Category: Turkey

  • 1922: Great Britain and the Turks, Charles Townshend

    1922: Great Britain and the Turks, Charles Townshend

     images
    1922: Great Britain and the TurksCharles TownshendThere is nothing that the Turk desires more ardently than to be friends with Great Britain. The price he asks is not exorbitant. It is no more than the heritage of every free-born nation. And the Turk is not a man to accept slavery or dependence. To him death is nothing if the alternative is dishonor. And whether as individuals or as a nation, the Turks will die fighting.I had this in mind early in October 1918, when Enver Talat and all the pro-German gang resigned, to make way for the party who wished to save their country by making peace with Britain and the Allies. When I formulated the armistice terms, although I conceded the necessity of keeping the narrow Straits open for the passage of commerce all over the world, I emphasized the need for keeping the frontiers of Turkey in Europe as they had been settled and defined in the Treaty of London. The bundling of Turkey “bag and baggage” out of Europe did not appeal to me either as a just proposal or as a practical possibility. The Turk fought his way into Europe centuries ago. He fought his way to the gates of Vienna itself. When finally the forces of Christendom united against him and pressed him back a little, he consolidated his position and stayed where he was for many a prosperous and proud generation. I am not going to defend what has been done in the name of Turkish rule, either to Europe or in Asia. But those of us who cast stones at the Turk should beware lest we damage our own frail house of glass. The Turk has had to deal with turbulent and treacherous peoples, and his way of dealing with them had the merit of strength at least. If the atrocities were totaled on either side of an account, we should find that many of the so-called Christian nations were deeper in bloodshed and guilt than the champion of Islam.

    After the fall of Kut, I was taken in battle and became a prisoner. In October, 1918, I was released without condition, save that mine was the task of bearing proposals to my own government for a peaceful settlement and the deliverance of thousands of men from bloodshed and weary struggle. In the cabin of the launch, which took me across from Prinkipo to the Sublime Porte, I jotted down in my pocketbook the conditions which I proposed. They were as follows:

    1 The opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus to the British
    fleet.
    2 Autonomy of Mesopotamia and Syria under the sovereignty of the
    Sultan, and evacuation of those territories by the troops of the
    Entente.
    3 Frontier settlement as in the Treaty of London.
    4 Immediate release of all British and Indian prisoners of war.

    On arrival at Constantinople, I was taken at once to see Field Marshal Izzet Pasha, a great soldier and an honorable man. He talked with me alone and told me that he would suggest no terms; for he knew that the terms I would suggest would be honorable. But he laid emphasis on the desire of Turkey for British protection. Later on in the evening I saw Raouf Bey, minister of marine, at my house in Prinkipo, and he in turn emphasized the desire of Turkey for friendship and support from England. What must men of this type have thought when they saw our Prime Minister egging on the Greeks to the occupation of Asia Minor, a country which is not theirs and from which they have been ignominiously chased by forces inferior in number and lacking outside support?

    When peace was made with Turkey, Austria at once took the cue and capitulated. That left the Germans no alternative. The war was won, civilization was saved and the barbaric prospect of German domination was done with forever. The first step in this achievement was taken when the Turkish leaders approached me and gave me authority to enter into peace negotiations. How were they rewarded for this, the first active offer to end the misery and destruction of Armageddon? They were given the Treaty of Sevres.
    What I think about that treaty is that, if we had deliberately set ourselves to devise the most unjust, ungenerous and merciless policy of revenge, if we had picked for the task our clumsiest and most ruthless and discredited politicians and partisans, we could not have evolved a worse result than that which was achieved by our complacent and self-congratulatory diplomatic “experts” at the Foreign Office and in Downing Street. They seem to have set themselves to create a Turkish Alsace-Lorraine, and they have done their job well enough. As I said in the House of Commons last May, before I went to Angora to see Mustapha Kemal, it might have been thought that to take away Irak, Syria, Palestine, Arabia and the Hedjaz was enough punishment for Turkey. But no. Our “experts” took away Thrace right up to the walls of Constantinople; they took away the holy city of Adrianople; and–the crowning insult and indignity of all–they invited the Greeks to set their feet upon Turkish soil and adopt the air of conquerors of a nation which has beaten them in almost every conflict that the two peoples have ever had.

    To occupy Constantinople with British Troops was a folly of a similar brand. It was bad tactics. It created, strengthened and cemented the Turkish Nationalist party and took from the puppet administration in Constantinople whatever claim it might have had to be representative of Turkish opinion. Where was the need to occupy Constantinople with British war-ships six hundred yards from the Sultan’s palace? What else could be the result of this insulting demonstration–the sight of foreign troops pacing the streets of the capital of Islam–than to send every patriotic Turk into the arms of the first strong man who was ready to take the lead in the defense of the national honor and integrity?
    I went to Angora without the permission of the Foreign Office, because I took the liberty of thinking that our government, though not the British people, had broken faith with an honorable enemy. And more: I knew what the Prime Minister did not seem to know: that the greatest safeguard we could possibly have for the preservation of India and our empire in the East was Turkey’s friendship. I thought I might do something to persuade the Turkish government at Angora that things were not so hopeless as they seemed and that this heaping of insult upon indignity was not the policy of more than a bigoted few in Great Britain.

    I went to Angora. And what did I find there? Not a band of brigands or irregulars, fighting under the compulsion of adventurers for a cause in which they did not believe. Not a scattered remnant of fanatics and disappointed tyrants. I found an entire nation in arms, under the leadership of single-minded patriots. I found an army whose match the world would be hard put to it to provide today, full of spirit, brilliantly led, from the generals down to the platoon officers, supplied with artillery, equipment and munitions which their own hands had made and adapted, ready to fight to the last man for the defense of their sacred soil. And after a long talk with Mustapha Kemal, I found that he was still ready to accept substantially the terms I had been asked to deliver to my government when I was set free, nearly three years before, to take the conduct and control of peace negotiations from Prinkipo to the British fleet in the Aegean Sea.

    Now that the Greeks have met defeat and Mustapha Kemal has proved that Turkey will stand for her rights whatever happens, Downing Street is proposing almost the very conditions which Turkey asks for. These conditions are roughly as follows:

    1 The restoration of Smyrna and all occupied territory in
    Asia Minor, the Turkish government guaranteeing the safety of
    life and possessions for Greeks and other foreigners in these
    territories.
    2 Modification of the frontier of Thrace as defined in the
    last conference at Paris, in such a way as to leave
    Constantinople amply defensible by the Turks themselves, or
    to have its defense guaranteed, not by a combination of
    Balkan interlopers, but by Great Britain and France only.
    3 The international garrison for the Dardanelles to be
    composed of British, French, Italian and Turkish detachments,
    under the command of a disinterested neutral, say a Dane,
    such occupation to be fixed for a definite period of five
    years and extended if necessary.
    4 Abandonment of the proposal to limit the Turkish armed
    forces to forty thousand regular troops and forty-five
    thousand gendarmerie and the substitution in their place of
    three hundred thousand fighting troops, without counting the
    gendarmerie, dividing these troops equally between the
    European and Asiatic fronts.

    The suggestion made at Paris last March that the Turkish army should be voluntary one, I can scarcely have the patience to discuss. The Turks are a nation of fighters. They do not desire an army modeled on our own expensive regular force, and they cannot afford it. A limited conscription suits them best; and it will suit our own interests as well since, if we allow it, the Turks will become our friends and safeguard our interests in the East.

    Now suppose for a moment that we make enemies of the Turks. What does that mean? Does it mean merely the possibility of war with Turkey? I wish it did. I wish that the peril were confined to that issue. But if we back the Turk up against the wall, we shall have to fight not him alone, but the entire Mahommedan world. Let us make no mistake at all about this point. The “holy war” is a card, which the Turk has not yet played, although he knows he has it and he knows that we know he has it. And it is just because the Turk likes and admires the spirit of Great Britain and France and sees therein a reflection of his own best qualities, just because he finds in us so many of the qualities which were once, under the great sultans of two and three centuries ago, the admiration of the world, that he is willing to leave us and the French in peaceful control of our vast Mahommedan populations. When we remember that in India and Africa Great Britain alone has a population of close upon a hundred million Mahommedan subjects, that there are large numbers in the Malay Peninsula and that the Hindu population of India has made the cause of religious freedom for all the races of India its own, we can see what the peril might be if we antagonize and insult the Turk, the acknowledged head and leader of Islam, in his own holy capital.

    At any moment, if Kemal likes, he can give the signal to raise the whole Mahommedan world against us. He has at his command not only the organized fanaticism of the Senussi in the deserts of Africa, not only the malcontents and agitators of Egypt and the Indian Peninsula, but the unscrupulous and powerful forces of Soviet Russia, ready to lend him any support for an enterprise which shall strike at the heart of the British and French empires. It is to Kemal’s lasting credit that he has not yet called upon this incalculable force to support him in his demands. It is to his lasting credit that he has not relied upon that support to make his demands such as would threaten the integrity and even the existence of the British Empire. Is it reasonable to expect that if we force him into a corner, if we deny him right and justice, he will hesitate to use the resources that he has at his call and face us with them in a war to the death, once the issue is declared?

    The Treaty of Sevres contains an insult to Turkey in almost every paragraph. The French Chamber of Deputies never accepted it. The Italians ignored it. France and Italy have always recognized the right of the Turks to live and have laughed at the Gladstonian bombast that pretended to turn them out of Europe. It is not Kemal who is preaching the “holy war.” He is demanding justice. But there are more than sufficient fanatics among the nonconformist element in England who know nothing of the East and wish to know nothing, but are ready to send our men to the horror and savagery of modern warfare in an unjust cause. The votes of these gentry have counted for much in the recent attitude of Mr. Lloyd George and his supporters. Their influence helped him along the road of intrigue with Greece, an intrigue which has almost wholly cost us our prestige. There is not a Turk who does not believe that British money and guidance were behind the invasion of Asia Minor by the rabble of King Constantine.
    There is the “holy war” which has been opened, not by the Turks or by Islam, but by the false champions of Christianity. To think that for so many generations great Englishmen in India and all over the Near and Far East have labored to keep the name of Britain fair and unstained, by insisting that the religious feelings of subject populations should be respected, and that now a British government should claim to take away the very center and focus of Mahommedanism and hand it over to the domination of an alien race and an alien creed1 What an advertisement for British justice and British policy!

    At this very moment there is on foot a great Mahommedan movement in India and Mesopotamia directed against British rule. That movement still lacks leadership, and we can deal with it by firmness and justice. But I served for twenty-one years amongst the Mahommedans of northern India and the Sudan, under that great administrator, Lord Kitchener, and I have never known a time when the peril of religious war was more grave and fraught with more dire consequences. In Turkey they speak openly of this movement against Great Britain and of the support it will have from Soviet Russia and Germany when occasion offers. There are plenty of Russians in Angora today and there is plenty of Russian gold ready for distribution. But the Turks dislike and distrust the Bolshevist movement and are themselves not anxious to engineer insurrection against the British in the East. It is only if forced too far that they will make use of the last, the greatest and in my opinion the one indubitably successful means of coercion. With Turkey leading the Mahommedan world in an organized rebellion against British rule, there would be, as I see it, no hope for the maintenance of the security of the empire.
    I wonder if the British government knows anything of the quality of Kemal’s army. The talk of French or German officers having led it against the Greeks is all nonsense. The Nationalist Turks want no foreign interference. Again and again they have said to me: “We are not the old Turks. We stand upon our own feet. We desire to see a Turkish nation composed of Christians as well as Moslems–but it must be a united nation. We want no foreign officers in our army, no foreign directors of our customs and finance. We recognize our foreign debts and will pay them. We look to the support of the great nations of the West in the development of our national existence. We are ready and anxious for foreign trade. But we are an independent nation and will not live upon foreign sufferance or permission.”

    They have given enough proof of their determination in the past few years. I cannot conceive how any statesman, after seeing what Turkey has done to organize itself and maintain its freedom against colossal odds, can deny it the right to independence. These are not the days of Gladstone. These are new days. The World will not uproot the Turk from Europe or Asia Minor by accusing him of atrocities, especially when all mention of atrocities committed against him is carefully suppressed. The world will not destroy the Turk in Europe until it has killed the last man of the nation–and that man, when he dies, will die fighting.

    We hear a great deal about the hidden intrigues of other European nations against the British Empire. I suppose all nations intrigue at times. But I must qualify that statement: it is the diplomatists and the politicians who cannot be trusted not to intrigue. They are always at it. But I do not believe that in this matter of the Mahommedan menace there is, or could be, any difference of opinion between Great Britain, France and Italy. On broad principles, in this and other matters, our union is as close as ever it was during the great war. I will not pretend that the reason for this community of policy is entirely altruistic. On the contrary, their own interest impels France and Italy to join hands with us in any safe and just policy designed to protect our empire of Mahommedan subject peoples. The French and the Italians will be the first to feel within their own colonial borders the repercussion of revolt against the British Empire by the Mahommedan subjects. It is for this reason, and because they have already seen the wisdom of the course we shall have to take in the end, that they have refused to support Mr. Lloyd George’s pro-Greek policy and have ceased empire-building in the Near East. If the British government proposes to force Turkey into the toleration of alien military and civil authority in Asia Minor, we shall be left to fight the issue alone. And Mr. Lloyd George could not have gone to the House of Commons and asked for a hundred millions or so and permission to raise five hundred and fifty thousand men for the support of the Greeks in a new offensive in Asia Minor. It would have ended his government sooner. If any British politician wants the situation put picturesquely, let me tell him that he can, perhaps, push the Turk out of Europe; but if he does so, he will make Turkey an Asiatic Power and turn its eyes at once to our empire in India and Egypt. We must realize that Turkey watches closely every phase of the present situation and is quite capable of using it to the best advantage. And I would venture to say that whatever anti-British feeling there is in Turkey has been deliberately fomented, not by foreign agitators so much as by British incapables.

    There are certain matters, as I have explained, in which Turkey looks for help from us and from other western Powers. Turkey wants our moral support and wants us to have more interest in Turkish trade, which up to now has been conducted to the profit of the Greek under the shadow of British prestige. I do not pretend that the Turk is very fond of the Bulgar or the Serb or the Rumanian. I am sure that he has no love for the Russian and especially the Bolshevik. But there is one nation he hates, and that is the Greek. From time immemorial Greeks have assisted in the conduct of Turkish affairs, but always as subordinates. If one went close enough into the matter, it would be found that the Greeks themselves had little to complain of in the opportunities that were given them, under the Turkish Crescent, for personal aggrandizement in the commercial and even in the political sphere. But they have always been subordinate, and their presence in Asia Minor was tolerated only so long as they did not interfere with the rule of the country. The same applies to the Armenians. It is this which has fired the blood of every Turkish peasant to revolt, when he sees the Greeks come marching under arms as the conquerors of his country, the usurpers of his native soil. Should we like it, if those whom we had made our servants for centuries were forced upon us as conquerors by other nations for whom we had every respect and with whom we desired to be friends?

    At this stage, when after nearly three years of muddle, the British government is being forced back to the position it should have taken at the armistice, the natural liking and trust of the Turks for the British people is still so strong that the situation can be saved. In this matter I would almost say that our luck is undeserved, if I did not feel that it is not our politicians, but our national character, which has earned the appreciation of the Turk.
    I remember now, as if it were yesterday, what Raouf Bey said to me at Prinkipo, the day before I left captivity to bear the terms of Turkish capitulation to the British government. He pointed out that Britain must not try to force the Dardanelles, for that would cause chaos in Constantinople. “Turkey only wants to be friends with the British,” he said. “The whole thing must be a fait accompli before it is talked about. If we want help, we will call on the British and open the Dardanelles. Leave us alone till then. Treat us like gentlemen, and we will be loyal.”

    British troops and Anzacs alike will remember that the Turk fought like a gentleman at the Dardanelles. It was not with the approval of these troops that the British government struck at Turkish honor when the Turk laid down his arms. I reached the British fleet, after passing through Smyrna amid cheers and acclamation, on October 20, 1918, and remained as the guest of Admiral Seymour. The Turkish delegates arrived on October 26, were quartered on the Agamemnon and went into conference on the following day. They were Raouf Bey, minister of marine, Saad-ullah, a colonel of their general staff from Aleppo, and Reshad Hikmet Bey. Tewfik Bey, of the Turkish navy, who had been my navel aide-de-camp at Constantinople, went with them.

    I cannot say what happened at this conference, for I was not present. But when I got back to England, I wrote, on November 15, to Mr. Montagu, secretary of state for India, pointing out that the pro-German Turks were out of power and that the race of honest Turkish peasants, who had never wished to enter the field against Great Britain, should not be punished for the crimes committed by the Committee of Union and Progress and its bloodthirsty leaders, Enver and Talaat. I added the following statement:
    “It should be borne in mind that Izzet Pasha, the field marshal, grand vizir and minister of war, has always been friendly with England. In the interview in which he gave me my liberty, he asked if I would help Turkey and said that he came of a family that had always respected England and remembered the Crimean War and the policy of Lord Beaconsfield. He said that he was ready to open the Dardanelles and the Bosporus and to give autonomy to Mesopotamia and Syria, but under the sovereignty of the Sultan, adding that we could take what guarantees we like. All that Turkey wanted, he said, was the protection of England. He thought it was better for England to have Turkey on her road to the East, a faithful and obedient ally, than some Power which eventually would become a thorn in our side. ‘But,’ he continued, ‘we will not accept dishonorable terms; we are not Bulgarians. We have ideas of honor. And rather than accept dishonorable terms, we will put our backs to the wall and fight. You know what the Turks can do when driven to it, for you have fought against them. Do not drive us out of Constantinople or Turkey in Europe, where we have been settled for centuries, for this it is impossible for us to accept.’

    “Raouf Bey, minister of marine, told me that he was also ready to make Constantinople a free port, and with that commercial advantage, with access to the Black Sea and the great strategic advantage of the Dardanelles, Gallipoli and the Bosporus in our hands, we have all Turkey at our feet … I should certainly not occupy Mesopotamia or Syria, where we would only lock up troops for no purpose. If it is considered desirable by the government to hold a portion of Mesopotamia, then I should retain the province of Basrah, which might be made a free port; but, having the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, I personally see no great necessity to hold Basrah … As regards Armenia, I should install a British regiment to see that people were not oppressed. I know well the horrors that have been perpetrated on the Armenian people, but it must be remembered that the Armenian question has been to Turkey what the Irish question has been to England. The Armenians, much as I sympathize with their wrongs, have invariably intrigued against the Turks, with the Russians and with the English, on every possible occasion.”

    These words I addressed to Mr. Montagu, not only as being a member of the British government and at that time a personal friend of Mr. Lloyd George, but also having, by virtue of his office, a particular interest in the maintenance of a secure road between Great Britain and India.
    What I said then about Mesopotamia, almost the entire press, with the exception of the government organs, is saying today. The man in the street is also saying it, but in stronger language. To gratify the whims of a few political “experts” and to protect the selfish interests of wealthy oil speculators, we are bleeding the British taxpayer white for the up-keep of a needless army in a barren desert, which will never bloom like the rose, however much we delude ourselves into thinking that it will. The Turk kept Mesopotamia quiet with a tithe of the troops that we employ. He could do so again.

    It is the same in Syria. Both we and the French, if we unite on policy, can find a means of restoring Turkish control in Syria, without injuring either the Arabs or our own interests.
    And finally, we must make up our minds to march side by side with the French in this Turkish affair. A lot of bad feeling between the two nations has been artificially stimulated by interested parties. There is no need for bad feeling at all. Our aims and objects are identical, and with them there coincide the objects of Italy and the United States. Even today foreign trade is being carried on extensively between the Nationalist Turks and French, Italian and American merchants, who have missions and agencies at Adana, the capital of Cilicia–and it will be remembered that there was a graver incident between French troops and Turkish irregulars in this district than anything that has occurred to us–and in the growing port of Mersina and at Konia.

    While the Greeks were in Smyrna, the Turks from the interior blockaded and boycotted the place. Even if it had not been burned, the Turks would never have allowed their trade to go there while the Greeks were on the spot. And the Greeks of Smyrna will go back again when the place is rebuilt and under Turkish rule, as they would go back anywhere where there is a profit to be made.

    British trade with Turkey is now represented by a very few merchants, who are known personally to their Turkish neighbors and are not held responsible for British policy. There are tales of persecution of British traders by the Turks. These merchants will tell you that there is no truth in such tales. And if the British change their policy and extend the hand of friendship to Turkey, their traders will be welcomed with open arms. England and France must, in common necessity, unite on the Near East question and give back this element of self-respect and independence of which England has sought to deprive Turkey, but which the valor of Turkish soldiery has maintained in spite of the British government. Only so can we hope to avert the menace of a “holy war” and keep the green flag of the Prophet from being unfurled against Christians in every corner of the East.
    Asia, Vol. XXII, Number 12 (December, 1922): 949-953.

    By Major-General Sir Charles Townshend

  • Kopani What does it mean for the United States? (Radikal Newspaper)

    Kopani What does it mean for the United States? (Radikal Newspaper)

    Kopani What does it mean for the United States? (Radikal)

    Today, the global coalition against the United States Isidor retired Gen. John Allen and assist coordinators Brett McGurk Ankara ‘, or they come. ISID for two days in the fight against Turkey ‘s military contribution will discuss can provide. Negotiations will be conducted with a wide range, but with the impact of developments in Turkey Kopani will be the first item on the agenda. Meet Washington in terms of freedom of Tolga penned Kopani issue. Here in the United States in terms of Article 10 Kopani!

    1) USA, Kobani’nin when the ISID forces began to attack?
    Isidor targets in Syria first started to hit on September 22. The siege lasted Isidor Kopani. HDPE Co-chairman Selahattin Demirtas was in Washington that week. Both the White House and the American Foreign Ministry has held talks with. Kobani’nin is about to fall, the support needs to be told. And Americans, has started its operations in Syria six days later, on September 27, Kobani’nin the first time in an air strike against Isidor held.

    2) Kopani Isidor how much weight to place holds on coalition attack?
    Isidor carrying out operations in Iraq and Syria in the region of the United States Army CENTCOM October 6, 2014, a memo sent to reporters. Accordingly, 22 September-6 October 2014 from a total of 95 air strikes in Syria and held them in place with a laser to mark targets men. Work together in Iraq as the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga forces in Syria is not a black. Kirby just called to say: “This matter will be honest with you, where air power has limits. And we are currently in Syria, land, eager, talented, do not have an active partner. “Every day 7-10
    For these operations, the Pentagon spends millions of dollars. However, cooperation with ground forces in Iraq, Syria is not yet able to sit.

    3) So these attacks Isidor fell to the Kobani’de enough?
    No. Kirby also clearly said it at a press conference yesterday. “These attacks will not solve it. Kopani to save the city. We know that, “he said. What’s missing? collaborate on land where the air while attacking the United States, smart missiles to hit targets on the ground, laser mark on the man. Work together in Iraq as the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga forces in Syria is not a black. Kirby just called to say: “This matter will be honest with you, where air power has limits. And we are currently in Syria, land, eager, talented, do not have an active partner. “Every day from 7 to 10 million dollars the Pentagon spends for this operation. However, cooperation with ground forces in Iraq, Syria is not yet able to sit.

    4) Kobani’yi pyd’y defending against Isidor (Democratic Unionist Party) connected YPG (People’s Defence Association) Do not be a partner of the United States?
    Clearly not. Because since 1997, the number of terrorist PKK connection with the ypg’y makes punishable under U.S. law. Moreover, together with its allies have Turkey. But do not communicate? It had. FP magazine published an article in the latest US’s former ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, a back channel diplomacy conduct by intermediaries PYD every 6 months since 2012 in Paris confirmed that contact. But for now, that’s all. He also regularly briefed Turkey. But yesterday, I spoke on the phone with a senior Kurdish politician. Kobani’de intensified in the last 48 hours in case of the continuation of the American attack me in this situation may change, he said. “YPG power between the United States and has been a military coordination committees” I said. No, I still have not. The task of marking targets on land already started to hit the United States Kobani’yi the day to help the Kurdish city of the Free Syrian Army troops was doing. “Which,” I said. “Northern Storm Brigade” he said.

    5) Kobani’de Turkey to establish a safe zone possible? Much discussed this issue in Turkey. But the idea of establishing a safe zone in Syria Washington thinks is not an option at the moment. Yesterday, all the spokesmen of the city, in the daily press conference gave the same answer to this question. First, Rear Admiral John Kirby, Pentagon spokesman, said: “It (the buffer zone), our military options currently on the table as we think not,” he said. Then it came to White House spokesman Josh Earnest. He said, “This (the buffer zone) of the Turks several times expressed themselves something they and we talked with them about it. However, we think our currently nothing, “he said. Journalists are still not satisfied with the same questions asked in the State Department briefing. There is also a spokeswoman Jen Psai repeat the same thing again: “This option (the buffer zone) has not ruled out in no time. Only applications currently do not intend to. ”

    6) Good singing is also a spokesman for Secretary of State John Kerry to come out yesterday why “this idea is worth a closer look,” he said?
    Spokesman of the job of politicians is to collect words anyway. Kerry actually said those words. British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond held a joint press conference at the ministry building had. Came the question. He said, “The idea of the buffer zone in the middle for a while. Worth checking out. Worth a look too close, “he said. So much in a press conference to discuss the issue of the buffer zone was because of those words. But in fact the issue is this: Americans, coalition military support against the Turks Isidor not use all their power to persuade
    They’re trying. Kerry, Turkey as well as other related issues in these negotiations also represents management’s soft face. Turkey at a time on this issue clearly before the public will be rejected Kerry’s job to facilitate the negotiations will not be applied even if the idea of holding pot. Indeed, Kerry Washington Administration in the eyes of today’s Turkey Turkey
    thesis by standing closest to. Indeed, the protocol has changed. You know, President Obama and Vice President Biden with a prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, not even once they contact. President Erdogan level relationships are established. Whereas on paper in executive Prime Minister. But Kerry, Mevlut Cavusoglu discussion with Foreign Minister Davutoglu and the whole story is ilişkisiyleyürütüy. Kerry and Obama in the last 48 hours of contact time traffic, this is clearly visible.

    7) the United States safely in the Turks would not be the cause of the arguments that will be used when describing what will happen?
    Official reasons given as to say. Business of the international law have size, land power necessary to use this situation in the region, other countries, irritable and Isidor against coalition weakens and so on … But beyond that … State Department Spokesman Jan Psai in yesterday’s raid at a meeting of business the most crucial part implicitly touched fact: “There are many challenges in its implementation. Including security guarantees, “he said, and was declared a safe zone when the Syrian government’s emphasis on the difficulty of obtaining the guarantee would attack here
    did. Set up a safe zone However, the necessary use of force, you’re going to make it, is not it? But Psai, this explanation has been clearly with the following: “We do not maintain safe zone against Assad.” Kirby’s where it stands at the briefing at the Pentagon was the same. “What are the risks of establishing buffer zone” the statement said. Kirby responded exactly as follows: “I’ll just say this. Our focus on Isidor apply pressure. “So. Assad is not the goal of the buffer zone Isidor, so also we do not consider this idea.
    8) Americans Assad met this job be?
    The official rhetoric of the American Administration, Management with legitimate non-Assad made absolutely clear that the direction of cooperation. Indeed, even in air strikes in Syria, the United Nations advance through their representatives, in general terms, did not receive a letter full partner outside the regime. However, no state wants to carry out a foreign policy options will narrow. I mean, no rational state. I these lines, the famous military academy in Vermont at Norwich University, I was invited “Grand Strategy of the United States entitled” I’m writing from the conference. America’s leading academics working in the school of war, and some names from the Pentagon, two days Isidor kind of have to deal with regional threats. One of the most heated topics of the conference and what do you know? Libya, Operation, what a big mistake that Gaddafi’s overthrow of how big a chaos that today in Syria karşıklıg a cause of Africa and the Middle East of weapons shedding post-Gaddafi Libya, which is, and in 1990 the first Gulf War ‘In topple Saddam’s risk seeing avoided the elder Bush – Brent Scowcroft (then-National Security Advisor) – James Baker (the then Foreign Minister) of a trio of American history ever best national security team to be one of. Do not forget. Obama, the son of former President Bush that they opposed arrived in Iraq. Continuity is essential in the American state of course. But from the conference in Norwich
    One of the conclusions in the American state to the president of a business is to provide the widest possible options. Come 2016. Hillary Clinton to the White House as a Democrat or a Republican to be elected any. And national security team also went to the new President “Sorry, can not talk with Assad. President Obama banned it in time “to say. Do you! Of course it will not. And of course, the American government, which is legally mobility units will be installed in 2016 after Assad Rejimi’yl the ground for a possible relationship
    to start preparing well in advance.
    9) For Syria, Turkey and the United States that deep differences in priorities, while the motion was echoed in Washington, how? ‘That differences in the shade of these priorities. Vice President Biden’s more like Turkey in Syria Isidor help organizations accusing senior I met who had no history of Harvard speech to an American official göreankara Assad’s first priority, second priority to prevent the strengthening of the Kurds. ISID the first priority of the United States, the second priority Assad, third priority to protect the Kurds. Note the following aspects were relieved Washington of course. Will last for years in an operation that can provide a huge cost and logistical advantages NATO base at Incirlik, thanks to this decision may be made available. But the issue before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 rated motion contrast, the decision to give consent to the use of Turkey’s Incirlik does not mean that. Ropes in the government. And in Washington, the Ankara government of this permit, in her words, a broader solution used as a leverage to talk thinks. There is a poll they are talking about. Isidor 80 percent of the people of Turkey against the United States conducted attacks in Syria and Iraq agreed to support. But that said, there is one situation in Syria … Erdogan-Obama Administration since the beginning does not act in accordance with public opinion. The same as the people of Turkey, 70 percent in Turkey, Syria, carried out by an overwhelming majority would approve interventionist policies, but nothing was changing me? Positive ministers there, of course. For example, during the 2003 permit the United States met with Ambassador Robert Pearson. Emphasized two points: 1) a positive sign this memorandum. Because the United States is open to cooperation areas. 2) Two of the capital’s politics are not clear, but the continuation of talks is important.
    10) What about the American public’s view on the subject? Is Washington Kopani policy affected?
    Was two weeks ago. Kobani’nin with the situation in the Kurdish-Americans were talking. “So far, we ‘Hevalno (friends) Tighten your teeth, seroma (Apo) speaks’ they said. Youth were your inhibitions. But if it falls Kopani hevalno will listen. We say to the Americans, “he said. Just like Demirtas, arriving in Washington the Kurds in Turkey or not the Kurds living in the United States. Kobani’nin human tragedy in the American media and think-tanks in Washington has created a great sensitivity. Latest from the Center for American Progress (CAP), written by Michael Werz and Max Hoffman, Washington’s Kobani’de should take immediate action, the Kurds in Syria, saying that the Allies needed one of these articles. Beyond that people in America Kobani’nin donation campaign has even begun. With a personal fortune of $ 1.1 billion, one of the nation’s leading rich, the owner of Chobani yogurt
    Hamdi Ulukaya (42) one of them. Talked on the phone earlier in the day. And Isidor Kopani Kurdish region of Syria under siege for a donation of $ 2 million, he said. Assistance to civil society organizations working in the area to do. Who said. “Which is yet unclear. Who is active on the field talking to them, “he said. “Others Do you want to participate in this donation,” I said. “Everyone in this case I want to help a human eye look. We insanıyız Anatolia. Political aspect of the event, who does not interest me what game to play. Everyone in shabby condition. It is impossible to remain indifferent. Or the audience will stay there for a massacre, and we will live a life of remorse or it will save the people, “he said.

  • Divisions Could Weaken U.S.-Led Coalition in Iraq and Syria

    Divisions Could Weaken U.S.-Led Coalition in Iraq and Syria

    George Freidman Chairman STRATFORD

    Analysis

    Print Text Size

    Summary

    Over the past week, the U.S.-led coalition carrying out airstrikes against Islamic State positions in Iraq and Syria has expanded to include several new members. This has enhanced its overall combat power and spread the burden more equitably. The British parliament voted Sept. 26 to join the group and has already commenced airstrikes over Iraq. Denmark and Belgium also decided to participate in direct combat operations. These new partners join two European peers, France and the Netherlands, as well as Australia. Notably, these six countries have chosen to restrict their combat roles to Iraq. This contrasts with the role of the United States’ five Arab partners — Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates — which have been carrying out airstrikes with the United States in Syria since operations expanded there Sept. 23.

    This odd division of labor does not operate in the interest of efficiency but is instead an artifact of the complicated and juxtaposed reality on the ground and in the political arena. The battleground against the Islamic State is ostensibly divided between the sovereign states of Iraq and Syria. In reality, however, it is a single space spread over what has become an imaginary border. The divided coalition reflects the members’ divergent political views on how to manage the respective situations of Iraq and Syria. Ultimately, the arrangement artificially separates what should be treated as a single battlefield and a single enemy. This weakens the coalition, confuses desired outcomes and often limits operations to what will appease all members.

    Analysis

    The coalition’s division of the battle space into two parts has already led to differences in target selection. Since earlier limited U.S. operations in Iraq expanded into Syria, the United States and Arab coalition members have focused on critical infrastructure in Syria that supports Islamic State operations in Syria and Iraq. This has included command centers, finance operations, supply depots and, most recently, oil refineries. The coalition’s strategy in Syria has been to degrade the Islamic State’s military capabilities through destruction or disruption of the critical assets that support it.

    Click to Enlarge

    The strategy in Iraq, however, has been quite different. There, the focus of air campaigns has been to buttress ground operations. This has translated into close air support for Kurdish peshmerga and national government forces, as well as strikes aimed at destroying Islamic State military supplies, vehicles and heavy weapons used in operations against those forces. This divergence stems in part from the different tactical situations in each country: In Iraq the coalition is operating in direct coordination with local forces, whereas in Syria efforts to facilitate anti-Islamic State ground attacks are in the early stages, with only the first steps having been taken to train Syrian anti-regime rebels in Saudi Arabia.

    But these disparate tactical realities are only part of the picture. The primary differences between these operations are explained by the imperatives of the partners operating in Iraq and in Syria. The United States’ Sunni Arab partners have an interest in participating in the operations against the Islamic State in Syria. Degrading the Islamic State’s capabilities there takes pressure off of anti-regime rebels currently fighting Damascus and Islamic State forces simultaneously. The United States’ reliance on support from these Sunni Arab countries, however, presents the risk that the core mission in Syria will be stretched in two different directions. The United States aims to cripple the Islamic State without directly targeting Syrian President Bashar al Assad. The Sunni Arab states, though, want to dislodge al Assad’s Iran-friendly regime and weaken the position of Lebanese-based Shiite militant group Hezbollah, which is assisting the Syrian government.

    Risks to Cohesion

    Conversation: U.S.-Led Bombing Raid Commences in Syria

    For their part, Australia and the coalition’s European members have a different set of interests from their Arab partners. Because a large number of Islamic State foreign fighters originated in Europe, these governments fear that the militants could at some point return home and threaten national security. The Islamic State has also taken European hostages and continues to be a source for radicalization inside Europe. This means that these states have compelling reasons for carrying out strikes against the Islamic State regardless of its area of operation. All six of these powers, however, have chosen not to operate over Syria without a clear mandate from the United Nations. In European countries especially, military intervention is a touchy political subject; approval for any type of direct involvement typically requires the support of parliament, putting tight electoral constraints on such operations. These limits are less severe in the case of Iraq, where the coalition is delivering assistance to a host nation requesting help rather than conducting a military intervention in a country without coordinating with its government.

    The division of the coalition into two separate areas does not necessarily limit its military capabilities, but it does pose serious risks to its cohesion and, by extension, its ability to sustain effective operations over Syria in particular. Because of the Arab states’ direct interest in the outcome of the Syrian civil war, they may try to push the United States toward extending air operations to targets of the al Assad regime. This is something the United States is unwilling to do, in part because it would carry a much higher logistical cost. But if such a disagreement were to threaten operations over Syria, the Europeans’ reluctance to extend their own activities into Syria would seriously limit the coalition. The United States would also risk being perceived as the sole actor on the Syrian side of the battle, rather than part of an international coalition, and this could result in significant blowback on the ground. At the same time, disagreements on the scope of operations in Syria could also constrain the effectiveness of strikes by limiting the target set to the bare minimum to which all parties can agree.

    As it stands, the U.S.-led coalition is fragile. When something is this delicate and complicated, it is hard to take the decisive action required to degrade and contain a dynamic opponent such as the Islamic State.

  • Turkey’s ISIL conundrum

    Turkey’s ISIL conundrum

    AMANDA PAUL

    a.paul@todayszaman.com

    September 30, 2014, Tuesday

    Since the release of the 46 Turkish hostages held by the Islamic State (IS) almost two weeks ago, Turkey has finally shifted up a gear and seems on the verge of taking a bigger role in the fight against the IS, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

    President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made several statements saying that Turkey is “in” and that “Turkey will do whatever is needed in the anti-ISIL fight.” Turkey has always been “ loud” on the need to fight against terrorist activities. ISIL, the world’s deadliest terrorist organization, is operating right on the other side of Turkey’s border and has already demonstrated itself to be a threat to Turkey’s security. Moreover, Turkey — which frequently brags about how it is a crucial regional power — will not want to play second fiddle to the group of Arab nations already bombing the IS.

    Turkey also needs to clean up its image following numerous accusations that it was in cahoots with the IS, including not taking enough steps to prevent it from recruiting fighters in Turkey or to secure the border. In other words, trash the story that was published in The Wall Street Journal on Sept. 15 titled “Our non-ally in Ankara.”

    Turkey has four key objectives: Bury ISIS; prevent the resurgence of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; shut down any possible Kurdish self-rule aspirations by creating a buffer zone inside the Syrian border; and have a say in Syria’s future.

    It seems unlikely that Turkey will take part in the airstrike campaign. I doubt whether this is necessary, anyway, with numerous countries already bombing the IS in Iraq and Syria. Whether Turkey would give support to the forces fighting the terrorists on the ground, including training, intelligence and equipment, is also questionable. Turkey is loath to do anything that may result in the IS retaliating with a terrorist attack on its territory. This fear is justified and reflected by the increasing numbers of European states — including Germany, France and the UK — which have warned their citizens against traveling to Turkey.

    Turkey is expected to have a key role in counter-terrorism including taking steps to block the funding of the IS from those sources in Turkey that have reportedly been dealing with the IS and stepping up measures to stop the flow of foreign fighters crossing from Turkey into Syria and Iraq, as well as offering humanitarian assistance. Turkey has already taken steps to strengthen its border. Ankara has boosted security while also imposing a curfew and ending its “open-door policy.” Turkish tanks and armored vehicles have taken up positions on a hill overlooking the besieged Syrian Kurdish border town of Kobane.

    When it comes to İncirlik Air Base, this is currently still a no-go, although the US has made clear they would like to use it. So far its use is reportedly restricted to humanitarian and logistical operations. Yet this may change in the event that Turkey gets the green light to create a buffer zone inside Syria, protected by a no-fly zone — although the IS do not use planes. Such a move would in part help stop the flow of refugees but clearly it could also serve to curb growing Kurdish self-rule aspirations, which Ankara fears could heat-up Turkey’s Kurds and possibly ruin the current cease-fire with the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) and the ongoing Kurdish peace process. Turkey has tried to prevent Turkish Kurds from crossing the border to help Syrian Kurds, prompting accusations of cooperation with the IS. So with this situation reaching boiling point, Ankara needs to take action. Faced with a common enemy, Turkey needs to strike a deal with the Kurds more than ever before.

    The Turkish Parliament is set to renew the agreement authorizing cross-border military operations into Syria, although Ankara is unlikely to do this without US agreement. While the US is currently opposed to the creation of a buffer zone, if Turkey’s territorial integrity is under threat, under international law it may intervene, but not further than a few kilometers.

    Having a buffer zone would give Turkey a bigger stake in Syria’s future, possibly reducing fears that an IS defeat would strengthen the Assad regime. This is also important given that the US does not seem to have long-term strategy beyond defeating the IS. There is no guarantee that another such group would not emerge in the future; hence, it is crucial that the roots of the region’s problems are addressed, rather than just sticking on another band-aid.

  • U.S.-Arab Coalition in Syria Could Impact Regional Balance

    U.S.-Arab Coalition in Syria Could Impact Regional Balance

    STRATFOR

    George Freidman Chairman STRATFORD
    September 23, 2014 | 2129 GMT

    Analysis
    U.S. airstrikes on Islamic State and al Qaeda positions in the Syrian city of Raqqa took place Sept. 22, for once not with the help and backing of traditional allies such as France or the United Kingdom, but rather with a surprising show of force from the region’s Sunni Arab monarchies. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Jordan took part in the airstrikes, with Qatar providing air support, even though it has long been at odds with members of this coalition. This push by Arab and U.S. forces risks upsetting the status quo that has defined the Syrian civil war for the past 12-16 months and could change the internal balance of power that developed from late 2012.

    Iran’s sphere of influence in the Arab world expanded with the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime and again with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in December 2011. Iran has backed Shiite and related sectarian forces from Mesopotamia to Syria and Lebanon, including Iraq’s Shiite majority government, Hezbollah and the ruling Syrian Alawite regime. This has allowed Tehran to maintain a hand in security matters along its western flank, to the consternation of Sunni Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. The prospect of a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, stirred by the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, has further unnerved Riyadh and its regional allies, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

    As a result, the past year saw increasing anger and activity from the region’s Sunni Arab groups. Most of these groups are backed by the coalition of monarchies that participated in yesterday’s joint airstrikes with the United States. This uptick in activity culminated in a flood of Islamic State militants out of Syria and into Iraq. Many of these forces — among them jihadists and those whose long-term targets include Saudi Arabia as well as Iran — pose serious threats to regional stability even as they focus on Iranian and Iranian-backed targets. Whether this situation is part of a long-term plan by regional Sunni actors or it is merely a serendipitous occasion for diplomacy and aggressive military action, this outpouring of jihadist activity represented by the Islamic State creates opportunities for Riyadh and the region’s Sunni Arab powerhouses.
    Alternative Partnerships
    This coalition is the largest grouping of Arab military forces against a common target since the 1991 Gulf War. From the standpoint of the United States, the joint airstrikes provide regional backing and legitimacy to U.S. actions in Iraq. More important, they provide legitimacy for its actions in Syria, where Washington lacks the overt support of Bashar al Assad’s Iran-backed government in Damascus.

    Beyond the current airstrikes, however, the overall role that Riyadh (along with other Arab monarchies) has in regional conflicts comes increasingly into question. At the moment activity is confined to Syria, but this alignment raises the issue of whether Gulf Arab airstrikes will extend to Islamic State targets in Iraq — a state strongly within the Iranian sphere of influence. Libya, too, has an ongoing conflict, one in which the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are rumored to be working with Egypt to suppress the rogue militias and Islamist forces.
    What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
    In recent years, the United States has been attempting to establish a new strategy, one that reduces direct U.S. military involvement, encouraging a greater role for regional players in containing conflicts such as Syria, Iraq and Libya. Clearly, regional actors are still unwilling or unable to shoulder the burden of managing such volatile conflicts on their own. The United States, perhaps, is also unwilling to see the expansion of proxy battles — such as the competition between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey in Syria — into larger regional warfare.

    The coming days and weeks will reveal just how much of a role Saudi Arabia and its allies are willing to take in the fight against Islamic State and, more broadly, in the project of enforcing regional stability. This could involve providing token political and military support, with the United States carrying the bulk of the burden. Conversely, these airstrikes could develop into a small but growing assertiveness among the region’s Arab monarchies.

    Regardless of further developments Iran is already on the defensive. With Washington and Tehran unable to coordinate openly against Islamic State in either Syria or Iraq, Saudi Arabia and its allies have moved to fill the gap. The situation, however, remains changeable. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is set to meet with British Prime Minister David Cameron on Sept. 24 on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly to discuss ways of combatting the Islamic State — the first such bilateral meeting between British and Iranian heads of state in 35 years. As the international community’s tactics to suppress Islamic State evolve, so will the region’s geopolitical realities, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran working to preserve their interests in the shadow of another round of U.S. military action in the Middle East.

  • A NATO ally stays on sidelines of fight against Islamic State

    A NATO ally stays on sidelines of fight against Islamic State

    Few countries are in a better position than Turkey to help the United States fight Islamic State. The moderate Islamic country shares a 750 mile border with Syria, is a NATO member and a long-time ally of America. But don’t hold your breath for Turkey’s support.

    For a long time, Turks have resented the “curse of strategic significance” related to its forming NATO’s southern flank. They felt it enabled the military to keep a watchful eye over their politicians. Likewise, it fueled the politicians’  sense of impunity that shielded them from the need for reform.

    This was part of the reason why, at the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Turkey refused to provide logistic support for the U.S.-led invasion to bring down Saddam Hussein. The chaos into which Iraq then descended after 2003 only reinforced the ruling AK party’s supporters of the validity of Turkey’s bid to go its own way.

    The government calls this policy “zero problems with neighbors.” This self-explanatory catchphrase was introduced by Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish premier and former foreign minister. It signaled the beginning of a new era in Turkish foreign policy, and troubles for Western allies that relied on it.

    Today, Turkey remains wedded to this policy. Despite the threat of the Islamic State, the country remains just as skeptical of getting involved in Iraq as in 2003. The opinion columns of pro-government newspapers, like Yeni Safak, warn Turkey not to fall into the trap of a military alliance.

    “The threat of IS terror is a pretext by racist Zionists to open up their stall in the Middle East,” writes one columnist. Others speak of the conspiracy to undermine a Turkey which has just begun to find its voice.

    Tellingly, Turkey refused to sign the recent Jeddah Communique, which was endorsed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the United States, stating that they will “stand united” on the threat posed by Islamic State and that they would all “do their share” in the fight. Unlike Turkey, none of the Arab nations who signed the declaration are NATO members.

    Turkey’s rejection of its strategic significance is clear. Ankara won’t let America attack Islamic State from its airbases, nor will it agree to contribute troops for military operations. Still, America hopes it can change its mind. That was the reason behind a recent visit by Chuck Hagel to Ankara, where he met with Erdogan and other top Turkish officials.

    But what if Turkey can’t return to its prior strategic significance, even if it wants to?

    There is plenty of evidence that Turkey is overwhelmed with the problems in its backyard. Turkish intelligence, for example, was blind-sided in June when Islamic State forces seized the Turkish consul general and nearly 50 other hostages in the Iraqi city of Mosul. This has effectively prevented Ankara from taking a public stand against radicals, for fear of worsening the hostages’ situation.

    Turkey is also struggling to stop fuel from Iraq and Syria being smuggled into the country by Islamic State, which uses the profits to line its coffers. Turkish officials maintain in private that they are doing their best to stop the flow of funds and fighters passing through the porous border, but its actions don’t always match its words.

    To make matters worse, the conflict is causing Turkey to lose its edge in peace negotiations with the Kurdish Worker Party (PKK), its historic domestic enemy. The PKK helped rescue thousands of Yazidis fleeing an Islamic State advance from Iraqi mountaintops. As a result, members of a group it has condemned as terrorists are now being hailed as heroes, which badly reduces Ankara’s bargaining power.

    Turkish foreign policy is in trouble and, while the country might pride itself on being an unwilling partner in this war, it is also an unable one.

    That, of course, is scarce consolation for the United States.

    Maybe one day, Turkey will seek to regain the strategic significance it once had. After all, when Islamic State is your neighbor, “zero problems” is hardly a sustainable policy.

    But America shouldn’t expect that day to come any time soon.