Category: News

  • Call for papers

    Call for papers

    The 5th World Conference for Graduate Research in Tourism, Hospitality and Leisure

    Following the success of the first four series, the fifth conference will be held in Cappadocia, the beautiful and historic region of Turkey, once again hosted by the journal Anatolia. The aim of the conference is to provide a forum for research collaboration and mentoring of emerging tourism researchers in order to share their research experience. We invite scholars from tourism studies and the wider social sciences to join us. Papers can be submitted for the following three categories:

    Thesis/dissertations: Open only for graduate students to reflect the summary of their thesis or dissertations in terms of the development of hypotheses and methodology and showing the way how it may contribute to the literature.

    Research papers: Open both for graduates and faculty members who are encouraged to submit their regular conceptual or empirical papers.

    Interdisciplinary papers: Open only for those faculty members who have a background in a different discipline, but have the willingness to expand their research interests into tourism and so forth.

  • LECTURE- Turkish-Russian Relationship & Its Importance for Eurasia, Istanbul, 11/06

    LECTURE- Turkish-Russian Relationship & Its Importance for Eurasia, Istanbul, 11/06

    As the first lecture of its Lecture Series on Eurasia,
    Maltepe University presents:

    “Turkish-Russian Relationship and Its Importance for Eurasia”

    By Professor Norman Stone (Department of International Relations,
    Bilkent University, Turkey).

    Time: Thursday, November 6, 2008, 2:00 PM
    Venue: Marma Congress Center, Maltepe University, Maltepe, Istanbul

    Norman Stone is a professor of Modern History and an expert on the
    history of the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the
    Turkish-Russian relations. He has served at Cambridge and Oxford
    Universities
    , and now lectures at Bilkent University. Some of his
    books are “The Eastern Front 1914-1917″, “Europe Transformed
    1878-1919” and “Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises, 1918-88″. He
    is also a co-author of “The Other Russia” with Michael Glenny.

    For further details:

    Dr. Güljanat Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun
    Maltepe University
    Faculty of Fine Arts

    ercilasun@maltepe.edu.tr
    +90 (216) 626 10 50 ext. 1841
    www.maltepe.edu.tr

  • EU Fights For Nabucco’s Future

    EU Fights For Nabucco’s Future

    Andris Piebalgs heads to Istanbul and Baku to make his case.

    November 05, 2008
    By Ahto Lobjakas

     

    BRUSSELS — The fate of the Nabucco pipeline project appears to be hanging by a thread. No EU official would publicly admit this, but the signs tell their own story.

    First, as a senior EU official told reporters in Brussels on November 4 on condition of anonymity, transit talks with Turkey have stalled.

    Second, Azerbaijan is dithering between competing Russian and EU bids for its gas exports, which are crucial to bringing Nabucco on line in 2012 as planned.

    Third, in the long term, Azerbaijani gas alone will not be sufficient. The EU official said that “other countries in the region” must supply most of the 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas Nabucco is expected to carry by 2020.

    But Iran, with the world’s second-largest reserves, remains off-limits as long as it continues to enrich uranium. And Turkmenistan, with its enormous export potential, has yet to decide whether to invest in a trans-Caspian pipeline linking it to Azerbaijan — and Nabucco.

    The common thread for all these countries, and the EU as the ultimate beneficiary of the 3,300-kilometer-long pipeline, is the question of intent and commitment.

    EU Makes Its Case

    On November 5-7, EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs will visit Turkey and Azerbaijan to demonstrate the bloc’s continued commitment to Nabucco.

    “The first objective of this trip is to show the political commitment of the European Commission to the Nabucco project and to reaffirm once more that we are convinced that it is going to be online according to the planned timetable,” says Piebalgs’ spokesman, Ferran Tarradellas.

    The Russian-Georgian conflict sent shock waves through the region and among potential investors. But official Brussels remains steadfast in the belief that Nabucco is safe from Moscow’s interference. “Russia would jeopardize its reputation as a reliable supplier” to the EU if it acted in any way to damage Nabucco, said one official.

    However, none of Nabucco’s essential building blocks is currently in place. Turkey continues to hold out for a better transit deal while Azerbaijan has yet to formally commit its gas exports to the project.

    Tarradellas says that while Piebalgs’ visit is a sign that the EU is upping the ante in its talks with the two countries. “We’re going to discuss also the remaining differences with the Turks and the question of the transit of the gas through Turkey,” he says, “and then we’re going to be visiting Azerbaijan, which will be probably be the first supplier of gas for the Nabucco pipeline.”

    The senior EU official who spoke on condition of anonymity said that, apart from charging a transit fee, Turkey wants to divert 15 percent of Nabucco’s gas for cheap domestic use. As Azerbaijan is insisting on selling its gas at European market rates minus transit costs, the Nabucco consortium and its subsidiaries in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria would be left to pick up the tab.

    Piebalgs is keen to break the deadlock before the end of the year. In Turkey this week he will meet with the country’s president, prime minister, foreign minister, and economy minister.

    Where Will Gas Come From?

    Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has yet to decide to whom to sell the estimated 7-9 bcm of gas it is able to export annually in the early years of Nabucco’s operations. The senior Brussels official said EU companies are pitted against Russian competitors. There are fears in the EU that Russian political pressure could clinch the deal for Russian bidders. A decision is expected sometime in 2009.

    EU officials say that the fact that Piebalgs has secured a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is a sign of “interest” on the part of Baku in doing business with the EU.

    But Azerbaijan’s gas reserves, even if supplemented by the planned expansion of the Shah Deniz field, will not be sufficient to keep Nabucco in business.

    And this is where Nabucco currently hits a wall. Iran will remain untouchable  in trade terms as long as it refuses to cease uranium enrichment. Like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan can be swayed by Moscow’s cash — or outright pressure. And even if Turkmenistan’s recently confirmed reserves of 14 trillion bcm dwarf Russia’s own transit capacity, Moscow will be seeking to deny the EU a piece of the pie.

    Piebalgs is hoping to soon visit Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, his aides say.

    This leaves Iraq and Egypt as the only other viable regional suppliers for Nabucco — with one extremely unstable and the other rather remote.

    Meanwhile, EU officials reject suggestions Nabucco could eventually carry Russian gas diverted south. This, they say, would defeat the purpose of Nabucco — which is to diversify supplies. (Competing Russian projects, such as South Stream, are not seen as a problem, however. The EU’s growing demand for gas will make sure it has a market and the diversification of transport routes is a good in itself).

    If the degree of insecurity associated with the 8 billion-euro ($10.3 billion) project coupled with the global financial crisis is making potential investors nervous, officials in Brussels remain serene. When pressed, they do point out, however, that should private investors balk, public lenders such as the European Investment Bank and the World Bank stand ready to step in.

  • US better understood Turkey after Sept. 11

    US better understood Turkey after Sept. 11



    Tuesday, 04 November 2008

    The United States understood Turkey much better after the Cold War and especially after Sept. 11, said Ross Wilson, the U.S. ambassador to Ankara in an exclusive interview.“Turkey is a democratic, stable, powerful and self-confident country, the majority of its population is Muslim. We much better understood these properties of Turkey after the Cold War and especially after September 11, in comparison to the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s,” Wilson said. Wilson has been ambassador to Turkey for three years and is preparing to go back to the United States.

    Wilson said if there is any change in U.S. policy toward Turkey, that is about the United States, better understanding the importance of Turkey for its own interests, it highlighted secularism in the past, but currently emphasizes that Turkey is a “country of moderate Islam.”

    Washington has never failed to understand the significance of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, issue for Turkey, including the existence of the PKK in northern Iraq, Wilson said.

    “When we first entered Iraq, however, our focus was on reading the complete picture correctly. (We) thought that the PKK issue would be easily solved if the Iraq project settled down,” he said.

    The increasing PKK attacks made the United States understand the urgency of the issue, Wilson said, adding that they saw leaving the issue on its own might negatively affect efforts and Iraq and also the enthusiasm of Turkey to play its role in the Iraq project.

    “After that our president’s contribution to the PKK issue came forth. Today northern Iraq is not safe for the PKK,” he said.

  • Turkish delight at German cult series’ new hero

    Turkish delight at German cult series’ new hero

    Rough talking, leather jacket-clad and quintessentially Teutonic: the intrepid detectives in the cult German-Austrian crime series Tatort have always been one of a kind. Until now that is.

    Enter Cenk Batu, the latest addition to the crime squad, who has given the hit show something it has never had before: a hero of Turkish descent.

    Millions tuned in for last week’s episode, shown at its usual Sunday prime-time slot. Tatort, translated as crime scene, serves up a typical dose of criminal-chasing antics, but the arrival of Batu, an undercover agent in Hamburg, made history for the 37-year-old series.

    “Finally we see a Turkish-German character who is not a bully or a drug dealer but a clever commissar,” said Cinar Safter of the Turkish Union in Berlin, which represents Germany’s 2.6m-strong Turkish community – its largest minority. “This is good news but it comes far too late.”

    Although the country’s Turkish population is Germany’s largest ethnic group, it is still under-represented on television.

    Sabine Schiffer, who heads the Media Responsibility Institute, argued that more “normal shows” should include minorities. She also complained that newsreaders in particular were rarely from minority communities, projecting an image of the country that is “blonder” than it really is.

    Actor Mehmet Kurtulus is well aware of his character’s symbolic value. When he was given the part last year he said the pioneering role had “social and political implications”.

    Kurtulus, who moved to Germany from Turkey when he was two years old, has described himself as a representative of a “bridge generation” between the two countries. He sees Batu, who speaks broken Turkish and has no contact with the Turkish community except through his father, as a realistic character.

    “The third generation is a lost, identity-less generation,” he said, referring to those whose grandparents moved to Germany as “guest workers” during the economic boom after the second world war.

    “They speak a mish-mash of German and Turkish and are not properly linked to Turkey or Germany.”

    in Berlin

    Guardian

  • Australian Macedonian Advisory Council and the falsification of Ancient Macedonian history Part 1

    Australian Macedonian Advisory Council and the falsification of Ancient Macedonian history Part 1

    Risto Stefov
    November 01, 2008

    This is a response to the Australian Macedonian Advisory Council in regards to the article entitled “Risto Stefov and the falsification of Ancient Macedonian history” published on October 29, 2008 at this link:

    My reply to you is “Two can play that game!” I too can provide you with just as many arguments that the Ancient Macedonians WERE NOT Greek. BUT!

    It is irrelevant, at least to me, if Modern Greeks claim that the Ancient Macedonians were Greeks or not, what is relevant here is that the Modern Greeks are not related to the Ancient Greeks or to the Ancient Macedonians. They call themselves “Greeks” but have nothing to do with the ancient Greeks or Ancient Macedonians because underneath their modern artificial Greek veneer is nothing more than Albanians, Vlachs, Turks and Macedonians, the same variety of Balkanites that exists throughout the entire southern Balkans. But, if they insist on accusing me of falsifying Ancient Macedonian history, then here is my rebuttal:

    “The modern Greek claim — that the ancient Macedonians were Greek — is politically motivated and is not supported by historical evidence. This political mythology was created in the late 19th century to advance territorial claims against Ottoman Macedonia. In its current incarnation it is used by Greece as an excuse to discriminate against its Macedonian minority.” (Gandeto)

    “I. What were a people’s origins and what language did they speak?

    From the surviving literary sources (Hesiod, Herodotus, and Thucydides) there is little information about Macedonian origins, and the archaeological data from the early period is sparse and inconclusive. On the matter of language, and despite attempts to make Macedonian a dialect of Greek, one must accept the conclusion of the linguist R. A. Crossland in the recent CAH, that an insufficient amount of Macedonian has survived to know what language it was. But it is clear from later sources that Macedonian and Greek were mutually unintelligible in the court of Alexander the Great. Moreover, the presence in Macedonia of inscriptions written in Greek is no more proof that the Macedonians were Greek than, e.g., the existence of Greek inscriptions on Thracian vessels and coins proves that the Thracians were Greeks.

    II. Self-identity: what did the Macedonians say or think about themselves?

    Virtually nothing has survived from the Macedonians themselves (they are among the silent peoples of antiquity), and very little remains in the Classical and Hellenistic non-Macedonian sources about Macedonian attitudes.

    III. What did others say about the Macedonians?

    Here there is a relative abundance of information from Arrian, Plutarch (Alexander, Eumenes), Diodorus 17-20, Justin, Curtius Rufus, and Nepos (Eumenes), based upon Greek and Greek-derived Latin sources. It is clear that over a five-century span of writing in two languages representing a variety of historiographical and philosophical positions the ancient writers regarded the Greeks and Macedonians as two separate and distinct peoples whose relationship was marked by considerable antipathy, if not outright hostility.

    IV. What is the nature of cultural expressions as revealed by archaeology?

    As above we are blessed with an increasing amount of physical evidence revealing information about Macedonian tastes in art and decoration, religion, political and economic institutions, architecture and settlement patterns. Clearly the Macedonians were in many respects Hellenized, especially on the upper levels of their society, as demonstrated by the excavations of Greek archaeologists over the past two decades. Yet there is much that is different, e. g., their political institutions, burial practices, and religious monuments.

    I will argue that, whoever the Macedonians were, they emerged as a people distinct from the Greeks who lived to the south and east. In time their royal court — which probably did not have Greek origins (the tradition in Herodotus that the Macedonian kings were descended from Argos is probably a piece of Macedonian royal propaganda) — became Hellenized in many respects, and I shall review the influence of mainstream Greek culture on architecture, art, and literary preferences.

    Finally, a look at contemporary Balkan politics. The Greek government firmly maintains that the ancient Macedonians were ethnic Greeks, and that any claim by the new Republic of Macedonia (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) to the name “Macedonia” and the symbols of ancient Macedonia is tantamount to an expropriation of Greek history. Moreover, it is claimed that there is no such thing as a distinct Slavic Macedonian identity and language separate from Bulgaria and Serbia.

    I shall review the evidence for the existence of a modern Macedonian ethnicity with reference to my recent work in a Macedonian ethnic community in Steelton, Pennsylvania. Both the gravestones in a local cemetery and US census reports from the early twentieth century provide evidence that émigrés from Macedonia who lived and died in Steelton in the early twentieth century considered themselves to be distinct from their Serbian and Bulgarian neighbours.” (Eugene Borza)

    Speaking of Eugene Borza, the American Philological Association refers to Eugene Borza as the “Macedonian specialist”. In the introductory chapter of “Makedonika” by Carol G. Thomas, Eugene Borza is also called “the Macedonian specialist”, and his colleague Peter Green describes Eugene’s work on Macedonia as “seminal.”

    Please read what P. Green thinks of Borza’s approach to the studies of ancient history, and of his method of abstraction of truth: “Never was a man less given to the kind of mean-spirited odium philologicum that so often marks classical debate. Gene could slice an argument to pieces while still charming its exponents out of the trees.”

    Ernst Badian from Harvard University writes: “It is chiefly Gene’s merit that recognizably historical interpretation of the history of classical Macedonia has not only become possible, but it is now accepted by all historians who have no vested interest in the mythology superseded by Gene’s work. Needless to say, I welcome and agree with that approach and have never disagreed with him except on relatively trivial details of interpretation.”

    Here are some excerpts from Borza’s writings regarding the Ancient Macedonians and the Ancient Greeks.

    On the matter of distinction between Greeks and Macedonians:

    1) “Neither Greeks nor Macedonians considered the Macedonians to be Greeks.”
    On the composition of Alexander’s army:

    2) “Thus we look in vain for the evidence that Alexander was heavily dependent upon Greeks either in quantity or quality.”

    3) “The pattern is clear: the trend toward the end of the king’s life was to install Macedonians in key positions at the expense of Asians, and to retain very few Greeks.”

    4) “The conclusion is inescapable: there was a largely ethnic Macedonian imperial administration from beginning to end. Alexander used Greeks in court for cultural reasons, Greek troops (often under Macedonian commanders) for limited tasks and with some discomfort, and Greek commanders and officials for limited duties. Typically, a Greek will enter Alexander’s service from an Aegean or Asian city through the practice of some special activity: he could read and write, keep figures or sail, all of which skills the Macedonians required. Some Greeks may have moved on to military service as well. In other words, the role of Greeks in Alexander’s service was not much different from what their role had been in the services of Xerxes and the third Darius.”

    On the policy of hellenization with Alexander’s conquest of Asia and the Greek assertion that he spread Hellenism:

    5) “If one wishes to believe that Alexander had a policy of hellenization – as opposed to the incidental and informal spread of Greek culture – the evidence must come from sources other than those presented here. One wonders – archaeology aside – where this evidence would be.”

    On the issue of whether Alexander and Philip “united” the Greek city-states or conquered them:

    6) “In European Greece Alexander continued and reinforced Philip II’s policy of rule over the city-states, a rule resulting from conquest.”

    On the ethnic tension between Macedonians and Greeks:

    Referring to the episode of Eumenes of Cardia and his bid to reach the throne: “And if there were any doubt about the status of Greeks among the Macedonians the tragic career of Eumenes in the immediate Wars of succession should put it to rest. The ancient sources are replete with information about the ethnic prejudice Eumenes suffered from Macedonians.”

    7) “The tension at court between Greeks and Macedonians, tension that the ancient authors clearly recognised as ethnic division.”

    On Alexander’s dismissal of his Greek allies:

    8) “A few days later at Ecbatana, Alexander dismissed his Greek allies, and charade with Greece was over.”

    On the so called Dorian invasion:

    9) The theory of the Dorian invasion (based on Hdt. 9.26, followed by Thuc. I.12) is largely an invention of nineteenth-century historography, and is otherwise unsupported by either archaeological or linguistic evidence.”

    10) “The Dorians are invisible archeologically.”

    11) “There is no archaeological record of the Dorian movements, and the mythic arguments are largely conjectural, based on folk traditions about the Dorian home originally having been in northwest Greece.

    12) “The explanation for the connection between the Dorians and the Macedonians may be more ingenious than convincing, resting uncomfortably on myth and conjecture.”

    On the Macedonian own tradition and origin:

    13) “As the Macedonians settled the region following the expulsion of existing peoples, they probably introduced their own customs and language(s); there is no evidence that they adopted any existing language, even though they were now in contact with neighbouring populations who spoke a variety of Greek and non-Greek tongues.”

    On the Macedonian language:

    14) “The main evidence for Macedonian existing as separate language comes from a handful of late sources describing events in the train of Alexander the Great, where the Macedonian tongue is mentioned specifically.”

    15) “The evidence suggests that Macedonian was distinct from ordinary Attic Greek used as a language of the court and of diplomacy.”

    16) “The handful of surviving genuine Macedonian words – not loan words from Greek – do not show the changes expected from Greek dialect.”

    On the Macedonian material culture being different from the Greek:

    17) “The most visible expression of material culture thus far recovered are the fourth – and third-century tombs. The architectural form, decoration, and burial goods of these tombs, which now number between sixty and seventy, are unlike what is found in the Greek south, or even in the neighbouring independent Greek cities of the north Aegean littoral (exception Amphipolis). Macedonian burial habits suggest different view of the afterlife from the Greeks’, even while many of the same gods were worshipped.”

    18) “Many of the public expressions of worship may have been different.”

    19) “There is an absence of major public religious monuments from Macedonian sites before the end of the fourth century (another difference from the Greeks).”

    20). “Must be cautious both in attributing Greek forms of worship to the Macedonians and in using these forms of worship as a means of confirming Hellenic identity.”

    21) “In brief, one must conclude that the similarities between some Macedonian and Greek customs and objects are not of themselves proof that Macedonians were a Greek tribe, even though it is undeniable that on certain levels Greek cultural influences eventually became pervasive.”

    22) “Greeks and Macedonians remained steadfastly antipathetic toward one another (with dislike of a different quality than the mutual long-term hostility shared by some Greek city-states) until well into the Hellenic period, when both the culmination of hellenic acculturation in the north and the rise of Rome made it clear that what these peoples shared took precedence over their historical enmities.”

    23) “They made their mark not as a tribe of Greek or other Balkan peoples, but as ‘Macedonians’. This was understood by foreign protagonists from the time of Darius and Xerxes to the age of Roman generals.”

    24) “It is time to put the matter of the Macedonians’ ethnic identity to rest.

    No matter how hard Modern Greeks try to prove otherwise, there is always more than one side to their story!

    To be continued.

    Many thanks to J.S.G. Gandeto for his contribution to this article.

    You can contact the author at rstefov@hotmail.com