Category: Business

  • Turkey in free-fall

    Turkey in free-fall

    By Robert M Cutler

    MONTREAL – Turkey’s stock markets, reflecting a stalling economy and doubts over International Monetary Fund loans in the run-up to polls next year, have intensified a year-long plunge, with a key benchmark tumbling more than 36% in barely 11 weeks.

    The ISE National 100 equities index has taken a 36.8% hit from its level at the end of August, the last time I reviewed the country’s economic and financial situation (See Turkey has a rough road ahead, Asia Times Online, August 28, 2008). At just above the 25,000 level, it is now down 56.8% from its all-time high of mid-October 2007.

    The ISE 100 is now in a short-term trading range between the low 24,300s and the mid 29,300s, but will sooner rather than later break out of this range on the downside. The next support level is in the 19,000-20,000 range, after which a medium-term recovery should kick into gear that could take it back as high as 30,000.

    However, it is more than likely that the recovery will be followed by another decline of indeterminate but substantial proportion. Any fall in the index significantly below 20,000 in the meantime will signify that that medium-term recovery is foregone and the further steep falls are to be expected.

    The domestic economic outlook justifies this pessimism. Declines in industrial production steepened in September to 5.5%, the biggest drop since 2002, from a 4.1% fall in August. With car manufacturers such as the local units of Ford and Toyota temporarily closing plants, and textiles manufacturing plunging 17.6% in September, the government’s 2009 spending plans based on 4% economic growth are now looking unrealistic, according to analysts.

    The economy expanded 1.9% year-on-year in the second quarter, down from 6.7% in the first quarter. Meanwhile, the central bank has kept its benchmark interest rate at 16.75%, more than four times the level in the euro zone, as it tries to bring down an inflation rate the central bank said this month could exceed 11% at the end of 2008.

    The government plans to increase key spending 17% next year as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party prepares for municipal elections due to be held by March.

    Foreign confidence in the economy plays a disproportionate role in Turkey’s stock market. Morgan Stanley estimates that foreign investors hold 16.5% of domestic debt stock and 72% of the free float in the stock market itself.

    International financial players, as well as domestic business interests, accordingly, are strongly in favor of Turkey signing a new agreement with the IMF, which is considered an important lever in encouraging further economic reforms.

    Turkey’s last agreement with the IMF, involving US$10 billion, expired in May. It was the most recent in a series of stand-by agreements beginning in 1999 that have been nearly universally viewed as an “anchor” instilling the discipline necessary to implement successive reform agendas, many of which would bring the country further into line with European Union standards.

    The government has continually claimed that it is bringing its economic, legal and financial structure into line with EU norms only because this is to the benefit of Turkey itself. Negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the EU are stalled in a number of key fields and the trading bloc has as yet no power to impose conditionality on the country’s reforms. Turkish public opinion in favor of accession, meanwhile, has recently declined.

    Turkey’s business community has been calling for another loan deal to help to limit the fallout from the global financial crisis. There is also concern in the national and international banking sectors that only an IMF agreement can supply the incentive for further reform and greater fiscal discipline. The IMF, meanwhile, admits that Turkey is better able than in the past to deal with external shocks, thanks to more diverse export markets and a flexible exchange rate.

    Perhaps partly because the present domestic financial crisis is not of Turkey’s own making, the government has hesitated to explore possibilities for a precautionary stand-by agreement with the IMF, of the sort that Ukraine and Hungary have recently concluded.

    The absence of a precautionary agreement would not necessarily cut Turkey off entirely – it could conceivably receive up to US$8.8 billion under the Short-Term Liquidity Facility that is dedicated shoring up emerging markets. Still, Erdogan would prefer to put off any agreement until after the local elections in March so as to avoid giving his political opponents any additional momentum in their criticism of his policies.

    To increase government spending in the run-up to the local elections. Erdogan would like to take the state unemployment fund and label it as revenue, but an agreement with the IMF could tie his hands in this respect.

    As a result, he may request a currency swap agreement from the US Federal Reserve Bank, of the sort that it has extended to other countries lately. While these funds might be intended to ameliorate the current-account deficit, there would be nothing to prevent the government from using them, in the place of existing state revenues, for expenditures in view of the upcoming local elections.

    The IMF and Turkey are expected to hold further talks during this weekend’s summit of industrial and developing nations in Washington.

    Even so, “It is not very easy to say whether there will be an agreement with the IMF or not,” Deputy Prime Minister Nazim Ekren said last week, according to a Reuters report.

    Robert M Cutler (http://www.robertcutler.org) is Research Fellow, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, Canada.

    (Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

  • AMERICA: The Economy Gets a Margin Call

    AMERICA: The Economy Gets a Margin Call

    Thoughts from the Frontline Weekly Newsletter

    The Economy Gets a Margin Call

    by John Mauldin
    November15, 2008

     

    As long-time readers know, my daughter Tiffani and I are interviewing millionaires for a book we will be writing called Eavesdropping on Millionaires. This has been one of the more personally impacting projects of my life, as the stories we hear are so very provocative. I hope we can transfer to readers of the book at least half of the impact we are personally experiencing. But at the end of each interview, we let the interviewee ask me questions. Often, they are along the line of “Do you really think we will Muddle Through?” Sometimes they ask in need of assurance and sometimes they simply think that my stance is somewhat naïve. It is something of an irony that I am called a perma-bear in some circles and a Pollyanna in others. The Muddle Through middle has been lonely of late. 

    So, this week I take another look at my Muddle Through stance. We look at some of the recent data on unemployment and retail sales, think about the implications of a falling trade deficit and a rising US government deficit, speculate about the potential for a serious stock market rally, and also comment on the potential for a GM bailout. There is a lot to cover, so let’s jump right in.

    Where Have All the Consumers Gone?

    Retail sales and prices of goods imported to the US dropped by the most on record, signaling the economy may be in its worst slump in decades. Purchases fell 2.8 % in October, the fourth straight decline, the Commerce Department said today in Washington. Labor Department figures showed import prices dropped 4.7%, pointing to a rising danger of deflation, and a private report said consumer confidence this month remained near the lowest level since 1980. (Bloomberg)

    Circuit City filed for bankruptcy and Best Buy said sales were down and gave even lower guidance for Christmas. Nordstrom’s cut its profit forecast for the third time this year.

    It is a perfect storm for retailers. Consumers are having a negative wealth effect as stock and housing prices have plunged, taking almost $20 trillion out of US consumer assets. Unemployment is rising and consumer confidence is at the lowest levels since the last major recession in 1980-82.

    The unemployment numbers which came out this week were particularly grim. Jobless claims on a seasonally adjusted basis were 516,000 newly unemployed. But that masked an even deeper actual number of 540,000. The largest previous number for this week was back in 2001 and was 420,000. Actual weekly numbers can be volatile, but such an increase is certainly disconcerting.

    I should point out that as of the end of September there were 3.3 million job openings, down slightly from August. It is not as if there are no jobs being created or available. But as pointed out last week, the number of people looking for work for over 8 months is high and rising fast, so there is a serious mismatch of the jobs available and the desire or ability of people to take them.

    Continuing claims are now at roughly 3.5 million individuals who are getting unemployment insurance. Let’s assume that each week we lose an average of 400,000 jobs. That is 20 million jobs a year. That means the US economy for the last year has created 16.5 million jobs (very roughly). So there is some robustness in the economy even as we slide deeper into recession.

    But what happens if we see the number of new unemployment claims start to rise to an average of 500,000 for a period of time? Without more job creation, that would mean an increase in unemployment of 1,000,000 people in just 10 weeks. This week we have seen an increase in continuing claims of 141,000 from just last week. That, gentle reader, is very grim if it were to continue. Unemployment is likely to continue to rise throughout most of 2009, closing in on 8%.

    This time of year should see some seasonal rise as retailers begin to hire for Christmas. But with retail sales down and facing the likely prospect of negative growth in Christmas sales for the first time ever, seasonal employment is evidently not responding. More comments on this below as I take up the Muddle Through economy.

    Why Is the Dollar Rising?

    The trade deficit is dropping slowly, from over $60 billion in July to $56 billion in September. Import prices fell and imports were down by 5.6%. On a less positive note, exports, which had been one of the bright spots in the economy, fell by 6%. The trade deficit would have been another $3 billion less if Boeing had not been on strike.

    Oil prices were an average of $104 a barrel in September. For November prices will be closer to $65, down at least one third. That means the possible trade deficit for November could be a lot closer to $40 billion, the lowest since 2003 and well off the highs of almost $68 billion a few years ago.

    Why is this important? Two reasons. First, it means that a lot fewer dollars are now going into the world economy. And demand for dollars is rising as the world seeks a safe haven in the current global recession, so it should not be a surprise that the dollar is rising.

    The surprise is the violence, the amazing rapidity of the rise. We are seeing movements in currency prices in a week that would normally be a year’s worth of volatility. It is a sign of the severity of the crisis, of the wariness of traders, that prices are so volatile.

    Second, it also means fewer dollars will be coming back into the US to finance the rising government deficits. As Woody Brock (one of my favorite economists) in a recent essay points out, this is counter-intuitive, but it is nonetheless true. Dollars which go abroad must eventually find a home, and that home is going to be in US assets of some kind, usually government bonds.

    Some worry about China or another large country might stop buying US bonds with their dollars. They worry that they might want to increase their holdings of euros, for example. But what that means is they take the dollars and sell them to someone who has euros. Then that country has dollars that they must then do something with. It is not as if the dollars disappear.

    The only way for China (and/or the world) to really reduce their dollar balances is to stop selling products to the US consumer or to buy US assets like stocks or real estate or wheat, thus bringing the dollars back to the US.

    But what in practice happens is that China and most Mideast countries on a net basis buy US government-backed debt. But if there are fewer dollars going abroad, that means there are fewer dollars to buy newly issued debt. And our government is issuing new debt at a rather startling rate.

    The estimates for the deficit next year are close to $1 trillion. But if the trade deficit is “only” $500 billion, that means that the appetite of foreigners for US debt will be less than half what is needed to finance the deficit. Where does the difference come from? US citizens and corporations, primarily banks, are going to have to buy the difference or the Fed will have to monetize a portion. Or rates on longer-term debt could go high enough to entice foreigners to buy US debt.

    Higher rates would be a drag on the US economy and especially the housing markets and would also cost the taxpayer a lot in additional interest-rate expenses. Total government debt is now $10.5 trillion, with the public (including non-US holdings) having $6.3 trillion. The average interest rate paid on that debt is 4.009%, and for fiscal year 2008, which ended October 31, the interest expense was $451 billion. Add another trillion and the interest paid would soon rise to $500 billion.

    The US will face a serious problem in 2009. Tax revenues are going to take a very serious fall. Remember when capital gains taxes would produce a few hundred billion? Not in 2009. And income taxes will drop as unemployment expenses rise. The perceived need for government stimulus will be offset by the problem of funding the deficit. Resorting to monetizing the debt is a nuclear option. Expect even more volatility in the currency and interest-rate markets next year.

    Can We Actually Muddle Through?

    In addition to the above, let me list a few problems I have highlighted in the past few months. Roughly 3% of GDP growth for 2002-2007 was from Mortgage Equity Withdrawals and other debt. That stimulus is gone. Consumers are going to start saving once again, taking money from a consumer-spending-driven economy. Taxes are likely to rise, not only at the federal but at the state and local levels, as governments of all sizes are faced with growing deficits and needs. Financial institutions are deleveraging at a very fast pace. It is, as one friend told me, as if the economy at large is facing a massive margin call.

    Given all of the above problems, how is it possible that we can Muddle Through?

    In January of 2007 I forecast a mild recession beginning in late 2007. I was early. In January of this year, I still thought the recession would be more like that of 1990-91. Clearly, I was an optimist. It is now likely that we will see a recession as deep as 1974. This quarter is likely to see a negative growth number of 4% or more. That is deep by any standard. And I do not think that the economy will begin to actually grow before the third quarter at the earliest. It is quite likely that 2009 will be negative for the entire year, and possibly for all four quarters.

    We are, as I have said, hitting the reset button on consumer spending. We are going to some lower level of consumer spending, and corporations and government are going to have to adjust their budgets. Corporate earnings will be under pressure for some time to come.

    But, and this is a big but, this too shall pass. At some point we will hit a bottom. Just as irrational exuberance led us into foolish actions, we are now becoming too pessimistic. The pendulum will swing. Minsky taught us that stability breeds instability. The more stable things are, the more comfortable we are with taking risk, which ultimately creates the conditions for a normal business-cycle recession. This time, we took on a whole lot more risk than usual and are facing a deeper recession.

    But the opposite is true as well. Instability will breed stability. It is, as Paul McCulley calls it, a reverse Minsky moment. We will adjust to the new environment by becoming more conservative. And that new conservative environment will bring about a new stability, albeit at lower levels. But it will be a level from which we can begin to grow once again. It has been this way since the Medes were trading with the Persians.

    And here is where I may not have been clear, as the conversations mentioned at the beginning of the letter have called to my attention. My thought is that Muddle Through is the period after we are finished with the recession. I think that the future recovery when it comes will be a lot slower and longer in getting back to trend growth than normal. It will be a Muddle Through, slow-growth economy. I expect that period to now last through at least 2010. The credit crisis and the housing bubble are not problems that can be quickly or easily fixed. It will take time.

    The Potential for a Large Stock Market Rally

    Everyone knows that there are large amounts of hedge fund redemptions being processed. Some blame the current vicious sell-off on forced hedge fund sales as they have to meet these redemptions at the end of the quarter.

    This brings up an interesting possibility. My guess is that the large bulk of that money is going back to institutions that will need to put the money to work. Where will they deploy it? If they are projecting 7-8% total portfolio returns, they cannot put that money in bonds. My guess is that it will go back to other hedge funds or into long-only managers. This money will start to go to work in mid- to late January. We could see a very large rally the first quarter of next year. For traders, this will be a chance to make some money. I think it will be a bear market rally, as the recession will still be in full swing, and we could see a pullback when that money gets fully deployed. But it will be fun while it lasts.

    As traders begin to sense that possibility, we could see a serious year-end rally as well. Would I bet the farm? No, but I offer up the idea as a possibility. And I know a lot of people have large short positions that have made them a lot of money this year. Maybe it is time to think about taking profits.

    And now a few thoughts on the possibility of bailing out GM.

    Is GM too Big to Let Fail?

    (Let me say at the outset I am truly sorry for those who have lost their jobs or are facing the possibility of a job loss, whether at GM or any other firm. I have been there, as have most people at one time or another.)

    I wrote in 2004 that GM was essentially bankrupt. They owed more in pension obligations than it seemed likely they would be able to pay, without major restructuring of the union contracts. I was not alone in such an assessment, although there were not many of us. Now that assessment is common wisdom.

    Bloomberg today cites sources that claim a collapse of GM would cost taxpayers $200 billion if the company were forced to liquidate. The projections also called for the loss of “millions” of auto-related jobs. GM, Ford, and Chrysler employ 240,000. They provide healthcare to 2 million, pension benefits to 775,000. Another 5 million jobs are directly related to the three auto companies. GM has 6,000 dealerships which employ 344,000 people. According to a recent study by the Center for Automotive Research (CAR), if the domestic automakers cut output and employment by 50 percent, nearly 2.5 million jobs would be lost and governments would lose $108 billion in revenue over three years. (Edd Snyder at Roadtrip blog)

    How did we get to a place where the market cap of GM is a mere $1.8 billion and its stock price has dropped from $87 in early 1999 to $3.10 today? (See chart below.) Where Rod Lache of Deutsche Bank has a “price target” of zero for GM? “Even if GM succeeds in averting a bankruptcy, we believe that the company’s future path is likely to be bankruptcy-like,” Lache wrote.

    The litany of reasons is long. At the top of the list are union contracts which mandate high costs and pension plans which cannot be met. Then there is the problem of many years of poorly designed cars, although they are now getting their act together. We can also discuss poor management and bloated costs, like paying multiple thousands of workers who are not actually working. GM is structured for the 50% market share they used to command, whereas now they only have 20%.

    Wilbur Ross, a well-known multi-billionaire investor, was on CNBC saying that allowing GM to go bankrupt would throw the country into what sounded like a depression. Of course, he does have an auto parts company which supplies GM; so he, as my Dad would say, does have a dog in that hunt.

    Ross said that we as a nation are to blame for GM’s problems (I am not making this up) because we do not have a national industrial policy. The US allowed other automotive companies to build plants in states that had lower labor costs, and that is the reason GM is uncompetitive. GM pays an average of $33 an hour, and those selfish other companies pay a mere $19 plus a host of benefits.

    Ross evidently believes that because some states have lower taxes and right to work laws, that it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to give GM a certain type of immortality rather than suggest GM deal with its problems directly. I assume that Ross also sides with the French when they suggest that Ireland should raise taxes so they will not have to compete with Ireland for business. Such thinking is nonsense and is also unconstitutional.

    Let’s all acknowledge that having GM go bankrupt would not be a good thing. But it is not the end of the US automotive industry, nor even of GM. Let’s think about what a GM bankruptcy might look like. In a bankruptcy, the debt holders line up to come up with a restructuring plan so that they can maximize the return of their loans or obligations. The shareholders get wiped out, but with GM down over 95%, that has largely been accomplished. That process has happened with airlines, steel companies, and tens of thousand of other companies. It is called creative destruction.

    First, let’s understand that the real owners of GM are the pension plans, as I wrote in 2004. They are the entities with the largest obligations and the most to lose. They are the biggest stakeholders in a successful GM. Giving them the responsibility for making a new, leaner, meaner GM with realistic union contracts would be rational; otherwise they would lose most of what they have.

    Factories need to be closed. Auto sales are down to 11 million cars a year, the lowest since 1982, which was the last major recession. Automotive companies sold cars at such low prices in the last few years that sales went to 16 million a year. But the cars that have been sold will last for a long time. Few people are going to buy a new car when the old one is working fine, especially in a recession and a Muddle Through economy. Further, does GM really need eight automotive lines, some of which have been losing money for years?

    A restructured GM with realistic costs could be quite competitive. They have some great cars. I drive one. It is four years old and so good I am likely to drive it for at least another four.

    At some point after the restructuring, the pension plans could float the stock on the market and get some real value. If actual pensions need to be adjusted, then so be it. While that is sad for the GM pensioners, is it any sadder than for Delta or United Airlines or steel company pensioners who saw their benefits go down? For the vast majority of Americans, no one guarantees their full retirement. Why should auto trade unions be any different?

    Taxpayers in one form or another are going to have to pay something. Unemployment costs, increased contributions to the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, job training, relocation, and other costs will be borne. So, it is in our interest to get involved so as to minimize our costs, as well as help preserve as many jobs as possible.

    Sadly, I think it is likely that a Democratic majority next year will quickly pass a bailout that will not solve any of the longer-term problems. Obama evidently wants to appoint an “automotive czar;” and the name being floated is the very liberal Michigan former Representative David Bonior, whose anti-trade and pro-union positions are well known. This is appointing the fox to guard the hen house. It is not a recipe for the restructuring that is needed.

    The bailout for GM is a bailout for the trade unions and management (who not coincidentally both made large contributions to the Democratic Party and candidates). US consumers are simply going to buy fewer cars in the future. That is a fact. Spending $50 billion does not address that reality. That $50 billion can be better spent by helping workers who lose their jobs. Without serious reforms a bailout will simply postpone the problem, and there will be a need for more money in a few years. And do we think that the management which got GM into the current mess is the group to bring them out?

    And as to the argument that “We bailed out Wall Street, so why not GM?” it doesn’t hold water. What we did and are doing is to try and keep the financial system functioning, so we don’t see the world economy simply shut down. But don’t tell the 125,000 people who have lost jobs on Wall Street that it was a bailout. That number is likely to go to 200,000. No one thinks that a restructured GM would see anywhere close to half that number of job losses.

    Do we protect Circuit City? Sun just announced plans to lay off 6,000 workers. Where is their bailout? Citibank announced 10,000 further job cuts today. This is a recession. And sadly that means a lot of jobs are going to be lost. GM workers should have no more right to their jobs than a Sun or Citibank or Circuit City worker.

    Now, would I be opposed to a bridge loan to help in the transition? No, because a viable Detroit is good for the country and will cost the taxpayer less in the long run than if we have to pick up their pension benefits. But any money must come with realistic reforms that put in charge new management and a realistic cost structure so GM can compete.

    New York, Moving, and Another One Leaves the Nest

    Today, while I am writing this letter, my #2 son Chad is moving out, to an apartment not far from me, but still no longer in the house. He is 20 and eager to be on his own. He has recently taken a job at Best Buy, while trying to decide what to do next. I am happy for him, as you can clearly see the anticipation on his face. Six down and one left. Trey, the youngest, is 14, and I suppose the day will come when he too decides it is time to be on his own. That is what we as parents hope for. But there is a part of me that will miss Chad being under my roof.

    Thanksgiving is coming up and I am making plans, not just for the usual big dinner but also for moving that weekend to another home not too far away. I will move my office into the same house in mid-December. The savings will be substantial, but the savings in commute time will be even more valuable. I will miss this Ballpark office, though.

    I will be in New York next month (December 4) for Festivus, a holiday fundraiser sponsored by my friends at Minyanville.com. If you are there, be sure and look me up. It will be a fun weekend, as there will be dinners with friends, and Barry Habib (of the Mortgage Market Guide and one of the show’s producers) has arranged for tickets to the musical Rock of Ages.

    It is quite late. For some reason, this letter was harder to write than usual, but even letter writing comes to an eventual end. Have a great week.

    Your ready already for recovery analyst,

    John Mauldin
    [email protected]

    Copyright 2008 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved

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  • Turkey: Considering Guaranteeing Banks Foreign Debts

    Turkey: Considering Guaranteeing Banks Foreign Debts

    Turkish legislators are set to debate a measure under which the foreign debts of Turkish banks would be guaranteed by the government, provided Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan approves the proposal, Turkish daily Vatan reported Nov. 6.

  • Bush to host world finance summit

    Bush to host world finance summit

    Bush to host world finance summit

     

    Government leaders will examine ways of preventing another crisis

    President George W Bush will host the world’s first global financial summit in the US on 15 November, a White House official has said.

    The meeting – the first in a series – will discuss the financial crisis and ways to prevent it recurring.

    Leaders from the G20 group of nations – the world’s leading industrialised countries and major developing nations – will attend.

    The winner of the US presidential election will also attend the summit.

    The meeting, to be held in the Washington DC area, will consider the reforms needed to avoid another financial crisis and look at the progress being made so far.

    “The leaders will review progress being made to address the current financial crisis,” said White House spokeswoman Dana Perino.

    In order to avoid a repetition of the crisis, she said they would “agree on a common set of principles for reform of the regulatory and institutional regimes for the world’s financial sectors”.

    Worldwide crisis

    Later summits will focus on working out the details of the reforms needed.

    Some European leaders had pushed for a summit before the end of the year, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy had said it should take place in New York.

    Among those expected to attend the summit will be leaders from the G20 group of nations, which includes the G7 group of major industrial economies, as well as key emerging-market countries such as China, India and Brazil.

    The head of the International Monetary Fund, the president of the World Bank, the United Nations secretary general and the chairman of the Financial Stability Forum have also been invited to participate.

  • The United States, Europe and Bretton Woods II

    The United States, Europe and Bretton Woods II

    By George Friedman and Peter ZeihanFrench President Nicolas Sarkozy and U.S. President George W. Bush met Oct. 18 to discuss the possibility of a global financial summit. The meeting ended with an American offer to host a global summit in December modeled on the 1944 Bretton Woods system that founded the modern economic system.

    Related Special Topic Page
    Political Economy and the Financial Crisis

    The Bretton Woods framework is one of the more misunderstood developments in human history. The conventional wisdom is that Bretton Woods crafted the modern international economic architecture, lashing the trading and currency systems to the gold standard to achieve global stability. To a certain degree, that is true. But the form that Bretton Woods took in the public mind is only a veneer. The real implications and meaning of Bretton Woods are a different story altogether.

    Conventional Wisdom: The Depression and Bretton Woods
    The origin of Bretton Woods lies in the Great Depression. As economic output dropped in the 1930s, governments worldwide adopted a swathe of protectionist, populist policies – import tariffs were particularly in vogue – that enervated international trade. In order to maintain employment, governments and firms alike encouraged ongoing production of goods even though mutual tariff walls prevented the sale of those goods abroad. As a result, prices for these goods dropped and deflation set in. Soon firms found that the prices they could reasonably charge for their goods had dropped below the costs of producing them.

    The reduction in profitability led to layoffs, which reduced demand for products in general, further reducing prices. Firms went out of business en masse, workers in the millions lost their jobs, demand withered, and prices followed suit. An effort designed originally to protect jobs (the tariffs) resulted in a deep, self-reinforcing deflationary spiral, and the variety of measures adopted to combat it – the New Deal included – could not seem to right the system.

    Economically, World War II was a godsend. The military effort generated demand for goods and labor. The goods part is pretty straightforward, but the labor issue is what really allowed the global economy to turn the corner. Obviously, the war effort required more workers to craft goods, whether bars of soap or aircraft carriers, but “workers” were also called upon to serve as soldiers. The war removed tens of millions of men from the labor force, shipping them off to – economically speaking – nonproductive endeavors. Sustained demand for goods combined with labor shortages raised prices, and as expectations for inflation rather than deflation set in, consumers became more willing to spend their money for fear it would be worth less in the future. The deflationary spiral was broken; supply and demand came back into balance.

    Policymakers of the time realized that the prosecution of the war had suspended the depression, but few were confident that the war had actually ended the conditions that made the depression possible. So in July 1944, 730 representatives from 44 different countries converged on a small ski village in New Hampshire to cobble together a system that would prevent additional depressions and – were one to occur – come up with a means of ending it shy of depending upon a world war.

    When all was said and done, the delegates agreed to a system of exchangeable currencies and broadly open rules of trade. The system would be based on the gold standard to prevent currency fluctuations, and a pair of institutions – what would become known as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank – would serve as guardians of the system’s financial and fiduciary particulars.

    The conventional wisdom is that Bretton Woods worked for a time, but that since the entire system was linked to gold, the limited availability of gold put an upper limit on what the new system could handle. As postwar economic activity expanded – but the supply of gold did not – that problem became so mammoth that the United States abandoned the gold standard in 1971. Most point to that period as the end of the Bretton Woods system. In fact, we are still using Bretton Woods, and while nothing that has been discussed to this point is wrong exactly, it is only part of the story.

    A Deeper Understanding: World War II and Bretton Woods
    Think back to July 1944. The Normandy invasion was in its first month. The United Kingdom served as the staging ground, but with London exhausted, its military commitment to the operation was modest. While the tide of the war had clearly turned, there was much slogging ahead. It had become apparent that launching the invasion of Europe – much less sustaining it – was impossible without large-scale U.S. involvement. Similarly, the balance of forces on the Eastern Front radically favored the Soviets. While the particulars were, of course, open to debate, no one was so idealistic to think that after suffering at Nazi hands, the Soviets were simply going to withdraw from territory captured on their way to Berlin.

    The shape of the Cold War was already beginning to unfold. Between the United States and the Soviet Union, the rest of the modern world – namely, Europe – was going to either experience Soviet occupation or become a U.S. protectorate.

    At the core of that realization were twin challenges. For the Europeans, any hope they had of rebuilding was totally dependent upon U.S. willingness to remain engaged. Issues of Soviet attack aside, the war had decimated Europe, and the damage was only becoming worse with each inch of Nazi territory the Americans or Soviets conquered. The Continental states – and even the United Kingdom – were not simply economically spent and indebted but were, to be perfectly blunt, destitute. This was not World War I, where most of the fighting had occurred along a single series of trenches. This was blitzkrieg and saturation bombings, which left the Continent in ruins, and there was almost nothing left from which to rebuild. Simply avoiding mass starvation would be a challenge, and any rebuilding effort would be utterly dependent upon U.S. financing. The Europeans were willing to accept nearly whatever was on offer.

    For the United States, the issue was one of seizing a historic opportunity. Historically, the United States thought of the United Kingdom and France – with their maritime traditions – as more of a threat to U.S. interests than the largely land-based Soviet Union and Germany. Even World War I did not fully dispel this concern. (Japan, for its part, was always viewed as a hostile power.) The United States entered World War II late and the war did not occur on U.S. soil. So – uniquely among all the world’s major powers of the day – U.S. infrastructure and industrial capacity would emerge from the war larger (far, far larger) than when it entered. With its traditional rivals either already greatly weakened or well on their way to being so, the United States had the opportunity to set itself up as the core of the new order.

    In this, the United States faced the challenges of defending against the Soviet Union. The United States could not occupy Western Europe as it expected the Soviets to occupy Eastern Europe; it lacked the troops and was on the wrong side of the ocean. The United States had to have not just the participation of the Western Europeans in holding back the Soviet tide, it needed the Europeans to defer to American political and military demands – and to do so willingly. Considering the desperation and destitution of the Europeans, and the unprecedented and unparalleled U.S. economic strength, economic carrots were the obvious way to go.

    Put another way, Bretton Woods was part of a broader American effort to extend the wartime alliance – sans the Soviets – beyond Germany’s surrender. After all wars, there is the hope that alliances that have defeated a common enemy will continue to function to administer and maintain the peace. This happened at the Congress of Vienna and Versailles as well. Bretton Woods was more than an attempt to shape the global economic system, it was an effort to grow a military alliance into a broader U.S.-led and -dominated bloc to counter the Soviets.

    At Bretton Woods, the United States made itself the core of the new system, agreeing to become the trading partner of first and last resort. The United States would allow Europe near tariff-free access to its markets, and turn a blind eye to Europe’s own tariffs so long as they did not become too egregious – something that at least in part flew in the face of the Great Depression’s lessons. The sale of European goods in the United States would help Europe develop economically, and, in exchange, the United States would receive deference on political and military matters: NATO – the ultimate hedge against Soviet invasion – was born.

    The “free world” alliance would not consist of a series of equal states. Instead, it would consist of the United States and everyone else. The “everyone else” included shattered European economies, their impoverished colonies, independent successor states and so on. The truth was that Bretton Woods was less a compact of equals than a framework for economic relations within an unequal alliance against the Soviet Union. The foundation of Bretton Woods was American economic power – and the American interest in strengthening the economies of the rest of the world to immunize them from communism and build the containment of the Soviet Union.

    Almost immediately after the war, the United States began acting in ways that indicated that Bretton Woods was not – for itself at least – an economic program. When loans to fund Western Europe’s redevelopment failed to stimulate growth, those loans became grants, aka the Marshall Plan. Shortly thereafter, the United States – certainly to its economic loss – almost absentmindedly extended the benefits of Bretton Woods to any state involved on the American side of the Cold War, with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan signing up as its most enthusiastic participants.

    And fast-forwarding to when the world went off of the gold standard and Bretton Woods supposedly died, gold was actually replaced by the U.S. dollar. Far from dying, the political/military understanding that underpinned Bretton Woods had only become more entrenched. Whereas before, the greatest limiter was on the availability of gold, now it became – and remains – the whim of the U.S. government’s monetary authorities.

    Toward Bretton Woods II
    For many of the states that will be attending what is already being dubbed Bretton Woods II, having this American centrality as such a key pillar of the system is the core of the problem.

    The fundamental principle of Bretton Woods was national sovereignty within a framework of relationships, ultimately guaranteed not just by American political power but by American economic power. Bretton Woods was not so much a system as a reality. American economic power dwarfed the rest of the noncommunist world, and guaranteed the stability of the international financial system.

    What the September financial crisis has shown is not that the basic financial system has changed, but what happens when the guarantor of the financial system itself undergoes a crisis. When the economic bubble in Japan – the world’s second-largest economy – burst in 1990-1991, it did not infect the rest of the world. Neither did the East Asian crisis in 1997, nor the ruble crisis of 1998. A crisis in France or the United Kingdom would similarly remain a local one. But a crisis in the U.S. economy becomes global. The fundamental reality of Bretton Woods remains unchanged: The U.S. economy remains the largest, and dysfunctions there affect the world. That is the reality of the international system, and that is ultimately what the French call for a new Bretton Woods is about.

    There has been talk of a meeting at which the United States gives up its place as the world’s reserve currency and primacy of the economic system. That is not what this meeting will be about, and certainly not what the French are after. The use of the dollar as world reserve currency is not based on an aggrandizing fiat, but the reality that the dollar alone has a global presence and trust. The euro, after all, is only a decade old, and is not backed either by sovereign taxing powers or by a central bank with vast authority. The European Central Bank (ECB) certainly steadies the European financial system, but it is the sovereign countries that define economic policies. As we have seen in the recent crisis, the ECB actually lacks the authority to regulate Europe’s banks. Relying on a currency that is not in the hands of a sovereign taxing power, but dependent on the political will of (so far) 15 countries with very different interests, does not make for a reliable reserve currency.

    The Europeans are not looking to challenge the reality of American power, they are looking to increase the degree to which the rest of the world can influence the dynamics of the American economy, with an eye toward limiting the ability of the Americans to accidentally destabilize the international financial system again. The French in particular look at the current crisis as the result of a failure in the U.S. regulatory system.

    And the Europeans certainly have a point. If fault is to be pinned, it is on the United States for letting the problem grow and grow until it triggered a liquidity crisis. The Bretton Woods institutions – specifically the IMF, which is supposed to serve the role of financial lighthouse and crisis manager – proved irrelevant to the problems the world is currently passing through. Indeed, all multinational institutions failed or, more precisely, have little to do with the financial system that was operating in 2008. The 64-year-old Bretton Woods agreement simply didn’t have anything to do with the current reality.

    Ultimately, the Europeans would like to see a shift in focus in the world of international economic interactions from strengthening the international trading system to controlling the international financial system. In practical terms, they want an oversight body that can guarantee that there won’t be a repeat of the current crisis. This would involve everything from regulations on accounting methods, to restrictions on what can and cannot be traded and by whom (offshore financial havens and hedge funds would definitely find their worlds circumscribed), to frameworks for global interventions. The net effect would be to create an international bureaucracy to oversee global financial markets.

    Fundamentally, the Europeans are not simply hoping to modernize Bretton Woods, but instead to Europeanize the American financial markets. This is ultimately not a financial question, but a political one. The French are trying to flip Bretton Woods from a system where the United States is the buttress of the international system to a situation where the United States remains the buttress but is more constrained by the broader international system. The European view is that this will help everybody. The American position is not yet framed and won’t be until the new president is in office.

    But it will be a very tough sell. For one, at its core the American problem is “simply” a liquidity freeze and one that is already thawing. Europe’s and East Asia’s recessions are bound to be deeper and longer lasting. So the United States is sure – no matter who takes over in January – to be less than keen about revamps of international processes in general. Far more important, any international system that oversees aspects of American finance would, by definition, not be under full American control, but under some sort of quasi-Brussels-like organization. And no American president is going to engage gleefully on that sort of topic.

    Unless something else is on offer.

    Bretton Woods was ultimately about the United States trading access to its economic might for political and military deference. The reality of American economic might remains. The question, then, is simple: What will the Europeans bring to the table with which to bargain?

    Tell Stratfor What You Think

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  • Corrupt Financiers Should Stop Their Assault on U.S., World Economy

    Corrupt Financiers Should Stop Their Assault on U.S., World Economy

    By Appo Jabarian
    Executive Publisher
    & Managing Editor

     
    USA Armenian Life Magazine — Issue #1121 Sept. 19-25, 2008riday September 19, 2008                                                        
     
    Yesterday, it was the evaporation of Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom, etc. Recently, it was Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and IndyMac Bank. Now, it is the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., and American International Group Inc.

     

    Which mega-corporations are next?
    The recent downfall of a number of major U.S. corporations has cost the American taxpayers huge amounts of money. Some who applaud the federal bailout of these failed corporations should realize that it is the taxpayer that is being further saddled with the burden of paying off these corporate “debts.”
    But are these “debts” real? Are they the result of honest mistakes? Or are they the by-products of greed and sugar-coated “mismanagement?”
    One of the reasons may lie in the fact that in late 1990’s, the Republican-controlled Congress and Democratic President Clinton “reshaped the financial landscape. That 1999 legislation removed Depression-era barriers between commercial banks and investment firms and allowed the creation of financial behemoths where years later the risks of underwriting sub-prime mortgages were somewhat hidden,” wrote Liz Sidoti of the Associated Press on Sept. 16.
    On September 15 the Wall Street’s Dow Jones took a historic plunge with the loss of 504 points. Although the drop was only 4.42% it made enough damage to make us realize that in today’s financial climate the economy of the United States is so weakened that even a minor loss in the percentage of its business volume, may send financial shockwaves.
    In a Sept. 15 article titled “Economic slump: Ethics loom large,” David R. Francis of the Christian Science Monitor wrote that the cause of the mild 2001 recession and the current slump “has been dishonesty, greed, and weak business ethics. … Today’s sinking economy … is the result of sagging real estate values and the bad behavior of many in the mortgage industry and on Wall Street. … In mature, highly developed countries like the US, individual acts of malfeasance are unlikely to have a widespread effect on the economy, notes Frank Vogl, cofounder of Transparency International, a nonprofit group which ranks nations each year by their degree of corruption, as perceived by investors. (Its next report is scheduled for release next week.) But, he adds, when ‘so many people engaged in so many aspects of finance have lost their ethical compass and put their short-term personal gains above other considerations,’ such as was the case in the sub-prime mortgage market in the US, it can have a ‘profound macroeconomic impact.’ In other words, the broad economy gets hurt by greed and selfishness as ensuing financial losses mount and trust fades.”
    The bottom line is that the American middle class is being subjected to double or even quadruple taxation.
    It is high time for the reinstatement of the Depression-era safety checks and barriers so that the corrupt financiers do not dip their hands deep in the American taxpayers’ pockets.