RICHARD G HOVANNISIAN PROFESSOR EMERITUS Ph.D., UCLA, 1966. Armenian Educational Foundation Professor of Modern Armenian History

Phone: 310-825-3375
Fax: 310-206-9630
E-mail: [email protected]

Press Release, April 14, 2009

Contact:  James Robbins

International Conferences

UCLA. During the first quarter of 2009, Professor Richard G. Hovannisian, AEF Chair in Modern Armenian History at UCLA, participated in twelve conferences and community lectures in Europe and the United States. The most recent was the 35^th Anniversary Conference of the Society for Armenian Studies held at UCLA from March 26-28. Hovannisian, serving for the seventh time as the president of the SAS, was the conference coordinator and chaired the session on the hundredth anniversary of the Adana/Cilicia massacres of 1909, with the participation of Drs. Bedross Der Matossian, Rubina Peroomian, and Ph.D. candidate Ohannes Kilicdagi.

Drs. Richard and Vartiter Hovannisian were in Stockholm, Sweden, from March 20 to 25, for an international conference titled “The Legacy of the 1915 Genocide in the Ottoman Empire,” with the participation of Armenian, Assyrian, Pontic, Turkish, and Swedish scholars. The moving force behind conference, held in the Kungsholmens Konferens Center on March 23, was Mr. Vahagn Avedian, Chairman of the Union of Armenian Associations in Sweden, together with Stefan Anderson of the Living History Forum. In his morning keynote address on “The Phases and Faces of the Denial of the 1915 Genocides,” Hovannisian assessed the various stages and changing strategies of denial from 1915 to the present. Ragip Zarakolu of Istanbul reflected on current discussions of the genocide in Turkey; Prof. David Gaunt explained the internal and external struggle for recognition of the Assyrian Genocide; Laurent Leylekian of the Armenian Federation, Brussels, analyzed Turkey’s policy relating to the Armenian Genocide within the framework of accession to the European Union; and Professor Ove Bring considered the legal dimensions of the 1915 atrocities. The conference was moderated by noted foreign correspondent Marika Griehsel.

On March 22, Hovannisian, Zarakolu, and Leylekian engaged in an informal roundtable with the Swedish Armenian community and organizations. And on March 24, before returning to the United States for the SAS conference, Hovannisian was guest lecturer at Uppsala University on the topic of the “Armenian Genocide as the Prototype of Modern Mass Killings.”

Prior to his trip to Sweden, Richard Hovannisian was at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, for a four-day conference, March 18-21, on “Armenia and Armenians in International Treaties.” The conference was organized by the Michigan Armenian Studies Program under the direction of Prof. Gerard Libaridian. Among the more than twenty treaties that were discussed, Hovannisian focused on “The Unratified Treaty of Alexandropol as the Basis for Subsequent Russian-Turkish-Armenian Relations,” giving little-known details about the negotiation of the controversial treaty and its relevance today.

Community Lectures

Hovannisian’s community lectures during the first part of 2009 included the Comité des Arméniens de Belgique in Brussels, February 1; St. James Church and its newly-formed Armenian Cultural Association of Sacramento, February 7; Armenian Cultural Association of Munich, February 21, and Surp Khatch Armenian Church and Armenian Association of Baden-Württemberg, Germany, February 22; St. Sarkis Church and Armenian Cultural Association of the Carolinas, Charlotte, February 28;  La Casa Armena Milano, Italy, March 8; and the Armenian National Committee of Providence, April 3. In addition, on March 4, Richard Hovannisian was at the Pasadena headquarters of Facing History and Ourselves, Inc. to direct a conference call with staff members around the country on issues relating to the Armenian Genocide and approaches to teaching the subject in middle schools and high schools.

In the second half of April, Richard and Vartiter Hovannisian will be in Yerevan for the annual meeting of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia and to participate in a conference sponsored by the Armenian Genocide Institute and Museum on the Cilician massacres of 1909.

END

By Harut Sassounian Publisher, The California Courier Turkey brilliantly accomplished its objectives in the first round of negotiations ostensibly to open the border with Armenia. Ever since 1993, when Turkish leaders closed the border, they set two main preconditions for its reopening. Armenia must: 1) Stop pursuing international recognition of the Armenian Genocide; and 2) Return Artsakh (Karabagh) to Azerbaijan. Despite persistent Turkish attempts to impose such harsh terms on Armenia, successive Armenian governments have declared that diplomatic relations should be established and the border reopened without any preconditions. Thus, the standstill continues until today. During the past year, however, a series of unexpected developments provided new impetus for Armenia and Turkey to repair their contentious relationship. Both countries, under pressure from the U.S. and Europe, were now prodded by a new major actor, Russia, to open the Armenian-Turkish border. As owner of major businesses in Armenia, Russia sought to establish cross border trade with Turkey, thereby also diminishing Georgia’s strategic significance as a sole transit route for the region. The turmoil in the aftermath of the contested Armenian presidential election last year rendered the new leaders more sensitive to demands from the major powers, expecting in return their support to counter the opposition at home. To be fair, the Armenian government believed that opening the border was also in Armenia’s own economic interest. Moreover, when Armenia’s imports through Georgia were temporarily blocked during last year’s Georgian-Russian war, Armenian officials realized the strategic value of having an alternate border outlet. Turkey also stood to gain both economically and politically from an open border with Armenia because: 1) The population of Turkey’s eastern provinces, living in abject poverty, would significantly benefit from trading with Armenia; 2) Turkey would fulfill one of the prerequisites for European Union membership; and 3) Ankara hoped to preempt the White House and Congress from taking a stand on the Armenian Genocide. Despite such clear and immediate advantages, Turkish officials prolonged the negotiations, in order to secure maximum concessions from Armenia in return for opening the border. The first glimmer of a breakthrough came on June 23, 2008, when Armenia’s newly-elected President, Serge Sargsyan, unexpectedly announced, during a Moscow visit, his acceptance of a Turkish proposal to form a “historical commission.” However, the Armenian President insisted that the commission would be established “only after the opening of the border.” Later, the Armenian side announced that it would accept the establishment an inter-governmental commission that would discuss all outstanding issues between the two countries. As it became clear in late 2008 that Barack Obama would win the presidency and probably keep his promise to recognize the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish government launched a propaganda campaign to convince the international community that Armenia and Turkey were engaged in delicate negotiations which would be undermined if third countries acknowledged the Genocide. Clearly, the Turks were not sincere in their declared intentions. Had they been serious, the border could have been opened in a matter of days, not months or years! At the height of that campaign, the Presidents of Armenia and Turkey held a summit meeting in Yerevan on the sidelines of a soccer match between their national teams. Armenians were encouraged that Turkish officials made no mention of their usual preconditions for Armenia to desist from genocide recognition and to make concessions on Artsakh. Pres. Obama’s visit to Turkey last week had a critical impact on the development of Armenian-Turkish relations. Judging from his circumspect remarks in Ankara, it became clear that the American President had adopted the duplicitous Turkish line that third parties should not comment on the Armenian Genocide while Armenia and Turkey were engaged in serious negotiations. This carefully orchestrated Turkish ploy, however, almost fell apart at the last minute when Pres. Aliyev of Azerbaijan refused to go to Istanbul and meet with Pres. Obama. Aliyev was upset that Turkey was considering opening the border with Armenia while ignoring Baku’s interests. To reassure Aliyev, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan announced that the border would not be opened until Yerevan resolved its conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia’s Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, objecting that Turkey was reviving its old preconditions, canceled his trip to Istanbul. However, he ended up taking a later flight, possibly at the urging of American officials. Aliyev, on the other hand, remained steadfast in his refusal to go to Turkey. Mr. Nalbandian’s presence in Istanbul regrettably gave credence to Turkish misrepresentations that the two countries were making good progress in their negotiations. Thus, Turkey managed to fool Pres. Obama and other world leaders into thinking that it was seriously trying to resolve its long-strained relations with Armenia. Consequently, Turkish officials were showered with many accolades and received priceless publicity. The Economist magazine aptly pointed out: “Turkey basks in the glory of a two-day visit by Barack Obama.” To be sure, the Turks managed to get maximal public relations benefits by simply talking about opening the border and succeeded in convincing Pres. Obama that it was not a good idea to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide while in Ankara. It remains to be seen whether Turkey has also secured the President’s silence on April 24! Round 2 of the Turkish ploy is now in full swing, with Azerbaijan threatening to take all sorts of measures against Turkey should the latter dare to open the border with Armenia, without linking such action to territorial concessions on Artsakh. The entire population of Azerbaijan has been whipped into frenzy over this issue. Opposition leaders in Turkey are also up in arms, accusing Erdogan of abandoning “fraternal Azerbaijan’s” interests. Pres. Obama, upon his return to the White House, immediately phoned Pres. Aliyev to assure him of America’s support for the resolution of the Artsakh conflict as well as normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations. While the charade goes on, Armenia’s leaders continue to make surprisingly positive statements about their negotiations with Turkey, despite repeated announcements by Turkish officials that the border will not be opened until Yerevan makes concessions on Artsakh. It now appears that Turkey will place the border negotiations on the back burner until the Minsk Group, composed of the United States, Russia and France, can come up with some evidence of progress on the Artsakh negotiations. Only then would Turkey consider opening the border with Armenia. To counter these Turkish/Azeri ploys: 1. Armenia’s leaders should start playing hardball with Turkey and Azerbaijan and not get overly concerned with making a good impression on the major powers in trying to accommodate their demands. 2. Armenia should stick to its long-avowed position of no preconditions for opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey, and resist pressures from Russia, the U.S., and Europe. 3. Armenia should consider setting October 7 as a deadline for opening the border. In case of Turkish inaction by that time, Pres. Sargsyan should refuse to go to Turkey for the return soccer match, thus exposing Turkey’s ploy on improving relations with Armenia. 4. Long in advance of any border accord, the Armenian Parliament should safeguard Armenia’s national security by prohibiting all foreigners from purchasing land in sensitive border areas and making investments in certain strategic resources. 5. Armenia and Armenian-Americans should condemn, in the strongest possible terms, Pres. Gul’s blatant denial of the Armenian Genocide during a joint press conference with Pres. Obama in Ankara last week, televised live worldwide. To set the record straight, Armenian-Americans should immediately submit to the U.S. Senate the counterpart of the House genocide resolution. After all, it makes more sense to pass such a bill in the Senate, which has never approved a resolution on the Armenian Genocide, rather than in the House which has already adopted two such resolutions in 1975 and 1984.

Europe Report N°199
14 April 2009

To access the media release of this report in Turkish, please click here.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over Turkey’s European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half, relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about history at a critical and promising time.

Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising, bipolar views of history are significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be healed. Most importantly, the advance in bilateral relations demonstrates that a desire for reconciliation can overcome old enmities and closed borders. Given the heritage and culture shared by Armenians and Turks, there is every reason to hope that normalisation of relations between the two countries can be achieved and sustained.

Internal divisions persist on both sides. Armenia does not make normalisation conditional on Turkey’s formal recognition as genocide of the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. But it must take into account the views of Armenians scattered throughout the global diaspora, which is twice as large as the population of Armenia itself and has long had hardline representatives. New trends in that diaspora, however, have softened and to some degree removed demands that Turkey surrender territory in its north east, where Armenians were a substantial minority before 1915.

Over the past decade, Turkey has moved far from its former blanket denial of any Ottoman wrongdoing. Important parts of the ruling AK Party, bureaucracy, business communities on the Armenian border and liberal elite in western cities support normalisation with Armenia and some expression of contritition. Traditional hardliners, including Turkic nationalists and part of the security services, oppose compromise, especially as international genocide recognition continues and in the absence of Armenian troop withdrawals from substantial areas they occupy of Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan. These divisions surfaced in events surrounding the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. That the new tendencies are gaining ground, however, was shown by the extraordinary outpouring of solidarity with Armenians during the Dink funeral in Istanbul and a campaign by Turkish intellectuals to apologise to Armenians for the “Great Catastrophe” of 1915.

The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia on recognition, borders and establishment of bilateral commissions to deal with multiple issues, including the historical dimension of their relations. Azerbaijan has strong links to Turkey based on energy cooperation and the Turkic countries’ shared linguistic and cultural origins. Ethnic Armenian forces’ rapid advance into Azerbaijan in 1993 scuttled plans to open diplomatic ties and caused Turkey to close the railway line that was then the only transport link between the two countries. For years, Turkey conditioned any improvement in bilateral relations on Armenian troop withdrawals. Baku threatens that if this condition is lifted, it will restrict Turkey’s participation in the expansion of Azerbaijani energy exports. While Azerbaijani attitudes remain a constraint, significant elements in Turkey agree it is time for a new approach. Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate.

Outside powers have important interests and roles. The U.S. has long fostered Armenia-Turkey reconciliation, seeking thereby to consolidate the independence of all three former Soviet republics in the south Caucasus and to support east-west transit corridors and energy pipelines from the Caspian Sea. Washington was notable in its backing of efforts that kick-started civil society dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. The Obama administration is working hard at repairing the damage done to U.S. relations with Turkey by the war in Iraq. Although Obama repeatedly promised on the campaign trail to formally recognise the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide, he should continue to steer the prudent middle course he has adopted as president. The U.S. Congress, which has a draft resolution before it, should do the same. At this sensitive moment of Turkish-Armenian convergence, statements that focus on the genocide term, either to deny or recognise it, would either enrage Armenians or unleash a nationalist Turkish reaction that would damage U.S.-Turkish ties and set back Turkey-Armenia reconciliation for years.

U.S. support for Turkey-Armenia reconciliation appears to be mirrored in Moscow. Russian companies have acquired many of Armenia’s railways, pipelines and energy utilities and seek to develop them; Russian-Turkish relations are good; and Moscow is looking for ways to mitigate the regional strains produced by its war with Georgia in August 2008. If sustained, the coincidence of U.S.-Russian interests would offer a hopeful sign for greater security and prosperity in the South Caucasus after years of division and conflict. All sides – chiefly Armenia and Turkey but potentially Azerbaijan as well – will gain in economic strength and national security if borders are opened and trade normalised.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Turkey:

1.  Agree, ratify and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; cultivate a pro-settlement constituency among Armenians; and avoid threatening or penalising Armenia for outside factors like resolutions or statements in third countries recognising a genocide.

2.  Avoid sacrificing implementation of the normalisation package to demands for immediate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and seek opportunities to show Baku that by easing Yerevan’s fears of encirclement, normalised Turkey-Armenia relations may ultimately speed up such an Armenian withdrawal.

3.  Make goodwill towards Armenia clear through gestures such as joint work on preserving the ancient ruins of Ani, stating explicitly that Turkey will recognise and protect Armenian historical and religious heritage throughout the country.

4.  Encourage universities and institutes to pursue broader research on matters pertaining to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Armenian and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and increase funding for cataloguing and management of the Ottoman-era archives.

To the Government of Armenia:

5.  Agree, ratify, and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; and avoid statements or international actions relating to genocide recognition that could inflame Turkish public opinion against the current process.

6.  Agree together with Azerbaijan to the OSCE Minsk Group basic principles on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement; then start withdrawals from Armenian-occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and pursue peace with Azerbaijan in full consciousness that only in this way can normalisation with Turkey be consolidated.

7.  Make clear that Armenia has no territorial claim on Turkey by explicitly recognising its territorial integrity within the borders laid out in the 1921 Treaty of Kars.

8.  Encourage universities and institutes to pursue more research on matters relating to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Turkish and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and organise the cataloguing of known Armenian archives pertaining to the events in and around 1915 wherever they may be located.

To the United States, Russia and the European Union and its Member States:

9.  Avoid legislation, statements and actions that might inflame public opinion on either side and so could upset the momentum towards Turkey-Armenia normalisation and reconciliation.

10.  Raise the seniority and intensify the engagement of the U.S., Russian and French co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group until Armenia and Azerbaijan reach final agreement on Minsk Group basic principles for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

11.  Back up Turkey-Armenia reconciliation with projects to encourage region-wide interaction, heritage preservation and confidence building; and support as requested any new bilateral historical commission or sub-commission, development of archive management and independent Turkish- or Armenian-led scholarly endeavours to research into aspects of the 1915 events.

Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, 14 April 2009

» read media release

Turkey and Armenia should seize their best opportunity yet to normalise relations, work on a new approach to shared history and open a European border that for nearly a century has been hostage to conflict. Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising views of history are significantly converging. At this sensitive time, third parties should avoid statements or resolutions in the politicised debate over genocide recognition or denial that could inflame opinion on either side. Regarding the separate but related issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey should persuade its Azerbaijan ally that détente which makes Armenia feel secure will do more for a settlement than continuing a fifteen-year impasse.