Category: Turkey

New Threats to Democracy in Turkey Will Recep Tayyip Erdogan Expand His Presidential Powers?

The Opinion Pages | Editorial By THE EDITORIAL BOARD AUG. 18, 2014

NEWYORK TIMES

By THE EDITORIAL BOARD AUG. 18, 2014
It is no surprise that Recep Tayyip Erdogan won Turkey’s first direct election for president. He has served as prime minister since 2002 and, over the intervening years, has skillfully, and ruthlessly, established control and cowed any serious opposition, which was weak to begin with. The victory was not as big as many predicted. Even so, Mr. Erdogan and his ambitions have created new uncertainties for his country and the United States and other NATO members who depend on Turkey to be the bulwark of the alliance’s eastern front.
For starters, the election means that Mr. Erdogan will be even less encumbered by the institutional checks and balances that are essential elements of any real democracy. The first step in his scheme to create an ever-stronger executive was to change the system so that the people, not Parliament, chose the president in a direct vote. Presidents selected by Parliament were largely ceremonial. After his inauguration on Aug. 28, Mr. Erdogan is expected to make the most of what powers he has as president and extend his influence through a handpicked and malleable prime minister.
Mr. Erdogan’s ambitious dreams are not guaranteed. Constitutional amendments will be necessary to make his changes permanent, and, for that to happen, he and his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party will need to strengthen their parliamentary majority in next year’s general elections.
His 52 percent tally in the presidential race seems healthy, but it was lower than polls had predicted. Indeed, some analysts say support for him and his party may have peaked. And while he remains popular among conservatives in Turkey’s Anatolian heartlands, many liberal and secular Turks who once endorsed him are now bitterly disaffected, with good reason.
Mr. Erdogan was once an inspiring figure who advocated reforms that seemed designed to make Turkey a model democracy among Muslim-majority nations, fulfill its commitments as a NATO member and make it eligible for membership in the European Union. Under his governance, economic growth has averaged 5 percent per year, inflation has eased and the army has been brought under civilian control. He has offered Turkey’s Kurds more rights than his predecessors and reached a cease-fire with Kurdish militants that has held since 2013.
But he long ago veered off the democratic course, brutally cracking down on antigovernment protests last summer and severely constraining free speech, the press and the Internet. News outlets have been taken over by his cronies, and independent-minded journalists have been fired. A power struggle with a former ally led to a corruption scandal last year that embroiled Mr. Erdogan’s family and seemed to make him even more determined to crush dissent.
Meanwhile, Mr. Erdogan’s authoritarian ways have strained relations with Abdullah Gul, the current president, a co-founder with Mr. Erdogan of the Justice and Development Party and a respected consensus-builder who is said to have grown alarmed at Mr. Erdogan’s antidemocratic excesses. But whether he would challenge Mr. Erdogan directly is unclear, and there are no other credible political rivals in sight.
If Mr. Erdogan succeeds in solidifying power, the future of Turkey’s already shaky democracy is more in doubt than ever, and the political uncertainties are expected to persist at least until the 2015 parliamentary election. That is not reassuring news for the United States or any other government that looks for Turkey to play a stabilizing role in an increasingly out of control Middle East.

August 20, 2014
What a Turkey! Has the Turkish leader lost his head

Washington And The World

What a Turkey!

Has the Turkish leader lost his head?

By STEVEN A. COOK

August 05, 2014

If Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan were an American politician, he would be an excellent candidate for one of Chris Cillizza’s “Worst Week in Washington” features. First, on Friday, July 19, a day after the State Department spokesperson criticized him for his frequent invocation of the Nazis to describe Israel’s behavior, Erdogan asked, “What do Americans know about Hitler?” Given that almost 200,000 young Americans died fighting in Europe during WWII, quite a lot, actually. Second, in an open and embarrassing display of just how far the cult of Erdogan’s personality has gone, the 60-year-old prime minister appeared in a friendly soccer match—wearing a bright orange uniform—and miraculously scored three goals in 15 minutes to the collective delirium of announcers, fans and opposing players from the Istanbul Basaksehir club. (It was a bit of a disappointment that he did not pull off his jersey in triumph after the hat trick; it would have given the growing Tayyip Erdogan-Vladimir Putin comparisons an additional element of absurdity.) Third, the American Jewish Congress demanded that Erdogan return the “Profiles in Courage” award the organization bestowed upon him in 2004 for his commitment to protect Turkish Jewry, combat terrorism and forge peaceful coexistence in the Middle East. The prime minister—who is also a recipient of the Muammar al-Qaddafi prize for human rights—was, in the words of Turkey’s ambassador in Washington, “glad” to return the honor. Finally, Cillizza’s colleague at the Washington Post, Richard Cohen, penned a column about Erdogan’s “Hitler fetish,” wondering whether the Turkish prime minister had lost his marbles.

So, is Erdogan crazy? No self-respecting psychiatrist, psychologist or clinical social worker would offer an assessment from afar. Putting world leaders on the couch is passé except at the CIA—and whatever the analysts at Langley conclude does not much matter in the places where policy is made, especially when it comes to Erdogan. The White House and the State Department would prefer not to rock the boat with the Turkish leader—a man President Obama once included among the world leaders with whom he had a “bond of trust” —for fear of what he might do to put American and Turkish interests at risk. That said, and without any scientific precision, it is hard to come to the conclusion that Erdogan is nuts. He may say or do things from time to time that make one wonder whether he got the self-awareness gene. Who wouldn’t, when the toadies of the Erdogan-adoring Turkish press consistently refer to the prime minister as the “Buyuk Usta,” or “Great Master”?

It is hard to blame Erdogan for this one, though. Having an over-inflated sense of self comes with being a world leader, and he’s has been in the bubble for almost 12 years. And for all of Erdogan’s seeming public decomposition, there is actually a perfectly rational and sane politician astutely advancing his agenda, which at the moment is focused on becoming Turkey’s next president.

In Turkey, all of those things that would have landed Erdogan in a “Worst Week” actually accrue to the prime minister’s political benefit as the leading candidate in Turkey’s first-ever direct election of its head of state. Given the prevailing and deeply held anti-Americanism among large numbers of Turks, Jen Psaki’s criticism of Erdogan from the podium at the State Department—she called his rhetoric “offensive and wrong” while chiding the prime minister for “distract[ing] from urgent efforts to bring about a ceasefire”—provided the Turkish leader with the opportunity to stand up to Washington and reinforce the idea that he is a truth-teller on the Middle East, especially in contrast to the United States that enables Israel’s ability to make war on the Gaza Strip. This plays extremely well even beyond Erdogan’s core constituency of middle class and pious Turks. As for the soccer match, which was the subject of considerable derision and sniggering among Turkey watchers everywhere, it was sheer political genius. In soccer-crazed Turkey, where Erdogan played at a fairly high amateur level in his younger days, the prime minister proved that he still has good game even if the 21 other sycophants on the pitch were letting him have his way. The implausible hat trick in 15 minutes? That only reinforced the Erdogan mystique. It seems that the man can do anything, face down the coup-prone Turkish military, denounce the international interest rate lobby (with more than a whiff of anti-Semitism), hold his own and more among world leaders—and still lace up the cleats for a friendly match. The event, ridiculous as it was, also put to rest any lingering questions about the prime minister’s health after a mysterious stomach ailment in 2011

When it comes to anti-Semitism, Erdogan is guilty as charged, but sadly so are large numbers of Turks. It is true that Jews found refuge in Turkey during the Inquisition and have lived and prospered there ever since, but that does not mean that anti-Semitism is alien to Turkish culture. Recent events in which blood curdling hatred of Jews appeared in the pro-Erdogan press (is there any other kind these days?) and among Turkish users of social media in response to Israel’s attack on the Gaza Strip demonstrate that it is decidedly not, particularly among Erdogan’s core constituency. Yet even beyond the particular strand of Turkish Islamism from which Erdogan’s worldview comes, anti-Semitism is widespread in Turkey. For Turks, Erdogan is not even necessarily an anti-Semite; more important, by calling out the Israelis for killing Palestinian innocents on a large scale, he is acting as the conscience of the Muslim world.

It would be unfair to a political talent like Erdogan, however, to suggest that he has been successful because of Turks’ dislike of the United States, Israel and Jews, let alone his ability to move around a soccer field relatively well. Erdogan’s repeated electoral victories are attributable to his many achievements. Since he became prime minister in March 2003, Turkey has made important strides in health care, redeveloped significant portions of its transportation infrastructure, put money in the pockets of the middle class, and become a regional power. Throughout Erdogan’s tenure the Turkish economy has been among the fastest growing in the world, surging by 9.2 percent in 2010 and almost doing that well the following year before slowing considerably in 2012. Before Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party came to power, Turkey was never regarded as an influential actor in the Middle East. Now, with the aid of his energetic foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and the investment Ankara has made in relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as well the country’s regional economic might, Turkey very much is a player. Washington’s romance with Turkey as a “model” for the Middle East world has diminished considerably since the halcyon days of the Arab uprisings and President Obama’s relationship with Erdogan has certainly cooled, but American officials still believe they need the Turkish leader. With the exception of Psaki’s atypical criticism, the Obama administration continues to treat Erdogan with kid gloves, much to the dismay of its other Middle Eastern allies. Even though there were many Egyptians, Saudis, Emiratis, Palestinians and Israelis who were angry that Davutoglu was involved in Gaza ceasefire talks, whether they like it or not, Ankara is an important channel of communication with Hamas. For many Turks, only Erdogan—the strong, unapologetic, tough guy—could have transformed Turkey in the way the prime minister has, even if from the perspective of outside observers these achievements have come at the cost of what was once promising political reform. Erdogan’s rule has become fundamentally illiberal, which seems just fine with his constituents.

The real question is not whether Erdogan has lost it, but why he is bothering to go to the lengths that he has to secure the Turkish presidency. He is running against two opponents: one guy running as a joint opposition candidate whom no one in either of the two nominating parties seems to like, and another guy who has rather narrow appeal.

Public opinion polls show that about half or slightly more than half of Turks approve of Erdogan, meaning that he can likely prevail without all the fury, anger and cult of personality that makes people wonder whether the Turkish prime minister is “all there.” But for Erdogan, there is no mercy rule in politics—especially for someone who has reason to be paranoid. This is a politician who, in the 1990s, was jailed for reciting a nationalist poem that the secular elites who were dominant at the time alleged was a call to religious incitement. After he became prime minister, his party barely escaped closure for being a “center of anti-secular activity.” Even as he has mastered the political arena, Erdogan has been worried when the next coup d’etat may come, given the Turkish military’s history of undermining governments that it did not like. So Erdogan will leave nothing to chance.

This is not to excuse Erdogan’s recent Jew-baiting or an entire previous year of intimidating his opponents, cowing the press, restricting access to the Internet, purging the bureaucracy and banning (unsuccessfully) social media. These are the tactics of a tin-pot dictator, not a major NATO ally, but Erdogan does not care. Behind the bluster and thuggish politics is an effort to secure the domestic political arena. To the extent that this approach plays well among voters in Kayseri, Trabzon and Erzurum, Erdogan will reap the benefits.

From afar, Erdogan certainly seems crazy, but he is more likely crazy like a fox.

Steven A. Cook is the Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

August 18, 2014
Turkey’s Geographical Ambition August 12, 2014 | 0802 GMT

Stratfor
Editor’s Note: We originally ran this Global Affairs with Robert D. Kaplan column on May 1, 2013. We are republishing it in light of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Aug. 10 election as Turkey’s new president.
By Robert D. Kaplan and Reva Bhalla
At a time when Europe and other parts of the world are governed by forgettable mediocrities, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister for a decade now, seethes with ambition. Perhaps the only other leader of a major world nation who emanates such a dynamic force field around him is Russia’s Vladimir Putin, with whom the West is also supremely uncomfortable.
Erdogan and Putin are ambitious because they are men who unrepentantly grasp geopolitics. Putin knows that any responsible Russian leader ensures that Russia has buffer zones of some sort in places like Eastern Europe and the Caucasus; Erdogan knows that Turkey must become a substantial power in the Near East in order to give him leverage in Europe. Erdogan’s problem is that Turkey’s geography between East and West contains as many vulnerabilities as it does benefits. This makes Erdogan at times overreach. But there is a historical and geographical logic to his excesses.
The story begins after World War I.
Because Ottoman Turkey was on the losing side of that war (along with Wilhelmine Germany and Hapsburg Austria), the victorious allies in the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 carved up Turkey and its environs, giving territory and zones of influence to Greece, Armenia, Italy, Britain and France. Turkey’s reaction to this humiliation was Kemalism, the philosophy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (the surname “Ataturk” means “Father of the Turks”), the only undefeated Ottoman general, who would lead a military revolt against the new occupying powers and thus create a sovereign Turkish state throughout the Anatolian heartland. Kemalism willingly ceded away the non-Anatolian parts of the Ottoman Empire but compensated by demanding a uniethnic Turkish state within Anatolia itself. Gone were the “Kurds,” for example. They would henceforth be known as “Mountain Turks.” Gone, in fact, was the entire multicultural edifice of the Ottoman Empire.
Kemalism not only rejected minorities, it rejected the Arabic script of the Turkish language. Ataturk risked higher illiteracy rates to give the language a Latin script. He abolished the Muslim religious courts and discouraged women from wearing the veil and men from wearing fezzes. Ataturk further recast Turks as Europeans (without giving much thought to whether the Europeans would accept them as such), all in an attempt to reorient Turkey away from the now defunct Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and toward Europe.
Kemalism was a call to arms: the martial Turkish reaction to the Treaty of Sevres, to the same degree that Putin’s neo-czarism was the authoritarian reaction to Boris Yeltsin’s anarchy of 1990s Russia. For decades the reverence for Ataturk in Turkey went beyond a personality cult: He was more like a stern, benevolent and protective demigod, whose portrait looked down upon every public interior.
The problem was that Ataturk’s vision of orienting Turkey so firmly to the West clashed with Turkey’s geographic situation, one that straddled both West and East. An adjustment was in order. Turgut Ozal, a religious Turk with Sufi tendencies who was elected prime minister in 1983, provided it.
Ozal’s political skill enabled him to gradually wrest control of domestic policy and — to an impressive degree — foreign policy away from the staunchly Kemalist Turkish military. Whereas Ataturk and the generations of Turkish officers who followed him thought in terms of a Turkey that was an appendage of Europe, Ozal spoke of a Turkey whose influence stretched from the Aegean to the Great Wall of China. In Ozal’s mind, Turkey did not have to choose between East and West. It was geographically enshrined in both and should thus politically embody both worlds. Ozal made Islam publicly respected again in Turkey, even as he enthusiastically supported U.S. President Ronald Reagan during the last phase of the Cold War. By being so pro-American and so adroit in managing the Kemalist establishment, in the West at least Ozal — more than his predecessors — was able to get away with being so Islamic.
Ozal used the cultural language of Islam to open the door to an acceptance of the Kurds. Turkey’s alienation from Europe following the 1980 military coup d’etat enabled Ozal to develop economic linkages to Turkey’s east. He also gradually empowered the devout Muslims of inner Anatolia. Ozal, two decades before Erdogan, saw Turkey as a champion of moderate Islam throughout the Muslim world, defying Ataturk’s warning that such a Pan-Islamic policy would sap Turkey’s strength and expose the Turks to voracious foreign powers. The term neo-Ottomanism was, in fact, first used in Ozal’s last years in power.
Ozal died suddenly in 1993, ushering in a desultory decade of Turkish politics marked by increasing corruption and ineffectuality on the part of Turkey’s sleepy secular elite. The stage was set for Erdogan’s Islamic followers to win an outright parliamentary majority in 2002. Whereas Ozal came from the center-right Motherland Party, Erdogan came from the more openly Islamist-trending Justice and Development Party, though Erdogan himself and some of his advisers had moderated their views over the years. Of course, there were many permutations in Islamic political thought and politics in Turkey between Ozal and Erdogan, but one thing stands clear: Both Ozal and Erdogan were like two bookends of the period. In any case, unlike any leader today in Europe or the United States, Erdogan actually had a vision similar to Ozal’s, a vision that constituted a further distancing from Kemalism.
Rather than Ataturk’s emphasis on the military, Erdogan, like Ozal, has stressed the soft power of cultural and economic connections to recreate in a benign and subtle fashion a version of the Ottoman Empire from North Africa to the Iranian plateau and Central Asia. Remember that in the interpretation of one of the West’s greatest scholars of Islam, the late Marshall G.S. Hodgson of the University of Chicago, the Islamic faith was originally a merchants’ religion, which united followers from oasis to oasis, allowing for ethical dealing. In Islamic history, authentic religious connections across the Middle East and the Indian Ocean world could — and did — lead to wholesome business connections and political patronage. Thus is medievalism altogether relevant to the post-modern world.
Erdogan now realizes that projecting Turkey’s moderate Muslim power throughout the Middle East is fraught with frustrating complexities. Indeed, it is unclear that Turkey even has the political and military capacity to actualize such a vision. To wit, Turkey may be trying its best to increase trade with its eastern neighbors, but it still does not come close to Turkey’s large trade volumes with Europe, now mired in recession. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey demands influence based on geographic and linguistic affinity. Yet Putin’s Russia continues to exert significant influence in the Central Asian states and, through its invasion and subsequent political maneuverings in Georgia, has put Azerbaijan in an extremely uncomfortable position. In Mesopotamia, Turkey’s influence is simply unequal to that of far more proximate Iran. In Syria, Erdogan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, thought — incorrectly, it turns out — that they could effectively mold a moderate Islamist Sunni opposition to replace President Bashar al Assad’s Alawite regime. And while Erdogan has gained points throughout the Islamic world for his rousing opposition to Israel, he has learned that this comes at a price: the warming of relations between Israel and both Greece and the Greek part of Cyprus, which now permits Turkey’s adversaries in the Eastern Mediterranean to cooperate in the hydrocarbon field.
The root of the problem is partly geographic. Turkey constitutes a bastion of mountains and plateau, inhabiting the half-island of the Anatolian land bridge between the Balkans and the Middle East. It is plainly not integral to a place like Iraq, for example, in the way that Iran is; and its Turkic language no longer enjoys the benefit of the Arabic script, which might give it more cultural leverage elsewhere in the Levant. But most important, Turkey is itself bedeviled by its own Kurdish population, complicating its attempts to exert leverage in neighboring Middle Eastern states.
Turkey’s southeast is demographically dominated by ethnic Kurds, who adjoin vast Kurdish regions in Syria, Iraq and Iran. The ongoing breakup of Syria potentially liberates Kurds there to join with radical Kurds in Anatolia in order to undermine Turkey. The de facto breakup of Iraq has forced Turkey to follow a policy of constructive containment with Iraq’s Kurdish north, but that has undermined Turkey’s leverage in the rest of Iraq — thus, in turn, undermining Turkey’s attempts to influence Iran. Turkey wants to influence the Middle East, but the problem is that it remains too much a part of the Middle East to extricate itself from the region’s complexities.
Erdogan knows that he must partially solve the Kurdish problem at home in order to gain further leverage in the region. He has even mentioned aloud the Arabic word, vilayet, associated with the Ottoman Empire. This word denotes a semi-autonomous province — a concept that might hold the key for an accommodation with local Kurds but could well reignite his own nationalist rivals within Turkey. Thus, his is a big symbolic step that seeks to fundamentally neutralize the very foundation of Kemalism (with its emphasis on a solidly Turkic Anatolia). But given how he has already emasculated the Turkish military — something few thought possible a decade ago — one should be careful about underestimating Erdogan. His sheer ambition is something to behold. While Western elites ineffectually sneer at Putin, Erdogan enthusiastically takes notes when the two of them meet.
Editor’s Note: Writing in George Friedman’s stead this week are Stratfor’s Chief Geopolitical Analyst Robert D. Kaplan and Vice President of Global Analysis Reva Bhalla.

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August 13, 2014
Turkey’s lopsided presidential election campaign

In this Sunday, Aug. 3, 2014 file photo released by the Turkish Prime Minister’s Press Office, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his wife Emine Erdogan wave to supporters during a rally in Istanbul, Turkey. Erdogan is the unquestionable front-runner in Turkey’s first direct presidential election on Sunday. And critics accuse him of using his position as premier to make the contest even more lopsided. Erdogan, a skilled public orator who has dominated Turkish politics for a decade, undisputedly enjoys far more popularity than either of his rivals: a newcomer on the national political scene supported by several opposition parties; and a high-profile, ambitious young Kurdish politician. (Kayhan Ozer, Turkish Prime Minister’s Press Office, HO/Associated Press)

By Associated Press August 6 at 6:20 AM

ISTANBUL — Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is the unquestionable front-runner in Turkey’s first direct presidential election on Sunday. And critics accuse him of using his position as premier to make the contest even more lopsided.

via Turkey’s lopsided presidential election campaign – The Washington Post.

August 7, 2014
Why Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be Turkey’s first directly elected president

By SONER CAGAPTAY AND BERIL UNVER

Recep Tayyip Erdogan is almost certain to be Turkey’s first popularly elected president

When Turkey holds direct presidential elections for the first time on Aug. 10, the people will speak. Turks are eager to be heard following a wave of protests in the last year against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, which were followed by a violent police crackdown. Erdogan faces criticism for his authoritarian leadership style, as well as corruption allegations. Yet it is all but guaranteed that he will be Turkey’s first popularly elected president.

Why? It is a numbers game.

AKP policies over a decade improved the country’s infrastructure and raised Turkey’s living standards significantly.

–

Local elections on March 30 brought the AKP 45% of the vote. The two main Turkish opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party and the Nationalist Action Party, together also received 45% and announced their joint presidential candidate. This move splits the Turkish public about evenly into pro- and anti-Erdogan camps, but the prime minister holds several trump cards.

The first is perhaps the most obvious: The economy has tripled in size since the Erdogan administration came to power in 2002. As the rest of the world suffered from the 2008 economic crisis, economic growth and development in Turkey continued unabated. AKP policies over a decade have improved the country’s infrastructure and raised living standards significantly.

This is why Erdogan continues to enjoy widespread support. He wins because he offers high-speed rail and mortgages. The high-speed rail system he built includes a recently inaugurated line from Ankara to Istanbul that halves travel time from seven hours to 3 1/2. Meanwhile, inflation — historically at dizzying three-digit levels — has come down to single digits, allowing many Turks to buy their first homes using a new mortgage system.

Turkish Prime Minister and presidential candidate Recep Tayyip Erdogan, center, poses wearing traditional Turkmen clothes during a meeting of his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Ankara. (Adem Altan / AFP/Getty Images)

The base rallies around this economic success, but it will not bring Erdogan a simple majority; a boost from voters in the Kurdish community at home will.

The prime minister’s charm offensive with the Kurds — who account for 15% to 20% of the country’s population — will secure their votes. The Erdogan administration passed reforms advancing Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights and laid the groundwork for the disarmament and reintegration of Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, militants into Turkish society.

The 2013 cease-fire declared by the PKK’s jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan — a victory that has proved elusive for other parties for more than 30 years — stemmed violence in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast and helped the AKP win local elections in March. Since then, a new law has created a framework for formal peace talks with the PKK, and Erdogan revealed further plans to devolve some powers to Kurdish provinces. The Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party, which received 6.5% of the vote in March, is thus virtually guaranteed to back Erdogan should there be a runoff.

A year ago, it looked as though protests could bring down the administration, but the political fallout has proved to be relatively modest. Erdogan has a knack for portraying himself as a political victim forced to crack down harshly on those who use lies and conspiracies to undermine his government. He is the man leading Turkey into an ever-brighter, more peaceful future in the face of challenges from a malicious opposition. What he lacks in diplomatic tact, he makes up for in passion. He pushes his vision for Turkey with the conviction that even his least popular decisions hold paramount the best interests of Turkish citizens.

The dark side of this electoral strategy, of course, is that his image as an authoritarian underdog demonizes the opposition and creates a powerful — and dangerous — cult of personality. With that as his shield, he has time to play the numbers. Turkey’s economic successes of the last decade will carry him most of the way to victory, and his campaign focus on the margins will push him over the top. But once elected, Erdogan is likely to consolidate all three branches of government. He will then become Turkey’s strongman president, one elected by Turks themselves.

Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is the author of “The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century’s First Muslim Power.” Beril Unver is senior programs officer at the Pacific Council on International Policy in Los Angeles.

via Why Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be Turkey’s first directly elected president – LA Times.

August 7, 2014
Is ‘Armenian’ an insult? Turkey’s prime minister seems to think so.

By Adam Taylor August 6 at 11:45 AM

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses his supporters in Istanbul. (Kayhan Ozer/Turkish Prime Minister’s Press Office via Associated Press)

In a television interview Tuesday, Turkish Prime Minister and presidential hopeful Recep Tayyip Erdogan complained that people had questioned his family background.

“I was called a Georgian. I apologize for this, but they even said [something] worse: They called me an Armenian,” Erdogan said during an interview with NTV, according to a translation from Today’s Zaman newspaper. “But I’m a Turk.”

The comment immediately sparked outrage, with CNN-Turk asking on Twitter whether it was really so “ugly” to be an Armenian and others accusing Erdogan of racism:

Erdogan is known to be a skilled orator, and this may have been just a slip of the tongue, but the history between Armenians and Turks make his comments especially ill-advised. In 1915, during the dying days of the Ottoman Empire, soldiers slaughtered hundreds of thousands of ethnic Armenians living in what is now Turkey. Armenians and historians alike refer to it as a genocide, though Turkey and, notably, the United States have officially refused to use that terminology.

The Turkish prime minister is just days away from his bid to become president and is facing considerable backlash after more than a decade of authoritarian rule. And while his Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish initials AKP) is known for its combination of capitalism, nationalism and Islamist governance, it has made significant inroads among Turkey’s minority communities.

Erdogan enjoys good support in the Kurdish-dominated southeast of the country, for example, and the AKP has pushed policies that supported Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights. If Erdogan wants to become president, this Kurdish support may well be vital. There are also signs that Erdogan had hoped to reach out to Armenians before his election, with reports that Turkey might open the Alican border crossing between the countries. Erdogan even took a tentative step toward acknowledging Turkey’s role in the mass killings of Armenians, offering condolences for the “inhumane” acts (his comments, while unprecedented, left many Armenian observers cold: One complained that Erdogan had used “euphemisms and the age-old ‘everyone suffered’ denialist refrain”).

Despite this, Erdogan has been criticized for repeatedly talking about ethnic and religious differences in what appears to be a bid to shore up his support among his Sunni Islam base. Earlier this week, he had called on his rivals to be clear about their backgrounds. “I am a Sunni, Kemal [Kılıcdaroglu of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP] is an Alevi [a branch of Shiite Islam], Selahattin [Demirtas, presidential candidate of the Peoples’ Democratic Party] is Zaza [a type of Kurdish people],” he said, according to Hurriyet Daily News, later adding. “I respect Alevis. Just as I make my sect public, so should he.”

70,000 or so Armenians still call Turkey home, and many in that community felt marginalized or even threatened before the comments. Erdogan often uses “extremely aggressive and bellicose language when referring to the Armenians or Armenian issue,” Richard Giragosian, an American-born Armenian analyst, told Today’s Zaman in July. Erdogan may have made an unfortunate verbal slip on Tuesday, but to critics it confirms their worst fears.

Adam Taylor writes about foreign affairs for The Washington Post. Originally from London, he studied at the University of Manchester and Columbia University.

via Is ‘Armenian’ an insult? Turkey’s prime minister seems to think so. – The Washington Post.

August 7, 2014