Category: News

  • Turkey to be number nine economy in the world by 2050

    Turkey to be number nine economy in the world by 2050

    Global investment bank Goldman Sachs said in a report that Turkey would grow to become a nearly 6 trillion dollar economy by 2050, the 9th largest economy in the world, moving ahead of G7 countries such as Japan, Germany, Italy, Canada and France.

    Turkey to be number nine economy in the world by 2050

    The report said that Turkey would become a part of the global balance of power if it maintains its policies, and the country’s national income per capita would be around $20,000-$25,000 in 2024 and exceed $30,000 in 2033. Turkey’s national income per capita would reach $60,000-65,000 by the year 2050, according to the report.

    The report also revealed that China would be the largest economy in 2050 with a nominal gross domestic product close to $70 trillion ahead of the United States, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico, Britain and Turkey.

    Photo: AFP

    Source: Hurriyet, July 29, 2008

  • What Would Ataturk Do?

    What Would Ataturk Do?

    PAGE ONE

    What Would Ataturk Do?
    Turkey Battles Over Long-Dead Leader

    By ANDREW HIGGINS
    July 29, 2008; Page A1

    ANKARA, Turkey — The Ataturk Thought Association, zealous guardian of the secular creed that guides Turkey, never thought it would come to this.

    Its chairman, a retired four-star general, is in jail. Its offices — plastered with portraits of modern Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk — have been raided by police. Several of its computer hard drives have been seized by investigators. They’re hunting for evidence of plots by hard-line secularists to topple Turkey’s mildly Islamic government.

    The assault, declares Suay Karaman, a land surveyer now filling in for the Thought Association’s imprisoned chairman, shows that “there is no such thing as moderate Islam.” Raids in Ankara and Istanbul came in the weeks before the country’s Constitutional Court on Monday began considering the secularists’ own offensive: a suit to outlaw the governing party for violating secular mandates Ataturk enshrined in 1923. (Please see related article on Page A10.)

    A final battle looms to decide whether Turkey remains a secular republic faithful to Ataturk, says Mr. Karaman, or instead “becomes like Saudi Arabia.”

    Warnings of the demise of Ataturk’s legacy have been around almost since he died 70 years ago. A relentless modernizer, hearty drinker and fan of the fox trot, the founder of the Turkish Republic — his name means “father of the Turks” — had issues with Islam. He shut down Islamic schools, banned Islamic garb and opened a German brewery in his new capital, Ankara. His was hardly the path of least resistance in a land that is 99% Muslim, once ruled Mecca and was for centuries home to the Caliph, Islam’s supreme leader. Yet Ataturk’s way prevailed for decades.

    Now, says Mr. Karaman, it faces grave peril. In February, Turkey’s elected government — led by observant Muslims whose wives mostly wear headscarves — moved to let pious female students cover their hair on university campuses, something that had been banned for years as an affront to secular traditions.

    The Constitutional Court quickly put a stop to that, and the chief prosecutor, an ardent secularist, filed suit in March, asserting that the governing party poses a “clear and present” danger and must be stopped before it imposes Islamic law. Outlawing the Justice and Development, or AK, Party could rock its leaders — and the country — politically, though they likely could reorganize under another banner without giving up power. Tensions were stoked late Sunday, on the eve of the court taking up the case, by two bombs in Istanbul that killed 17 people. There was no immediate claim of responsibility.

    The headscarf effort, says Mr. Karaman, along with the arrest of his boss and scores of others, has exposed what he calls the governing party’s hidden agenda — a plan to turn Turkey into an Islamic theocracy. Chanting “Turkey will not be Iran,” activists in the Ataturk Thought Association held a noisy protest on July 19 in Istanbul, waving portraits of their jailed chairman, Sener Eruygur, and of Ataturk. A few days later, more than two dozen people were arrested as part of a sprawling search for antigovernment plotters. Mr. Eruygur hasn’t been charged; his lawyer has said he is innocent of wrongdoing.

    Many, including foreign diplomats, scoff at the notion that Turkey now is governed by a cabal of closet fundamentalists. The AK Party generally is friendly to the West — friendlier than many secular activists, in fact. Party officials deny harboring anti-Ataturk tendencies.

    One thing is clear: Ataturk worship, the world’s most enduring personality cult, still holds this increasingly prosperous nation of more than 70 million people in its thrall. Ataturk shows scant sign of going the way of his contemporaries. Vladimir Lenin lies in Red Square but is barely mentioned in Russia now, except as a butt of jokes. Even Mao Zedong, embalmed in Tiananmen Square, has slipped from his pedestal: The Chinese Communist Party’s official view of him is 70% good, 30% bad.

    Untouchable Ataturk

    Ataturk, revered for defeating invading British, French and Greek forces, is untouchable. His mausoleum in Ankara drew more than 12 million visitors last year, up by four million from 2006. The constitution bans all deviation from the “reforms and principles” of “the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero.” It is illegal in Turkey to publicly curse him. Virtually nobody, including members of the AK Party, disses him, at least not in public. One young, headscarf-wearing woman recently said on TV, “I do not like him.” She is being investigated by prosecutors.

    Politicians invoke Ataturk’s name to justify starkly different agendas. Even Ataturk’s long-deceased wife, whom he divorced, has been dragged into furor: Did she or didn’t she observe Islamic custom and cover her head? An AK Party legislator has contended that she did. That question is among the issues to be mulled by the Constitutional Court.

    Just as Muslim activists mine the Quran for verses to boost their cause, Turkey’s hard-line secularists and their foes delve into Ataturk’s voluminous writings and speeches — Turkey’s secular scripture. The sheer volume of Ataturk’s words gives plenty of scope for argument: a single speech he gave in 1927 lasted 36 hours, spread over six days.

    For Mr. Karaman of the Ataturk Thought Association, a bastion of Turkey’s secular establishment, the key text is one of Ataturk’s shorter works, a 230-word address to Turkish youth. It warns against “malevolent people at home and abroad,” and urges ceaseless struggle against any “traitors” who worm themselves into power. That dark fear, says Mr. Karaman, has taken shape in the form of the AK Party. Among signs of this, he says, are the woes of his group.

    The governing party’s own claim of allegiance to Ataturk only demonstrates its deviousness, says Mr. Karaman. When Recep Tayyip Erdogan, now Turkey’s prime minister, launched the AK Party in 2001, he did so in a hall bedecked with a giant portrait of Ataturk. The event began with a minute’s silence in Ataturk’s memory. “All fake,” huffs Mr. Karaman.

    Suat Kiniklioglu, an AK Party legislator, says he has “no problems at all” with “Ataturk’s principles” but the key issue is “how we interpret them.” Ataturk’s “true genius,” he says, was his “ability to adapt to change.” Clinging to details from the 1920s, he says, “will not work.”

    Secularism a la Ataturk is not a simple formula. Unlike America’s founding fathers, who separated church and state, Ataturk did not so much split Islam from the state as subordinate it to the state. He abolished the post of Caliph and placed all mosques and Muslim clerics under a government department. At the same time, he purged religion from other state agencies.

    Ataturk, a very stylish dresser himself, clearly didn’t like traditional Islamic garb, viewing it as an emblem of backwardness. His best-known comments on the dress question came in 1925 when he declared “international” — that is, Western — dress as “very important and appropriate for our nation. We shall wear it.”

    Legislation he introduced, known as the Hat Law, did not explicitly prohibit veils or headscarves and focused instead on banning fezzes and turbans for men. The ban on headscarves in colleges dates not from Ataturk, say its opponents, but from a 1980 coup by the military, which also tried, in vain, to crack down on miniskirts. Mr. Karaman says the spirit, if not the letter of the 1925 law, requires modern dress for both sexes.

    A Furious Row

    During a discussion of the 2006 budget by legislators, a furious row erupted over Islam, Ataturk and headwear, when AK Party legislator Musa Uzunkaya asserted that Ataturk’s wife, Latife Hanim, attended meetings at the presidential mansion in the 1920s with her hair covered. Was she a “reactionary?” he asked. The question enraged ardent secularists, who saw it as defiling Ataturk’s memory.

    Ipek Calislar, the author of a biography of Turkey’s first first lady, says she sometimes hid her hair only so conservatives could not push Ataturk “into a corner because of her dress.” It wasn’t an endorsement of Islamic norms, says Ms. Calislar: “People are arguing about this in a very stupid way.”

    Next to his desk, Mr. Karaman keeps a big photograph of Ataturk in military uniform. Ataturk, he predicts, will ultimately triumph. His hero, he says, would be in no doubt about how to confront any assaults on Turkish secularism were he still alive today: “He would put his army boots back on and start fighting.”

    –Farnaz Fassihi contributed to this article.

    Write to Andrew Higgins at andrew.higgins@wsj.com

    Source: Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2008

  • Comment from Jane’s Middle East Editor on the Bombings in Turkey

    Comment from Jane’s Middle East Editor on the Bombings in Turkey

    London , UK (Jul. 28, 2008) — David Hartwell, Jane’s Middle East Editor, commented “Turkish authorities are probably correct in their early assessment that the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan was responsible for the attack, which was probably carried out in retaliation for a series of raids that took place last week by the Turkish military targeting Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan bases in northern Iraq.”

    Will Hartley, Editor, Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Centre , further added “There is a slight possibility the attack could be linked to current investigations into the activity of Ergenekon – a ‘deep state’ nationalist group accused of a number of violent acts. It could be significant the attacks happened on the same weekend that the indictment of alleged Ergenekon members, which the authorities have been preparing for over a year now, was finally made public. However, at this time, and in the absence of more evidence, the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan ( Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan: PKK) remains the most likely culprits – although a PKK spokesman has denied the group was responsible, and the operation is not typical of the group’s modus operandi.

    ‘Modus operandi’ or MO refers to the signature style of a group/incident. In the absence of concrete evidence or claims of responsibility, matching the known MO of groups with the MO of an incident is often the only thing analysts can use to assess who may have been responsible. In this case the MO was a mass casualty attack aimed at urban civilian targets and employing coordinated twin bombs (emplaced), with the secondary device timed to cause maximum damage among first-responders.

    The Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan: PKK) is Turkey’s most active insurgent group.

    Source: Jane’s Information Group, 28 July 2008

  • If the Turkish secularity goes, so go the Turkish women’s rights, par Ozer Aksoy, Turkish Forum, le 24 juillet 2008

    If the Turkish secularity goes, so go the Turkish women’s rights, par Ozer Aksoy, Turkish Forum, le 24 juillet 2008

    Si la laïcité recule en Turquie, les droits des femmes reculeront, par Ozer Aksoy

    dimanche 27 juillet 2008, par Annie Lessard, Marc Lebuis


    « Le monde occidental ne semble pas être au courant de la menace immédiate et grave qui pèse sur les droits des femmes en Turquie. Le foulard est un symbole indubitablement politique. Il n’y a pas un seul exemple d’un pays musulman où les droits des femmes ont progressé d’un iota après que la religion ait été politisée ».

    Mme Ozer Aksoy est présidente de la Federation of the Turkish Canadian Associations et vice-présidente du Turkish World Congress. Elle répond à un récent article naïf du Globe and Mail sur la question du foulard en Turquie.

    If the Turkish secularity goes, so go the Turkish women’s rights, par Ozer Aksoy, Turkish Forum, le 24 juillet 2008

    J’ai lu avec intérêt l’article de Mark Mackinnon Traditional headscarf unveils new rifts in Turkey (Globe and Mail, le 22 juillet 2008). Il semble y avoir une confusion de concepts – et je dis cela de la manière la plus courtoise possible – impliquant les dichotomies laïcité et islam, droit moderne et canons islamiques (charia), les élites et les non éduqués, le centre et la périphérie, Turcs noirs et Turcs blancs, vieille garde contre réformateurs islamiques, et plus encore. Je demande instamment à vos lecteurs d’acquérir une meilleure compréhension des dichotomies avant de s’embarquer dans une analyse des enjeux récents concernant la Turquie. Voyons si je peux jeter un peu de lumière sur tout cela.

    Alors que le monde chrétien se caractérise par la séparation de l’église et de l’État, grâce à la période historique des Lumières, le monde islamique continue de traiter la démocratie et la laïcité comme les deux côtés d’une pièce de monnaie. Aujourd’hui encore, la plupart des pays musulmans enchâssent la charia dans leur constitution, laquelle n’est pas compatible avec la laïcité ou la démocratie.

    La Turquie, d’autre part, avec une population à 99% musulmane, a été fondée en 1923 comme république laïque. Ainsi, le développement de la démocratie en Turquie a été construit sur de solides fondations laïques. La laïcité ne signifie pas « être opposé à la religion ». La laïcité témoigne d’un profond respect pour toutes les confessions car elle garantit les libertés individuelles tout en rejetant la supériorité d’une religion sur les autres. Si les fondations laïques de la Turquie étaient sapées, sa structure démocratique s’effondrerait aussitôt. Que répond à cela le représentant de l’AKP dans votre reportage ?

    La population et les gouvernements turcs depuis 1923 ont toujours été fondamentalement pro-occidentaux, bien qu’entre 5% et 7% des électeurs, issus pour la plupart de divers milieux religieux, semblent toujours s’opposer à toute forme d’occidentalisation.

    La révolution iranienne de 1979 a eu un impact considérable dans l’ensemble du monde musulman. En outre, certains pays du Moyen-Orient (comme l’Arabie Saoudite) ont essayé très fort d’exporter leur version de l’islam et ont fourni un soutien financier à divers cercles islamiques en Turquie.

    La combinaison de ces deux facteurs a abouti à une explosion du religieux : des sociétés d’édition ont surgi, les publications islamiques se sont multipliées, des mosquées sont apparues à tous les coins de rues, se transformant rapidement en centres imposant le mode de vie islamique. Des femmes ont été « formées » et envoyées dans les maisons de chaque famille turque à faible revenu pour orienter et influencer d’autres femmes. Des cours sur le coran ont été organisés pour endoctriner les enfants à un âge précoce. Des étudiants universitaires et du secondaire ont été financièrement soutenus, sans condition. Des manifestations publiques ont été organisées pour exiger que les étudiantes se présentent à l’université avec des vêtements islamiques, y compris le foulard.

    La presse religieuse a souligné que les femmes devraient également couvrir leur corps en entier. La plupart des étudiantes universitaires militantes étaient bien payées et ont insisté pour assister aux cours en tchador (un vêtement traditionnel noir qui recouvre la femme de la tête aux pieds). Elles étaient soutenues par des étudiants islamistes extrémistes et des avocats. Tout cela, alors que le Coran ne fait que suggérer aux femmes de couvrir leurs cheveux, mais ne l’impose pas. La plupart des médias ont appuyé les étudiantes islamiques sans savoir que celles qui portaient le foulard étaient des recrues payées (Fatma Benli interviewée dans votre reportage me les rappelle).

    Le gouvernement Erdogan a entamé l’érosion du système laïc en 2002. Aujourd’hui, la situation n’est pas aussi innocente que le portrait qu’en donnent certains médias occidentaux. Il y a 67.000 écoles laïques contre 85.000 mosquées. Comparez les 77.000 médecins qui tentent désespérément de dispenser des soins de santé à 75 millions de citoyens turcs, avec les 90.000 religieux (ou imams) bien rémunérés par l’État qui dispensent la foi avec bonheur, aux frais des contribuables.

    Bien qu’il y ait un seul hôpital pour desservir 60.000 personnes en Turquie, il n’y a pas de problème à trouver une mosquée pour chaque 350 personnes. Il y a 1435 bibliothèques publiques à travers la Turquie, mais 3852 classes sur le coran. Le budget des Affaires religieuses équivaut au coût de 22 universités. Le gouvernement Erdogan encourage ses partisans (et leurs entreprises) à stimuler le mode de vie islamique autour d’eux. Un nombre croissant d’hôtels et de municipalités offrent des piscines ségrégées, des maillots de bain de la tête à la cheville pour les femmes et le « hasema » pour les hommes.

    Des publicités laïques destinées aux femmes ont été altérées avec Photoshop par certains journaux pour allonger les manches et les jupes portées par les mannequins. Certains hôtels et restaurants ont cessé de servir de l’alcool. On signale que des licences d’alcool ont été refusées et des sites internet pornographiques interdits. Et les imams – des prédicateurs islamiques employés par le gouvernement – continuent de fustiger librement les femmes qui osent sortir et travailler pour leur subsistance.

    Tout aussi troublant, sont les différentes formes de pression exercées sur les femmes qui ne sont pas vêtues de manière suffisamment « islamique » ou qui partagent l’espace public avec les hommes. La presse islamique insiste qu’il n’est pas approprié pour les hommes médecins d’examiner les patients de sexe féminin, et vice versa. Certains étudiants en médecine ont mis beaucoup d’efforts pour tenter d’appliquer ces règles de la charia en Turquie, mais les autorités laïques les en ont empêchés.

    Tous ces exemples sortent directement du répertoire de l’Iran et de l’Arabie saoudite. Alors que nous observons des programmes officiels d’islamisation en Malaisie, au Maroc, en Algérie, en Indonésie et en Iran, nous pouvons clairement voir comment ces « pays musulmans » se transforment en « états islamiques ». Dans tous les cas, les femmes ont d’abord été forcées de couvrir leurs cheveux et leur corps, et des changements systématiques dans le mode de vie au quotidien ont ensuite été progressivement introduits. Est-ce que ça sonne familier ?

    Le foulard est plus qu’un bout de tissu. Attaché avec soin pour dissimuler le cou, la gorge et les cheveux, le foulard islamique est devenu le symbole indubitable de l’islam politique. C’est pourquoi les personnes laïques ont insisté pour l’exclure des universités et des institutions gouvernementales, comme l’exigent les lois laïques. S’ils ont encore des doutes, vos lecteurs doivent être informés que le Premier ministre turc a récemment fait une déclaration publique disant quelque chose à l’effet que « …le foulard est un symbole politique, et alors ?.. » Cette déclaration révèle ses intentions et aussi celles de son parti politique islamique.

    La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a statué en faveur de l’interdiction du foulard islamique dans les universités turques en novembre 2005, disant que « le foulard semble être imposé aux femmes en vertu d’un précepte religieux qu’il est difficile de concilier avec le principe de l’égalité des sexes ». La Cour constitutionnelle turque a aussi annulé une loi conçue par l’AKP islamiste qui aurait permis aux femmes de la république laïque de porter le foulard islamique dans les universités.

    Le monde occidental ne semble pas être au courant de la menace immédiate et grave qui pèse sur les droits des femmes en Turquie. Il n’y a pas un seul exemple d’un pays musulman où les droits des femmes ont progressé d’un iota après que la religion ait été politisée.

    L’alternative à l’extrémisme religieux n’est pas un coup d’État militaire. Je ne justifie pas une intervention militaire comme celle du 27 avril 2008. Bien qu’il soit souhaitable de préserver l’héritage laïc d’Atatürk, cela ne devrait pas se faire au détriment des processus démocratiques normaux.

    Pour parler clairement, le foulard est la tyrannie des hommes sur les femmes. Toute tentative visant à justifier cette agression directe et brutale sur les droits des femmes, que ce soit au nom de la démocratie, des droits de l’Homme, de la liberté d’expression, ou d’autres principes, revient tout simplement à prendre part à cette tyrannie.

    Voir aussi :

    Du voile, de la charia et de la démocratie

    Turquie – Demande d’interdiction du parti au pouvoir pour activités anti-laïques

    Turquie -« L’immoralité nous vient de l’Occident »

    Turquie – Manifestation contre la levée de l’interdiction du voile dans les universités

    Turquie – Signes d’islamisation croissante

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  • Blood and Belief  –  Kurdish Identity

    Blood and Belief – Kurdish Identity

    The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence

    by Aliza Marcus
    New York: New York University Press, 2007. 349 pp. $35

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    Most writers on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, best known by its Kurdish language acronym, the PKK, substitute advocacy for accuracy, so their books about the PKK tend to have limited practical use for policymakers. But Marcus, a former international correspondent for The Boston Globe who spent several years covering the PKK, has done important work in Blood and Belief. While sympathetic to her subject—the substitution of “militant” for “terrorist” grates—she retains professional integrity and does not skip over inconvenient parts of the PKK narrative such as its predilection to target Kurdish and leftist competitors rather than the Turks; the patronage it has received from the Syrian government; and the important role of European states and the Kurdish diaspora in its funding.

    Blood and Belief has four sections: on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s life and the PKK’s beginnings; the PKK’s consolidation of power; the civil war; and the aftermath of Öcalan’s 1999 capture.

    The Kurds inhabit a region that spans Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and Marcus does not let national borders constrain her analysis. Events in Iraq—such as the squabbling between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani—influenced Öcalan, who concluded that he should tolerate no dissent. “We believed in socialism, and it was a Stalin-type of socialism we believed in,” one early PKK member relates.

    Steeped in Kurdish and Turkish history, Marcus provides better context than many other journalists who have tackled this subject. The PKK took hold, she shows, largely because of the weakness of the Turkish state in the 1970s. Between 1975 and 1980, the Turkish government barely functioned. After the 1980 coup, the Turkish military restored order. But when Barzani offered the PKK shelter in northern Iraq, the group remained beyond reach, allowing it to plan and launch a full-scale guerilla war against Turkey. Marcus concludes that the group’s continued survival in Turkey is because, at some level and among some constituents, it remains popular; its support is not all driven by intimidation as some Turkish analysts claim.

    Marcus impressively covers the civil war years (1984-99), and her narrative, combining dialogue and context, is rich and accessible. While many journalists and authors satisfy themselves with a single round of interviews, Marcus concentrates not on active PKK members, who she realizes do not enjoy the freedom to speak, but rather on past members, villagers, and family members whose accounts she cross-checks. She also incorporates Turkish language press accounts and interviews with Turkish officials.

    It is unfortunate, though, that her coverage of PKK resurgence, between 1999 and 2007, is just thirteen pages long. An exploration of how Öcalan has retained control while in prison and where he and his henchmen might take the PKK has seldom been more relevant. One hopes that this new chapter of PKK history will become the basis for a sequel.

     

    ***********************************************************************

     

    Kurdish Identity

    Human Rights and Political Status

    Edited by Charles G. MacDonald and Carole A. O’Leary. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. 336 pp. $65

    Reviewed by Michael Rubin

    Middle East Quarterly
    Summer 2008

    The reader of Kurdish Identity, published in 2007, will find himself reading such timely insights as former State Department Iraq coordinator Francis Ricciardone explaining that, “Of course, we have no relations at all with [Baghdad],” and former deputy assistant secretary of state David Mack writing that he understands both Kurdish aspirations and “the potential danger that a ruthless regime in Baghdad poses,” as though Saddam Hussein’s regime had not ceased to exist in 2003.

    The collection of articles published by MacDonald and O’Leary, Kurdish experts at, respectively, Florida International University and American University, might have been useful to practitioners in April 2000, the date of the conference for which they were written, but the articles are now out-of-date.

    Some chapters are useful to historians. Robert W. Olson’s essay on Turkish-Iranian relations between 1997 and 2001 capably reviews that period. Kurdistan Regional Government financial advisor Stafford Clarry’s analysis of the U.N.’s humanitarian program retains value because of his precision and attention to detail, all the more so in the wake of the Oil-for-Food program scandal, which he helped expose. Michael Gunter’s apt analysis of how the capture of Kurdish terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan catalyzed Turkey’s EU accession drive stands the test of time.

    The editors conclude with an essay updating the reader on world events. Both are academics well worth reading, but they provide no insights in this collection not already published elsewhere. Their comments in passing on the dire situation of Syrian Kurds, who do not enjoy equal protection under the law, raises the question why Kurdish Identity does not address this subject.

    Had MacDonald and O’Leary reassembled their April 2000 conference participants to reconsider their contributions seven years later and analyze where they were right and wrong, Kurdish Identity would have advanced scholarship in a novel way. As it stands, however, their book offers too little and much too late, suggesting that academics live in a world of publish or perish with the content of those publications sometimes a secondary consideration.

  • Top of the Agenda: Turkey Court Ruling

    Top of the Agenda: Turkey Court Ruling

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    – Turkey’s top court to rule on AKP; suicide bombs in Istanbul.
    – Bombings at Iraqi Shiite pilgrimage; separate attack in Kirkuk.
    – Philippines strikes deal with rebel group.
    – Pakistani PM in Washington for talks.
        
    Top of the Agenda: Turkey Court Ruling

    Turkey’s top court today begins deliberations on whether to shut down the country’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), in a decision with major implications for a country that has long sought to balance a secularist constitution and majority Muslim population. The court is considering whether the AKP’s decision to lift a ban on headscarves at universities constitutes a violation of Turkey’s constitution, and thus is grounds for banning the party (al-Jazeera).

    Turkey’s Hurriyet says the political conflict has wrought financial turmoil and has thrust Turkey into a new period of political instability. A day before the court deliberations, two bombings in Istanbul (Turkish Daily News) killed sixteen and injured at least 150 others in a crowded shopping area.

    Experts have warned Turkey’s secularists, whose power is felt most strongly among the country’s military elite, against trying to shut down the AKP, saying such a move could wind up isolating Turkey and could prove an obstacle to EU accession (Today’s Zaman). CFR’s Steven A. Cook, in an essay published on bitterlemons-international.org, says the events in Turkey represent a radicalization of the national dialogue between secularists and moderates.

    Background:

    – A Foreign Affairs article from November 2007 takes an in-depth look at the roots of Turkey’s constitutional conflict and says the dispute has “exposed the illiberal nature of Turkish secularism.”