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  • RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Chiquita Papers : Uncertainty Fueled Staff Concerns about Payments to Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

    RESEARCH DOCUMENT /// Chiquita Papers : Uncertainty Fueled Staff Concerns about Payments to Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

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    Chiquita Papers : Uncertainty Fueled Staff Concerns about Payments to Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

    Colombia Payments a “Leap of Faith”

    “We are funding their activities, or we are protecting ourselves. It’s questionable.”

    CFO asks: “How can I audit that? I cannot ask them to sign a receipt.”

    Posted May 2, 2017
    National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 589
    Edited by Michael Evans
    For further information, contact: mevansTwitter: @colombiadocs

    Washington, D.C., May 2, 2017 – Chiquita’s Colombia-based staff questioned the company’s payments to illegal armed groups, and asked whether Chiquita had gone beyond extortion and was directly funding the activities of leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary groups, even while top company executives became “comfortable” with the idea.

    This is the second in a series of stories jointly published by the National Security Archive and VerdadAbierta.com documenting how the world’s most famous banana company financed terrorist groups in Colombia.

    The New Chiquita Papers are the result of a seven-year legal battle waged by the National Security Archive against the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and later Chiquita itself, for access to tens of thousands of records produced by the company during an investigation of illicit payments made in Colombia.

    The Archive has used these records to identify individual Chiquita executives who approved and oversaw years of payments to groups responsible for countless human rights violations in Colombia, but whose roles in the affair have been unknown or unclear until now.

    In this installment, we examine the roles of financial officers, security staff and hired intermediaries on the ground in Colombia who managed an unorthodox payments process one official described as a “leap of faith.”

    The following article was also published today in Spanish at VerdadAbierta.com.

    * * *

    Payments to Armed Groups Generated Internal Conflicts at Chiquita Brands

    The banana company invented an accounting system to hide payments to guerrilla groups in Colombia that they admitted were “impossible to audit.” Even while senior Chiquita officials became “comfortable” with the way the payments were made, officials based in Colombia had their reservations.

    By Tatiana Navarrete and Juan Diego Restrepo E.
    Edited by Michael Evans – This is the second in a series of articles published jointly by the National Security Archive and VerdadAbierta.com

    “[These] were payments that, you know, are questionable, payments to the guerrillas that at the end are payments that, you know, are questionable,” said Jorge Forton, chief financial officer for Banadex, Chiquita’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Colombia, in his April 27, 1999 statement to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). “We are funding their activities, or we are protecting ourselves. It’s questionable.”[1]

    The deposition of this Peruvian accountant, who worked for Chiquita from 1990-1998, turns out to be key evidence on a little-known chapter in the history of Colombia’s banana-growing zone: payments made by the multinational fruit company to anti-government guerrilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and the funding of political organizations like the Current for Socialist Renovation (CRS), Hope, Peace and Liberty, and the Popular Commands.

    Forton began in 1990 at Chiquita headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio, looking for opportunities to expand the company’s worldwide operations. In the middle of 1994, he was sent to Colombia to assess how the local economy was affecting the prices of banana production. Over the next few months, Forton returned to the country several times and proposed alternatives for reorganizing Colombian operations. At the end of the year, Forton accepted a new position as chief financial officer for Banadex in Medellín.

    Since his arrival in Colombia in early 1995, the accountant knew that Chiquita made “sensitive payments” to illegal armed groups to ensure, as he was told, that its workers were not killed or kidnapped and that its plantations were not burned to the ground. “My role was to see how we could standardize and have a good control of those payments,” he said to the SEC.

    At that time, there were two Chiquita offices in Colombia: Banadex, in Medellín, and Samarex, in Santa Marta; each with independent accounting systems and separate sets of books to record payments not only to guerrillas but to the Colombian Armed Forces, which also benefitted from the company’s secret security fund. Forton’s job was to unify the accounts so Cincinnati could better track the payments. The company asked him to prepare a report on all the “sensitive payments” realized since 1992, something that, according to Forton, was almost impossible given the “poor accounting records” that had existed up to that point.

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    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, pp. 45-46.

    So Forton implemented a new procedure to better account for the payments. He introduced two basic rules: there would be no more cash payments, and none would be authorized without an invoice.

    Forton said he was “not comfortable” with the guerilla payments: “How do I feel those payments are really going to those groups? I mean, how can I audit that? I cannot ask them to sign a receipt.”

    The fact that Colombian guerrilla groups could not be counted on to provide receipts elevated the role of the Security Department and the intermediaries they relied on as go-betweens with the insurgent factions, military units, and paramilitary groups at the receiving end of those payments. These are the names and signatures that appear on the forms used to request payments to the various armed groups.

    The fewer people who knew about the “sensitive payments,” the better, so the payments only needed the authorization of the general manager, Charles Keiser, and the signature of Forton. Keiser was followed as general manager by Álvaro Acevedo, who later oversaw several years of payments to the paramilitary United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and today works for a fruit producer in Ecuador. VerdadAbierta.com tried to contact Acevedo, but did not receive a response.

    Forton instituted the “1016” form to register all of the payments and to camouflage them among the fruit multinational many other expenses. To do so, he created two new accounts: “Logistics,” for payments to government agencies; and “Operations” for payments to guerrilla groups.

    This rigorous accounting system coldly recorded the harsh reality of life in the violently-contested region of Urabá during the 1990s. Forton was aware of the impact that the payments had on public order and thought it indispensable to know whether the money found its way to the intended recipients. At the very least, the ultimate destination of the payments mattered more to Forton than to his superiors in Cincinnati, who had not witnessed Colombia’s war in person.

    In a vivid account to the SEC, Forton said the surge in paramilitary groups (or “anti-guerrilla groups,” as he called them)—who were also financed by the company—had intensified conflict in the region. He recalled a day when some 20 bus riders were killed, and a subsequent call from company staff in Urabá asking what to do. “I have a wife that carried the body of her husband into the office to ask for money to bury him,” he remembered.

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    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, p. 57.

    “There were situations where, I mean, things that I hope not to live again. But after being exposed to those horrible stories, I understood better if the money was reaching the end or not,” he explained.

    Forton left Colombia in 1996 and was effectively fired from the company in 1998 for his role in authorizing bribes to Colombian port authorities in Turbo, Antioquia. Forton is now a high-ranking official at Dun & Bradstreet, according to his LinkedIn account. VerdadAbierta.com did not receive a response from a message sent to Forton through the social media network.

    Where did the money actually go?

    The names of the individuals from the Security Department who handled the “sensitive payments” to armed groups in Colombia during that time, Juan Manuel Alvarado and John Stabler, are found in a draft Chiquita legal memorandum dated January 5, 1994.

    One of the chief intermediaries used as a bridge between the company and the insurgent groups was René Alejandro Osorio J., an attorney from Antioquia who in 1992 signed a services contract with the Compañía Frutera de Sevilla, another of Chiquita’s Colombian subsidiaries.

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    His role as a “Security Consultant” for Chiquita is revealed in an earlier draft of the same memo, dated January 4, 1994, which identifies Osorio as the company’s “contact with the various guerrilla groups in both Divisions.” The professional middleman was responsible for making “guerrilla extortion payments” for Chiquita. In many internal company records, he is referred to by the initials “R.O.”

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    Another document obtained by the National Security Archive is a copy of a contract signed by Osorio indicating that he was paid five million Colombian Pesos (about five thousand U.S. dollars) every three months. Osorio assumed all risks involved with the assigned work, but Chiquita would provide legal assistance if it ever became necessary. VerdadAbierta.com contacted him in Medellin, where he apparently resides, to hear his version, but made clear that he "was not going to refer to that subject".

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    The sort of informality that existed between Chiquita Brands and the intermediaries made it even more difficult to determine if the money was actually reaching the guerrillas and generated suspicions among some of the managers in Medellín.

    Even when the payments were made in cash, before the arrival of Forton as CFO, it was never really known whether they arrived in their totality to the guerrillas. John Ordman, based in Costa Rica, was a key link between Chiquita’s Colombian operations and top executives at the company’s headquarters in Cincinnati (as explained in the first article in this series). Ordman called these payments "a leap of faith."

    “Now does it get distributed to the people that it should be? Does it get distributed – you know, there’s a commission for this guy [name redacted]. Does he take half of it and put it in his pocket? How do you tell? There’s no way of determining that.”

    SEC Testimony of John Ordman, November 23, 1999, pp. 124-125.

    In spite of this, Ordman said he felt “comfortable that this was being handled in a responsible way.” The view of Robert F. Kistinger, head of Chiquita’s Banana Group, was much the same. He told the SEC he saw the guerrilla payments as an “ongoing cost” of company operations, like the purchase of fertilizers or agrichemicals.

    Forton told the SEC that he took the concerns about his inability to track the payments to a top executive in Cincinnati, asking, “How can I audit this?” And the response was: “If nobody is killed, it’s because the money is reaching the end. That’s the only way to say that the money is there.”

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    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, p. 58.

    The person who provided that response may well have been Robert Kistinger, since SEC investigators asked him about this same episode during his interview, but denied ever having such a conversation with Forton.

    SEC Testimony of Robert Kistinger, January 6, 2000, pp. 66-67.

    Forton was not the only person who worried that the money could not be tracked. His replacement in Colombia, John Paul Olivo, who arrived in 1996, voiced similar concerns in his SEC testimony. Olivo’s name has been known to Colombian investigators since 2009 when the Attorney General opened an investigation against him and two other officials, Charles Keiser and Dorn Wenninger, for conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony—a process that has gone nowhere in eight years.

    In his December 1999 testimony to the SEC, Olivo said he did not feel comfortable with the way the company made the payments, since it was impossible to know whether Alvarado, Osorio and the others were actually delivering the money to the armed groups. “The only person that requests funds and payments for guerrillas is the head of security,” he said. “No one ever knows who – or negotiates with this groups, except for himself. And that’s been my . . . concern since day one.”

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    SEC Testimony of John Paul Olivo, December 15, 1999, p. 64.

    More than extortion?

    In his declaration, Kistinger said the company made the payments because they were being extorted and wanted to protect the lives of their workers amid constant threats. For this reason, Chiquita also paid Colombian military and police forces, above all when they needed special security services.

    While the internal discussions of Chiquita employees mostly revolved around the technical aspects of the payments, Forton’s deposition is testament to the thin line between paying extortion and willingly funding the operations of a violent group.

    SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton, April 27, 1999, pp. 90-91.

    Other documents obtained by the National Security Archive indicate that Chiquita’s outlays to guerrillas were perhaps not as innocent as the company portrayed them in negotiations with Colombian and U.S. authorities. As the following draft legal memorandum demonstrates, at least some Chiquita officials believed the payments were illegal under Colombian law, while others wanted to eliminate evidence of such knowledge from the record.

    The same memo also suggests that not all of the payments were the result of extortion. If indeed the multinational made the payments to protect itself from guerrilla threats, it is equally clear that some of Chiquita’s farms were supplied with “security personnel” from “Guerrilla Groups.”

    Why did Chiquita Brands make payments to virtually every guerrilla group in Urabá? How much did the FARC, ELN, EPL and the other groups receive each year, according to company records? Were there any contracts or agreements with insurgent groups?

    The complex relationship between Chiquita Brands and Colombian guerrillas will be the subject of the next report in this series, to be published next Tuesday by the National Security Archive and VerdadAbierta.com.

    • The depositions of the seven Chiquita employees interviewed by the SEC were obtained by the National Security Archive after seven years of litigation. Although the names of those officials remained hidden, it was possible to identify them by comparing the transcripts to other official sources.

    READ THE DOCUMENTS

    Document 01

    1992-12-14

    [Bill for Services Rendered]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Bill for services rendered to Compañia Frutera de Sevilla on letterhead of "Rene Alejandro Osorio J."

    Document 02

    1992-12-18

    ["Contract for Provision of Professional Services"] [Includes original attachment]

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Copy of a contract between a Chiquita subsidiary and Rene Osorio, identified by the initials "R.O." The attached forms indicate that the three million Peso payment was to a "security advisor" who "works as liaison with activist groups."

    Document 03

    1994-01-04

    "Reportable Payments in Colombia and Manager’s Expense Payments" [Draft; includes original annotations

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Draft Chiquita legal memorandum on payments to guerrilla groups in Colombia identifies intermediary employed by Security Department to handle payments to guerrilla groups.

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Document 04

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>1994-01-05

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>"Reportable Payments in Colombia and Manager’s Expense Payments" [Draft; includes original annotations

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Draft Chiquita legal memorandum on payments to guerrilla groups in Colombia identifies members of the Security Department, John Stabler and Juan Manuel Alvarado.

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>Document 05

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>1999-04-27

    <

    p class=”MsoNormal”>[SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton], April 27, 1999, pp. 45-48.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Forton describes the challenge of auditing payments to guerrillas since the groups do not provide any kind of receipt.

    Document 06

    1999-04-27

    [SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton], April 27, 1999, pp. 57-60.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Forton recounts a call with company staff who told him about a massacre of some 20 bus travelers in Urabá.

    Document 07

    1999-04-27

    [SEC Testimony of Jorge Forton], April 27, 1999, pp. 89-92.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Forton says it was “questionable” whether payments to guerrillas were for self-protection or for “funding their activities.”

    Document 08

    1999-10-23

    [SEC Testimony of John Ordman], November 23, 1999, pp. 121-128.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Ordman says there is “no way of determining” whether money channeled through the Security Department and third-party intermediaries ever reached the intended recipients.

    Document 09

    1999-12-15

    [SEC Testimony of John Paul Olivo], December 15, 1999, pp. 61-64.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Olivo says his “concern since day one” was that he could never be sure that money intended for guerrillas and other groups was not being stolen by a third-party intermediary.

    Document 10

    2000-01-06

    [SEC Testimony of Robert Kistinger], January 6, 2000, pp. 65-68.

    Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Kistinger does not recall telling “Jorge” the way to know whether company funds had reached illegal armed groups was “if there are no killings.”

    NOTE

    [1] While the name of the SEC witness identified here as Jorge Forton was redacted from the transcript, there is abundant evidence indicating that Forton is the Chiquita witness interviewed by the SEC on April 27, 1999.

    · A 1998 series in the Cincinnati Enquirer identified Forton as one of the officials central to the bribery case that triggered the SEC probe.

    · The witness describes the role he played overseeing Chiquita’s financial operations in Colombia from 1994-1998, while an account for “Jorge Forton” on the popular social media network LinkedIn indicates that he held various positions at Chiquita from 1990-1998, including “Country Controller.”

    · Throughout the testimony, the witness describes how he sent financial reports to his superiors about so-called “sensitive payments” that were made in Colombia, mainly to government officials and to guerrilla insurgent groups.

    · The witness describes a conversation he had about these payments with a superior at the company: “… I questioned the nature of the payment. And he said: [Redacted], don’t get involved in this. I’m handling this and I know this is correct.” And basically, that was an invitation to get out. I mean, I wasn’t—I shouldn’t worry about questioning those payments, because, as I said, if no killings are, meaning that the payments were correct, reached the end user.”

    · Another witness who has been separately identified as Robert Kistinger, is asked by the SEC about this same conversation during his later testimony: “[Redacted] also said that … that you had responded to him, “Jorge, if there are no killings, you know the money is getting to the guerrillas.”

    · Another witness separately identified as Orlando Dangond mentions “Jorge” as being present at a key meeting where the bribe was discussed: “[Redacted] and myself may have explained to Jorge what had been going on, and then I believe [Redacted] explained to him about the payment.”

    · While questioning a witness separately identified as John Ordman the SEC investigator mentions “Jorge Forton” during a discussion of how certain sensitive payments were recorded and reported to corporate headquarters: “… [T]his document related to Jorge Forton and this document contains disclosures…”

    · Information at beginning of interview reveals that the witness is from Arequipa (assumed to be Peru). The LinkedIn account for Jorge Forton (mentioned above) says that he is a graduate of Catholic University of Santa María, a university in Arequipa, Peru.

  • HAGOP (MARTAYAN) DILACAR: A TRIBUTE TO A GREAT TURKISH-ARMENIAN LINGUIST By: Ayhan Ozer

    HAGOP (MARTAYAN) DILACAR: A TRIBUTE TO A GREAT TURKISH-ARMENIAN LINGUIST By: Ayhan Ozer

                      THE TURKISH TIMES

                        January 15, 1996

     HAGOP (MARTAYAN) DILACAR:  A TRIBUTE TO A GREAT TURKISH-ARMENIAN  LINGUIST

    By: Ayhan Ozer

     

    Today, we remember a great Turkish-Armenian linguist who rendered enormous services to the Turkish language.

    Hagop Martayan, a philologist and an expert in the science of encyclopedia, was born in Istanbul in 1895. A graduate of the American Robert College, he dedicated his entire life to the study of languages and was an expert in the Turkish language. He studied the etymology of Turkish words, meticulously tracing their origins since their earliest recorded coinage, their transmissions from one language to another, analyzing the words into their component parts, identifying their cognates in other languages, and tracing them to a common ancestral root.

     

    Later, Mr. Martayan became an instructor and an administrator at the Robert College. He participated in World War I as a reserve officer. Then he lived in Europe for a while. In 1932, Ataturk was impassionate with giving back the Turkish language its true identity, and clear it from the shadow of the Ottoman Turkish. He himself an orator and a master in using the Turkish language, he knew the expressive power of the Turkish, and he had a burning desire to liberate it from the shackles of Arabic and Persian influence. When he heard about Hagop Martayan, who was at that time in Bulgaria, invited him to Turkey. When he met Mr.Martayan he became impressed with his knowledge and expertise. He appointed him to the First Turkish Language Convention (Türk Dil Kurultayı). Around that time, a law making the surnames mandatory was at the legislature. Ataturk suggested that Mr. Martayan took the last name DILACAR, meaning  “tongue opener”, which Martayan graciously accepted.

     

    After the Turkish Language Convention, Mr. Dilacar became the Head Expert in the Turkish Language Association (Türk Dil Kurumu). Later, he taught languages at the universities and high schools. Starting in 1936, he taught for fifteen years The History of Linguistics, and General Linguistics at the Philology Department of the Language, History & Geography Department (Dil,Tarih & Cografya Fakultesi) of the University of Ankara. He was the advisor to the Turkish Encyclopedia, and later he became its chief editor. Mr. Dilacar passed away on September 12, 1979 in Istanbul.

    Hagop Martayan Dilacar contributed generously to the enrichment of the Turkish language and culture. He worked tirelessly to elevate and refine the Turkish language. We remember him with respect, gratitude and admiration.

     

    Ayhan Ozer

     

    ============

    Ayhan Ozer

    Ayhan Ozer

    Ayhan Ozer is an engineer by profession; he holds an MSc degree from the Technical University of Istanbul. He and his family have been living in the United States since 1971.

    Mr. Ozer has been active in the Turkish cause in a variety of capacities as president, vice president, public relations director, fund raiser, writer and lecturer to name a few.

    He and his wife Angul were among the founding members of the Assembly of the Turkish-American Associations (A.T.A.A.) in May 1980 in Washington D.C. At that time he was elected the regional V.P. of the Assembly and worked tirelessly in that capacity until 1986.

    His dedication, vision, broad experience and knowledge in issues related to Turkey, and his writings and commentary have always been an asset for the Turkish community. He served twice as the president of T.A.F.S.U.S. (Turkish-American Friendship Society of the United States) in Philadelphia, the Regional P.R. director of the Federation of Turkish-American Associations in New York, and most recently served as the P.R. chairman of the faith-based Turkish cultural organization in Pennsylvania (Turkish-American Muslim Cultural Association).

    He served for ten years as the Editorial Page Editor of The Turkish Times published in Washington, D.C., and contributed articles to that publication as a Political Analyst.

    He continues writing opinion articles on a regular basis for area newspapers such as Bucks County Courier Times and Asbury Park Press.

    He is also a lecturer and a luncheon speaker. His credits in that area include Princeton Rotary Club, Rutgers University, Bucks County Community College and various churches.

    Mr. Ozer speaks Turkish and French, and lives in Pennington, New Jersey.

  • SECURITY FILES /// 5 Questions : Operation Euphrates Shield

    SECURITY FILES /// 5 Questions : Operation Euphrates Shield

    1. What are the technical details of the operation?

    The “Operation Euphrates Shield” is a military operation led by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) together with the Syrian opposition forces to eliminate DAESH from Jarabulus in the Syrian province of Aleppo. Along with the Turkish air and land forces, special TAF units and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) are also taking part in this operation, which is partially supported by the international coalition against DAESH. Turkey trained and equipped the Syrian opposition forces of Sultan Murad Brigade, Sham Front, Faylaq al-Sham, Jaysh al-Nasr, Jaysh al-Tahrir, Hamza Division, Liwa al-Muattasim, Nureddin Zengi Brigade, 13th Division and Liwa Suqur al-Jabal for the “Operation Euphrates Shield” in advance. It is noteworthy that additionally to groups that were part of the Hawar-Kilis Operations Room, which had liberated Al-Rai from DAESH, the Nureddin Zengi Brigade, 13th Division, Jaysh al-Nasr and Faylaq al-Sham participated in the operation.

    Turkey has been striving for a long time to take control from DAESH of the 90-kilometer-long Azaz-Jarabulus region with the aim of securing its border line as in the case of the zone between Azaz and al-Rai that was already liberated from DAESH. In this manner, the “Operation Euphrates Shield” is in fact the second phase of a controlled effort to secure Turkey´s border with Syria. The operation began at 4 a.m., August 24 with Turkish artillery and howitzer strikes. Following these shellings, the Turkish Air Force and the International Coalition targeted several DAESH positions and helped to create a corridor for 25 TAF tanks and Syrian opposition forces to cross the border to Syria along with TAF Special Forces and other special units of the intelligence agency. Constitutively, the “Euphrates Shield” operation had two phases. The first phase aimed to liberate several villages and areas in the west and south of Jarabulus in order to be able to lay siege to the city. In the second phase, an offensive attack enabled the entrance of the aforementioned forces to the city center. The numbers of the Syrian opposition forces involved in this operation is estimated at 2,000-3,000.

    2. What is the importance of Jarabulus? Why did Turkey start this operation?

    Jarabulus is very important for all actors on the ground. The city has a logistic importance due to its position on the west banks of the Euphrates. In addition to this, its border crossing with Turkey will allow the logistic support of Turkey-supported oppositional forces. This border gate was considered DAESH’s last door to the world by virtue of the presence of illegal crossing points. Possible future operations towards south-west fronts are now easier since the city is secured by the Euphrates River on its east side and Turkey in the north. To create Turkey´s long-awaited security zone, DAESH could be attacked from the Azaz-Marea-al-Rai axis and from Jarabulus simultaneously.

    Jarabulus was taken by opposition forces on July 2012 and then captured by DAESH at the end of 2013. After the loss of Tal Abyad, DAESH held its last border gate at Jarabulus. Turkey arrested lots of people who tried to cross the border using illegal border-crosssings near the border gate of Jarabulus. In 2015, the PYD tried to take control of Jarabulus, so they could unite their self-declared cantons in Northern Syria. Jarabulus is important to Turkey for avoiding further threats to its border and for preventing the fusion of the PYD cantons.

    3. How will the regional dimensions be shaped after the operation?

    During his visit to Ankara, Joe Biden constantly emphasized that “The people of Turkey have no greater friend than the United States of America.” This could be understood as the USA expressing its wish to continue its cooperating relationship with Turkey. In this regard the U.S. demand that the PYD/YPG withdraw their forces back to the east side of the Euphrates could be interpreted as a positive step towards Turkey´s Syria policy. Furthermore, the weak response of the Assad regime could be seen as a result of the Turkish-Iranian talks. Added to this, the normalization process with Russia leads to the same enemy setting, namely of DAESH and PYD/YPG. The policy of Turkey from the very beginning to maintain the territorial integrity of Syria made it possible to reach an agreement on this base with the other sides. The common goal to fight against DAESH, which was created by the USA, now has developed into a fight also against the PYD/YPG to save the territorial integrity of Syria.

    On the other side, all developments until “Operation Euphrates Shield” on the northern countryside of Aleppo were in favor of the PYD/YPG. The SDF/PYD/YPG, which has gained the support of the US-led Internal Coalition lead, was able to make great progress against DAESH and the Syrian opposition. But with this operation, Turkey and the Turkish Air Force are now effective on the ground. This was the first time Turkish jets entered the Syrian airspace since the downing of a Russian jet. With this move Turkey also broke the aerial control of the International Coalition. As a result, this will also influence the situation on the ground in Syria. The PYD/YPG has made positive gains for its dream of a PYD corridor under the banner of the fight against DAESH, but now they have lost their role as the force fighting DAESH and given up their advantage as a result of the air support from the International Coalition. The opposition force will be able to advance against DAESH and to limit the countryside controlled by the PYD/YPG. After pushing back PYD/YPG and DAESH forces, the position of Turkey and the Syrian opposition will get stronger.

    4. How is the existence of the PYD/PKK in Northern Syria a threat to Turkey?

    The PYD gained dominance in the regions of Afrin, Ayn al-Arab and Jazira by creating a symbiotic relationship with the Assad regime during the Syrian revolution. Since 2003, they acted as the Syrian affiliate of the PKK. Finally, they took control of a region in the northwest and northeast of Syria with the aim of creating a corridor that went as far as Afrin. The PYD has been behind the ethnic cleansing of Turkmens and Arabs in the region in an effort to create a society dominated by its own population. The PYD also give the HPG logistic support for terrorist attacks in Turkey. The military alliance with the USA against DAESH gave them new power, as a result of which they declared the Northern Syrian Federation. In conclusion, the PYD is a threat to Turkey and to the territorial integrity of Syria.

    5. What are the next steps for Turkey?

    One can expect that Turkey will take steps to effectuate a safe zone after the “Operation Euphrates Shield,” which has been on its agenda for a long time. A buffer zone may be established, which covers an area between Azaz and Jarabulus of 90 km in length and 40 km in depth and which has been liberated from DAESH and PYD/PKK terrorist groups. Thus, while Turkey eliminates major threats to its national security, people who forcibly migrated from these areas, can now return to their homes safely. After “Operation Euphrates Shield,” Turkey will carry on the air support to opposition forces to enable them to progress firstly to al-Rai and then further south against DAESH. Turkey should take steps to secure its borderline as much as possible and provide the Syrian opposition forces the support to go deeper towards the southern countryside. With this change of the balance of power, Turkey can support the unification efforts of the Syrian opposition forces in Idlib and Aleppo and lead them toward becoming a powerful actor on the ground and at the negotiation tables with the regime. Turkey should also try to isolate the YPG and to win over other groups that are under the umbrella of the SDF. Finally, following this, Turkey should act together with local actors, groups and tribes to push the YPG towards the east of the Euphrates.
  • Turkish Writer Exposes Persecution of Jews in Turkey

    Turkish Writer Exposes Persecution of Jews in Turkey

     

     Harut Sassounian
     
     
    Israel National News published an extremely interesting article written by Turkish journalist Uzay Bulut on the discrimination and persecution that Turkish Jews have suffered since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
     
    This is an important exposé since the Turkish government has gone to great lengths for many decades to deceive the international community that there is great tolerance for Jews in Turkish and that Jews lived in a democratic society which protected their civil and religious rights. The aim of this Turkish propaganda campaign was two-fold: To keep Israeli leaders and American Jews happy so they would support Turkish interests in Washington and enlist the political lobbying clout of American Jews in Washington to counter congressional efforts to recognize the Armenian Genocide.
     
    The Turkish government back in 1992 commemorated with a big splash the 500th anniversary of Jews fleeing from Spain and relocating in Turkey. Ankara co-opted many of the Jewish community leaders, including the Chief Rabbi, into propagating this false historical narrative. When I wrote an editorial back then exposing the lies of that celebration, I got a letter from the head of the commemorative events, asking why I wanted to cast a negative light on their celebration. Interestingly, that Jewish leader did not contest any of the facts in my article on the persecution of Jews in the Ottoman Empire throughout the centuries.
     
    Bulut’s article is significant because it describes the persecution of Jews not centuries ago but during our own times in ‘modern’ Turkey! The article begins with a news item from the Turkish Milliyet newspaper reporting that dozens of historic Jewish synagogues “run the risk of disappearing forever.” One of the main reasons why these synagogues are disappearing is that the majority of the Jewish community of Turkey has departed from Turkey fleeing from “systematic discrimination and campaigns of forced Turkification and Islamization.” Bulut reports that in 1923, at the beginning of the Turkish Republic, there were 81,454 Jews in Turkey. That number has dwindled to “fewer than 15,000.” The last of Jewish schools was shut down by the Turkish government in 1937, according to Bulut.
     
    Here is the list of the major episodes of Turkish persecution and discrimination against Jews and other non-Turkish minorities in recent decades, as compiled by Turkish journalist Bulut:
     
    — The Turkish Law of Family adopted in 1934 forced Jews and other non-Turks to abandon their ethnic names and adopt Turkish sounding names.
     
    — “Jews were deprived of their freedom of movement at least three times: in 1923, 1925 and 1927.” Bulut also mentions that “during the Holocaust, Turkey opened its doors to very few Jewish and political refugees and even took measures to prevent Jewish immigration in 1937.”
     
    — Hate speech and anti-Semitic comments are very prevalent in Turkish society and the media. Activities in support of Israel by the Jewish community were banned by the Republic of Turkey.
     
    — The Turkish government has assigned secret code numbers to individuals of Jewish, Armenian and Greek descent. That way the government can track them down and expose their background when necessary.
     
    — “Laws that excluded Jews and other non-Muslims from certain professions:” The Republic of Turkey banned these minorities from holding government positions. “Thousands of non-Muslims lost their jobs,” according to Bulut.
     
    — Prohibition of the use in public of all languages except Turkish. The “Citizen Speak Turkish” campaign in the first years of the Republic mainly targeted the Jewish community, according to Rifat Bali, the leading scholar of Turkish Jewry.
     
    — “The Jews of Eastern Thrace were targeted by pogroms from June 21-July 4, 1934. These began with a boycott of Jewish businesses, and were followed by physical attacks on Jewish-owned buildings, which were first looted, then set on fire. Jewish men were beaten, and some Jewish women reportedly raped. Terrorized by this turn of events, more than 15,000 Jews fled the region.”
     
    — The conscription of non-Muslims in the Turkish Army (1941-42). “On April 22, 1941, 12,000 non-Muslims (also known as “the twenty classes”), including Jewish men — even the blind and physically disabled — were conscripted. But instead of doing active service, they were sent to work in labor battalions under terrible conditions for the construction of roads and airports. Some of them lost their lives or caught diseases.”
     
    — “On Nov. 11, 1942, the Turkish government enacted the Wealth Tax Law, which divided the taxpayers in four groups, as per their religious backgrounds: Muslims, non-Muslims, converts (‘donme’), i.e. members of a Sabbatean sect of Jewish converts to Islam, and foreign nationals. Only 4.94 percent of Turkish Muslims had to pay the Wealth Tax. The Armenians were the most heavily taxed, followed by Jews. According to the scholar Başak İnce, ‘the underlying reason was the elimination of minorities from the economy, and the replacement of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie by its Turkish counterpart.’”
     
    — “During the 6-7 September 1955 government-instigated attacks against non-Muslim communities in Istanbul, Turkish mobs devastated the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish districts of the city, destroying and looting their places of worship, homes, businesses, cemeteries, and schools, among others.”
     
    — “Murders of Jews: Yasef Yahya, a 39-year-old Jewish dentist was brutally murdered on August 21, 2003 in his office in the Şişli district of Istanbul, many Jewish lawyers and doctors in Istanbul removed the signs on their offices in order not to have the same fate as Yahya.”
     
    This list of continued harassment and persecution of Jews and other minorities should be sent to the international media each time that the Turkish government misrepresents its record of mistreatment of the Jewish community in Turkey.
    It is a shame that the Israeli government does not whisper a single word of criticism in the face of such persecution of fellow Jews in Turkey. On the contrary, Israeli officials cowardly buckle under pressure from Turkey to deny the Armenian Genocide and ban this crime against humanity from Israeli TV and academic conferences.
  • International observers in Turkey to hold press conference on Monday

    International observers in Turkey to hold press conference on Monday

    press e media

    ANKARA, 14 April 2017 – The international observers monitoring the constitutional referendum in Turkey will present their preliminary post-referendum statement at a news conference on Monday, 17 April, in Ankara.

    The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

    The statement will be delivered by Cezar Florin Preda, Head of the PACE delegation, and Tana de Zulueta, Head of the ODIHR Limited Referendum Observation Mission.

    The International Observation Mission comprises 63 observers from 26 countries, including 40 long-term observers and experts deployed by OSCE/ODIHR and 23 parliamentarians and staff from PACE.

    Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 17 April, in the Kingdom Conference Hall of the Holiday Inn Ankara, Kavaklıdere Mahallesi, Tunus Caddesi 7, Ankara

    Live stream of the press conference will be available at:

     

    For further information contact:

    Thomas Rymer, ODIHR, +90 535 891 9998 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

    Nathalie Bargellini, PACE, +90 544 781 49 74 or +33 6 65 40 32 82, nathalie.bargellini@coe.int

  • EU wants Turkey’s Erdogan to be the next ‘Yanukovych’

    EU wants Turkey’s Erdogan to be the next ‘Yanukovych’

     

    Very interesting perspective from Pravda.
    Pulat Tacar
    EU wants Turkey’s Erdogan to be the next ‘Yanukovych’World » Asia » Turkey. The latest and breaking news from Turkey

    When discussing the recent scandal in the relations between Turkey and the European Union, many pay attention to the electoral aspect of this conflict – the forthcoming elections in Germany and France and a referendum in Turkey. However, it remains unclear why Turkish President Erdogan has decided to go to the length of the conflict.

    Many Russian and not only Russian political analysts or teachers of political science do not understand, for some reason, the difference between making and developing decisions in big politics. This is an aspect of paramount importance in understanding the very nature of democracy. For example, many say that we can not change anything in foreign policy, because it is the president, who makes decisions at this point. This is a wrong point of view, because there are many people, who analyze various issues, elaborate decisions and show influence on the president.

    Naturally, there are people, who make decisions, form medium and long-term policy in the European Union.

    Turkish President Recep Erdogan is a very smart and experienced politician, who has an amazing, and I would even say, phenomenal political instinct. Erdogan has a remarkable sense of danger, which allows him to stay in power for so long despite intricate intrigues in the Turkish policy. He has felt something and decided to aggravate the relations with the European Union.

    There are reasons to believe that Erdogan understood that the EU was going to launch the process that could be referred to as the “Ukrainization” of Turkey, in which Erdogan would have to play the role of the Turkish Yanukovych or even Ceausescu or Gaddafi.

    Let’s take a look at the recent history of the European Union. The machine of German and French capital constantly needs the process of EU expansion. When expanding the European Union, the German-French capital destroys productions on newly acquired territories and captures new markets at the same time.

    At first, Germany and France (as well as small countries of the “old” EU) destroyed production in Southern Europe. Spain still has Seat and Italy has Fiat, but there is practically no machine-building in these countries, nor are there shipyards in Greece). Afterwards, having seized and digested the economy and production sector of those countries, the German capital turned to Eastern Europe and the Baltic States.

    Turkey next after Ukraine

    The EU needs to constantly expand by destroying productions in new territories and conquering new markets. Otherwise, the EU will simply disappear in competition with Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Indian, and even Russian and American producers. The European competition will not be able to stand fair competition. Ukraine is the most recent victim of the German-French capital. The German capital has not been able to fully digest it, but the destruction of the Ukrainian national economy is only a matter of time, and the capital will need to expand further. Turkey appears to be next on the line.

    It is important to understand here that capital is not malevolent or insidious. It destroys the Ukrainian economy not because Germany wants the Ukrainians to live worse and worse. On the contrary, German masters of life want the Ukrainian “untermenschen” to live well under the German “ordnung”, gradually turning them into law-abiding and obedient Europeans. I think that when Ukraine recognizes the will of the people of the Crimea and people’s republics of Donbass, Ukraine will become a member of the European Union.

    Simply put, capital is indifferent to everything except its profit. It needs to capture new markets and destroy their production. German and French entrepreneurs naturally assume that selling Volkswagen and Peugeot vehicles in Ukraine is much more profitable than letting Ukraine make its own cars. Therefore, they have decided to let the Ukrainian Zaporozhye Automobile Plant die in peace.

    After digesting the Ukrainian economy that used to be Europe’s fifth largest economy in 1991, German planners and strategists will turn to Turkey as the next candidate for the “European integration.” Similarly, Turkey may become a member of the European Union, if Turkey lets European giants destroy its national industry and agriculture.

    Turkey’s future depends on relations with Russia

    Needless to say that Erdogan does not like the idea. Of course, Turkey is not Ukraine. Yet, Turkey already has its fifth column. This is the old Istanbul commercial capital, which has little to do with the manufacturing sector, but is very interested in Turkey’s accession to the European Union. Representatives of the Istanbul capital despise Erdogan, who relies on industrialists of Anatolia (the Asian part of Turkey).

    Yet, the Anatolian capital that has made Erdogan become the Erdogan he is today, can easily become the comprador capital in nature, because production has reached new stages, when financial services (for example, export services, export insurance, banking services, lending, etc.) play a more important role in terms of profit than production itself. To crown it all, no one knows who is stronger: the Istanbul trade capital or the Anatolian industrial capital.

    In addition, there is the so-called “military” sector of the Turkish economy that remains under the control of the military. First and foremost, it goes about heavy and mining industries, as well as shipbuilding and similar industries. There are many Europe-oriented people among the Turkish military, and those people may support those, who may wish to topple Erdogan like Yanukovych.

    One may say that Erdogan is a lot stronger than Yanukovych. Yet, Yanukovych managed to organize his supporters after the first Maidan in Ukraine and thus win both presidential and parliamentary elections in the country. In 2012-2013, many considered his removal from power absolutely impossible. Similarly, many think that it is impossible to topple Turkish President Erdogan.

    Erdogan understands that Yanukovych’s attempts to sit between two chairs – be nice to both the European Union and Russia – have taken him to the shameful fiasco. Probably, Erdogan correctly assesses the current situation and understands that he needs to be more sincere, more open with Russia. Hopefully, he understands that his political future and, most importantly, the future of Turkey depends on relations with Russia.

    Said Gafurov
    Pravda.Ru

    Read article on the Russian version of Pravda.Ru