President Dervis Eroglu of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) said that going on Cyprus talks in an open-ended way would prevent reaching a solution.
During a meeting on Monday, Eroglu said that there could be a study by a technical committee in order to eliminate the inconsistencies, but a “leaders meeting” was not on the agenda.
Eroglu said that Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias did not accept a multilateral conference on Cyprus issue, and mentioned carrying out open-ended talks.
An open-ended talk would continue 40 more years, and no one could make Turkish Cypriots sit on the negotiation table for another 40 years, he added.
On April 27, UN head’s special Cyprus adviser Alexander Downer said he planned to carry out “a two-week shuttle diplomacy” between Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders to see if they could agree on methods for a fresh round of settlement negotiations to reunify their island.
“There will be no peace talks between the sides until leaders find a common ground to continue with the negotiations in a fresh round,” Downer noted.
Downer said the UN head had an intention to hold a international conference on the Cyprus issue this summer, adding that Ban’s decision hinged on a “common negotiations ground” between the two leaders that could lead to a comprehensive solution.
We have just passed April 24, when Armenians of various walks of life commemorate the anniversary of the arrest of the Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul 97 years ago, alleged to have been the beginning of “Armenian genocide.” So the pundits chastise, woefully, Turkey for “denying” genocide, and demand that Turkey extend an apology and offer restitution (meaning money and land) to the Armenians.
This is no place to dwell on history to explain why such demands lack rational basis, e.g., if the Ottoman Turks had intent to exterminate the Armenian minority, why they gave Armenian citizens high positions in the government, why they waited for more than 6 centuries – when they were in much better position – to deliberately target Armenians.
Nor is this the proper place to elaborate why some critical pieces of “evidence” e.g., the Andonian files, that the proponents of genocide cite to support their thesis, were forgeries, or that the orders issued by the Ottoman central government to relocate Armenians proscribed that all measures were to be taken to ensure the safety of the deportees and meet their needs during and after relocation.
But there are two aspects the proponents of genocide conveniently ignore, that call for special attention: balance and due process.
Regarding balance, no one denies that Armenians suffered during relocation, and some lost their lives, in a time of war when chaos, lawlessness and depravation prevailed. Surely we must mourn the sufferings and loss of life. But do we ever hear about the sufferings and loss of lives of non-Armenians? During that tragic period more than half a million Muslims – and some Jews – perished at the hands of armed, marauding Armenian gangs that terrorized the countryside and helped invading enemy armies.
Do the lost lives of Muslims not matter?
If we are to recall history, do Armenians carry any sense of guilt and culpability for aiding the enemy and terrorizing the local civil population?
And why do we not hear, one must ask, any remorse on the part of Armenians for the killings by the ASALA organization of more than 40 Turkish diplomats in the 1970’s and ‘80’s?
As for due process, it must be emphasized that “genocide” is a special crime, and the term should not be used lightly. To quote the 1948 UN Resolution on the Prevention of Genocide, determination on genocide can only be made “by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.” In the case of the alleged Armenian genocide, there has been no such determination. No court verdict; none, period. The U.N. resolution also makes no attribution to “Armenian genocide.”
A parliamentary body, often beholden to special interests, and acting as both the prosecutor and judge, is no substitute for a duly authorized court of law.
So, one must ask, without a court verdict, how can the Turks be accused of the “g” crime? Where is the respect for due process?
In fact, the only judicial proceeding that comes close to being an international tribunal on the Armenian case is the Malta Tribunal, held by the victorious British after WWI. The proceedings, investigating charges against 144 high-ranking Ottoman officials accused of harming Armenians, failed to bring about a single conviction. Even searching through the U.S. State Department files in Washington D.C. failed to produce any incriminating evidence. Off went the dispatch from the British Embassy to Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in London: “I regret to inform Your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial at Malta.” All the detainees were set free and returned to Turkish soil.
Armenian genocide allegations, apart from being legally unsustainable, create discord and animosity in society. Nearly a century has passed, and it is time to move on toward greater inter-communal harmony.
French presidential candidate Gil Taieb failed to visit Turkey and meet with local French community during his campaign due to his position on Israel and the Armenian Genocide.
After successful trips to Greece and Israel, Taieb had to travel to Istanbul, JSSNews reports.
It was his second trip to Turkey but it was postponed because of his “active position on Israel and the army, as well as support for the Armenian Genocide recognition, a source told JSSNews.
A source close to Taieb said he is determined to protect republican values, his commitments and freedom wherever he is.
via French candidate’s trip to Turkey canceled due to his position on Armenian Genocide | Armenia News – NEWS.am.
Turkey has begun drilling for natural gas in northern Cyprus, increasing tension across the east Mediterranean over control of offshore gas fields.
NICOSIA, Cyprus, April 27 (UPI) — Turkey has begun drilling for natural gas in northern Cyprus ratcheting up growing tension across the east Mediterranean over control of offshore gas fields that could transform the economies of a region long barren of energy resources.
The Turks control the northern one-third of Cyprus, where they’ve stationed 30,000 troops since 1974 when they invaded the island, which is dominated by Greek Cypriots.
Ankara calls its zone the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus but it’s recognized only by Turkey. The Greek Cypriot government in Nicosia is internationally considered the sovereign authority.
Technically, that means the Turks are drilling illegally.
That exacerbates a spider’s web of territorial and maritime disputes in the east Mediterranean that intersect with long-running and potentially explosive conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors and the ancient rivalry between Turkey and Greece.
Israel made the first discoveries off its northern coast in 2009-10 with the Noble Energy Corp. of Houston striking major reserves.
The Tamar field contains an estimated 9 trillion cubic feet of gas but the nearby Leviathan field has 17 tcf, the biggest strike made so far in the region. Four subsequent finds have boosted estimated Israeli reserves in the Levant Basin to 35 tcf, worth in excess of $130 billion and enough to turn the once energy-poor Jewish state into an exporter.
The Turks launched their drilling in the TRNC Thursday, sharpening the swelling dispute over who has rights to the island’s potential energy riches and setting back hopes of reconciliation between the two communities and the states that support them.
Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz declared the onshore well operated by the state-run Turkish Petroleum Corp. has “strategic significance and we attribute great importance to it.”
Cyprus could be sitting on enough natural gas to last it 200 years.
When the Greek Cypriots, defying Turkish warnings, began exploration of the southernmost of their 12 maritime blocks in 2011, Turkey sent a seismic vessel escorted by a warship into Greek Cypriot waters and warned it would “retaliate even more strongly” to any further drilling.
Israel and Cyprus, where Noble Energy made a strike of 5 tcf-8 tcf recently, are collaborating on plans to jointly export their gas to Europe via an underwater pipeline to Greece.
Another option is building a liquefied natural gas plant, possibly offshore which would make it the world’s first floating LNG terminal — and a juicy target. China’s interested in building it.
The economic cooperation between Israel and Cyprus, 300 miles to the north, is also forging a new military alliance between the Jewish state and Greece.
This is rapidly replacing the strategic alliance between Israel and Turkey that was formalized in 1996, but broke apart in May 2010, in large part because of growing antagonism by Turkey’s Islamist-led government.
So a major realignment in the eastern Mediterranean appears to be under way as the region’s energy resources are uncovered.
The U.S. Geological Survey reported in 2010 that the Levant Basin, embracing Syria, Israel, the Gaza Strip and Cyprus, contains an estimated 122 tcf of gas and some 4 billion barrels of oil.
In February, Israel, a major regional military power, signed a military cooperation pact with the Greek Cypriots, whose military forces are miniscule. This allows Israeli ships and aircraft to use Cypriot territorial waters and airspace.
That will probably open the way for Israel to deploy F-16s on the island if the Turks get pushy there. Turkey has a squadron of its own F-16s in the TRNC.
Meantime, the Israelis are making elaborate plans to defend their offshore fields against terrorist or missile attacks.
For now at least, the main danger is seen to be Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed movement in Lebanon. Beirut claims that Leviathan, as designated by Israel, overlaps into 330 square miles of Lebanese waters.
The Lebanese are preparing to launch their own exploration in waters likely to hold major gas fields, adding to the complex energy mosaic.
Hezbollah, which has fought Israel since 1982, says it won’t allow the Jewish state to “plunder” Lebanese resources.
Israel took part in naval exercises in the region with U.S. and Greek warships March 25-April 5 that included protecting offshore gas platforms. Turkey was excluded.
The Israeli air force has held several joint maneuvers with the Greeks, where once they trained with the Turks.
via Turkish gas drill in Cyprus hikes tensions – UPI.com.
“Turkey denies the Armenian Genocide” goes a jingle. Yes, the Turkish state’s official policy towards the Armenian Genocide was and is indeed characterized by the “three M’s”: misrepresentation, mystification, and manipulation. But when one gauges what place the genocide occupies in the social memory of Turkish society, even after nearly a century, a different picture emerges. Even though most direct eyewitnesses to the crime have passed away, oral history interviews yield important insights. Elderly Turks and Kurds in eastern Turkey often hold vivid memories from family members or fellow villagers who witnessed or participated in the genocide. This essay is based on countless interviews conducted with the (grand-)children of eye witnesses to the Armenian Genocide. The research results suggest there is a clash between official state memory and popular social memory: The Turkish government is denying a genocide that its own population remembers.
Children in Mush (photo by Khatchig Mouradian)
Oral history in Turkey
Oral history is an indispensible tool for scholars interested in mass violence. A considerable collection of Armenian and Syriac oral history material has been studied by colleagues.1 The existing body of oral history research in Turkey, though gradually developing, has hardly addressed the genocide. A potential research field was politicized by successive governments and the Turkish Historical Society. Several documentaries about the victimization of Ottoman Muslims in the eastern border regions have included shots of elderly Muslims speaking about their victimization at the hand of Armenians (and presumably Cossacks) in 1918. It seems unmistakable that the Turkish-nationalist camp fears that the local population of Anatolian towns and villages might “confess” the genocide’s veracity and disclose relevant details about it. For example, the 2006 PBS documentary “The Armenian Genocide” by Andrew Goldberg includes remarkable footage of elderly Turks speaking candidly about the genocide. One of the men remembers how his father told him that the génocidaires had mobilized religious leaders to convince the population that killing Armenians would secure them a place in heaven. Another middle-aged man recounts a recollection of his grandfather’s that neighboring Armenian villagers were locked in a barn and burnt alive.2
In the past decade, I have searched (and found) respondents willing to relate their personal experiences or their family narratives related to the war and the genocide. In the summers of 2002 and 2004-07, I conducted up to 200 interviews with (grand-)children of contemporaries in eastern Turkey, all semi-structured and taped. Needless to say, oral history has its methodological pitfalls, especially in a society where the memory of modern history is overlaid with myth and ideologies. Many are unwilling to reflect about their family histories because they have grown accustomed to ignoring inquisitive and critical questions, not least on their own moral choices in the face of their neighbors’ destruction. Others are reluctant to admit to acts considered shameful.3
But while some were outright unwilling to speak once I broached the taboo subject, others agreed to speak but wished to remain anonymous, and again many others were happy to speak openly, with some even providing me access to their private documents. Even though direct eyewitnesses to the crime have most probably passed away, these interviews proved fruitful. Elderly Turks and Kurds often remember vivid anecdotes from family members or villagers who witnessed or participated in the massacres. My subject position as a “local outsider” (being born in the region but raised abroad) facilitated the research as it gave me the communicative channels to at once delve deeply and recede at the appropriate moments. It also provided me with a sense of immunity from the dense moral and political field in which most of this research is embedded.
Turkish and Kurdish eyewitness accounts
A.D., a Kurdish writer from Varto (Muş), recalled a childhood memory from 1966 when an earthquake laid bare a mass grave near his village. The villagers knew the victims were Armenians from a neighboring village. According to A.D., when the village elder requested advice from the local authorities on what to do, within a day military commanders had assigned a group of soldiers to re-bury the corpses. The villagers were warned to never speak about it again.4
Interviews with elderly locals also yielded considerable useful data about the genocide itself. For example, a Kurdish man (born 1942) from Diyarbekir’s northern Piran district, had heard from his father how fellow villagers would raid Armenian villages and dispatch their victims by slashing their throats wide open. As they operated with daggers and axes, this often led to decapitations. After the killing was done, the perpetrators could see how the insides of the victims’ windpipes were black because of tobacco use.5 Morbid details such as these are also recorded by the following account from a Kurdish man from the Kharzan region, east of Diyarbekir:
My grandfather was the village elder (muhtar) during the war. He told us when we were children about the Armenian massacre. There was a man in our village; he used to hunt pheasants. Now the honorless man (bêşerefo) hunted Armenians. Grandpa saw how he hurled a throwing axe right through a child a mother was carrying on her back. Grandpa yelled at him: “Hey, do you have no honor? God will punish you for this.” But the man threatened my grandfather that if he did not shut up, he would be next. The man was later expelled from the village.6
Here is another account from a Turkish woman (born 1928) from Erzincan:
Q: You said there were Armenians in your village, too. What happened to them?
A: They were all killed in the first year of the war, you didn’t know? My mother was standing on the hill in front of our village. She saw how at Kemah they threw (döktüler) all the Armenians into the river. Into the Euphrates. Alas, screams and cries (bağıran çağıran). Everyone, children and all (çoluk çocuk), brides, old people, everyone, everyone. They robbed them of their golden bracelets, their shawls, and silk belts, and threw them into the river.
Q: Who threw them into the river?
A: The government of course.
Q: What do you mean by ‘the government’?
A: Gendarmes.7
These examples suggest that there still might be something meaningful gained from interviews with elderly Turks and Kurds. Needless to say, had a systematic oral history project been carried out in Turkey much earlier, e.g. in the 1960’s or 1970’s, undoubtedly a wealth of crucial information could have been salvaged. Besides the excellent research conducted in Turkey by colleagues such as Leyla Neyzi, Ayşe Gül Altınay, and others, interviews by individual researchers are at best a drop in the ocean. A measured research project with a solid book as output would be a memorable achievement for the centenary of the genocide.
Discussion
When I was traveling from Ankara to Adana in the summer of 2004, I stopped by the friendly town of Ereğli, north of the Taurus mountain range. My friend, an academic visiting his family, had invited me along. Strolling through the breezy town, we came across one of my friend’s acquaintances, an “Uncle Fikri.” The old man looked sad, so we asked him what was wrong. He said, “My father has been on his deathbed for a few days now.” When we tried to console him, he answered: “I’m not sad because he will die, he has been sick for a while now. I just cannot accept that he refuses to recite the Kelime-i Shehadet before he passes on.” (Shahadah, the Muslim declaration of belief: “There is no God but Allah and Muhammed is his Prophet.”) The man looked deep into our eyes, there was an awkward silence for four seconds, we understood each other, and we parted.
In this example, only two generations separated us from the eyewitness generation. Therefore, I believe there might still be avenues for oral history research on the genocide. Father Patrick Desbois is a French Catholic priest who travels to Ukraine in a concerted effort to document the Shoah through the use of oral history. His team locates mass graves and interviews contemporary witnesses about the mass shootings of Jews, which often took place just outside the Ukrainian villages they visit. The elderly respondents usually remember the slaughter in vivid detail.8 Desbois’ work on Ukraine has proven helpful in completing the already comprehensive picture historians have of Nazi mass murder in that region. During a private conversation, Desbois intimated that he would be interested in launching a similar project in Turkey, if a viable initiative was proposed.9 It might be worthwhile to gauge what place the Armenian Genocide occupies in the social memory of Turks and Kurds, even after nearly a century. The conclusion would undoubtedly warrant my introductory comment: The Turkish government is denying a genocide that its own population remembers.
Endnotes
1. Donald E. Miller and Lorne Touryan-Miller, Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I, Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006, appendix; Ayşe Gül Altınay and Fethiye Çetin, Torunlar (Istanbul: Metis, 2009).
2. Andrew Goldberg, “The Armenian Genocide,” Two Cats Productions, 2006.
3. For parallel problems in Russian history, see Orlando Figes, The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia, London: Penguin, 2007, p. XXXV.
4. Interview conducted with A.D. (from Varto district) in Heidelberg, Germany, Nov. 24, 2009.
5. Interview conducted with M.Ş. (from Piran district) in Diyarbakır, July 15, 2004.
6. Interview conducted with Erdal Rênas (from the Kharzan area) in Istanbul, Aug. 18, 2002.
7. Interview conducted with K.T. (from Erzincan) in Bursa on June 28, 2002 and Aug. 20 2007, partially screened in the documentary “Land of our Grandparents” (Amsterdam: Zelović Productions, 2008).
8.Patrick Desbois, Porteur de Mmémoires: sur les Traces de la Shoah par Balles, Paris: Michel Lafon, 2007. Also, see www.shoahparballes.com.
9. Personal communication with Patrick Desbois at the conference “The Holocaust by Bullets,” organized by the Amsterdam Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the NationaalMuseum Vught (Netherlands), Sept. 11, 2009.
European Journal of International Law (EJIL) yaklasik bir yil once kendilerine yayimlanmak uzere yollanan – İsvec’te mukim bir Ermeni tarafindan kaleme alindigini yaptigimiz inceleme sonucunda ogrendigimiz-
“State Identity, Continuity and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire,
the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide”
bir makale taslagini karsi gorus (cevap) yazmam talebi ile bana yolladi. Sagligim uzun sure bilgisayar onun de calismama olanak saglamamaktaydi. Bu talebi reddedersem, “Turklere yazdik cevap vermek istemediler ” gerekcesi ile -ulkemiz hakkinda gercekten cok agir ve asilsiz suclamalar iceren- bu yaziyi herhalde yayimlayacaklarini dusunerek, Ankara’da doktorasini yapmakta olan Fransiz Maxime Gauin’in yardimini rica ettim. Ekte sundugum cevabi yazdik ve 24.04.2012 tarihinde EJIL’e yolladik.
13 sahifelik bu yazimiz 35 sayfalik makaleye cevap teskil ediyor.
EJIL bu cevabimizi yayimlar mi ? Bilmiyorum. Rahatsiz olacaklarini ve Ermeni militanlarin serrinden korkacaklarini sanirim. En azindan yayimlamazlar ise, orijinal makaleyi de yayimlamazlar insallah
Ayrica, bilimsel dergilerde adet oldugu uzere, makaleye verilecek cevabimiza, orijinal makale yazarinin verecegi cevabi da yayimlamak istediklerini bana bildiren EJIL’e , yazar, makale hakkindaki yorumumuza cevap verirse, buna verecegimiz cevabi da birlikte yayimlamalari gerektigini hatırlattim.
Yazimizi bilgi ve degerlendirmenize sunuyorum. Yorumumuzu okumak zahmetine katlanacak arkadaslar, meslekdaslar goruslerini bildirirlerse sevinirim.
Saygilariğmi sunarim. Dostlukla
Pulat Tacar
—————–
Reply to “State Identity, Continuity and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire,
the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide”
Pulat Tacar[1] and Maxime Gauin[2]
Introduction
We have been asked by the European Journal of International Law to write a reply to a manuscript titled “State Identity, Continuity and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide”. The said manuscript accuses Turkey of “practicing a denialist policy” with regard to “the act of genocide committed during 1915-1916,” demanding it “make itself responsible for its own internationally wrongful acts committed against Armenians and other Christian minorities,” and also accused it of “expanding the massacres beyond its borders into the Caucasus and the territories of the independent Republic of Armenia.” According to the same manuscript, there is a state succession and continuation of responsibility from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, and the Republic must assume full responsibility for and should also repair the injury caused by the Ottoman Empire.
The Armenian question is especially sensitive, among other reasons because of the long accumulation of prejudices against Turks[3], Armenian terrorism of 1973-1991[4], the Armenian invasion and occupation of western Azerbaijan since 1992[5], or more recently the virulent anti-Turkish stance of Anders Breivik in his manifesto[6] and the various campaigns or attacks by Armenian nationalists.[7] Instead of easing the tensions, the manuscript fuels them through the provocative[8], defaming,[9] irredentist[10] remarks of its author who harbors in his writings the colors of a political pamphleteer.
On this sensitive issue our main objective is to restore much-needed understanding and fair as well as reconciliatory dialogue between the Armenian and Turkish people and all interested parties, including scholars.[11]
“The right to truth” encompasses all the aspects of the truth and all the pages of history; in short, “a just memory.” Thus, initiatives for dialogue between those who defend different views should be promoted. In this respect, the creation of joint commissions foreseen by the protocols between Armenia and Turkey will no doubt serve the cause of reconciliation, even if parties to the conflict insist on highlighting their views on the different aspects of “their truth.” We believe, like the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, that history is not frozen or rigid forever; that assessments categorized as historical truth cannot be conclusive, and that the assertions related to historical knowledge develop. Consequently, research on history is continuous.
Paul Ricoeur,[12] who has received international recognition with his book titled Memory, History, Forgetting, criticized the concept of “collective memory” and pointed out that some ideologies have been formed under the auspices of this concept concerning the warning—reminded frequently by local and foreign scholars or politicians—on “completing the task of memory.” Paul Ricoeur emphasized that not the “task of memory” but a “study of memory” process should be developed in our minds. He further stated that discussions around “rightful memory” create a difficult picture vis-à-vis those who are forced somewhere to exceedingly remember their sorrows, and who may somewhere else equally face the position of those who tend to excessively forget that conviction and punishment are the task of judges. The citizen must resist “forgetting” and at the same time should possess a ‘just memory.’ The task of the historian is not to accuse or exculpate, but to understand; the ‘study of memory’ is open to improvement and its feature of défamiliarisation [13] outweighs the task of memory.”
As we address our comments to the European Journal for International Law, we intend to focus mainly on the international law aspects of the question.
I. Why Turkey does not qualify the tragic events of 1915-1916 as genocide?
1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
The main incrimination of the author is that Turkey denies recognizing the 1915-1916 Armenian genocide. Let us scrutinize if such an accusation is legally sustainable.
“The concept of the “Armenian genocide” is being used in a historical and political rather than in a legal perspective. It has become a catchword which reveals deep scars in the Armenian collective memory. Learned legal discussions on the issue of genocidal intent are of little or no relevance to the perception by the Armenians of one of the most defining moments of their history [14]”.
The term “genocide” is a legal term; it describes a crime specifically defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention and must be addressed accordingly. The existence of the crime of genocide can be legally determined only by the judges of a competent tribunal on the basis of the prescribed legal criteria and after a fair and impartial trial. The Genocide Convention does not allow for convictions on genocide by legislatures, scholars, pamphleteers, politicians or others. Some historians, sociologists, politicians and even political scientists who dealt with these issues tend to describe almost any incident which involves a significant number of dead[15] as genocide; they sometimes purposely mislead those who are not familiar with the law; they created an “Armenian taboo” and now they are prisoners of it.[16] Indeed,
“To term the events of 1915 as genocide is to detach genocide from its legal definition and to use it for political or moral purposes. Whether it is sound to keep hammering on a legal term based on non-legal considerations is doubtful… it adds to a wrong conceptualization of the legal system and eventually could lead to a devaluation of the norm itself…” [17]
But, Armenians and some of their supporters have deliberately set aside the legal aspects of the issue, because –they thought- it would weaken their genocide claims. They have chosen to adopt a dogmatic political approach to underline the tragic nature of the incidents so that they can make genocide claims more easily acceptable by the public.[18]
Dolus specialis – special intent
The most important characteristic of the Genocide Convention is that for the crime of genocide to exist, acts must have been committed with the intent to destroy the protected groups as such. The mental or subjective element (mens rea) is a constituent of that crime. The concept of “general intent,” which is valid for ordinary crimes, is inadequate in the identification of acts of genocide.
Sociologically and psychologically, the intent “to destroy a group as such” emerges in the most intensive stage of racism. Racial hatred is quite different from the ordinary animosity laced with anger, which parties engaged in a substantial dispute may feel toward one another. Racial hatred is a deeply pathological feeling or complicated fanaticism. Anti-Semitism is an example in this context.[19]
According to the Genocide Convention, the intent to destroy a group must be in the form of “special intent,” dolus specialis, beyond any doubt. This crucial aspect of the crime of genocide has been underlined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in paragraph 187 of its verdict on Bosnia Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro[20]: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) examined the allegations by Bosnia and Herzegovina and conducted long and detailed investigations regarding the alleged atrocities, the findings of which are grouped according to the categories of prohibited acts described in Article II of the Genocide Convention. With regard to killing members of the protected group, the Court found that massive killings throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina were perpetrated during the conflict. However, with the exception of Srebrenica, the Court was not convinced that those killings were accompanied by the specific intent on the part of the perpetrators to destroy in whole or in part the group of Bosnian Muslims. So, if the “special intent” is not proven beyond any doubt, judicially an act cannot be qualified as genocide. The cases of civil war, rebellion, and mutual killings should not be confused with the crime of genocide.
A competent tribunal to judge the genocidal acts
Moreover, the existence of the crime of genocide must be decided by a competent tribunal. Article VI of the 1948 Genocide Convention on the subject reads as follows:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
The issue of a competent tribunal had been debated extensively by the International Preparatory Conference of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The question of determining a competent tribunal was resolved[21] after lengthy discussion and the above-mentioned text was approved. During the discussions, a proposal of “universal repression” was rejected[22]. Universal repression foresees the judging of the suspects by any tribunal of any state. Without a valid decision from a competent court, an act cannot legally be qualified as genocide.
The Turkish government and the overwhelming majority of Turks, as well as other governments [23] and many scholars or experts reject qualifying the tragic events of 1915 as genocide, because the sine qua non legal conditions incorporated in the 1948 Genocide Convention have not been fulfilled. These torts may be legally qualified criminal acts foreseen by the Ottoman Penal Code and / or mutual killings.[24]
On this occasion we would like to underline that, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu very clearly stated he was not insensitive to the sufferings of the Ottoman Armenians, but was expecting the same understanding from the Armenian side with regard to the plight of the Muslim Ottomans which equally suffered during the same tragic events.[25] The Turkish government has more than once declared that it was ready to consider and eventually accept the conclusion of historians and legal experts who will meet to study the tragic events of 1915-1916; but Yerevan refused.[26] Regardless, Ankara has supported the Vienna platform since 2004, which in 2009 published a large compilation of documents.[27] Turkey fully opened its archives—unlike the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Armenian Patriarchate at Jerusalem—, and, according to Dr. Hilmar Kaiser, a supporter of the “Armenian genocide” label, there is no evidence for deliberate destruction of Ottoman documents.[28]
Other general principles of international criminal law on internationally wrongful acts
Thos who refer to internationally wrongful acts in the context of 1915 events, should also take into consideration the following principles of international law:
“Nulla crimen sine lege”[29] and “Nulla poena sine lege”[30]
The governing principles of criminal law are also valid for the crime of genocide: “Nulla crimen sine lege,” which means no crime shall exist without law, and “Nulla poena sine lege,” which means no person shall be punished without a law foreseeing such punishment.
Ne bis in idem
The principle “Ne bis in idem”[31] means that no person shall be tried with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the competent court.
The Turkish government and the great majority of Turks do not deny that Ottoman Armenians, together with Muslim and other Ottoman citizens, were the subject of a great tragedy[32] during the 1915-1916 events, that they lost their lives, properties, families as well as their homes. During the relocation or the transfer of a population within the borders of Ottoman territory, a number of military personnel or civil servants and other members of the population committed crimes in spite of orders given by the Ottoman government to protect the lives and properties of the displaced Armenians.
The 1915-1916 trials by the Ottoman government for crimes against Ottoman Armenians
In this respect it should be underlined that the criminality associated with the tragic events and the relocation of the Ottoman Armenians during the years 1915-1916 was addressed by the Ottoman judiciary. Individuals or members of the groups who attacked the Armenian convoys and officials who exploited the Armenian plight, neglected their duties or abused their powers were court-martialed and punished.
In 1915, more than 20 Muslims were sentenced to death and executed for such charges.[33] Following a report of Talat Pasha, the Ottoman government created three commissions[34] to investigate the complaints of Armenians and the denunciations of civil servants. As a result, in March-April 1916, 1673 Muslims—including captains, lieutenants, first and second lieutenants, commanders of gendarme squads, police superintendents, and mayors—were sent to martial courts. 67 were sentenced to death, 524 were sentenced to jail, 68 received other punishments such as forced labor, imprisonment in forts, and exile. Since the author of the manuscript stresses the alleged “confiscation” of Armenian properties by the Ottoman State, it is not unimportant to notice that several people were sentenced to death for plunder, and that other death sentences were justified not only by murders, but also by robberies.[35]
The Malta Investigation
In 1919, the Ottoman government asked its Spanish, Dutch, Danish and Swedish counterparts to send impartial investigators of the Anatolian events of WWI. The demand went in vain because of British pressure.[36]
Furthermore, the occupying British forces brought 144 Ottoman officials to Malta to judge them in a tribunal for presumed war crimes and crimes against Armenians. The author misrepresents the case of those 144 Ottoman officials interned in Malta from 1919 to 1921. They were released after more than two years of unsuccessful investigation by a British prosecutor and his staff. The occupying powers had not found enough evidence in the British, U.S. and Armenian archives, or in the Ottoman documentation seized by the British army. The statement of the author that the archives had been destroyed does not reflect the truth. It is known that at that time the British government relied on an Armenian researcher Haig Khazarian in its hunt for incriminating evidence against Ottoman officials brought to Malta. The British also requested the U.S. government’s help for this purpose, but received the response that there was not enough evidence there. If even the slightest proof existed at the hands of British authorities—enough to inculpate the prisoners at Malta—the trials would surely have taken place against the Ottoman citizens which were sent to Malta to face trial.[37]
Malta’s prosecutor refused to use the material of the courts-martial of 1919-1920. Indeed, the trial of the ministers in 1919 was legally null and void, since it took place as a court-martial. According to the Ottoman Constitution, the ministers had to be judged only by the High Court for the crimes committed in the exercise of their responsibilities. As early as 1919, the right to appeal the sentences was suppressed. The courts-martial of 1919-1920 did not allow the right of cross-examination, which exists even at Guantanamo. In April 1920, Damat Ferit Pasha even banned the defendants from hiring a lawyer. After the final fall of Damat Ferit, the right to appeal and hire a lawyer was restored. All the surviving convicts of April-October 1920 appealed the decisions, and they were acquitted of all or most of the charges. These decisions took place when Istanbul was still occupied by the Entente.[38]
Malta’s prosecutor did not adopt the allegations against the Ottoman Special Organization (SO) unit. Actually, the Special Organization took no part in the forced Armenian displacements and massacres and no observer of WWI accused this unit of crimes against Armenians. Many years after WWI, Mr. Dadrian, followed by Mr. Akçam, seriously distorted their material and invented references to the SO which actually do not exist in the records. For instance, they reverted purely and simply the sense of the Memoirs of Arif Cemil Denker, a officer of SO during WWI, seriously distorted the Memoirs and the statements and another officer, Eşref Kuşçubaşı, and falsely alleged that the martial-courts of 1919-1920 found the Ottoman SO guilty for Armenian deportation and massacres. Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Akçam also neglected the relevant Ottoman military documents.[39]
The eastern front
According to the author:
Turkey did continue the same internationally wrongful acts, even expanding the massacres beyond its own borders into the Caucasus and the territories of the independent Republic of Armenia…
We assume that the author wants to refer to the 1920 Turco-Armenian war. Much is written about that tragic period. One of the correct evaluations about the stated period was made by the then-Prime Minister of Armenia Hovannes Kachaznuni. He wrote:
Despite these hypotheses there remains an irrefutable fact. That we had not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evade war. We ought to have used peaceful language with the Turks whether we succeeded or not, and we did not do it. […] With the carelessness of inexperienced and ignorant men we did not know what forces Turkey had mustered on our frontiers. When the skirmishes had started the Turks proposed that we meet and confer. We did not do so and defied them.[40]
We would strongly recommend that those who are interested be acquainted with the realities of that time to consult this book. This may help them refresh their memories. Furthermore, we should add that the Russian, United States, British and Turkish archives are full of documents which prove the atrocities committed by the Armenian forces in eastern Anatolia during that period. A fact which some leaders of the Armenians are proud of and do not deny.[41]
After the end of the Turco-Armenian War, the Kars Treaty was signed on October 13, 1921 by the delegates of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Turkey. The intervention of the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Mr. Muravian, who attended the Kars Peace Treaty Conference on September 22, 1921, is also worth mentioning to reflect the Armenian position at that point. He said:
We have not come here with antagonistic feelings and we have no intentions of presenting here the controversial issues we have inherited from the former nationalist governments. We are only admirers of the brave struggle which the preserving people of Turkey engaged in. We carry a sincere wish, and we are absolutely convinced that a nation which defends its country will be victorious and the enemy will be defeated.[42]
Is The War of Independence a Myth Invented By Kemalists?
The author alleges that “The “War of Independence” is a myth invented by Kemalists; that it was not against the occupying Allies, but rather a campaign to clear Turkey from remaining “non-Turkish elements.” Even Taner Akçam does not assume such an absurd [43] stance. The author should ask himself the reason why France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Greece and other powers signed the Treaty of Lausanne which ended WWI and the War of Independence if this war had been a myth.
The Kemalist movement was by no means hostile to the non-Muslims and was supported, not only by most of the Turkish Jews[44], but also by a portion of Istanbul’s Armenians, like the Karabetian Society and the Deputy Director General of the Ottoman Bank (promoted Director general during WWI), Berç Keresteciyan (1870-1949), future deputy of the Turkish National Assembly from 1935 to 1946. [45]
Contrary to the author’s false allegations, the National Liberation Government even tried to keep the Christian population of Cilicia at the end of 1921—in vain, because of the Armenian nationalist propaganda.[46] Similarly, the exodus of most of the Christians of western Anatolia is chiefly due to the torched earth policy of the Greek army in 1922.[47]Most of the allegations of “massacre” against the National Liberation Movement were proven to be false.[48]
II. Pacta sunt servanda and lex specialis principles governing the liabilities and legal responsibilities of the Ottoman State and of the Republic of Turkey
After WWI and the War of Liberation, Turkey concluded international agreements to put an end to the wars and insurgencies disrupting the country and region’s peace since 1914. Some of these agreements contained amnesty clauses. The amnesties aimed to cover the humanitarian dimensions of the tragic past.
To ignore these agreements and the declarations is in contradiction to the jus specialis principle foreseen by Article 55 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and also the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
Let us briefly examine the Lausanne, Kars and Ankara treaties as well as the agreement between the United States and Turkey on all compensation demands.
The Treaty of Lausanne
The Treaty of Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923 included a Declaration of amnesty according to which Turkish nationals, and reciprocally nationals of the other signatory powers of the Treaty of Lausanne, who were arrested, prosecuted or sentenced prior to November 20, 1922, benefited from an amnesty.
In addition, the Treaty of Lausanne, in ending the war between Turkey and other powers, decreed that former Ottoman citizens, who resided in countries that were separated from Turkey by Article 31 of the Lausanne Treaty and who had automatically gained citizenship of that country by Article 30, would have the right within two years to choose Turkish citizenship. Through these decrees, all the Armenians who were on that day outside the borders of Turkey and who retained Turkish citizenship, and those Armenians who were in those countries separated from Turkey, obtained the right to return to Turkey if they so wished. Article 6 of the Amnesty Declaration attached to the Lausanne Treaty states regarding the same subject:
The Turkish Government which shares the desire for general peace with all the Powers, announces that it will not object to the measures implemented between 20 October 1918 and 20 November 1922, under the protection of the Allies, with the intention of bringing together again the families which were separated because of the war, and of returning possessions to their rightful owners.
It is apparent that this article concerned the individuals who were forced to emigrate, and who returned to their homes during the period of armistice and occupation. At that time, Turkey announced that these procedures, prepared under the control of the occupation powers, would be maintained without modification. According the U.S. archives[49], 644,900 Armenians returned and settled in Anatolia after the war and right before the Treaty of Sevres.[50] By returning to Ottoman territories in 1918–1919, many Armenians regained some of their properties they had left behind during the 1915 transfer of population. For instance, the number of properties returned by April 30, 1919 was recorded as 241,000. This comprised approximately 98% of the immovable properties[51]. Records also state that some problems and injustices took place during the application of the regulations[52]. The possibility of judicially challenging these injustices continues to exist. Two recent decisions of the local courts in Adana and in Sarıyer (Istanbul) which returned properties to one Lebanese and one Turkish citizen of Armenian origin prove that those who possess appropriate documents may present their cases to a competent court, and if unsatisfied to bring the file to the European Court of Human Rights.
It has already been mentioned that Ottoman citizens who committed crimes during the transfer of population were punished in courts-martial held during 1915-1916 pursuant to the Ottoman Penal Code.
Article 65 of the Treaty of Lausanne stipulates that property of individuals who had foreign citizenship when the war started and whose possessions in Turkey had been confiscated would be returned to them. Article 95 gave a deadline for inquiries on this matter. Section VIII and paragraph six of the Lausanne Treaty on the Declaration of Amnesty declared the Turkish government’s intent to not contest the measures carried out under the auspices of the English and French during the period between 1918 and 1922 regarding Armenians scattered around outside Turkish borders returning and their properties being given back to them. According to this, Armenians wanting to return to Turkey would return. Arrangements were made concerning the measures for Armenians whose properties were returned to them; they would maintain their validity, a timeframe was determined for the Armenians to make their requests, and in order to resolve possible disagreements that could arise, a Special Civil Claims Tribunalwas created. Judges of various countries to stand by Turkish judges were also foreseen in these courts[53].
Liquidation of the Ottoman debts and other economic aspects
Finally, Articles 46-63 of the Lausanne Treaty were about the liquidation of the debts of the Ottoman State. The Republic of Turkey paid all the Ottoman debts.
According to Article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the parties to the treaty reciprocally renounced all claims for the loss and damage suffered between August 1, 1914 and June 6, 1924 as a result of acts of war or measures of requisition, sequestration, disposal or confiscation.
Articles 65-72 also entailed economic clauses; in the section of properties, rights and interests, all legal interests and interests related to properties of those subjected to relocation were protected. Article 74 entailed special provisions related to insurance contracts and in relation, prescription. The following take into account those provisions.
Moscow and Kars Treaties
The Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921 was signed between Turkey and Russia. Thereafter, the Treaty of Kars was concluded between Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on October 13, 1921. The Treaty Kars signed before the Treaty of Lausanne settled the conflicts between Turkey and Armenia as well as the other Caucasian republics. This Treaty stated in Article 15 that “each of the Contracting Parties agrees to promulgate a complete amnesty to citizens of the other Party for crimes and offenses committed during the course of the war on the Caucasian front.”
The “murders and atrocities” were by no means limited to actions of Turks and other Muslims against Armenians. The investigation of Captain Emory H. Niles and Arthur E. Sutherland in eastern Anatolia during the year 1919 led them to conclude “First, that Armenians massacred Moslems with many refinements of cruelty, and second that Armenians are responsible for most of the destruction done to towns and villages” (our emphasis).[54]
The Ankara Treaty with France
Some of the tragic events took place in territories occupied by France, where Armenian groups cooperating with France committed massacres against the Muslim population. The Ottoman Muslims retaliated. The Ankara Treaty signed on October 20, 1921 between France and Turkey had foreseen the parties promulgating a total amnesty for the crimes committed in that occupied territories. Article 5 of the Ankara agreement reads as follows: “Both sides will announce a general amnesty in the evacuated area, following the occupation of this area.”
Once again, the amnesty was far from concerning only Turks. French courts-martial sentenced many Armenians for banditry, robbery, rape and assassination against Turkish civilians, and more generally the large scale of atrocities and destruction—by arson in particular—is confirmed by many French, British and American sources, in addition to the Turkish ones.[55]
Those treaties constitute lex specialis in legal terms.[56] [57]
Claims Settlement Agreement with the United States
The Republic of Turkey, which settled the issue of Ottoman debts in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne,also paid 899,840 U.S. dollars (dollars of 1930s) to the United States government for distribution to its citizens based on the Agreement of December 24, 1923 and Supplemental Agreements, concluded and implemented between the U.S. and Turkey[58]. The Supplemental Agreement of October 25, 1934 concluded by the two governments foresaw a settlement of the outstanding claims of the nationals of each country against the other; Article II of the agreement is as follows:
The two Governments agree that, by the payment of the aforesaid sum [$1,300,000], the Government of the Republic of Turkey will be released from liability with respect to all of the above-mentioned claims formulated against it and further agree that every claim embraced by the Agreement of December 24, 1923, shall be considered and treated as finally settled. [59]
The last U.S. report in 1937 finally estimated that the principal and interest amounts to $899,840 [60], It is remarkable that not a single claimant with an Armenian name was considered by the American civil servants to have made a credible case of seizure and/or destruction of property. [61]
Conclusion: Turkey did not renege on its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention.
The fact that Turkey does not recognize the 1915-1916 events as a crime of genocide does not violate the 1948 Convention. One should underline that if Armenia had seen the slightest proof with regard to the responsibility of Turkey on the matter, it would have attempted to bring the case before the ICJ many years ago.
It should be clear from the above that
a) the Turkish Republic paid all the Ottoman debts;
b) the tribunals of the Ottoman State judged those who infringed on Ottoman laws during the relocation of the Ottoman Armenians;
c) amnesty has been declared for all other suspects and/or criminals.
We believe that no one now has the right to make any kind of demand from Turkey regarding the events which took place before the signing of the above mentioned Moscow, Kars, Ankara, Lausanne Treaties[62] and the Claim Settlement Agreement with the United States.
Finally, we are in the opinion that those who complain of an internationally wrongful act for which the Turkish Republic is responsible may be well advised to take their lamentations to the relevant international institutions like the United Nations, the International Court of Justice [63], the Council of Europe or any other similar establishment, instead of disseminating unfounded and misleading accusations.
[1] Pulat Tacar has been Co-Chairperson of the Turkish National Commission for UNESCO (1995-2006); he was Ambassador of Turkey to UNESCO (1989-1995), Ambassador of Turkey to the European Communities (1984-1987) and to Jakarta (1981-1984). He is the author of many books and articles.
[1] Maxime Gauin is a researcher at the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK, Ankara) and a Ph.D. candidate at the Middle East Technical University.
[1] Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America. The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010).
[1] “ASALA: We All Believed In One Idea: Party,” .com/2012/04/3348-asala-we-all-believed-in-one-idea.html ;Maxime Gauin “Remembering the Orly Attack,” Review of International Law and Politics, VII-27, September 2011; Michael M. Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause of their People. A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism, (Westport-New York-London: Greenwood Press, 1986); Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and the Question of Genocide, (New York-London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Francis P. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: the Past, the Present, the Prospects, (Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1991); International Terrorism and the Drug Connection, (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984); Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror. For Forty Years We Fought Alone, (London-New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 11-13; Bilâl N. Şimşir, Şehit Diplomatlarimiz (Our fallen-martyr diplomats) (1973-1994), (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), two volumes.
[1]Antoine Constant, L’Azerbaïdjan, (Paris: Karthala, 2002), pp. 343-344 and passim.
[1] “Norwegian Hitman Was Obsessed With Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, July 25, 2011, news-251593-norwegian-hitman-was-obsessed-with-turkey.html
[1] For example: Bahar Senem Çevik-Ersaydı, “Dehumanization in Cartoons: A Case Study of the Image of the Turk in Asbarez Newspaper,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 24, 2011, pp. 103-121: “Reviewing and shaping the already traumatized Diaspora identity with hostile feelings towards another group will most likely result in an unresolved trauma. […] The image of the Turk within Diaspora Armenians could be summarized as being worthless, inhuman, murderer, barbaric and savage” ; Jugement du tribunal de grande instance de Lyon, 27 avril 2010 (Gauin c. Nissanian), IMG/pdf/JugementTGILyon27042010.pdf
[1] Like the recurrent comparison between the late Ottoman Empire and the Nazi Germany. On this point, see Türkkaya Ataöv, “The Jewish Holocaust and the Armenians,” in Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period, (Ankara: TBMM, 2001), pp. 315-344, altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/TheHolocaust.pdf ; and Yücel Güçlü, The Holocaust and the Armenian Case in Comparative Perspective, (Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth: University Press of America), 2012.
[1] Page 18 of the manuscript: “The Stalinist cleaning allowed Kemal to effectively eliminate all potential political rivals and opponents.” This slander by the author is an unfortunate example which demonstrates the state of his mind. The whole world knows Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as one of the great leaders of the 20th century. On the political nature of the Kemalist regime, see among others Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Third Edition, (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 290; Maurice Duverger, Les Partis politiques, (Paris : Le Seuil, 1981), pp. 375-377 ; and Salâhi R. Sonyel, Atatürk, the Founder of Modern Turkey, (Ankara: TTK, 1989).
[1] Page 17 of the manuscript: “the demand…of the reunification of West Armenia and the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus” reflects the irredentist dream of the Armenian nationalist to create “Great Armenia.” Furthermore, page 20 of the manuscript: “Most of the total losses claimed were from Turkish Armenia.” “Western Armenia” and/or “Turkish Armenia” exist only in the minds of irredentist militant Armenians.
[1] For comparative analyzes, consult: Serdar Palabıyık, “A Literature between Scientificity and Subjectivity: A Comparative Analysis of the Books Written on the Armenian Issue,” Review of Armenian Studies, IV-11/12, 2007, http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=476 ; Hakan Yavuz, “Contours of Scholarship on Armenian-Turkish Relations,” Middle East Critique, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 231-251, 19436149.2011.619761
[1] Paul Ricoeur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000).
[1] Defamiliarization or ostranenie (остранение) is the artistic technique of forcing the audience to see common things in an unfamiliar or strange way, in order to enhance the perception of the familiar.
[1]Hans Wilhelm Longva, “The concept of genocide in international law, A wound not healed,”Conference on Turkish-Armenian relationship, University of Oslo, February 1st, 2010.
[1] William A. Shabas, Genocide in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 7; Guenter Lewy, “Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Committ Genocide?”, Journal of Genocide Research, IX-4, December 2007, pp. 661-674 (second edition in Essays on Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2012).
[1]Ahmet İnsel and Michel Marian, Dialogue sur le tabou arménien, (Paris: Liana Levi, 2009).
[1] Der Jan van der Linde, “The Armenian Genocide Question and Legal Responsibility,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 24, 2011, pp. 123-151
[1] Gündüz Aktan “The Armenian problem and International Law,” in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), Armenians in the Late…, pp. 263-614, altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/InternationalLaw.pdf
[1]Aktan ibid p. 270
[1]Para 187 “Article II (of the Convention) requires a further mental element. It requires the establishment of the intent to destroy in whole or in part the protected group as such. It is not enough to establish, for instance in terms of paragraph. (a) That unlawful killings of members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be established and is defined very precisely. It is often referred to as the “specific intent” (dolus specialis). It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. The acts listed in Article II, must be done with the intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part. The words “as such” emphasize that intent to destroy the protected group.
[1] See Travaux préparatoires Doc. E/794 page 294 and 97, the meeting of the Conference page 360 and following pages
[1] With regard to the “Power to Exercise Universal Repression” or “Universal Repression” (see: April 5, 1948. Doc. E/794. pp.29-33) The Committee rejected a proposal in this respect (Ibid, p.32).Those rejecting the principle of universal repression argued as follows: “ … universal repression is against the principles of traditional law; permitting the courts of one State to punish crimes committed in another state by foreigners will be against the sovereignty of the State; as genocide generally implied the responsibility of the State on the territory of which the crime was committed, the principle of universal repression would imply national courts to judge the acts of foreign governments. The result will be dangerous international tensions.”
[1] The British government on many occasions officially declared its position on the matter. On April 14, 1999 the Foreign Office spokesperson Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale said that “the British government has not recognized the events of 1915 as indications of genocide”; On February 7, 2001, acting on behalf of the British Government, Baroness Scotland of Asthal declared: “The government, in line with the previous British governments, have judged the evidence not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations on genocide….The interpretation of events in Eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916 is still the subject of genuine debate among historians.”The UK government did not accept qualifying as genocide the 1915 events. The Israeli government refused to accept the parallelism between the Holocaust and the tragic events of 1915. The Ambassador of Israel Rivka Kohen in Yerevan declared on February 7, 2002, during a press conference that “the 1915 events couldn’t be considered genocide because the main killings in these events were not planned and the Ottoman government had no intention to destroy a nation or a group of people as such. As a well-known fact many people from the Armenian and Muslim groups had lost their lives in these events. The Holocaust is unique. At this stage nothing should be compared with the Holocaust.” On April 10, 2001 the Nobel Prize-awarded Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Perez said that “the fate of Armenians in Anatolia was a tragedy, not genocide.” He added: “Armenian allegations are meaningless. We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegation. If we have to determine a position on the Armenian issue it should be done with great care not to distort the historical realities.”
[1]Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkıran and Ömer Turan, The Armenian Rebellion at Van, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 265: “The slaughter of Muslims that accompanied the Armenian revolt in Van Province inexorably led first to Kurdish reprisals on the Armenian, then to a general and mutual massaccre of the people of the East. The Armenian revolt began an intercommunal war, in which both sides, fearing their own survival, killed those who, given the chance,would have killed them.The result was unprecended horror. History records few examples of mortality as great as that suffered in Van Province.”
[1] “WWI Inflicted Pain to Everyone, Davutoğlu Says,” Hürriyet Daily News, December 30, 2011 .com/wwi-inflicted-pain-on-everyone-davutoglu-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=10325&NewsCatID=338; “Turkey ‘Ready to Share Pain’ With Armenians,” Hürriyet Daily News, March 1, 2012, .com/turkey-ready-to-share-pain-with-armenians.aspx?pageID=238&nID=14993&NewsCatID=338
[1] For example: Anatolian News Agency, April 11, 2005; “Yerevan Rejects Turkish PM Erdogan’s Dialogue Letter,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, April 14, 2005, news/8050/yerevan-rejects-turkish-pm-erdogan-s-dialogue-letter.html ; Interview of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Charlie Rose, September 27, 2007; “Turkey’s Proposal Clears Last-Minute Snag in Zurich,” Today’s Zaman, October 12, 2009, news-189623-100-turkeys-proposal-clears-last-minute-snag-in-zurich.html ; Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and…, pp. 125-129.
[1] İnanç Atılgan and Garabet Moumdjian (ed.), Archival Documents of the Viennese Armenian-Turkish Platform, Klagenfurt-Vienna-Ljubjana-Sarajevo: Wieser Verlag, 2009.
[1] “We should be really careful about not mixing information. Anything about the CUP archives is sheer speculation. We don’t have any indication that they have been destroyed.” Hilmar Kaiser, interview to Aztag, September 22, 2005. See also “Historian Challenges Politically Motivated 1915 Arguments,” Today’s Zaman, newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=170297 ; Yücel Güçlü, “Will Untapped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Armenian Debate?”, The Middle East Quarterly, XVI-2, Spring 2009, pp. 25-42, ottoman-archives-reshape-armenian-debate
[1]Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 22.
[1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 23.
[1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 20.
[1] Shimon Perez: Statement in April 2001: “What happened to the Armenians was a tragedy, but not genocide.”
[1] Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, p. 111.
[1] Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts on the Relocation of Armenians. 1914-1918, (Ankara: TTK, 2002), pp. 84-86; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarınay (ed.), Turkish-Armenian Conflict Documents, (Ankara: TBMM, 2007), p. 294.
[1] Yusuf Halaçoğlu, The Story of 1915. What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?, (Ankara: TTK, 2008), pp. 82-87; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, p. 112; Yusuf Sarınay, “The Relocation (Tehcir) of Armenians and the Trials of 1915-1916,” Middle East Critique, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 308-314.
[1] Yusuf Halaçoğu, Facts on the…, p. 99 and annexes XX-XXI.
[1]Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 122-128; Bilâl N. Şimşir, “The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question,” in Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926), (İstanbul: Tasvir Press, 1984), pp. 26-41; Bilâl N. Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri, (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009); Salâhi R. Sonyel, “Armenian Deportations: A Re-Appraisal in the Light of New Documents,” Belleten, January 1972, pp. 58-60; Salâhi R. Sonyel, The Displacement of Armenians: Documents, (Ankara: TTK/Baylan Matbaası), 1978.
[1] Ferudun Ata, İşgal İstanbul’unda Tehcir Yargılamaları, (Ankara: TTK, 2005); Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 79-82; Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny of Akçam’s Version of History and the Armenian Genocide,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, XXVIII-2, August 2008, p. 307, files/news/pdf/Erman-Sahin-Review-Article.pdf
[1] Ferudun Ata, İşgal İstanbul’unda Tehcir…, pp. 193, 199, 201 and 204; Edward J. Erickson, “Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame,” The Middle East Quarterly, XIII-3, Summer 2006, pp. 67-75, armenian-massacres-new-records-undercut-old-blame ; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 82-88 and 221; Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny of…”, pp. 310-312; Erman Şahin, “Review Essay: The Armenian Question,” Middle East Policy, XVII-1, Spring 2010, pp. 151, 153 and 162, n. 48, http://www.turkishcanadians.com/wp-content/uploads/armenian_question.pdf ; Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, (Ankara: TTK, tome I, 2006), pp. 373-409; Arslan Terzioğlu, “The Armenian Deportation in Line With National and Foreign Sources of Information,” in Selçuk Erez and Mehmet Saray (ed.), Uluslarası Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Sempozyumu, (Istanbul: Istanbul University Publications, 2001), pp. 321-358.
[1] Ermeniler Tarafından Yapılan Katliam Belgeleri/Documents on Massacre Perpetrated by Armenians, Ankara, two volumes, 2001; Kara Schemsi, Turcs et Arméniens devant l’histoire, (Geneva: Imprimerie nationale, 1919), http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/turcs_et_armeniens.pdf See also n. 37.
[1] Kâmuran Gürün, The Armenian File, (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 2007), p. 339 (1st English edition, Nicosia, 1985).
[1] For a comprehensive study of this war: Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923. A Documentary Study, (Ankara: TTK, 2000), five volumes.
[1] Salâhi R. Sonyel, Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, (Ankara: TTK, 1993), pp. 439-441.
[1] Mim Kemal Öke, The Armenian Question, (Ankara: TTK, 2001), pp. 196-202 and 210-216; Mim Kemal Öke, “The Response of the Turkish Armenians to the ‘Armenian Question’ (1919-1926),” in Armenians in the Ottoman…, pp. 71-88; Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire…, volume III-1, p. 1050. See also Rapport hebdomadaire, 23-29 mars 1920, 15-21 juin 1920, Service historique de la défense nationale (SHDN), 4 H 58, dossier 1.
[1] Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 24 octobre 1921 ; télégramme du ministère au Haut-Commissaire à Beyrouth, 3 novembre ; télégrammes du général Pellé au ministère, 5, 15 et 23 novembre 1921 ; lettre du ministère à Franklin-Bouillon, 12 novembre 1921, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), P 17785 ; Commandement supérieur, Levant — Journal des marches et des opérations, 1921, pp. 456-469, SHDN, 4H 47, dossier 1 ; Bulletin périodique n° 39, 5 décembre 1921-5 janvier 1922, SHDN, 4 H 49, dossier 1 ; Bulletin de renseignements n° 279, 17-21 novembre 1921, 4 H 61, dossier 3; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia (1914-1923), (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), pp. 140-156 and 210-216.
[1] Rapport du père Ludovic Marseille, septembre 1922 ;Télégramme du colonel Mougin au général Pellé, 8 septembre 1922 ; télégramme du général Pellé au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 8 septembre 1922 ; télégramme de Raymond Poincaré à Athènes, Londres, Rome, Washington, 9 septembre 1922 ; télégramme de l’ambassadeur de France à Londres au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 12 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.
[1] American investigations: Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies…, pp. 124-127; Heath Lowry, “American Observers in Anatolia circa 1920: The Bristol Papers,” in Armenians in the…, pp. 42-58; French investigations: Rapport du commandant Labonne, 7 décembre 1919 ; le chef de bataillon Labonne, en mission à Afioun-Karahissar, à Monsieur le général Commandant en chef des armées alliées [Franchet d’Esperey], 2e bureau, 1919, SHDN, 7 N 3210 ; S.R. Marine, Affaires arméniennes, 15 novembre 1920, AMAE, P 16674; British accounts : Salâhi R. Sonyel, “How Armenian Propaganda Nurtured a Gullible Christian World In Connection With the Deportation and ‘Massacres’,” Belleten, January 1977, pp. 167-168. See also Bulletin de renseignement n° 285, 11-13 décembre 1921, SHDN, 4 H 62, dossier 3; Général Pellé au ministère, 8 septembre 1922, Télégramme de l’ambassadeur français à Londres, 12 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1360.
[1]NARA, T1192 R2.860J.01/395; verified by the Armenian Patriarch.
[1]“Yusuf Halaçoğlu Cevap Veriyor,” Taraf (newspaper), 23 June 2008.
[1] “Tehcirden Dönenlerin Malları,” (Properties of Those Returning from the Relocation), Sosyal Tarih, September 1994, pp.45-48; Bülent Bakar, “Malların İadesi,” (“Returning of properties”) in Hikmet Özdemir (ed.), Türk-Ermeni İhtilafı Makaleler (“Papers on Turko-Armenian Conflict”), (Ankara: TBMM, 2007), pp. 327-339. See: enactment of 8.1.1920. Md. 33 bTakvim-i Vekayi 12 Kanunu Sani 1336 N° 3747 BOA .MV. 245/15 Düstur II Tertip.C.II. pp. 553-554.
[1] Prof. Dr. Nurşen Mazıcı, “Ermenilerin tazminat davası” (The Armenians’ Suit for Damages), Radikal, 13 August 2010.
[1] Justin McCarthy, “The Report of Niles and Sutherland,” p. 1850. For other sources, see for example Maxime Gauin’s “The Convergent Analysis of Russian, British, French and American Officials Regarding the Armenian Volunteers (1914-1922),” International Review of Turkish Studies, 1.4, Winter 2011-2012, pp. 18-34, http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2012/03/3341-convergent-analysis-of-russian.html ; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…; Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, (New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), volume II, 1978, pp. 322-323 and 325.
[1] Maxime Bergès, La Colonne de Marach et quelques autres récits de l’armée du Levant, (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1924), pp. 56, 81-82, 89 and 142-143 ; Maxime Gauin, “The Convergent Analysis…,” pp. 34-41; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies…; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…, pp. 202-208; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 107-108; Stanford J. Shaw, “The Armenian Legion and its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia,” in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), The Armenians in the…, pp. 155-206, altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/ArmenianLegion.pdf
[1] Doç. Dr. Sadi Çaycı “Ermeni sorununun hukuksal boyutu” (The legal dimension of the Armenian question), http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankası/tr/index2_1_2.htm
[1] See for Lex Specialis Article 55 of the text of the draft articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd session (2001) which foresees that the international responsibility of a State for the existence of an internationally wrongful act is governed by special rules of international law (lex specialis).
[1]American-Turkish Claims Settlement Under the Agreement of December 24, 1923 and Supplemental Agreements between the United States and Turkey: On December 24, 1923 Opinion and report, prepared by Fred K. Nielsen, (Washington: GOP, 1937). Turkey and the United States of America concluded an agreement with regard to the settlement of claims of their citizens. A joint commission was created to examine the claims. 898 dossiers were laid before the Commission by the U.S. government. No claims of Turkish citizens against the U.S. were presented to the commission. The dossiers of the claims had to contain the documents establishing the nature, the origin and the justification of each claim. The claims had to be submitted by February 15, 1934. The U.S. government had the right to submit up to August 15, 1934 other documents in support of claims (Nielsen Report page 9) According to Mr. Nielsen, the author of the report, “These provisions are in harmony with international practice in relation to such matters. The following type of stipulations is found in numerous claims agreements: The high contracting parties engage to consider the result of the proceedings of the (claims settlement) commission as a full, perfect and final settlement of every claim upon either Government arising out of any transaction of a date prior to the exchange of the ratifications of the present convention; and further engage that every such claim, whether or not the same may have been presented to the notice of, made, preferred or laid before the said commission.” Nielsen report, p.15; our emphasis).
[1]Selâhaddin Kardeş, Tehcir ve Emval-I Metrûke mevzuatı (Relocation and Legislation on Abandoned Property) Maliye Bakanlığı Strateji Geliştirma Başkanlığı Ankara 2008 (Publication of the Ministry of Finance, Ankara 2008).
[1] Fred Kenelm Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims…, pp. 780-782. See also Kemal Çiçek, “The 1934-1935 Turkish-American Compensation Agreement and Its Implication for Today,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 23, 2011, pp. 93-146.
[1] Fred Kenelm Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims Settlement…
[1] Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File, pp. 360-379.
[1] Pulat Tacar, “An Invitation to Truth, Transparency and Accountability: Toward ‘Responsible Dialogue on the Armenian Issue,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 22, 2010, pp. 135-170.
[1]Pulat Tacar has been Co-Chairperson of the Turkish National Commission for UNESCO (1995-2006); he was Ambassador of Turkey to UNESCO (1989-1995), Ambassador of Turkey to the European Communities (1984-1987) and to Jakarta (1981-1984). He is the author of many books and articles.
[2] Maxime Gauin is a researcher at the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK, Ankara) and a Ph.D. candidate at the Middle East Technical University.
[3] Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America. The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010).
[4] “ASALA: We All Believed In One Idea: Party,” .com/2012/04/3348-asala-we-all-believed-in-one-idea.html ;Maxime Gauin “Remembering the Orly Attack,” Review of International Law and Politics, VII-27, September 2011; Michael M. Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause of their People. A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism, (Westport-New York-London: Greenwood Press, 1986); Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and the Question of Genocide, (New York-London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Francis P. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: the Past, the Present, the Prospects, (Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1991); International Terrorism and the Drug Connection, (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984); Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror. For Forty Years We Fought Alone, (London-New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 11-13; Bilâl N. Şimşir, Şehit Diplomatlarimiz (Our fallen-martyr diplomats) (1973-1994), (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), two volumes.
[5]Antoine Constant, L’Azerbaïdjan, (Paris: Karthala, 2002), pp. 343-344 and passim.
[6] “Norwegian Hitman Was Obsessed With Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, July 25, 2011, news-251593-norwegian-hitman-was-obsessed-with-turkey.html
[7] For example: Bahar Senem Çevik-Ersaydı, “Dehumanization in Cartoons: A Case Study of the Image of the Turk in Asbarez Newspaper,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 24, 2011, pp. 103-121: “Reviewing and shaping the already traumatized Diaspora identity with hostile feelings towards another group will most likely result in an unresolved trauma. […] The image of the Turk within Diaspora Armenians could be summarized as being worthless, inhuman, murderer, barbaric and savage” ; Jugement du tribunal de grande instance de Lyon, 27 avril 2010 (Gauin c. Nissanian), IMG/pdf/JugementTGILyon27042010.pdf
[8] Like the recurrent comparison between the late Ottoman Empire and the Nazi Germany. On this point, see Türkkaya Ataöv, “The Jewish Holocaust and the Armenians,” in Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period, (Ankara: TBMM, 2001), pp. 315-344, altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/TheHolocaust.pdf ; and Yücel Güçlü, The Holocaust and the Armenian Case in Comparative Perspective, (Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth: University Press of America), 2012.
[9] Page 18 of the manuscript: “The Stalinist cleaning allowed Kemal to effectively eliminate all potential political rivals and opponents.” This slander by the author is an unfortunate example which demonstrates the state of his mind. The whole world knows Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as one of the great leaders of the 20th century. On the political nature of the Kemalist regime, see among others Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Third Edition, (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 290; Maurice Duverger, Les Partis politiques, (Paris : Le Seuil, 1981), pp. 375-377 ; and Salâhi R. Sonyel, Atatürk, the Founder of Modern Turkey, (Ankara: TTK, 1989).
[10] Page 17 of the manuscript: “the demand…of the reunification of West Armenia and the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus” reflects the irredentist dream of the Armenian nationalist to create “Great Armenia.” Furthermore, page 20 of the manuscript: “Most of the total losses claimed were from Turkish Armenia.” “Western Armenia” and/or “Turkish Armenia” exist only in the minds of irredentist militant Armenians.
[11] For comparative analyzes, consult: Serdar Palabıyık, “A Literature between Scientificity and Subjectivity: A Comparative Analysis of the Books Written on the Armenian Issue,” Review of Armenian Studies, IV-11/12, 2007, http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=476 ; Hakan Yavuz, “Contours of Scholarship on Armenian-Turkish Relations,” Middle East Critique, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 231-251, 19436149.2011.619761
[12] Paul Ricoeur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000).
[13] Defamiliarization or ostranenie (остранение) is the artistic technique of forcing the audience to see common things in an unfamiliar or strange way, in order to enhance the perception of the familiar.
[14]Hans Wilhelm Longva, “The concept of genocide in international law, A wound not healed,”Conference on Turkish-Armenian relationship, University of Oslo, February 1st, 2010.
[15] William A. Shabas, Genocide in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 7; Guenter Lewy, “Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Committ Genocide?”, Journal of Genocide Research, IX-4, December 2007, pp. 661-674 (second edition in Essays on Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2012).
[16]Ahmet İnsel and Michel Marian, Dialogue sur le tabou arménien, (Paris: Liana Levi, 2009).
[17] Der Jan van der Linde, “The Armenian Genocide Question and Legal Responsibility,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 24, 2011, pp. 123-151
[18] Gündüz Aktan “The Armenian problem and International Law,” in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), Armenians in the Late…, pp. 263-614, altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/InternationalLaw.pdf
[19]Aktan ibid p. 270
[20]Para 187 “Article II (of the Convention) requires a further mental element. It requires the establishment of the intent to destroy in whole or in part the protected group as such. It is not enough to establish, for instance in terms of paragraph. (a) That unlawful killings of members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be established and is defined very precisely. It is often referred to as the “specific intent” (dolus specialis). It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. The acts listed in Article II, must be done with the intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part. The words “as such” emphasize that intent to destroy the protected group.
[21] See Travaux préparatoires Doc. E/794 page 294 and 97, the meeting of the Conference page 360 and following pages
[22]With regard to the “Power to Exercise Universal Repression” or “Universal Repression” (see: April 5, 1948. Doc. E/794. pp.29-33) The Committee rejected a proposal in this respect (Ibid, p.32).Those rejecting the principle of universal repression argued as follows: “ … universal repression is against the principles of traditional law; permitting the courts of one State to punish crimes committed in another state by foreigners will be against the sovereignty of the State; as genocide generally implied the responsibility of the State on the territory of which the crime was committed, the principle of universal repression would imply national courts to judge the acts of foreign governments. The result will be dangerous international tensions.”
[23] The British government on many occasions officially declared its position on the matter. On April 14, 1999 the Foreign Office spokesperson Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale said that “the British government has not recognized the events of 1915 as indications of genocide”; On February 7, 2001, acting on behalf of the British Government, Baroness Scotland of Asthal declared: “The government, in line with the previous British governments, have judged the evidence not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations on genocide….The interpretation of events in Eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916 is still the subject of genuine debate among historians.”The UK government did not accept qualifying as genocide the 1915 events. The Israeli government refused to accept the parallelism between the Holocaust and the tragic events of 1915. The Ambassador of Israel Rivka Kohen in Yerevan declared on February 7, 2002, during a press conference that “the 1915 events couldn’t be considered genocide because the main killings in these events were not planned and the Ottoman government had no intention to destroy a nation or a group of people as such. As a well-known fact many people from the Armenian and Muslim groups had lost their lives in these events. The Holocaust is unique. At this stage nothing should be compared with the Holocaust.” On April 10, 2001 the Nobel Prize-awarded Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Perez said that “the fate of Armenians in Anatolia was a tragedy, not genocide.” He added: “Armenian allegations are meaningless. We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegation. If we have to determine a position on the Armenian issue it should be done with great care not to distort the historical realities.”
[24]Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkıran and Ömer Turan, The Armenian Rebellion at Van, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 265: “The slaughter of Muslims that accompanied the Armenian revolt in Van Province inexorably led first to Kurdish reprisals on the Armenian, then to a general and mutual massaccre of the people of the East. The Armenian revolt began an intercommunal war, in which both sides, fearing their own survival, killed those who, given the chance,would have killed them.The result was unprecended horror. History records few examples of mortality as great as that suffered in Van Province.”
[25] “WWI Inflicted Pain to Everyone, Davutoğlu Says,” Hürriyet Daily News, December 30, 2011 .com/wwi-inflicted-pain-on-everyone-davutoglu-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=10325&NewsCatID=338; “Turkey ‘Ready to Share Pain’ With Armenians,” Hürriyet Daily News, March 1, 2012, .com/turkey-ready-to-share-pain-with-armenians.aspx?pageID=238&nID=14993&NewsCatID=338
[26] For example: Anatolian News Agency, April 11, 2005; “Yerevan Rejects Turkish PM Erdogan’s Dialogue Letter,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, April 14, 2005, news/8050/yerevan-rejects-turkish-pm-erdogan-s-dialogue-letter.html ; Interview of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Charlie Rose, September 27, 2007; “Turkey’s Proposal Clears Last-Minute Snag in Zurich,” Today’s Zaman, October 12, 2009, news-189623-100-turkeys-proposal-clears-last-minute-snag-in-zurich.html ; Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and…, pp. 125-129.
[27] İnanç Atılgan and Garabet Moumdjian (ed.), Archival Documents of the Viennese Armenian-Turkish Platform, Klagenfurt-Vienna-Ljubjana-Sarajevo: Wieser Verlag, 2009.
[28] “We should be really careful about not mixing information. Anything about the CUP archives is sheer speculation. We don’t have any indication that they have been destroyed.” Hilmar Kaiser, interview to Aztag, September 22, 2005. See also “Historian Challenges Politically Motivated 1915 Arguments,” Today’s Zaman, newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=170297 ; Yücel Güçlü, “Will Untapped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Armenian Debate?”, The Middle East Quarterly, XVI-2, Spring 2009, pp. 25-42, ottoman-archives-reshape-armenian-debate
[29]Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 22.
[30] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 23.
[31] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 20.
[32] Shimon Perez: Statement in April 2001: “What happened to the Armenians was a tragedy, but not genocide.”
[33] Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, p. 111.
[34] Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts on the Relocation of Armenians. 1914-1918, (Ankara: TTK, 2002), pp. 84-86; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarınay (ed.), Turkish-Armenian Conflict Documents, (Ankara: TBMM, 2007), p. 294.
[35] Yusuf Halaçoğlu, The Story of 1915. What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?, (Ankara: TTK, 2008), pp. 82-87; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, p. 112; Yusuf Sarınay, “The Relocation (Tehcir) of Armenians and the Trials of 1915-1916,” Middle East Critique, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 308-314.
[36] Yusuf Halaçoğu, Facts on the…, p. 99 and annexes XX-XXI.
[37]Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 122-128; Bilâl N. Şimşir, “The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question,” in Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926), (İstanbul: Tasvir Press, 1984), pp. 26-41; Bilâl N. Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri, (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009); Salâhi R. Sonyel, “Armenian Deportations: A Re-Appraisal in the Light of New Documents,” Belleten, January 1972, pp. 58-60; Salâhi R. Sonyel, The Displacement of Armenians: Documents, (Ankara: TTK/Baylan Matbaası), 1978.
[38] Ferudun Ata, İşgal İstanbul’unda Tehcir Yargılamaları, (Ankara: TTK, 2005); Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 79-82; Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny of Akçam’s Version of History and the Armenian Genocide,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, XXVIII-2, August 2008, p. 307, files/news/pdf/Erman-Sahin-Review-Article.pdf
[39] Ferudun Ata, İşgal İstanbul’unda Tehcir…, pp. 193, 199, 201 and 204; Edward J. Erickson, “Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame,” The Middle East Quarterly, XIII-3, Summer 2006, pp. 67-75, armenian-massacres-new-records-undercut-old-blame ; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 82-88 and 221; Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny of…”, pp. 310-312; Erman Şahin, “Review Essay: The Armenian Question,” Middle East Policy, XVII-1, Spring 2010, pp. 151, 153 and 162, n. 48, http://www.turkishcanadians.com/wp-content/uploads/armenian_question.pdf ; Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, (Ankara: TTK, tome I, 2006), pp. 373-409; Arslan Terzioğlu, “The Armenian Deportation in Line With National and Foreign Sources of Information,” in Selçuk Erez and Mehmet Saray (ed.), Uluslarası Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Sempozyumu, (Istanbul: Istanbul University Publications, 2001), pp. 321-358.
[41] Ermeniler Tarafından Yapılan Katliam Belgeleri/Documents on Massacre Perpetrated by Armenians, Ankara, two volumes, 2001; Kara Schemsi, Turcs et Arméniens devant l’histoire, (Geneva: Imprimerie nationale, 1919), http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/turcs_et_armeniens.pdf See also n. 37.
[42] Kâmuran Gürün, The Armenian File, (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 2007), p. 339 (1st English edition, Nicosia, 1985).
[43] For a comprehensive study of this war: Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923. A Documentary Study, (Ankara: TTK, 2000), five volumes.
[44] Salâhi R. Sonyel, Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, (Ankara: TTK, 1993), pp. 439-441.
[45] Mim Kemal Öke, The Armenian Question, (Ankara: TTK, 2001), pp. 196-202 and 210-216; Mim Kemal Öke, “The Response of the Turkish Armenians to the ‘Armenian Question’ (1919-1926),” in Armenians in the Ottoman…, pp. 71-88; Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire…, volume III-1, p. 1050. See also Rapport hebdomadaire, 23-29 mars 1920, 15-21 juin 1920, Service historique de la défense nationale (SHDN), 4 H 58, dossier 1.
[46] Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 24 octobre 1921 ; télégramme du ministère au Haut-Commissaire à Beyrouth, 3 novembre ; télégrammes du général Pellé au ministère, 5, 15 et 23 novembre 1921 ; lettre du ministère à Franklin-Bouillon, 12 novembre 1921, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), P 17785 ; Commandement supérieur, Levant — Journal des marches et des opérations, 1921, pp. 456-469, SHDN, 4H 47, dossier 1 ; Bulletin périodique n° 39, 5 décembre 1921-5 janvier 1922, SHDN, 4 H 49, dossier 1 ; Bulletin de renseignements n° 279, 17-21 novembre 1921, 4 H 61, dossier 3; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia (1914-1923), (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), pp. 140-156 and 210-216.
[47] Rapport du père Ludovic Marseille, septembre 1922 ;Télégramme du colonel Mougin au général Pellé, 8 septembre 1922 ; télégramme du général Pellé au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 8 septembre 1922 ; télégramme de Raymond Poincaré à Athènes, Londres, Rome, Washington, 9 septembre 1922 ; télégramme de l’ambassadeur de France à Londres au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 12 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.
[48] American investigations: Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies…, pp. 124-127; Heath Lowry, “American Observers in Anatolia circa 1920: The Bristol Papers,” in Armenians in the…, pp. 42-58; French investigations: Rapport du commandant Labonne, 7 décembre 1919 ; le chef de bataillon Labonne, en mission à Afioun-Karahissar, à Monsieur le général Commandant en chef des armées alliées [Franchet d’Esperey], 2e bureau, 1919, SHDN, 7 N 3210 ; S.R. Marine, Affaires arméniennes, 15 novembre 1920, AMAE, P 16674; British accounts : Salâhi R. Sonyel, “How Armenian Propaganda Nurtured a Gullible Christian World In Connection With the Deportation and ‘Massacres’,” Belleten, January 1977, pp. 167-168. See also Bulletin de renseignement n° 285, 11-13 décembre 1921, SHDN, 4 H 62, dossier 3; Général Pellé au ministère, 8 septembre 1922, Télégramme de l’ambassadeur français à Londres, 12 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1360.
[49]NARA, T1192 R2.860J.01/395; verified by the Armenian Patriarch.
[50]“Yusuf Halaçoğlu Cevap Veriyor,” Taraf (newspaper), 23 June 2008.
[52] “Tehcirden Dönenlerin Malları,” (Properties of Those Returning from the Relocation), Sosyal Tarih, September 1994, pp.45-48; Bülent Bakar, “Malların İadesi,” (“Returning of properties”) in Hikmet Özdemir (ed.), Türk-Ermeni İhtilafı Makaleler (“Papers on Turko-Armenian Conflict”), (Ankara: TBMM, 2007), pp. 327-339. See: enactment of 8.1.1920. Md. 33 bTakvim-i Vekayi 12 Kanunu Sani 1336 N° 3747 BOA .MV. 245/15 Düstur II Tertip.C.II. pp. 553-554.
[53] Prof. Dr. Nurşen Mazıcı, “Ermenilerin tazminat davası” (The Armenians’ Suit for Damages), Radikal, 13 August 2010.
[54]Justin McCarthy, “The Report of Niles and Sutherland,” p. 1850. For other sources, see for example Maxime Gauin’s “The Convergent Analysis of Russian, British, French and American Officials Regarding the Armenian Volunteers (1914-1922),” International Review of Turkish Studies, 1.4, Winter 2011-2012, pp. 18-34, http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2012/03/3341-convergent-analysis-of-russian.html ; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…; Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, (New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), volume II, 1978, pp. 322-323 and 325.
[55] Maxime Bergès, La Colonne de Marach et quelques autres récits de l’armée du Levant, (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1924), pp. 56, 81-82, 89 and 142-143 ; Maxime Gauin, “The Convergent Analysis…,” pp. 34-41; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies…; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…, pp. 202-208; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 107-108; Stanford J. Shaw, “The Armenian Legion and its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia,” in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), The Armenians in the…, pp. 155-206, altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/ArmenianLegion.pdf
[56] Doç. Dr. Sadi Çaycı “Ermeni sorununun hukuksal boyutu” (The legal dimension of the Armenian question), http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankası/tr/index2_1_2.htm
[57] See for Lex Specialis Article 55 of the text of the draft articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd session (2001) which foresees that the international responsibility of a State for the existence of an internationally wrongful act is governed by special rules of international law (lex specialis).
[58]American-Turkish Claims Settlement Under the Agreement of December 24, 1923 and Supplemental Agreements between the United States and Turkey: On December 24, 1923 Opinion and report, prepared by Fred K. Nielsen, (Washington: GOP, 1937). Turkey and the United States of America concluded an agreement with regard to the settlement of claims of their citizens. A joint commission was created to examine the claims. 898 dossiers were laid before the Commission by the U.S. government. No claims of Turkish citizens against the U.S. were presented to the commission. The dossiers of the claims had to contain the documents establishing the nature, the origin and the justification of each claim. The claims had to be submitted by February 15, 1934. The U.S. government had the right to submit up to August 15, 1934 other documents in support of claims (Nielsen Report page 9) According to Mr. Nielsen, the author of the report, “These provisions are in harmony with international practice in relation to such matters. The following type of stipulations is found in numerous claims agreements: The high contracting parties engage to consider the result of the proceedings of the (claims settlement) commission as a full, perfect and final settlement of every claim upon either Government arising out of any transaction of a date prior to the exchange of the ratifications of the present convention; and further engage that every such claim, whether or not the same may have been presented to the notice of, made, preferred or laid before the said commission.” Nielsen report, p.15; our emphasis).
[59]Selâhaddin Kardeş, Tehcir ve Emval-I Metrûke mevzuatı (Relocation and Legislation on Abandoned Property) Maliye Bakanlığı Strateji Geliştirma Başkanlığı Ankara 2008 (Publication of the Ministry of Finance, Ankara 2008).
[60] Fred Kenelm Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims…, pp. 780-782. See also Kemal Çiçek, “The 1934-1935 Turkish-American Compensation Agreement and Its Implication for Today,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 23, 2011, pp. 93-146.
[61] Fred Kenelm Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims Settlement…
[62] Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File, pp. 360-379.
[63]Pulat Tacar, “An Invitation to Truth, Transparency and Accountability: Toward ‘Responsible Dialogue on the Armenian Issue,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 22, 2010, pp. 135-170.
