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  • View of the history Azerbaijani-Chechen interaction

    View of the history Azerbaijani-Chechen interaction

    sevinc-israfil Sevinj Aliyeva, PhD Institute of History Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences
    On November 15, 2012, head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov paid a visitto Azerbaijan to discuss prospects for cooperation between the two republics. Thevisit of the Chechen leader to Baku was not the first contact between Azerbaijan and Chechnya. AZPROMO, the Azerbaijani Foundation for Supporting Exports andInvestments, on April 4, 2012, organized in Baku a presentation on investment possibilities in the Chechen Republic. The presentation was attended by a Chechendelegation headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Chechen Republic and Finance Minister Ali Isayev. Among others in the delegations were alsothe Industrial and Trade Minister of Chechnya Galas Taymaskhanov and CultureMinister Dikalu Muzakayev. The delegation met both with members of theAzerbaijani government and with the countrys business circles, in which they with a view to laying the groundwork for mutually profitable economic cooperationbetween the two sides proposed projects in various segments of the economy.
    [1]This elicited interest from the Azerbaijani side, which prepared a draft agreement oncultural and economic cooperation. The Chechen delegation also visited majorindustrial objects of the country, and an agreement was reached on a visit by anAzerbaijani delegation to Chechna at a later point. Still earlier, in November 2011, an Azerbaijani delegation headed by Economic Development Minister ShahinMustafayev visited Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. [2]An interest to foster bilateral relations is shared by both sides, with ChechenPresident Kadyrov having emphasized that, [w]e must strive for all-sidedstrengthening of contacts with Azerbaijan. [3] Azerbaijan, in turn, which now hostsa representation office for Daghestan and Chechnya, has been expanding itscooperation with a range of republics and oblasts  of the North Caucasus, includingChechnya. With the latter, BakuÕs relations have been advancing both in the tradeand economic sectors and in the military and political directions.
    Baku  engagement with the Chechen people is far from a new phenomenon andtraces back to many decades ago in history. By early 20th century, Baku emergedas the center not only of religious, spiritual and cultural life of the Muslim peoples ofthe Caucasus, but also a focal point of the ethnically varied work force of the region.In 1917, 999 North Caucasians lived in Baku, including Chechens, Daghestanis,Osetins, and others. Baku got to know quite a handful of prominent Chechens andIngush in the 20th century who lived and developed their activity in the Azerbaijanicapital, including enlightener Adil-Girei Dolgiyev; ethnographer, regionalist andfolklorist Chakh Akhriyev; public teacher Tashtemir Eldarkhanov; famous composerand pedagogue Muslim Magomayev, and others. The daughter of Chakh Akhriyev,Tamara (Gul-Bahar khanum) Akhriyeva received her education in Bakus St. Ninafemale academic institute and stayed to teach in Baku afterwards. In 1911-1915,she worked as the head of the female Russian-Muslim Aleksander Institute. [4]In the second half of the 19 th century, Azerbaijani oil specialists would share theirexperience in the development of all aspects of the oil industry in Grozny, which wasthe main oil centre in the North Caucasus. One of the well-known oil industrialistsinvolved in the Grozny works was A. Akhverdov. [5]
    The improvement of rail,highway, sea and air communications in the 20 th  century to a still greater degreemade possible the close economic and cultural ties of the regions of the Caucasus.A new stage of Azerbaijani-Chechen relations set in following the February 1917revolution: National Councils and various political organizations came to surface.The Chechen Congress in Grozny sent a telegram to members of the Ozakom M.Yu.Jafarov and M.I. Papadzhanov requesting that the Ozakom send the inspector of theGoychay higher educational institution Eldarkhanov to serve as inspector of primaryschools in Chechnya. [6]Following the February 1917 revolution, virtually in all regions of the former RussianEmpire the tsarist administration began to be disbanded and replaced by all-nationalinstitutions, the latter dominated by bourgeois nationalist parties. The nationalbourgeoisie and intelligentsia, the Cossacks, and various strata of the population,having supported the democratic transformation in the country, began to insist uponfreedom of speech and the press, the creation of national schools and a nationaladministration.Cooperation between the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-20) and theMountaineer Republic included the dispatch of Azerbaijani military units to the latter.Azerbaijani-Turkish forces, supplemented by native gortsy  forces, occupied the coastbetween Derbent and Petrovsk. On 7 November 1918, Petrovsk was seized.
    Theterritory of Daghestan and Chechnya was freed from the Bolsheviks and powerpassed to the Mountaineer Government. Turkish forces let by Col. Ismail Haki-bey, together with Azerbaijani units and others from the North Caucasus, began an attackagainst the Denikin-led Armed Forces of White Russia. Ismail-pasha was sent toDaghestan and Chechnya, while Shukri-bey went to the Terek and Kuban regions.However, as a result of the defeat of the German bloc in World War I and thewithdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the war in November 1918, Turkish forceshad to quickly leave the territory of Daghestan and the South Caucasus.In these conditions, an independent Mountaineer Republic was proclaimed at ageneral assembly of representatives of the peoples of Daghestan and Chechnya.
    According to the representative of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Mountaineer Republic, A. Akhverdov, there were no political parties in the latter, which onlyfeatured national fractions instead, such as the Ingush, Chechen, Kumyk, and thelike; and the majority of the members of the Union Council were spiritual leaders andinfluential people. [7]A delegation of the Mountaineer Republic, together with the Azerbaijani delegation,set off for the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 to seek internationalrecognition. However, the White Army occupied Chechnya and Ingushetia.
    Thesenior commander of the units of the Volunteer Army in the Caucasus, Maj.Gen.Shatilov, sent the Azerbaijani Government a letter on February 13, 1919, in which heassured the latter about the voluntary nature of the subordination of these two North Caucasus regions to the Volunteer Army and about the introduction in these placesof self-administration. He consequently recommended that the MountaineerGovernment yield its authority given the lack of demand for it. The Chechen delegation visited the diplomatic representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in theMountaineer Republic, described in detail their republicÕs fight with the White Armyand declared that if it did not receive support, it would be forced to surrender sinceits supplies and materiel were near exhaustion.In his proclamation, Shatilov noted that the command of the Volunteer Army knewabout the preparation of the Azerbaijan Republic to support the Chechens with itsown forces and about the disinformation of the Chechens by statements that theWhite Army wanted to subordinate Chechnya to the Cossacks.
    Regarding theCossacks, he gave assurances that the White Army intended to make peace with theChechens. [8] One should note that after the occupation of the Terek oblast byDenikinÕs army, a dubious attitude toward the events could be seen. The ChechenNational Council headed by Chulikov supported the appointment as ruler of ChechnyaVoluntary Army General Iris-Khan Aliyev. But part of the population of Chechnyaspoke out against the occupation of its territory by the White Army. On April 26, A.Kantemir, at the direction of the chairman of the Mountaineer Government P. Kotsev,sent the government of Azerbaijan and the allied command a note of protest againstthe actions of the White Army on the territory of Chechnya. The commander ofBritish forces in Petrovsk responded that Denikin would not continue his militaryactions and would make peace with the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, and Osetins andawait the decision of the Peace Conference on the independence and borders ofstates formed on the ruins of the Russian Empire.
    In exchange, he wrote, theMountaineer Government must allow the White Army to struggle against theBolsheviks on the territory of the Mountaineer Republic.Following the defeat of the forces of the Mountaineer Republic, a powerful uprisingled by the local spiritual leaders broke out in Chechnya and Daghestan. In hismemoirs, Denikin described this as follows: In its search for a way out, theMountaineer Parliament began to seek political union with Azerbaijan in the name of  the defense of religion and the unique qualities of Daghestan  The MountaineerGovernment continued its agitation and set to mountainous Chechnya small Daghestani units and Azerbaijani volunteers. [9] A. Akhverdov, in turn, was askingthe Azerbaijani Government to send Azerbaijani officers to provide help to theChechens, because Òthis could have  a moral impact on those who are fighting.ÓAkhverdov also asked Baku to send a small unit toward Khasavyurt.
    A detachmentunder the command of Kazim-bey was dispatched for the defense of the MountaineerRepublic. Representatives of the Ingush met with told Akhverdov that they had assembled a serious force and were preparing an attack from three sides:Ingushetia, Chechnya ad the Georgian military highways. According to Akhverdov, Òthe Chechens also were inclined to unite with Azerbaijan. It was particularlyemphasized that the head of the Noth Caucasus Emirate Uzun-Haji also called for joining with Azerbaijan. [10]
    The White Army at that time was engaged in battles onthe territory of the Terek region, in particular in Ingushetia and in Chechnya. As iswell known, Denikin set as his main task the liquidation of all newly formedsovereign states and the restoration of a single and indivisible Russia.ÓFollowing the seizure of Gudermes station by Denikin, the English colonel Rowlandson officially declared to Chechen governor Col. Jafarov about the inclusionof the North Caucasus into the sphere of influence of the White Army and of Daghestan into the English sphere of influence. In response, a session of the inter-party commission in Baku adopted an appeal to the citizens of Azerbaijan in which itdeclared, In the North Caucasus, the freedom-loving mountaineers true to thebehest of their ancestors and the principles of freedom and independence of smallpeoples, is shedding blood in an unequal battle with the reactionary forces of Denikin and company it is the responsibility of every Muslim to provide help to the fraternalmountaineers in a timely fashion. The Inter-party commission set on the formationof an Azerbaijan Volunteer Detachment under the leadership of experienced officersto provide such help.Uzun-Haji, the head of the North Caucasus emirate, sought to achieve via thediplomatic channels of Georgia and Azerbaijan recognition of his monarchy by theworld powers. He asked Akhverdiyev to convey from him a message of greetings tothe Azerbaijani government.
    In the middle of May 1919, it was reported that UzunHaji, together with Akhverdov, was getting ready to come to Baku for talksconcerning Chechnya. However, it appears that he sent as his representatives thebrother of Mogamed Efendi Dibir-Magomayev and the honorary Chechen MagomedPiralov, while he himself went to Chechnya. According to a dispatch from A.Akhverdov, Òafter the seizure of Petrovsk, Daghestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia willrecognize the authorities of Azerbaijan; they are prepared for this. After this, theMountaineer Republic can be reestablished under the protectorate of Azerbaijan.Ó[11]At the beginning of June 1919, Azerbaijani agents were dispatched to Temir-Khan-Shura, Shamil-Kala (Petrovsk), Grozny and Vladikavkaz in order to follow the actionsof the Volunteer Army. According to Akhverdov, the population of Daghestan andChechnya impatiently awaited the arrival of Azerbaijani forces. Uzun-Haji fromBotlikh reported about the readiness of the Avar and Andi districts to rise againstDenikins army.
    The residents of the auls  of mountainous Chechnya reachedagreement about not subordinating themselves to Denikin. And already at acongress in Shali, the Chechens resolved to defend the interests of the mountaineersto the last drop of blood and to preserve their freedom, and not to help in any waythe Volunteer Army. Akhverdov sent two letters to Baku from the Chechen people – one written in Arabic and one in TurkicÑreporting about the situation in Chechnyaand the destruction of villages there by the Denikin forces. In July, intense battlesagainst the Denikin forces and the Cossacks were conducted by Ingush and Chechenmutineers in the directions of Vladikavkaz and Grozny. They cut the Grozny-Beslanline.
    The Ingush National Council organized a rising against Denikin, which seizedthe lower portions of Ingushetia in the middle of July 1919. On June 28, AbubakarPliyev, the representative of the Ingush people and a member of the United Councilof the Mountaineer Republic, sent a special letter to the Chairman of the Parliamentof the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic requesting assistance and left for Baku. [12]In September 1919, a new wave of the national liberation movement of the peoplesof the North Caucasus began. The national movement in Daghestan was headed byN. Gotsinsky, that in Chechnya by Uzun-Haji, and that in the Northwestern Caucasusby Sultan Klych Girey. Meanwhile, members of the Mountaineer Government,located provisionally in Tiflis, reached agreement on forming a Committee ofMountaineers consisting of 12 people under the chairmanship of A. Tsalikov. Theconduct of foreign policy was entrusted to Dzhabagiyev.
    They appealed to Vekilovwith a request to the Azerbaijani government for subsidies and the transfer of theactivities of this Committee to Baku. Vekilov transferred to Dzhabagiyev a 250,000rubles loan for the needs of the Mountaineer organization. [13]In November 1919, the Azerbaijani government sent Nuri Pasha to Daghestan as thecommander in chief of the North Caucasus front. He and his Turkish officers formeda regular division in Daghestan and a cavalry division in Chechnya. Nuri-pashaorganized negotiations between the commanders and the leaders of Daghestan andthe North Caucasus, Ali Haji Akushinsky, Ibrahim-Haji, Kazim-bey, N. Gotsinsky, andK. Alikhanov. Nuri-pasha promised military assistance from Azerbaijan. He plannedfirst to liberate the territories of Daghestan, then to establish a new provisionalgovernment and together with Uzun Haji occupy the Terek district. He also plannedto conclude an agreement with the parliament of the Mountaineer Republic.
    Following the recognition of the Azerbaijani Republic by the major powers and thenon-recognition by them of the Mountaineer Republic, Azerbaijan continued tosupport the North Caucasus peoples in their struggle for independence. [14]Following the victory of the Red Army in Azerbaijan and in the North Caucasus, thepower of the Bolsheviks was established, but even during Soviet times, relationsbetween the Azerbaijani and Chechen peoples did not break off and continued withinthe framework of the Soviet state, the latter having promoted a mutual enrichmentof cultures and the establishment of cultural links. According to the 1989 census,456 Chechens lived in Azerbaijan.
    Following the war in Chechnya, the number ofChechen refugees there reached 4,700. And Azerbaijan took them in despite theproblems it had with its own refugees as a result of the occupation of Azerbaijanilands by Armenian forces. If the Azerbaijani refugees had somewhere to retreat to,the Chechens did not.Consequently, in the 1990s and 2000s, a new wave of resettlement ofrepresentatives of many North Caucasus peoples to Azerbaijan was under way. Theyfound work, sought education, and received local residence permits (Rasulov 2005,pp. 42-43). In 1995, a Cultural Center of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria was openedin Baku.
    Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev considered the political problem of Chechnya as an internal affair of Russia, but the Chechen issue as a humanitarianproblem. For the resolution of the problems of Chechen refugees, the main office ofthe plenipotentiary representative of Chechnya to the Muslim countries, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, was opened in Baku. The number of Chechen refugees in Azerbaijangrew to 10,000 by the year 2000. Despite its own problems with refugees,Azerbaijan could not close its borders to suffering people who were hostages tolarger political games. And most of the latter found refuge and a better life there.The situation changed in the fall of 1999. According to Azerbaijani political scientistR. Musabayov, the watershed became the explosions of the fall of 1999 when theChechen resistance turned to terrorism. Azerbaijani society could not find a justification for this type of action, which discredited the Chechen resistance. In July2000, the office of the representation of the Government of Ichkeria in MuslimCountries was suspended. Pressure from Russia played an essential role in thatdecision. With the coming to power in Russia of Vladimir Putin, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia improved. According to the director of the
    Chechen humanrights center in Baku, Mairbek Taramov, after the events of September 11, theinternational Islamic foundations which were operating in Baku in 1999-2000 underpressure from the US, Russia and Azerbaijan, ceased their activities and assistanceto the Chechens.As a result, in March 2001, the Chechen refugees turned to President Heydar Aliyevwith an open letter, noting that they did not want to be returned to Russia andinsisted on their rights under the 1951 convention. These refugees indicated thatthey were encountering difficulties in obtaining the necessary documentation,because Azerbaijani officials were referring them to the Russian embassy. Theyasked that their problems be referred to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) and that their position in Azerbaijan be regularized. As a result, they wereissued a form of UNHCR identification, which legalized their status only in Azerbaijan,but stayed short of guaranteeing the provision of financial, humanitarian, medical,and other kinds of assistance. At the present time, there are 4,930 Chechenrefugees in Azerbaijan.
    They continue to complain about problems with the police,obtaining documents for themselves and their children, and access to education.These minor problems notwithstanding, the Chechen refugees in Azerbaijan have notlost hope and continue to support the position of an independent Azerbaijan in allquestions and share the feelings of Azerbaijani refugees and martyrs who just likethemselvesÑsuffered in the early 1990s. Thus, the Council of Chechen Refugeesexpressed its solidarity with Azerbaijan and sympathies on the occasion of thetragedy of January 20, 1990: ÒJanuary 20 in the history of the Caucasus will alwaysremain a day of loss and gaining: patriots died and a worthy Republic was born- The Chechen, sympathetic to the ideas of freedom and independence and having sufferedenormous losses on this path have a deep understanding of what is taking placetoday on the territory of Azerbaijan. We will never forget the asylum offered toChechen refugees on this land, the warmth and tolerance of the Azerbaijani people.
    The glorious action by the Azerbaijanis was among the first and served as a worthyexample for the continuation of the national liberation war of the Caucasus. At thepresent time in Baku, there is a Chechen school, various committees established forwork with mountaineers arriving from the North Caucasus, and a womenÕscommittee of Chechnya. There are also representations of Daghestan andChechnya, as well as other organizations.Indeed, the Azerbaijani population, despite its own far from simple position,continues to show tolerance and friendship toward its North Caucasus neighbors.There is no ethnic discrimination or hostile attitude toward other ethnoses inAzerbaijani society. The North Caucasus population in Azerbaijan is involved in trade and transit through the country. Now, thanks to the stabilization of the situation inAzerbaijan itself, the efforts of individual extremists have been blocked. Chechensare living in a stable environment, and everything is being done to ensure that they,like all the other ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan, can continue to do so.
    In the post-Soviet period, several projects for the integration of the peoples of theCaucasus have been developed. On August 26, 1989, at a congress of mountainpeoples of the Caucasus in Sukhumi, on the initiative of the Popular Front ofAbkhazia, the Assembly of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was established, withKabardin Yury Shanibov as its president. In the fall of 1991, General D. Dudayevtook the Assembly under his protection. In November of the same year, thatorganization was transformed into the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of theCaucasus. The confederation united in its midst the Chechens, Kabardins, Cherkess,Adygeys, Abaza, Abkhaz, and others.
    The Ingush did not joint it, nor did the Turkiclanguage mountain peoples (the Kumyks, Balkars, and Karachays) save AkhyskTurks. The Nogays and Azerbaijanis who were living on the territory ofcontemporary Daghestan also refused to join that group. Instead, they entered theAssociation of Turkic Peoples.A round table on a common Caucasus home took place in Grozny on September 4-5, 1992. Participants proclaimed the creation of a Higher Religious Council of thePeoples of the Caucasus and a Single Information Center of the Caucasus.Allahshukur Pashazade, sheikh-ul-Islam and head of the Muslims of Azerbaijan, waselected chairman of the religious council. In the declaration of this meeting,reference was made to Òthe necessity of creating a confederation of Caucasusstates.Ó On September 27, 1992, the International Forum of the Caucasus Homewas established in the Chechen Republic, and a program was developed for theunification of the peoples of the Caucasus. On October 19, 1992, at the initiative ofDzh.Dudayev, the Confederation of the Mountaineer Peoples of the Caucasus wasreformed as the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus. The group discussedthe participation of the Cossacks and the possible formation of Cossack autonomiesin places where the Cossacks lived together. This congress was created in oppositionto the CIS. Its second conference was scheduled for Baku in the fall of 1993, but itwas not held.
    References
    Rasulov M.A. (2005) Embployment and Labor Market in Daghestan (1991-2001 .),in Russian, Makhachkala: Epoch.
    Notes
    [1] See (accessed 13 April2013).[2] Ibid.

    [3] See (accessed 13 April2013).13

    [4]  [The first generalcensus of the population of the Russian empire], 1897,
     [Bakuprovince], 1904, pp. 52-53.
    [5]  Kaspi, No. 222, 12 September 1893;  Kaspi, No. 81, 16 April 1895
    [6]  Baku, No. 137, 27 June 1906;  Kaspi, No. 66, 23 March 1917.
    [7] State Archive of the Azerbaijan Republic (henceforth SAAR), f. 897, op. 1, d. 22

    Kaspi, No. 74, 9October (26 September) 1918.

    [8] SAAR, f. 970, op. 1, d. 23, l. 9-10; SAAR, f. 970, op. 1, d. 59, l. 1-3.
    [9]  (Georgia), No. 55, 11 March 1919;  (Georgia), No. 39, 20 February 1919;  (Georgia), No. 93, 3 May 1919;  (Georgia), No. 54, 9 March 1919.
    [10] SAAR, f.970, op.1, d.59, l.13-16ob., 17 ob., 21, 25, 26, 26 ob.

    [11] SAAR, f.894, op.10, d.62, l.37ob., 40; SAAR, f.970, op.1, d.59, l.5ob.-16, 28,31;

     (Georgia), No. 93, 3 May 1919.
    [12] SAAR, f.894, op.10, d.62, l.41, 41ob., 62-63; SAAR, f.970, op.1, d.46, l.6-6 ob.
    [13]  (Dawn of Russia), No. 25, 14 (27) September 1919.
    [14]  (Struggle), No. 82 (637), 14 April 1920
    AZERBAIJAN IN THE WORLDADA Biweekly Newsletter
    Vol. 6, No. 8April 15, 2013
  • Iraq: An Oil Deal Drives Kurdish Parties Further Apart

    Iraq: An Oil Deal Drives Kurdish Parties Further Apart

     

    Iraq: An Oil Deal Drives Kurdish Parties Further Apart

    (Stratfor)

    Discord is spreading through Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), this time because of a recent oil deal between Arbil and Baghdad. Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, a senior figure of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the wife of former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, sent a letter to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi on Sept. 7 threatening to halt the flow of oil out of Kirkuk. Ahmed criticized a revenue-sharing agreement struck in August between al-Abadi’s administration and the Kurdish government to jointly export 150,000 barrels of oil per day from the disputed Kirkuk region through Turkey, claiming the deal lacks transparency. She added that the accord, which splits oil revenue evenly between Arbil and Baghdad, was crafted without her party’s input.

    Ahmed’s ability to follow through with her threat is limited, but her allegations signal the growing strain between the PUK and the Kurdish government’s ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Since the parties’ political alliance crumbled earlier this year, the KDP has taken steps to marginalize the PUK in the KRG’s decision-making process. In fact, the Kurdish delegation that brokered the recent oil deal was made up primarily of KDP members. The Kurdish Ministry of Natural Resources, moreover, has accused the PUK of illegally selling Kirkuk’s oil to Iran, which has long been an influential partner of the PUK. Ahmed has denied the ministry’s claims that people and companies affiliated with her party have sent 30,000 bpd to Iran to the tune of $30 million.

    But a dispute with the KDP, though problematic, is not the PUK’s most pressing concern at the moment. On Sept. 1, the PUK’s secretary-general announced the formation of a decision-making body intended to put an end to the monopoly on authority held by a small cadre in the party. Though the move is widely considered illegitimate within the PUK’s ranks, it reflects the deepening internal divides threatening to tear the party apart. Hidden differences among party members began to emerge in 2012, as Talabani’s health deteriorated, and the contention has worsened ever since.

    The intra- and inter-party bickering will only further destabilize the Kurdish government, which is already struggling to overcome mounting tension between the ruling KDP and the Gorran movement (Iraqi Kurdistan’s largest opposition party). Ahmed’s latest statement will make it even more difficult for Iraqi Kurdistan’s political parties to work together to solve the financial and security problems piling up against them.

  • Turkey’s new role: From NATO lapdog to Emerging Empire

    Turkey’s new role: From NATO lapdog to Emerging Empire

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    Turkey’s new role: From NATO lapdog to Emerging Empire

    Gearóid Ó Colmáin

    The recent Turkish coup attempt marks a turning point in NATO’s war on Syria. An emerging empire and portal to the orient, Turkey has always played a key role in NATO’s ‘Drang Nach Osten’- the drive to encircle Russia, destroy its client-states Syria and Ukraine, and serve as a bulwark against other emerging powers such as Iran. But now it seems Turkey may no longer be carrying out its designated role.

    That the United States was behind the coup attempt there is little doubt, though some prominent analysts such as Thierry Meyssan disagree that the coup was orchestrated by Gülenists. Fethullah Gülen is known to be close to the CIA and the U.S. obmutescence during the coup was typical of standard procedure during U.S. covert regime change operations. While Erdoğan is unquestionably a war criminal who is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocents in Syria and Libya and heavy repression at home, nonetheless, as in the case of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, the Turkish leader seems to have fallen out of favour in the West. The media have already begun the predictable, clichéd demonisation process – publishing pictures of the Turkish incumbent’s opulent palaces etc. Turkey desperately needs a new, progressive regime, which would contribute to peace in the Middle East. But if the choice is between a monster the CIA wants out and a monster the CIA wants in, the latter is the best option as it weakens U.S. imperialism.

    Turkey’s strategic imperatives

    Stratfor director George Friedman claims Turkey is now a world power whose military is more powerful than the French or British. The U.S. strategy for Europe was to force Turkish entry into the EU – most recently through weapons of mass migration. The policy worked in Turkey’s favour. But the British decision to exit the European Union changed the balance of power. Moscow took the opportunity to extend the hand of friendship once more to Ankara. Just before the July 19th coup attempt, there were reports of a possible détente between Turkey and Syria.

    U.S./Turkish relations have soured considerably since 2013 when U.S.-based billionaire Fethullah Gülen fomented the Gezi Park protest movement against the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan regime. Though there was certainly popular discontent in the country with Erdoğan’s Islamisation policies and his support for terrorism in Syria, the Gezi Park protests were really about pushing Gülen’s attempt to destabilise the regime and take over. Fethullah Gülen is the founder of a vast empire of private prep schools throughout the world. He promotes an extremist form of Islam.

    Though originally close to Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), Gülen’s movement Hizmat (service) is less nationalist and therefore more amenable to U.S./Zionist interests. The Gülenist network operates as a fifth column in Turkey, a para-state operating at the highest levels of the military, intelligence and judicial apparatuses. I was asked by Russian state media RT to comment on the Turkish shooting down of a Russian jet in November 2015. I said then that the Turkish government was acting against the national interest. It has since transpired that the attack was carried out by Gülenist military personnel who have been prosecuted for the crime. President Erdoğan recently apologised to Russian President Vladimir Putin for the attack. In fact, Turkey had indicated on July 13th that it intended to normalise relations with Syria, thus ending the war against Assad. Contacts between Ankara and Damascus have been growing in recent months and it now looks like Russia and Turkey may have begun to mend relations. Southstream, Russia’s plan to pipe oil to Europe through Turkey, had to be abandoned last year due to U.S. pressure on Ankara. There is now a possibility of renegotiation recommencing between Moscow and Ankara. Recent Turkish/Iranian contacts also indicate that the Kurdish question is forcing Ankara to re-calibrate its foreign policy.

    Although secret talks have reportedly been taking place between Ankara and Damascus, the two countries remain at war in Syria and there is no change yet in the official position of either state.

    The geopolitical theories of Greek turkologist Dmitiry Kitsikis have had a major influence on Turkish foreign policy. Kitsikis is famous for promoting the notion of Turkey as a civilisation-state which naturally encompasses the region stretching from North Africa, through the Balkans and Eastern Europe; Kitsikis refers to this as the ‘Intermediate Region’. Turkey’s previous ‘good neighbourly’ policy seemed to be in accordance with Kitsikian geopolitics but was sabotaged by Ankara’s treacherous collaboration with U.S. chaos strategy in the Middle East since the U.S.- fomented ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011.

    U.S. policy towards Turkey has always been to support the regime as a strong regional power to wield against Russia while at the same time supporting the Kurdish YPG (people’s defense units) in Syria. U.S. support for the Kurds is part of the long-term geopolitical remodeling of the region – the creation of what former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice at the start of the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in 2011 referred to as the “New Middle East”. The U.S. and Israel want to carve out a Kurdistan in the region, which would become a client-state of Israel; thus providing the Zionist regime with an effective proxy army against its Arab enemies – once the Da’esh-fomented genocide has created the requisite Lebensraum.

    Erdoğan’s ambitions of reviving the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East ultimately threaten U.S. hegemony. The United States Navy rules the waves. The U.S. will not allow another major maritime power to threaten its global control. Rapid economic growth and the paying off of its IMF debt in 2013 have seen Turkey emerge more and more as a strategic regional power with increasing independence and political assertiveness. Turkish investment in Africa has increased more than ten-fold since 2000. The Turks have opened embassies all over Africa. Ankara is selling the notion of ‘virtuous power’ in Africa with infrastructural development projects and investments designed to compete with China and the United States. Turkish involvement in Somalia has turned the East African nation into a veritable client-state of the emerging Turkish Empire. In 2015 Turkey opened a military base in Somalia. Turkey will henceforth have a strategic reach in the Gulf of Aden, one of the most important oil choke-points in the world. Ankara also has plans to establish military bases in Azerbaijan, Qatar and Georgia.

    The Turkish regime has been attempting to oust the presence of the Gülenist movement in many African countries by offering to supply state funds for education programmes. A recent statement by a Turkish government spokesman alluded to Ankara’s desire to counter Western ‘neo-colonial’ interests in Africa. The statement clearly shows that Turkey intends to join the new ‘scramble for Africa’ as part of neo-ottoman imperialism.

    Turkey in Central Asia and China

    Turkey has considerable power and influence in Central Asia where many Turkic-speaking people reside. In 2009, Turkey helped found the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States. Turkish investment has been increasing in Central Asia. Ankara has also been training military personnel in Central Asian states. The oil-rich Turkmenistan is one nation which has received visits in recent years from the ‘Sublime Porte’. During its spat with Moscow, Ankara sought to deepen ties with Turkmenistan in hopes of enticing that state to participate in the Trans-Caspian Pipeline – a project to pipe gas from the Caspian Sea through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Turkey to Europe, thereby bypassing Russia. Turkey also has considerable influence in Turkic speaking regions of the Russian Federation such as Tartarstan. Though relations with Moscow have now improved, Ankara’s links in Central Asia remain key strategic levers in the renaissance of Turkish imperialism.

    Turkey’s links with Uighur terrorists in China’s troubled Xinjiang (East Turkestan) province has led to diplomatic rows with Beijing. Many of the Uighur terrorists operating against China have been trained and facilitated by Turkey in Syria. Although Turkey’s support for Uighur terrorists in Xinjiang complies with NATO policy towards China, it shows once again the potential reach of Turkish power.

    Turkey’s drive for world power status, together with the decline of Europe as a political entity, means that Ankara will continue to flex its muscles in the international arena. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault has said that Turkey is no longer a reliable partner in NATO’s fight against the Islamic State. Of course, Ankara was never a partner in the war against the Islamic State as the Turkish regime has been arming and training the Islamic State terrorists along with its NATO partners and has been caught in flagrante delicto on several occasions. But what the French Foreign Minister’s remarks mean is that Turkey may no longer be as sanguine in its support for terrorism in Syria, due to the West’s support for the Kurds; rapprochement with Moscow and Damascus, and now more than ever after the failed U.S.-backed coup attempt.

    Israel’s double game

    The situation is further complicated by Israel’s stance towards the Turkish coup attempt and its aftermath. The Turkish regime thanked Israel for its help quashing the coup. Relations between Tel Aviv and Ankara have improved, in spite of the current dispute with Washington. One should not overlook the fact that, although the Israeli Lobby exerts considerable control over U.S. foreign policy, Israel often adopts a friendlier attitude to many of America’s so-called enemies. Israel’s relationship with Belarus has always been generally good, in spite of repeated U.S. aggression. Israel’s relationship with Azerbaijan has been good, in spite of major diplomatic rows with the U.S..

    Israeli/Russian relations are far better than Moscow’s relationship with Washington. Israel has always had a more nuanced oriental policy than the U.S. The Israelis are masters at playing both sides off each other in international conflicts. During the Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s, the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein’s regime while Israel eventually provided Israel covert supplies of weapons to Iran with on U.S. approval. The Israelis had established ties with Iranian fifth columnists Mir-Hossein Moussavi and Hachemi Rafsanjani. The aforementioned Stratfor director George Friedman has said that the Iran/Iraq war would be a template for dealing with the rise of Turkey as a world power.

    A rising maritime power in trouble?

    Turkey will pay dearly for the folly of abandoning its ‘good neighbourly’ regional policy, which showed some promise until 2011. It had a glorious opportunity then to exercise ‘virtuous power’. Now the country could be facing civil war. The purge of Gülenists in the Turkish regime has already led to hundreds of arrests of top military and government personnel. If Turkey is to emerge as a regional empire, it will have to leave the Zionist axis and find a solution to the Kurdish question in conjunction with Syria and Russia. It is currently beginning to appear that previous secret plans agreed upon by Ankara and Paris to carve out a Kurdish state in Northern Syria may have to be abandoned. As the French escalate bombing of Raqqa in Syria in the wake of the Nice terrorist psyops, Turkey could be facing an acute state of emergency.

    The United States cannot tolerate the emergence of a major maritime power like Turkey which, since the Cold War, has been used as a tool against Russia. Turkey’s Incirlik Airbase holds up to 80 percent of Washington’s nuclear arsenal in Europe. A significant oriental shift in Ankara’s foreign policy would signal the end of America’s prospects of ‘full spectrum dominance’, creating the conditions for a new imperial division of the world- a geopolitical reconfiguration some might imagine as falling in with conjectures of a Moscow/Constantinople axis or, in mytho-historical terms, a ‘Third Rome’.

    It is possible that the U.S. already sees that a reconfiguration of imperialist alliances is necessary with the influential former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advocating a détente in U.S. relations with Russia and China. What is clear from recent events in Turkey is that the world imperialist system is going through seismic changes, with old military alliances breaking down and new configurations of imperial power emerging. What prospect exist for global,working-class liberation in a period of deepening capitalist crisis and war remain to be seen.

    Ahttp://www.gearoidocolmain.org/

    bout Gearóid Ó Colmáin

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    Gearóid Ó Colmáin is an Irish journalist and political analyst based in Paris. His work focuses on globalisation, geopolitics and class struggle.

  • Inside the Syrian Dust Bowl

    Inside the Syrian Dust Bowl

    The Assad family’s favorite international development organization tried to turn Syria into an agricultural powerhouse. Its failure sparked a civil war.

    • By Peter Schwartzstein

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    On July 15, 2012, Mahmoud Solh at the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) received the news he’d long been dreading: Syrian rebel fighters had drawn too close to the center’s headquarters near Aleppo for the board of trustees’ comfort. As the director-general of an organization with 600 employees and a net expenditure of $71 million in 2014, he was going to have to shut most operations down.

    The uprooting of the Middle East’s largest agricultural organization was an ominous early warning of the chaos that has since engulfed most of Syria. But it did not come as much of a surprise to the employees at ICARDA’s sprawling 2,500-acre research station in the village of Tel Hadya. As members of an organization charged with boosting food security in Syria, they knew that one of the underlying causes of the conflict — the poor agricultural conditions that fueled popular discontent across the country — was not getting any better. For years, they had witnessed the hardship of Syrian villagers up close, as extended bouts of low rainfall cut crop yields and pushed farmers off their land, which ultimately led some of them to take up arms.

    “After the first year without rain, we started to see people struggle a lot. After the second, there was desperation,” an ICARDA plant breeder said, speaking on the condition of anonymity as he sometimes still works in Syria. “And after the fourth, it wasn’t really a surprise to see them rise up.”

    Solh, too, saw some of this coming. “What it did was that it forced migration from rural areas to cities,” he told me when we met at the organization’s temporary headquarters in a residential apartment building in an upscale Beirut neighborhood. “With more migration, there was more unemployment. Certainly among the young, there was a lot of frustration.”

    But in 2012, after the kidnapping of two lab technicians by a local rebel group, along with an uptick in skirmishes on the adjacent highway, ICARDA’s departure suddenly took on a new urgency. The organization put previously laid evacuation plans into motion, ferrying more than 100 expat agronomists and hydrologists to Aleppo’s airport and flying them out of harm’s way. Syrian staff then hastily set about transferring the station’s most valuable technology to their annex in the city center while also dispersing ICARDA’s 400 sheep among local farmers for safekeeping. More than two-thirds of the flock was stolen and eaten before its transport to new pastures in Lebanon could be arranged.

    As the situation continued to deteriorate through the fall of 2012, 100 remaining staff members, all of them Syrians, hurried to complete the drawdown. They took last-minute readings for decade-long research projects and scoured the black market to secure diesel to power generators for the station’s treasured seed bank.

    When rebel militias, including the Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham, assumed total control of Tel Hadya in 2012, the last researchers were forced to leave ICARDA’s headquarters. Like more than half of the Syrian population, they have been scattered across the country and into neighboring states.

    With the war showing few signs of abating, there’s little suggestion their technical know-how will be put to use in rebuilding the country anytime soon.

    With the war showing few signs of abating, there’s little suggestion their technical know-how will be put to use in rebuilding the country anytime soon.

    But some experts and former staff members, assessing ICARDA’s past activities, wonder if that might not be a bad thing. The projects that the organization pursued within Syria in cooperation with the country’s government are now earning the scrutiny of critics. And it’s not just the organization’s moral judgment they question, but also its professional competence.

    ICARDA and the Assads

    There is plenty of tragedy, but also some irony, in ICARDA’s forced departure from Syria. The reason the organization was based there in the first place was in large part because Hafez al-Assad, the country’s longtime dictator and father to Bashar, hoped it would prevent a catastrophic drought of the sort that is now fueling the country’s ongoing war.

    Founded at the height of the Middle East’s population boom in the 1970s, ICARDA’s mandate was to improve agriculture in “marginal” environments around the world, where poor soil and water conditions made large-scale crop production difficult. The organization originally intended to operate from across the border in Lebanon but began fishing around for alternative bases when the civil war struck Beirut in 1975. The elder Assad, keen to increase Syria’s food production and thereby insulate his regime from external pressures, made the fledgling group such an attractive offer of land to the south of Aleppo that two years later it didn’t feel able to refuse.

    Today, ICARDA receives funding from a range of states and development groups, including the Afghan government and the U.S. Agency for International Development, to operate in dozens of countries around the world. At the time of its flight from its Syrian headquarters, it had more than 120 projects outside Syria in progress, from Sudan to Uzbekistan.

    But much of the organization’s attention was devoted to Syria. Even now, the financially stricken authorities in Damascus pay ICARDA its annual dues of half a million dollars. (Senior directors say money for projects in the eastern Mediterranean is increasingly hard to come by as donors redirect their giving toward Syria’s refugees.)

    And the organization did assist Syria in earning a reputation, until recently, as the region’s agricultural powerhouse. For more than a decade, the country was self-sufficient in cereals and had been exporting wheat to Jordan and Egypt. To many neighboring states, which regularly spend large sums of money to buy foreign foodstuffs, Syria seemed the picture of agricultural health.

    But all wasn’t well, and the measures taken to turn Syria into an agricultural power in the first place had a lot to do with this. The government sponsored the expansion of farmland, which grew from about 1.5 million acres in the mid-1980s to roughly 3 million acres by 2000. It also almost doubled the number of wells, which contributed to a rapidly falling water table. At the Tel Hadya station, ICARDA recorded a 40-meter drop in local water levels between 1984 and 2010. When the rains failed starting in 2006, farmers turned to groundwater for supplemental irrigation as they had during past droughts — but found that many of the wells had run dry or turned saline.

    The Syrian government wasn’t blind to the perils of fast-depleting aquifers and moved to tackle the overuse of well water. But some of its solutions, while likely necessary from a purely environmental perspective, only contributed to rural hardship. In May 2008, authorities in Damascus dramatically cut diesel subsidies, raising the price of fuel from 7 Syrian pounds ($0.14) per liter to 25 pounds ($0.53) overnight. For many farmers, whose income had already tanked with reduced yields, the heightened cost of operating their pumps and transporting their goods to market was the final straw.

    “Everything from the weather to the government was bad, but after the oil price [increase], we just gave up,” said Ahmed Talib, a former farmer from the town of Binnish, which is about 5 miles from the ICARDA station.

    The fact that ICARDA was a close partner of the Syrian government as Damascus pursued these unsound policies means it must now shoulder a share of the blame, two middle-ranking employees of the organization suggested. Perhaps its senior directors, who enjoyed close relations with regime officials, could have pushed their friends to change tack.

    “It was a culture of deference,” the ICARDA plant breeder said.

    “No one was willing to be brave.”

    “No one was willing to be brave.”

    Mahmoud Solh, the director-general, rejects this argument, insisting that ICARDA had a limited local remit and that it held up its part of the bargain for several decades by helping boost overall food production in Syria. “This is why the government still appreciates us,” he said.

    Solh also acknowledges, however, that the country’s use of water was “unsustainable.” The situation, he said, “was not optimal.”

    ICARDA had good reason to be worried about the consequences of opposing the Syrian government. Ordinary citizens were fearful of speaking out against a government renowned for its intolerance of dissent. International organizations seemingly were too.

    “If you are too critical, then they won’t cooperate with you,” said Adriana Bruggeman, a hydrologist at the Cyprus Institute who previously worked for ICARDA in Aleppo for 11 years. “Syria was our host. We were their guests, and you can’t keep on kicking your hosts.”

    As the water situation spiraled out of control, farmers very soon also found themselves battling an array of botanical diseases, some of which agronomists attribute to climate change. An outbreak of wheat stripe rust, which stunts plant growth and shrivels wheat grains, killed off many crops in northwest Syria in the years prior to the war. With sky-high population growth raising demand for scarce resources by the year, no manner of innovations could overcome the challenging environment.

    “Poverty, climate change, food security, [and] increasing populations are all worsening at a pace that I think is faster than the rate we can make improvements,” said Hassan Machlab, ICARDA’s Lebanon director.

    The result for farmers like Talib was their forced exodus from their homes. Talib ended up in one of Aleppo’s fast-expanding migrant neighborhoods in 2010, before traveling south to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley when the war worsened in 2012. The town sided with the rebels early in the conflict and was subsequently heavily shelled by government forces. Not entirely coincidently, perhaps, Binnish is also the hometown of Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, the Islamic State’s former chief propagandist who was killed this week, and a number of other senior jihadis.

    Syria’s Brain Drain

    If Syria is ever to recover from a war that shows few signs of ending soon, the likes of ICARDA will be sorely needed. Up to 50 percent of citizens derived at least some of their income from agriculture before the uprising, and with swaths of the country’s irrigation infrastructure now crippled and some soils denatured from wartime farming without fertilizers, the rural economy will need all the help it can get.

    For this reason, ICARDA has worked to maintain a presence in Syria throughout the war. Several dozen employees have remained behind at the group’s Aleppo offices in the government-controlled district of Azamieh, where they keep an eye on ICARDA property and participate in several agricultural studies with their Syrian government counterparts on the city’s outskirts.

    On the other side of the battle lines, the organization maintains loose connections with villagers, a number of whom keep tabs on the status of the Tel Hadya station and report back through Viber. They’re often paid in cash by couriers who cross the front line during lulls in combat. ICARDA received an exemption from the U.S. Treasury Department to conduct transactions in a sanctioned country.

    Above all,

    ICARDA is intent on preventing the destruction of its precious seed bank

    ICARDA is intent on preventing the destruction of its precious seed bank, which was built to maintain genetic crop diversity in the Middle East and contains 143,000 deposits. Many of its samples existed nowhere else in the world until 2012. In a much publicized rescue operation, employees drove through the night and over the back roads of northern Syria to deliver more than 20,000 unduplicated gene samples to the Turkish border. And, so far at least, the news is good, with the facility still functional despite intermittent electricity supply.

    Despite some looting of the sheep that sat next to the perimeter fence and a number of old cars, the entire station appears to be largely undamaged. Tel Hadya has avoided the brunt of government airstrikes. Ali Shehadeh, who managed the seed bank and is the most senior official remaining in Aleppo, says the disparate groups of rebels that have exchanged control of the facility over the past four years appear to understand the seed bank’s value and have left it untouched despite its array of valuable equipment.

    “I think the international media effect … has helped,” he said. “We have the impression that they know how it helps Syria and the world.”

    But even if the conflict comes to a close soon and Tel Hadya remains salvageable, ICARDA won’t ever again operate in Syria as it did before the war. With at least one veterinarian still missing — his fate unknown having being kidnapped shortly after the two abducted lab technicians were released — the memories remain too raw for some employees to return. Everything that has happened also brought home to the senior management the pitfalls of basing all their operations in one location. They’ve since decentralized their work and spread their staff around a range of new installations from Morocco to Ethiopia and India.

    “We were naive. We thought it would be war [for] maybe a year and then we could come back,” Solh said. “But it won’t be like before.”

    Neither, it seems, will anything in Syria.

    LOUAI BESHARA/AFP/Getty Images

  • Azerbaijan in the context of Caucasus policy of the Russia empire: from Peter to Pavel Part II

    Azerbaijan in the context of Caucasus policy of the Russia empire: from Peter to Pavel Part II

    caucasian-provinces- historyUnder Catherine II, Russia’s struggle for the Caucasus was carried out purposefully. By signing the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), Russia has strengthened its positions in the Crimea and the Azov coast, and thereby expanded its sphere of influence in the mega region – Caucasus.  Catherine II, in order to establish its political domination in this choronym, had been conducting an active resettlement policy. In so doing, just like her forefather, she has not refused to play the “Armeniancard”. The Highest Charter of March 9, 1779, by the Russian Empress gave rise to the Armeniancolonization of the Don coast. Nakhichevan city was established on the outskirts of the St. Demetrius of Rostov Fortress and Russia resettled 20 thousand Armenians from Crimea, including the newly formed city of Novorossiysk province. Active efforts of representatives of the wealthier segments of Armenians contributed to this colonization. In the XVIII century, rich Armenian merchants, natives of New Julfa, who left the Safavid state during its fall, appear in Russia. Sparing no expense, they set the Armenian tandem in motion. The Sarafovs and Lazarevs made a special effort in this direction. Ivan Lazarev was especially distinguished. By turning into a major industrialist and landowner in theRussian Empire as a result of successful commercial and financial deals, he invested huge subsidies in imposing intelligible dreams of the Armenians among the highest circles of Russian society.  Stressing the primary role of the Armenian Gregorian Church, the carrier of mythical idea of “Great Armenia”, this Armenian wealthy man, in the last quarter of the XVIII century, built Armenian churches in the capital cities of the Russian Empire. Ivan Lazarev became one of the key “players”, who integrated the “Armenian question” into the policy of Catherine’s Russia. By entering into negotiations with the famous favorite of Catherine II Prince G. Potemkin, this wealthy Armenian, in unison with the head of the Armenian Church in Russia Archbishop Joseph Argutinsky, tried to convince the Russiannobleman in feasibility of the formation of the Armenian statehood with the center in Irevan, while not recalling the historical homeland of the Armenians, located on the banks of the Euphrates, and which has no relation to the Caucasus, and thus, to Irevan. The duo of Lazarev- Argutinsky, in the presented draft, insisted on capturing of this ancient Azerbaijani city by the Russian army. Short memory of the Armenian tandem during the creation of this project has “failed” and it “forgot” about the pre-Caucasus homeland of Armenians – Eastern Anatolia.

    In the second half of the XVIII century, the Armenian statehood projects have been also developed by rich Armenians of Indian colonies. The authors of projects – Joseph Emin, Sh. Shaamiryan tried to draw the attention of Catherine’s Russia to the centuries-old dream of Armenians. These designers of “Great Armenia”, as well as their predecessors, considered it appropriate to act in union with the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. Presenting projects identical in content, the representatives of the Indian colonies, in order to achieve their intelligible dream, just like their fellow-designers of Russiancolonies, “forgot” the original oecumene, Asia Minor, which served as the matrix in the process of formation of the Armenian statehood and, by creating virtual geographic framework of their centuries-old dream, set their sights on foreign soil, on the ancestral lands of Azerbaijan.

    Hajar Verdiyeva Doctor of Historical Science

    Azerbaijan in the context of Caucasus policy of the Russia empire: from Peter to Pavel (PART I)

    Part I is here

    Source // “International Academic Herald” 2014 »5 (5) // .pp. 4-11

  • Geneva Talks III: Light at The End Of The Tunnel or a Mirage in The Syrian Desert?

    Geneva Talks III: Light at The End Of The Tunnel or a Mirage in The Syrian Desert?

    Author: Şakir Alemdar, PhD Candidate, Near East University, Nicosia Date: May 06, 2016

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    *Source: Daily Sabah ©

    Geneva Talks III:
    Light at The End Of The Tunnel or a Mirage in The Syrian Desert?

    Summary

    UN led Geneva III negotiations aimed at solving the Syrian conflict appears to have taken off despite earlier doubts. The first UN attempt after the Security Council resolution 2254 to start the talks was suspended when opposition threatened to leave the talks due to the continued Russian bombings. Then another attempt by the UN Syrian Representative De Mistura was successful and the first round took place between …. and ……. And the second round is scheduled to start on…….Whether Geneva III negotiations will in the end lead to a compromise solution or break down like all previous UN attempts remains to be seen.

    The main reason behind the continuation of the ceasefire and the negotiations so far is that this is the first US-Russian push for a ceasefire and negotiations. It was this strong push which allowed the UN representative de Mistura to bring the parties together, while this had proved impossible to do so until then. So far there has not been any direct talks between the parties in Geneva, but instead a sort of proximity talks, where Mistura is talking to each party separately until a common basis could be built up. It is hoped that after such a common basis emerges it will be possible for de Mistura to bring the parties to face to face talks to reach a compromise.

    The question to ask is what brought the US and Russia to a broad strategic understanding on Syria which opened the way for a joint effort to help the UN initiative. While the two global powers maintained their differences, they had agreed on the need for a solution in the conflict. They saw no benefit from the continuation of the conflict. The proximity talks were getting out of control creating major problems for both powers. The European Union was cracking under the refugee pressure from Syria and the conflict was giving signs of spreading to other countries in the region such as Iraq and the Gulf which risked a wider US Russian conflict.

    Secondly both powers at that stage were feeling strong enough to impose a solution on their side in Syria. Russian air support which saved Assad showed him that he depends on Russia for survival. The moderate opposition groups also saw that without US support they could not win and get a solution at the table which could protect their interests. So both parties saw that without their great power backers, neither side could either continue the conflict for long or reach a diplomatic solution which would protect their interests.

    Thirdly asymmetric importance attached by the US and Russia to Syria made such a broad understanding possible. While Russia attached top priority to Syria where she had military bases, Obama administration did not see Syria as strategically carrying top priority. Instead Obama thought it important to keep Russia as a partner in dealing with world issues in particular to fight against ISIL/DAESH and get a nuclear deal with Iran. This led Obama to avoid attacks on Assad, even turn a green light on for the Russian intervention which saved Assad and shifted the balance of power on the ground in favor of Assad. But once Russia entered Syria she kept bombing the moderate opposition much more that in bombed ISIL/DAESH trying to eliminate the moderate opposition and leave only Assad and the ISIL/DAESH in the ring. Russian thinking is that by leaving these two sides the West would chose Assad rather than the radical terrorist groups. But despite this the Russian-US understanding on Syria continued.

    This US- Russian understanding led to a joint effort by the two to push for a Security Council resolution on a comprehensive solution in Syria. Thus the Security Council resolution 2254 was passed. Although it left many issues unclear and some others untouched, it nevertheless was aimed at a comprehensive solution and remains the basis of the subsequent resolutions or decisions on Syria. The two countries also pushed for a cessation of hostilities which was backed by another UN Security Council resolution 2268. Consequently Geneva III negotiations began.

    The main issues which could derail the Geneva III negotiations need to be looked at here. Firstly the future of Assad is a critical issue which could make or break the talks. Assad might insist on remaining in power beyond the 18 month envisaged in the Resolution 2254. This is particularly so since he has been strengthened militarily by the Russian support and air attacks. Secondly the establishment of a non-sectarian administration in Syria’ agreed earlier is likely to prove quite difficult since Assad administration is a sectarian administration based on the dominance of the minority Shiite groups over the majority Sunnis. Will Assad or the Alewites or even Russia let this system change which would increase the weight of the Sunnis in the system? Thirdly regional rivalries such as the Saudi-Iranian rivalry could make it quite difficult to reach a compromise agreement. Nuclear deal with Iran isolated Saudi Arabia and the friendly Gulf countries that are feeling vulnerable and see Iran as an expansionist power. In the same way, if the interests and worries of other regional powers are not taken into account in a compromise solution, this could lead to a regional tension and crises later. Some see that on the Assad side a deal might upset the Iranians and on the Western side it might create problems with Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Fourthly PYD and some allied groups approved a document that declares a federal system in the North of the country. This is likely to be a major problem because all outside stakeholder states except Russia reject this strongly.

    In conclusion it could be said that some light at the end of a long tunnel seems to be a better description of the situation than a mere mirage in the desert. On the “light” side, there is a ceasefire, which already saved thousands of lives, negotiations, the backing of the two world powers and the huge cost of returning to the fighting again. On the “mirage” side the future of Assad, the regional rivalries, the establishment of a non-sectarian administration, and above all the military imbalance and the continuing Russian-Assad push to take the critical city of Aleppo risks every progress made so far. These can risk every positive step taken so far and turn them into a mirage. I think the scales are slightly heavier on the ‘light’ side at present and the hope is that the negotiations, while being difficult will continue. The longer the negotiations continue on and off, the light will get brighter and the negotiations will go in the direction of partial solutions in various places over time which could be linked up to create a Syrian wide solution. This looks the most promising and realistic path forward.

    Introduction

    Whether the Geneva III talks, which began on 9 March 2016 will put the nearly five-year-old Syrian conflict on to a diplomatic track for a solution is a critical question. It came after the US-Russian agreed cessation of hostilities in Syria which was backed by the Security Council resolution 2268 and came into force on 27 February 2016. The first attempt to get the parties start the talks after the critical 2254 resolution was suspended by the United Nations special envoy for Syria Mr. Steffan de Mistura on March 3, 2016. The reason was the threat by the opposition to leave the talks due to the continuation of the attacks by Russian and Assad forces. The next attempt for negotiations was successful which is now completed. The date for the next round will become clear later.

    The Council Resolution 2268 backing the cessation of hostilities demanded that all parties involved fulfill their commitments. It also urged all Member States, especially ISSG (International Syrian Support Group) members – the European Union, the Arab League, the United Nations, and 17 countries, including the United States and Russia, who have been trying to push forward for several months – to pressure the parties to make sure that they fulfill their commitments and support efforts “to create conditions for a durable and lasting ceasefire.”

    The Resolution also demanded the “full and immediate” implementation of the Council Resolution 2254 (2015), passed on December 18, 2015. This was the first Council resolution which focused on a comprehensive solution in Syria and set the framework for diplomatic negotiations. It had set out a roadmap to end the war in Syria: a national ceasefire, UN-mediated political talks and a two-year period to achieve a political transition. Other Council resolutions passed on Syria until then have dealt mainly with the humanitarian situation and the question of chemical weapons.

    The first attempt to find a solution in Syria began in late 2011 when the Arab League launched two initiatives which failed. Then in January 2012 and in November 2013 Russia tried to get the Syrian government and the opposition talking in Moscow without much success. After that a joint effort by the United Nations and the Arab League coordinated by Kofi Annan raised hopes for a sort while. In January and February 2014, the Geneva II Talks on Syria took place, which was organized by the then UN Envoy to Syria Mr. Lahdar Brahimi which again failed to take off. On 30 October 2015, further talks started in Vienna involving officials from the US, the EU, Russia, China and various regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and, for the first time, Iran. Inclusion of Iran in the talks completed the missing link to get all the major outside actors involved in the negotiations.

    The Syrian Conflict and the Parties

    More than 250,000 Syrians have lost their lives in this brutal conflict. Eleven million have been made homeless; 4.5 five million people left Syria became refugees living in neighbouring countries and about one million refugees entered Europe living in very difficult conditions. In addition the country is totally destroyed (BBC news 2016).

    As Assad used brutal methods to suppress the demonstrations which began in 2011, the reaction grew and the situation escalated to a widespread uprising against Assad. This soon turned into a sectarian fight in a country where Alawite-led government of President Assad has been dominating the political system where majority is Sunni, for decades. Escalation to a full scale civil war followed, which then turned into a proxy war even risking a direct major power Russian-US confrontation.

    Forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and those opposed to his rule continue to fight in a complex war which destroyed the country. At present the Syrian conflict has turned into a complex problem where the Syrian Government Regime under President Bashar Al-Assad is supported by the Iranians, Lebanese Hezbollah and the Russians. The opposition/Rebels are made up of Syrian National Coalition, including a break-away portion of the Syrian Army made up of 70-100 separate groups, each with separate leadership, many of whom frequently fight amongst themselves. Lastly there is also a Kurdish element in Syria, PYD (Syrian Kurdish Democratic Unity Party) and its armed wing YPG (The People’s Protection Units / Popular Protection Units). The Syrian National Coalition is supported by the Western powers but in particular the US, and regional allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia. While the Western powers support YPG Turkey opposes strongly seeing it as the extension of the PKK terrorist organization in Turkey. Among the opposition to Assad, there is also the most feared radical terrorist group ISIS/DAESH (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) whose brutal tactics outraged the world. Also there are the Jihadists, including the al-Nusra Front (or al-Qaeda in Syria).

    Negotiations in Syria are conducted between the representatives of the Syrian Ba’athist government and Syrian Opposition, while the Western-backed Kurdish forces have stayed out of the negotiations framework. Also the radical opposition terrorist groups Salafist forces and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/DAESH) have not engaged in any contacts on peaceful resolution to the conflict.

    Major Force Behind Geneva III Negotiations:
    US-Russian Joint Push for a Ceasefire and Negotiations

    Due to the disagreements between the Security Council permanent members on Syria, the Council has not been effective in the Syrian conflict until 2015. Then the US and Russia began to come to a broad understanding on Syria which led them push for negotiations.

    Clearly one reason is that the USA and Russia saw that they have nothing to gain from further conflict and are now able to impose a solution on the parties. They have reached a strategic understanding behind closed doors on Syria and decided to push jointly for a ceasefire and negotiations. The asymmetric strategic value attached to Syria by the two powers made it easier to reach a broad understanding. Putin attached top priority to Syria where Russia had the only two military bases in the Mediterranean region. Russia continued to support Assad right from the beginning and made this clear. The US, on the other hand, did not see Syria as strategically very important to justify employing the kind of military -economic resources to the region to match Russia. Instead, the US saw Russian partnership in international issues and a nuclear deal with Iran as more important than Syria. Therefore, the US, right from the beginning, wanted to avoid engaging in a military operation in Syria against Assad in order not to worsen relations with Russia, which she saw as a partner in dealing with the world issues. Washington also attached top priority to nuclear issue with Iran and wanted to keep Russia on board but avoid pressuring and/or overthrowing Assad to give ammunition to the hardliners in Iran against the liberal Rohani, who wanted a nuclear deal (Smith 2015).

    The US even went as far as assuring Russia publicly that she would not enter a proxy war with Russia in effect giving her a carte blanche on Syria (Hof 2015). This will probably go down in history as a “recipe for a guaranteed failure in diplomacy” book written by Obama to be studied by future generations of international relations students worldwide.

    Secondly, Russia and the US now see that they could impose a solution on the parties in Syria as they became more dependent on them. Assad forces were saved from collapse by the Russian intervention and supply of huge amounts of weapons. Assad knows that he cannot continue without Russian support and if he tries to go it alone he might lose Russian support and even if his regime survives, might end up being tried in international courts for war crimes (Glass 2016). This does not mean that he will follow the Moscow line entirely and will not take risks but the message from Moscow is there.

    On the side of the pro-western groups, there is a feeling that they are already outgunned and weakened substantially and has little room for maneuver and need the US support. They do not have the military power to continue fighting for long and fear the resumption of the Russian air attacks. The alternative, without US support, might be a defeat. Just before the cessation of hostilities Assad-Russian-Iranian push towards the critical Aleppo city made progress and almost encircled the city. US did not oppose these attacks strongly and left Assad gain a major advantage. Opposition fears that if the talks break down Russian-Assad forces could attempt to take the city and change the balance of power in the entire country.

    While the support of the regional powers for the two sides has been important, it has not been enough to bring victory. Despite Iranian support Assad came to the brink of collapse and was saved by the Russians. The moderate opposition, on the other hand, despite the support of regional allies came to the brink of collapse and could not get any final results and needs the US support. So both sides in the Syrian conflict are under heavy pressure to come to an agreement and need the big power ally.

    Thirdly, the proxy war between the two sides was getting out of control and giving signs of spilling over and creating bigger problems for Russia and the US. The refugee crises from the conflict is now threatening to derail the European project. European states could not agree on a common project on the refugee issue. Who will make decisions on the issue and how many refugees will Europe and the individual countries will take divided the members seriously. The US does not want this problem get out of control and threaten its European allies.

    On the other hand, Russian economy is in real trouble due to low oil prices, collapse of the rubble and the western sanctions. Putin does not want to risk a wider and a longer conflict and get into a quagmire like Afghanistan which would worsen the already fragile Russian economy further.

    Both powers also know that Syria is in ruins and after a peace agreement the country will need tens of billions of dollars to even stabilize and function and trillions for reconstruction over many decades. Some speculate that what appears to be the Russian military advantage might lead to a pro-Russian solution but when it comes to supporting reconstruction afterwards, the advantage will inevitably shift in favor of the Western countries.

    UN Security Council Resolution 2254 of 2015 and the Major Points of Disagreement between the Parties

    The UNSC Resolution 2254 (2015) calls on member states to fight ISIL/DAESH and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups and all other groups and individuals, terrorists associated with it. It further calls on the members to fight the other terrorists groups as may be agreed by the ISSG (international Syrian support group) and leave no safe heavens to the terrorists in Syria. Also it makes clear that ceasefire will exclude the fight against these terrorists groups which means that fighting will continue in many places. Finally, it calls for drafting of a constitution and support for the free and fair elections to be held within 18 months.

    The biggest point of disagreement is the future of Assad. This is not talked about in the UN Resolution 2254 and reflects a clear disagreement between the Western and the Russian sides. This can make or break the negotiations. All major Western powers including the USA, France, Britain, Turkey and also the Free Syrian Army, as well as Saudi Arabia and Qatar do not accept the continuation of Assad beyond the transition period. For them accepting Assad to continue during the transition is already a major concession that they could accept only with major difficulty. While Obama administration was strongly calling for his departure in the past, today Washington is ready to accept the continuation of Assad at least during the transition period.

    Russia insists that only Syrians can decide who will be the next president of the country, in effect trying to keep him in power as long as possible. Some argue that Russia will accept the departure of Assad only after a new government is formed and Russia secures the continuation of her old and newly established military bases in the country. By pulling back some of her forces from Syria immediately after the cessation of hostilities, Russia tried to gain diplomatic points but also force Assad to make concessions and accept departure after a certain time in the negotiations. If Assad does not make concessions and push for maximal demands, Russia may withdraw her support and Assad might face the prospect of a fall and international criminal court for war crimes.

    The other point is that the ceasefire does not include attacks on the terrorist groups and individuals who mean that during the 18 months Assad will remain in power, the USA led coalition, Russian and Assad-Hezbollah-Iranian forces will continue attacking El-Nusra and ISIS/DAESH and other groups considered as terrorist. But what happens if Assad refuses to go after these terrorist groups are weakened or eliminated in 18 months? Already Russian backed Assad forces got the strategic town of Palmira, from ISIL/DAESH which has an airport and the ruins of the 2000 year old city scoring a propaganda point. Assad already talked of taking over the whole of Syria.

    So far Assad shows no sign of accepting a proposed national unity government and rejected even a ‘transitional ruling body with full powers’ the main opposition demands. He added “The transition period must be under the current constitution, and we will move on to the new constitution after the Syrian people vote for it” Assad said 5(Karam, 2016).

    But major powers agreed on the transitional body with full powers at a Geneva Conference in June 2012 which remains the basis of UN-mediated talks which are scheduled to resume in April 2016. Whether Assad is defying international community rejecting the basis of talks with the full support of Russia or acting in defiance of Russian desires is a critical question. In the coming days this will be clear and will have a major impact on the negotiations 6 (Hof, 2016).

    The stress on non-sectarian administration in Syria is also important in the resolution. This is particularly so considering that the Assad administration is itself a sectarian administration where the small Alewite community has been ruling the majority Sunni population for decades. A non-sectarian administration would mean that the majority Sunni population would get a much stronger representation in the running of the country and Alewites will lose their former dominance that they have been enjoying until now. One question will be whether Assad and the dominant Alawite community around him will accept such a major change. Russia may also see the increasing weight of the Sunnis in the political system as something which could put the future of the Russian bases at risk. While a compromise might be possible, it will be difficult.

    The question of who will participate in the elections does not have a clear answer. While the main terrorist groups, such as ISIL-DAESH as well as El Nusra will be excluded, other groups may also be kept out in the future. It is clear that the parties may disagree on the groups to be excluded from the process that may be put forward during the negotiations. Russian side wants to include some groups that are Assad allies within the opposition group attempting to dilute the opposition and weaken them in the negotiations. Russia has been arguing right from the beginning that there is no moderate opposition but merely anti Assad opposition that are terrorists. This is also likely to create major problems in the negotiations.

    Apart from all these the Syrian peace process, might still be derailed by regional rivalries. Rising Iranian-Saudi rivalry reignited by the execution of a Shia cleric by the Saudis and the burning of some Saudi diplomatic mission buildings in Iran recently, risks a wider conflict which could derail the Syrian peace process. Iran claims to represent the Shia world and Saudi Arabia, the Sunni Islam and they have been waging proxy wars in Lebanon, Yemen and more intensely in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Iran will be sitting at the table in the negotiations. Both leaderships also use the conflict in Syria and in other places to strengthen their popularity at home which makes the issue more complicated. Therefore, rising tension between Tehran and Riyadh which now has turned into a conflict between Tehran and the Arabs could derail the negotiations (Miller and Brodsky, 2016).

    Also the lack of military balance on the ground will have a major effect on the negotiations. If the opposition breaks the ceasefire, Assad forces backed up by the Russians could use propaganda to prove the world that the opposition could not be trusted and does not want peace and justify a full scale counterattack on the outgunned and weakened opposition. But if the opposite was the case and Assad forces or Russia breaks the ceasefire, it is not clear how they will be punished (Kanat, 2016). This is likely to be a major advantage for the Assad side. It will be tempting for Russians, if the opposition does not make the critical concessions, to try to raise tension and bring military pressure on the opposition to get what it wants at the table. Already reports are coming in that Russian- Assad forces are trying to take Aleppo the critical city which could change the balance of power entirely in Syria.

    It must be mentioned, however, that John Kerry warned Russia earlier that if these talks fail then Syria could be partitioned (Wintour 2016). How seriously this will be taken, given the past record of the Obama administration, is not clear.

    A recent development is also worrying for the talks. PYD and some allied groups approved a document that declares a federal system in the North of the country (Al Jazerra 2016). While the US, Turkey, the UN and Assad opposed it, some argue that in the plan B of the US, a federal solution would be on the cards. So PYD and its supporters, lobbying hard for it might try to obstruct the negotiations in order to get support for a federal solution in Syria.

    Finally, Russia and the US will need to deal not only with the parties in Syria but also with their own regional allies too. If the genuine interests and particularly the security interests of these regional actors are ignored, then a compromise agreement to be reached will still face serious problems.

    Conclusions

    Is there a light at the end of the tunnel or are we seeing a mirage in the desert? On the “light” side, there is a ceasefire, which already saved thousands of lives, and the huge cost of returning to the fighting again. Negotiating table has been set up and the UN is at work backed up by the two major world powers. On the side which could create a mirage, we can count the future of Assad, the regional rivalries, the establishment of a non-sectarian administration, push for a federal solution and above all the military imbalance on the ground. Continuing Russian- Assad push to take the critical city of Aleppo in particular is a very negative development. These factors can risk every positive step taken so far and turn them into a mirage.

    In conclusion it could be said that some light at the end of a long tunnel seems to be a better description of the situation than a mere mirage in the desert. I think the scales are slightly heavier on the ‘light’ side at present and the hope is that the negotiations, while being difficult will continue. US-Russian push still continues and the parties are under serious pressure to negotiate. Considering the complexity of the conflict, a more realistic expectation would be small steps forward, stops and resumptions going in the direction of partial solutions in various places over time which could be linked up to create a Syrian wide solution. This looks the most promising and realistic path forward.

    Şakir Alemdar, PhD Candidate, Near East University, Nicosia

    Please cite this publication as follows:

    Alemdar, Ş. (May, 2016), “Geneva Talks III: Light at The End Of The Tunnel or a Mirage in The Syrian Desert?”, Vol. V, Issue 5, pp.6 – 18, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. )

    References

    BBC news (2016 ) “Syria: The story of the conflict” 11 March

    Hof, F. C. (2016) “Assad: Total Defiance” Atlantic Council, 4 April.

    Hof, F. C. (2015), “Syria: Taking the Initiative, Acquiring some Leverage”. Real Clear Defense, 5 October.

    Glass, Charles. (2016), “Russia and the US now have the power to impose peace in Syria” The Guardian, 13 March.

    Kanat, K. B. (2016) “Cessation of hostilities in Syria” Daily Sabah, 29 February.

    Karam, Z. (2016) “Syria’s Assad rejects ‘transitional body’ demanded by rebels Associated Press, 30 March.

    Miller, A. D. and Brodsky, J. (2016) “Saudi Arabia and Iran’s Forever Fight”, foreign Affairs, 13 January.

    Smith, L.(2015) “Obama Avoided Syria Action to Help Iran Negotiations, The Weekly Standard, 8, September

    Wintour, P. (2016) “John Kerry says partition of Syria could be part of ‘plan B’if peace talks fail”, The Guardian, February 23, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/john-kerry-partition-syria-peace-talks.

    Al Jazeera (2016) ‘Syria civil war: Kurds declare federal region in north’, 17 March Stream

    Imran Awan

    2 months ago – Shared publicly

    The European Union was cracking under the refugee pressure from Syria and the conflict was giving signs of spreading to other countries in the region such as Iraq and the Gulf which risked a wider US Russian conflict.
    http://www.siyasat.pk/india-and-international-siyasat-f10.html