Category: News

The new ’moderate’ Turkey By Robert Ellis, August 15 2008

The new ’moderate’ Turkey
By Robert Ellis, August 15 2008

Under AKP rule Turkey has become a Big Brother state where critical journalists risk arrest.

Since the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002, and especially in the last year, Turkey’s development has taken an Orwellian turn.

For the first three years things went well and the AKP government continued with the reform program embarked on by the previous coalition government. But since Turkey started accession negotiations with the European Union in October 2005, the zeal for reform has lost momentum.

Together with the reform packages aimed at opening the gate to the Promised Land, there was a parallel development designed to secure the AKP’s grip on Turkey. The preamble to the Turkish constitution establishes that “there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics” but this is exactly what the AKP has done.

In Sepember 2006 General Ilter Basbug, who has just been appointed Chief of Staff, warned of “intentional, patient and systematic attempts” to erode what the Turkish republic has achieved since it was founded in 1923. At the same time the higher echelons of the state administration and particularly inside education have been replaced with the party faithful. For example, last year 4,500 people were appointed as principals and deputy principals, two-thirds of whom were affiliated with the governing party.

God’s will
The year after the AKP came to power its parliamentary majority voted to appoint 15,000 new imams instead of a proposed 1,500 for the country’s more than 77,000 mosques. But the move was blocked by the International Monetary Fund, which as a condition for a $16 billion loan had limited the total number of new jobs in the health, education, police and religious services to 34,000 that year.

Another move which has pleased the AKP’s grass roots has been to ease the restrictions on Koran courses, which have since almost doubled. One consequence was the recent gas explosion in a ramshackle building in Konya province, where an illegal Koran course was being held. As a result, 18 young girls were killed but this was ascribed by the parents to God’s will.

The government has also increased quotas for enrollment at religious high schools by 66 percent, compared to only 8 percent for standard high schools, but the AKP has not yet succeeded in gaining admission to the universities for these students on an equal footing with the others.

The question of whether female university students should be allowed to wear the Islamic headscarf has been at the root of the clash between the government and secular supporters in Turkey. The AKP’s attempt in February to change the constitution to make this possible was annulled by the Constitutional Court, and at the end of July the party’s state subsidy was halved as a punishment for becoming “the center of acts against the principle of secularism”. However, there is no reason to believe that the AKP intends to deviate from its present course.

The AKP has also laid its hand on the Higher Education Board, whose chairman was appointed by the government in March. President Gül, the AKP’s former foreign minister, has just chosen 21 new university rectors from lists prepared by the Board, and consequently bypassed a number of candidates chosen by the universities. This has been considered as yet another blow to the universities’ autonomy and tit for tat for the refusal by many rectors to allow the Islamic headscarf.

Ergenekon
A clear indication of the AKP’s mindset is the proposal put forward by the party’s deputy chairperson, Edibe Sözen, with the intention of protecting Turkey’s youth.

This includes compulsory prayer rooms at all schools, a ban on entering Internet cafes for young people under 18 and the registration of anyone buying pornography.

Edibe Sözen claims there is similar legislation in Germany but because of a strong reaction from different groups in society the proposal has been withdrawn.

At the same time as the Constitutional Court deliberated over the future of the AKP, the government launched a counter-offensive in the form of the so-called Ergenekon case, where the public prosecutor has in a 2,500-page indictment charged 86 people with being members of a terrorist organization opposed to the government. This allegedly includes a number of critical journalists, including the 84-year-old editor of a secular daily, who was dragged out of his sickbed at four in the morning.

Turkey has just marked the 100th anniversary of the lifting of press censorship but this has also been overshadowed by the Ergenekon case. In this connection the Turkish Journalists Association issued a written statement, deploring that the number of journalists taken into custody for alleged claims that they disrupt the government is increasing.

The AKP government has tightened its grip on the Turkish media through the controversial sale of the Sabah-ATV media group to Calik Holding, which is owned by a close friend of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, and where Tayyip Erdogan’s son-in-law is the general manager. The purchase sum of $1.1 billion was financed by two loans totalling $750 million from two state banks and the rest from a Qatar-based company. Moreover, KanalTurk, which was formerly anti-government, has been bought by an AKP associate.

An eery dimension is that Turkey is being transformed into a Big Brother society.

According to Soner Cagaptay from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Turkish journalists believe the AKP government has intercepted more than 1.5 million phone and email conversations involving its secular opponents. And Transport Minister Binali Yildirim has admitted: “It is not possible to prevent being listened to; the only way is not to talk [on the phone]. If there is nothing illegal in our actions, we should not be concerned about such things.”

An AKP deputy interviewed by The Economist claims Prime Minister Erdogan has become a tyrant and the editor of the Middle East Quarterly, Michael Rubin, has dubbed him “Turkey’s Putin”. Taking this into account, the question is how long Turkey can maintain its image as a spokesman for “moderate Islam”.

Robert Ellis is a frequent commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish press and since 2005 also in Turkish Daily News. However, after a critical article on the AKP in the Los Angeles Times in March, he was informed by TDN’s editor he was ‘persona non grata’.

August 15, 2008
Erdogan: “We wish the soonest solution to Nagorno Karabakh conflict”

Next week Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan will discuss initiative of the platform of security and cooperation in the South Caucasus with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, Turkish Prime Minister Receb Tayyip Erdogan told reporters at the press conference in Bodrum, Turkey, APA reports. (more…)

August 15, 2008
DEVILS AND DETAILS: AHMADINEJAD VISITS TURKEY

By Gareth Jenkins

Thursday, August 14, 2008

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived in Turkey on August 14 in the latest in a series of high level contacts between the two countries against a backdrop of growing international pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program. Both the United States and Israel have expressed their concern over the visit.

Since it first came into power in November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has vigorously sought to improve Turkey’s ties with the rest of the Muslim world. Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor, has described the shift in emphasis in terms of redressing a previous imbalance in Turkish foreign policy by creating what he calls “strategic depth” and strengthening ties with countries that previous Turkish governments had tended to neglect.

Davutoglu undoubtedly has a point. Prior to the AKP taking office, the emphasis given to maintaining strong ties with the West had resulted not only in Ankara neglecting its relations with the countries of the Middle East but also in a dearth of expertise on the region both in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and in academia. Very few Turkish diplomats speak Arabic, for example, and at least until relatively recently any academic who bothered to learn the language was vulnerable to accusations of being a closet Islamist.

For religious reasons, Arabic-speakers are much more common among the ranks of the AKP, but the AKP’s emotional enthusiasm for closer ties with the rest of the Muslim world has frequently been accompanied by an intellectual naivety, particularly in the party’s failure to understand how some of its initiatives appear to its Western allies. In February 2006, Davutoglu was the architect of a visit to Ankara by Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. Davutoglu appears to have calculated that Turkey would gain international kudos by persuading Mashal to moderate his attitude toward Israel. Yet Mashal did no such thing, merely using the visit to try to boost Hamas’s claim to international legitimacy. In January 2008, the AKP literally rolled out the red carpet for another international pariah, Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, who paid a three-day official visit to Ankara (see EDM, January 22).

A similar naivety can be seen in Erdogan’s recent peace initiative in the Caucasus. On August 8, Erdogan issued a statement proposing the creation of a “Caucasus Pact,” including Turkey, Russia, and other Caucasus countries and backed by the EU and the United States (CNNTurk, NTV, August 9). On August 13, Erdogan flew to Moscow where he met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. On the following day, the perennially insecure Turkish media basked in the contrast between what they claimed was the perfunctory welcome given by the Russians to French President Nicholas Sarkozy and the hospitality lavished on Erdogan. “Russia gives green light to Caucasus Pact,” the website of the daily Hurriyet proclaimed excitedly (www.hurriyet.com.tr). Neither the newspaper nor Erdogan appeared to realize that while all efforts to end the bloodshed were welcome, the whole point of Moscow’s fierce military response to Georgia’s attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was to demonstrate Russia’s hegemony in its “near abroad.” Moscow is unlikely to have any desire to dilute its authority through a pact, particularly one that brings the United States and the EU into the region.

Nor did Erdogan appear to be aware that if the AKP were serious about Turkey acceding to the EU, he needed to try to ensure that Turkey’s foreign policies were coordinated with, or at least complementary to, those of the EU.

The same naivety can also be seen in the AKP’s decision to push ahead with Ahmadinejad’s visit. There is no reason to doubt that AKP officials genuinely believe that the visit offers an opportunity for Turkey to boost its international standing by acting as an intermediary in the long-running standoff between Tehran and the international community over its nuclear program. What they do not appear to understand is how Ahmadinejad will use the visit to demonstrate both to the international community and to the public in Iran that the country is not alone.

Speaking to Turkish journalists on the eve of his visit to Turkey, Ahmadinejad was effusive in his praise for the “great Turkish people,” the “great friendship between Turkey and Iran,” and his pleasure about the “ever-growing political ties” (CNNTurk, NTV, August 13). He also took the opportunity of the interview being broadcast at prime time on Turkish television to launch one of his characteristic tirades against Israel and repeat his support for the Palestinian opposition to what he described as the “occupying Zionist forces” (CNNTurk, NTV, August 13).

In its eagerness to host Ahmadinejad, the AKP also acceded to his refusal to visit Anitkabir, the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), the militant secularist who founded the modern Turkish Republic in 1923. Anitkabir is an essential part of a visit by any head of state to Turkey. Even al-Bashir visited Anitkabir to pay his respects, but the Iranians have consistently refused to do so.

When it became clear that Ahmadinejad would not visit Anitkabir, his planned “official visit” was quickly downgraded to a “working visit”; and it was agreed that he would meet with both Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul not in Ankara, the capital of the modern republic, but in Istanbul, the old Ottoman capital (Hurriyet, Milliyet, August 5).

In his interview on Turkish television, Ahmadinejad disingenuously claimed that he was traveling to Istanbul because that was where Gul and Erdogan were going to be anyway. This is not true; but when asked whether this meant that he would have visited Anitkabir if Gul and Erdogan had agreed to meet him in Ankara, Ahmadinejad prevaricated. “Turkey is a very large country and has a large population. There are a lot of places in Turkey. Of course, that means that there are many places for the president to go to,” he said (CNNTurk, NTV, August 13).

In the run-up to Ahmadinejad’s visit, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan attacked the Turkish media for its coverage of his refusal to visit Anitkabir. “I consider these discussions about the details of the visit irrelevant,” declared Babacan (Zaman, Hurriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, August 5).

But, as so often, the devil is in the details.

August 14, 2008
MOUNTING PKK DEATH TOLL INCREASES PRESSURE ON THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT

By Gareth Jenkins

Tuesday, August 12, 2008

On August 11 nine Turkish soldiers were killed when the truck in which they were traveling was struck by a mine laid by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Kemah county in the province of Erzincan in southeast Turkey. It was the largest death toll suffered by the military in a single incident in southeast Turkey in 2008.

Since resuming its campaign of violence in June 2004 after a five year lull, the PKK has pursued a two-front strategy: combining a rural insurgency in southeast Turkey with an urban bombing campaign in the west of the country. In early fall 2007, the deaths of nearly 40 Turkish soldiers in less than a month triggered anti-PKK demonstrations and public protests across Turkey and increased the pressure on the government to strike at the organization’s training camps and bases in northern Iraq. As Turkish troops massed on the Turkish-Iraqi border, the United States finally reversed its refusal to allow Ankara to strike at PKK assets in northern Iraq. Washington even agreed to provide Ankara with useful intelligence on the PKK in return for an understanding that any cross-border military operations would be limited in scope and duration. In December 2007 Turkey launched the first of what have become regular air raids against PKK positions in northern Iraq. In February Turkish commandoes even staged a nine-day ground operation against PKK forward bases inside Iraq close to the border with Turkey.

The Turkish military strikes against the PKK in northern Iraq were never expected to eradicate the organization. Through early 2008, however, the raids did appear to be disrupting the PKK’s ability to stage operations inside Turkey. Perhaps more importantly, they forced the PKK onto the defensive both militarily and psychologically. Since 2004 the PKK has used violence as part of a psychological war of attrition in an attempt to wear down the resistance of the Turkish authorities both to making concessions on Kurdish cultural and political rights and to sitting down with the PKK to negotiate a peace settlement. Until relatively recently, the PKK also tended to avoid doing anything that it believed could damage its claim to be a legitimate political interlocutor in the eyes of Western public opinion.

But since the beginning of July, the PKK appears to have jettisoned its concerns about alienating Western public opinion and has begun to stage more reckless and ruthless attacks. Its primary goals appear to be to demonstrate, both to the Turkish authorities and to the country’s Kurdish minority, that it remains a viable force.

On July 8 a unit of the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), the PKK’s military wing, kidnapped three German mountaineers in eastern Turkey (see Terrorism Monitor, July 25). On July 27 the PKK detonated two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in a crowded street in the center of Istanbul in an attack that appears to have been solely designed to kill as many civilians as possible. A total of 17 people were killed and 154 injured (see Terrorism Focus, August 5). The PKK also claimed responsibility for the August 5 explosion and subsequent fire on a stretch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in Erzincan, the same province as the site of the mine attack of August 11 (see EDM, August 9).

Turkish officials continue to insist that the BTC explosion and fire were the result of an accident (CNNTurk, August 11), although it was not until August 11 that the fire was finally extinguished and a thorough investigation into the cause of the explosion could begin. It is expected to be several weeks before the damage is repaired and the oil flow through BTC returns to normal (Radikal, Hurriyet, Zaman, Milliyet, August 12). Even if the fire was not the result of an attack by the PKK, its claim of responsibility is an indication of its willingness to risk antagonizing Western governments by targeting BTC and potentially driving up the global price of oil. There is also little doubt that the stretch of BTC running though Turkey is vulnerable. Although the pipeline itself is buried at a depth of one meter, the valves that are located at intervals along it are dangerously exposed. Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, Turkey has not attempted to protect the valves by reinforcing them.

The high death toll in the mine attack of August 11 appears to have been more the result of luck than a change in strategy or increase in the PKK’s military capabilities. Since resuming violence in June 2004, the PKK has frequently used mines to target Turkish military units but usually inflicted considerably fewer casualties.

On August 11 the Turkish authorities received intelligence that, at 21:30 on August 10, a group of three HPG militants had arrived in the village of Sariyazi in Kemah county and demanded food. On the morning of August 11, a unit of 15 members of the gendarmerie was dispatched to Sariyazi to confirm the report. As they returned from the village, a mine hidden close to the road was detonated by remote control (Radikal, August 12). There has been no official statement about whether the truck carrying the soldiers was a target of opportunity or, as seems likely, the intelligence report was a ploy by the PKK to draw them to the village and then kill them on their return.

It was precisely because they believed that they would reduce the PKK’s ability to stage high casualty attacks that so many Turks staged public demonstrations in fall 2007 calling for cross-border raids into northern Iraq. If the incident in Kemah is followed by more high-casualty attacks, either as the result of luck or of the PKK’s recent increased ruthlessness and recklessness, it is going to be very difficult for the Turkish authorities to claim that the air raids have been successful. Past experience suggests, however, that the government will nevertheless respond with more of the same and intensify its military operations against the PKK in northern Iraq.

August 13, 2008
Iraq Demands “Clear Timeline” for US Withdrawal

Sunday 10 August 2008

by: Robert H. Reid, The Associated Press

    Iraq’s foreign minister insisted Sunday that any security deal with the United States must contain a “very clear timeline” for the departure of U.S. troops. A suicide bomber struck north of Baghdad, killing at least five people including an American soldier.

    Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told reporters that American and Iraqi negotiators were “very close” to reaching a long-term security agreement that will set the rules for U.S. troops in Iraq after the U.N. mandate expires at the end of the year.

    Zebari said the Iraqis were insisting that the agreement include a “very clear timeline” for the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces, but he refused to talk about specific dates.

    “We have said that this is a condition-driven process,” he added, suggesting that the departure schedule could be modified if the security situation changed.

    But Zebari made clear that the Iraqis would not accept a deal that lacks a timeline for the end of the U.S. military presence.

    “No, no definitely there has to be a very clear timeline,” Zebari replied when asked if the Iraqis would accept an agreement that did not mention dates.

    Differences over a withdrawal timetable have become one of the most contentious issues remaining in the talks, which began early this year. U.S. and Iraqi negotiators missed a July 31 target date for completing the deal, which must be approved by Iraq’s parliament.

    President Bush has steadfastly refused to accept any timetable for bringing U.S. troops home. Last month, however, Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agreed to set a “general time horizon” for a U.S. departure.

    Last week, two senior Iraqi officials told The Associated Press that American negotiators had agreement to a formula which would remove U.S. forces from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, with all combat troops out of the country by October 2010.

    The last American support troops would leave about three years later, the Iraqis said.

    But U.S. officials insist there is no agreement on specific dates. Both the American and Iraqi officials spoke on condition of anonymity because the talks are ongoing. Iraq’s Shiite-led government believes a withdrawal schedule is essential to win parliamentary approval.

    American officials have been less optimistic because of major differences on key issues including who can authorize U.S. military operations and immunity for U.S. troops from prosecution under Iraqi law.

    The White House said discussions continued on a bilateral agreement and said any timeframe discussed was due to major improvements in security over the past year.

    “We are only now able to discuss conditions-based time horizons because security has improved so much. This would not have been possible 18 months ago,” White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said Sunday. “We all look forward to the day when Iraqi security forces take the lead on more combat missions, allowing U.S. troops to serve in an overwatch role, and more importantly return home.”

    Iraq’s position in the U.S. talks hardened after a series of Iraqi military successes against Shiite and Sunni extremists in Basra, Baghdad, Mosul and other major cities.

    Violence in Iraq has declined sharply over the past year following a U.S. troop buildup, a Sunni revolt against al-Qaida in Iraq and a Shiite militia cease-fire.

    But attacks continue, raising concern that the militants are trying to regroup.

    The suicide bomber struck Sunday afternoon as U.S. and Iraqi troops were responding to a roadside bombing that wounded an Iraqi in Tarmiyah, 30 miles (50 kilometers) north of Baghdad, the U.S. military said.

    Four Iraqi civilians were killed along with the American soldier, military spokesman Lt. Col. Steve Stover said. Two American soldiers and an Iraqi interpreter were among 24 people wounded.

    No group claimed responsibility for the blast but suicide bombings are the signature attack of al-Qaida in Iraq.

    “This was a heinous attack by al-Qaida in Iraq against an Iraqi family, followed by a cowardly attack against innocent civilians, their security forces and U.S. soldiers,” Stover said.

    Elsewhere, a car bomb exploded outside the Kurdish security department in Khanaqin, 90 miles northeast of Baghdad. At least two people were killed and 25 wounded, including the commander of local Kurdish forces, Lt. Col. Majid Ahmed, police said.

    First reports indicated it was a suicide attack. But the U.S. military later said the bomb was in a white truck filled with watermelons and that witnesses saw the occupants leave the vehicle just before the blast.

    Ethnic tensions have been rising in northern Iraq amid disputes between Kurds, Turkomen and mostly Sunni Arabs over Kurdish demands to annex the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into their self-ruled region.

    Sawarah Ghalib, 25, who was wounded in the blast, said he believed military operations under way south of the city in Diyala province had pushed insurgents into the Khanaqin area.

    “I did not expect that a terrorist attack to take place in our secure town,” Ghalib said from his bed in the Khanaqin hospital. “Al-Qaida is to blame for this attack. Operations in Diyala have pushed them here.”

    In Baghdad, six people were killed in a series of bombings on the first day of the Iraqi work week.

    The deadliest blast occurred about 8:15 a.m. in a crowded area where people wait for buses in the capital’s mainly Shiite southeastern district of Kamaliya. Four people were killed, including a woman and her brother, and 11 others wounded, according to police.

    A car bomb later exploded as an Iraqi army patrol transporting money to a state-run bank passed by in Baghdad’s central Khillani square, killing two people including an Iraqi soldier and wounding nine other people, a police officer said.

    Another Iraqi soldier was killed and five were wounded by a car bomb in Salman Pak, about 15 miles south of Baghdad, police said.

    ——–

    Associated Press writers Hamza Hendawi, Kim Gamel and Sameer N. Yacoub in Baghdad and Yahya Barzanji in Sulaimaniyah contributed to this report.

August 13, 2008
Turkey walks tightrope over Iran ties

By Paul de Bendern
Reuters
Tuesday, August 12, 2008; 9:13 AM

ISTANBUL (Reuters) – A visit by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Turkey on Thursday reflects a desire by the NATO member to remain on good terms with an unpredictable neighbor and secure future energy needs.

President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan have come under criticism at home and abroad for inviting Ahmadinejad, a visit that marks a diplomatic coup for the firebrand leader who has been shunned by European countries.

Ankara has said his visit was necessary given the standoff between Iran and the West over Tehran’s disputed nuclear enrichment program, and offered to help resolve the dispute.

But analysts said the trip was more about ensuring centuries-old ties during a period of global tensions.

“Although Turkey doesn’t like the present regime it has always tried to keep Iranians both at bay and collaborate with them. It is an extremely delicate balancing act and it will continue to be so,” said Cengiz Aktar, a political scientist at Istanbul’s Bahcesehir University.

“The visit is all about controlled risks and the most important aspect is a gas deal with Iran, not the nuclear program because Turkey has little influence on that,” he said.

Turkey and Iran share a border dating to a 1639 peace treaty.

Ahmadinejad has been courting Turkey in the past few years as the United States has stepped up efforts to isolate Iran for failing to halt its disputed nuclear enrichment program. Washington sees the president’s visit as undermining such moves. Israel, another ally of Turkey, has also criticized the visit.

Gul and Erdogan — both founders of the Islamist-rooted ruling AK Party — have pushed to boost Turkey’s position in the Middle East region, building greater ties with neighboring countries than previous governments.

TRADE TIES

Though Iran and Turkey are close geographically, historically and culturally, they have remained distant in policy and direction since the Iranian revolution in 1979.

Turkey, which is seeking European Union membership, is also concerned at the repercussions were the United States or Israel to strike the Islamic Republic.

“Ankara definitely does not sympathize with the ‘theodemocracy’ (theocracy-partial democracy) of Iran. … But not having a hostile attitude against Iran is important for Turkey’s domestic stability as well as its energy needs,” said Sahin Alpay, a columnist for conservative daily Zaman.

Turkey is entirely dependent on energy imports to quench its increasing thirst for oil and gas as its industry expands. Iran is currently its second biggest supplier of gas after Russia.

Bilateral trade reached $5 billion in the first half of 2008 and Turkey has pledged to invest $3.5 billion in Iranian gas production. Ankara and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding but are yet to sign a comprehensive agreement to invest in Iran’s South Pars gas field project.

Part of that deal agreement may be signed on Thursday.

Turkey is also a major transit route for goods between the European Union and Iran.

Turkey, an officially secular but predominantly Sunni Muslim country, has long been wary over Shi’ite Tehran’s effort to export its style of Islamic Republic, its meddling in the region and its true intentions regarding its nuclear program.

Iran has on the other hand resented Turkey’s Western orientation and reluctance to back Tehran against U.S. and EU pressure, now in the form of economic sanctions.

News reports that Ahmadinejad did not wish to visit the tomb of Turkey’s revered founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Ankara have caused a stir. Protocol requires foreign leaders to visit the mausoleum and Turkish media said Gul had subsequently moved the trip to Istanbul to avoid a potential embarrassing moment.

While tensions have simmered from time to time each country clearly recognizes they have mutual interests.

Tehran’s help in tackling Kurdish separatists based in northern Iraq has also boosted bilateral ties with Turkey, to the dismay of Washington, which until recently offered little help in moving against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) bases.

“Will the visit really help Turkey? I doubt it. It’s more beneficial for Ahmadinejad. He’ll get another 15 minutes in the spotlight when he unleashes his trademark attacks against Israel and the United States,” said a senior EU diplomat.

(Editing by Mary Gabriel)

August 13, 2008