A book on legends and talismans of Istanbul has been published as part of the ARCHIMEDES Project within the framework of the MED-PACT Programme. “ARCHIMEDES” stands for “Action to Regenerate Cities and Help Innovate Mediterranean Economic Development Enhancing Sustainability”. The project is led by Venice and Istanbul as co-leaders, in cooperation with Bordeaux (France), Genova (Italy), Oran (Algeria), El-Mina (Lebanon) and Beirut (Lebanon). The aim of the project is to define institutional settings, instruments and tools based on the best practices of EU partner cities, in order to promote public- private partnerships, mobilize civil society, promote sustainable tourism, and valorisation of underutilized cultural heritage in the MEDA partner cities. The Çemberlitaş-Mahmutpaşa-Yeni Cami Axis in Eminönü has been chosen as the pilot region in Istanbul and a strategic study programme has been undertaken. The ARCHIMEDES Project International Conference also took place in June 2008 in Istanbul. Besides the publication of the book on legends and talismans of Istanbul, the project activities in relation to Istanbul will include a guidebook of Eminönü for tourists, a tourism itinerary with sign boards for information and directions, a feasibility study for the restoration of a han and a training course for the Eminönü Municipality staff.
Category: News
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No Threat Against Secularism of Turkey
Although social democrat party CHP, got just 20 percent of the votes, more than 50 percent of the Turkish people descibing themself as social democrats, according latest poll by Usadem, International Strategical Research Center. USADEM researchers interviewed with 1960 persons from all regions of Turkey. Result of the poll is exactly surprising. According to the poll 16.32 percent voters described themself as conservative nationalists, 14,45 leftist and 50,62 social democrat. However the main opposition party CHP, which claiming itself as the only social democrat party of Turkey got just 19 percent of the ballots at parlamentary elections last year. USADEM poll shows that just 4 percent of the voters describing themself Islamist and dreaming Sharia regime for Turkey, the fact is that it is weird to say there is a serious threat against secularist constitution.
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Turkish courts show Solomonic wisdom
The Gazette
Published: Monday, August 04
Turkey’s highest court has made a sensible decision in rejecting a suit, brought by the country’s chief prosecutor, to ban the ruling Justice and Development Party. Outlawing the party would have meant banning dozens of politicians including – preposterously – Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul.
Turkey is a volatile political stew, including a large Muslim majority, a secular constitution, and a secular, intervention-prone military. Sustaining the democratic rule of law in such an environment is a complicated legal and political challenge. This decision, although it came in a narrow split decision of the Constitutional Court, helps.
Turkey’s 70 million people spoke clearly last year, when the Justice and Development Party, which is frankly a religious Islamic party, won a sweeping parliamentary majority with 47 per cent of the popular vote in multi-party elections. But in Turkey, as elsewhere, ambiguity runs in the arteries of political parties, especially once they take power, and Justice and Development has governed with less religious zeal than its foes had feared.
That’s good, because the stakes are high in Turkey, which has been called the most important political project in the world today. Bridging as it does east and west, Turkey is a model of a democratic country whose population is majority Muslim and which has achieved real political, social and economic advances.
Turkey stands as a genuine example to the rest of the world that democracy, far from being Islam’s enemy, can in fact be perfectly compatible with it.
The legal move against the ruling party was spurred by what we might call secular fundamentalists, who saw danger in a government initiative to allow women to wear headscarves on university campuses. Ever since the days of fiercely secular and still widely beloved reformer Kemal Ataturk, who died in 1938, such symbols of religion have been carefully constrained in Turkey.
But the courts had already struck down the headscarf law. For the judges to have legitimized the outlawing of a popular – and apparently competent – administration could have plunged the country directly into dangerous political tumult.
And for what? Erdogan’s party has not undermined the principles of secular democracy in any serious way we can see, and has in fact liberalized a number of economic and social policies. The PM, eager to get Turkey into the European Union, has repeatedly disappointed his harder-line religious followers.
At least some of the existing tension between the secular and the religious in Turkey comes, we think, from misplaced fears. Many experts say the shift into positions of power of more observant Turks from Anatolia is plausibly more the result of a social and economic movement than a religious impulse. But the country’s entrenched elite – in the military and the secular ruling class – is unhappy with the political success of the new, more religious middle class. The old establishment remains convinced that Erdogan’s party intends to subvert the the secular constitution.
The military needs to acknowledge that the courts should be the legitimate and primary guardian of the constitution. With this week’s ruling, the courts have strengthened their own position as arbiters of common sense.
Turkey has faced a constitutional crisis, and survived, intact. This is good news, and not only for the people of Turkey.
Source: The Gazette (Montreal) August 04, 2008
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Muslim Land Joins Ranks of Tigers
By ANDREW HIGGINS and FARNAZ FASSIHI
August 6, 2008; Page A1ANTALYA, Turkey — When an Islamist-leaning political party took charge of Turkey six years ago, this vibrant Mediterranean resort town feared a bumpy ride for a local economy driven in part by booze and bikinis.
Today, says Ahmet Barut, a hotel magnate here, the only real question is whether the town can sustain an unprecedented economic boom. He’s not keen on the teetotaling habits of the governing party’s leaders, nor the headscarves worn by their wives, but he applauds a key part of their record: “They are good at economics.”
From tourism and tomato growing to car making, Turkey has prospered far more under an Islam-tinged government than it did under some previous, ardently secular administrations more in tune with the often decidedly un-Islamic ways of many Turkish businesspeople.
By nearly every measure, Turkey’s economy is now much stronger than it was when the Justice and Development Party, or AK Party, won elections in 2002. Annual growth since then has averaged around 6.5%, up from an annual average of roughly 2.5% over the previous six-year period.
Turkey still faces various headwinds. Economic momentum has been slowed by the global credit crunch, and the country is running a sizable current-account deficit. A spasm of political uncertainty this year over headscarves didn’t help matters. The AK Party set off the turbulence with an effort to let female college students wear headscarves on campus — a potent symbol of conservative Islam, and a touchstone issue in Turkey, which is constitutionally secular. Opponents used the headscarf flap to try (unsuccessfully) to outlaw the AK Party, saying it harbors a hidden agenda to turn Turkey into an Islamic state resembling Iran.
Despite hiccups like these, the economy shows scant sign of slipping back into its earlier doldrums. “Numbers don’t lie,” says Antalya’s mayor, Menderes Turel, an AK Party member. He boasts of new investment, new sewage pipes and a new airport terminal, but also hails a phenomenon not generally esteemed in Muslim lands: Alcohol sales — turbocharged by tourists, restaurants and a raucous club scene — are up.
Nearly all Turks are Muslim. But Islam and its symbols have been banished from spheres of state here since 1923, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the modern Turkish republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Ataturk regarded religion as an obstacle to his vision for Turkey as a modern, Western power.
The AK Party’s economic record highlights an intriguing evolution in relations between political Islam and capitalism. Islamists in the Arab world tend to look askance at the secular ways of their Turkish brethren, but Turkey’s experiment with modern-minded Islam is closely watched in big parts of the Muslim world.
Islam itself has nothing against business. The Islamic prophet Muhammad started out as a merchant, and his first wife was a successful businesswoman. Asked to fix prices in the bazaar by followers who wanted to buy goods more cheaply, Muhammad is said to have refused: “Only Allah governs the market.”
Over the past century, however, Islam has often served as a vehicle for anticapitalist revolt. Egypt’s Sayyid Qutb, an influential Islamist thinker, crystallized this trend with a 1951 book, “The Battle Between Islam and Capitalism.” Across much of the Muslim world, Islamists denounced the market, not out of deeply held economic convictions, but mostly in response to corrupt crony capitalism in countries such as Egypt, Algeria and Indonesia before the fall of Suharto in 1998.
Turkey’s AK Party, however, has gone in the opposite direction. It insists it has no desire to challenge Turkey’s secular order. Instead, it sees the solution to many of Turkey’s ills in the free-market — both to open up and vivify an economy long dominated by a state-coddled elite and also to modernize a political system forged in the 1930s and still tinged with authoritarianism.
“We favor more competition, productivity and innovation,” says Mehmet Simsek, Turkey’s minister of state for economic affairs. “Those with 1930s mind-sets — statist and inward-looking — cannot understand this.”
An observant Muslim married to an American from Wisconsin, Mr. Simsek embodies the AK Party’s efforts to bridge different but, it believes, compatible worlds. Mr. Simsek used to work as an economist for Merrill Lynch in London and before that at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. Faith, says the minister, is a personal affair, not a matter of state.
The success of the AK Party’s economic policy, he says, is easily measured: “People are making money.” Private-car sales, he notes, have jumped during his party’s tenure from 90,000 a year to around 400,000. Per-capita gross domestic product has soared from $3,300 in 2002 to more than $10,000.
Turkey’s rebound from financial disaster in 2001 — when the currency went into free fall and the economy contracted by 6% — “has surpassed expectations,” the International Monetary Fund said in its most recent detailed review of Turkey’s economy, prepared last year before the headscarf ruckus. It credited “sound macroeconomic policies, a conducive global environment and political stability.”
Since the AK Party took over at the end of 2002, exports have more than tripled, foreign investment has jumped from under $1 billion a year to more than $20 billion, and the number of tourists has more than doubled. Inflation, out of control for three decades, remains a problem but has fallen sharply to around 10%. Growth in GDP this year is expected to be around 4.5%, way down from over 9% in 2004, but still robust.
Guided by the IMF, the AK Party has imposed fiscal discipline that eluded its predecessors, accelerated privatization and trimmed bureaucracy. Recently abolished, for example, was a requirement that any company with 50 or more employees must hire an ex-convict and a terrorism victim, among various others.
The AK Party has also reactivated a long-stalled drive to join the European Union, pushing through regulatory and other changes designed to bring Turkey more into line with European norms.
Unconventional Alignments
The AK Party’s mix of free-market zeal and emphasis on conservative, faith-rooted personal values has scrambled conventional alignments. In many countries, politicians who back free-market economics are supported most enthusiastically by the wealthy. Poorer folk tend to be more skeptical.
In Turkey, it has been the other way round. The AK Party’s biggest traditional base of support is among poorer and generally more devout citizens. Many wealthy businesspeople, on the other hand, started out viewing the party with deep suspicion — and still do on issues such as headscarves.
Foreign investors were also dubious. The AK Party’s Islamic background raised some eyebrows, but one key worry was that the victors might turn their back on an agreement with the IMF negotiated by the previous government. Backtracking would likely stoke inflation and derail economic recovery.
Instead of rejecting the IMF package, the new government embraced it and carried out a long list of IMF-endorsed reforms. “In the market, there was a lot of skepticism,” Mr. Simsek said recently in his office in Ankara, the capital. Over his desk hangs a portrait of Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey.
When the IMF program reached its scheduled end earlier this summer, Lorenzo Giorgianni, the IMF’s Turkey mission chief, said it had contributed to “the most rapid period of economic growth in the recent history of the Republic.”
Meantime, an influential organization of Turkish industrialists, known as TUSIAD, has also shed much of its early skepticism, at least about Turkey’s economic direction. Haluk Tukel, its current secretary general, hails AK Party economic policy over the past six years as “perfect.” But, he adds, many TUSIAD members still worry that the AK Party has a hidden Islamic agenda.
Such worries grew sharply this year when the government moved to lift a ban on pious female students covering their hair in class. AK Party has also talked about making adultery a criminal offense.
The opposition, flummoxed by AK Party’s economic and electoral successes, has seized on issues like these to try to win back support. Onur Oymen, vice president of the staunchly secular CHP party, dismisses Mr. Simsek and other Westernized officials as window dressing. AK Party’s ultimate goal, he believes, is an Islamic theocracy.
“You cannot have a short version of the Quran,” he says. “They present themselves as representing modern life. It is just the opposite.”
Nonsense, says Cemil Ipekci, an openly gay Turkish fashion designer who wears gold earrings and assortments of flamboyant necklaces and bracelets. “They are not radical Islamists. They are conservative, yes, but not fanatics. Look at me, they socialize with me.” He says he and his boyfriend attend state dinners and parties organized by AK Party ministers. The government-owned airline, Turkish Airlines, hired him to re-design its décor.
Levent Kizil, a more mainstream business leader, is also a fan. “They turned our economy round,” says the Istanbul-based owner of a big soft-drinks company. He doesn’t want Islam interfering with his lifestyle but sees scant sign yet of this happening. “I enjoy my secular lifestyle. I like to drink alcohol and gamble and none of the women in my family wear headscarves,” he says, chomping on a Cuban cigar at an Italian seafood restaurant.
When AK Party took office, Mr. Kizil’s company exported just $3 million of soft drinks. The figure is now $12 million. Confident that his domestic and foreign markets will keep growing, Mr. Kizil has invested €25 million, or about $40 million, to renovate two plants.
Big Problems
Turkey’s economy still has big problems. One of the biggest is mushrooming current-account deficit, which stood at around $43 billion for the 12 months leading to May. The current account is the broadest measure of a nation’s trade balance — and deficits raise worrisome questions about how the country will finance the gap.
Mr. Simsek blames the deficit largely on energy costs. Others point to Turkey’s imports of machinery and other items needed to modernize the economy, and point out that Turkey’s current account has been positive only in times of economic malaise.
Nevertheless, the deficit has spooked the market. There are concerns that a global credit squeeze could hurt Turkey’s ability to borrow the funds it needs. Standard & Poor’s Corp., the credit-rating agency, in April revised its outlook for Turkey from “stable” to “negative.” It last week changed this back to “stable” after Turkey’s highest court struck down a request from the chief prosecutor that the ruling AK Party be disbanded for “antisecular” activities related largely to the headscarf spat.
Abrupt Swings
Turkey has a long history of abrupt swings in economic fortune. An earlier attempt to open up to the world economy — and mimic the success of Asia’s so-called “tiger economies” — got off to a promising start in the 1980s. But that export-driven effort petered out and was followed by an era of chronic inflation and budgetary indiscipline. A big constraint on economic performance has been political instability, caused in part by a Kurdish minority seeking greater autonomy, as well as the continuing debate over the very nature of the Turkish state.
Many investors are now waiting to see whether Turkey can reach a new agreement with the IMF. It doesn’t need money from the fund, says Mr. Simsek, and has paid back more than half of the $23.5 billion it owed in 2002. But a new accord would help calm market jitters. Mr. Simsek, who is handling negotiations, said technical discussions would be completed in a “month or so.”
On the Mediterranean coast, meanwhile, Antalya is in the middle of its busiest tourist season ever. It expects over nine million visitors this year, up from 7.3 million last year and roughly half that in 2002. It’s biggest worry is not Islam, but forest fires that raged this week through coastal regions.
Mr. Barut, the hotelier, says Turkey might get more conservative but sees no risk of it turning into anything like Iran. That, he says, would kill the tourism industry.
Agriculture, another local mainstay, is also growing. Antalya now exports around 350,000 tons of tomatoes a year, nearly double the amount in 2002. Exports of flowers to Europe and Russia have soared, too.
A beneficiary of this is Ali Riza Akinci, who sells seeds for tomatoes, flowers and hotel lawns. He gets some of these from Israel, a supplier that is shunned in the rest of the Muslim world — but not here. Business, says Mr. Akinci, should trump politics.
Not everyone is upbeat. The head of the Antalya’s chamber of commerce, Kemal Ozgen, thinks the state is now too hands-off. He wants it to do more to protect small shop owners, who are losing business to newly opened shopping malls. Antalya, he says, had just one mall when the AK Party took power. It now has 28. Foreign retailers have fueled much of this expansion. Too much competition, says Mr. Ozgen, is unhealthy.
All the same, Mr. Ozgen is happy with the benefits that have accrued to his own business, a window-making factory. Thanks to a building blitz, he’s more than tripled output since the AK Party came to power.
Antalya’s growing integration in the world economy makes it highly vulnerable to any serious downturn on a global level. For example, a recession in Germany, now Antalya’s biggest tourist source, would hit local businesses hard.
Antalya’s AK Party mayor, Mr. Turel, can’t do much about that. But he does try to nip less serious problems in the bud — such as reports in the Russian media of a crackdown on booze. Mr. Turel swiftly set the record straight: Alcohol, he announced at a tourism conference, would never be restricted in Antalya on his watch. More than two million Russians are expected to visit the resort this year.
Pragmatism, says the mayor, is the AK Party’s guiding creed. “We allow praying, we allow bikinis, we allow discos,” the mayor says. “We allow everything.”
Write to Andrew Higgins at andrew.higgins@wsj.com and Farnaz Fassihi at farnaz.fassihi@wsj.com
Source: The Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2008
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Victory for Turkish Democracy (Editorial)
By Japan Times, Tokyo
Aug. 5–Turkey’s Constitutional Court ruled last week that the country’s governing party will not be banned for violating the country’s constitution. The outcome is a victory for democracy, as the court decision amounted to a rejection of conservative opposition to the ruling Justice and Development Party and the opposition’s attempts to shape Turkish politics by extra-parliamentary means.
While Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country, the country’s constitution prescribes a secular state. That mandate has empowered a conservative order — backed by the military — that has controlled Turkish politics in the name of secularism.
Having won 47 percent of the popular vote in elections last year — the biggest margin in over 40 years — Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), feels confident enough to press for greater expression of Islamic identity in Turkey. For example, his government has rescinded the ban on women wearing head scarves in university. While this may seem like a minor issue, many fear it is only the first item in an agenda designed to push Turkey toward becoming an Islamic state.
Mr. Erdogan insists he and his party respect the constitution, but critics have their doubts. This spring the chief prosecutor charged the prime minister with harboring an Islamic agenda and demanded that the AKP be banned. The Constitutional Court ruled that the party’s activities were indeed unconstitutional. Six of the 11 judges voted to ban the party, but seven were needed for the ban to be enacted. Another four judges felt that cutting in half the funding the AKP receives from the Treasury — $20 million — would suffice as punishment.
The decision was “a serious warning,” said chief judge Hasim Kilic, to the AKP to “take the necessary lessons.” The loss of financing is not likely to hurt badly since party supporters can make up the lost revenue. The lifting of the threat of a party ban means that Mr. Erdogan can reach out to secularists who oppose conservatives and want to see democracy more deeply entrenched in Turkey. The question now is whether hardliners in the party will see the decision as an opportunity to push harder on their Islamic agenda, alienating moderates and animating conservatives.
The AKP may be on probation, but the decision is also a sign that the country’s judiciary, a pillar of the conservative order, is not prepared to once again overturn the democratic will of the Turkish people. Political parties have been banned in the past, but never one as popular as AKP or one that is in power. While the military has dominated Turkish politics since the founding of the modern state in 1923 — there have been four coups in the last half century — its allies are no longer prepared to give it a blank check.
Mr. Erdogan deserves some of the credit for this new reluctance. His economic policies have been a success. GDP expanded 5 percent in 2007, a slight slowdown from the previous year, but still a respectable showing. Inflation is at a 37-year low and foreign investment last year set a record, topping $22 billion.
The most important development is Mr. Erdogan’s ability to commence membership talks with the European Union. That has been and will continue to be a difficult negotiation as Europe is by no means united on Turkey’s membership. (The chief objection is the fact that it’s a Muslim country; Turkey’s size, argue the critics, would transform the nature of the EU.) But any progress depends on a rigorous and stable democracy. A constitutional coup would strengthen the hands of opponents.
This realization constrains whatever inclinations the AKP might have to push the Islamist agenda further. After the court ruling, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn called on Ankara “to resume with full energy its reforms to modernize the country,” forging consensus “through a broad-based dialogue with all sections of Turkish society.” The message could not be clearer.
The constitutional court decision has settled one important question, but tensions and deep divisions remain. Eighty-six people, including several senior military officers, are in jail awaiting trial on charges of involvement with a terrorist group that aimed to overthrow Mr. Erdogan’s government. The group is suspected of having operated with the tacit acceptance of other pillars of the “secular order.”
Although such musings appeal to the conspiracy minded, many believe that the group enjoys good connections with elements of the security forces. Thus the rulings in their cases will be every bit as important as last week’s ruling on the AKP. They will confirm whether laws and democratic processes, rather than an unelected elite, will shape Turkey’s future.
Source: Japan Times, Tokyo, 05.08.2008
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BASBUG APPOINTED CHIEF OF THE TGS
By Gareth Jenkins
Tuesday, August 5, 2008
On August 4 Turkish President Abdullah Gul formally approved the appointment of Land Forces Commander General Ilker Basbug as the chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to replace the outgoing General Yasar Buyukanit, who will step down on August 30 after reaching the compulsory retirement age of 67.Basbug’s appointment followed a three-day meeting of the Supreme Military Council (YAS), which meets at the beginning of August each year to decide on the annual round of promotions and postings in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Basbug has been replaced as Land Forces Commander by General Isik Kosaner, the head of the Gendarmerie. The commanders of the Turkish Navy, Admiral Muzaffer Metin Atac, and the Turkish Air Force, General Aydogan Babaoglu, remain unchanged.
Although there is nothing in military regulations to prevent a chief of the TGS from being drawn from the Navy or Air Force, the post has always been filled by a member of the Land Forces, usually the Land Forces commander. The Gendarmerie is distinct from the Land Forces in terms of personnel, with only rare transfers of officers between the two. However, it has traditionally been commanded by a four star general on secondment from the Land Forces. Kosaner is a career Land Forces officer and has been replaced as commander of the Gendarmerie by General Atilla Isik, the current chief of staff of the Land Forces.
In terms of postings, the military year runs for 12 months from the end of August. Chiefs of the TGS can serve for a maximum of four years, provided that they do not reach the compulsory retirement age of 67; in which case they are obliged to step down at the end of the following August.
Basbug was born in 1943 and is expected to serve as chief of the TGS until 2010. It currently appears that he will be succeeded by Kosaner, who was born in 1945 and could thus serve as chief of staff until the end of August 2012. The commands of the individual services have a lower retirement age of 65.
Basbug has a reputation for combining a formidable intellect with an unswerving commitment to the ideological legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), the fierce secularist who founded the modern Turkish Republic in 1923. In the months leading up to the YAS meeting, hard-line elements in the Islamist media launched a defamation campaign against Basbug in the hope of preventing him from being appointed chief of the TGS. In theory at least, it would have been possible for Gul to delay ratifying Basbug’s appointment, thus forcing him to retire at the end of August while still head of the Land Forces; but Gul appears to have had no hesitation in ratifying Basbug’s appointment when it was presented to him for his approval on August 4.
More surprising than what happened at the YAS meeting was what did not happen. Traditionally, the TGS has used the August YAS meetings and, to a lesser extent, a second YAS meeting in December each year, to purge the officer corps of anyone deemed to be ideologically suspect.
Like most of its counterparts around the world, the Turkish military has its own court system to try those alleged to have breached laws and regulations. The military courts follow standard judicial procedures, including hearings, the presentation of evidence, prosecution and defense. In contrast, the meetings of the YAS are closed. The members of the council simply vote on cases brought before them. The accused do not have the right of defense. In many instances, they are only aware of the allegations against them when they are notified after the YAS meeting that they have been expelled from the military. There is no right of appeal.
Although it has also been applied for other offences, the system has been the main instrument used against suspected Islamist activists. The TGS has long suspected, and not without justification, that Islamist groups are trying to infiltrate the ranks of what is regarded as one of the bastions of the Turkish secular establishment. YAS meetings have proved a convenient way of purging the officer corps of those believed to have been recruited by Islamist groups, without the need to present evidence in a court or risk the possibility of an acquittal. It is also likely, however, that some of the officers expelled over the years for alleged Islamist activism have been guilty of nothing more insidious than increased piety.
The number of officers expelled has tended to vary. At the YAS meeting in August 2007, a total of 23 officers were expelled, 10 of them for alleged Islamist activism. This year, however, for the first time in 16 years, there were no expulsions (Milliyet, Vatan, Hurriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, August 5).
In a country already awash with conspiracy theories, the absence of any expulsions has sent the rumor mills into overdrive. The pro-AKP press has triumphantly speculated that Basbug must have agreed not to expel any officers for Islamist activism in return for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan promising to ensure that the continuing Ergenekon investigation (see EDM, July 29) would not implicate any members of the military high command (Zaman, Yeni Safak, Sabah, August 4). This is unlikely in the extreme.
In the prevailing political climate in Turkey, no incoming chief of the TGS, much less one as ruthlessly ideologically committed as Basbug, could afford to be seen to be bowing to pressure from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) over what most secularists regard as a politically motivated investigation.
It is difficult to imagine that, since the last YAS meeting, there have been no perceived serious breaches of military discipline similar to those previously dealt with at these meetings. Rather than allowing suspected Islamist activists to remain within its ranks indefinitely, it is more likely that the TGS is either biding its time or will opt to deal with them through more conventional disciplinary procedures.