Category: News

Geopolitics Keeps Pushing Turkey and Israel Back Together.

Highlights
Turkey and Israel’s strategic alliance in the Middle East, fostered by their shared aim to limit Iran and prevent Arab states from aligning against them, will preserve their relationship through most external shocks.
Intensifying U.S. efforts to find regional allies it can rely on to contain Iran helps keep the two countries together.
Turkey’s defense of Palestinian statehood will always be a caustic wedge between the two: While it provides Turkey with important credibility in the Muslim world, it conflicts with Israel’s defense strategy.

Israel and Turkey appear to be testing the waters in preparation for resuming diplomatic relations. Officials from the two countries are thought to have met in the United Arab Emirates last month to discuss improving their diplomatic ties, which have been on pause since May. Other signs also point to a rapprochement: Turkey recently sent an economic attache to Israel, and Israel recently opened an internal job listing for an ambassador to Turkey. The two countries — sometime allies, sometime enemies — are again being pushed toward reconciliation as they move to counter Iran, cope with U.S. demands and defend their positions in the Middle East.

The Big Picture

Among the countries that the United States depends upon in the Middle East, Turkey and Israel stand out as cornerstones. Though they vacillate between friendship and hostility with one another, their ties rest atop a foundation of mutually beneficial trade, which survives even the most contentious times. Since hitting a low in 2010, their relations have been slowly on the mend. In their regional balancing act, Turkey and Israel always find that strategically they have more in common than not, but they will never see the need to entirely bury the hatchet.

See Israel’s Survival StrategySee Turkey’s Resurgence
The Search for Common Ground

Many strategic factors bind Turkey and Israel. They are two of the key non-Arab powers in the region and critical to its balance of power, which includes Persian Iran and Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia. They also have two of the strongest militaries in the Middle East. Turkey maintains the most powerful navy, and Israel the strongest air force. Each sees the other as too powerful to have as an enemy.

Ultimately, for Israel to protect itself in an unfriendly neighborhood, it must maintain at least a working relationship with Turkey. The alternative means contending with a big regional power while living next door to hostile Arab nations. Also, Turkey is the larger, more influential and more strategically crucial power due in large part to its location between the Mediterranean and Black seas and its status as a counterbalance to Russia, Iran and other regional heavyweights. This same strategic value came into play during the Cold War when the United States joined with Turkey and Israel to offset Soviet penetration of the Arab world.

Over the past two decades, Israel has had to adjust to Turkey’s way of building regional relationships; that method included picking fights with Israel — particularly over the treatment of the Palestinians — to gain traction with the Arab public. And for Turkey, Israel’s relationship with certain Kurdish factions — some of which it has heavily armed in the past — hits close to home and hampers its goal of weakening a potential Kurdish state. Keeping Israel close could help prevent it from arming the Kurds again.

Despite their differences, some of their regional goals overlap, especially when it comes to containing Iran’s influence. This objective plays out most clearly in the Syrian conflict, where Turkey and Israel want to direct Damascus away from Tehran and toward Ankara. While Israel is concerned primarily about the stability of the corners of Syria that affect its border, the Iranian presense there unsettles it. Much like Russia, Turkey can influence the Iranian presence but not control it. Israel also knows that Turkey, more than any other power active in Syria, is critical to ensuring that rebel groups there remain distinct from extremists.

In Lebanon, both have sought to curb Hezbollah’s influence, though they have used different means. Israel fights Hezbollah from time to time, keeping its military expansion in check. Turkey has chosen to take a nuanced and more gradual approach by supporting political and security forces opposed to Iran, counteracting Hezbollah and other proxies of Tehran.

The Economic Ties That Bind

Improved trade is perhaps the most deeply shared goal, because even in times of diplomatic rupture, import-export commerce has continued apace. Israel imports about $3 billion worth of raw materials and manufactured goods, such as cement, steel and tomatoes, from Turkey, whose current economic fragility highlights the importance of their trade relationship. For Israel, the imports help ensure that its manufacturing companies have a steady supply of materials.

Israeli arms sales to Turkey have also played a significant role in their relationship. While Turkey’s weapons industry has matured considerably over the past decade, the arms trade remains a promising area of cooperation. The energy sector, as well, could eventually become another area for collaboration. The two have been competing for natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean even as they had discussed over the past couple of years the possibility of building a pipeline between them. But the deal between Noble Energy and Israel’s Delek Drilling and the Egyptian East Gas Co. signed in late September to deliver natural gas from the Tamar and Leviathan fields in Israel to Egypt, compounded with the difficulty of building a pipeline across contested Cypriot territory, puts to rest any Israel-Turkey pipeline dreams in the near term.

The Most Recent Split

The May 2018 breakdown in ties between Israel and Turkey was just one of many periodic ruptures in their carefully balanced relationship. In December 2017, the United States decided to move its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, aggravating the most contentious issue between Turkey and Israel: the Palestinian conflict. In May, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of genocide and expelled Israeli Ambassador Eitan Naeh after dozens of Palestinians were killed in unrest in Gaza driven in part by the embassy move. Caustic rhetoric from Turkey about Israel’s actions against Palestinians has been a familiar refrain under Erdogan. Turkey is seeking to be a champion of the Palestinian cause because it raises Ankara’s stature and leadership influence in the Muslim world. In his role as a patriarch of political Islam, the president is building his strongman image at home and solidifying his domestic legitimacy.

Israel is focused primarily on its security, and denying Palestinian statehood is a means of ensuring that security as well as stability. Turkey will continue to be a bit unpredictable on how far it is willing to go to ensure Palestinian rights. And Israel can withstand all manner of tough rhetoric from the Turkish government; it is used to it. But any new, outright meddling by the Turkish government in the restive Palestinian territories will be seriously troublesome. Israel is already concerned about the Turkish funding of civic and Islamic associations in east Jerusalem. That support is meant to bolster Turkey’s soft power there in its competition with the Arab states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The Role of the United States

That the U.S. embassy decision could spur the most recent Turkish-Israeli split underlines the influence the United States has on their contentious relationship. The United States had previously played a key part in bringing them together. In 2013, President Barack Obama pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to apologize for the deaths of Turkish activists killed when Israel intercepted the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” in 2010 and agree to compensate their families.

Now, the United States needs the cooperation of both and a working relationship with both, as during the Cold War, to counterbalance Iran and reduce its own burden in the region. And the pressure this time, heightened by its economic problems, is on Turkey. Despite the low tide in U.S.-Turkish relations, the United States will continue to encourage Turkey to work with Israel. At the same time, the United States and Israel are in an unusually close period in their relations, which could embolden Israel in its regional and domestic policies, knowing that America has its back. Israel has exploited this greater U.S. pressure on Turkey when dealing with Ankara and has included its own pressure on the United States to not sell the advanced F-35 jet to Ankara.

Finally, Turkey must consider the quiet Israel-Saudi Arabia rapprochement. Their cooperation, encouraged by Washington and driven by the mutual desire to contain and combat Iran, could undercut Ankara’s goal to increase its influence across northern Syria and northern Iraq. This situation naturally leaves Turkey wanting to work more closely with Israel, so it can mitigate any Saudi moves that might threaten Turkish security imperatives, such as the possibility of arming certain Kurdish groups that fight against Iran. And an improved Turkish relationship with Israel could also help alleviate some of the U.S. pressure as well.

The Road Ahead

Though most signs point to an eventual reconciliation, Turkish actions could hinder progress. Turkey is still looking for ways beyond rhetoric to reinsert itself into the Palestinian issue. Ankara’s proposal for a Gaza seaport, which would facilitate Turkish aid reaching the area, could make some headway. And Ankara will forge ahead with building up ties in east Jerusalem, hoping that Israel would prefer to have it involved there in lieu of other powers, namely Iran. But Turkey likely would only provide funding with Israel’s approval. Otherwise, the resumption of further diplomatic ties could be restricted.

But for now, the ties between Turkey and Israel will remain pragmatic, limited and businesslike, subject to the influence of events in the region. Rapprochement could open economic opportunities for Israeli companies looking to invest in and with an economically weak Turkey. The two countries can be expected to continue discussions on the future of Syria and on ways to isolate Iranian influence there. Those two issues — trade and Iran — remain at the center of their on-again, off-again relationship.

October 9, 2018
To Look at A Jewish Boycott By Arabs

Richard DeGraff <dickdegraff@gmail.com>

Some time ago, Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei urged the Muslim World to boycott anything and everything that originates with the Jewish people.

In response, Meyer M. Treinkman, a pharmacist, out of the kindness of his heart, offered to assist them in their boycott as follows:

“Any Muslim who has Syphilis must not be cured by Salvarsan discovered by a Jew, Dr. Ehrlich. He should not even try to find out whether he has Syphilis, because the Wasserman Test is the discovery of a Jew. If a Muslim suspects that he has Gonorrhea, he must not seek diagnosis, because he will be using the method of a Jew named Neissner.

“A Muslim who has heart disease must not use Digitalis, a discovery by a Jew, Ludwig Traube.

Should he suffer with a toothache, he must not use Novocaine, a discovery of the Jews, Widal and Weil.

If a Muslim has Diabetes, he must not use Insulin, the result of research by Minkowsky, a Jew. If one has a headache, he must shun Pyramidon and Antypyrin, due to the Jews, Spiro and Ellege.

Muslims with convulsions must put up with them because it was a Jew, Oscar Leibreich, who proposed the use of Chloral Hydrate.

Arabs must do likewise with their psychic ailments because Freud, father of psychoanalysis, was a Jew.

Should a Muslim child get Diphtheria, he must refrain from the “Schick” reaction which was invented by the Jew, Bella Schick.

“Muslims should be ready to die in great numbers and must not permit treatment of ear and brain damage, work of Jewish Nobel Prize winner, Robert Baram.

They should continue to die or remain crippled by Infantile Paralysis because the discoverer of the anti-polio vaccine is a Jew, Jonas Salk.

“Muslims must refuse to use Streptomycin and continue to die of Tuberculosis because a Jew, Zalman Waxman, invented the wonder drug against this killing disease.

Muslim doctors must discard all discoveries and improvements by dermatologist Judas Sehn Benedict, or the lung specialist, Frawnkel, and of many other world renowned Jewish scientists and medical experts.

“In short, good and loyal Muslims properly and fittingly should remain afflicted with Syphilis, Gonorrhea, Heart Disease, Headaches, Typhus, Diabetes, Mental Disorders, Polio Convulsions and Tuberculosis and be proud to obey the Islamic boycott..”

Oh, and by the way, don’t call for a doctor on your cell phone because the cell phone was invented in Israel by Jewish engineer Martin “Marty” Cooper .

Meanwhile I ask, what medical contributions to the world have the Muslims made?”

The Global Islamic population is approximately 1,200,000,000; that is ONE BILLION TWO HUNDRED MILLION or 20% of the world’s population.

They have received the following Nobel Prizes:

Literature:
1988 – Najib Mahfooz

Peace:
1978 – Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat
1990 – Elias James Corey
1994 – Yaser Arafat:
1999 – Ahmed Zewai

Economics:
(zero)

Physics:
(zero)

Medicine:
1960 – Peter Brian Medawar
1998 – Ferid Mourad

TOTAL: 7 SEVEN

The Global Jewish population is approximately 14,000,000; that is FOURTEEN MILLION or about 0.02% of the world’s population.

They have received the following Nobel Prizes:

Literature:
1910 – Paul Heyse
1927 – Henri Bergson
1958 – Boris Pasternak
1966 – Shmuel Yosef Agnon
1966 – Nelly Sachs
1976 – Saul Bellow
1978 – Isaac Bashevis Singer
1981 – Elias Canetti
1987 – Joseph Brodsky
1991 – Nadine Gordimer World

Peace:
1911 – Alfred Fried
1911 – Tobias Michael Carel Asser
1968 – Rene Cassin
1973 – Henry Kissinger
1978 – Menachem Begin
1986 – Elie Wiesel
1994 – Shimon Peres
1994 – Yitzhak Rabin

Physics:
1905 – Adolph Von Baeyer
1906 – Henri Moissan
1907 – Albert Abraham Michelson
1908 – Gabriel Lippmann
1910 – Otto Wallach
1915 – Richard Willstaetter
1918 – Fritz Haber
1921 – Albert Einstein
1922 – Niels Bohr
1925 – James Franck
1925 – Gustav Hertz
1943 – Gustav Stern
1943 – George Charles de Hevesy
1944 – Isidor Issac Rabi
1952 – Felix Bloch
1954 – Max Born
1958 – Igor Tamm
1959 – Emilio Segre
1960 – Donald A. Glaser
1961 – Robert Hofstadter
1961 – Melvin Calvin
1962 – Lev Davidovich Landau
1962 – Max Ferdinand Perutz
1965 – Richard Phillips Feynman
1965 – Julian Schwinger
1969 – Murray Gell-Mann
1971 – Dennis Gabor
1972 – William Howard Stein
1973 – Brian David Josephson
1975 – Benjamin Mottleson
1976 – Burton Richter
1977 – Ilya Prigogine
1978 – Arno Allan Penzias
1978 – Peter L Kapitza
1979 – Stephen Weinberg
1979 – Sheldon Glashow
1979 – Herbert Charles Brown
1980 – Paul Berg
1980 – Walter Gilbert
1981 – Roald Hoffmann
1982 – Aaron Klug
1985 – Albert A. Hauptman
1985 – Jerome Karle
1986 – Dudley R. Herschbach
1988 – Robert Huber
1988 – Leon Lederman
1988 – Melvin Schwartz
1988 – Jack Steinberger
1989 – Sidney Altman
1990 – Jerome Friedman
1992 – Rudolph Marcus
1995 – Martin Perl
2000 – Alan J. Heeger

Economics:
1970 – Paul Anthony Samuelson
1971 – Simon Kuznets
1972 – Kenneth Joseph Arrow
1975 – Leonid Kantorovich
1976 – Milton Friedman
1978 – Herbert A. Simon
1980 – Lawrence Robert Klein
1985 – Franco Modigliani
1987 – Robert M. Solow
1990 – Harry Markowitz
1990 – Merton Miller
1992 – Gary Becker
1993 – Robert Fogel

Medicine:
1908 – Elie Metchnikoff
1908 – Paul Erlich
1914 – Robert Barany
1922 – Otto Meyerhof
1930 – Karl Landsteiner
1931 – Otto Warburg
1936 – Otto Loewi
1944 – Joseph Erlanger
1944 – Herbert Spencer Gasser
1945 – Ernst Boris Chain
1946 – Hermann Joseph Muller
1950 – Tadeus Reichstein
1952 – Selman Abraham Waksman
1953 – Hans Krebs
1953 – Fritz Albert Lipmann
1958 – Joshua Lederberg
1959 – Arthur Kornberg
1964 – Konrad Bloch
1965 – Francois Jacob
1965 – Andre Lwoff
1967 – George Wald
1968 – Marshall W. Nirenberg
1969 – Salvador Luria
1970 – Julius Axelrod
1970 – Sir Bernard Katz
1972 – Gerald Maurice Edelman
1975 – Howard Martin Temin
1976 – Baruch S. Blumberg
1977 – Roselyn Sussman Yalow
1978 – Daniel Nathans
1980 – Baruj Benacerraf
1984 – Cesar Milstein
1985 – Michael Stuart Brown
1985 – Joseph L. Goldstein
1986 – Stanley Cohen [& Rita Levi-Montalcini]
1988 – Gertrude Elion
1989 – Harold Varmus
1991 – Erwin Neher
1991 – Bert Sakmann
1993 – Richard J. Roberts
1993 – Phillip Sharp
1994 – Alfred Gilman
1995 – Edward B. Lewis
1996- Lu RoseIacovino

TOTAL: 129!

The Jews are NOT promoting brainwashing children in military training camps, teaching them how to blow themselves up and cause maximum deaths of Jews and other non-Muslims.

The Jews don’t hijack planes, nor kill athletes at the Olympics, or blow themselves up in German restaurants.

There is NOT one single Jew who has destroyed a church..

There is NOT a single Jew who protests by killing people. The Jews don’t traffic slaves, nor have leaders calling for Jihad and death to all the Infidels.

Perhaps the world’s Muslims should consider investing more in standard education and less in blaming the Jews for all their problems.

Muslims must ask ‘what can they do for humankind’ before they demand that humankind respects them.

Regardless of your feelings about the crisis between Israel and the Palestinians and Arab neighbors, even if you believe there is more culpability on Israel ‘s part, the following two sentences really say it all:

‘If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence. If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel.”

Benjamin Netanyahu: General Eisenhower warned us. It is a matter of history that when the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General Dwight Eisenhower, found the victims of the death camps he ordered all possible photographs to be taken, and for the German people from surrounding villages to be ushered through the camps and even made to bury the dead.

He did this because he said in words to this effect: ‘Get it all on record now – get the films – get the witnesses – because somewhere down the road of history some bastard will get up and say that this never happened’

Recently, the UK debated whether to remove The Holocaust from its school curriculum because it ‘offends’ the Muslim population which claims it never occurred.

It is not removed as yet. However, this is a frightening portent of the fear that is gripping the world and how easily each country is giving into it.

It is now more than 65 years after the Second World War in Europe ended.

Now, more than ever, with Iran, among others, claiming the Holocaust to be ‘a myth,’ it is imperative to make sure the world never forgets.

This e-mail is intended to reach 400 million people. Be a link in the memorial chain and help distribute this around the world.

How many years will it be before the attack on the World Trade Center ‘NEVER HAPPENED’ because it offends some Muslim in the United States?

September 24, 2018
Low-income Turks take early crisis blows

Turkey Pulse

Mustafa Sonmez September 17, 2018

Article Summary

Turkey’s economic turmoil is already bruising millions of minimum wage earners, who are grappling with a flurry of price hikes and the prospect of losing jobs.

REUTERS/Murad Sezer

People shop at the Spice Market, also known as the Egyptian Bazaar, in Istanbul, Turkey, Aug. 17, 2018.

Following six consecutive quarters of high growth rates, Turkey’s economy appears to be coursing toward stagnation and, ultimately, contraction, as all leading indicators have been pointing to a slowdown since July. For decades, Turkey has had one of the world’s most unfair income distributions. The working classes have taken the hardest blow during times of economic turmoil, responding by voting against the ruling party in the first elections.

Though Turks went to the polls as recently as June, economic grievances did not figure prominently in the votes of roughly half of the electorate, which backed President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Yet, popular discontent has grown fast since then amid surging inflation, company bankruptcies, loan repayment woes and uncertainty over what the country’s economic future holds. Ankara’s extensive control of the media and judiciary — and the more oppressive nature of the presidential system that took effect in June — are discouraging street protests and other public expressions of discontent, but an undercurrent of resentment is clearly growing.

The muttering in low-income groups is rising primarily over the flurry of price hikes that Turks have come to encounter at the markets. Year-on-year consumer inflation hit nearly 18% in August, becoming increasingly ossified in a way that Turkey has not witnessed in many years.

Producer inflation is even higher, standing at 32%, which is an omen that consumer prices could rise even further in the coming months. Retailers say they have done their best to minimize the effect of producer hikes on consumer prices, but note they have reached the limit, reinforcing expectations that inflation would hit 20% by the year-end.

Among emerging economies, Turkey’s inflation is comparable only to that of Argentina, which is already under the watch of the International Monetary Fund. While prices soar, few Turks can hope for pay hikes matching the inflation rate. Out of the 19 million wage earners who make up 70% of the labor force, only about 3 million public employees enjoy some inflation-related pay adjustments, in addition to about 10 million pensioners. For the remaining 16 million wage earners in the private sector, such an adjustment facility does not exist. Moreover, only about 1 million of them are unionized, standing a chance of some organized effort to secure pay hikes. The overwhelming majority of 15 million wage earners are on their own.

Worse, more than 60% of wage earners work for the minimum wage of 1,600 Turkish liras or even less, according to the micro data of labor statistics by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). This is equivalent to $246, based on the dollar’s average price of 6.5 liras this month — a 42% decrease from the $426 that the minimum wage was worth at the beginning of the year.

According to the TUIK, the average home rent in Turkey is 1,000 liras, including related fees. Hence, a wage earner’s family needs the equivalent of at least two minimum wages to scratch along or second jobs for extra income or other forms of support. But even this is not enough to protect their purchasing power against 18% inflation, meaning that those families are growing relatively poorer.

The gloomy picture is now compounded by the risk of losing jobs. The growth rate is falling fast in sectors such as construction, agriculture, tourism and services, where minimum wage earners are heavily employed. Despite the 5.2% overall growth rate in the second quarter announced this week, the agricultural sector regressed by 1.5%, and the construction sector grew only 0.8%. The momentum loss in the manufacturing industry was also significant. Official figures for the third quarter are not yet available, but the pace of growth is known to be sharply falling.

Non-agricultural unemployment currently stands at more than 12.5%, and it will hardly be a surprise if the figure reaches 14-15% when the figures for August and September are released. The real fears, however, are about the fourth quarter, when a sharper contraction and layoffs are expected. For many families, losing jobs would mean an intolerable situation.

On top of all those risks, low-income groups are grappling with debt woes stemming from a loan bonanza that Turks had until several years ago as the banking sector was able to borrow for cheap from abroad. A significant increase in credit card use and consumer loans has saddled Turkish households with a hefty debt burden. According to figures by the Turkish Banks Association, the credit card and loan debt of households stands at some 567 billion Turkish liras ($92.5 billion). Setting aside the 244-billion-lira debt linked to car and home loans (which are presumed to belong to the more well-off), the debt in credit cards and personal finance loans — which is generally considered to belong to lower income groups — emerges as 323 billion liras ($52.7 billion).

Non-performing loans are already close to 6%, and litigations are on the rise. For both debtors and banks, the repayment problem raises the grave prospect of sequestration, which could lead many to lose homes, cars and even domestic appliances.

In sum, although the crisis has only reared its head, low-income groups are already under severe strain. It is important to note that those groups represent an important segment in the AKP electorate. How long their credit to the AKP will last or how much patience they will show is hard to predict. Yet, local elections are looming in March 2019. Will the voters punish the AKP at the ballot boxes? Could the government temper the crisis until March? These are a few of the questions that will hover in the coming months.

Found in: Turkish economy

Mustafa Sonmez is a Turkish economist and writer. He has worked as an economic commentator and editor for more than 30 years and authored some 30 books on the Turkish economy, media and the Kurdish question.

September 24, 2018
China, U.S.: The Trade Fight Escalates With New Rounds of Tariffs
Sep 19, 2018 | 14:44 GMT
The Big Picture

Trade frictions between the United States and China have intensified during the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. As Stratfor’s 2018 Fourth-Quarter Forecast indicated, Trump added to a series of tariffs, which, along with other pressure tactics, are part of the broader U.S. strategic competition with China. But despite its slowing economy, China has proved willing to respond with tariffs and non-tariff measures alike. Although both sides have indicated their willingness to negotiate, neither has backed away from the fight.

What Happened

The trade war between China and the United States has escalated yet again. Just hours after U.S. President Donald Trump said he was following through on his threat to slap new tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, China responded by announcing tariffs on $60 billion in U.S. products. The U.S. tariffs, 10 percent on a range of goods including electronic and machinery products that are part of the Made-in-China 2025 program targeted by Trump, as well as some consumer products such as furniture and household appliances, would take effect Sept. 24 and would increase to 25 percent on Jan. 1, 2019. As he announced the latest round of tariffs on Sept. 17, Trump added that if China responded in kind, he would begin the process of authorizing tariffs on a further $267 billion in Chinese imports. Thus, with China’s announcement the next day, it appears that their battle over trade is likely only to intensify.

Since the White House first proposed this round of U.S. tariffs in July, the list of goods it would affect has been adjusted to exclude some more sensitive consumer goods such as smartwatches and Bluetooth devices, sensitive consumer safety items like car seats, and critical raw materials like rare earth metals. China, meanwhile, lowered its own threatened tariff rates from an original 5 to 25 percent, to 5 to 10 percent. But those tariffs still will affect agricultural and chemical products, metals and other exports designed to inflict pain on U.S. farmers, and they will still target the industrial and pharmaceutical sectors. China is also pursuing non-tariff methods to retaliate against U.S. trade pressure, including imposing lengthy cargo inspections for U.S. imports, slowing customs clearance times and undertaking cumbersome regulatory approvals of U.S. businesses hoping to operate in China. Chinese officials have also proposed adding export restrictions on certain metals critical to U.S. industries.

Why It Matters

With both the United States and China upping the ante, and with the United States pursuing a long-term strategic economic competition to balance against China, their trade battle is unlikely to end anytime soon. Two rounds of negotiations since May aimed at settling their differences have failed. Last week, the U.S. Treasury Department proposed holding another round of talks, and the Chinese government was reportedly considering the plan. But the latest tariff round could take those talks off the table. Both the White House and Beijing have said they remain open to negotiations, but their positions on trade remain far apart.

The Trump administration has calculated that as trade tensions escalate, China’s cooling economy would make Beijing more willing to consider concessions and agree to structural economic reforms. After all, in earlier talks, Beijing offered to take steps to reduce the U.S.-China trade deficit and to loosen market access restrictions, allowing U.S. companies to compete in such sectors as banking, security and insurance. But Beijing has steadfastly refused to budge on Washington’s core demands for structural economic reforms. Instead, in a bid to strengthen its negotiating position as the trade tension escalates, Beijing instead has chosen to impose greater costs on U.S. companies operating in China and to further restrict their access. More importantly, Beijing increasingly is taking the view that the trade war is just one part of the overall U.S. strategy to contain China’s rise and prevent it from gaining the upper hand in technology.

Political pressure is mounting on Chinese President Xi Jinping to hold firm against making significant concessions to the United States. China is likely hoping that the pinch of higher prices for U.S. consumers and industries as midterm U.S. elections near will compel the White House to change tactics. But given Trump’s ideological opposition to trade deficits and the internal divisions within his administration in dealing with China, Beijing’s approach may instead only complicate potential talks down the road.

What To Look for Next

China has yet to publicly decline the Treasury Department’s proposal for a third round of trade talks, to which Beijing had considered sending Vice Minister of Commerce Wang Shouwen. The timing and nature of China’s response to the U.S. invitation and who, exactly, would be chosen to represent the U.S. side will determine whether the talks offer any chance to de-escalate the trade dispute.

It will be important to note whether China pursues even more aggressive non-tariff measures against U.S. companies operating there and to watch for signs that U.S. and foreign companies are rethinking their supply chain strategy.

U.S. business groups could pursue possible legal challenges to the White House’s approach to tariffs, saying that additional tariffs would violate the administration’s statute authority under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The administration has used that law to justify tariffs on China on national security grounds. Instead, the groups argue, any further rounds of tariffs would first require an entirely new Section 301 investigation to have legal authority.
September 21, 2018
A Deal Between Turkey and Russia Won’t Stop the Crisis in Idlib
Sep 19, 2018 | 09:00 GMT

(OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP/Getty Images)
Highlights

A deal over Syria’s Idlib province will prevent Russian-backed loyalist forces from launching an offensive there and will defuse the growing crisis between Turkey and Russia.

The Syrian government, Iran and the jihadist factions among the rebels will try to undermine the agreement.

As a result, Idlib will remain unstable and the threat of military operations around the province will continue.

Russia and Turkey have come to an agreement over Syria’s last rebel stronghold, Idlib. Following their latest round of talks in Sochi, Russia, on Sept. 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced their deal to set up a 15- to 20-kilometer (9.3- to 12.4-mile) jointly patrolled demilitarized zone around the province by mid-October. The agreement, which will prevent Russian-backed loyalist forces from launching a major offensive to reclaim Idlib from the rebels, stands to ease tensions between Russia and Turkey. Nevertheless, the standoff over Idlib is far from resolved, and numerous obstacles remain that could undermine the deal.

The Big Picture

The fate of Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in the Syrian civil war, will help determine the future of the conflict. Not only could Idlib make or break Turkey’s relationship with Russia, but it could also draw in external powers and drag the war beyond Syria’s borders.

Reaching a Compromise

Russia agreed to the deal out of a desire to preserve its relationship with Turkey. The Turkish government opposed the Russian-backed operation on Idlib, which would have deprived it of a buffer zone in northern Syria while also driving millions of Syrian refugees into its territory. To try to avert the operation, Ankara reinforced its 12 observation posts in and around Idlib and promised its rebel allies in the region more supplies and support. Russia still could have maintained its backing for the Syrian military attacks on the province, striving to avoid a direct confrontation with Turkish forces by steering clear of their observation posts. But given the high risk of accidental strikes on Turkish troops — and the damage they would cause relations with Turkey — Moscow instead opted for a compromise with Ankara. By avoiding significant offensive operations in Idlib, moreover, Russia reduced the chances that the Syrian government would carry out another chemical attack on Idlib’s rebel forces, thereby warding off dangerous strikes from the United States and its allies.

Though the agreement accomplished Ankara’s goal of deterring a major assault on Idlib, it is not without its costs for Turkey. Turkey, for instance, has openly promised to work to drive out rebel forces from the demilitarized zone around Idlib as part of the deal. In addition, it has probably assured Moscow privately that it would do more to crack down on the extremist groups still operating in the province, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria. These groups and their regional affiliates not only include many Chechen and Uighur militants among their ranks — a source of concern for Russia and China, respectively — but they also have spearheaded attacks against Russian forces in Syria. In several strikes, for example, they used drones to drop rudimentary explosives onto the Russian air base at Latakia.

Complications

The extremist groups’ reaction to the deal will pose the most immediate obstacle to its success. Having maintained their ties with Turkey, jihadist organizations like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkistan Islamic Party will face considerable pressure from Ankara to withdraw from Idlib. Their cooperation is hardly guaranteed, however. The groups have long been wary of Turkey’s intentions and are aware of its efforts to set up a rebel coalition, the National Front for Liberation, to balance and eventually replace them in the fight. Furthermore, giving up front-line positions and quietly withdrawing from the demilitarized zone would contradict their hard-line ideological stance in the fight against the Syrian government. By compromising their beliefs in this way, the groups could risk further splintering and lose recruits to al Qaeda affiliate Hurras al-Deen or to lingering Islamic State cells in the region.

On the other side of the zone, Russia’s allies Iran and the Syrian government will also challenge the deal. Tehran and Damascus have been keen to get Russia’s backing for a full-scale offensive on Idlib and will not be pleased with the agreement, though they may publicly endorse it. Motivated to destroy the deal and weaken Russia’s relationship with Turkey, the Syrian government could, with Iran’s help, start skirmishes with rebel forces or even launch its own attacks in the region under the pretense of responding to strikes by the extremist groups there. All these constraints mean that violence and instability will continue to grip the region, even without the prospect of a major offensive on Idlib.
September 20, 2018
Turkey Room for Reconciliation With Washington? – Diverging Interests in Syria –
TURKEY AS SEEN BY BY DG RICHARD
- The recent summit in Tehran between the Iranian, Russian and Turkish leaders revealed the shortcomings in Turkey’s strategy in Syria, which has strained its alliance with the United States.
- The Turkish government may be able to ease tensions with Washington if it releases Andrew Brunson and the other U.S. citizens it has detained.
- Nevertheless, the damage of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s risky international and economic policies has already been done, and it will continue to add up if the leader continues his personalized approach to governing.
The limits and detriments of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s one-man rule are becoming increasingly clear. Under Turkey’s new executive presidential system, Erdogan has faced a barrage of crises. Turkey’s shaky alliance with Russia has shown signs of strain, and its relations with the United States have continued to falter. U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, in fact, stands ready to impose more sanctions on Turkey if Erdogan’s government fails to release American detainees by mid-October. For the beleaguered Turkish economy, the additional sanctions could be crippling — though in the meantime, Erdogan continues to pressure the central bank not to raise interest rates, against the recommendations of his economic advisers. The net result of Ankara’s posture has been the devaluation of the national currency, the lira, by about half this year.

Given the costs of his foreign and economic policies, Erdogan’s recalcitrant stance and obstreperous persona on the international stage seem to run counter to Turkey’s interests. But not to Erdogan’s. The Turkish president is acting out of little more than a desire to appear strong and to defy perceived opponents, including allies. His objective is to preserve his image at home as a leader who can overcome any problem and thwart any challenge to Turkey’s global ambitions.

Diverging Interests in Syria

The Tehran summit, a meeting on Sept. 7 between Russian, Turkish and Iranian leaders to discuss the Syrian civil war, revealed the rifts among the three participating countries. As Syrian government forces, with support from Russia and Iran, prepare for an impending military operation on the last rebel stronghold in Idlib, Turkey fears that a fresh wave of refugees will cross its borders to flee the offensive. It is also concerned that the operation will destroy the Free Syrian Army, a rebel outfit Turkey has been supporting in an effort to prevent Kurdish forces from establishing an autonomous region. With these issues in mind, Erdogan proposed a cease-fire in Idlib to halt the attacks on rebel forces. But Russia is eager to end the Syrian civil war by eliminating the insurgent forces and restoring control of all territory in the country to President Bashar al Assad. As a result, Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected and mocked Erdogan’s suggestion at the summit, in front of video cameras broadcasting the event live.

Erdogan, in turn, has warned of “consequences” for the Idlib offensive. The threat, however, is an empty one. Turkey will not fight back against Syrian government forces because Russia and Iran support them. In addition, Moscow controls the skies over Idlib. The United States, meanwhile, has signaled that its only red line on the Idlib battle is the use of chemical weapons. Turkey has a lot at stake in Syria, whether in the number of refugees coming across its border, in the threat of Kurdish separatist movements or in the economic opportunities that postwar reconstruction has to offer Turkish companies. But in the drama unfolding around Idlib, Ankara will probably face a scenario where al Assad reasserts his authority over Syria with no guarantee that his government will consider how its actions affect Turkey.

Reacting to these developments, Erdogan has blasted the United States and its support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, also known by its Kurdish initials as the YPG, which it blames entirely for Turkey’s failures in Syria. The move is intended only to satisfy the Turkish public and to portray Erdogan as a principled and steadfast leader. In the process, though, it has ensured that Turkey cannot achieve its desired goals in Syria, while isolating Ankara from the United States and Russia alike.

Room for Reconciliation With Washington?

Turkey may still be able to turn its relationship with the United States around if it heeds the Trump administration’s calls to free the Americans Ankara has detained. The case of Andrew Brunson — an American pastor arrested in Turkey nearly two years ago in the wake of the country’s failed military coup — is of particular interest to Trump and to his evangelical support base. The next hearing in the case is scheduled for mid-October, at which time Ankara is expected to release Brunson. Judicial officials recently replaced the judge overseeing Brunson’s case, suggesting that Erdogan is working to facilitate his release. Brunson, however, is just one of the detained U.S. citizens whose release Washington has demanded. (For that matter, the detainees are but one of several issues straining the U.S.-Turkish alliance, including Ankara’s plans to purchase the Russian-made S-400 air defense missile system.)

The U.S. citizens’ arrests, with no credible evidence to support them, were political from the start; Erdogan believed that he could use the captives as a bargaining chip against Washington. By holding out so long on the Brunson case, and those of the other American detainees, Erdogan demonstrated his strength against U.S. pressure while also sending domestic audiences the message that the Turkish judiciary remains independent. But now that the Trump administration has threatened unprecedented sanctions on Turkey, Erdogan’s back is up against a wall. Ankara is quickly running out of options to maintain its credibility on the global stage and to salvage its domestic economy. Though it has tried palliative measures, such as rhetorical overtures to convince the European Union of its enduring interest in joining the bloc, these are impulsive rather than strategic moves. Erdogan’s insistence on noninstitutional, personalistic and norm-defying leadership has come at a heavy cost to Turkey — one that is only getting steeper.
September 18, 2018