Category: Main Issues

  • Expert on Genocide bill: France decided against impairing ties with Turkey

    Expert on Genocide bill: France decided against impairing ties with Turkey

    armenia francePanARMENIAN.Net – Recently, the relations between Turkey and France were rather strained. The adoption of a bill criminalizing the denial of Armenian Genocide would further exacerbate them, according to a Turkish Studies expert.

    Commenting on the French Senate’s non-adoption of the bill in a conversation with a PanARMENIAN.Net reporter, Ruben Melkonyannoted, “with Turkey’s increasing presence in the international scene, many countries, including France, have to reckon with it. Recent international situation does not favor adoption of Genocide resolutions or similar draft laws,” he said.

    The expert noted with regret that the Genocide issue was turned into a bargain between the states.

    Dwelling on the response of France’s Armenian community, the expert noted, “I expect the reaction will be sharp, yet I’m more interested in the response of Charles Aznavour, who earlier said he’d undertake drastic steps were the bill not adopted.”

    The French Senate on Wednesday, May 4 rejected a bill penalizing the denial of Armenian Genocide.

    The bill, which was recently rejected by the French Senate Constitution Commission, envisioned five years in prison and a fine of up to 45,000 euros for people on French soil who deny Armenian Genocide. The bill was not endorsed by the French government either.

    Earlier, the Coordination Council of Armenian Organizations of France called on Armenian community representatives to gather in front of the Senate during the discussion of the bill to be presented by Serge Lagauche at 2:30 pm Paris time.

    via Expert on Genocide bill: France decided against impairing ties with Turkey – PanARMENIAN.Net.

  • ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

    ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

    adresinden T-346/03 nolu dosya aratilarak ulasilabilinir.

     

    ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

    17 December 2003 (1)

    (Non-contractual liability of the Community – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

    In Case T-346/03,

    Grégoire Krikorian, residing in Bouc-Bel-Air (France),

    Suzanne Krikorian, residing in Bouc-Bel-Air,

    Euro-Arménie ASBL, established in Marseille (France),

    represented by P. Krikorian, lawyer,

    applicants,

    v

    European Parliament, represented by R. Passos and A. Baas, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg,

    Council of the European Union, represented by S. Kyriakopoulou and G. Marhic, acting as Agents,

    and

    Commission of the European Communities, represented by F. Dintilhac and C. Ladenburger, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg,

    defendants,

    APPLICATION for compensation for the non-material damage suffered by the applicants on account of, inter alia, recognition of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union,

    THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

    OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

    composed of: B. Vesterdorf, President, P. Mengozzi and M.E. Martins Ribeiro, Judges,

    Registrar: H. Jung,

    makes the following

    Order

    Facts and procedure

    1.

    By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 9 October 2003, the applicants brought this action for damages in which they seek compensation for the harm caused to them by, inter alia, recognition of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union, although that State has refused to acknowledge the genocide perpetrated in 1915 against the Armenians living in Turkey.

    2.

    The applicants claim that the Court of First Instance should:

    – declare that the resolution of the European Parliament of 18 June 1987 on a political solution to the Armenian question (OJ 1987 C 190, p. 119) (‘the 1987 resolution’) has binding legal force in respect of the European Community;

    – declare that the defendants are in serious breach of Community law to the prejudice of the applicants;

    – order the defendants to pay each of the applicants the sum of EUR 1 in damages;

    – order the defendant to pay the costs, assessed at EUR 30 000, plus interest.

    3.

    In a separate document, lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 9 October 2003, the applicants applied for interim measures seeking, in particular, suspension of the procedure for examining the Republic of Turkey’s candidature for accession to the European Union by the defendant institutions and asking that resumption of that procedure be made conditional on prior acknowledgement by that State of the abovementioned genocide.

    Law

    Arguments of the parties

    4.

    According to the applicants, the first element giving rise to the non-contractual liability of the Community is the fact that, at its meeting in Helsinki (Finland) on 10 and 11 December 1999, the European Council officially recognised the Republic of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union, but did not make that accession conditional on the prior acknowledgement by that State of the abovementioned genocide. Moreover, they note that the Republic of Turkey enjoys an accession partnership, which provides in particular for significant assistance to enable that State to begin the irreversible process of accession. They refer in that connection to several documents, including Council Regulation (EC) No 390/2001 of 26 February 2001 on assistance to Turkey in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of an Accession Partnership (OJ 2001 L 58, p. 1), Council Regulation (EC) No 2500/2001 of 17 December 2001 concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey and amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89, (EC) No 1267/1999, (EC) No 1268/1999 and (EC) No 555/2000 (OJ 2001 L 342, p. 1) and Council Decision 2001/235/EC of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey (OJ 2001 L 85, p. 13).

    5.

    The defendant institutions therefore blatantly failed to have regard to the 1987 resolution. In that resolution, the Parliament declared that the Turkish Government’s refusal to acknowledge that genocide constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the examination of the Republic of Turkey’s possible accession.

    6.

    According to the applicants, the 1987 resolution is a legal act which, in the same way as recommendations and opinions, can produce legal effects (Case C-322/88 Grimaldi [1989] ECR 4407. In this case, the 1987 resolution has or is intended to have legal effects going beyond the internal organisation of the Parliament’s work (Joined Cases T-222/99, T-327/99 and T-329/99 Martinez and Others v Parliament [2001] ECR II-2823). In that resolution the Parliament intended publicly to lay down a special condition for the Republic of Turkey’s accession, namely the prior acknowledgement by that State of the genocide in question. Moreover, the words used in the resolution leave no room for ambiguity as to the intention of that Community institution.

    7.

    The applicants note in that connection that, since the entry into force of the Single European Act on 1 July 1987, the Parliament had the power under Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, since repealed, to object to the Republic of Turkey’s accession; they state that the requirement of the assent of the Parliament is now laid down in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. They point out that the 1987 resolution was published – and therefore brought to their knowledge – after that date, namely on 20 July 1987.

    8.

    It follows that the 1987 resolution gave rise to a legitimate expectation on their part that the Parliament would, if necessary, exercise its right of veto on the Republic of Turkey’s accession or, more generally, that that institution would object to examination of the Republic of Turkey’s candidature as long as the latter had not acknowledged the genocide in question. The situation noted in paragraph 4 above constitutes an infringement of that legitimate expectation.

    9.

    The applicants therefore claim that, since the Community set itself an obligation of conduct and an obligation as to the result to be achieved, the mere fact that there has been a failure to have regard to the requirements of the 1987 resolution suffices to prove a sufficiently serious breach of Community law.

    10.

    The applicants also rely on an infringement of several fundamental rights, including the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to respect for private life, laid down in Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950.

    11.

    Finally, the applicants claim that, as members of the Armenian community and descendants of survivors of the genocide in question, they have suffered non-material damage.

    12.

    In that respect, they state that the conduct of the defendant institutions is an affront to their dignity, in view of the fact, as they claim, that the memory of the victims of that genocide and the concern for historical truth are an integral part of the dignity of all Armenians. Moreover, since that genocide is an integral part of the history and identity of the Armenian people, the identity of the applicants is itself irreparably affected by the conduct of the defendant institutions. Finally, calling into question the reality of the abovementioned genocide brings about marginalisation and a feeling of inferiority within the Armenian community. Thus the attitude of the Republic of Turkey has the effect of ostracising the applicants, since they are regarded as second-rate victims. Those circumstances result in the applicants’ harbouring feelings of deep injustice, which also prevents them from completing the mourning process satisfactorily.

    Findings of the Court

    13.

    Under Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, where an action is manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court of First Instance may, by reasoned order and without taking further steps in the proceedings, give a decision on the action. In the light of the application, the Court of First Instance considers that it is able to give a decision on the substance of the present action, without hearing the observations of the defendant institutions and without opening the oral procedure.

    14.

    It is settled case-law that, for the Community to incur non-contractual liability within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 288 EC a number of conditions must be satisfied, namely the illegality of the conduct alleged against the institutions, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the alleged conduct and the damage complained of (Case 26/81 Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC [1982] ECR 3057, paragraph 16; Case T-175/94 International Procurement Services v Commission [1996] ECR II-729, paragraph 44; Case T-336/94 Efisol v Commission [1996] ECR II-1343, paragraph 30; and Case T-267/94 Oleifici Italiani v Commission [1997] ECR II-1239, paragraph 20).

    15.

    If any one of those conditions is not satisfied, the entire action must be dismissed and it is unnecessary to consider the other conditions for non-contractual liability on the part of the Community (Case C-104/97 P Atlanta v European Community [1999] ECR I-6983, paragraph 65).

    16.

    In this case, the applicants plead, essentially, two circumstances capable of giving rise to the non-contractual liability of the Community, namely recognition of the Republic of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union by the European Council at Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999, and the fact that that State enjoys a European Union accession partnership.

    17.

    As regards recognition of the Republic of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union, it must be stated that that is the result of an act of the European Council, which is not an institution of the Community within the meaning of Article 7 EC. As has been noted at paragraph 14 above, only the conduct of an institution of the Community can give rise to the non-contractual liability of the Community. In those circumstances, the argument that recognition of the Republic of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union gives rise to liability on the part of the Community must be rejected.

    18.

    As regards the fact that the Republic of Turkey enjoys a European Union accession partnership, the applicants rely on the argument that the conduct of the defendant institutions is unlawful because it is contrary to the 1987 resolution.

    19.

    It suffices to point out that the 1987 resolution is a document containing declarations of a purely political nature, which may be amended by the Parliament at any time. It cannot therefore have binding legal consequences for its author nor, a fortiori, for the other defendant institutions.

    20.

    That conclusion also suffices to dispose of the argument that the 1987 resolution could have given rise to a legitimate expectation, on the part of the applicants, that the institutions would comply with that resolution (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 87/77, 130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84 Salerno and Others v Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523, paragraph 59, and Joined Cases C-213/88 and C-39/89 Luxembourg v Parliament [1991] ECR I-5643, paragraph 25).

    21.

    As regards the alleged breach of fundamental rights (see paragraph 10 above), it is sufficient to note that the applicants merely claim that such a breach took place, without explaining how that follows from the conduct of the defendant institutions complained of in this case.

    22.

    For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out, first, that the applicants have manifestly not shown that the requirement of a causal connection is satisfied in this case.

    23.

    It is settled case-law that there must be a direct link of cause and effect between the fault allegedly committed by the institution concerned and the damage pleaded, the burden of proof of which rests on the applicant (Case T-220/96 EVO v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II-2265, paragraph 41, and the case-law cited). Moreover, the wrongful conduct of the institution concerned must be the direct and determining cause of that damage (orders of the Court of First Instance in Case T-614/97 Aduanas Pujol Rubio and Others v Council and Commission [2000] ECR II-2387, paragraph 19; Joined Cases T-611/97, T-619/97 to T-627/97 Transfluvia and Others v Council and Commission [2000] ECR II-2405, paragraph 17; and Case T-201/99 Royal Olympic Cruises and Others v Council and Commission [2000] ECR II-4005, paragraph 26, confirmed on appeal by order of the Court of Justice of 15 January 2002 in Case C-49/01 P Royal Olympic Cruises and Others v Council and Commission, not published in the ECR).

    24.

    In this case, it appears from the arguments put forward by the applicants that the alleged non-material damage is the result of the refusal by the Turkish Government to acknowledge the genocide in question rather than of the conduct of the defendant institutions complained of. In those circumstances, the applicants have not in any way shown that the conduct of the defendant institutions complained of is the direct and determining cause of the alleged damage.

    25.

    Secondly, as regards the requirement that the applicants must have suffered actual and certain damage, the applicants clearly confined themselves in their application to relying in general terms on non-material damage caused to the Armenian community, without giving the least indication as to the nature or extent of the damage which they consider they had suffered individually. Therefore the applicants have supplied no information that would enable the Court to find that the applicants in fact suffered actual and certain damage themselves (see, to that effect, Case T-99/98 Hameico Stuttgart and Others v Council and Commission [2003] ECR II-2195, paragraphs 68 and 69).

    26.

    In those circumstances, the applicants have manifestly not shown that the conditions under which the Community will incur non-contractual liability are satisfied.

    27.

    It follows from the foregoing that the claims for compensation are manifestly unfounded.

    Costs

    28.

    In accordance with Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

    29.

    However, in the present case, pursuant to Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure, the order is made before the defendants have lodged their defence and had the opportunity to apply for costs. It is therefore necessary to apply Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure, according to which the Court of First Instance may order the costs to be shared where the circumstances are exceptional.

    30.

    Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs.

    On those grounds,

     

    THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE,

     

    hereby orders:

     

    1. The action is dismissed.

    2. The applicants shall bear the costs.

     

    Luxembourg, 17 December 2003.

     

    H. Jung

    B. Vesterdorf

    Registrar

    President

  • Swiss try to unblock Armenia–Turkey deal in meeting with Armenian president

    Swiss try to unblock Armenia–Turkey deal in meeting with Armenian president

    GSAsPresident Micheline Calmy-Rey has held talks with Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan over a Swiss-mediated deal aimed at normalising relations with Turkey.

    Sargsyan thanked Switzerland for its efforts but accused Turkey of blocking implementation of the 2009 landmark treaty.

    He said he had “interesting discussions” with Calmy-Rey to try to end the deadlock.

     

    The meeting in Bern also focused on boosting economic and development cooperation between Armenia and Switzerland, the foreign ministry said on Tuesday.

     

    It was the first official visit by an Armenian President to Switzerland and comes a month after Calmy-Rey opened a Swiss embassy to the Armenian capital, Yerevan.

     

    The trade volume between the two countries has been modest – less than SFr10 million ($11.6 million) – but Switzerland has contributed about SFr5 million annually to development aid for Armenia, according to the foreign ministry.

     

    In October 2009 Armenia and Turkey signed a deal in Zurich to normalise relations strained over a historic conflict at the beginning of the 20th century, notably the issue of mass deportations and genocide of ethnic Armenians during the Ottoman empire.

     

    However, the agreement has been put on hold as a result of a regional conflict.

    swissinfo.ch and agencies

    via Swiss try to unblock Armenia–Turkey deal in meeting with Armenian president. – swissinfo.

  • Golden Rules of Tallahassee Democrat “Faith and Courtesy”

    Golden Rules of Tallahassee Democrat “Faith and Courtesy”

    IMG 5059International Center for Journalists continues to realize cross border projects all around the world. One of them is Turkish-Armenian-American journalists exchange program which combines 7 Turkish and 6 Armenian journalists to make them observers in different American media organs. Our author Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is one of the participants of this project. Every journalists have gone to different regions of the US and they are visitors of American journalists. Oztarsu lives in Florida with his Armenian partner Ofelya Kamavosyan and observes American media mechanism`s differences. He compares business ethics, journalism style and effects of Tallahassee Democrat with the direction of International Center for Journalists. The author shares his observations with interesting points for us: (more…)

  • Are the same Turks and Armenians who were just yesterday inseparable today enemies?

    Are the same Turks and Armenians who were just yesterday inseparable today enemies?

    mark mustianTurkey, which was made aware of the sensitivity surrounding the Armenian issue throughout the world through attacks by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), continues to be caught unprepared every year as to how to shape its approach towards the events of April 24. (more…)

  • A solution lies under the sea

    A solution lies under the sea

    By Max Gevers

    Cyprus2

    NOW that the chances of Turkey joining the EU in the foreseeable future have declined to zero, the prospect of a solution to the Cyprus problem too is close to nil. For Cyprus, Turkey’s road towards EU-accession always was a powerful and unique strategic opportunity, the strongest imaginable political impetus to negotiate a solution acceptable to both sides. That opportunity has now been squandered: by the Cyprus government, because of its attempts to have it all its own way and not seeing where and in which European capitals its real interests were best assured; by northern Cyprus, because its hard line government preferred the present situation in the absence of some powerful coaching and arm twisting by Turkey and never seemed sincere in negotiations; and by Ankara, because with the disappearance of a serious European incentive, it lacked the drive for hard negotiations. For Turkey there is, in the absence of a European option, no longer any incentive to achieve success, despite its zero-problem foreign policy.

    Years have been wasted away and, with the departure of Mehmet Ali Talat in northern Cyprus and the increasing reluctance in some European countries concerning Turkey’s EU negotiations, this incredible incentive for Turkey to settle on Cyprus was lost. With that loss, chances for a solution in Cyprus are indeed very slim. They will remain so, and gradually if not very fast, become non-existent.

    If a solution to the Cyprus problem is still really sought after, that is if the Cyprus government is really serious about negotiating and finding a solution, then it will have to come up with an incentive for Turkey. This must be powerful enough to change the present parameters of the negotiations in which almost nobody believes any more that something useful and substantial can be achieved. Is there such an incentive?

    There is, and it concerns the exploration and production of hydrocarbons in the sea around Cyprus. There has been a lot of talk about the potential presence of oil and/or gas in this part of the Mediterranean. Much of it is wishful thinking based on inflated expectations of a very complex geology in the area. Up to now, not a drop of oil or gas has actually been found and brought to the surface; only some preliminary seismic exploration has been carried out. That may have been promising, but the experience of the search for oil and gas in seas elsewhere in the world has shown that it is almost impossible to make reliable estimates of possible reserves without exploratory drilling itself.

    With the Cyprus conflict nowhere near a solution, it is extremely unlikely that Turkey will allow Cyprus full-scale and unhindered exploration in this part of the world. Israel may join in some exploration, but it could not be a fully fledged partner, without also becoming a burden for Cyprus’ foreign policy towards the Arab world. Besides, it would not take away the main factor, which is that Turkey and northern Cyprus have to be major partners in the game for serious and sustained exploration and production of hydrocarbons in the area. Cyprus must come to terms with Turkey on this issue; it cannot do without this, or the full potential exploitation of mineral riches in the seas around Cyprus will not be realised.

    A second factor the Cyprus government should take into account, if it is at all serious about negotiating a solution, is that it should facilitate a very broad based internal debate, with the involvement of NGOs and civil society on the sort of solution it wants. The studies by researcher Alexandros Lordos some years ago were an excellent beginning but not properly followed up nor elaborated into operational conclusions. The present situation is that the Greek Cypriots, with a fair amount of contempt for historical truths, basically want it almost all for themselves. There is hardly any pretence about it with the consequence that, after the Annan plan, there was no serious thought on the type of solution that could and would be acceptable to all. Neither is there any thought on how to actually live in a Cyprus where Turkish and Greek Cypriots genuinely share responsibilities for government and society. Whenever some sort of compromise on specific subjects leaks out, it invariably meets ferocious opposition and accusation that the Cyprus government is giving it all away, a situation worse than any imaginary zero-sum game. It is an almost impossible situation for any government, and the present one is certainly not known for its courageous stands and decisions.

    A third factor to be kept in mind is that the UN will not eternally remain in Cyprus to separate the parties, in the absence of even the remotest prospect for a solution. At the same time, this also offers an opportunity: the future possibility that the UN might well leave could trigger an increased sense of urgency that something serious and substantial should really happen quite soon.

    A fourth aspect with which parties should rapidly come to terms is the idea that permanent partition, with northern Cyprus gradually being absorbed into Turkey itself, a scenario which foolishly northern Cyprus does not really seem to realise, is a very serious and by now realistic option. August 1974 is almost 37 years ago and the memory of a fully independent and united Cyprus is hardly very much alive these days, let alone that the situation before that time scarcely merited a beauty prize. Maybe it is indeed the case that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, although grudgingly liking each other, do not really want to live together and certainly not to share responsibility for government and society.

    These are the issues which should be at the forefront of everybody who is involved with Cyprus. A solution is still possible but realistically and unfortunately at present increasingly remote. The international community, indeed the EU, is bored stiff with Cyprus and hardly ever pays more than minimal lip-service when needed, something the Cyprus government should keep in mind as its time to take the EU presidency approaches.

    Realism, political courage, serious civil society debate and, why not, some substantial assistance by a major outside power are needed. The old mantra that only Cypriots can solve their own problems has been proved totally and disastrously wrong, something only Cypriots don’t realise. Cypriots have, unfortunately, managed to transform an unwanted situation into a stale problem and a permanent misfortune. The incentive of the potential riches of oil and gas exploration and production could change this, but only if the authorities in Cyprus and Turkey really want that and if civil society in Cyprus has a productive say in the type of future society it wants to live in.

    Source: Cyprus-mail