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  • Geopolitics Keeps Pushing Turkey and Israel Back Together

    Geopolitics Keeps Pushing Turkey and Israel Back Together

    A map shows the Middle East, including Turkey and Israel.
    (HANS SLEGERS/Shutterstock.com)
    Highlights
    • Turkey and Israel’s strategic alliance in the Middle East, fostered by their shared aim to limit Iran and prevent Arab states from aligning against them, will preserve their relationship through most external shocks.
    • Intensifying U.S. efforts to find regional allies it can rely on to contain Iran helps keep the two countries together.
    • Turkey’s defense of Palestinian statehood will always be a caustic wedge between the two: While it provides Turkey with important credibility in the Muslim world, it conflicts with Israel’s defense strategy. 

    Israel and Turkey appear to be testing the waters in preparation for resuming diplomatic relations. Officials from the two countries are thought to have met in the United Arab Emirates last month to discuss improving their diplomatic ties, which have been on pause since May. Other signs also point to a rapprochement: Turkey recently sent an economic attache to Israel, and Israel recently opened an internal job listing for an ambassador to Turkey. The two countries — sometime allies, sometime enemies — are again being pushed toward reconciliation as they move to counter Iran, cope with U.S. demands and defend their positions in the Middle East.

    The Big Picture

    Among the countries that the United States depends upon in the Middle East, Turkey and Israel stand out as cornerstones. Though they vacillate between friendship and hostility with one another, their ties rest atop a foundation of mutually beneficial trade, which survives even the most contentious times. Since hitting a low in 2010, their relations have been slowly on the mend. In their regional balancing act, Turkey and Israel always find that strategically they have more in common than not, but they will never see the need to entirely bury the hatchet.

    See Israel’s Survival StrategySee Turkey’s Resurgence

    The Search for Common Ground

    Many strategic factors bind Turkey and Israel. They are two of the key non-Arab powers in the region and critical to its balance of power, which includes Persian Iran and Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia. They also have two of the strongest militaries in the Middle East. Turkey maintains the most powerful navy, and Israel the strongest air force. Each sees the other as too powerful to have as an enemy.

    Ultimately, for Israel to protect itself in an unfriendly neighborhood, it must maintain at least a working relationship with Turkey. The alternative means contending with a big regional power while living next door to hostile Arab nations. Also, Turkey is the larger, more influential and more strategically crucial power due in large part to its location between the Mediterranean and Black seas and its status as a counterbalance to Russia, Iran and other regional heavyweights. This same strategic value came into play during the Cold War when the United States joined with Turkey and Israel to offset Soviet penetration of the Arab world.

    Over the past two decades, Israel has had to adjust to Turkey’s way of building regional relationships; that method included picking fights with Israel — particularly over the treatment of the Palestinians — to gain traction with the Arab public. And for Turkey, Israel’s relationship with certain Kurdish factions — some of which it has heavily armed in the past — hits close to home and hampers its goal of weakening a potential Kurdish state. Keeping Israel close could help prevent it from arming the Kurds again.

    Despite their differences, some of their regional goals overlap, especially when it comes to containing Iran’s influence. This objective plays out most clearly in the Syrian conflict, where Turkey and Israel want to direct Damascus away from Tehran and toward Ankara. While Israel is concerned primarily about the stability of the corners of Syria that affect its border, the Iranian presense there unsettles it. Much like Russia, Turkey can influence the Iranian presence but not control it. Israel also knows that Turkey, more than any other power active in Syria, is critical to ensuring that rebel groups there remain distinct from extremists.

    In Lebanon, both have sought to curb Hezbollah’s influence, though they have used different means. Israel fights Hezbollah from time to time, keeping its military expansion in check. Turkey has chosen to take a nuanced and more gradual approach by supporting political and security forces opposed to Iran, counteracting Hezbollah and other proxies of Tehran.

    The Economic Ties That Bind

    Improved trade is perhaps the most deeply shared goal, because even in times of diplomatic rupture, import-export commerce has continued apace. Israel imports about $3 billion worth of raw materials and manufactured goods, such as cement, steel and tomatoes, from Turkey, whose current economic fragility highlights the importance of their trade relationship. For Israel, the imports help ensure that its manufacturing companies have a steady supply of materials.

    Israeli arms sales to Turkey have also played a significant role in their relationship. While Turkey’s weapons industry has matured considerably over the past decade, the arms trade remains a promising area of cooperation. The energy sector, as well, could eventually become another area for collaboration. The two have been competing for natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean even as they had discussed over the past couple of years the possibility of building a pipeline between them. But the deal between Noble Energy and Israel’s Delek Drilling and the Egyptian East Gas Co. signed in late September to deliver natural gas from the Tamar and Leviathan fields in Israel to Egypt, compounded with the difficulty of building a pipeline across contested Cypriot territory, puts to rest any Israel-Turkey pipeline dreams in the near term.

    The Most Recent Split

    The May 2018 breakdown in ties between Israel and Turkey was just one of many periodic ruptures in their carefully balanced relationship. In December 2017, the United States decided to move its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, aggravating the most contentious issue between Turkey and Israel: the Palestinian conflict. In May, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of genocide and expelled Israeli Ambassador Eitan Naeh after dozens of Palestinians were killed in unrest in Gaza driven in part by the embassy move. Caustic rhetoric from Turkey about Israel’s actions against Palestinians has been a familiar refrain under Erdogan. Turkey is seeking to be a champion of the Palestinian cause because it raises Ankara’s stature and leadership influence in the Muslim world. In his role as a patriarch of political Islam, the president is building his strongman image at home and solidifying his domestic legitimacy.

    Israel is focused primarily on its security, and denying Palestinian statehood is a means of ensuring that security as well as stability. Turkey will continue to be a bit unpredictable on how far it is willing to go to ensure Palestinian rights. And Israel can withstand all manner of tough rhetoric from the Turkish government; it is used to it. But any new, outright meddling by the Turkish government in the restive Palestinian territories will be seriously troublesome. Israel is already concerned about the Turkish funding of civic and Islamic associations in east Jerusalem. That support is meant to bolster Turkey’s soft power there in its competition with the Arab states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

    The Role of the United States

    That the U.S. embassy decision could spur the most recent Turkish-Israeli split underlines the influence the United States has on their contentious relationship. The United States had previously played a key part in bringing them together. In 2013, President Barack Obama pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to apologize for the deaths of Turkish activists killed when Israel intercepted the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” in 2010 and agree to compensate their families.

    Now, the United States needs the cooperation of both and a working relationship with both, as during the Cold War, to counterbalance Iran and reduce its own burden in the region. And the pressure this time, heightened by its economic problems, is on Turkey. Despite the low tide in U.S.-Turkish relations, the United States will continue to encourage Turkey to work with Israel. At the same time, the United States and Israel are in an unusually close period in their relations, which could embolden Israel in its regional and domestic policies, knowing that America has its back. Israel has exploited this greater U.S. pressure on Turkey when dealing with Ankara and has included its own pressure on the United States to not sell the advanced F-35 jet to Ankara.

    Finally, Turkey must consider the quiet Israel-Saudi Arabia rapprochement. Their cooperation, encouraged by Washington and driven by the mutual desire to contain and combat Iran, could undercut Ankara’s goal to increase its influence across northern Syria and northern Iraq. This situation naturally leaves Turkey wanting to work more closely with Israel, so it can mitigate any Saudi moves that might threaten Turkish security imperatives, such as the possibility of arming certain Kurdish groups that fight against Iran. And an improved Turkish relationship with Israel could also help alleviate some of the U.S. pressure as well.

    The Road Ahead

    Though most signs point to an eventual reconciliation, Turkish actions could hinder progress. Turkey is still looking for ways beyond rhetoric to reinsert itself into the Palestinian issue. Ankara’s proposal for a Gaza seaport, which would facilitate Turkish aid reaching the area, could make some headway. And Ankara will forge ahead with building up ties in east Jerusalem, hoping that Israel would prefer to have it involved there in lieu of other powers, namely Iran. But Turkey likely would only provide funding with Israel’s approval. Otherwise, the resumption of further diplomatic ties could be restricted.

    But for now, the ties between Turkey and Israel will remain pragmatic, limited and businesslike, subject to the influence of events in the region. Rapprochement could open economic opportunities for Israeli companies looking to invest in and with an economically weak Turkey. The two countries can be expected to continue discussions on the future of Syria and on ways to isolate Iranian influence there. Those two issues — trade and Iran — remain at the center of their on-again, off-again relationship.

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  • The Pulse of Political Islam

    The Pulse of Political Islam

    The political order of the modern Middle East, one that has stood in place through the strength of autocratic regimes for more than a century, is under threat. The threat comes not from Western democracy or from Islam but from a potent combination of the two: political Islam, whose mere existence undermines the monarchies and military dictatorships that have so often suppressed its adherents. Some governments will continue to suppress them, of course, but the ones that work with them will eventually gain influence at the expense of those who do not.

    The monarchies and military dictatorships of the modern Middle East are under threat from a potent combination of Islam and democracy.
    (KHALIL MAZRAAWI/AFP/Getty Images)
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  • Labeling the Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorists Invites Complications for the U.S.

    Labeling the Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorists Invites Complications for the U.S.

    Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (L), shakes hands with U.S. President Donald Trump at the start of a bilateral meeting in New York on Sept. 24, 2018.
    (NICHOLAS KAMM/AFP/Getty Images)
    Highlights
    • Washington’s consideration of the matter demonstrates the influence Brotherhood opponents including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Israel have — and will continue to have — on the current White House. 
    • The designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a specially designated global terrorist group would harm the U.S. government’s ability to work productively with governments that include parties that are Islamist or aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, such as strategic U.S. allies Turkey and Kuwait.
    • It will be impossible to categorize all Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups according to one blanket designation because each organization has varying ideological beliefs and attitudes toward violence.
    • The designation could even become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as some political Islamists could respond with violence at what many in the Muslim world would perceive as proof that America is an enemy of Islam.

    One of the standard bearers of political Islam finds itself square in the White House’s crosshairs. The Trump administration confirmed that it is weighing whether to designate the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that is prominent in politics and society throughout the Sunni world, as a foreign terrorist organization. If the United States were to add the Brotherhood to its list, it would join Russia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates in doing so.

    Such a move threatens to open a can of worms for the United States, however, not least because the group has so many incarnations — in so many countries — that it defies easy designation. More important, though, are the political difficulties Washington will create for itself in taking a firm stand against the Brotherhood: For while prominent foes of the group in Cairo, Riyadh and elsewhere will laud the move, the United States will struggle to work with the many regional governments that include Brotherhood-affiliated groups within their ranks.

    The Big Picture

    In pursuing its policies in the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. government has come to rely heavily on the strategic preferences of a handful of regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. As the White House again mulls whether to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a foreign terrorist organization, the influence of these regional actors is evident in the White House’s seemingly black-and-white approach to a complex issue.

    See The Pulse of Political Islam

    Fulfilling the Criteria

    Hassan al-Banna, a conservative Muslim thinker, formed the Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. Nearly a century later, the organization’s Egyptian branch continues to be the most prominent, yet it has also inspired or aligned with the thinking of countless other Islamist groups across the Muslim world that oppose Westernization and secularization to some degree: Some of these groups have a clear link with the original Egyptian Brotherhood; others do not.

    In considering its course of action, the United States must decide whether the Brotherhood fulfills the legal definition of a foreign terrorist organization. To apply the designation, the U.S. State Department must confirm that the group is 1) foreign, 2) engages in terrorist activity and 3) is a danger to the United States. But other than the indisputable fact that the Brotherhood is a foreign organization, it doesn’t easily conform to the other two characteristics. Ultimately, the United States will find it difficult to adopt a single policy for a political group with so many facets and branches, all of which have varying degrees of separation from the core group in Egypt.

    Differences of opinion about violence within the Brotherhood will also complicate the United States’ efforts to designate the group a terrorist organization. The core group and many of its affiliates continue to seek change through political and non-violent means, and there are parties in Turkey, Tunisia, Kuwait and Morocco, among others. In the main branch, politically oriented violence is not a core tenet of the Brotherhood’s ideology; accordingly, the group possesses no armed forces. Indeed, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has not conducted a terrorist attack, which is technically a prerequisite for a foreign terrorist organization designation. Its more extreme leaders and branches have pushed for dramatic reformations of society from the inside out and from the top down — which partly explains why Muslim monarchies like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia perceive the group’s ideology as such a threat.

    In short, if the United States were to designate the organization a terrorist group, it would be sanctioning the governments of its allies.

    At the same time, Brotherhood factions have emerged that support violence as a political tool — usually leading to spin-offs. In the most extreme case, the ideology has fueled groups such as al Qaeda, which draws on the same conservative Sunni ideology but takes it to a violent extreme. More moderately — and more aligned to the Brotherhood — the movement has spawned groups such as Hamas, which the United States lists as a terrorist organization. For Washington, however, the case for labeling Hamas as a terrorist entity was much more straightforward because the Palestinian group conducted and claimed responsbility for violent attacks against one of the United States’ closest allies, Israel.

    The Reach of the Brotherhood

    Perhaps the biggest obstacle to Washington’s plans is the presence of a large number of Brotherhood-affiliated or -inspired parties in administrations around the Middle East and the greater Muslim world. Depending on the country, these parties are extremely important members of the political landscape, often as popularly elected members of parliament. In some cases, authorities in Muslim countries, such as Morocco, have permitted the growth of Brotherhood-inspired parties so that they can provide a more moderate counterweight to more extreme strains.

    This graph shows the positions of parties with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in a number of different countries.

    A Counterproductive Measure?

    If the United States were to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group, it would effectively be sanctioning the governments of its allies. There are many conflicts in the region (Yemen and Libya are just two examples) in which political Islamists are legitimate and critical parties to the discussion, as well as many partially democratic systems in which political Islamist groups operate as part of the government. U.S. allies including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and, especially, Egypt — which have long viewed the Brotherhood as an enemy to their system of governance — would welcome the designation and likely view the action as an indication of U.S. approval of other parts of their regional agendas. Others, including Turkey and Qatar, however, would express fury at such a move. Even more important, a sanctions designation, depending on its wording, could force U.S. government officials to restrict their travel or financial activity in countries in which a Brotherhood-affiliated group is active in the government. And for a country like Turkey, which is already embroiled in numerous diplomatic spats with the United States, the designation could spur yet another bilateral diplomatic crisis, possibly convincing Turkey to diversify its security partnerships beyond its traditionally Western base.

    Another issue centers on the U.S. administration’s balancing act between limiting regional actors from engaging in activity that — according to Washington — threatens U.S. security and supporting democratic developments and popular will in the region. This quandary dogged the Obama administration during the Arab Spring, which toppled a number of autocratic but friendly governments and paved the way for popular Islamist movements to join administrations after years in the shadows. Ultimately, the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups did not develop in a vacuum — they support values that a section of society espouses or wouldn’t mind seeing reflected at the government level.

    As times change and demographics shift, support for political Islam may wane.

    Indeed, the recent Arab Youth Survey from Burston-Marsteller, a global public relations firm, suggests that many young Muslims across the region do not back Islamist groups as much as previous generations. For the moment, however, Islamist groups such as the Brotherhood retain a great deal of popular support among all segments of society in many countries. But as the popular elections in 2011 and 2012 in Egypt show, Islamist political parties — including those aligned with the Brotherhood — retain a sufficient degree of popularity among all segments of society to be a major political force. In the end, designating the Brotherhood a terrorist organization, thereby helping to narrow the space for legitimate political activity, could even fuel extremism as it would portray the American government as an enemy to Islam — the very narrative the White House says it is trying to fight. But even if such dire consequences don’t come to pass, the United States could make its work in the region more difficult by taking an action that could shut it out of critical areas of the Muslim world.

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  • Charting the Muslim Brotherhood’s Influence

    Charting the Muslim Brotherhood’s Influence

    May 31, 2019 | 10:00 GMT

    Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood senior members, including Khairat al-Shater (top left), gesture from the defendants' cage at the Egyptian Police Academy on the outskirts of Cairo on June 2, 2015.
    (KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/Getty Images)

    As a staunch advocate of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood has played a prominent part in society and politics throughout the Sunni Arab world for more than 90 years. Formed by conservative Muslim thinker and teacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928, the organization’s Egyptian branch continues to be the most pronounced, but the Brotherhood’s reach stretches across the Middle East and beyond. The group has inspired (or aligned with) the thinking of countless other Islamist groups across the Muslim world that oppose Westernization and secularization to some degree.

    While many of these groups have a clear link to the original Egyptian Brotherhood, others do not. It is important to remember that the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups did not develop in a vacuum — they emerged from, and seek to represent, the segments of society that support a revivalist Islamic tradition. The Brotherhood’s message does not always resonate with more progressive establishments, and the group’s significance varies from country to country. The following graphic shows not only the level of influence the Brotherhood’s ideas have within numerous political groups in the Middle East but also the variance between them.

    muslim brotherhood grid 050319 0

    The United States under President Donald Trump has confirmed that it is deciding whether to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization. Washington’s thinking is supported by the fact that some Brotherhood factions support violence as a political tool — usually leading to spin-offs. In the most extreme case, the ideology has fueled groups such as al Qaeda, which draws on the same conservative Sunni ideology but takes it to a violent extreme. More moderately — and more aligned to the Brotherhood core — the movement has spawned groups such as Hamas, which the United States already lists as a terrorist organization.

    However, authorities in many Muslim countries have permitted the growth of Brotherhood-inspired parties as a moderate counterweight to more extreme strains. If the United States were to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group, it risks effectively sanctioning the governments of its allies. Read the full article, Labeling the Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorists Invites Complications for the U.S.

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  • Rasmus Paludan: Meet the far-right leader who wants to deport all Muslims from Denmark 21

    Rasmus Paludan: Meet the far-right leader who wants to deport all Muslims from Denmark 21

    By Anne Sofie Schrøder 

    Rasmus Paludan: Meet the far-right leader who wants to deport all Muslims from Denmark

    Convicted of racism, accused of Nazi ties, known for burnings of the Quran… and about to become a Danish MP?

    Danish lawyer Rasmus Paludan was little known a few months ago but his far-right party has gained traction ahead of a general election on June 5.

    His political movement — Stram Kurs (Hard Line) — calls itself the party for “ethnic Danes”, wants to ban Islam and deport all Muslims from Denmark.

    His party is forecast to win 2.3%, according to a recent poll published by Voxmeter, which would be enough to enter parliament.

    Hard Line’s rise comes as support for the country’s biggest nationalist movement, Danish People’s Party, has fallen.

    “Hard Line’s only agenda is to be extremely tough on refugees, immigrants and Muslims in particular, and that attracts a small group of voters who think anti-immigration policies can always get harder and more radical,” said elections specialist and professor of political science at Copenhagen University, Kasper Møller Hansen.

    Since founding his party in July 2017, Paludan has earned a following on YouTube and Snapchat but in recent months he emerged from virtual stardom among teenagers to securing election candidacy by gathering the required 20,000 digital signatures of endorsement from voters.

    In April, a Danish court found Paludan guilty of racism after he argued that people from Africa are less intelligent.

    Paludan said in a December 2018 video: “The enemy is Islam and Muslims. The best thing would be if there were not a single Muslim left on this earth. Then we would have reached our final goal.”

    The foundation of Hard Line is “ethnonationalism” and Paludan says you need at least two grandparents of Danish origins to prove you are Danish.

    Martin Krasnik, editor-in-chief of the Danish newspaper “Weekendavisen”, called Paludan a Nazi in a recent editorial. He said that Paludan is “clearly familiar with the Nuremberg laws” from Nazi-era Germany.

    Paludan denies having any associations with Nazism.

    He and his supporters are known for burning or throwing the Quran in the air. Police have spent almost €6 million on protecting Hard Line’s leader during his protests this year.

    In April, Paludan demonstrated in the ethnically diverse Nørrebro district of Copenhagen where large numbers of Muslims live. It caused a violent reaction and unrest that spread to several parts of the capital.

    “I strongly disagree with Paludan’s meaningless provocations that have no other purpose than sow disunity. Meet him with arguments – not with violence,” Denmark’s prime minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, wrote on Twitter.

    However, journalists have found it difficult to argue with Paludan, who recently claimed on air that there are 700,000 Muslims in Denmark.

    There are no official figures but experts estimate there to be 320,000.

    Danish media has been under fire for giving Paludan a platform to promote his agenda and Paludan’s protest and many interviews have once again ignited the heated debate about freedom of speech in Denmark.

    “Paludan is acting much like Trump, he is pointing fingers at the establishment and the media and often lies. But his voters do not care”, said Hansen. “Despite the rise of Hard Line, right-wing populism has weakened a lot in this election.”

    The opposition “red bloc” is forecast to win the general election, which would make the leader of The Social Democrats, Mette Frederiksen, prime minister.

    Their bloc is estimated to gain more than 50% of the vote after the Social Democrats adopted a stricter migration policy, which has helped them to win back left-leaning anti-immigration voters who had previously abandoned them for right-wing parties.

    “The right-wing parties will get fewer votes this time and the government will most likely be based on the Social Democrats, which means that a party like Hard Line will be alienated on the far-right and probably they will not have much to say in the coming term and law-making process”, Hansen said.

     

  • SPIEF – 2019 to host more than 120 significant international business events

    SPIEF – 2019 to host more than 120 significant international business events

    St. Petersburg International Economic Forum is about to take off in less than two weeks.

    Akademik Tryoshnikov

    The Forum will host more than 120 events, including two plenary sessions, panel sessions, round tables, business breakfasts and TV debates, the Roskongress Foundation, the organizing committee of the forum, reports.

    “According to the official website of SPIEF – 2019 there is a business program with speakers and moderators of discussions. The forum will take place on June 6–8, 2019. The main theme is “Forming grounds for sustainable development,” the message says. The program consists of four thematic blocks: “The World Economy in Search of Balance”, “The Russian Economy: Realizing the Goals of National Development”, “Technologies Approaching the Future”, “People are the top priority”.

    “The business program of SPIEF-2019 is attended by representatives of the government, public organizations, and leaders of the business community. This year we will talk a lot about economic development and strengthening multilateral mutually beneficial cooperation between countries, including the role of Russia in the international arena, ”said Anton Kobyakov, Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation, Executive Secretary of the SPIEF Organizing Committee.