Category: Main Issues

  • Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

     
    18/08/2008 14:49  (18:05 minutes ago)
    STRATFOR — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day trip to Ankara ended Aug. 15. While the Iranian government and state media have touted his trip as proof that Iran and Turkey are close allies, the Turkish government is far more concerned with containing the current situation in the Caucasus, which could have major implications for Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan. Read STARTFOR analysis. 

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    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrapped up a two-day trip to Ankara on Aug. 15. The Iranian government and state media have been hyping Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey for days in an attempt to showcase to the world the Iranian belief that Iran and Turkey, as the two principle non-Arab regional powerhouses, are close and natural allies.
     
    But while Iran is eager to forge closer ties with Turkey, the Turks do not have much time for Ahmadinejad right now. Ankara has bigger things on its mind, namely the Russians.
     
    Turkey is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended deep into the southern Caucasus region where Russia just wrapped up an aggressive military campaign against Georgia. Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the Caucasus have primarily been defensive in nature, focused on keeping the Russians and Persians at bay. Now that Russia is resurging in the Caucasus, the Turks have no choice but to get involved.
     
    The Turks primarily rely on their deep ethnic, historical and linguistic ties to Azerbaijan to extend their influence into the Caucasus. Azerbaijan was alarmed, to say the least, when it saw Russian tanks crossing into Georgia. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned, Baku could have been the next target in Russia’s military campaign.
     
    However, Armenia — Azerbaijan’s primary rival — remembers well the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Turks, and looks to Iran and especially Orthodox Christian Russia for its protection. Now that Russia has shown it is willing to act on behalf of allies like South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, the Armenians, while militarily outmatched by the Azerbaijanis, are now feeling bolder and could see this as their chance to preempt Azerbaijan in yet another battle for the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region— especially if it thinks it can look to Russia to militarily intervene on its behalf.
     
    The Turks and their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan are extremely wary of Russia’s intentions for the southern Caucasus beyond Georgia. Sources told Stratfor that Azerbaijan has learned that the Russian military jets that bombed Gori and Poti were based out of Armenia. This development not only signaled a significant expansion of Russia’s military presence in the southern Caucasus, but it also implied that Armenia had actually signed off on the Russian foray into Georgia, knowing that Russian dominance over Georgia would guarantee Armenian security and impose a geographic split between Turkey and Azerbaijan. If the Armenians became overly confident and made a move against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh, expecting Russian support, the resulting war would have a high potential of drawing the Turks into a confrontation with the Russians — something that both NATO member Turkey and Russia have every interest in avoiding.
     
    The Turks also have a precarious economic relationship with Russia. The two countries have expanded their trade with each other significantly in recent years. In the first half of 2008, trade between Russia and Turkey amounted to $19.9 billion, making Russia Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Much of this trade is concentrated in the energy sphere. The Turks currently import approximately 64 percent of the natural gas they consume from the Russians. Though Turkey’s geographic position enables it to pursue energy links in the Middle East and the Caucasus that can bypass Russian territory, the Russians have made it abundantly clear over the past few days that the region’s energy security will still depend on MOSCOW ’s good graces.
     
    Turkey’s economic standing also largely depends on its ability to act as a major energy transit hub for the West through pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was recently forced offline due to a purported Kurdish militant attack and the war in Georgia. Turkey simply cannot afford to see the Russians continue their surge into the Caucasus and threaten its energy supply.
     
    For these reasons, Turkey is on a mission to keep this tinderbox in the Caucasus contained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spent the last couple of days meeting with top Russian leaders in MOSCOW and then with the Georgian president in Tbilisi . During his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Erdogan pushed the idea of creating a Caucasus union that would include both Russia and Georgia. Though this organization would likely be little more than a talk shop, it is a sign of Turkey’s interest in reaching a mutual understanding with Russia that would allow both sides to maintain a comfortable level of influence in the region without coming to blows.
     
    The Iranians, meanwhile, are sitting in the backseat. Though Iran has a foothold in the Caucasus through its support for Armenia, the Iranians lack the level of political, military and economic gravitas that Turkey and Russia currently hold in this region. Indeed, Erdogan did not even include Iran in his list of proposed members for the Caucasus union, even though Iran is one of the three major powers bordering the region. The Turks also struck a blow to Iran by holding back from giving Ahmadinejad the satisfaction of sealing a key energy agreement for Iran to provide Turkey with natural gas, preferring instead to preserve its close relationship with the United States and Israel. Turkey simply is not compelled to give Iran the attention that it is seeking at the moment.
     
    The one thing that Turkey can look to Iran for, however, is keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict under control. Iran’s support for Armenia has naturally put Tehran on a collision course with Ankara when dealing with the Caucasus in the past. But when faced with a common threat of a resurgent Russia, both Turkey and Iran can agree to disagree on their conflicting interests in this region and use their leverage to keep Armenia or Azerbaijan from firing off a shot and pulling the surrounding powers into a broader conflict. In light of the recent BTC explosion claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey can also look to Iran to play its part in cracking down on PKK rebels in the region, many of whom have spent the past year fleeing a Turkish crackdown in northern Iraq by traversing through Iran to reach the southern Caucasus.
     
    While Iran and Turkey can cooperate in fending off the Russians, it will primarily be up to Turkey to fight the battle in the Caucasus. Russia has thus far responded positively to Turkey’s diplomatic engagements, but in a region with so many conflicting interests, the situation could change in a heartbeat.
     
    Reprinted with permissions of STRATFOR.
    Strategic Forecasting, Inc., Stratfor, is a private intelligence agency founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas. George Friedman is the founder, chief intelligence officer, and CEO of the company.
     

  • STRATFOR ; The Real World Order

    STRATFOR ; The Real World Order

    By George Friedman

    On Sept. 11, 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed Congress. He spoke in the wake of the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the weakening of the Soviet Union, and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. He argued that a New World Order was emerging: “A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor, and today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”

    After every major, systemic war, there is the hope that this will be the war to end all wars. The idea driving it is simple. Wars are usually won by grand coalitions. The idea is that the coalition that won the war by working together will continue to work together to make the peace. Indeed, the idea is that the defeated will join the coalition and work with them to ensure the peace. This was the dream behind the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, the United Nations and, after the Cold War, NATO. The idea was that there would be no major issues that couldn’t be handled by the victors, now joined with the defeated. That was the idea that drove George H. W. Bush as the Cold War was coming to its end.

    Those with the dream are always disappointed. The victorious coalition breaks apart. The defeated refuse to play the role assigned to them. New powers emerge that were not part of the coalition. Anyone may have ideals and visions. The reality of the world order is that there are profound divergences of interest in a world where distrust is a natural and reasonable response to reality. In the end, ideals and visions vanish in a new round of geopolitical conflict.

    The post-Cold War world, the New World Order, ended with authority on Aug. 8, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war. Certainly, this war was not in itself of major significance, and a very good case can be made that the New World Order actually started coming apart on Sept. 11, 2001. But it was on Aug. 8 that a nation-state, Russia, attacked another nation-state, Georgia, out of fear of the intentions of a third nation-state, the United States. This causes us to begin thinking about the Real World Order.

    The global system is suffering from two imbalances. First, one nation-state, the United States, remains overwhelmingly powerful, and no combination of powers are in a position to control its behavior. We are aware of all the economic problems besetting the United States, but the reality is that the American economy is larger than the next three economies combined (Japan, Germany and China). The U.S. military controls all the world’s oceans and effectively dominates space. Because of these factors, the United States remains politically powerful – not liked and perhaps not admired, but enormously powerful.

    The second imbalance is within the United States itself. Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United States remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act.

    The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over.

    As Iraq pulled in the bulk of available forces, the United States did not shift its foreign policy elsewhere. For example, it remained committed to the expansion of democracy in the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, to include Ukraine and Georgia. From the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States saw itself as having a dominant role in reshaping post-Soviet social and political orders, including influencing the emergence of democratic institutions and free markets. The United States saw this almost in the same light as it saw the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. Having defeated the Soviet Union, it now fell to the United States to reshape the societies of the successor states.

    Through the 1990s, the successor states, particularly Russia, were inert. Undergoing painful internal upheaval – which foreigners saw as reform but which many Russians viewed as a foreign-inspired national catastrophe – Russia could not resist American and European involvement in regional and internal affairs. From the American point of view, the reshaping of the region – from the Kosovo war to the expansion of NATO to the deployment of U.S. Air Force bases to Central Asia – was simply a logical expansion of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a benign attempt to stabilize the region, enhance its prosperity and security and integrate it into the global system.

    As Russia regained its balance from the chaos of the 1990s, it began to see the American and European presence in a less benign light. It was not clear to the Russians that the United States was trying to stabilize the region. Rather, it appeared to the Russians that the United States was trying to take advantage of Russian weakness to impose a new politico-military reality in which Russia was to be surrounded with nations controlled by the United States and its military system, NATO. In spite of the promise made by Bill Clinton that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union, the three Baltic states were admitted. The promise was not addressed. NATO was expanded because it could and Russia could do nothing about it.

    From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an anti-Russian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States.

    If the United States had intended to break the Russian Federation once and for all, the time for that was in the 1990s, before Yeltsin was replaced by Putin and before 9/11. There was, however, no clear policy on this, because the United States felt it had all the time in the world. Superficially this was true, but only superficially. First, the United States did not understand that the Yeltsin years were a temporary aberration and that a new government intending to stabilize Russia was inevitable. If not Putin, it would have been someone else. Second, the United States did not appreciate that it did not control the international agenda. Sept. 11, 2001, took away American options in the former Soviet Union. No only did it need Russian help in Afghanistan, but it was going to spend the next decade tied up in the Middle East. The United States had lost its room for maneuver and therefore had run out of time.

    And now we come to the key point. In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia’s southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.

    Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.

    The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.

    The Russians were partly influenced in their timing by the success of the American surge in Iraq. If the United States continued its policy and had force to back it up, the Russians would lose their window of opportunity. Moreover, the Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran.

    The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States re-evaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later.

    The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.

    We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don’t, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn’t absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another.

    The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can’t do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the Unit ed States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).

    One of the interesting concepts of the New World Order was that all serious countries would want to participate in it and that the only threat would come from rogue states and nonstate actors such as North Korea and al Qaeda. Serious analysts argued that conflict between nation-states would not be important in the 21st century. There will certainly be rogue states and nonstate actors, but the 21st century will be no different than any other century. On Aug. 8, the Russians invited us all to the Real World Order.

    Tell Stratfor What You Think

    This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

  • 80-km Submarine Pipeline To Carry Water From Turkey To Northern Cyprus

    80-km Submarine Pipeline To Carry Water From Turkey To Northern Cyprus

    Published: 8/17/2008

    ANAMUR – Turkey will build a dam on a creek in the Mediterranean region to carry fresh water to Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) through a 80-kilometers submarine pipeline.

    The Alakopru Dam will be constructed on Dragon Creek in Anamur town of the Mediterranean province of Mersin and is planned to be completed within three years once the construction works are started.

    The project aims to pump 75 million cubic meters of water yearly to the island, 15 of which will be used as drinking water and the rest for irrigation.

    Turkish State Minister Kursad Tuzmen said project design works would be finalized next year.

    “This project will be implemented to help TRNC fight drought and carry out irrigated farming,” Tuzmen said.

    Turkey first started the project in 1998 to build a dam on Dragon Creek and Turkish construction company Alarko was contracted for the project. A memorandum of understanding was signed by Turkish State Hydraulic Works and Alarko in 2005.

    The project will bring water to the island from Alakopru Dam through a 80-kilometers submarine pipeline to be installed 120 meters deep in the Mediterranean Sea.

    Turkish Cypriot people, cultivating their land by means of dry farming for years, will now be able to carry out irrigated farming, officials said.

    (TÇ-UK)

    (GEN)

    Source: www.turkishpress.com, 17.08.2008

  • Open Letter to Senator Barack Obama

    Open Letter to Senator Barack Obama


    Dear Senator Obama,

     

    Recently, a friend wrote to you about her concerns on your support of the myhtical Armenian genocide, which is rejected by those who know what happened during those terrible First World War years. Your response to her stated that  “I share your view that the United States must recognize the events of 1915 to 1923, carried out by the Ottoman Empire, as genocide. As you know, this resulted in the deportation of nearly 2,000,000 Armenians, of whom 1,500,000 men, women, and children were killed.”

     

    The above statement has been taken directly from the HR 106 (Item 1) which was shelved by the House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2007 because it was full of distortions and lies and had no chance of passage in the House of Representatives. My friend did not state any of those false claims or that the Armenian genocide should be recognized. On the contrary, she asked you to reject the Armenian claims. As I also wrote to you in 2007 and early this year, what you have stated in your kind response are false and what happened in 1915 can not be categorized as genocide. What your advisors are telling you are lies and falsified propaganda stories, which are shown in historical documents that can be found in the US archives, especially in the Near East Relief Report.

    The  Near East Relief Report is dated 22.04.1922 but gives the status of 1921 year-end, signed by James Barton. As of end of 1921, 200.000 to 300.000 refugees were alive in Syria and in need of housing (since they are alive).

    Barton, approved with thanks by Armenian Patriarchs Bezdjian (Protestant) and Sayegiiyan (Catholic) confirmed the following: 

    P. 4 –   It states that 300.000 Armenians returned to Cilicia after British-French occupation, but that they evacuated the region in 1921 after F. Bouillon’s Treaty with Kemalist Turks. 

     


    P. 5 – The number of living people in Russian Armenia is 1 million and 500.000 of these need help of the Relief Organization. (This 1 million matches with Katchaznuni and Lalaian statements for 1918, before war – 200.000 who died of starvation until end of 1921 there.
    It states that at the time 1.000.000 are alive in Caucasus Armenia,- 500.000 in need of help!P. 8 – It gives account of 64.000 alive in 124 orphanages + 50.000 in the areas = 114.000 living.

    P. 9 – Relief activities continued in full during Kemalist rule in all areas, since the US was not at war with Turkey. The following figures were given for some of the orphanages: Ankara 350, Kayseri 3190, Harput 5176, Konya 813, Sivas 1368, Maras 468 etc. It states that 500.000 persons migrated from Anatolia to Caucasus region. (Other sources had indicated this figure as 400.000). It lists various orphanages in occupied – unoccupied cities of the Ottoman Empire and Kemalists, showing that Turks never hindered their activities!

    Throughout the report, there is not a word of Turkish atrocities or refusal of cooperation or attacks on relief goods protected by famished soldiers or Turks, and that only Christians received subject Relief!  Generally there’s NO mention of “massacre-genocide or even LACK OF HELP” of Turks!  In fact, Ch.15 –  “Population Controversy” proves that figures of Art. 1 of HS 106 and alike are all tall lies! 

    Unfortunaley, Near East Relief is continuing its activities at present as “The Near East Foundation” uner the influence of Armenian administrators and recognizes the mythical genocide despite the presence of the above report in their archives which proves otherwise.

     

    We are all aware of the new book that just came out “Obama Nation” which is also full of lies and your campaign has rejected the book in a 40 page “Unfit to Publication” rebuttal. This is exactly the way many Turks and Americans characterize “Ambassador Morgenthau”s Story”, the mother of all anti-Turkish material published under his name but actually written by his Armenian secretray and Armenian translator with input from many anti-Turkish circles. This book too was unfit for publication and the suggestion to turn it into a movie was rejected by President Wilson even though he had no love for Turkey and wanted to divide the Ottoman Empire. And yet millions have read this book for over 90 years and have been exposed to a falsified history of Turkish-Armenian and Turkish-American relations.

     

    Below is a document, “White paper: The Armenian Issue” prepared by a group of professionals and intellectuals living in Holland, Germany, France, Turkey, the United States, etc., who would like to see this issue resolved. I am sure, if you and your advisors and supporters also read this document, your false and unjustified attitude will also change, the cornerstone of your campaign.

     

    Regards.

     

    Yuksel Oktay

    16 August 2008

    New Jersey

     

    White Paper  : The Armenian Issue

     July 2008

    I.                    Introduction

         Statesmen in western countries are often besieged by representatives of Armenian groups representing huge voting blocks demanding resolutions or “Denier” legislation -with penalties- in connection with events that occurred in Eastern Anatolia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As they would with any other constituents, legislators typically feel obliged to hear these people out and somewhat obligated to represent their interests.

           The historical events in question are extremely complex. Not only did they occur in a Moslem culture which is seldom studied to the requisite level of detail by typical students in Western Colleges – or even by future History Teachers – but the particular events in question occurred at the center of an extremely complex web of relationships between nations of extremely diverse cultural backgrounds.  Legislators approached with these demands:

     

    ·        Are not elected to legislate on the true nature of extremely complex events that occurred over a century ago.

    ·        Are not at all equipped to evaluate their veracity and have increasingly been turning to a group of “genocide scholars” which suddenly appeared in roughly the same time frame at which the Armenians started voicing their demands loudly (in the 60’s).

     

    American citizens of Turkish Ancestry report many incidents of ethnic prejudice in their daily lives as a result of these campaigns but they are -almost everywhere- vastly outnumbered as constituents by the Armenians. The same situation is true for persons of Turkish ancestry residing in other western countries.

     

     The Armenian Groups have been widely successful in representing their ideological opponents as “Genocide Deniers” comparing them to David Irving and others who go so far as to claim that there are “unanswered questions about the Nazi Gas Chambers”. This slander has been so successful that representatives from the Turkish side are typically either not allowed to speak their case before critical decisions are made, or when given the opportunity to speak, it is only in a poisoned, prejudicial atmosphere.

     

     Due process, freedom of speech, presuming one innocent until proven guilty, assessing the credibility of evidence and the right to a defense are the foremost values of democracy and all civilized jurisprudence. Armenian genocide proponents, time and again are given free rein to convince an unknowing public that Turkey and Turks are not entitled to these most basic underlying rights and values of all civilized societies.

     The continuing efforts by the Armenian Propagandists create many problems in international relations and in the lives of new generation of Turks in different countries who face accusations about their ancestors who report many incidents of ethnic prejudice in their daily lives.  The continuous accusations of an unacknowledged genocide, and of a deliberate cover-up results in a pervasive atmosphere of distrust and prejudice against Turks and the unfounded allegations do tremendous damage to Turkey ‘s image in the West.

     

    The purpose of this White Paper is to present the facts: incidents leading to, the cause for and the aftermath of the decision to relocate Armenians living in eastern Anatolia during WWI, and to explain why that decision did not amount to “genocide”.

     

    II.                 Background

    Complicity of the movement with Organized Crime

     

    1.1 The movement for recognition of a genocide label has not been a peaceful movement. Although many of the participants in the movement are law-abiding citizens, the movement in general gave its silent assent and financial support to a series of terrorist acts perpetrated against Turkish Civil Servants in the period spanning to 1973-1991. A total of 110 acts of terror were carried out by Armenian terrorists in 38 cities of 21 countries. 39 of these were armed attacks, 70 of them bomb attacks and one was an occupation. 42 Turkish diplomats and 4 foreign nationals were assassinated in these attacks, while 15 Turks and 66 foreign nationals were wounded. These acts were not openly condemned by the movement; it raised funds for legal defense of some of the perpetrators and openly treated others as heroes. An atmosphere of confusion resulting from the profuse Anti-Turkish Government propaganda they generated at the time afforded them some level of face-saving and bought them much needed time and cover and enabled them to spread intimidation and terror against anyone who might dare oppose them -all in an era when the West’s approach to terrorism was characterized by that naïveté of the pre-2001 World.

    1.2  In 1977, the home of UCLA History Professor Stanford Shaw -who had taken the position after studying the Turkish Archives that there was no directly intended genocidal attempt on the Armenians- was bombed by Armenian Extremists.

     

    The Genocide ‘Scholar’ factor:

     

    2.1 The rise of the Genocide “Scholar” movement coincided roughly with virulent rise of Armenian Diaspora demands in the West. The movement came into being largely through the efforts of individuals rather than through a combined effort by established academic institutions. Moreover, unlike conventional transactions in established academic institutions, the transactions of the genocide “scholars” are conducted behind closed doors; individuals who disagree with their thesis report that they are made to know that they are not welcome. Their process is not transparent and they do not uniformly enforce recognized standards of academic rigor

     

    2.2 The movement’s habit of attacking the integrity and character of their ideological opponents -on the Armenian issue- as “Genocide Deniers” is highly irregular in the academic community which normally appeals to documentation and (objective) evidence rather than personal attacks on the integrity of their opponents. Even in the case of the true deniers of the Nazi Holocaust, such individuals are easily dispatched by appealing to logical proofs and documentary evidence rather than by propagandistic accusations against their character. Furthermore their castigation of their ideological opponents as “Genocide Deniers” amounts to a condemnation of practically an entire ethnic group since the overwhelming majority of Turks feel very strongly that the events in question cannot rightly be labeled “genocide”. To date the “Genocide Scholar” movement has attempted to avoid being stigmatized as racist by pursuing a two-pronged strategy:

    ·        All rhetoric is directed at the Turkish Government arguing that it is not the Turkish People but the Turkish Government that is guilty of “Genocide Denial”.  Care is taken to represent the Turkish People as a race brainwashed by their government and thus somewhat innocent of the crime of “Genocide Denial”. By this tactic, the Armenian lobby and their ‘scholar’-allies attempt to avoid the appearance of stigmatizing an entire race as “Genocide Deniers” while, in reality, they are doing exactly that.

    ·

    ·        Psychologist and leading spokesman for the movement, Israel Charny, has formulated an elaborate theory of “Genocide Denial” which allows for the existence of what he terms “innocent deniers.” According to this theory, huge groups of people can fall under the heading of “innocent deniers” who, he assures us, “may not really be aware of the genocide they are helping to deny,” and while somewhat innocent are yet “Genocide Deniers” nevertheless. Clearly, by virtue of this theory Charny would have us exempt him from the stigma associated with pejorative condemnation of an entire ethnic group (i.e. almost all people of Turkish Ancestry both in Turkey and abroad ) and escape the epithet of “Racist”. The last time we saw people talk about an entire race like this was during World War II, when the Nazis argued that although some Jews appeared to be good, and tried to be good, they could not help themselves from being evil nonetheless. After all, the Nazis argued, it was in their blood to do evil.

     

    2.3 The movement’s response to the Statement of the 69 Academicians published in several leading newspapers is most telling of their modus operandi. In 1985 a large paid advertisement appeared in the New York Times, Washington Post and Washington Times, signed by 69 Americans specializing in Turkish, Ottoman and Middle Eastern Studies objecting to the use of the “genocide” label in House Joint Resolution then before the U.S. Congress. Instead of openly debating the issue, the genocide ‘scholar’ movement immediately embarked on an effort to discredit these academics on various grounds, insinuating that some of them may have been corrupted by having received research grants from the Turkish Government, etc. The response is conspicuous for the absence of any serious scholarly debate about the issues and concerns raised by these Academicians in the paid Advertisement; instead it consists primarily of insinuated personal attacks on the professional and academic integrity of the signatories who, like all ideological opponents of the movement – are collectively slandered as “Genocide Deniers”.  All of this constitutes a serious departure from recognized standards of academic integrity;  to immediately attack and denigrate ideological opponents before speaking to the substance of the issue – especially in consideration of the credentials of the individuals in question – should place a very serious onus on the accusers.  This constant pattern of relentless personal attacks on the integrity and professional qualifications of their ideological opponents followed by declaration of ideological/rhetorical victory when the slander campaign succeeds cannot be tolerated any longer. 

     

    Who are the Armenians?

     

    3.1 The Armenians are a Christian People whose history goes back as far as the earliest centuries of Christianity. Of all the ancient patriarchates of Christianity, the Armenians have the distinction of being the only Patriarchate to have developed and evolved outside of the ancient Roman Empire . All the other ancient patriarchates, the Alexandrian, the Roman, the Greek, the Jerusalem and the Syrian, evolved and flourished -until the rise of the Arab Empire- within the boundaries of the Roman Empire . It is worth noting that the adoption of Christianity as the state religion under Constantine in 325 CE was preceded by a similar event -devoid of any political or social connections- in Armenia , where the monarch, Triadates, had converted just two decades previously effectively bringing with him practically the entire population of the country. Though the Armenians from time to time were tributary to the Roman Empire, there was no prolonged period in the pre-Arab era during which they were full subjects of the Roman empire . Thus, the political forces and social climate which sometimes influenced the development of church doctrine were different in the Armenian church. Armenian bishops were present, however at most major Church councils as far back as the Nicene, and participated with their peers in the deliberations. The Great Church Controversies of the 5th century resulted in the Armenians permanently rejecting Ecclesiastical control from either Rome or Constantinople . Though Christians, the Armenians remained in many ways separated from the West for over a thousand years, well beyond the middle ages. They were a protected minority when the Ottoman Empire was at its height and Europe was trembling at the advance of the Ottoman Armies. As the Ottoman Empire began to decline in the 18th-19th centuries however, and the “Great Powers” of Europe and “Holy Russia” foresaw the impending collapse of the “Sick man”, the Armenians were re-discovered by the Christian West not only as long-lost fellow Christians but as potential contacts in a territory which the principle of the “balance of power” dictated should be divided equitably among the existing powers in case of collapse and dismemberment. This re-discovery with its attendant mixed motives was to have unfortunate consequences for the Armenians when the hour of final collapse came in the War we now call the “Great War”. 

     

    These newly re-discovered Christians were viewed not only as potential future allies in connection with territorial ambitions but also as potential proselytes.  Protestant missionaries were sent in to win over, wherever possible, new converts from the long-separated Armenian fold to the doctrines of the Protestant Reformers that had so changed the texture of Western Christianity in the interval of separation.  These were soon followed by Roman Catholic Missionaries – all of whose efforts were to be backed by a conspicuously high level of support from their respective governments. But though the Armenians were very accepting of new western ideologies -particularly nationalism – the assiduous efforts of the missionaries did not result in nearly as many conversions as they had hoped for; most Armenians remained attached to the “Orthodox Armenian” Church.  In the 19th century there were nearly 2,000 foreign religious missions in Anatolia hailing from the United states , the United Kingdom , France , Germany , Austria , Italy , etc. 

    Although they established educational institutions, they involved themselves in the lives of the Armenians and had the effect of separating them from the Turks.  Documentary evidence shows that the Missionary Schools ultimately had a role in the Armenian revolutionary activity.

     

    III.             The Problems and Issues

    The Provocation: The Armenian insistence on the Genocide label generally ignores or diminishes the very serious provocation in the hour of Peril. Unlike the American Experience in WWII, in which there were no civilian casualties, Armenian Revolutionary Activity in the years leading up to 1915 involved many instances of brutal killings of Non-Armenian Moslem Turkish civilians. Furthermore the Armenian Military leaders, emboldened by the support they were receiving from the Western Powers and Russia , were even reckless enough to inform the Turks that they would not side with them in the impending war but would instead side with the enemy (Imperial Russia). The Armenian insistence on the “Genocide” label ignores the seriousness of this activity, the great loss of (Moslem Turkish) life and the ramifications of colluding with an extremely powerful enemy in the hour of great danger.

     

    The word “genocide”: In the words of one recent author, this word “evokes implicit comparisons with the Nazi past” and this imagery which the word carries in popular usage is inescapable when decisions are being made by civic institutions on the matter. In fact Armenians lived peacefully for centuries with Turks in an atmosphere directly opposite to that in which European Jews lived for centuries. This is precisely what makes the accusation of ‘genocide’ – when originating from the West toward Turks – so insulting and intolerable. The problem started when revolutionary elements among the Armenians – encouraged by Christian powers with territorial ambitions in the collapsing Ottoman Empire – embarked on a path that threw the entire region into turmoil sparking a conflict that quickly grew out of control, gravely endangering the vast majority of the Armenian Population, precipitating the Great Armenian Tragedy of 1915. These Armenian revolutionaries killed tens of thousands of innocent Turkish Muslims in their attempt to create a nation-state of their own.  Their collusion with the invading Russian Armies resulted Turkish deaths numbering in the hundreds of thousands. These massacres of Muslim Turks, many of which took place well before the Ottoman government decided to relocate a large part of its Armenian citizens, amounted to ethnic cleansing. Since Jews did no such thing before the holocaust started, it is utterly dishonest to directly or indirectly compare the Holocaust to the Armenian Tragedy of 1915.

     

    Intolerance and hatred: the Armenian allegations and their reckless campaign against Turkey has fostered in the West an atmosphere of hatred toward present-day Turks, who were not even alive at the time of the events in question. Turks often feel discriminated against and they often feel unwanted. The campaign waged by Armenians and their allies has assumed the proportions of a campaign against Turkey and against Turks. This even though Turkey as a state did not exist until 1923 (that is 8 years after the Armenian tragedy). In response, Turks often are unwilling to engage with Armenians or genocide ‘scholars’ on this subject, let alone speak out to Western newspapers or politicians. The result of this, in turn, is that the Turkish side does not get any exposure, while the Armenian side constantly has and takes the opportunity to share its views with the world. This only increases the intolerance already existing.

     

    History becomes political: Because Turks are never heard, the debate about what happened before, during and after World War I is not much of a debate in the West anymore. Most people simply assume that Armenians were victims of genocide. To Armenians this is probably not a problem, but the reality of the matter is that the historians -with the exception of a few specialists – are less sure about what happened than politicians. Politicians, under pressure from powerful constituencies, propose bills that ‘recognize’ the Armenian ‘genocide’ while individuals who have studied this subject carefully and objectively are not able to share a collective conclusion. Some history professors say that the Tragedy constitutes genocide, but many others do not[1]. Normally history would be left to historians, but nowadays history is turned into a political tool and the fear of a slander campaign has the effect of bullying historians into silence. As a result, the truth – and history itself – suffers.

     

    IV.              Conclusion: call for action

    When all the evidence is examined, an impartial observer must admit that the movement for recognition of a “genocide” label for the Armenian Tragedy is not at all the humanitarian movement that its promoters would have us believe it to be.   Instead, it is not only a deliberate distortion of historical facts but has as its malignant fruits ethnic hatred, terrorism and murder, defamation and intimidation of historians, suppression of true scholarship, the politicization of history and disruption of legitimate political processes in Western Countries. We call upon all recipients of this document to take all steps in their power to ensure that no further support be given to such a clearly harmful and deceitful movement. 

     

     

     

    Index of Misrepresentations of Fact

    Associated with

    The Armenian Issue

     

     

    Continued use of Wartime Propaganda as Historical sources…………………………………………………. 2

    Morgenthau’s Story…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2

    The British Blue Book………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3

    Intentional omission of key parts of the story……………………………………………………………………………….. 3

    Continued use of Ancestral War Stories……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4

    Using False Documents…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5

    The Hitler Quote………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5

     

     

     

     

     


     

     

    Armenian Propagandists often cite two sources in particular:  “Ambassador Morganthau’s Story” and the British “Blue Book” prepared by the young graduate student Arnold Toynbee.   To the uninformed layman these documents have the appearance of reliable historical sources.  But from the point of view of competent historians there are several problems with these sources.

     

    ·        The most glaring problem with the continued use of these two sources is that it violates a fundamental principle of historical research: single sources cannot be viewed out of the context of all primary documentation available on the subject.   In other words, if overwhelming evidence from other known facts and documents throws one or two sources in doubt, the discrepancy must be reconciled.   Both of these documents are known -on the testimony of the authors themselves- to have been intended as wartime propaganda to secure the entry of the U.S. into the war.  This fact -by itself- does not necessarily impeach them, but when viewed in conjunction with all the remaining evidence it becomes clear that they have little value as historical records and are instead to be regarded as primarily wartime propaganda. . 

     

    ·        Those who have seen war first hand describe its cruelty, inhumanity and injustice.  Almost any war, when viewed through the eyes of one side only, can look like a genocide.  Both Morganthau’s story and the British Blue Book are clear examples of one-sided documents.  Reputable historians view them as having, at best, very limited value for understanding the events of 1915,  but when presented to the uninitiated public they produce an extremely distorted and misleading picture of those events.

     

    U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau – though he lived long before President Nixon – had a similar habit of keeping a scrupulous record of his daily activities; not on tape but in writing.  We have his diaries and extensive documentation of so many events of his daily life.   His book -which appeared in what was then one of America’s best-known magazines, “The World’s Work” (circ. 120,000) read like an adventure novel and was such a sensation that not only did it play a major role in securing America’s entry into the war, but it even received a movie offer from Hollywood which Morgenthau rejected only at the urging of President Wilson himself.  But when the “stories” in his book are checked against the records in his diary and other personal records, the value of the work as an historical source is destroyed completely.   Furthermore, the book itself is characterized by a significant number of anti-Turkish clauses which are nothing less than racist; an element that was necessary for propaganda value.  Turks are portrayed as an inferior race.  One of the main themes of the book is a series of stories portraying the Central Government as having had a conspiracy to exterminate the Armenians.  But even if we were to disregard the other obvious problems with Morgenthau’s book, there are irreconcilable problems with these stories.  For example:

     

    ·        Why is it that there are so many communications -still extant in the original- coming from this same government warning that anyone who molested the deported Armenians or who failed to protect them adequately would be punished severely?

    ·        If the government had a conspiracy to exterminate the Armenians, why is there so much documentation showing that this same government punished and even executed in many cases persons whom it considered guilty of massacring innocent Armenians?

    ·        If the government wanted to exterminate the Armenians, why did it offer them Autonomy in August 1914, in Erzurum- an offer which they promptly rejected ?

     

    In summary, Morgenthau’s diary is generally regarded as a reliable primary historical source by both sides but this diary clearly exposes his book, Morgenthau’s Story as a propaganda piece. 

     

     

    A second source that is continually used by Armenian Propagandists is the British Blue Book, published in 1916 mostly through the efforts of Arnold Toynbee who was at the time a graduate Student.  Abundant evidence exists to show that the intention of the British Government in producing the Blue Book was to bring about the entry of the U.S. into the war; not to deliver a comprehensive portrayal of what was happening in Eastern Anatolia at the time. Again, by itself this fact does not necessarily impeach the work.  However there are several problems with the use of this document as an historical source authenticating a label of “genocide”:

     

    ·        Contrary to the assertions of Armenian Propagandists, the Blue Book contains no evidence proving that the Turkish government was responsible for the massacres[2] described therein and the atmosphere of near-anarchy and local animosity stemming from the depravity of the Armenian Revolutionaries, would tend to militate against such a conclusion in any case.

    ·        Contrary to the assurances of co-Author Lord Bryce, that most of the stories in the Blue book came from “eye-witnesses”, most of the evidence presented in the work is hearsay evidence, not first hand.

    ·        Five years after compiling it, Toynbee would visit Turkey , report his deep shock at the instances of cruelty and barbarity he saw perpetrated by Greeks against Moslem Turks in Western Anatolia, and then later reveal that he had -all along- been ignorant of Armenian provocation in Eastern Anatolia[3].

     

    The Relocation of the Armenians -the event which witnessed such great suffering and loss of life- occurred in 1915.  The year 1908 was the year of the “Young Turk” revolution.  As a result of this revolution, there was a breakdown of law and order in many parts of Anatolia .  Later, in 1914 when World War 1 broke out, conditions became so desperate that not only able-bodied

    men but even policemen were called to the front to defend the country as Turks were dying by the thousands in a conflict of apocalyptic proportions at Gallipoli.  This added to the breakdown of law and order and brought Eastern Anatolia to a near-anarchic condition.  By this time Armenian Revolutionary activity – complete with internal attacks on non-combatant civilians – had been going on not for years but for decades.  And it was at this time that Armenian Revolutionary leaders felt so confident in Allied help that they decided to risk everything and refuse to enter the war on the side of their country – even the best Armenian primary sources admit this.   They openly recruited Armenian men from within the borders of the country to side with “Holy Russia”,  the hereditary enemy of the Ottomans.  It was in this desperate atmosphere that the Central Government decided on the Relocation Order, which had such dire consequences. Extensive documentary evidence is still extant showing that the Central Turkish Government not only sent out messages warning that the relocated Armenians were to be protected,  but later carried through on threats to punish -even with execution- responsible parties who were negligent in their duty to protect the Armenians on their journey.   Contrary to claims of Armenian Propagandists who omit all this important information from the story, this relocation order did not amount to a death sentence for the Armenians.   It was a desperate last-ditch effort to solve a seemingly impossible problem precipitated by the Armenian Revolutionaries themselves and the meddling of the “Great Powers” in the internal affairs of the crumbling Ottoman Empire .  Although there were many deaths in this relocation:

     

    ·        Many survived in their new location or emigrated to various locations.

    ·        Many returned after a law was passed ending the relocation .

    ·        Food was scarce and Non-Armenians (Turks especially) were dying of starvation everywhere.

    ·        Many of the deaths resulted from an atmosphere of anarchy; outlaws roamed the countryside with impunity.

     

    Finally, the intent here is not to absolve the 1915 Central Turkish Leadership from all blame but to show that use of the “genocide” label in this case is not only wholly unjustified, but in most cases deliberately deceitful. 

    Armenian Propagandists make continued use of stories of the deaths of their ancestors many of whom died in truly deplorable circumstances.   The stories are repeatedly told in conjunction with Armenian attempts to have the events of 1915 labeled a “genocide”.  What can one say when confronted with these stories many of which are undoubtedly true?  On the one hand, one does not wish to show disrespect for these individuals or negate the seriousness of the situations, however there are several serious problems with this continued use of these Ancestral war-stories:

    ·        Many Moslem Turkish Civilians died at the hands of Armenian Revolutionaries under circumstances that were as bad -and often worse- than the circumstances under which the Armenian deaths occurred.  The Turks are only too well aware of these stories because their families were affected for generations but the consequences.  However the Armenians make it quite clear that it is the life of a Christian Armenian that should count and stories of the tragic deaths of so many Moslem Turks are rigidly suppressed by the Armenians. 

    ·        The implication of innocence is clear in the telling of these stories by the Armenians.  It is true that many of the dead were non-combatant civilians but it is also true that the whole episode was precipitated by the actions of Armenian Revolutionaries who brutally massacred Moslem Turks in a widespread campaign to establish a “Western Armenia” and “take back” lands that they regarded as hereditarily theirs – lands in which they constituted at that time only a very small minority.

     

    One of the most common “proofs” used by Armenian activists in support of their claim of “genocide” is a book known as The Memoirs of Naim Bey.  This book is represented as proof that the Ottoman Government deliberately exterminated the Armenian population of Anatolia . The source of the book was a certain Armenian man named Aram Andonian who translated it into Armenian.  He claimed that he came into the possession of official Ottoman documents, telegrams and decrees, many of which were supposedly signed by Ottoman Interior Minister Talat Pasha.  Briefly, the list of authentication problems with this Book and with Andonian’s story of how he came into possession of the “documents” contained therein is very long.  And so is the list of reputable historians -specialists in this field- who reject them outright as forgeries.  Even the British Authorities charged with prosecuting Ottoman rulers after the First World War refused to use them at that time.  But the Armenian Propagandists continue to pass them off on an unsuspecting public as authentic proof of a program to exterminate the Armenians.  See these websites for critical discussion of this forged work:

    Armenian activists often claim that Hitler said that he could get away with exterminating European Jewry because no one “remembers today the extermination of the Armenians”.  This “statement” appears (in more or less these words) in the leaflets handed out by groups of demonstrating young Armenians, on the cover of books and in articles written by Armenian authors. Furthermore, the “statement” is written at the Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C. , where millions of visitors every year read it, many believing that Hitler felt confident he could exterminate the Jews because the Ottomans had been successful in Armenians.

     

    There is just one problem with the quote: Hitler never said it (Lowry, Heath, “The U.S. Congress and Adolf Hitler on the Armenians.” Institute of Turkish Studies, Inc. Washington , D.C. Political Communication and Persuasion, Volume 3, Number 2 (1985)). Armenian activists have him saying it in a meeting with his General staff. This was, they claim, brought to light in the Nuremberg trials. The problem is that actual transcripts of this meeting, (Hitler’s speeches and recollections of leading Nazis accepted as authentic by the Nuremberg court) do not contain any such reference to Armenians; they only have him calling them “unreliable” and “dangerous”. Instead, the quote was taken from a book, written in 1942, by someone who was never able to authenticate his claim. It was later reproduced in an article by an unnamed writer for Times of London on Saturday, November 24, 1945, but it was most definitely not used by the Nuremberg prosecutors. In short; Hitler never said it, yet Armenians continue to use it to back up their case against the Turks.

     

    [1] For an excellent discussion of the problems with use of the Blue Book see p137-139 Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey . A Disputed Genocide, Salt Lake City , University of Utah Press, 2005

     

    [1] This confession appears on page 276 of Toynbee’s 1922 work “The Western Question in Greece and Turkey “. 

     

     



    [1] See addendum for list of some of the scholars who believe that, although what happened was terrible, it most certainly does not constitute genocide

     

     

  • STRATFOR : Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    STRATFOR : Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

     

    Turkey, Iran: Ankara’s Priorities Shift

    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (L) and Turkish President Abdullah Gul in Istanbul
    Summary
    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two-day trip to Ankara ended Aug. 15. While the Iranian government and state media have touted his trip as proof that Iran and Turkey are close allies, the Turkish government is far more concerned with containing the current situation in the Caucasus, which could have major implications for Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan.
    Analysis
    Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrapped up a two-day trip to Ankara on Aug. 15. The Iranian government and state media have been hyping Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey for days in an attempt to showcase to the world the Iranian belief that Iran and Turkey, as the two principle non-Arab regional powerhouses, are close and natural allies.
    But while Iran is eager to forge closer ties with Turkey, the Turks do not have much time for Ahmadinejad right now. Ankara has bigger things on its mind, namely the Russians.
    Turkey is heir to the Ottoman Empire, which once extended deep into the southern Caucasus region where Russia just wrapped up an aggressive military campaign against Georgia. Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the Caucasus have primarily been defensive in nature, focused on keeping the Russians and Persians at bay. Now that Russia is resurging in the Caucasus, the Turks have no choice but to get involved.
    The Turks primarily rely on their deep ethnic, historical and linguistic ties to Azerbaijan to extend their influence into the Caucasus. Azerbaijan was alarmed, to say the least, when it saw Russian tanks crossing into Georgia. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned, Baku could have been the next target in Russia’s military campaign.
    However, Armenia — Azerbaijan’s primary rival — remembers well the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Turks, and looks to Iran and especially Orthodox Christian Russia for its protection. Now that Russia has shown it is willing to act on behalf of allies like South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, the Armenians, while militarily outmatched by the Azerbaijanis, are now feeling bolder and could see this as their chance to preempt Azerbaijan in yet another battle for the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region— especially if it thinks it can look to Russia to militarily intervene on its behalf.
    The Turks and their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan are extremely wary of Russia’s intentions for the southern Caucasus beyond Georgia. Sources told Stratfor that Azerbaijan has learned that the Russian military jets that bombed Gori and Poti were based out of Armenia. This development not only signaled a significant expansion of Russia’s military presence in the southern Caucasus, but it also implied that Armenia had actually signed off on the Russian foray into Georgia, knowing that Russian dominance over Georgia would guarantee Armenian security and impose a geographic split between Turkey and Azerbaijan. If the Armenians became overly confident and made a move against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh, expecting Russian support, the resulting war would have a high potential of drawing the Turks into a confrontation with the Russians — something that both NATO member Turkey and Ru ssia have every interest in avoiding.
    The Turks also have a precarious economic relationship with Russia. The two countries have expanded their trade with each other significantly in recent years. In the first half of 2008, trade between Russia and Turkey amounted to $19.9 billion, making Russia Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Much of this trade is concentrated in the energy sphere. The Turks currently import approximately 64 percent of the natural gas they consume from the Russians. Though Turkey’s geographic position enables it to pursue energy links in the Middle East and the Caucasus that can bypass Russian territory, the Russians have made it abundantly clear over the past few days that the region’s energy security will still depend on Moscow’s good graces.
    Turkey’s economic standing also largely depends on its ability to act as a major energy transit hub for the West through pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was recently forced offline due to a purported Kurdish militant attack and the war in Georgia. Turkey simply cannot afford to see the Russians continue their surge into the Caucasus and threaten its energy supply.
    For these reasons, Turkey is on a mission to keep this tinderbox in the Caucasus contained. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan spent the last couple of days meeting with top Russian leaders in Moscow and then with the Georgian president in Tbilisi. During his meetings with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Erdogan pushed the idea of creating a Caucasus union that would include both Russia and Georgia. Though this organization would likely be little more than a talk shop, it is a sign of Turkey’s interest in reaching a mutual understanding with Russia that would allow both sides to maintain a comfortable level of influence in the region without coming to blows..
    The Iranians, meanwhile, are sitting in the backseat. Though Iran has a foothold in the Caucasus through its support for Armenia, the Iranians lack the level of political, military and economic gravitas that Turkey and Russia currently hold in this region. Indeed, Erdogan did not even include Iran in his list of proposed members for the Caucasus union, even though Iran is one of the three major powers bordering the region. The Turks also struck a blow to Iran by holding back from giving Ahmadinejad the satisfaction of sealing a key energy agreement for Iran to provide Turkey with natural gas, preferring instead to preserve its close relationship with the United States and Israel. Turkey simply is not compelled to give Iran the attention that it is seeking at the moment.
    The one thing that Turkey can look to Iran for, however, is keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict under control. Iran’s support for Armenia has naturally put Tehran on a collision course with Ankara when dealing with the Caucasus in the past. But when faced with a common threat of a resurgent Russia, both Turkey and Iran can agree to disagree on their conflicting interests in this region and use their leverage to keep Armenia or Azerbaijan from firing off a shot and pulling the surrounding powers into a broader conflict. In light of the recent BTC explosion claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey can also look to Iran to play its part in cracking down on PKK rebels in the region, many of whom have spent the past year fleeing a Turkish crackdown in northern Iraq by traversing through Iran to reach the southern Caucasus.
    While Iran and Turkey can cooperate in fending off the Russians, it will primarily be up to Turkey to fight the battle in the Caucasus. Russia has thus far responded positively to Turkey’s diplomatic engagements, but in a region with so many conflicting interests, the situation could change in a heartbeat.
  • Azerbaijan: The Stark New Energy Landscape

    Azerbaijan: The Stark New Energy Landscape

     

     

     

    August 15, 2008 | 1817 GMT

    Yoray Liberman/Getty Images

    Workers at the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline terminal in Turkey

    Summary

    Russia’s military defeat of Georgia puts Azerbaijan in a difficult position. With all of its existing energy export routes now back under Russian control, Baku faces a stark set of choices that may force it to reach an accommodation with Moscow.

    Analysis

    Related Links

    • Turkey: An Oil Pipeline Fire and the Russian Alternative
    • Russia: Courting Azerbaijan for Natural Gas
    • Global Market Brief: BP Takes a Hit in the Georgia Conflict

    Related Special Topic Pages

    • Central Asian Energy: Circumventing Russia
    • The Russian Resurgence
    • Russian Energy and Foreign Policy
    • Crisis in South Ossetia

    Azerbaijan is losing some $50 million to $70 million per day due to the closure of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, the Caspian Energy Alliance said Aug. 14, adding that Baku’s total losses from the closure amounted to some $500 million. The 1 million barrel per day (bpd) BTC line, which passes from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, was shut down Aug. 6 following an attack on the Turkish part of the line, claimed by a Kurdish separatist group. If not for that attack, however, it might well have been shut down anyway amid the military conflict in Georgia that began two days later.

    Azerbaijan exports oil and natural gas to Western energy markets via three pipelines — all of which pass through Georgia, and all of which experienced cutoffs in the past several days. Two
    of them — the BTC and the 150,000 bpd Baku-Supsa — carry oil. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum line carries natural gas at 9 billion cubic meters per year. The pipelines were built to provide a transport route for Caspian Sea energy to reach Western markets without having to pass through Russia, which controls the majority of pipeline infrastructure into Europe. Now that Russia has established a firm military presence in Georgia, however, it is highly likely that all three lines will continue to operate, or not, at the pleasure of the Kremlin.

    This puts Azerbaijan in a predicament. With its export routes to the West blocked by the Russian presence in Georgia, Baku is carefully considering its options. Though other potential pipeline routes exist, they are plagued with problems that could prove insurmountable. Azerbaijan may have no real option but to try to reach some sort of accommodation with Moscow.

    Initially, Baku was excited by the conflict in Georgia’s South Ossetia region because it provided a possible blueprint for dealing with Azerbaijan’s own restive separatist enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh — and for potentially imposing a new military reality on Baku’s regional rival, Armenia.. If successful, such a campaign could have allowed Baku to use Armenian territory for a new energy export route. Sources tell Stratfor that, following the Georgian military’s Aug. 8 invasion of South Ossetia, Azerbaijan’s leadership convened an emergency meeting at which they reportedly gave serious consideration to invading Nagorno-Karabakh, contingent on the eventual success of the Georgian operation.

    However, the Georgian offensive not only failed, it resulted in the Russian invasion of Georgia proper — which has effectively suspended Tbilisi’s ability to control its own territory. Russia also used air bases in Armenia to assist in the Georgian intervention, which marked a significant change in the dynamic between Baku and Yerevan. Russia keeps military assets in both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and sells weapons to both — indeed, part of Moscow’s strategy in the Caucasus is to ensure that the two rivals remain distracted by their tense relations — but from Baku’s perspective, the Russian decision to activate its assets in Armenia means Moscow is choosing sides. However possible it might have been for Azerbaijan to invade its neighbor, it has suddenly become inconceivable.

    For Baku, this is the worst-case scenario. Its energy lifelines, intended to circumvent Russian territory, are now under the overt control of the Kremlin, while its alternative of forcing a new path through Armenia is completely taken out.

    Baku also suddenly found itself trying to block the flood of Azeri volunteers heading to Georgia to fight the invading Russians. Azerbaijan’s government did not want to provoke Russia, especially with Russian tanks only a couple of hundred miles from Baku itself. For that matter, with a presidential election set for Oct. 15, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev does not want a security crisis on his hands. Even though Azerbaijan has been using its energy revenues to build up its military in recent years, it is nowhere near ready to defend itself from a Russian invasion. Its security situation is in many ways even more dire than that of Georgia (or even Ukraine).

    Turkey, Baku’s strongest ally in the region, theoretically would not stand by if Russia invaded Azerbaijan — but then, Ankara has been silent on the Russian intervention in Georgia. To the Azeris, this is a sign that they cannot depend on the Turks to commit themselves to a fight with Moscow if push should come to shove. Also, now that Georgia is under effective Russian military control, the only route for Turkish aid to Azerbaijan is cut off — neither Iran nor Armenia would provide passage.

    With the Russians in control of Georgia and with domination of Armenia out of the picture, Azerbaijan’s only other feasible export route would be southward through Iran, hooking into existing Turkish pipeline infrastructure or sending exports out via the Persian Gulf. The problem with this option is one of timing: Any move into Iran would have to wait for an accommodation between Tehran and the United States over Iraq, which appears to be getting ever nearer but could still be derailed. At $50 million in losses per day, however, Azerbaijan does not have the time to wait for these pieces to fall into place and then build a new pipeline into Iran. A Russian move to cut off all three pipelines going through Georgia would make the cost unbearable. Baku counts on i ts energy export revenues in order to maintain military parity with Armenia, so a sharp drop in funding could quickly become a national security issue.

    That leaves one other option, which from Baku’s perspective is the least desirable but the most realistic: seeking accommodation with Russia.

    Russia now effectively controls the entire already-built energy transport infrastructure between Baku and Western markets. Russia could accommodate transport of Azeri energy through Georgia for the right price. That price would be both financial and political: Azerbaijan would need to align with Moscow on matters of import in order to keep the pipelines open. Baku also could ship its natural gas through Russia proper via pipelines such as Baku-Rostov-on-Don, which used to provide Azerbaijan with natural gas supplies before it became a net exporter. There also is the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, which has a capacity of nearly 200,000 bpd, although very little Azeri crude normally goes through it.

    Azerbaijan has tried to avoid shipping its energy exports through Russian pipelines while other feasible options were open. But Baku may have to reconsider now that Russia holds all the cards.

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