Category: Sci/Tech

  • 24,000-Year-Old Body Is Kin to Both Europeans and American Indians

    24,000-Year-Old Body Is Kin to Both Europeans and American Indians

    Sibirya’da gömülü bulunan 24.000 yıllık çocuğun DNA’sı Avrupalı ve Amerikan yerlilerinin akrabalıkları gibi Antropologlar için sürpriz sonuçlar ortaya çıkardı.

    21genome-1-articleLarge

    A view of Lake Baikal in eastern Siberia near where the young boy buried at Mal’ta was discovered.

    By NICHOLAS WADE

    The genome of a young boy buried at Mal’ta near Lake Baikal in eastern Siberia some 24,000 years ago has turned out to hold two surprises for anthropologists.

    The first is that the boy’s DNA matches that of Western Europeans, showing that during the last Ice Age people from Europe had reached farther east across Eurasia than previously supposed. Though none of the Mal’ta boy’s skin or hair survive, his genes suggest he would have had brown hair, brown eyes and freckled skin.

    The second surprise is that his DNA also matches a large proportion — some 25 percent — of the DNA of living Native Americans. The first people to arrive in the Americas have long been assumed to have descended from Siberian populations related to East Asians. It now seems that they may be a mixture between the Western Europeans who had reached Siberia and an East Asian population.

    The Mal’ta boy was aged 3 to 4 and was buried under a stone slab wearing an ivory diadem, a bead necklace and a bird-shaped pendant. Elsewhere at the same site some 30 Venus figurines were found of the kind produced by the Upper Paleolithic cultures of Europe. The remains were excavated by Russian archaeologists over a 20-year period ending in 1958 and stored in museums in St. Petersburg.

    There they lay for some 50 years until they were examined by a team led by Eske Willerslev of the University of Copenhagen. Dr. Willerslev, an expert in analyzing ancient DNA, was seeking to understand the peopling of the Americas by searching for possible source populations in Siberia. He extracted DNA from bone taken from the child’s upper arm, hoping to find ancestry in the East Asian peoples from whom Native Americans are known to be descended.

    via 24,000-Year-Old Body Is Kin to Both Europeans and American Indians – NYTimes.com.

    more: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/science/two-surprises-in-dna-of-boy-found-buried-in-siberia.html?smid=fb-nytimes&WT.z_sma=SC_2YO_20131120&_r=0

  • What Went Wrong in Turkey’s Corvette Contest

    What Went Wrong in Turkey’s Corvette Contest

    By BURAK EGE BEKDIL

    bilde

    Critics believe Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has restarted a competition for a new naval corvette as political payback against a firm that is viewed as sympathetic to protesters. (AFP / Getty Images)

    FILED UNDER

    World News

    Europe

    ANKARA — There are two accounts. The unofficial one hints at a political crackdown on a company owned by an industrial conglomerate that has been at odds with Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian government, especially this summer.

    And then there’s official account, which denies everything. Whichever is true, the Turkish government will now open a fresh competition among the country’s seven leading shipyards for the production of four Navy corvettes.

    In January, Turkey’s decision-maker on procurement, the Defense Industry Executive Committee, chaired by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, awarded the corvette contract, for six vessels at that time, to RMK Marine, an Istanbul shipyard owned by the country’s biggest business group, Koc Holding.

    Defense News had reported that Koc Holding’s defense business could be a casualty of a row between the Erdogan and one of its top executives after a month of civil unrest that battered the Turkish government.

    The report quoted an analyst as saying, “It should come as no surprise if the government decided to thoroughly scrutinize all Koc-related contracts, including defense deals.”

    In one incident during the June demonstrations, protesters tried to escape police tear gas and pepper spray by taking refuge in a posh Istanbul hotel, Divan, owned by Koc. Hotel management admitted the protesters to its lobby, which quickly turned into a makeshift first aid room.

    The police fired more tear gas and pepper spray into the hotel lobby although it is illegal to fire these chemicals into indoor spaces. It was reported that Ali Koc, a board member and third-generation family member, had ordered the hotel to help the protesters.

    On June 16, an angry Erdogan said in a public rally: “We know which hotel owners helped terrorists [protesters]. It is a crime to abet terrorists. And those crimes will not remain unpunished.”

    Defense News reported on Aug. 13 that the government could revise a contract for the production of corvettes, and on Sept. 26 the Turkish government scrapped the corvette deal, dubbed Milgem, and pledged to renew competition.

    Industry sources insist that the decision was political.

    “The hostility between Koc and the government is not new. It was there even before the protests. The Koc hotel incident was the last drop in a growing feud,” said one source.

    But the top procurement official has a different explanation. “There is no political link here,” said Murad Bayar, head of Turkey’s procurement agency, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM).

    According to Bayar, one Istanbul shipyard filed a complaint that the earlier two-way contest had violated competition rules. SSM invited two companies, RMK Marine and Dearsan, to the Milgem contest, although a 2007 Strategic Sector Document issued by SSM had named seven shipyards as potential bidders.

    Bayar said that in April or May, an inspection board of the prime minister’s office found the complaint accurate and recommended the contract with RMK Marine be canceled. It ruled that all seven shipyards had had to be invited to the competition.

    “This has caused us a loss of one year in progressing with this program,” Bayar said. “Now we will invite all seven to a new competition.”

    Bayar said two more of a total of eight Milgem corvettes would now be built by the military shipyards, and the remaining four (the first two had been delivered by the military shipyards) would now be commissioned to the winner of the new race. Each vessel, he said, would cost Turkey between US $300 million and $350 million.

    Turkey plans to use the experience gained in the Milgem project to develop its first national frigate, the TF-2000, in the 2020s.

    via What Went Wrong in Turkey’s Corvette Contest | Defense News | defensenews.com.

  • Refractory Failure Elimination in Fludised Bed Reactors

    Refractory Failure Elimination in Fludised Bed Reactors

    Refractory Failure Elimination in Fludised Bed Reactors

    Technical paper IRE – Refractory Failure Elimination (Download .doc)

    Dr Cengiz Erkan

    Principle Engineer BHB Billiton

    PhD.MSc.BEng.FIEAustCPEng.MIREng.DBus

    Dr Tom Honeyands

    BHP Billiton – Newcastle Technology Centre

     

    Dr Andrew Shook

    BHP Billiton – Newcastle Technology Centre

     

    Dr Philip Clausen

    School of Engineering, University of Newcastle

    1. Executive Summary

     

    Spalling of fluidised bed reactor refractories and subsequent feed leg blockages have been a significant cause of lost production in Iron, alumina and nickel processing plants. This work describes the Strategic Refractory Management Plan developed to address high refractory failure rates during the first years of operation of the Port Hedland HBI plant.

     

    An example is then given of a mathematical modelling study of the heat transfer and stresses in the reactor vessel to see whether any conclusions can be drawn about the maximum allowable heating or cooling rates.

     

    The reactor hot face refractory and insulation layers, restrained by a stainless steel shell, were modelled using “strand7” finite element software. Here only the dome of a simplified reactor, not including expansion joints, anchors, gas inlets and outlet, was modelled to determine the stress profile through the wall when subject to thermal loading.

     

    Several alternative refractory configurations were considered for this application. The compressive thermal stresses predicted on heat-up were found to always be lower than the crushing strength of the materials in this investigation, and no conclusions can be made regarding maximum heating rate.

     

    When the internal surface of the reactor is cooled by cold purge gasses, tensile stresses can potentially be generated in the hot face refractory, along with shear stresses between the hot face and the insulation. Tensile stresses were only predicted in one case – 150mm hot face / 150mm insulation – during rapid cooling. This configuration was therefore rejected.

     

    Shear stresses in the other refractory configurations were found to be relatively low (<1.1MPa). No indications of the reasons for previous refractory failures were found using this simple model. It is concluded that differences in the dry-out and curing of the 60% Alumina and 80 % Alumina based castables hot face refractories is responsible for their differing performance.

     

    1. Introduction

     

    In this paper we consider the example of BHP Billiton’s hot Briquetted iron (HBI), processing plant in Port Hedland due to problematic processing characters. In this plant the high alumina refractories must contain abrasive solids at elevated temperatures and pressures under reducing gas conditions. A combination of reasons accelerated the deterioration and shortened the life expectancy of the refractories during this period. The following examples are typical of the problems experienced:

     

    • Reactor refractory dome collapse

    • Refractory anchor failures

    • Reactor wall refractory failures

    • Hot spots

     

    The objectives of this paper are two fold:

    1. To outline the overall refractory management plan that was put in place and to demonstrate the economic benefits

    2. To describe a modelling study used to assist in troubleshooting the refractory failures and in assessing alternative refractory thickness options for one of the vessels including:

     

    • 150 mm hot face and 150 mm insulation

    • 150 mm hot face and 50 mm insulation

    • 100 mm hot face and 200 mm insulation (the “normal” configuration)

     

    1. The Port Hedland Example

     

    Cracking, spalling and or even complete failure of reactor refractories causes significant lost of production, increased maintenance and increased operational costs. These refractory failures can be caused by:

     

    • Incorrect material selection: Refractories must be chosen with the correct thermo-physical properties including thermal conductivity, coefficient of thermal expansion, strength and chemical compatibility with the process stream.

    • Incorrect thermal or physical design, particularly with consideration to compatible thermal expansion and the refractory-steel interface.

    • Incorrect dryout, curing and heatup: Non-uniform temperature distribution during heatup, either surface or internal, can significantly reduce refractory integrity.

    • Excessive thermal cycling or the presence of thermal shock conditions during operation

     

    To address this problem, a technical team supervised by Genghis Erkan developed a long term “Strategic Refractory Management Plan in BHP Billiton”, to systematically solve refractory and related problems. This plan provided systematic material selection and evaluation process and enabled us to manage and monitor such things as uniformity of heat transfer during start-up, operation and shut down.

     

    This resulted in longer campaign periods, less equipment wear, shorter shut-downs and decreased overall operating costs. The resulting benefits can be seen in the later years of operation shown in Table 1. The corresponding increase in refractory life is shown in Table 2.

     

    Table 2: Refractory Operational Life (Briquetting Feed Bin)

     

    Year

    Days

    1999

    70

    2000

    75

    2001

    60

    2002

    140

    2003

    220

     

    To achieve these improvements, the following actions were taken as part of the Strategic Refractory Management Plan:

     

    • Development of refractory specifications and replacement of poor quality / unsuitable refractories with suitable ones

    • Design modifications in some critical areas to improve refractory life, such as briquetting feed bin striker pad, reactor dome refractories re-design, replacing panels with a continuous ring and Implementation of an effective monitoring system

    • Development of suitable heat up procedures to remove all free and molecular moisture and chemical binder, relieving stresses in the structure, promoting uniformity of thermal conductivity and minimising the impact of porosity on the system

    • Elimination of thermal shock conditions via uniform preheating of the refractory system prior to normal operation and minimisation of thermal cycling

    • Removal of hot face refractory line expansion joints in the walls of vessels

     

    Figure 1 show refractory failures, which have decreased significantly since the full implementation of this strategy.

    Figure 1.  Refractory failures from 1999 to 2003

     

    1. Mathematical Modelling

     

    To assist with the modification to the refractory design, and to guide changes to start up and operating strategy, a number of mathematical models were used.  In conjunction with this, the failures of the refractory lining were extensively studied during post mortem investigations, Historical plant data were analysed to determine refractory performance relative to operating conditions, and in service tests were carried out.

     

    4.1 Heat Transfer Analysis

    The first step was to carry out an analysis of the heat transfer environment. A set of data were examined to give a good range of heat up and cool down rates actually experienced in the plant.

     

    The temperature profiles through the refractory were calculated using a commercial heat transfer package, Heating, using the thermal properties of the refractories supplied by the plant technology department and assuming that the thermocouple present in the gas space of the reactor vessel was a good approximation to the hot face temperature, and applying external convective heat transfer. An example of the temperatures calculated through the refractory thickness is given in Figure 2.

    Figure 2. Temperatures calculated for the 100mm hot face / 200mm insulation reactor configuration

     

    When the reactor is cooled due to process upsets, the internal surface of the hot face can be cooled below the temperature at the hot face / insulation boundary (see Figure 3). This sub-cooling has the potential to generate tensile stresses in the hot face refractory and shear between the hot face and insulation. These stresses are calculated in the next section.

     

    4.2 Stress Analysis using Finite Element Modelling

     

    A finite element model of the dome of the reactor was created to determine the stress profile through the reactor wall when subject to the thermal loading calculated in Section 4.1. The reactor consists of a 20mm thick, 3740mm internal diameter stainless steel cylinder with a hemispherical dome cap. The internal surface of the shell is coated with insulation refractory with this coated with hot face refractory.  The “normal” configuration has 200mm of insulation and 100mm of hot face.

     

    To analyse the thermally induced stress in the upper wall section of the reactor requires a full 3D model to be built and solved.  Ignoring the two nozzles in the reactor’s dome section, however, simplifies this structure to a solid of revolution.  Here a planar section through the wall can be modelled to represent the complete stress field in the structure as long as this section can be extruded 360 around an axis to create the structure.

     

    Modelling the dome as a solid of revolutions also requires the material properties, loading and constraints to be axisymmetric in nature, that is, they are circumferentially independent.  Here we assumed all material properties to be isotropic with the lower edge of this section of the bin restrained from moving in the axial direction only.

     

    Figure 4 shows the finite element model of the simplified dome of the reactor vessel. The model consists of just over 5000 low-order plate elements with the red, blue and green coloured elements modelling the hot-face refractory, insulation refractory and stainless steel respectively.  Nodes on the lower edge of the cylindrical section were constrained from moving in the axial (y) direction. The material properties used for the stainless steel, insulation and hot-face are given in Table 3.

    Early modelling work showed that the internal surface of the hot face was always in compression for the entire temperature cycle. Here it was assumed that the zero stress state occurred at 40C, the ambient air temperature. This assumption, however, may be in error as the hot face refractory was cured at a temperature significantly above ambient.  As such, the temperature profile through the wall during the curing process is more likely to coincide with the zero stress state.  At this zero stress state, the modelling has indicated that tensile stress will occur on the internal surface of the hot face refractory.

     

    The model was also solved where the zero stress states were set at both 550°C and 700°C to see if the stress profile through the wall was sensitive to its initial temperature state.

     

    Table 3.  Material properties used in finite element model

     

    Material

    Young’s Modulus of Elasticity (GPa)

    Poisson’s ratio

    Density (kg/m3)

    Thermal expansion coefficient mm/mm°C

    Stainless steel

    199.95

    0.32

    7, 806

    1.72×10-5

    Insulation

    4.865

    0.3

    800

    8.5×10-6

    Hot Face

    4.865

    0.3

    2100

    8.5×10-6

    1. Finite element Analysis Results

     

    1. Compressive and Shear Stress During the Early Part of the Operating Cycle

     

    Table 4 below shows the maximum compressive stress and the shear stress at the interface of the insulation refractory and hot face refractory during the heat-up period and into the early cool down part of the bin’s operating cycle.  As expected, the maximum stress for all times considered occurred on the plate element adjacent to the inside surface of the hot face refractory.  The shear stress rz, shown in Table 4 was the value at the centroid of the hot face element adjacent to the boundary.  As can seen, the value of the shear stress is small in comparison to the normal stresses.

     

    Table 4.  Maximum compressive stress and shear stress at the hot face – insulation junction during the early part of the operating cycle.

     

    Time (seconds)

    r  MPa (max)

    z MPa (max)

      MPa (max)

    rz, Mpa

    465

    -26.1

    3.9

    -26.1

    -0.003

    10000

    -34.5

    0.49

    -34.5

    0.15

    20000

    -34.9

    0.12

    -34.9

    0.18

    80000

    -31.7

    -0.08

    -31.7

    0.17

    166800

    -30.0

    -0.19

    -30.0

    0.16

    200000

    -20.28

    -0.23

    -20.28

    0.12

    300000

    -8.58

    -0.02

    -8.58

    0.05

     

    1. Thermal Stresses when the Zero Stress State is above Ambient

     

    The following two zero stress state temperatures were considered: a wall temperature of 550C and a wall temperature of 700C.

    Zero Stress State at a Wall temperature of 550C

     

    Figure 3 and 4 show contours of circumferential stress for the 200,000s and 350,000s respectively with the wall temperature at 550C. As can be seen, figure 5 shows compressive stresses in the element adjacent to the inside surface of the hot-face with the other two recording tensile stress. The centroid stress is shown in Table 4.

    Figure 3. Contours of stress at 200,000s with an internal temperature of 550C.

    Figure 4. Contours of stress at 300,000s with an internal temperature of 550C.

     

    Table 5.  Stress at the centroid of the plate indicated in figure 3 for the 550C zero stress state.

     

    Time (sec)

    r  MPa

    z Mpa

      MPa

    rz, MPa

    167000

    -6.08

    -0.0023

    -6.08

    0.035

    200000

    3.56

    -0.017

    3.56

    -0.042

    300000

    15.8

    -0.073

    15.8

    -0.107

    Zero Stress State at a Wall temperature of 700C

     

    Table 6 documents the stress for the case 167,000s and 200,000s. Results for the 300,000s case was not considered, as these stresses will simply be higher than for the case at 200,000s.

     

    Table 6.  Stress at the centroid of the plate indicated in figure 6 for the 700C zero stress state.

     

    Time (sec)

    r  MPa

    z MPa

      MPa

    rz, MPa

    167000

    1.41

    -0.077

    1.41

    -0.018

    200000

    10.96

    -0.137

    10.97

    -0.086

     

    1. Stresses in Different Refractory Thickness

     

    As previously stated, the normal wall had 200mm of insulation refractory and 100mm of hot face.  Here two other configurations are considered: 150 mm of insulation and 150mm of hot face and 50mm insulation and 150mm of hot face. The zero stress state was assumed to be at 40C.  Temperature profiles through the wall were supplied.

     

    The results show for the 150mm hot face/ 50mm insulation case the refractory is in compression at both 200,000s and 300, 000s as indicated in Table 7. The shear stress at the hot face/insulation junction is shown in the last column in the table.

     

    For the 150mm hot face /150mm insulation case, however, the plate element adjacent to the inside surface is in tension as shown in Table 8. Here the shear stress at the hot face /insulation junction is of similar magnitude to that in the 150mm hot face/50mm insulation case. The tensile stress at the surface of the hot face suggests that this insulation/hot face configuration is undesirable.

     

    Table 7.  Normal stresses at the centroid of the plate adjacent to the inside surface of the hot face and the shear stress at the hot face insulation boundary for 150mm hot face /50mm insulation case.

     

    Time (sec)

    r  MPa

    z MPa

      MPa

    rz, MPa (interface)

    200000

    -16.0

    -0.095

    -16.0

    0.081

    300000

    -7.55

    -0.045

    -7.55

    0.038

     

    Table 8.  Normal stresses at the centroid of the plate adjacent to the inside surface of the hot face and the shear stress at the hot face insulation boundary for 150mm hot face /150mm insulation case.

     

    Time (sec)

    r  MPa

    z MPa

      MPa

    rz, MPa (interface)

    200000

    13.54

    -0.017

    13.55

    -0.052

    300000

    7.4

    -0.018

    7.5

    -0.028

     

    1. Discussion

     

    The heat-up rate used in Figure 2 is extremely high, as the gas thermocouple has essentially been set instantaneously to 700C. The state of stress in the bin is generally compression in the refractory with the stainless steel shell in tension. Even at this extreme heating rate, the compressive stresses in the refractory do not exceed the crushing strength of either 60% Al2O3 or 80% Al2O3 refractories where the crushing strength is between 68 and 72MPa.

     

    These stresses were calculated for the three refractory configurations:

     

    • 100 mm hot face / 200 mm insulation: The internal surface remains in compression, with small amounts of shear at the interface

    • 150 mm hot face / 150 mm insulation: The internal surface goes into tension, suggesting that the refractory will crack during cooling in this case.

    • 150 mm hot face / 50 mm insulation: The internal surface remains in compression, with small amounts of shear at the interface. In this case there is essentially no sub-cooling of the internal surface, suggesting that this configuration will be the most resistant to thermal stresses on cooling. The wall temperature would increase from approximately 85C to 180C, and the heat losses would increase from approximately 80kW to 185kW with this configuration. This heat loss is still small in comparison to the other losses through briquetting.

     

    During the thermal analysis a simple comparison was made between 60% Al2O3 and 80% Al2O3. Analysis of historical data by plant suggests that the performance of 60% Al2O3 has been superior to that of 80% Al2O3. A simple measure of thermal shock resistance, based on avoiding the initaition of fracture, can be calculated using the following equation.

    The results of the comparison between 60% Al2O3 and 80% Al2O3 using Equation (1) are given in Table 9.

    The termal shock resistance, R, is given by:

    R’ = k..(1-) / E.a (1)

    Where;

    R is Thermal shock resistance

    k is the thermal conductivity,

     is the failure stress,

    E is Young’s modulus (value of  4.8 Gpa used),

    a is the coefficient of thermal expansion,

    and  is Poisson’s ratio (value of 0.3 used).

     

    Table 9. Simple comparison of thermal shock resistance of 60% Al2O3 and 80% Al2O3.

     

    60% Al2O3

    80% Al2O3

    K (W/m.K)

    0.92

    1.56

     (MPa)

    6

    16

    a (mm/mmC)

    8.5 x 10-6

    7.0 x 10-6

    R’

    95

    520

     

    This comparison suggests that 80% Al2O3 should have better thermal shock resistance than 60% Al2O3 refractories, which is presumably why it was used. There is clearly some other reason for the differences in performance. One possibility is that differences may exist in the behaviour of the two refractories during dry out and curing. 80% Al2O3 is a wet gunning mix, whereas 60% Al2O3 is a dry gunning mix. Both are reportedly dried out using the same temperature ramps and holds (up to 550C).

     

    This was explored using special stress model, by changing the temperature at which the refractory was at a “zero stress” state from room temperature to 550C. This assumes that the castable refractories form their bonds at the curing temperature of 550C. Heating above this temperature puts the refractory into compression as before, however, cooling below this temperature puts the internal surface of the refractory into tension and could lead to failure.

     

    This hypothesis is likely to be generally correct, in that large thermal cycles are bad for the refractories and that the reactor should be kept at it’s operating temperature whenever possible. Other more quantitative predictions cannot be made with our current level of knowledge.

     

    1. Conclusions

     

    The establishment of a Strategic Refractory Management Plan resulted in a significant increase in refractory life at the Port Hedland HBI plant, and a corresponding decrease in refractory management costs.

     

    A mathematical modelling study was carried out as part of this plan. The finite element modelling indicated that if the zero stress state was assumed to be at an ambient temperature of 40C, then the stress in the refractory wall was compressive at all times during a typical operating cycle.  If, however, the zero stress state was set at the refractory curing temperature, then the stress within the refractory wall maybe tensile.

     

    Furthermore, raising the refractory curing temperature can lead to tensile stress in a greater percentage of the operating cycle.  This led the refractory engineers to closely examine the drying and curing of refractories, and led to improved practices. The refractory wall with a 150 mm hot face/150 mm insulation configuration produces tensile stress on the inside surface of the hot face irrespective of the temperature of the zero stress state.  These results suggest that this thickness combination is inappropriate for a refractory vessel.

     

    To achieve the best results for the plant a proper evaluation is best accomplished by complete cooperation and communication between refractory manufacturer, installer, and internal stakeholders. To continue to operate the plant without a “Strategic Refractory Management Plan” will prove to be very costly and unsustainable.

     

    References

     

    Genghis Erkan, BChEng, MscEnv, MIEAust, CPEng, MIREng “Fludised Bed Reactor Refractory Implementation Strategy, 2003”.

     

    Dr P.D Clausen, BE, PhD, “A Finite Element Analysis of the Refractory Wall, 2001”.

     

    Dr Andrew Shook, BHP Billiton Technology Internal report, “Thermal Stress Analysis of BFB Refractories, 2001”.

    Dr Tom Honeyands, BHP Billiton Technology Internal Report, “Thermal Stress Analysis of BFB Refractories, 2001.

  • Barry Allen (McMaster) at Istanbul Technical University, 08.10.2013 | Hesperus is Bosphorus

    Barry Allen (McMaster) at Istanbul Technical University, 08.10.2013 | Hesperus is Bosphorus

    Hesperus is Bosphorus

    A group blog by philosophers in and from Turkey

    Barry Allen (McMaster) at Istanbul Technical University, 08.10.2013

    KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

    This talk is an essay in Comparative Philosophy, comparing ancient and modern western ideas of knowledge and wisdom with the conception found in classical Chinese thought. Compared with the Greeks and their contemplative theory the Chinese are pragmatists. Compared with the Moderns and their epistemology the Chinese are postmodern. Problematic ideas of truth and representation play no part in their understanding of knowledge or its value. Nor does their perplexity about knowledge turn on untenable dichotomies like mind and matter, being and becoming, or appearance and reality. Their questions concern, for example, the relation of knowledge to wisdom and virtue; the limits of its effectiveness; and the right appreciation of its contribution to civilized life. These are not logical but ethical questions, questions not about essence or being but quality and value. What desirable quality distinguishes knowledge? What value makes it wise and worth pursuing?

    13:30 ITB Seminar Room

    Istanbul Technical University

    Ayazağı Campus (which is in Maslak not Ayazağı!)

    Fen-Edebiyat Fakultesi

    Right by the İTU-Ayazağı metro station

    Professor Allen is a visitor in the Department of Philosophy at Boğaziçi University for the current semester.

    His homepage at McMaster http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~philos/people/profile_allen.php

    via Barry Allen (McMaster) at Istanbul Technical University, 08.10.2013 | Hesperus is Bosphorus.

  • Researchers from Istanbul Technical University Describe Findings in Nanoparticles

    Researchers from Istanbul Technical University Describe Findings in Nanoparticles

    İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesini Nano parçacıklar üzerine başarılı çalışmaları için tebrik ediyoruz

    Researchers from Istanbul Technical University Describe Findings in Nanoparticles

    October 11, 2013

    c7300262-74d8-4675-9812-e1fa38108cbd

    By a News Reporter-Staff News Editor at Science Letter — New research on Nanoparticles is the subject of a report. According to news reporting originating in Istanbul, Turkey, by NewsRx journalists, research stated, “The kinetics of ZnO nanoparticles was examined by fluorescence measurements. Emission peak intensities of the ZnO nanoparticles synthesized at different conditions were monitored during wet-chemical reactions.”

    The news reporters obtained a quote from the research from Istanbul Technical University, “It was shown that the three stages of the reaction; nucleation, growth, and reaching the average size, can be followed by means of the fluorescence intensities corresponding to both bandedge (similar to 375 nm, similar to 445 nm, and similar to 485 nm) and deep-trap (similar to 520 nm and similar to 545 nm) transitions. With both higher stirring velocity and temperature the particle formation is faster. Although the nucleation time is not affected by stirring velocity, higher temperature causes faster reaction rate in all stages including nucleation.”

    According to the news reporters, the research concluded: “This method can be used for controlling the size of the nanoparticles.”

    For more information on this research see: Kinetics of ZnO nanoparticle formation via fluorescence measurements. Journal of Luminescence, 2013;143():741-745. Journal of Luminescence can be contacted at: Elsevier Science Bv, PO Box 211, 1000 Ae Amsterdam, Netherlands. (Elsevier – www.elsevier.com; Journal of Luminescence – www.elsevier.com/wps/product/cws_home/505700)

    Our news correspondents report that additional information may be obtained by contacting E. Alveroglu, Istanbul Technical University, Fac Sci & Letters, Dept. of Engn Phys, TR-34469 Istanbul, Turkey. Additional authors for this research include N. Yavarinia and Y. Yilmaz (see also Nanoparticles).

    Keywords for this news article include: Turkey, Eurasia, Istanbul, Nanotechnology, Emerging Technologies

    Our reports deliver fact-based news of research and discoveries from around the world. Copyright 2013, NewsRx LLC

    For more stories covering the world of technology, please see HispanicBusiness’ Tech Channel

    Source: Science Letter

    via Researchers from Istanbul Technical University Describe Findings in Nanoparticles – HispanicBusiness.com.

  • U.S. Military says Chemical weapons given to rebels in Turkey

    U.S. Military says Chemical weapons given to rebels in Turkey

    WND EXCLUSIVE

    U.S. military confirms rebels had sarin

    Classified document shows deadly weapon found in home of arrested Islamists

     

    author-image F. Michael Maloof

    F. Michael Maloof, staff writer for WND and G2Bulletin, is a former senior security policy analyst in the office of the secretary of defense.

    As part of the Obama administration’s repeated insistence – though without offering proof – that the recent sarin gas attack near Damascus was the work of the Assad regime, the administration has downplayed or denied the possibility that al-Qaida-linked Syrian rebels could produce deadly chemical weapons.

     

    However, in a classified document just obtained by WND, the U.S. military confirms that sarin was confiscated earlier this year from members of the Jabhat al-Nusra Front, the most influential of the rebel Islamists fighting in Syria.

     

    The document says sarin from al-Qaida in Iraq made its way into Turkey and that while some was seized, more could have been used in an attack last March on civilians and Syrian military soldiers in Aleppo.

     

    The document, classified Secret/Noforn – “Not for foreign distribution” – came from the U.S. intelligence community’s National Ground Intelligence Center, or NGIC, and was made available to WND Tuesday.

     

    It revealed that AQI had produced a “bench-scale” form of sarin in Iraq and then transferred it to Turkey.

     

    A U.S. military source said there were a number of interrogations as well as some clan reports as part of what the document said were “50 general indicators to monitor progress and characterize the state of the ANF/AQI-associated Sarin chemical warfare agent developing effort.”

     

    “This (document) depicts our assessment of the status of effort at its peak – primarily research and procurement activities – when disrupted in late May 2013 with the arrest of several key individuals in Iraq and Turkey,” the document said.

     

    “Future reporting of indicators not previously observed would suggest that the effort continues to advance despite the arrests,” the NGIC document said.

     

    The May 2013 seizure occurred when Turkish security forces discovered a two-kilogram cylinder with sarin gas while searching homes of Syrian militants from the al-Qaida-linked Jabhat al-Nusra Front following their initial detention.

     

    The sarin gas was found in the homes of suspected Syrian Islamic radicals detained in the southern provinces of Adana and Mersin.

     

    Some 12 suspected members of the al-Nusra Front were arrested. At the time, they were described by Turkish special anti-terror forces as the “most aggressive and successful arm” of the Syrian rebels.

     

    In the seizure, Turkish anti-terror police also found a cache of weapons, documents and digital data.

     

    At the time of the arrest, the Russians called for a thorough investigation of the detained Syrian militants found in possession of sarin gas.

     

    This seizure followed a chemical weapons attack in March on the Khan al-Assal area of rural Aleppo, Syria. In that attack, some 26 people and Syrian government forces were killed by what was determined to be sarin gas, delivered by a rocket attack.

     

    The Syrian government called for an investigation by the United Nations. Damascus claimed al-Qaida fighters were behind the attack, also alleging that Turkey was involved.

     

    “The rocket came from a place controlled by the terrorists and which is located close to the Turkish territory,” according to a statement from Damascus. “One can assume that the weapon came from Turkey.”

     

    The report of the U.S. intelligence community’s NGIC reinforces a preliminary U.N. investigation of the attack in Aleppo which said the evidence pointed to Syrian rebels.

     

    It also appears to bolster allegations in a 100-page report on an investigation turned over to the U.N. by Russia. The report concluded the Syrian rebels – not the Syrian government – had used the nerve agent sarin in the March chemical weapons attack in Aleppo.

     

    While the contents of the report have yet to be released, sources tell WND the documentation indicates that deadly sarin poison gas was manufactured in a Sunni-controlled region of Iraq and then transported to Turkey for use by the Syrian opposition, whose ranks have swelled with members of al-Qaida and affiliated groups.

     

    The documentation that the U.N. received from the Russians indicated specifically that the sarin gas was supplied to Sunni foreign fighters by a Saddam-era general working under the outlawed Iraqi Baath party leader, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri.

     

    Al-Douri was a top aide to Saddam Hussein before he was deposed as Iraqi president.

     

    The sarin nerve gas used in the Allepo attack, sources say, had been prepared by former Iraqi Military Industries Brig. Gen. Adnan al-Dulaimi. It then was supplied to Baath-affiliated foreign fighters of the Sunni and Saudi Arabian-backed al-Nusra Front in Aleppo, with Turkey’s cooperation, through the Turkish town of Antakya in Hatay Province.

     

    The source who brought out the documentation now in the hands of the U.N. is said to have been an aide to al-Douri.

     

    Al-Dulaimi was a major player in Saddam’s chemical weapons production projects, the former aide said. Moreover, Al-Dulaimi has been working in the Sunni-controlled region of northwestern Iraq where the outlawed Baath party now is located and produces the sarin.

     

    The NGIC depiction of the variety of sarin as “bench-scale” reinforces an analysis by terrorism expert Yossef Bodansky, who said the recent findings on the chemical weapons attack of Aug. 21 on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, was “indeed a self-inflicted attack” by the Syrian opposition to provoke U.S. and military intervention in Syria.

     

    Bodansky, a former director of the U.S. Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, said a preliminary analysis of the sarin showed that it was of a “kitchen” variety and not military grade.

     

    He questioned that the sarin was of a military variety, which accumulates around victims’ hair and loose clothing.

     

    Because these molecules become detached and released with any movement, Bodansky said, “they would have thus killed or injured the first responders who touched the victims’ bodies without protective clothes … and masks.”

     

    Various videos of the incident clearly show first responders going from patient to patient without protective clothing administering first aid to the victims. There were no reports of casualties among the first responders.

     

    “This strongly indicates that the agent in question was the slow acting ‘kitchen sarin,’” Bodansky said.

     

    “Indeed, other descriptions of injuries treated by MSF (The French group Doctors Without Borders) – suffocation, foaming, vomiting and diarrhea – agree with the effects of diluted, late-action drops of liquefied Sarin,” he said.

     

    The terrorism expert said that the jihadist movement has technologies which have been confirmed in captured jihadist labs in both Turkey and Iraq, as well as from the wealth of data recovered from al-Qaida in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002.

     

    He added that the projectiles shown by the opposition, which were tested by U.N. inspectors, are not standard weapons of the Syrian army.

     

    Meanwhile, an  Italian former journalist and a Belgian researcher who were recently freed from their al-Nusra captives say they overheard their captors talking about their involvement in a deadly chemical attack “last month,” which would have been the Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack.

     

    The Italian, Domenico Quirico, and Belgian researcher Pierre Piccinin were released Monday after five months of captivity.

     

    “The government of Bashar al-Assad did not use Sarin gas or other types of gas in the outskirts of Damascus,” Piccinin said.

     

    While captive, Piccinin said the two had overheard a Skype conversation in English among three people.

     

    “The conversation was based on real facts,” said Quirico, claiming one of the three people in the alleged conversation identified himself as a Free Syrian Army general.

     

    He added that the militants said the rebels carried out the attack as a provocation to force the West to intervene militarily to oust the Assad regime.

     

    Both men told a news conference they had no access to the outside world while they were held captive and knew nothing about the use of chemical weapons until they heard the discussion on Skype.

     

    Now, a former analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency, Ray McGovern, similarly backs the claim that the Syrian rebels perpetrated the poison gas attack on Aug. 21

     

    McGovern was one of a number of veteran intelligence professionals who recently signed a letter to Obama saying that Damascus wasn’t behind the Aug. 21 chemical attack.

     

    As WND recently reported, former U.S. intelligence analysts claim current intelligence analysts have told them Assad was not responsible for the Aug. 21 poison gas attack, saying there was a “growing body of evidence” that reveals the incident was a pre-planned provocation by the Syrian opposition.

     

    The analysts, in an open letter to Obama, referred to a meeting a week before the Aug. 21 incident in which opposition military commanders ordered preparations for an “imminent escalation” due to a “war-changing development” that would be followed by the U.S.-led bombing of Syria. They said the growing body of evidence came mostly from sources affiliated with the Syrian opposition and its supporters.

     

    Those reports, they said, revealed that canisters containing chemical agents were brought into a suburb of Damascus, where they were then opened.

     

    “Initial meetings between senior opposition military commanders and Qatari, Turkish and U.S. intelligence officials took place at the converted Turkish military garrison in Antakya, Hatay Province, now used as the command center and headquarters of the Free Syrian Army and their foreign sponsors,” the analysts said.

     

    The VIPS memo to Obama reinforces separate videos, which show foreign fighters associated with the Syrian opposition firing artillery canisters of poison gas. One video shows Nadee Baloosh, a member of an al-Qaida-affiliated group Rioyadh al-Abdeen, admitting to the use of chemical weapons.

     

    In the video clip, al-Abdeen, who is in the Latakia area of Syria, said his forces used “chemicals which produce lethal and deadly gases that I possess.”