Note on Armenia Allegations – Recent Developments
Category: Main Issues
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Denialist Erdogan in the White House:
An Unworthy Guest!
Turkish Prime Minister Receb Erdogan made insulting statements on the Armenian Genocide during his visit to Washington on December 6-8. Rather than hosting him in the White House, Pres. Obama should have declared him “persona non grata” — an undesirable person!
Would Pres. Obama have welcomed Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the White House and sang his praises, given his revisionist views on the Holocaust? Inviting Erdogan to the U.S. is even more offensive, akin to receiving a German leader who denies the Holocaust!
Erdogan made a series of outrageous remarks and denialist statements during five public appearances in Washington: At PBS, the Willard Hotel, the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced and International Studies, SETA-DC Turkish think tank, and the German Marshall Fund.
During his December 8, hour-long PBS TV interview by Charlie Rose, Erdogan brought up the Armenian issue by claiming that his government had recently restored “an Armenian Church” in Van, without disclosing that the Holy Cross Church on Akhtamar Island in Lake Van was reopened not as a house of worship, but as a cultural site to attract tourists! Indeed, the Turkish authorities refused to allow a cross to be placed on the Church’s dome!
Erdogan’s boastful comments led Charlie Rose to raise the Armenian Genocide issue in a passive manner by asking: “What is necessary in order to — what more evidence does history need with respect to the genocide?”
The question threw Erdogan into a rage, making him spew hateful statements about the Armenian Genocide: “I can say very clearly that we do not accept genocide. This is completely a lie. I invite people to prove it…. Something like this is really not possible, and there is no truth to it.” These are the shameful words of the same man who claimed there was no genocide in Darfur, since he saw no trace of such a crime during his visit to Sudan!
When asked by Charlie Rose if Pres. Obama had brought up the Armenian Genocide issue during the White House meeting, Erdogan said yes, adding that it was in the context of normalizing relations with Armenia: “It was Turkey that initiated the normalization process. It was Turkey that took upon itself the risk. We believe in ourselves. What we would like to see is for this normalization process to go forward. And in that it’s important that we go into that and the Karabagh issue between Azerbaijan and Armenia be resolved. There is an occupation. We have to solve that problem. …And if the positive developments that we would like to see do not come about, then I do not believe that our parliament will have a positive result as a result of its deliberations.”
During his appearance at the Johns Hopkins University, Erdogan proudly claimed that his “ancestors have never committed genocide.” The real issue is not whether his grandparents participated in the Armenian Genocide, since there was no shortage of Turks who did. What’s more important is that the Prime Minster has chosen to become an accomplice to these heinous crimes by participating in their cover up!
Despite all the diplomatic pleasantries exchanged between Erdogan and Obama, there were indications that the two leaders had a tense meeting. According to media reports confirmed by White House sources, Pres. Obama bluntly told Erdogan that if the Turkish Parliament did not ratify the Armenia-Turkey Protocols in a timely manner, the U.S. Congress could well adopt a resolution on the Armenian Genocide.
The two leaders also clashed over their divergent views on several key issues: Turkey’s unwillingness to send more troops to Afghanistan, refusal to support a recent IAEA resolution to censure Iran’s nuclear program, the signing of a multi-billion dollar energy contract with Iran in defiance of U.S. sanctions, worsening ties with Israel, continued occupation of Northern Cyprus, and manifest disregard of minority rights in Turkey.
In the midst of Erdogan’s crucial visit, Turkey’s Ambassador to Washington Nabi Sensoy tendered his resignation unexpectedly, after an argument with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu over the logistics of the White House meeting. This scandalous development must have
been highly embarrassing for the Prime Minister!
Upon returning to Turkey, Erdogan faced a major political crisis and bloody clashes in the streets of Kurdish populated cities, triggered by the Constitutional Court’s banning of the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). The court expelled two DTP members from Parliament, while 19 others resigned in protest.
It is a shame that Armenia’s leaders, rather than repudiating Erdogan’s offensive statements on the Armenian Genocide, continued to talk about normalizing relations with Turkey! Armenian Americans were equally negligent, failing to express their outrage. Erdogan should have been confronted in Washington with massive protests and demonstrations! Sadly, silence makes genocide denial an acceptable practice!
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Krekorian defeats Essel in L.A. City Council race
December 9, 2009 | 12:06 am
Assemblyman Paul Krekorian claimed victory tonight in the bitter and expensive race for the Los Angeles City Council seat previously held by City Controller Wendy Greuel.Krekorian, the former head of the Burbank Board of Education who was elected to the Assembly in 2006, defeated former film executive Christine Essel by a 14% margin with all precincts reporting.
Krekorian’s win was a major rebuke to some of the city’s most powerful unions, which flooded the race with hundreds of thousands of dollars in independent expenditures to support his rival.
At his campaign headquarters Tuesday night, Krekorian said voters had united around “a common vision about a city government that is marked by integrity and accountability, for starters — a city government that actually works for the people of the San Fernando Valley.”
“We’re all going to have to continue to work together and if we do, I think this is a time that all of us will be able to look back to and say that the reform of Los Angeles began tonight,” Krekorian said.
Essel could not be reached for comment Tuesday night.
Essel also outspent Krekorian 2 to 1 in Tuesday’s runoff and the primary campaign, where they faced eight other candidates.
Outside groups, including the Los Angeles Police Protective League and the union representing workers at the city’s Department of Water and Power, spent nearly $1 million, setting a record for independent spending in a non-citywide race — with most of that money backing Essel.
Both candidates grew up in the San Fernando Valley but moved into the 2nd Council District, which stretches from Sherman Oaks and Studio City to Tujunga, in May to run for Greuel’s seat.
Essel argued that her three decades of business experience at Paramount Pictures Corp. made her uniquely suited to work on retaining businesses in Los Angeles and creating jobs. Krekorian said he had a better understanding of the issues facing residents of the district, after representing some of them in the Assembly. He courted neighborhood leaders throughout the race, promising to curb development and preserve open space.— Maeve Reston
Photo: Candidate Paul Krekorian with his son Andrew, 4, votes Tuesday in the special election for the Los Angeles City Council 2nd District seat in the library at Ulysses S. Grant High School in the Valley Glen neighborhood of the San Fernando Valley. Credit: Brian Vander Brug / Los Angeles Times
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Grave robbers steal former Cyprus president’s corpse
Tassos Papadopoulos died of lung cancer in Nicosia in 2008, aged 74 Thieves have stolen the corpse of Tassos Papadopoulos, the former president of the Republic of Cyprus, police say.
Mr Papadopoulos’ body was removed after his grave in Nicosia was broken into overnight, officials said.
Marios Garoyan, leader of the former premier’s centre-right Diko party, condemned the act as a “heinous and terrible crime”, AFP reported.
Mr Papadopoulos died of lung cancer in Nicosia in 2008, aged 74.
The theft from the Deftera village cemetery in Nicosia was discovered a day before the first anniversary of his death.
The motive for the theft remains unclear, investigators say.
A veteran of Greek Cypriot politics, Mr Papadopoulos became president in 2003 but lost a bid for a second term in 2008. He was defeated by Demetris Christofias, a former coalition partner.
One of his achievements was to oversee the Republic of Cyprus’s entry into the European Union in 2004.
Source: bbc.co.uk, 11 December 2009
Mr Papadopoulos’ body was removed after his grave in Nicosia was broken into overnight, officials said.Marios Garoyan, leader of the former premier’s centre-right Diko party, condemned the act as a “heinous and terrible crime”, AFP reported.Mr Papadopoulos died of lung cancer in Nicosia in 2008, aged 74.The theft from the Deftera village cemetery in Nicosia was discovered a day before the first anniversary of his death.The motive for the theft remains unclear, investigators say.A veteran of Greek Cypriot politics, Mr Papadopoulos became president in 2003 but lost a bid for a second term in 2008. He was defeated by Demetris Christofias, a former coalition partner.One of his achievements was to oversee the Republic of Cyprus’s entry into the European Union in 2004Mr Papadopoulos’ body was removed after his grave in Nicosia was broken into overnight, officials said.Marios Garoyan, leader of the former premier’s centre-right Diko party, condemned the act as a “heinous and terrible crime”, AFP reported.Mr Papadopoulos died of lung cancer in Nicosia in 2008, aged 74.The theft from the Deftera village cemetery in Nicosia was discovered a day before the first anniversary of his death.The motive for the theft remains unclear, investigators say.A veteran of Greek Cypriot politics, Mr Papadopoulos became president in 2003 but lost a bid for a second term in 2008. He was defeated by Demetris Christofias, a former coalition partner.One of his achievements was to oversee the Republic of Cyprus’s entry into the European Union in 2004. -
Armenia engagement derailing Turkey’s energy policy
by Ferruh Demirmen
Türksam, December 9, 2009
(Turkish Center for International Relations & Strategic Analysis)
A misconceived engagement with Armenia has boomeranged beyond diplomacy to impact Turkey’s energy policy. The developments so far are already worrying, and further negative consequences may follow. Turkey’s energy policy is held hostage, and the culprit is a short-sighted Armenia rapprochement that has ignored Azerbaijan’s legitimate concerns on Nagorno-Karabakh.
While some may view the energy “fallout” as a case of “unintended consequences” for Turkey, the effects could have been foreseen easily.
Background
The secret, Switzerland-based Turkish-Armenian normalization process that surfaced in April 2009 in the aftermath of President Obama’s visit to Turkey, albeit launched with good intentions, turned out to be a disappointment for the Turkish side. The “road map” that was announced had a glaring omission: trustworthy preconditions or commitments requisite for normalization of bilateral relations.
In particular, there was no assurance that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, vital for Azerbaijan, would be resolved before opening the Turkey-Armenia border. Baku was concerned, and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations soured.
The two Turkish-Armenian protocols later initialed on August 31 and signed on October 10 confirmed the absence of any caveat on Nagorno-Karabakh, and further alienated Azerbaijan.
For the better part of 2009 Turkey has been trying to placate Azerbaijan, with promises that it will not open the Turkey-Armenia border unless the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is first resolved.
The promise is like a double-edged sword. If Turkey reneges on its promise to Azerbaijan, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations will receive a serious, possibly fatal blow. If Turkey keeps its promise, and Turkish-Armenian normalization fails as a result, Turkey will be criticized in the West for being insincere or manipulative on Armenia “opening.” Armenian “genocide” allegations in the US Congress will come to the forefront again. April 24, 2010 is not too far ahead.
In either case, unless the Armenian parliament refuses to ratify the normalization protocols before the Turkish parliament does, Turkey will be the loser.
That will be the price paid for an ill-conceived political process. Armenia has made it clear repeatedly that it sees no linkage between the normalization process and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. So, Turkey is facing a major quandary.
At present, neither Turkey nor Armenia has submitted the protocols to their respective parliaments for ratification. The fate of the normalization process will hang heavily on the actions of the two parliaments. But for Turkey, and the West in general, some energy projects are at stake.
The fallout on energy
From energy point of view, worsening Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, if not stemmed, will come at a heavy price for Turkey. Alarmed at the Turkish-Armenian normalization talks conducted behind his back, an angry and resentful Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, announced in May that, if forced, Azerbaijan would resort to military force to recapture the Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh territory it lost to Armenia in 1994. (See also recent analysis, ref. 1)
Aliyev had the sympathy of Turkey and a host of other nations and several UN resolutions to back him up, but that was not enough. Peace talks mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group were also not producing palpable results. (Armenian-Azeri talks in Munich in late November were also inconclusive, ref. 1).
To give credibility to his warning, or threat, Aliyev decided to play the gas card as a strategic tool. Partnership with Russia, at least on energy initially, was the strategy he had in mind. And Russia, given the opportunity to exploit the South Caucuses conflict, was more than willing to appear cooperative.
The gas card Aliyev was mulling over was the Shah Deniz gas lying below the bed of the Caspian Sea. Aliyev was already unhappy over the prolonged, yet unresolved, dispute with Turkey over the price of Shah Deniz-1 gas that Turkey had been importing since July 2007. The price of gas was up for negotiation in April 2008, but discussions had reached a deadlock. Aliyev complained that Turkey was paying, at $120/1000 m3, one-third of the market price for gas, and Turkey’s counter offers were not high enough.
On June 29, Russia’s Gazprom and Azerbaijan’s state-owned company Socor signed a gas agreement in Baku in the presence of respective presidents. The agreement stipulated that, starting in 2010, Gazprom would buy Azeri gaz, including, apparently, Shah Deniz-2 gas when it becomes available (currently in 2015). This would be the first time in Azerbaijan’s history that Azeri gas would be exported to Russia.
The gas volume initially involved was small (annually 500 million m3), but it was announced that the volume would increase in future. Gazprom would have the right of first refusal on additional supplies of gas when available. The agreement paved the way for a broad Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation that could possibly extend beyond gas.
The June 29 deal received further endorsement in Baku on October 14.
The Russian-Azerbaijani accord was a clear message to Turkey, and the West in general, from Aliyev that Azerbaijan would keep its options open as far as exporting its gas from the planned Shah Deniz Phase-2 development. This cast doubt not only on future Shah Deniz-2 gas supplies to Turkey, but also on Azeri gas supplies to the planned west-bound Nabucco project that Turkey had boastfully committed itself to in Ankara on July 13 (ref. 2).
To export its gas, Azerbaijan is now pursuing other options that circumvent Turkish territory: a subsea line in the Black Sea running from Georgia to Romania (White Stream project), tanker transport of compressed gas from Georgia to Bulgaria, and a swap or direct gas sale deal with Iran. Preliminary agreements have been signed on all of these. The existing pipeline connections with Iran and Russia would facilitate Russia and Iran options.
Broader implications
Turkey’s ill-founded Armenia engagement process, lacking any meaningful preconditions, is derailing Turkey’s energy policy. A distrustful Azerbaijan has now moved closer to Russia, and Shah Deniz-2 gas exports to Turkey for its domestic needs, as well as for onward transit to Europe via the planned Nabucco pipeline, are put in jeopardy.
Import of Turkmen gas via a future Trans-Caspian pipeline, that could also feed the Nabucco pipeline, is also at risk. For Turkmen gas to reach Turkey via the Trans-Caspian pipeline, Azerbaijan’s cooperation is essential.
Turkey needs Azeri gas in excess of the currently imported Shah Deniz-1 gas to diversify its gas supply sources and routes. Currently there is excessive (some 60%) dependence on Russian gas supplies for Turkey’s domestic needs.
Despite its shortcomings, Nabucco project is still a vital project for Turkey both from energy and political point of view (ref. 2). If Nabucco does not receive throughput from Azeri or Turkmen sources, Turkey’s long-avowed strategic position as an energy corridor to the West will be seriously compromised.
Public outcry stemming from alienation from the brotherly Azeri nation is also a price that Turkish policy makers must consider.
The above considerations leave no doubt that the Ankara-Baku rift should be mended. The sooner the better. The onus of this burden rests mainly on Turkey, not Azerbaijan. Otherwise Azerbaijan will move even closer to Russia, and Turkey may have to do without new Azeri (Shah Deniz-2) gas supplies. That would be rather unfortunate.
While it would entail a higher cost, Azerbaijan has options to export its gas without transiting Turkish territory.
Aliyev has indicated a number of times that Azerbaijan is interested in the Nabucco project, but unless Turkey is more accommodating, that interest may go nowhere.
All indications are that Turkey has overplayed its hand as far as its geographic position as an energy conduit, and has also stonewalled too long to meet reasonable Azeri requests for a gas price that closely reflects market conditions.
Turkey should not be seen as being obstructionist for the implementation of the Nabucco project. In this connection, the possible ramifications of Turkey’s support for the rival South Stream project during the August 6 Russia-Turkey-Italy energy summit in Ankara were not lost on the EU, and may dampen the EU’s interest in Nabucco.
It is telling that Austrian OMV (the flag-bearer for Nabucco), Italian ENI and French EDF have signed preliminary agreements with Gazprom recently about joint implementation of the South Stream project. In the light of these developments, one wonders whether the EU’s support for Nabucco is as good as before, and whether Turkey’s apparent wavering on Nabucco is playing a role. The financing problem of Nabucco is also at a standstill.
Another fallout from strained Turkish-Azerbaijani relations could be the curtailment of the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) throughput, with some of the crude diverted to the Russian and Georgian ports of Novorossiysk and Supsa, respectively. Lukoil, ExxonMobil and Devon, shareholders of AIOC (Azerbaijan International Oil Company) but not the BTC consortium, are already using these routes to export their entitlements from the ACG (Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli) field in Azerbaijan.
Export of Kazakh crude through the BTC could also be delayed or blocked. An ominous sign in this respect comes from the Russian-Kazakh oil transit agreement signed in Yalta on November 20. The agreement signaled support for the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, which Russia, at Turkey’s strong urging, recently endorsed. Samsun-Ceyhan will undermine plans to export Kazakh oil through a trans-Caspian pipeline link to the BTC.
An irony for the US
As a footnote to the above, it is also worth observing an irony in Turkey’s “opening” to Armenia. It is no secret that US pressure, in particular the urging of President Obama in person, played a key role in launching the Armenia engagement process. Yet, the process has not only damaged the close Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership, it has drawn Azerbaijan into Russia’s orbit of influence. This runs counter to the long-established US policy of weaning Soviet-era Turkic republics from Russia’s sphere of influence, in particular on energy.
The maxim, “unintended consequences,” describes this situation well for the US.
Concluding remarks
An ill-conceived political normalization process undertaken with Armenia has pushed a nervous Azerbaijan closer to Russia and has driven this small nation to seek alternative gas export options that circumvent Turkish territory. Future Azeri, and in the longer term Turkmen, gas imports to Turkey are jeopardized.
Some of the throughput to the BTC may be diverted, and plans to channel Kazakh oil to the BTC may be cancelled or postponed indefinitely.
In parallel, Turkey’s role to act as an energy corridor to the West is compromised.
The energy projects impacted are all important for Turkey. If for no other reason than to safeguard these projects, it is vitally important that the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are put back where they belong, and where they traditionally have been: good, friendly terms.
Despite rosy statements from Turkish government circles, Turkish-Azeri relations are severely strained. Rapprochement with Armenia should not come at the expense of brotherly relations with Azerbaijan.
Turkish policy makers who now claim the Turkey-Armenia border would not be opened until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, should answer the question: If that were to be so, why did the normalization protocols signed with Armenia not contain the requisite precondition in the first place? It is no secret that the Armenia engagement started under external pressures, both from the US and the EU.
The adverse energy-related effects stemming from the ill-conceived Armenia normalization process were no surprise, and could have been foreseen in advance.
Those who are entrusted to lead the nation should be cognizant of the fact that one-sided foreign-policy initiatives that are launched without due consideration of underlying risks can have boomerang effects that may undermine national energy interests.
If the rift in energy cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan deepens, in a sense it will be a betrayal of the legacy of the late Azerbaijani President Haydar Aliyev, who, with resolute determination, championed the realization of the BTC project despite many roadblocks. Turkey will bear the lion’s share of responsibility for this state of affairs.
Separate from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the Armenia normalization process has ignored other legitimate concerns that are important for Turkey (ref. 3).
A far-sighted national energy policy requires vision, foresight and perseverance. Whether Turkey’s policy makers have these traits, the readers should ponder.
References cited
(1) “Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations in Munich and the possibility of war,” by Sinan Oğan, Türksam, Nov. 23, 2009.
(2) “Nabucco: A challenge for EU and a partially fulfilled promise for Turkey,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Eurasia Critic, September 2009.
(3) “Current Turkish ‘opening’ to Armenia cannot be supported,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Turkish Forum, October 9, 2009.
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TURKEY-ARMENIA NORMALIZATION LINKED TO ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Wednesday, December 9, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 226 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION
by Vladimir Socor
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has clearly reaffirmed the linkage between normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations and early substantial progress toward resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Ankara defines such progress as an agreement on withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied districts of Azerbaijan beyond Upper Karabakh, pending a determination of the latter’s future status.
Erdogan reinforced this linkage during his December 7-8 visit to Washington, despite U.S. and E.U. attempts in recent months to break that linkage and to convince Ankara also to break it. That course of action ignored and alienated Azerbaijan, playing into Russia’s hands and jeopardizing Western strategic interests in the South Caucasus. Washington and Brussels seemed to be guided primarily by internal political considerations in adopting that policy. They will now have to reconsider it, in the wake of Erdogan’s and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s latest clarifying statements.
The U.S. agenda for Erdogan’s visit, as publicized ahead of the event (White House website, December 4) included neither the Karabakh conflict nor energy projects such as Nabucco among the issues to be discussed by President Barack Obama with Erdogan.
The first omission reflected Washington’s attempts to de-link the Karabakh conflict-resolution negotiations from Turkey-Armenia normalization. U.S. policy (seconded by that of the E.U. and Russia) pressed for Turkish parliamentary ratification of the October 10 Turkey-Armenia protocols on establishing full diplomatic relations and opening the land border between them, without conditioning this on Armenian troop withdrawal from certain Azerbaijani districts.
The omission of energy transit issues from the U.S.-prepared agenda remained without official explanation, but could be seen as relegating Caspian and European energy security to a secondary level on the White House’s list of priorities. This perception would ipso facto reduce Azerbaijan’s importance to U.S. policy in this administration, compared with preceding U.S. administrations of both parties. Obama solicited Turkish support on Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq as top U.S. priorities, while also urging Turkish ratification of the protocols with Armenia.
Obama did not mention the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict or a Karabakh resolution process at the concluding news conference. It was Erdogan who reintroduced this issue into the equation: “We have also discussed [issues] between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are of great importance in the context of Turkey-Armenia relations…because the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia is very much related to those issues,” Erdogan stated at the joint news conference (White House press release, December 7; APA, PBS, December 8).
In follow-up statements in Washington, Erdogan recounted that he had “explained to him [Obama]” that Turkey-Armenia normalization is difficult without resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The Turkish parliament is “conditioning” the protocols’ ratification on conflict-resolution, it “feels strongly about this,” and it “cannot be dictated to,” he declared. He called for Armenian troop withdrawal from seven Azerbaijani districts and urged the “Minsk Group’s” co-chairs (U.S., Russia, France) to promote that goal (APA, December 8).
U.S. policy makers were still pressing as recently as last month for de-synchronizing the two processes. On the eve of Erdogan’s visit, however, the Turkish position had become clear. During the OSCE’s year-end conference in Athens, Davutoglu stated that the Turkish parliament can only ratify the Turkey-Armenia protocols after the Karabakh issue is resolved (Trend, December 2).
Erdogan clarified—in an interview televised in Azerbaijan––that “resolution” means, in this context, “reaching an agreement [between Azerbaijan and Armenia] regarding the seven districts….We have told U.S. officials all along: If you want to resolve the Turkey-Armenia issue, you should also resolve the Karabakh conflict. Otherwise any resolution would be impossible…The Turkish-Armenian issue and the Karabakh problems are closely related” (ANS TV cited by Day.az, December 4, 5).
The Turkish parliament’s foreign policy commission chairman, Suat Kiniklioglu, corroborated this view in a public debate in Brussels. While Turkey-Armenia normalization has the potential to dramatically improve the overall situation in the South Caucasus, “it would be incomprehensible and illogical to normalize relations on one side while maintaining a conflict on the other side” (Day.az, December 4).
Ankara was slow to clarify its position in recent months. For its part, Washington put domestic politics ahead of strategic considerations. To deflect pressures from Armenian advocacy groups and a large part of the U.S. Congress, the Obama administration decided to push for re-opening the Turkish-Armenian border before April 2010, when the Armenian genocide resolution comes up for reconsideration in Congress. Candidate Obama had promised to sign such a resolution, but President Obama cannot do so. Instead, the White House decided in April 2009 (at the time of Obama’s visit to Turkey) to press for re-opening the Turkish-Armenian land border, hoping to defuse the explosive potential from the annual political debate on the genocide issue.
This course of action, however, could only be pursued at Azerbaijan’s expense and at the risk of fracturing the Turkey-Azerbaijan partnership, instead of nurturing it. That partnership largely accounts for the West’s strategic gains in the South Caucasus-Caspian region over the past decade. Strained recently by Russian advances in the region and a burgeoning Russo-Turkish partnership, the West’s gains could be severely jeopardized by policies that isolate Azerbaijan or sacrifice its interests.
Baku does recognize—as presidential adviser Novruz Mammadov has put it (www.day.az, December 6)—that the U.S. initiative to help normalize Turkey-Armenia relations can generate positive dynamics for regional cooperation, if this initiative is synchronized with Karabakh conflict-resolution. But it would only exacerbate tensions in the region, if the two processes are separated, instead of converging.
–Vladimir Socor