli to the coup attempt, and claiming that Dr. Ayasli, and his business and charitable interests had treasonous and conspiratorial ties to FETO and Gulen himself,” the complaint states.

The lawsuit details how Korkmaz filed a criminal complaint that accused Ayasli, falsely he says, of Gulenist ties, and planted a series of outlandish stories in Turkey’s state-aligned press. One article claimed that Ayasli used a BoraJet aircraft to secretly fly Gulen into Turkey to plan the coup, and another splashed a photograph of a man identified as Ayasli on its front page.

“The man pictured in the photograph was not Dr. Ayasli,” the complaint says.

Amid this disinformation campaign, threats from angry readers allegedly forced Ayasli to shutter the Istanbul offices of one of his charities. Physical threats occurred as well: the lawsuit says Korkmaz threatened and assaulted Ayasli’s associates and attorneys, including a rape threat against BoraJet’s former chief financial officer Zahide Uner.

“You can’t escape me,” Korkmaz told Uner, according to the complaint. “I will fuck you, and then I will kill you.”

In another portion of the lawsuit, Korkmaz bragged to Ayasli’s attorney about bashing the face of BoraJet’s former chairman of Fatih Akol with an iron ashtray before saying: “I have beaten many people.”

Akol is named in the lawsuit as Korkmaz’s co-conspirator, abusing his position of trust to assist in BoraJet’s buyout.

How Korkmaz came to become a figure into the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election remains a mystery, but he has had a documented, if aborted, business dealing in Russia via his company SBK Holdings, which describes itself as a distressed-debt investment firm.

Though the deal ultimately went to a company owned by Vladimir Putin’s childhood friend Arkady Rotenberg, SBK signed a $850 million preliminary agreement in 2014 to help build a bridge across the Kerch Strait between Russia and freshly annexed Crimea.

Mueller subpoenaed Korkmaz’s grand jury testimony three years later, as reported by ProPublica, in association with an investigation involving possible violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Though the nature of that testimony remains unclear, Ayasli asserts in his complaint that Korkmaz used that subpoena to bully him.

“Korkmaz sent this document to Dr. Ayasli in an effort to further intimidate Dr. Ayasli and give him the false impression that defendant Korkmaz was politically connected to the Mueller Investigation and as such, could exert political influence over Dr. Ayasli in the United States as well as in Turkey,” the complaint states.

Late last year, federal prosecutors charged Korkmaz’s associate Ekim Alptekin and Bijan Kian, a member of President Donald Trump’s transition team, with failing to disclose a foreign-influence campaign that snared Michael Flynn, the disgraced ex-national security adviser who admitting to acting as a secret agent for Turkey.

The racketeering complaint against Korkmaz lists Alptekin, who remains a fugitive from U.S. criminal charges, as a nonparty co-conspirator.

“Alptekin witnessed defendant Korkmaz assault Dr. Ayasli’s female CFO, Zahide Uner, and heard defendant Korkmaz threaten to stalk, rape, and then murder her,” the complaint says.

The day you pay will come. Don’t you worry, I am aware of your games, and plots against me.”

@sbarankorkmaz

Korkmaz denied the allegations against him in an online interview.

“There is no basis for these allegations,” Korkmaz said. “Mr. Ayasli has engaged in multiple illegal activities for which he is officially charged in Turkey.”

In Turkey, where the justice system allows citizens to file criminal complaints against defendants, Korkmaz has filed criminal complaints against Ayasli and Uner. Ayasli describes these filings as “sham litigation” in his U.S. lawsuit, but Korkmaz noted that Ayasli’s associate was arrested last week in Turkey.

“His co-conspirator Zahide Uner was caught by authorities while trying to flee the country last week, and this lawsuit is nothing more than an effort to cover up his own fraudulent and illegal actions,” Korkmaz said.

Half a world away, Ayasli says that Korkmaz’s influence is not confined to Turkish borders. His lawsuit accuses Korkmaz of attempting unsuccessfully to bribe Hakan Yavuz, a professor at the University of Utah and noted scholar on the Gulen movement.

“Yavuz felt threatened by defendant Korkmaz and immediately informed Dr. Ayasli of the details surrounding defendant Korkmaz’s unannounced visit to his office,” the complaint states.

The professor did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Last week on Twitter, Korkmaz appeared to threaten prominent Turkish journalist Razi Canikligil for his investigative reporting.

“The day you pay will come,” Korkmaz tweeted at him on Feb. 13. “Don’t you worry, I am aware of your games, and plots against me.”

Two days after receiving these messages, Canikligil said that he refused to be intimidated.

“I am glad they saw his threats and put it in the complaint,” Canikligil told Courthouse News, referring to Ayasli’s attorneys.

“I guess I am the only Turkish journalist writing about this case. And that makes him worry,” he continued. “That’s why he started character assassinations against me. But, when it comes to character, I am tough as a rock. I am just doing my job as a journalist.”

For three years running, Turkey has led the world in jailing reporters. Prosecutors routinely brand journalists critical of the Erdogan government and its allies as terrorists.

Sezgin Baran Korkmaz

February 27, 2019
What U.S. troops are actually doing on the Mexican border,

Pentagon Chief Weighs Broader Approach to Border Security

The military considers how best to use the 6,000 troops sent to the U.S.-Mexico border, who cannot legally stand in for CBP.

By Lara Seligman

| February 25, 2019, 5:42 PM

Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, center, fires a modified paintball gun that shoots pepper balls during a tour of the U.S.-Mexico border at Santa Teresa Station in Sunland Park, New Mexico, on Feb. 23. (AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais)

The U.S. military is sending an additional 1,000 troops to the border with Mexico, bringing the number of U.S. military personnel there—both active-duty and National Guard—to about 6,000, a senior defense official told reporters at the Pentagon on Feb. 22.

That’s a significant chunk of military resources going toward a mission that can only legally be performed by domestic law enforcement such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers: border security. Under the Posse Comitatus Act, the U.S. military is prohibited from taking any direct role in law enforcement—including search, seizure, apprehension, or arrest.

So what, then, are those 6,000 troops actually doing there? So far, the U.S. military has functioned primarily in a supporting role—installing concertina wire, transporting law enforcement officers by air, providing medical services to migrants, hardening points of entry, and helping with surveillance. In addition to stringing another 140 miles of concertina wire, the troops will be supporting the CBP officers between the points of entry, as well as installing ground-based detection systems, the senior defense official said.

The goal is “freeing up agents and putting them in a law enforcement role instead of administrative duties,” according to the official.

Despite their restricted role, it now seems like the troops on the border are there for the long term. As the Trump administration trumpets the so-called national security crisis of border security—and seeks to divert billions of dollars in military funding to building his long-promised border wall—the Pentagon is reassessing the role of the U.S. military in securing the border.

Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan indicated on Feb. 23 during a surprise trip to the border—which, as is more common for trips to combat zones, was kept secret until his arrival—that the U.S. government needs a broader, more holistic approach to border security instead of a short-term solution.

“Let’s not do triage. Let’s really solve the fundamental problem,” Shanahan told reporters during the trip. “I think of it as: This is an opportunity, as we’re addressing this issue, to recommend solutions that are systemic and major and not a triage solution.”

“I don’t want to just add resources and not fix the problem long term,” Shanahan stressed.

As part of that holistic strategy, a U.S. military presence at the border could become the new normal. Shanahan said he and Gen. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed a two- or three-year support role. For example, the troops could potentially take on more of the monitoring and detection mission in order to free up the CBP officers for other aspects of their mission.

Arguably, as long as the troops stick to the support mission, the deployment does not run afoul of the law, said Andrew Boyle, who works as counsel for the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice. However, an increased military presence in the border communities does raise concern about the possibility of violent cross-border incidents, he said.

“It does raise alarm bells in regards to the militarization of the domestic sphere,” he said.

Trump May Have $21 Billion in Military Funds Available for the Wall

The president plans to sign a federal spending bill and declare a national emergency to bankroll his long-promised border wall.

But William Banks, an emeritus professor at Syracuse University’s College of Law and Maxwell School, believes there is no “clear, positive legal authority” for active-duty U.S. troops to be at the U.S.-Mexico border. The surveillance and detection role could pose a particular problem, he added.

The laws allowing U.S. military forces to conduct surveillance in support of CBP officers dates back to the “war on drugs” in the 1980s and were specifically designed for counter-drug activities, Banks explained.

That means that any surveillance the U.S. military is conducting that is not directly related to drug trafficking—for example, monitoring the border for illegal crossings—could be challenged in a court of law.

“If a federal lawsuit is brought challenging the scope of the military’s activities at the border, it remains unclear how a court would rule on such a challenge when drug trafficking is not remotely the issue,” Mark Nevitt, a Sharshwood fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, wrote in November 2018.

Either way, it doesn’t look like these troops will be heading home anytime soon.

“What’s the core issue that has to get addressed?” Shanahan said. “How do we get out of treating the symptoms and get at the root of the issues?”

Lara Seligman is a staff writer at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @laraseligman

February 27, 2019
Neither Moscow way, nor the EU’s? how Moldova’s Vladimir Plahotniuc manipulates the public opinion
The upcoming elections in Moldova are encouraging more and more political experts to attempt to predict the results. The main focus is on Moldova’s de-facto leader, Vladimir Plahotniuc who continues to play the double game both with the West and Moscow. Through manipulating both Russia and US/EU, Plahotniuc has already earned a fortune and he is definitely not going to stop.

Notorious for stealing $1 billion (around 12% of the country’s GDP) to the offshore territories (a “theft of the century”) through the Moldavian banks back in 2014, Plahotniuc managed to get away with it and even to charm Washington’s power brokers making the Obama Administration welcome him with open arms.

According to Aaron Miller’s book, “Moldova Under Vladimir Plahotniuc: Corruption & Oligarchy”, Plahotniuc deftly manages and manipulates the public opinion in Moldova with an ongoing “Russia vs. the West” narrative. But indeed, no party is expected to win the majority, which will lead to a deadlock that benefits a power broker like Plahotniuc. The only Plahotniuc political ambitions is to get wealthier. As Moldovan’s whistleblower Gofman says, Plahotniuc, as chairman of the Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM), received 70 percent of the $1 billion stolen funds, with the remaining 30 percent divvied up between DPM deputies and officials from Moldova’s Liberal Party. Despite winning only 19 of 101 parliamentary seats in Moldova’s 2014 parliamentary election, Plahotniuc’s DPM party formed a coalition government with the pro-European Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM). This has certainly raised doubts in Brussels whether the EU could continue trade with corrupted Moldova. Nevertheless, Plahotniuc remains “unpunishable” as, the Miiller says, “Moldova’s elites, like Plahotniuc, get to define the rules…write the rules and rewrite the rules, and [they] are not held accountable by either Brussels or Moscow.”
February 22, 2019
Will an Economic Reckoning Follow Turkey’s Local Elections?
Will an Economic Reckoning Follow Turkey’s Local Elections?

By Sinan Ciddi

Board of Contributors

Sinan Ciddi

Board of Contributors

(ADEM ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images)
Contributor Perspectives offer insight, analysis and commentary from Stratfor’s Board of Contributors and guest contributors who are distinguished leaders in their fields of expertise.

Highlights

Consumer prices, a deteriorating economy and relations with the United States, Russia and Iran are key developments to watch as Turkey prepares to hold local elections next month.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan insists his country will never ask for another bailout from the International Monetary Fund, but Turkey is fast running out of economic options.

Russia essentially has put Turkey on notice in Syria, while Erdogan’s behavior toward the United States risks serious consequences.

As Turkey’s March 31 local elections draw closer, three key developments bear watching. All three are likely to significantly affect Turkey’s political and economic trajectory as well as its international standing.

Consumer Discontent

Local elections don’t usually attract the same level of domestic and international attention that Turkey’s elections have received this year. But the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has branded the March 31 vote as one that will determine Turkey’s fate and well-being. In addition, deteriorating economic conditions, including a depreciating currency and inflation, have heightened tensions in the country. Prices for some food items have increased by more than 300-400 percent, prompting President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to mandate that state wholesalers in Ankara and Istanbul sell produce directly to consumers. Long lines of residents buying food at heavily discounted prices is reminiscent of the late 1970s, when Turks had to line up to buy staples such as butter, sugar and cooking oil. The government says the state will continue to sell produce wholesale until the local elections are held.

To further combat Turkey’s inflationary headwind, Erdogan has ordered state authorities to track prices and punish retailers who allegedly arbitrarily increase prices. To say that these issues have tarnished the reputation of the AKP and Erdogan would be an understatement. The AKP has consistently campaigned on the premise that it is the party of capable governance. The question remains as to whether food prices can be controlled, or even lowered, so that wider public discontent does not translate into votes for the opposition. The loss of large metropolitan municipalities such as Istanbul and Ankara would irreparably harm Erdogan’s image and weaken his power base.

Is a Bailout on the Horizon?

Turkey’s macroeconomic indicators are the second significant development to watch. The lira’s depreciation has placed an undue burden on the country’s private sector industries, many of which rely on imports to run their business. By July 2019, roughly $180 billion worth of foreign debt will come due, which equates to about one-quarter of Turkey’s entire economic output. Not only has this resulted in record numbers of Turkish companies filing for insolvency protection, it has required the government to take unprecedented measures to ensure liquidity and assure investors that Turkey can honor its debts. The prevailing economic opinion in Washington and European investment capitals is that these aims can no longer be met without direct international intervention.

If the IMF is asked to bail out Turkey, what government accountability, transparency, anti-corruption and belt-tightening measures will it demand in return?

Though Erdogan insists at public rallies that Turkey will never ask for another bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), his tune is likely to change after the March elections, when Turkey may have to reach a standby agreement of about $150 billion just to keep the lights on. If this were to happen, the IMF would loan Turkey nearly double what it gave Argentina to shore up its economy. It is in the material interests of European banks and the United States to provide Turkey with the necessary funding to allay concerns of a recessionary contagion, as Turkey’s creditors have loaned generously and will have to satisfy their investor’s concerns that existing debts will be honored. There is also the question of conditionality. If the IMF is asked to bail out Turkey, what government accountability, transparency, anti-corruption and belt-tightening measures will it demand in return? It is hard to envision Erdogan satisfying some or any such conditions given the opaque, unaccountable and corruption-ridden government he perpetuates.

Relations With the U.S., Russia and Iran

Finally, Turkey’s interaction with the United States, Russia and Iran isn’t independent of its domestic economic concerns. Ever since the United States announced it would leave Syria, Erdogan has been keen to convince Russia and Iran of the need to establish a safe zone in Syria — one designed to undermine and prevent a Syrian-Kurdish entity that Turkey will have to reckon with. In Sochi, Russia, last week where he, Erdogan and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani met to talk about Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin essentially put Turkey on notice that any Turkish demand for a safe zone in Syria would require the approval of the Syrian government. At this point, Russia and Iran are mainly concerned with eliminating challenges to the Syrian government’s ability to impose its sovereignty throughout the country. There is little reason to believe that Turkey will be granted any latitude to pursue Kurdish elements in Syria. If Erdogan is to participate in the reconstruction of Syria and be able to conduct border trade, he will soon have to resolve his differences with Syrian President Bashar al Assad.

Erdogan continues to tread on thin ice when it comes to the United States, and the Trump administration could impose significant measures that could compound Turkey’s economic degradation. Erdogan’s support of the ailing government of President Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela is demonstrated by the large volume of Venezuelan gold Turkey is purchasing. Turkey watchers are concerned that this gold could once again be used to buy Iranian oil and breach U.S. sanctions. Were this to occur, there is good reason to believe the United States could make life very difficult for Erdogan by withholding IMF funding or imposing crippling sanctions, among other possible measures. Turkey is fast running out of options as the March 31 elections approach, despite appearances otherwise in Erdogan’s public speeches. Even in a limited and transactional manner, it is incumbent upon the Erdogan government to collaborate with the United States on a number of issues: to renounce its S-400 missile defense deal with Russia; put a visible distance between itself and the Maduro government; and release Americans it currently detains. Each of these issues will have to be confronted eventually. It makes sense for Turkey to resolve them now before they are dangled in front of Erdogan as conditions that must be met before Turkey can secure an international bailout.
February 21, 2019
China, Turkey: Ankara Takes an Economic Risk by Standing Up for Chinese Uighurs

The Big Picture
Turkey considers itself a leader in the broader Muslim world, a part of its identity that has compelled it to speak out against China’s ongoing detention of Turkic Chinese Muslims. The current AKP-led government in Ankara is defending its cultural and religious credentials in upcoming local elections, and defending the Uighurs helps in that regard. But this is also a position that could threaten Turkey’s economic ties to China, which is intent on defending its security crackdowns against Uighurs in the name of national security.

See Turkey’s Resurgence
What Happened
The Turkish Foreign Ministry released a statement Feb. 9, calling on Beijing to respect fundamental human rights and close its internment camps for China’s Uighurs, calling them a “great shame for humanity.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Hami Aksoy added that “it is no longer a secret that more than 1 million Uighur Turks incurring arbitrary arrests are subjected to torture and political brainwashing in internment camps and prisons.” The Chinese Embassy in Ankara responded Feb. 10, calling the Turkish allegations inaccurate and demanding that Turkey retract them.

Why It Matters
Turkey is the first major Muslim country to speak out against the ongoing internment of Chinese Uighurs, who share Turkic roots with most of Turkey’s population. The statement’s timing makes domestic political sense in light of the upcoming March 31 municipal elections in Turkey, in which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is defending its turf in the Anatolian heartland against other nationalist and Islamist parties. The AKP has come under increasing criticism from other parties, including the nationalist Good Party, over the Turkish government’s silence in the face of fellow Muslims’ suffering.

Even though the statement appears measured, it could damage Turkey’s economic ties with China just as the Turkish government has said it wants to increase them. Turkey has explored purchasing Chinese missile systems in the past, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has invited his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, for a state visit to Turkey in 2019, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China recently extended Turkey a multimillion-dollar loan.

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has come under increasing criticism from other parties over the Turkish government’s silence in the face of fellow Muslims’ suffering.

The Uighur issue is particularly sensitive to China given that the Uighur homeland, China’s westernmost region of Xinjiang, is a vital part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. It affords the Chinese initiative with direct links to Central Asia and Pakistan that continue onward as far as Europe. Chinese fears of separatism, supply chain disruptions and the risk that Western countries could exploit the issue to China’s disadvantage will, in fact, compel Beijing to consolidate its security hold over Xinjiang. In pursuit of this objective, which has accelerated over the past three years, the Chinese government has engaged in a broad security crackdown in Xinjiang, detaining as many as 1 million ethnic Uighurs, Hui and Kazakhs and subjecting them to re-education.

Background
As part of its political identity under the AKP, Turkey has championed popular Islamism and political Islam. And, even if it were to face Chinese economic retaliation for its outspokenness on the Uighurs, Turkey isn’t as vulnerable as other leading Muslim states. The Arab Gulf states have deeper economic ties with China, while Iran needs its relationship with China — especially as Western sanctions pressure builds up on it. Each has received some heat regarding its relative silence on the issue, increasing the significance of the Turkish statement.

In the broader Muslim world, Indonesia is another country to watch. With national elections approaching April 17, the campaign of candidate Prabowo Subianto has criticized incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo for neglecting the Uighur issue, alleging that he is beholden to China. But while Jokowi’s foreign minister has reportedly expressed concerns to China in private about the Uighur crackdown, the president is focused on pursuing billions of dollars in Chinese support to remedy Indonesia’s deep infrastructure deficits. At the same time, he is likely trying to avoid inflaming sentiment against his country’s ethnic Chinese minority.

February 13, 2019
Armenian military joins Russia in Syria

U.S. Azeris Network [usazerisnetwork@gmail.com]

Call to Action Armenia sent an 83-person strong military mission to Aleppo, Syria comprised of servicemen, military and civilian de-miners and medics. Russian and Assad’s forces have been in control o

Call to Action

Armenia sent an 83-person strong military mission to Aleppo, Syria comprised of servicemen, military and civilian de-miners and medics. Russian and Assad’s forces have been in control of Aleppo since its capture in 2017. With the announcement of US withdrawal from Syria, Russia has been adamantly establishing its positions in the country by strengthening its forces and pulling along its closest allies. Armenia was the first ally of Moscow to publicly announce its decision to go hand-in-hand with Kremlin in its foreign policy endeavors in the Middle East.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan described this step by Yerevan as a “joint decision” of Russia and Armenia back in September 2018 after meeting Russian President Putin in Moscow.

Portraying the joint mission as “humanitarian” Armenia announced it on February 8, 2019 when its Defense Minister met his Russian counterpart in Moscow. Russian Defense Minister thanked Armenia for being the “first to respond to our (Russian) appeal to help the Syrian people,” and called it a “significant contribution” while Armenian Defense Minister thanked Russia for “organizing our humanitarian mission in Syria.” Armenian Defense Ministry also clarified that Armenian military will serve in Syria “with the assistance of the Russian side.” Armenia’s joining Russian counterparts in Syria signifies the “presence” of international support to Russia’s presence in the country.

This is the first serious foreign policy decision by the new Pashinyan Government formed in Armenia in January. For Prime Minister Pashinyan, it is a personal oath of loyalty to Moscow while for Armenia it reconfirms the path of unbreakable dependence on Russia.

Please take a moment to send this letter to your elected officials and local media to inform them about the development, and how Armenia continues to work against US interests in Syria and the region, as a whole.

February 12, 2019