Category: Turkey

  • Turkey: A Rerun of the Istanbul Mayoral Election Raises Economic Risk

    Turkey: A Rerun of the Istanbul Mayoral Election Raises Economic Risk

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    The Big Picture

    In pushing for an election rerun in Istanbul, Turkey’s cultural and economic capital, the ruling AKP is prioritizing political continuity at home above peaceful relations abroad and near-term economic stability. Still, the party must tread carefully, lest it deepen the economic pain as it courts the nationalist vote that could help it regain the city.

    See Turkey’s Resurgence

    What Happened

    Just over a month after Turkey’s main opposition scored a stunning victory in local elections in Istanbul, the residents of the country’s largest city are going back to the polls. On May 6, Turkey’s Supreme Election Board (YSK) canceled the March 31 Istanbul mayoral poll results in a 7-4 vote on account of “unlawful appointments to some ballot box boards,” ordering new elections for June 23. Ekrem Imamoglu, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate who assumed office just over two weeks ago, will now have to return his mandate for the mayoral post while Istanbul Gov. Ali Yerlikaya and Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) handpick an interim mayor to govern the city until the new election.

    Why It Matters

    The contentious decision sets up a historic contest between the AKP, which exercises enormous influence over government institutions (including the YSK), against a political opposition that managed to grab a rare but unprecedented win in Turkey’s most important city. The CHP won Istanbul on March 31 thanks to the strategic support of other opposition parties, and it is likely to have even more support this time from other AKP detractors in its battle against the government. But whether the CHP can eke out another win in what is sure to be a tight race will depend on its success in fending off the media onslaught that will come from the AKP, which controls most of the country’s media outlets, as well as its ability to overcome other systemic challenges stemming from the AKP’s strong hold over Turkey’s institutions. The AKP’s leader and the country’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, can focus all his attention on campaigning for Istanbul — a city the AKP is loath to lose given that it is a major source of wealth and an important site for patronage networks.

    On a broader level, Turkey’s domestic political turmoil will further color its government’s often-turbulent interactions with the outside world.

    On a broader level, the domestic political turmoil will further roil the Turkish government’s often-turbulent interactions with the outside world. Already, countries in the European Union, including Germany, have criticized Ankara for ordering a new election, adding yet another issue to the many grievances Turkey’s Western allies have leveled against Ankara. (At the same time, Ankara knows that Brussels cannot push too far, since the European Union counts on Turkey in the summer to prevent migrants from seeking a new life in Europe.) The AKP’s need to stoke nationalist fervor in Turkey to help secure victory could result in it promoting hypernationalist positions on controversial issues like Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia, its intentions to drill for oil and natural gas in Cypriot waters, and its anti-Kurdish militant operations in Syria and Iraq. The Turkish government will be further willing to stoke tension in the Eastern Mediterranean against Cyprus, Greece and Israel. In addition, Turkey could rail against Israel as the latter beats a war drum against Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip, and refuse to toe the U.S. line on sanctions against Iran — although Turkey’s economic woes could temper some of Ankara’s obstinance.

    What About the Economy?

    Beyond politics, Erdogan’s insistence on new elections in Istanbul will have economic ramifications, as a nosedive in Turkey’s relations with its largest investment and trade benefactors, the European Union and the United States, could hurt the country’s fragile economy. The lira’s value versus the dollar behaved erratically leading up to and after the YSK’s decision, thereby lowering investor and consumer confidence in the Turkish economy even further. Although the AKP’s candidate, former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, will likely promise some of the populist measures for which the AKP has become famous (such as subsidized food supplies), such measures won’t help shore up foreign investor confidence in the Turkish economy. But by pushing for an electoral rerun, the AKP has already demonstrated its preference for possible political gain over probable economic pain.

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  • Baghdadi Is Back And Turkey Might Be His Next Target

    Baghdadi Is Back And Turkey Might Be His Next Target

    Kimden: Pulat Tacar [tacarps@gmail.com]

    Baghdadi Is Back And Turkey Might Be His Next Target

    By Moon Of Alabama

    April 29, 2019 “Information Clearing House” – Remember this dude?


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    He is back.


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    Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, self declared caliph of ISIS, appeared in new video published today. These are the first pictures of him since some three plus years ago. He mentions the defeat in Baghouz. A speaker in the video, not Baghdadi, mentions the recent attacks in Sri Lanka which killed over 250 people and the recent ouster of Omar al-Bashir in Sudan. A short excerpt of the 18 minutes long video can be seen here.

    There are three disguised people Baghdadi is talking to. The video is heavily edited and it appears that it was filmed in many takes. The visible walls are of drapery but do not seem to be the inside of a tent. The ground is flat. The light is artificial. The sound is solid but has no echos. This was probably filmed in a room of a larger house.

    Tired Of The Lies And Non-Stop

    No Advertising – No Government Grants – This Is Independent Media

    The gun to his right is a Kalashnikov AKS-74U with a large (45 rounds) magazine:

    US journalist C. J. Chivers reported that the gun was nicknamed “the Osama” in jihadist circles, after Osama bin Laden was photographed next to an AKS-74U.

    Pictures of the (now dead) leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi showed the same type of gun. It is not a very practical weapon but demonstrates Baghdadi’s heritage.

    Baghdadi accepts the oath of loyalty from groups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Written text in the video says that the attack in Sri Lanka was in retaliation for Baghouz in Syria where ISIS made its last stand. It claims that the ISIS jihadists did not hand over any area and died fighting to the end in Sirte, Mosul, Raqqa and Baghouz. At least the claim about Raqqa is wrong. When the U.S. destroyed Raqqa some 2-3,000 ISIS fighters negotiated their exit with the U.S. proxies on the ground and moved south-east to attack the Syrian army.

    Baghdadi says that ISIS will eventually win in a war of attrition against the “Crusaders”. This points to a continuous, geographically dispersed terror campaign after it no longer holds any ground. At one point one of the three other people gives him a folder with some plans. The folder is marked Wilayat Turkey. (Wilayat means province of the Islamic State).

    baghdadi3-s.jpg
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    Baghdadi looks well fed. The reports of him ailing and thin are obviously wrong. His face and hands and those of his guests show no signs of harsh weather or even sun exposure.

    One wonders whose guest he is.

    This article was originally published by “Moon Of Alabama” –

  • Invitation to 38TH ANNUAL TURKISH DAY PARADE AND FESTIVAL organized by FTAA 1 Attachment

    Invitation to 38TH ANNUAL TURKISH DAY PARADE AND FESTIVAL organized by FTAA 1 Attachment

    Dear ATAA Friends & Değerli Arkadaşlar,

    It has been a long time since I had the opportunity to communicate with you all. Lots have happened during that interim period. But, as they say here, that’s water under the bridge. We need to look ahead.

    First, I would like to inform you of the well-known Turkish Parade that normally takes place around this time every year in New York City, and specifically this year on Saturday, May 18th. It is organized by sister organization Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA) in recognition of the singular importance of the movement of independence of the Turkish people that our founding father Mustafa Kemal Pasha Atatürk started back in 100 years ago by landing at Samsun on 19 May 1919. I am pleased to have received an invitation by the president of the Board of Directors of FTAA, Mr. Tulga Tekman for ATAA to attend this 38TH ANNUAL TURKISH DAY PARADE AND FESTIVAL starting at the corner of 53rd street and Madison Ave. New York, NY at 11:00 A.M. In thanking Mr. Tekman accordingly for the invitation, I am looking forward to seeing ATAA members and associated friends in the NY and NJ region to gather around the ATAA banner near the FTAA banner. If any questions, please let me know.

    Secondly, I wanted to tell you briefly about a lecture that I attended the other day given by one of the very belligerent advocates, Peter Balakian, of the so-called “Armenian Genocide.” The lecture was at Dutchess Community College in Poughkeepsie, NY, and it was well-attended. When the Q & A started, I was determined to ask the first question to set the stage for what was to come. I had been waiting for this moment for several years since I wanted to meet with him almost ten years ago when my wife and I were visiting with some friends at Colgate College where Prof. Balakian teaches. Well, soon after having thanked him for enlightening us with his version of the history, and sensing where I was going, he interrupted me. I stood my ground and continued to ask the following question:

    “Can you prove for us that there was a so-called ‘Armenian Genocide,’ bearing in mind that “genocide” is a legal term according to the United Nations 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and that for an event to be called genocide three basic tenements must have been met, namely: 1. genocide charges can only be litigated by a “competent tribunal,” 2. which shall follow “due process,” and 3. to prove “intent to destroy? For otherwise, don’t you think you would be defrauding the unsuspecting public that there was a so-called ‘Armenian Genocide’ when we all know that there wasn’t?”

    The give and take with Prof. Peter Balakian after that exchange is attached for your information. I think we need to educate the public at large about the history that has been distorted and falsified so much for too long…. Please let me know if you have any comments. Thank you.

    All the best,

    Sevgin Oktay, VP

    ATAA, NY-NJ Region

    Assembly of Turkish American Associations

    PO Box 65782

    Washington, DC 20035

    Tel : 202.483.9090

    Fax: 202.483.9092

    E-mail: vpny

    Web : www.ataa.org

    Alt.E-m: Sevgin

    Alt.Tel : 845.485.2184

    Alt..Fax : 845.452.5658

    Mobile : 845.240.2801_.

    Posted by: <Sevgin>

     

    Response to Balakian Lecture.pdf

  • SOZDE SOYKIRIMA ERMENISTANDAN BIR BAKIS  English NEWS in ARMENIA

    SOZDE SOYKIRIMA ERMENISTANDAN BIR BAKIS English NEWS in ARMENIA

    Noyan Tapan [contact@news-nt-magazine.info]

    29 April 2019
    © 2019 Noyan Tapan Magazine

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  • Close interaction of Alans with Huns, Khazars and Kipchaks

    Close interaction of Alans with Huns, Khazars and Kipchaks

    Tracing the Alanian history, it is not difficult to notice that they cooperated most closely with Türks, at first with Sarmatians and Sarmatian people, Roxolans (in Türkish – Uraksy Alans, ‘Alans-farmers’), Siraks (i.e. Sary-ak people ‘white – yellow’, ancestors of Cumans), Aorses (Aor-Awar-Avars, -os is a Greek ending), Yazygs (Türks – Uzes). All historians admit the close link of Alans with these peoples, only in the definition of ethnolinguistic classification of these peoples do the opinions differ. Iranists classify them as Iranian speaking, Türkologists – as Türkic speaking, as supported by numerous historical facts.

    Prior to sorting out the Alanian-Hunnish links, one should visualize Huns. The official historical science postulates that Huns, first mentioned in the Chinese sources, sometime in the II c. migrated from Central Asia to Urals, and from there in 70ties of the 4 c. poured into the Eastern Europe, thus initiating, supposably, the so-called The Great Migration of Peoples, allegedly Huns were the first Türks appearing in Europe, on the way to Europe they would have subdued Alans in the Northern Caucasus, and, led by the leader Balamber, crossed river Don, defeated Goths, Ostgoths, and Vestgoths, who infiltrated the Northern Pontic, and expelled Vestgoths to Thracia, supposedly crossing through Caucasus, they devastated Syria and Cappadocia, settled in Pannonia, and kept attacking the Eastern Roman empire. In 451 under Attila they invaded Gaul, but at Catalaun fields the Romans, Vestgoths, and Franks defeated them. After the death of Attila (453.) there were conflicts among Huns, and the German tribes devastated them in Pannonia. The Hunnish union broke up, and they left to Northern Pontic. Gradually, Huns disappeared as people, though their name still lingered for a long time as a common name for Northern Pontic nomadic pastoralists [Gumilev L.N. Huns]

    Such an unreal explanation of the history by L.N.Gumilev raises questions: whether could nomads, having forded Volga, defeat strong Alans, Goths, Syrians, Anatolians (in Cappadocia), population of Pannonia, Gaul, Northern Italy? Certainly, this is unreal. How could L.N.Gumilev determine that Huns disappeared, while their ethnonym continued to last as a common name of the Pontic nomads? How he could know that ethnonym Huns for long time designated not Huns, but others? Whom? Why the advancing Romans, and together with them other peoples (more correctly, armies and colonists), did not constitute the Great Migration of Peoples, while creating a huge Roman empire, but the movement from the periphery to the central regions of the Roman empire of other peoples (liberation army, avenging colonists) is called a Great Migration of Peoples? Why Türks, at first as Huns, and then under the names of Avars, Türks, Khazars, Cumans, and Kipchaks constantly migrated from Asia to Europe? Where would they disappear there? How did they procreate so quickly in Asia? Etc. Trying to answer these questions makes it clear that the traditional presentation of Türks’ history is fashioned tendentiously, irrespectively of the real historical conditions.

    Summarizing impartially all historical data based on real historical grounds, it is not difficult to suggest that Huns (Sen or Hen) at first were an undistinguished Türkic people among Türkic Scythians and Sarmatians. They started making themselves known in the 1 c. AD. The Greek historians, marking their presence in Europe, did not say a word about their arrival from Asia.

    Thus, Dionysus (the end of the 1st – beginning of the 2nd c.) notes that on the Northwestern side of the Caspian sea live Scythians, Uns, Caspians, Albanians, and Kaduses… [Latyshev V.V., 1893, 186]. As we were proving more than once, Scythians were basically Türkic speaking (see ETHNIC ROOTS OF THE TATAR PEOPLE, § 3), Uns are Huns, with sound h dropped, Caspians also are Türkic ‘people of rocks’ (kas ‘rock’, pi~bi~bai ‘rich owner’), Albanians are Alans, Kaduses are Türkic Uzes~Uses among kath ‘rocks’.

    Ptolemy (2 c. AD, B.3 Ch.5 – Translator’s note) writes that in the European Sarmatia ‘below Agathyrsi (i.e. Akatsirs~agach ers‘forest people’- M.Z.) live Savari (Türkic Suvars – M.Z.), between Basternae and Rhoxolani(Uraksy Alans, i.e. ‘Alans-farmers’ – M.Z.) live Huns [Latyshev V.V., 1883, 231-232].

    Philostogory, living in the end of the 4 c. (i.e., when, in the opinion of certain scientists, Huns moved to Eastern Europe), describing Huns, does not say a single word of their arrival from the Asia, and writes: ‘These Uns are probably the people who the ancients named Nevrs, they lived at Ripean mountains (Don Ridge S. of Donets river, Mid-Europian Uplands N. of it – Translator’s note), from which come the waters of Tanaid’ [Latyshev V.V., 1893, 741].

    Zosim (2nd half of the 5c.) suggests that Huns are Royal Scythians [Ibis, 800]. The impartial analysis of the ethnographic data provides a basis to state that Royal Scythians were ancestors of Türkic peoples [Karalkin P.I., 1978, 39-40].

    Thus, among the peoples named Scythians and Sarmatians, at the beginning of our era, the Huns make themselves known, in the Assirian and other Eastern sources they were mentioned among the people living in the 3rd millennium BC. In the 4-th c. in a fight for a domination in the Northern Caucasus they defeated the Alanian power, and together with them revolted against the colonial policy of the Roman empire, at first in Cappadocia, then in the western part of the empire, where appeared new Gothic colonizers. Naturally, neither the Huns, nor the Alans, did not move to the West as a people, as it is imagined by the supporters of the ‘Great Migration Of Peoples’, it was the Hunnish-Alanian army that penetrated deep into the West. The main body of the Hunnish and Alanian peoples remained in the same old places of habitation.

    In the end of the 4 c. the Huns, together with the Alans, fell on the Goths, who wanted to colonize the Northern Pontic. The main historian of the Huns and Alans of this period, Ammianus Marcellinus, frequently equated them, for they were ethnically very close. ‘Ammianus Marcellinus not only emphasized that precisely the assistance of Alans helped Huns, but also quite often called attackers Alans’ [Vinogradov V.B., 1974, 113].

    After the death of Attila (453), the Hunnish union gradually disintegrated, and Huns as a ruling power do not appear any more, they fused with the Türkic Alans and Khazars, while keeping their ethnonym Hun (Sen).

    In the Gaul the Alans entered into a close contact withthe Vandals (Eastern Germans), together they devastatedthe Gaul, and in the 409 they settled in Spain, wherethe Alans received the middle part ofthe Lusitania (later – Portugal) and Cartagena. However, in the 416the Vestgoths entered Spain and defeatedthe Alans. Inthe May of the 429 the Vandal King Geizerix together withthe subordinated Alans went to Africa, and, defeating the Roman armies, created a new Vandal and Alan state. As the result the Alanian troops dissolved amongthe Vandals andthe local population. But in the Northern Pontic and in the Caucasus the Huns and Alans continued to cooperate closely.

    Following the disintegration of the Hunnish empire, in the decentralized period, various tribes and peoples tried to become the ruling group, therefore in the Byzantian sources frequently appear ethnonyms: Akathirs, Barsils, Saragurs, Savirs, Avars, Utigurs, Kutigurs, Bolgars, Khazars. All these ethnonyms belong to the Türkic populations. The Barsils are the inhabitants of the Berselia (Berzilia), which in many sources is considered as the country of the Alans. Here is an obvious identification of Alans with Barsils~Bersuls, deemed related to Khazars [Chichurov I.S., 1980, 117]. More than that, the Khazars also came from Berzilia. So, Theophan in 679-680 writes: ‘From the depths of Berzilia, the first Sarmatia, came the great people Khazars and began to dominate all the land on that side down to the Pontic Sea’ [Chichurov I.S., 1980, 61].

    From the 5 c. among the Caucasian Alans, i.e. numerous Türkic peoples, also began to make themselves knowntheother tribes: Khazars, Bulgars, Kipchaks etc. After the brilliant performance of the Türkic peoples, led by the Huns, against the colonial policy ofthe Goths andthe Romans, the Huns ceased to be ruling, andtheAlans and Khazars took their place, competing on the political arena up to the 10-th c. ‘From the 5-th c. the push of the Khazar Khaganate grows, establishing control overthe Alans’ [Vinogradov V.B., 1974, 118]. In the 8 c., at the time of the Alanian expansion, the Alans once again proved that they supported Khazars. ‘The 10-th c. marks a turn. Now the Khazars had to recognize their former vassals with the following words: ‘The Alanian Kingdom is stronger and tougher than all other peoples around us’ [Vinogradov V.B., 1974, 118-119].

    In the 11-th c. others nations begin to raise in the Northern Caucasus, Kipchaks (Russ. Polovets), who at once joined with the Alans, and established peaceful and loving relations [Djanashvili M., 1897, 36]. In this area the Alans, together with the Kipchaks, adopted Christianity.

    In the 1222 Alans and Kipchaks come out together against the Mongolo-Tatars. Seeing that they together represent an undefeatable force, the Mongolo-Tatars used a trick. ‘Seeing a danger, the leader of the Chengizkanids (Subetai – Translator’s note)… sent gifts to the Kipchaks and ordered to tell them, that they, being the same kin as the Mongols, should not rise against their brothers and be friends with Alans, who are entirely of another lineage’ [Karamzin N.M., 1988, 142]. Here the  Mongolo-Tatars figured, apparently, that their army at that time consisted primarily of the Kipchak Türks of the Central Asia, therefore they addressed Kipchaks as kins, andthe Alans ofthe Caucasus were partially Kipchaks (ancestors of Karachai-Balkars), and partially Oguzes (ancestors of Azerbaijanis -the inhabitants ofthe Caucasian Albania, Alania).

    It is known that soon all Kipchak steppes passed into the hands of Mongolo-Tatars. The Volga Bulgaria, the main component of whose population was referred to as the Yases, subordinated to the Mongolo-Tatars in 1236, and the Alans – Yases of the Northern Caucasus in 1238.

    Thus, Alans made their celebrated military and political route hand-to-hand with their Türkic kins: Huns, Khazars and Kipchaks. From the 13 c. Alans-Yases cease to be ruling among the other Türkic people. But it does not mean at all that they physically disappeared, they lived among others Türkic people and gradually entered into their ethnicity, accepting their ethnonym. Such a strong, scattered along all Eurasia people as Alans-Yases, cannot be equated to Iranian speaking Ossetians by a single trait, and could not be suddenly reduced ‘by a miracle’ to the strictures of the Caucasus Ossetians.

    If the Scythians, Sarmatians and Alans were Ossetian speaking, all Eurasia should have Ossetian toponyms. They do not exist, unless artificially (quasi-scientifically) produced. Thus, in all their attributes the Alans were Türkic, and took part in the formation of the many Türkic peoples.

    Zakiev M. Z.

     

    PROBLEMS of the HISTORY and LANGUAGE
    Collection of articles on problems of lingohistory, revival and development of the Tatar nation
    Kazan, 1995
  • Turkey’s Opposition Takes the Shine off Erdogan’s Victory

    Turkey’s Opposition Takes the Shine off Erdogan’s Victory

     Apr 1, 2019 | 21:24 GMT

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    (YASIN AKGUL/AFP/Getty Images)

    Stratfor’s geopolitical guidance provides insight on what we’re watching out for in the week

    Turkey’s government and political institutions are heavily controlled by Turkey’s powerful ruling party, the Justice and Development Party of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In March 31 local elections, the largest opposition party challenged some of that dominance in Turkey’s largest cities when it won mayoral races in Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul, according to preliminary data. The close races in Turkey’s biggest cities show that Turkish voters worried by the country’s unstable economic conditions are divided over whether the ruling party or the opposition can best help Turkey emerge from a nascent recession. To maintain its dominance over the next several years before the next elections, the ruling party will have to adjust its messaging and reassess its alliances.

    What Happened

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won yet another election on March 31, but few victories have been as pyrrhic as this. Twelve parties competed for thousands of local government posts at the municipal and provincial level. According to preliminary results (official results might not be available for many weeks) the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an Islamist and populist party that has governed Turkey since 2002, gained 44.3 percent of the votes in mayoral contests, ahead of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), a secularist party, with 30.1 percent. Trailing behind was the AKP’s right-wing ally, the National Movement Party (MHP) at 7.31 percent; the CHP’s nationalist ally, the Good Party, at 7.45 percent; as well as the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) at 4.24 percent. The AKP also won 41.61 percent of the overall vote for the provincial assemblies across the country, far ahead of the MHP, which garnered 18 percent.

    Crucially, however, the AKP lost the capital, Ankara, and appears to have come second in the country’s largest city, Istanbul. Indeed, the AKP’s candidate in Istanbul, former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, said early April 1 that his CHP challenger, Ekrem Imamoglu, received 25,000 more votes than he did but that election clerks declared 216,000 votes invalid. As a result, both parties are calling for a recount.

    Why It Matters

    The results are mixed for the government. The AKP has won an overall victory in terms of votes, especially the provincial assembly vote. But in the mayoral races in several key cities, including Ankara and Istanbul, as well as the CHP stronghold of Izmir, the main opposition beat the AKP, according to the Supreme Election Board. If the results in Ankara and Istanbul are confirmed, it would deal a highly symbolic blow to the AKP. The party (or one of its predecessors) has ruled each since 1994. Moreover, Erdogan launched his political career as mayor of Istanbul in the mid-1990s, while Ankara has long been a bastion of AKP support.

    Losing the popular vote in Turkey’s major cities highlights the AKP’s tough balancing act: It needs to court popular support at a time when the fragile economy demands that the AKP do the exact opposite by implementing structural reforms.

    What We’re Looking for Next

    How will the government deal with citizens’ economic stress? The shift in Turkey’s urban centers, the first in a quarter century, stemmed in part from the deep economic strain which many Turkish citizens are feeling — and which more and more are blaming on the government. On the day after the election, Erdogan promised to enact better economic policies, while his son-in-law and finance minister, Berat Albayrak, promised to double down on the government’s economic rebalancing program, which envisions a reduction in fiscal spending on government programs. But losing the popular vote in Turkey’s major cities highlights the AKP’s tough balancing act: It needs to court popular support, which it has typically done through economic stimulus, at a time when the fragile economy demands that the AKP do the exact opposite by implementing structural reforms, including austerity measures.

    What does this say about Turkey’s demographics? This is the first local election in five years, and Turkey’s population is younger than ever. Young citizens might have tuned out the AKP and its populist and Islamist values in favor of the CHP, which is stronger in urban secular areas. This is one reason why the AKP will have to reassess its platform. Whatever the case, the close margins highlight Turkey’s intense polarization over social and economic issues, which suggests that authorities will encounter more difficulties making policy and implementing reforms in the years to come.

    What does this mean for the AKP’s alliance strategy? The AKP will also reassess its alliance strategy, in which the party has recently relied on working closely with nationalist allies like the MHP. That alliance might have worked against the AKP by splitting some of the votes it could have garnered. The AKP will recalibrate its platform and message after these races, even though there are still four years to go until more important general and presidential races.

    What does this say about the opposition? Turkey’s typically fragmented opposition finally figured out a way to work together and support a single candidate in many key races. The HDP, for example, did not field candidates in Turkey’s five largest cities, and encouraged its followers in those cities to vote for the CHP candidate, thereby tipping the balance. Mansur Yavas of the CHP won the Ankara mayoral race by uniting a combination of nationalists, leftists, secularists and conservatives on a platform to restore Ankara’s prestige and improve the city’s overall conditions. Yavas’ victory in Ankara sets him up to be a prominent future opposition figure in the often unwieldy CHP. Meanwhile, Imamoglu is a young (he was born in 1970) businessman who was formerly the mayor of the western Istanbul district of Beylikduzu. If he survives the coming recount, Imamoglu will have the chance to use Istanbul — which, at more than 15 million people, is almost as large as neighboring Greece and Bulgaria combined — to build a national platform and become a potentially major player in the CHP and the opposition in general.

    Turkey’s typically fragmented opposition finally figured out a way to work together and support a single candidate in many key races.

    What does this say about the government’s relationship with Turkey’s Kurds? In addition to acting as kingmaker in major races in western Turkey, the HDP also won most of its key races in the Kurdish-dominated southeast, particularly Diyarbakir. In the latter, the party scored more than double the figure of its main rival, an AKP candidate who had been running the city for more than two years as a government-appointed trustee after authorities removed the erstwhile HDP co-mayors for alleged ties to terrorists. The HDP’s success in the southeast and strategic support for the CHP in the west highlight how the AKP has lost some of its ability to court Kurds, who make up roughly 20 percent of Turkey’s population. This was the first local election in five years, during which time the AKP moved more aggressively against Kurdish politicians in an attempt to damage their appeal to the Kurdish voter base. Already, Erdogan has extended an olive branch of sorts, referring to Turkey’s “Kurdish brothers” in an indication that he might need to appeal to the oft-maligned community, even as he works to contain Kurdish militants in the southeast and in Iraq and Syria.

    What happens next? Both the government and the opposition will continue to trade accusations of election fraud; at present, the Istanbul race will come down to the electoral board’s decision. The opposition doesn’t trust the electoral board, which has frequently sided with the government in past elections. The AKP is well-positioned to challenge the results — as appears likely to happen. The election board has already conceded that the CHP has more votes than the AKP in Istanbul, but each will push for a recount before either one can claim ultimate victory in Turkey’s most important municipal race.

    • Copyright ©2019 Stratfor Enterprises, LLC. All rights reserved.

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