Category: Armenian Question

“The great Turk is governing in peace twenty nations from different religions. Turks have taught to Christians how to be moderate in peace and gentle in victory.”Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary

  • MEHMET SUKRU GUZEL: Pan-Armenian Declaration on the Centennial of the Armenian Genocide as a Crime Against Humanity

    MEHMET SUKRU GUZEL: Pan-Armenian Declaration on the Centennial of the Armenian Genocide as a Crime Against Humanity

    mehemet-rayen-reynaldo-300x200Pan-Armenian Declaration on the Centennial of the Armenian Genocide as a Crime Against Humanity

    MEHMET SUKRU GUZEL

    (Switzerland Representative of Center for International Strategy and Security Studies)

     

    On 29 January 2015, Armenian State Commission on the Coordination of Events Dedicated to the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, in consultation with its regional committees in the Diaspora, gave a declaration. [1]

    This declaration is in fact a crime against humanity based on racial and religious discrimination. This declaration is a crime against humanity by non-mentioning the killings of more than 500.000 Turks by Armenian non-state armed groups between the years 1914 -1921. As all historian and international politicians knows that for a specific date and specific place of historical events based on religious and racial issues, if only a portion, or one side of the specified events is to be mentioned and only one side is side to be accused of the same actions, this is a discrimination on religion and racial origin. And this is the legitimization of crimes of the other side on religious and racial reasons which is a crime by itself.

    No normal person can believe then more than 500.000 civilians Turks could be killed including children, woman and older people on self-defense actions of Armenian non-state armed groups. By not mentioning of the killings of more than 500.000 Turks in the declaration, this should be accepted as the legitimation of the war crime acts of Armenian non-state armed groups and this is a crime against humanity.

    International Court of Justice gives the definition of Crimes against Humanity as:

    Include any of the following acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious bodily or mental injury. [2]

    Armenian non-state armed groups made many acts of this definition and the Declaration itself is persecution against the Turkish people on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds.

    In the paragraph 4 of the declaration, it is written that “recalling the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, whereby recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”

    In the paragraph 5 of the declaration, it is written that “ guided by the respective principles and provisions of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96(1) of 11 December 1946, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, the United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of 26 November 1968, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 as well as all the other international documents on human rights,”

    As mentioned in the declaration paragraph 4 and 5, all other human rights international documentations, we can give examples of the International Committee of the Red Cross study on customary international humanitarian law rules made a significant contribution to the process of identifying fundamental standards of humanity by clarifying, in particular, international humanitarian law rules applicable in non-international armed conflict. Furthermore, adoption by the Human Rights Committee of general comment 31 on article 2 of the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and its judgment in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo reaffirmed the applicability of international human rights law during armed conflict and addressed the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. [3]

    Also the International Court of Justice in the 1985 Nicaragua case recognized that certain minimum humanitarian standards apply during internal armed conflict. [4]

    On February 26, 2007, the International Court of Justice issued its judgment in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The International Court of Justice did conclude that Serbia, through its continued support of Bosnian Serbs in light of the probability that some of them would commit the crime of genocide, had “violated the obligation to prevent genocide in respect of the genocide that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995. [5]

    We have to remember that Bosnian Serbs were a non-state armed group and they committed crime of Genocide.

    In fact, if the word “ Genocide “ is to be used for the 1st World War period, Armenia should accept that the 1st Genocide of the 1st World War was made by non-state armed Armenian groups in the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War lost territories of the Ottoman Empire Kars, Ardahan and environs. Ottoman sources reported some 30,000 Muslim civilians killed; more recent scholarship has pointed to an even higher number, as many as 45,000 in the Chorokhi valley alone in. Traveling the Ardahan-Merdenek road in Ardahan province in early January 1915, an Azeri Duma deputy, Mahmud Yusuf Dzhafarov, witnessed “mass graves of unarmed Muslims on both sides of the road.” Whatever the exact number of victims, the wave of Christian vengeance killings against Caucasian Muslims was serious enough that the long-serving viceroy of the Caucasus, Count I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, issued a series of decrees forbidding further atrocities while also ordering the deportation of about 10,000 Muslims from sensitive areas near the front lines to the Russian interior. [6]

    When we think of Srebenica and the International Court of Justice confirmed that genocide had been committed in Srebenica. If a single massacre satisfies the criterion of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, certainly the Armenian massacres against the Turks in Russian control territory before the deportation decision of Armenians in Ottoman Empire would qualify as the 1st Genocide of the 1st World War. Non-state armed Armenian groups made more massacres to the Turks at the back of the war frontier in different parts of Anatolia as well should be recognized as Genocides also.

    In the article 8 of the Declaration, it is written that “Calls upon the Republic of Turkey to recognize and condemn the Armenian Genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire, and to face its own history and memory through commemorating the victims of that heinous crime against humanity and renouncing the policy of falsification, denialsm and banalizations of this indisputable fact” forms crimes against humanity.

    Article 8 of the declaration was written with the concept of racial and religious discrimination. Armenian State and Armenian Diaspora deny the fact of the war crimes of Armenian non-state armed groups and their genocides to Turks as Genocide and afraid to face in fact their own history and memory through commemorating the victims of that heinous crime against humanity and renouncing the policy of falsification, denialsm and banalization of this indisputable fact forms crimes against humanity.

    A demand of blaming only one side for what had happened in the past means a demand from international community to accept acts of so-called in an orientalist understanding as superior civilized Armenian non-state armed groups acts against to Muslims Turks, as a Holy Christian War as was in the old times of the Crusades by which no one can blame the Armenian non-state armed groups acts of genocides against the Turks.

    The logic of Armenian State and Armenian Diaspora Declaration is a threat to world peace and security.

    Someone can use the same logic of religious and racial discrimination as an example for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and try to legitimize the war crimes acts of ISIS by not mentioning in a written text and blame some wrongful acts Iraqi Government as genocide or war crimes in the same text.

    If Armenian State and Armenian Diaspora condemn Ottoman Empire without mentioning war crimes acts of Armenian non-state armed groups, this is a crime against humanity. This is also valid for all other states and other racial politicians or historians. Without mentioning the killings of more than 500.000 Turks by the Armenian non-state armed groups, to recognize so-called Armenian Genocide is a crime against humanity.

    Turks and Armenian share a “common pain” inherited from their grandparents. A joint commission composed of Turkish and Armenian historians can be formed to study the events of 1915. The findings of the commission, if established, would bring about a better understanding of this tragic period and hopefully help to normalize the threat to world peace and security. If not, by only blaming the Turks of the past events means approving the killings of more than 500.000 children, women and older Turks by Armenian non-state armed groups can only be described as a crime against humanity.

    For example, if US President Obama is to recognize so-called Armenian Genocide without mentioning the killings of the more than 500.000 Turks by Armenian non-state armed groups; this will be a crime against humanity. Turkey can go in such a condition to the United Nations Security Council as this act should be described as a threat to world peace and security as this one sided recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide is illegal according to Article 103 of United Nations Charter.

    Mehmet Sukru Guzel

    Switzerland Representative of Center for International Strategy and Security Studies

     

    [1] Pan-Armenian Declaration on the Centennial of the Armenian Genocide, 01.02.2015

    [2] cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/frequently%20asked%20questions/Pages/12.aspx 01.02.2015

    [3] United Nations Document. E/CN.4/2006/87, paragraphe 30

     

    [4] Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, pp. 101-102, , 01.02.2015

     

    [5] Dermot Groome, “Adjudicating Genocide: Is the International Court of Justice Capable of Judging State Criminal Responsibility?”, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 31, Issue 4 2007, pp-912

     

    [6] Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2011, p.160

     

  • Letter to Harut Sassounian:  Convenience or Conviction?

    Letter to Harut Sassounian: Convenience or Conviction?

    Dear Mr. Sassounian!

    I have read your article “Armenia’s Jewish Community Leader Lashes out at Pro-Azeri Propagandists” of January 27, 2015, and once again feel compelled to respond!

    I have a distinct feeling that you would prefer to see a world war rather than peaceful coexistence among nations. Why should Israel, more democratic than Armenia, not have good relations with the Turcic world? For tens of years excellent relations in every field existed between Israel and Turkey. Interestingly enough, Turkey had recognized the State of Israel long before Armenian and Greece.

    What you will never be able to explain is; how come the Armenian and Jewish Communities in turkey, are the richest members of Turkish society! Come on Mr. Sassounian, tell us, don’t be shy.

    Furthermore, it is indeed laughable that, of all people, you Sir should be complaining about President Aliev’s manipulation and molding opinion I the West. If the Armenian Diaspora which you are wrongly leading had spent half of her funds and influence in helping poor Armenia, unemployment and poverty would be halved the very least.

    May I also remind you Mr. Sassounian that, recently the Parliaments of the UK, Germany and Australia have spoken out against that Armenian myth of “Genocide”. Why don’t you write about those democratic decisions of conviction rather than those of convenience for you?

    FYI:
    1). German Bundestag: “Gedenken an das Leid der Armenier”
    https://dub122.mail.live.com/mail/ViewOfficePreview.aspx…

    2). Australia does not recognize the events of 1915….

    3). The UK Position

    ” Following Mr Robertson’s report (In November 2009, following instruction by The Armenian Centre, Geoffrey Robertson QC published a legal opinion entitled “Was there an Armenian genocide?” ) and the publicity it attracted we have updated our public lines to make clear that HMG does not believe it is our place to make a judgment (historical or legal) on whether or not the Armenian massacres constituted genocide. Instead our lines focus on the need for the governments of Turkey and Armenia to adopt some form of truth and reconciliation process. We believe that this issue can only be resolved through a process owned by those directly engaged. We have rejected the claim that Ministers or officials have misled Parliament”

    Kufi Seydali, M.Sc., DIC

  • Book Review: The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, A Disputed Genocide

    Book Review: The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, A Disputed Genocide

    Book Review: The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, A Disputed Genocide
    Fatih Balci and Arif Akgul

    There could be some mistakes in the history, but it should be more objective to enlighten those mistaken events with the helping of the historians. Guenter Lewy’s book, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, A Disputed Genocide, mainly focuses on the massacres in Ottoman Turkey, and he strongly stands on the way of the truths which he finds from the historical documents. After all, he mentions that trustfully the deaths of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey can not be called “genocide”. There were some deaths but they can not be called as genocide. For calling genocide, it is needed to have a look at the definition of genocide which is mostly accepted to intention to annihilation of one group. To use or say genocide for an event it has to involve an intention of annihilation. In the Armenian case the main aim was not based on the intention of Armenian annihilation. The only thing was deporting· the Armenians from some places only for security purposes, because the Armenians became a big problem for the Turks during World War I with the rebellions and armed guerillas inside the country.

    It is seen to the massacres as the only culpability was the Turks, but with Lewy’s book, it is understood clearly that the Armenians had many problems for the Turks at their worse situation during the wartime. At the war time, Turks had in troubles in different reasons, and at that position the Armenians also had problem to Turks. The Armenians wanted to establish their independent state and they wanted to get some more help from the Christian world with using their Christian identity. They gave ways to the Turks to make some plans against the Armenian problem, and the Turks found the best way to deport them, but they did not foresee some problems such as the geographic conditions and some other issues that caused mass killing while making their decisions. These kinds of unintended things caused the deaths of the Armenians. Lewy’s argument about the massacres of the Ottoman Turks against the Armenians can be clarified with one of the Turkish proverbs: “Okay, the burglar has culpability but does not have any culpability of the house holder?”
    Guenter Lewy, in his book, approaches Turk-Armenian conflict from the historical perspective. He shows the events that happened in the late 19thcentury and the beginning of the 20th century in the Ottoman Empire between the Turks and the Armenians. He gives information from the sources and explains that it was not genocide, it was only massacres. · Lewy uses deportation, but may be it could be used relocation, because deportation is used for taking out of the frontiers, whereas relocation means mostly changing places into the frontiers. The places of Armenians changed their residential were still in the Ottoman frontier.
    The book, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, includes four main parts with fourteen chapters. In the first part, with its four chapters, the author mostly looks at the Turk-Armenian problem from its beginning with historical events. His main argument in this part is that the characteristics of the conflict were based on religious background. The Armenians have approximately two thousand years history and they were the first Christian state in the world history, whereas the Turks are one of the major states among the Islamic world. The author argues that the Armenians tried to get attendance of the Christian world with provoking the Turks to attack themselves. Different courtiers with different purposes tried to help Armenians (For example, Russia helped to reach the south which had been its main desire for years, while Great Britain did not want that Russia to reach its desire), and the Armenians wanted to get their independence after political events. On the other hand, all the responsibilities were given by the Armenians to the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, because, for the Armenians, he was preventing the aims of the Armenian committees. Only because of this, the Armenians tried to kill him on Friday, July 21, 1905 with planting dynamite in his carriage, but Abdul Hamid II delayed his departure only a few minutes which saved his life; however, twenty six people died while fifty eight were wounded (p.32). The other events, which caused the Armenian massacres, were seizing the Imperial Ottoman Bank by Armenian revolutionaries on August 26, 1896 (p.24) and a shot assumed by an Armenian outside a mosque in Bitlis on a Friday while the Muslims were in the mosque for their ritual Friday praying (p.23). From the resources the author collected, the range of death of Armenians only of the 1895-1896 events is between twenty thousand and three hundred thousand (p.26).

    In the first part of the book, Lewy generally explains the causes of the differences, occurred between these two nations which had been living together for centuries. He focuses on the causes, which started after the Russian war, and the Armenians intended to establish their own states at the region, and they wanted to use their Christian identity to get supported by the Christian world. The best way of doing this was also provoking the Ottoman Turks, which they did well at the end of the nineteenth century. The best way to get support from the Christian world is to provoke and cause the Ottomans to attack the Armenians.
    In part two, the author mostly focuses on the Armenians’ genocide plans and the Turks positions against them. Ziya Gokalp, a Turkish sociologist and educator, is shown to be the responsible person of the massacres because of his argument of Turkification, which is based on blood and race for some scholars. From an Armenian perspective, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) premeditated the massacres of Armenians, and they played their role in this plan. “The Ten Commandments” (p.48) was the Armenians’ main argument to express the CUP’s main aim on the Armenians. For Armenians those Ten Commandments show the CUP’s plan clearly. Another source to make stronger this thesis about Armenians is Armenian author Aram Andonian’s book named The Memoirs of Naim Bey. This book is about one of the Ottoman chief’s secretaries telling during the deportation of the Armenians. However, there could not be found any documents about Naim Bey to be hired in the Ottoman army. The other important point also the real document that Andonian argues about the book (Naim Bey’s telling) does not exist in any archives. Andonian says that he sent all the original documents to the Armenian patriarch and later he never learned anything about what happened to them. (p.67) He also says that in a different time about his book that he wrote that book for doing Armenian propaganda (p.70). The sources of Armenian sides have not any real genuineness as the author explains in this part of the book.
    From the Turkish perspective, even the Turkish sources are biased; their main argument is that the relocation of the Armenians from many main places was necessary, because Armenians were getting armed with the help of Russia. During the wartime, the Armenians were a big problem to the Turkish military and the Muslim people in the region. According to the information supplied by the Ministry of Interior, thirty thousand armed Armenians were at the east region of the country (p.92). Fifteen thousand of them joined the Russian army, while the other fifteen thousand were helping the Russian army behind the Turkish army. The enemies were inside according to the Turks and it was needed to find any solutions. The revolts also were major problems for the Turkish army during the wartime.
    On the other hand, the Turks also had real economic, military, and social problems at that period. The refugees from the other provinces where the places conquered by the winner countries at the war were coming to the country, and they needed places to live. There was a civil war within a global war for the Turks. Under these conditions, the Turks decided to relocate the Armenians to different provinces for both to make safe its back yard and to open new provinces to the Muslim refugees.
    Another important issue to make a decision of relocation was the Armenians’ brutality against the Muslim people of some cities and towns in the region. The Armenians were attacking the Turkish people with Russian support, because they knew that Russia was at their side. It also was known that they got their weapons from Russia. For example, the Russians took Diyarbakir, led by advance guards of Armenian volunteers in January 1916. The Muslims who were not able to escape were put the death. When the Turkish forces entered the city of Erzincan in February 1918, they found a destroyed city, fell upon the Turkish homes and committed extraordinary acts (p.118-119).
    In some places in the Ottoman Empire, Armenians rebelled against to the Turks while the war was ongoing and especially near the end of the war. For example, the Armenian volunteers joined the fighting against the Turks in Palestine and Syria (p.108). Because of all these reasons, from the Turkish perspective, the deportation was needed to secure the east part of the Empire. Turks had to make a secure place in the east cost of the country and the best way to do this is to relocate the Armenians to different places. The main purpose did not punish the Armenians. Relocation was the prevention of Armenian activities against the government which had some troubles at this time also. The decision was not intended to destroy innocent people.
    The third part of the book is mostly focuses on the sources to light the history, because the author’s main argument is to bring up the events is mostly the duty of the historians. Historical memories can enlighten history better according to Lewy. From this perspective, Lewy explains the events with the sources from every side, which begins with the Turkish archives and goes on the way of who did a small part from the puzzle of this unclear event in the history. The missionary reports, the foreign countries official and unofficial reports and even eyewitnesses’ statements are seen in Lewy’s book. He shows the ways which and what conditions happened from these sources and he writes some of his critiques with historical explanations. He gives a major importance to the Turkish archives but he has some problems about the opening of the archives; only 9%, but now all the Turkish archives are open to the research. He compares his findings and he shows so many different explanations of the same events. For example, Lewy mentions that one of the German missionaries, Johannes Lepsius’s, book involves a collection of 444 documents, but Wolfgang Gust argues that only a few of these 444 documents corresponded fully to the originals (p.134). One of the British sources, a parliamentary Blue Book shows the massacre story, but it also involves a lot of narratives by eyewitnesses, which are mostly based on hearsay (p.138).
    Lewy expresses an important result from the sources that he follows to understand that historical event between the Turks and the Armenians that “when Armenians used guns it was always strictly for self-defense, while Turkish troops using force were usually described as engaged in murderous activities” (p.144). He also does not give more reliability to the survivors’ testimony. His main argument on this issue is that the survivor’s testimony is mostly under the pressure of the historical events and their personality, perceptions and experiences.
    Lewy’s main concern about the historical document is there are not many Turkish scholars who are specialists of the Armenian events. He gives more spaces to the Turkish archives than the scholarly resources. On the other hand, he does not give more reliability to the Armenian scholars who have scholarly sources about the issue, because he sees that most of them are not truly explaining the events. To answer the question of why there are not any Turkish scholars, while there are many more Armenian scholars in this issue, it could be said that Diaspora Armenians are mostly studied on this issue, so it is easy to find some sources from different languages. He can reach more Armenian sources than Turkish because Diaspora Armenians have more interest on this issue and they wrote books in different languages, whereas the Turks have not this chance.
    After giving the historical perspective which shows the positions of the Empire especially during the war time, he expresses the specific events during the cities and towns in which deportation happened. He shows the readers that the main purpose was not based on the intention of annihilation of the Armenians. But he gives some responsibility to the governmental authority not to predict what should have-happened during the deportation. For him, the government had to make some prevention activities for the possibilities, however, one of the important points also needed to be on our eyes is that the government had little authority at that time period, even to help its soldiers, because so many soldiers died at that period without any war. From this perspective, more things were not wanted from the government, but it also does not throw its responsibilities from its shoulders.
    Lewy separates the causes of the massacres of the Armenians during the deportation of 1915-1916, and he gives the most important clue to the geographic situations. Later he focuses on the Kurds, Circassians, brigands (cetes), irregulars, and the gendarmes as the causes of the mass killing. The Turks tried to protect the deportees from these unexpected causes, but most times and most places they could not achieve success. Lewy asks this question: Who killed the Armenians? He could not find the exact answer, because several culpabilities shared the massacres.
    Nobody can say anything about the number of the victims during that period, because each side mentions the amount from their perspectives. The main problem is that the exact populations of the Armenians are not known. The estimated amounts also do not give any clue about the amount of the killed people, because some Armenians lost their lives as the result of the guerilla wars, some lost at the rebellions and some joined the Russian army. Lewy gives the amounts from the sources he investigated, and he gives a number as an average of the Armenians in the Empire in 1914 as 1,750,000. For the amount of the survivors after the events, he again gives an estimated number which is 1,108,000. So, for Lewy, 642,000 were killed, which is about 37% during the World War period.
    In the last part of his book, Lewy explains the controversy of the massacres of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. While he gives the examples of the Armenian side, who mostly argue that it is premeditation, the Armenians try to take a picture of Turkish responsibility with the Turkish national character, which is called barbaric for by them. On the other hand, the Turkish view focuses on the necessity of the deportation and actually both sides had many deaths which should be accepted; the events were not genocide, it was a war between the Turks and the Armenians (p.248).
    Lewy’s strongest argument is that the central government of Turkey has not more culpability because there no authentic documentary evidence exists (p.250). He says that the deaths were an intended outcome of the deportations. Lewy’s main concern is based on shaping this world on the events that happened in the first quarter of the last century. He says that the massacres began to play a role on the politics, which was seen at some countries’ parliaments. But Lewy advises that which is the most important issue to lighten the historical events, is not the job of the politicians, but the historians. The politicians should give up these kinds of historical events to the historians to get more reliable results.
    The main argument about the Armenian problem in the Ottoman Empire was that they wanted to establish their own independent state and so they became more nationalist as they saw from some other nations into the Empire. On the other hand, they mostly sought to get support from the Christian world as being the first Christian state. They wanted to get a reputation for themselves. If they rebel against the governmental authority, it can be thought that they could have thought what could have happened to them if they could not achieve success.
    Geunter Lewy denies genocide and claims that the Armenian deaths in the Ottoman Turkey at the end of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century were massacres. He wrote his book to enlighten one of the biggest problems for the last one hundred years. His approach is mostly based on the memory of the historical events. He investigates the literatures from each side and he concludes his research with saying that the historical events should be given to the historians to enlighten them. If those events go to the politicians, the problems could not be solved easily.
    While the Turks and the Armenians were living together on the same lands for centuries, after the Ottoman Empires were getting weaker and losing the war against Russia, the Armenians got more wishes to establish their own independent states at the east provinces of the Ottoman Empire. They better knew that they needed to get some foreign help to achieve their ambitions. They used their Christian identity versus Muslim Identity to get more support from the Christian world. But they needed something to pull the Turks towards them, so they used some important activities in both Istanbul and Anatolia like the bombing events and rebellions. They achieved their aims of getting the Turks against them, and they did not see these specific events enough, so they got armed during the wartime. The Turkish government had to do something immediately, and decided to relocate the Armenians from their provinces to be less threatened by the government.
    The deaths of most Armenians happened during these relocations, but the conditions, both geographic and other causes like Kurdish groups or the Circassians or the chettes, were not predicted by the Turkish government. Most of the Armenians died because of several reasons like starvation, illness and also with some other groups mentioned above. So, Lewy argues that it is not genocide that happened by the Turks, because there were not any intentions to annihilate the Armenians. The Turks’ main concern was to make the country safer. The sources also show this truth according to Lewy, even though there were many sources in which people complained about the Turks, but Lewy does not find these reliable.

    Fatih BALCI, University of Utah
    Arif AKGUL, Washington State University

      Kufi Seydali

     

  • Australia does not recognize the events of 1915 as “Genocide”

    Australia does not recognize the events of 1915 as “Genocide”

    Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia released internal communication documents about the “Events of 1915” under the Freedom of Information request made last month.

    The letter requests DFAT to disclose “ANY” correspondence about “Armenian Genocide” and or “Armenian Massacres” from 1 January 2014 onward. . .

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  • There Was and There Was Not

    There Was and There Was Not

    A Journey Through Hate and Possibility in Turkey, Armenia, and Beyond

    by Meline Toumani

    There Was and There Was Not

    Hardcover, 286 pages, Henry Holt & Co, List Price: $28 | purchase

    NPR Summary

    Documents the author’s experiences as an Armenian-American who was raised in a close-knit community and her provocative decision to move to Istanbul to learn the realities of Turkish citizens she was taught to hate.

    Read an excerpt of this book

    Excerpt: There Was And There Was Not

    There Was and There Was Not

    1

    When We Talk About What Happened

    I had never, not for a moment, imagined Turkey as a physical place. Certainly not a beautiful place. But it was all I could do to get through my first taxi ride from the Istanbul airport into the city—the first of perhaps a hundred on that route, as I came and went and came back again and again over the span of four years before I was finished—without letting the driver see me cry. I shifted a bit so that my face would not be visible in the rearview mirror.

    The sight of water was what did it. Istanbul is a city laced by three seas: the Marmara, the Bosphorus Strait, and the Black Sea. This struck me as utterly absurd. From as early as I knew anything, I had known Turkey only as an idea: a terrifying idea, a place filled with people I should despise. Somehow, through years of attending Armenian genocide commemorations and lectures about Turkey’s denial of the genocide, of boycotting Turkish products, of attending an Armenian summer camp whose primary purpose seemed to be to indoctrinate me with the belief that I should fight to take back a fifth of the modern Turkish state—somehow in all of that, it never occurred to me to wonder what Istanbul, or the rest of Turkey, looked like. And here it was, a magnificent, sea-wrapped city, as indifferent to my imagination as I had been to its reality.

    Was it anger I felt, something like what James Baldwin described when he recalled descending in a plane to the American South for the first time and seeing the stunning red hills of Georgia below him? “This earth had acquired its color from the blood that dripped down from the trees,” Baldwin wrote. I felt something like that, and the thought that now formed in a place I didn’t know I still had within me was: how, after everything they’ve done, do they get to have a place that looks like this?

    No, that’s not true. Anger was only what I was supposed to feel, what I perhaps even hoped to rekindle, when I arrived in Turkey, alone, looking out the window as the water chased the road all the way to my hotel. What I actually felt was loss. Not the loss of a place, of a physical homeland—that was for others to mourn. This had never been my homeland. The loss I felt was the loss of certainty, a soothing certainty of purpose that in childhood had girded me against life’s inevitable dissatisfactions; a certainty that as a college student and later as a journalist in New York City had started to fray, gradually and then drastically; a certainty whose fraying began to divide me uncomfortably from the group to which I belonged, from other Armenians. The embracing, liberating expanse of Istanbul’s waters, and the bridges that crossed them, and the towers on hills that rose up and swept down in every direction, made me realize upon sight that I had spent years of emotional energy on something I had never seen or tried to understand.

    This was 2005. I had come to Turkey that summer because I am Armenian and I could no longer live with the idea that I was supposed to hate, fear, and fight against an entire nation and people. I came because it had started to feel embarrassing to refuse the innocent suggestions of American friends to try a Turkish restaurant on the Upper East Side, or to bristle when someone returned from an adventurous Mediterranean vacation, to brood silently until the part about how much they loved Turkey was over. I came because being Armenian had come to feel like a choke hold, a call to conformity, and I could find no greater way to act against this and to claim a sense of myself as an individual than to come here, the last and most forbidden place.

    Does it sound like I’m exaggerating? Is there such a thing as nationalism that is not exaggerated?

    * * *

    WHEN WE TALK about what happened, there are very few stories that, once sifted through memory, research, philosophy, ideology, and politics, emerge unequivocal. But there are two things I know to be true.

    One: I know that if your grandmother told you that she watched as her mother was raped and beheaded, you would feel something was yours to defend. What is that thing? Is it your grandmother you are defending? Is it the facts of what happened to her that you are defending, a page in an encyclopedia? Something as intangible as honor? Is it yourself that you are defending? If the story of the brutality that your grandmother encountered were denied or diminished in any way, you would feel certain basic facts of your selfhood extinguished. Your grandmother, who loved you and soothed you, your grandmother whose existence roots you in the world, fixes you somewhere in geography and history. Your grandmother feeds your imagination in a way that your mother and father do not. Imagination is farsighted; it needs distance to discern and define things. If somebody says no, what your grandmother suffered was not really quite as heinous as you’re saying it is, they have said that your existence is not really so important. They have said nothing less than that you don’t exist. This is a charge no human being can tolerate.

    Two: I know that if somebody tells you that you belong to a terrible group of people, you will reject every single word that follows with all the force of your mind and spirit. What if somebody says to you that your history is ugly, your history is not heroic, your history does not have beauty in it? Not only that, you don’t know your history. What you have been taught by your mother and your father and your teachers, it’s false. You will retreat to a bomb shelter in your brain, collapse inward to protect yourself, because what has been said to you is nothing less than that your entire understanding of who you are is in danger. They will have said to you that your existence is without value. You, who wondered now and then what the meaning of your life was, who made a soft landing place for those worries by allowing yourself to feel a certain richness about where you came from and who and what came before you, will be left empty. The story you thought you were a part of does not exist. Neither do you exist.

    Those accusations and their consequences are the first truths we must recognize when we talk about what happened between Armenians and Turks in the Ottoman Empire in 1915. A century after those events, Armenians and Turks—in Turkey, in Armenia, and especially in the widespread diasporas of both countries—believe in two radically different accounts of what happened. “Believe.” It is not a matter of faith, yet it might as well be for the power that these clashing narratives hold.

    What did happen? I will tell you—but I am Armenian. It is almost impossible for me to talk about this history. Not because I find it painful to talk about—for me to claim that particular pain would be self-indulgent—but because the terms of the conversation have evolved to leave me no satisfactory options. To tell the Armenian version of the story goes against every instinct in me, not because I disagree with it—I do not—but because I know that even if I wanted to believe that the thing in question did not fit the definition of genocide, it would be impossible for me to find my way into that belief. Even if you wanted to believe that I am objective, it would be impossible for you to do so. I also know the pleasure of healthy contrarianism; so when I encounter an outsider who has been intrigued by the Turkish version of this history, I understand his desire to fancy himself open to an alternative point of view. But then I find myself inflamed, needing to convince him all the more. I am doomed to be what is known as an unreliable narrator. I hate the way it feels.

    Newspaper articles dispense with the controversy in the first or final paragraph of any news report concerning Turkey and Armenia:

    “Turkey denies that the deaths constituted genocide, contending the toll has been inflated and the casualties were victims of civil war. It says Turks also suffered losses in the hands of Armenian gangs” (AP).

    “Turkey accepts that many Christian Armenians were killed by Ottoman Turks but denies that up to 1.5 million died and that it amounts to genocide, as Armenia views it” (Reuters).

    “The Turkish government says massacres took place in the context of clashes that related to Armenian groups supporting Russia against Turkey during World War I” (Bloomberg).

    This expository shrug is the peace that copyeditors the world over have made with the issue that, more than any other, defines the collective psychology of Armenians and of Turks, defines their educations, the development of their cultures, their political horizons, and—let me not call it any less than it is—their souls. Because what else but your soul can we speak of when, one hundred years later in your otherwise liberal and tolerant life, the very sound of the name of a country makes your head blur and your limbs tighten?

    Now and then governments get involved, by participating in what Armenians refer to as “recognition.” In my life, this general word, “recognition,” with its various potential applications in the vast and flexible English language, had by the time I was eleven or twelve come to denote, with Pavlovian consistency, only one thing: recognition of the Armenian genocide.

    Recognition: It is sought and secured anywhere possible, from the city council of Milan to the parliament of New South Wales, Australia. It has been granted in the form of official resolutions, commemorative statements, and board decisions from institutions large and small, including the European Union and at least twenty countries, forty-three US states, various American cities from Santa Fe to Minneapolis, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and the New York Times. Their usage of the word genocide is tracked on lists that are ranked and counted each year in the run-up to April 24, Armenian genocide remembrance day.

    For Armenians, recognition is not only institutional; tacit acknowledgment is expected on an individual basis, too. There was the thesis committee in college who reviewed my eighty-page paper about—what else could it be about?—the genocide; and there were friends (the subject has a way of coming up if you are Armenian) and boyfriends, too, and God help them if they tried to tease or argue.

    Recognition means all of that, but what it really means is the United States Congress, that mysterious holdout, at once powerfully stubborn and surprisingly malleable and, as of yet, unwilling to fully appease the Armenians. Recognition means an official shift in terminology by the US president and the State Department, and one administration after another has withheld reprieve. On another level of importance, separated by an order of magnitude that straddles the realms of the possible and the inconceivable, recognition means Turkey.

    To some Armenians, recognition means reparations from Turkey: to the true zealots, land; to the slightly more pragmatic, money. To most, it simply means the official usage of the word genocide. To me, it came to mean that I could no longer stand to attend any Armenian gathering, because it seemed that whether it was a poetry reading, a concert, or even a sporting match, it was always, ultimately, about the genocide.

    Or was it? At some point I started to wonder. Not about what had happened, exactly, and not about whether the term genocide was applicable. It is clear that between 1915 and 1923, in Ottoman Turkey, a history-shifting number of Armenians, probably between eight hundred thousand and one million, were killed outright or driven to death on the watch of a government that was supposed to protect them; another million or so survived deportation to the Syrian desert or fled just in time to avoid it. These events echoed but exceeded earlier pogroms against Armenians, in the 1890s and 1909. The violence happened in fits and starts and was entangled with, though not fully explained by, the circumstances of World War I; and was complicated by the degrees to which different regional leaders throughout Turkey obeyed or defied central orders. In a few of the hundreds of towns and villages affected, Armenian nationalist committees seeking greater rights or independence staged violent resistance, and as a result, about thirty thousand Turks and Kurds were killed by Armenians, too. Of the 2.5 million Armenians then living in the Ottoman Empire, a few thousand men in border cities joined the Russian army against the Turks. When the fighting was over, only two hundred thousand Armenians were left in Ottoman lands, lands Armenians had called home for twenty centuries. Armenians had faced genocide. And the empire that had contained and then expelled them was itself dissolved and reborn as the Republic of Turkey.

    What I started to wonder about was whether “recognition”—propagating the usage of the word genocide to every corner of the world like a smallpox shot—was what we really needed. Arguments for recognition spoke of “justice” or “honoring the memory,” but these had turned into hollow platitudes for me. Claims that human rights were at stake seemed disingenuous; and when Armenian lobbying groups yoked the cause to a platform of saving Darfur, it seemed motivated more by PR than conscience. Then there was that well-intentioned but unattainable promise, the favorite argument of first and last resort, repeated over and over by scholars and laymen alike: “Never again.” That if a tragedy were recognized by the world, if massacre were transfigured into punishment and compensation, such a horror would not be repeated. Doesn’t all evidence suggest that this is untrue?

    Let me put it less coldly: I wondered whether our obsession with genocide recognition was worth its emotional and psychological price. I wondered whether there was a way to honor a history without being suffocated by it, to belong to a community without conforming to it, a way to remember a genocide without perpetuating the kind of hatred that gave rise to it in the first place. And as I questioned the underlying needs that drove my own community, I wanted to understand what drove Turks to cling to their view. Why couldn’t they admit it? This was the simple (or simplistic) question that took me to Turkey.

    In both Armenian and Turkish, a particular phrase signals the start of a story: “There was and there was not.” In Armenian, Gar u chgar. In Turkish, Bir varmis bir yokmus. There was, and also there was not, a long time ago, in a place far away, an old man, a talking horse, a magical kingdom. Once there was, and once there wasn’t. It is an acknowledgment not only of the layers and complexities of truth in a given story, but of the subordination of a storyteller to the tale she tells. It is my way of saying that this is where we find ourselves now—locked in a clash of narratives that confuses outsiders, frustrates officials, stifles economies, and warps identities—and no matter what was or was not, this is where we must begin.

    Copyright © 2014 by Meline Toumani

    =================

    Author Explores Armenian Genocide ‘Obsession’ And Turkish Denial

    Listen to the Story

    6 min 17 sec
    Earlier this year, protestors in Los Angeles called for recognition of, and reparations for, the 1915 Armenian genocide executed by Ottoman Turks.

    Earlier this year, protestors in Los Angeles called for recognition of, and reparations for, the 1915 Armenian genocide executed by Ottoman Turks.

    David McNew/Getty Images

    Writer Meline Toumani grew up in a tight-knit Armenian community in New Jersey. There, identity centered on commemorating the mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks during World War I, a history that’s resulted in tense relations between Armenians and Turks to this day.

    In her new book, There Was and There Was Not, Toumani recounts her attempts to understand Turkey and the Turkish people — people she was always taught were her bitter enemy. She also explores what she calls the Armenian community’s “obsession” with genocide recognition, which she herself harbored.

    “There would be moments where I felt almost embarrassed by a certain deep-seated prejudice in me,” Toumani tells NPR’s Eric Westervelt. “For example, if a friend comes back from vacation in Turkey and they’re talking about it and I’m kind of bristling or brooding and just waiting for that to be over because I know that I can’t say what I feel — which is, you know, ‘I would never go to Turkey. The Turks, you know, killed the Armenians in 1915.’”


    Interview Highlights

    There Was and There Was Not
    There Was and There Was Not

    A Journey Through Hate and Possibility in Turkey, Armenia, and Beyond

    by Meline Toumani

    Hardcover, 286 pages purchase

    More on this book:

    • NPR reviews, interviews and more
    • Read an excerpt

    On why she decided to move to Turkey, a sort of forbidden place for Armenians

    I’d have these feelings rise up in me and they didn’t fit anymore in the life that I had created, which was otherwise very progressive and intellectually oriented. And that was when I decided I kind of need to explore this. And through a series of events, it entered my mind that exploring it would mean going to Turkey, talking to Turks; not to try to take seriously the Turkish version of the history of the genocide, but just to understand how does it happen that another group of people have learned this history in a completely different way leading to a completely different conclusion? And is there any way that we can connect if I find the right way to talk about it, or the right way to listen about it?

    On being attacked on Armenian-American news sites for taking on this project

    It’s actually surprisingly painful given that I’ve just written a book that describes the kinds of attitudes that lead to that kind of criticism. … I knew that there would be people who would feel that way, and yet part of what my book is about is this incredible tension between belonging to a community and trying to individuate from it.

    And it’s sad for me to see that some people are so threatened that they’re not even willing to engage, because most of the people publishing those attacks haven’t read the book. In fact, one of them celebrates the fact that he hasn’t read it and in the same breath calls for a boycott.

    On how people in Turkey reacted when they learned she was Armenian

    I was perhaps recklessly optimistic in thinking that things wouldn’t be quite as bad in Turkey regarding the Armenian issue as I had been taught to believe. … In some ways, they were even worse. The thing that shocked me the most was the fact that on a daily basis, you know and this is over the course of two and a half years of living there, people would find out that I was Armenian and sometimes the reaction would be so blunt: “Well, I guess you came here to prove that there was a genocide. I want you to know that I don’t believe that that’s what happened.” Or something like that. And those moments were really jarring and made it very difficult for me to ever really relax. There was a lot of stress in my daily life.

    And I want to be clear, of course, that I also had the opposite reactions, you know. There was a young man who I met outside of a restaurant with some friends, just totally at random on a Saturday night, and when he found out I was Armenian he put his hand over his heart and he said, “I want to welcome you back to your country and I want to apologize on behalf of the Turkish nation.”

    So I would have every manner of reaction, but to be honest, most of the reactions ranged from pretending I hadn’t said anything at all to saying something sort of blunt and harsh.

    On where relations between Turks and Armenians stand today

    It was a few years ago already that I left Turkey. And in the time since then, there have been some big changes. For example, on April 24, 2014 — which was the 99th-year commemoration of the Armenian genocide — in Istanbul you had several events commemorating the genocide openly and without any kind of the contorted language that you might have had in the past.

    Also [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan made a statement that was very much falling short but at the same time really breaking new ground in acknowledging that something tragic had happened to the Armenians. And although he, you know, was very careful not to call it a genocide and to say everyone suffered and to use a lot of the same rhetoric that he has always used, I consider it a major step.

    =====================================================

    Meline Toumani: Genocide and Narrative Ambiguity

    meline toumani
    photo: Mark Smith

    Born in Iran and ethnically Armenian, Meline Toumani grew up in a close-knit Armenian community in New Jersey, where the genocide of Armenians at the hands of the Ottoman Turkish government in 1915 and hatred of the Turks were defining facts of life. In 2005, Toumani did the unthinkable and moved to Istanbul on a quest to understand how to remember a genocide without being crippled by it.

    You went to Turkey because you “could no longer live with idea that I was supposed to hate, fear and fight against an entire nation and people.” Could you describe the process that led you to that position?

    Coming from a family that was not directly involved in the genocide and that had a very strong sense of Iranian-Armenian ethnicity gave me a little bit of space to question and look from the outside. At home our identity was many things, but it wasn’t really about hating Turkey or being obsessed with the genocide. But when I participated in community activities, which was all the time, it came to me that this was a dominant part of our identity as a community. Since I didn’t have that direct experience and I didn’t have a grandmother who had told me some horrific story about what she had suffered, I had one foot in and one foot out.

    So, without questioning the reality of the genocide, you began to wonder whether focusing on genocide recognition was helpful for your community?

    I definitely wasn’t questioning what happened. When you’ve been immersed in something like that for your entire life, it’s a part of you. But it began to feel to me that the community was not psychologically well.

    A lot of that manifested for me in looking at creativity and expression within the community. The [genocide] narrative was holding us hostage. As an Armenian, whatever you do has to serve that in some way–through your volunteer work or as a playwright or a musician or whatever. You’re not just addressing the history or the culture. You’re addressing this political impasse. A piece of writing that sets out with a political agenda is going to be limited from the beginning. You can’t explore its emotional and psychological dimensions freely.

    Early on in my work I tried to frame it in a political way: “genocide recognition campaigns are bad for Armenia because it’s creating a climate in which diplomatic relations can’t be established.” I was trying to establish a geopolitical argument for why genocide recognition was problematic, but it’s more about an existential condition than it is about a political argument.

    At one point you use the phrase “soft recognition”: the idea that you can make changes one person at a time. Is that where you started when you got to Turkey? I don’t think it’s where you ended.

    I’m very glad that you understood that. That is where I started and that’s not where I ended. I had this vision that if there were just a certain way to portray the Turks to the Armenians and a certain way to portray the Armenians to the Turks, and if I could behave in a certain way as an Armenian among Turks, I could open up some speech where people would realize that the other side wasn’t so bad.

    Then [Armenian journalist] Hrant Dink was assassinated. He was the ultimate case of someone really trying to connect and he was murdered because of it. Not in spite of it but exactly because of it. That moment had a huge impact on me. I was well into the project, and it really threw me for a loop as to what was I really doing here. Especially when I went back to Turkey and experienced discrimination and intolerance for Armenians every single day in so many ways large and small, spoken and unspoken. My intention was to be diplomatic and tactful and pleasant in talking to people and not offend anyone and not be too belligerent with Turks because I wanted to open up the pathway to communicate.

    After two and a half years–this comes toward the end of the book–I realized I had to get out of there because I’d completely lost track of what I believe in. That led to a lot of self-questioning about what set me off into this project in this first place. The way I ended the book is that it really wasn’t about Turkey or Armenia or the genocide, but about how to find a way to individuate yourself.

    Your title, There Was and There Was Not, has such a fairy-tale quality.

    I’ve been waiting a long time to tell somebody about the title!

    When I first started, the working title was “Silence and Madness.” The idea was that you have this overwhelming silence on the subject on the part of Turkey and this growing madness in the Armenian diaspora and these two things play off of each other. As I got further and further into the work, I realized silence wasn’t relevant any more in Turkey. Hrant Dink was murdered and suddenly there wasn’t silence anymore.

    Then I was sitting with my parents at a café in Yerevan [Armenia]. We had been shopping in the outdoor market and my mom had bought a bunch of books. She opened one and started reading from it in Armenian: “There was and there also was not.” I heard that a million times growing up in stories. The previous week in Istanbul, in a Turkish class, we had been reading a story that started, “There was and there also was not.” I suddenly was struck that we started the stories in exactly the same way. I told my parents about having read that in my Turkish workbook. My dad said, “That’s your title!” We looked at each other–you can’t say that because that’s like you’re saying there was a genocide and there wasn’t a genocide. Then I realized it captured exactly what I was trying to do with the book in all sorts of ways.

    I felt at first hamstrung by the fact that I’m an Armenian telling the story and [thus] expected to be an unreliable narrator. I was really attached to the narrative ambiguity of what happens when someone tells you a story and they tell you at the outset that there was and there was not. The storyteller puts that on you from the beginning and you have to sit with it the entire time.

    What do you hope readers will take away from your book?

    My biggest fear, to the extent that I want to reach Armenian and Turkish readers and have an impact on the conversation between the communities, is that the people who read only the first two chapters will completely misunderstand. Armenians who read the first chapters will think I’m some kind of traitor and hate me for it. And the Turks who only read the first two chapters will think, “Oh great, Armenians are just as crazy as we thought.”

    You answered in terms of Armenian and Turkish readers. What about other readers?

    Often the immigrant experience comes to us in a cute package, like My Big Fat Greek Wedding. “Oh look at the funny old grandmother in her black widow costume and the aunt who’s trying to feed you.” That’s a very real part of the immigrant experience in America in a lot of ethnic groups, but it underplays the extreme existential crisis that comes from having that kind of bifurcation in your life. This is not a cute clichéd thing about bringing egg rolls to school when all the other kids have sandwiches. There is crisis in a lot of different parts of your life and your psyche when you have that experience. Perhaps I darken it a bit? –Pamela Toler

    ============================================================

    Metropolitan Books: There Was and There Was Not by Meline Toumani
    Metropolitan Books: There Was and There Was Not by Meline Toumani
    Metropolitan Books: There Was and There Was Not by Meline Toumani
    Metropolitan Books: There Was and There Was Not by Meline Toumani

    There Was and There Was Not

    by Meline Toumani

    In 2005, Armenian-American journalist Meline Toumani traveled to Turkey–a place she had previously known only as “a terrifying idea”–with the intention of studying Armenia-Turkey relations for a month or two, three at the most. She stayed for two years, with the help of regular “visa runs” over the border. The result of her immersion in a culture she had been trained to “hate, fear and fight” is There Was and There Was Not: A Journey Through Hate and Possibility in Turkey, Armenia and Beyond, an engaging and deeply personal exploration of ethnicity, nationalism, history and identity.

    The conflicting Armenian and Turkish narratives regarding the massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 defined the Armenian diaspora community of Toumani’s childhood. On the one hand, Turkey has historically denied that the massacre existed, or minimized the scale of the deaths. On the other hand, the Armenian community focuses substantial energy on campaigns designed to pressure the Turkish government to recognize the massacre as genocide. Toumani had reached the point where the dominance of the genocide narrative felt like an artistic and emotional chokehold. She set out to Turkey in an attempt to answer two questions: How could she honor her history without being suffocated by it, and why do Turks cling to their version of the events of 1915?

    Toumani brings the reader along on a voyage of discovery that begins with her growing doubts about the emotional, psychological and political costs of the Armenian diaspora’s focus on Turkish recognition of the genocide; it ends with Toumani defying rules about neutrality in the press box by screaming her support of Armenia at a World Cup match between Armenia and Turkey in Istanbul. In between, she tells a story riddled with unreliable narrators, unreliable listeners, lost memories, lost history, false assumptions and real places transformed by the imagination. She establishes the constantly shifting ground of her experience at the beginning when her plane lands in Istanbul and she realizes she has never imagined Turkey as a physical place. She is stunned by the country’s beauty and charmed by what she describes as the “particular sweetness of Turkish manners”; she actively enjoys learning the Turkish language. (The contrast between Toumani’s phobia about speaking Armenian and her delight in learning Turkish is typical of her skilled use of irony and reversal to enrich her narrative.) At the same time, she is repeatedly dismayed and occasionally enraged by the ways in which Turkey erases traces of the Armenian past: the opening ceremony of a newly renovated Armenian church as a UNESCO world heritage site that makes no reference to Armenians; a museum visit in which she discovers that hundreds of years of Armenian civilization in Anatolia don’t appear on the time line or the map; brochures and travel guides that describe Armenian artifacts in southeastern Turkey but never identify them as Armenian.

    Moving between Turkey and the Republic of Armenia, Toumani shares her experiences of events as important as the assassination of Turkish-born Armenian journalist and civil rights activist Hrant Dink and as small as the street vendors calling their wares on the street outside her apartment. She finds friends and allies among the Turkish activists, journalists, scholars and lawyers who have taken up the Armenian issue, often at the risk of prison or worse. She speaks to millionaires, dentists and cab drivers; Turkish scholars dedicated to cooperating across ethnic lines and Turkey’s official historian; Turkish-Armenians and Armenians from the former Soviet republic; Kurds, Turkish nationalists and an ethnic Turk who refuses to identify himself as Turkish. She encounters Turks who are uncomfortable with the fact that she is Armenian and Turks who struggle to find a point of connection (described by Toumani as the “narcissism of small similarities”).

    Over the course of the book, the clear-cut oppositions with which Toumani begins her project become more nuanced. Even the unity of the Armenian community itself becomes more complex as she examines the different concerns of the diaspora; Turkish-Armenians (described by members of the diaspora community as Bolsahay–a term that avoids describing them as Turkish) and citizens of the Republic of Armenia; those whose families survived the genocide and those whose families were not directly involved; and the ideological divide between those who support the activist Dashnak Party of the Republic and those who do not.

    There Was and There Was Not is neither a history of the genocide nor an examination of its political ramifications for the modern world. It is the story of one woman’s attempt to understand her community, its fundamental assumptions, and herself. Written in a conversational style that is by turns heart-wrenching and unexpectedly funny, There Was and There Was Not will appeal not only to those interested in questions of the Armenian genocide but to readers interested in the larger questions of how individuals define themselves within communities and how communities define themselves. –Pamela Toler

    Metropolitan Books/Holt, $28, hardcover, 9780805097627, November 2014

    Metropolitan Books: There Was and There Was Not by Meline Toumani

  • THE ADDRESS DELIVERED BY MR. TAL BUENOS

    THE ADDRESS DELIVERED BY MR. TAL BUENOS

    24. November 2014
    NEW SOUTH WALES PARLIAMENT
    AUSTRALIA

    I would like to acknowledge the Gadigal people of the Eora nation, who are the traditional custodians of this land on which we are gathered. I would also like to pay my respect to the elders past and present of the Eora nation and extend that respect to other Aboriginal people present.

    I would also like to acknowledge, the presence of the Members of Parliament here with us, and other distinguished guests.

    I would also like to thank the New South Wales Parliament and the Parliamentary Friends of Turkey for inviting me to speak in this parliament.

    This is my first time here in Australia. Upon arrival yesterday, I heard some stories about sharks. Considering the media here, I imagined how interesting it would be for a headline to read “Genocide denier attacks shark,” and in the story the “genocide denier” would be quoted as saying “what shark?”

    WAS IT A GENOCIDE?

    Well, was it a genocide? Why is this even asked? Why do people want to characterize an event without having to study what happened… a century ago? And – how about this for a preliminary question – what is genocide?

    Genocide is a characterization of an event. Genocide is not the event itself. It is an epithet, not a name of an event. It is a legal characterization given to an event if the event falls within the meaning of the term as defined in the Convention adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948.

    According to Article 2, genocide means an act committed with “intent to destroy,” and the group that is being destroyed is either national, ethnical, racial or religious, and is destroyed as such. That’s what it says. Notice the “as such.” Notice that “political” is not mentioned as a group identifier. The victims of a response to a rebellion are not victims of genocide, no matter what. If you do not want your wife, your husband, your child or your next door neighbour to be burdened by your own act of rebelliousness, then the time to think of it is before committing an act of rebelliousness against the state. The intent on the part of the state in cases of a reaction to rebellion is to maintain sovereignty, not to destroy a group of people. Remove the political condition of rebellion, and you shall also remove whatever state aggression happens as a result. No rebellion, no deportations, no massacres. The rebelling group, though it may have a national, ethnical, racial, or religious identity, is a political group once its purpose is to replace the sovereign, once its intent is to destroy the state in its current existence. In the Armenian case in World War One, the Armenian leadership was leading a rebellion under the intention – shared by its sponsors, the Entente – to destroy the Ottoman state. The Ottoman state, was not trying to destroy the Armenian people – and it is a fact that many Armenians in Anatolia were left unharmed – rather, the Ottoman state was trying to save itself, and to survive as a sovereign.

    Considering the weight of the legal characterization that is genocide, a responsible person would not use genocide as a name, unless it was legally determined to be genocide, and Article 6 of the Convention states that persons charged with genocide “shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” These are exact words, and they mean that only suitable courts may charge a person with genocide. Neither of the types of tribunals stated in the article have ever declared that what happened to the Armenians in 1915-16 was genocide, that’s one point. Another point is that persons are to be charged with genocide, not a nation. The third point is that if you look at the wording you see that there was a clear forward-view to the term genocide. Meaning, it was designed to prevent future – future – genocides, and that’s the “shall” part. “Shall” has a clear tense-distinction. Future. That was the idea that was put to paper. Genocide was something to be prevented from happening in the future. It was not designed to become a source for a disingenuous discourse that consists of false accusations about the past.

    WHOSE FAN ARE YOU?

    Now that we have a decent grasp of what genocide is by definition, let us consider the difficulty of characterizing an event in general. It could be any event. There is a difference between facts that make an event and the characterization of the event. We might be looking at the same thing and characterize it differently. It happens in sports regularly. In soccer. I am from Israel, and in Israel to this day, the thought of Australia brings to mind one name: Charlie Yankos. People know him here? Charlie Yankos? Well that name still keeps many Israelis up at night. You’d think there’d be other names to keep Israelis up at night, but no. It’s Charlie Yankos. Israel and Australia used to tangle in the 1980s in the World Cup qualifiers. So, in soccer – it’s a game, it’s a sport, right – say there is a semblance of contact in the penalty box, a possibility of a foul, i.e., an event: do you think both sets of fans are going to characterize the event in the same way? No! They’ll see the same thing, but characterize it differently.

    But that is what historiography does, it characterizes events according to the needs of collective memory, to strengthen group solidarity. The characterization of the event informs us on whose fan you are, than it does on what happened. So whose fan are YOU? Are you a fan in this political game in which only Armenians and Turks are on the field? Who runs this game? Do you want to be the referee? As the referee you’d have the players of both teams begging that you characterize events in a certain way. You don’t see players asking the referee “hey, why are we even playing this game?” They are so caught up in the game. Being the referee in that particular situation is a position of power, as the players of the two teams hold their breaths, waiting for the referee to decide how to characterize what happened. Referees would like to freeze this moment of getting attention, before actually making a decision that will disappoint one of the two sides. Such is the issue between the Armenians and the Turks. For some reason – which is not that big of a mystery if you come to think of it – the referee, or referees are suspending the decision. It might be clear that there was contact but no foul, but the important aspect of this event and its characterization has become this frozen moment in which Turks are shown as having to plead with the referee that there was no foul. It is a humiliating position to be in, if you are the Turks. It is frustrating for the Armenians, who for a long time think that they are about to get a penalty-kick. They’re not going to get it. And let me tell you something important: there are no real referees in the international political system. But a great power, or an aspiring power, would like to be thought of as a referee. Referees are the most powerful when there is a situation in the penalty box. Imagine a referee that was able to delay the decision, and just bask in the moment. Isn’t that a referee’s fantasy, the best of both worlds: to have both teams beg for a favorable decision, and yet not have to make a decision on the characterization of the event. In the game between Armenia and Turkey there are no real referees, there are people who pretend to be referees, but they are actually extensions of whoever is running the game – and they want to freeze this moment, to keep this question of foul contact in the penalty box as long as possible – the most dramatic state of the game on pause – so that the Turkish team will constantly appear as running to the referee in “denial” of having committed a foul. This image of denying that something happened is the whole point, and it has a life of its own, regardless of whether there was a foul in the penalty box. The Turks are constantly shown as saying “no” to something, like the players who run at the referee to say, “no, no penalty.” A century after the contact in the box. The Turks are constantly shown as if they are denying that something happened.

    DENYING A FACT OR REFUTING A CHARACTERIZATION?

    Let’s talk about real denial. Holocaust denial – denial – is something completely different. To say, for instance, that there were no gas chambers in Auschwitz is to deny a fact. To say that Jews were not executed by gas chambers, is to say that an event did not happen. In our soccer analogy, to say that the players weren’t even in the box would be a denial of fact, while to say that the contact in the box does not qualify as a foul is to refute a characterization of an event. One denies facts. If something is not a fact, then it is not denied, it’s refuted or rejected. People might call you a denier to make it seem as if they have ownership of facts. It is a tactic. It is my understanding that the Turkish government recognizes the contact in the penalty box; it recognizes every aspect of the Armenian suffering in 1915-16, but it rejects the biased characterization of the event. The fact that those who accuse Turkey of genocide and denial are ignoring Turkey’s clear position, and ignore the distinction made between fact and its characterization, should serve as a strong indication that there is a political commitment at play to press this issue against the Turks regardless of facts. A genuine study is that of facts. To study the actual contact first, before deciding how to characterize the events.

    Those who study the facts full-time, are the very opposite of deniers of facts. Justin McCarthy was here in Australia and he was accused of terrible things. This Dr. McCarthy, whom I have had the pleasure to meet once at a conference in Sarajevo, is not a denier of facts. He is dedicated, as a scholar, to knowing more about what happened. This impressive man, a walking encyclopedia of a man, has spent a lifetime of studying the facts of the events and surrounding the events. I sit and study facts all day. This is what I do. I am not a big-time barrister in London, I am not even a recording artist. This is not a gig for me. I am committed to studying facts. I am finding them. Give me time, and these facts will become known. Give me a platform, and these facts will become known. Would you publish my work here? Do you want to know what happened, or have you already decided to take part in running this political game?

    THE LETTER BY FM JULIE BISHOP

    Even a well-articulated letter such as that drafted by the Honourable Julie Bishop in June – stating that the tragic events are not characterized by the Australian government as genocide – even such a letter only extends the game if it is accompanied by efforts of other branches of the Australian government to utilize the media and education to indirectly promote the belief that the event should be characterized as genocide. It is clear to me that by making the public believe that it was genocide, great pressure is placed on the Turkish government, and then the Western governments reap the benefits of this pressure, and letters such as the one by the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs are considered a favor to Turkey, to which a price is attached. It is like a coupon that Turkey is expected to accept. However, the jig is up on this type of double play.

    POLITICAL POWER

    Why is it so easy for scholars who are not Ottomanists to publish work that is readily accessible to a wide audience in the US, in the UK, and here in Australia? Why is it so easy to publish a book in which truly skilled scholars such as Dr. McCarthy are disrespected? Why is it so easy to call Turks genocidal? To accuse an entire nation of something so abominable without the expertise, without the knowledge of Ottoman history and language?

    Samantha Power, now representing the United States as its ambassador to New York, she did this. There was power behind this book of hers. Infrastructure. Typically, books that are filled with inaccuracies – the work of shoddy research – are not expected to win prizes. This book won the Pulitzer Prize. No joke. It presented “Turks” as perpetrators of a terrible crime in a matter-of-fact way, used imprecise descriptions, citing fiction as fact, advocating a distinctly anti-Turkish view of history.

    Samantha Power is a political actor. Look at what she said about Russia in the book and what she has to say about Russia now. Her opinion changes according to the political needs of the United States government. Period. So yeah, she did it, she freely tarnished the image of an entire nation without being able to cite Ottoman sources, by simply and unabashedly relying on English writings of Anglo-American political actors. Also, Michael Ignatieff, a famous friend of hers, almost the Canadian prime-minister, did it. Michael Oren, another famous friend of hers, the former American-turned-Israeli ambassador to the United States, he did it. These people are not Ottomanists, and, judging by who they cite, they did not spend any time studying first hand facts on Ottoman history and language. They are famous Harvard scholars and political actors, who have access to readers, and influence public opinion. They do not seem to want to access facts. They have access to readers, to the public. Power. And they use this power to make terrible accusations against Turks in general, that they are genocidal and deniers. Have these scholars no shame? Do we know why people who do not know what happened – and do not want to know what happened – are pretending to know what happened and are clearly popularizing a phrase that combines “Armenian” with “genocide” as if a name? It makes you want to ask “What’s going on?”

    POLITICAL PURPOSE

    Here’s what’s going on. The accusation of genocide serves political purpose. Three main purposes, one that is great-power specific, one that is Turkish-specific, and one that is Armenian-specific.

    The first one, it allows great powers, usually the United States, to replace disfavored regimes in an indirect manner. Instead of just using sheer force to dominate a region, which also happens, it is more advantageous for a great power to do so by setting up a revolt that would lead to a reaction by the sovereign, that would lead to international acceptance of an intervention led by the very same great power that concocted this mess. This way, the sovereign gets the blame for killing its own people, and the great power, typically America, typically if you have oil or other important resources, gets to show up and save the day, as Samantha Power would have it do. Interestingly, the definition of genocide as it was drawn up does not consider political groups to be victims of genocide. Meaning, if a great power wants to stage a genocide in order to topple a regime, then it will have to make it seem as if the group of people is persecuted for religious or ethnic reasons. Other times, the great power just doesn’t care. This happens when the popular perception is all that the great power cares to affect, without having to admit that it is misusing the term in the legal sense. For instance, in oil-filled Libya, those were clearly political rebels who were facing annihilation by [Muammar] Gaddafi, and yet that did not stop President Barack Obama from using the phrase genocide in justifying the planned intervention. By the way, at the time, Power was a member of Obama’s National Security Council. Another point of interest regarding how great powers use the genocide concept is that the Genocide Convention gives no heed to the fact that many massacres are the result of the intent to instigate by a third party to the conflict. It has been common to point a finger at third parties who did not stop massacres, suggesting that they were complicit. However, there is not much discussion in academia on how the Genocide Convention sets free third-party instigators for whom it serves a political interest to encourage a rebellion, even when the terrible consequences are anticipated. In this instance, the great power mobilizes a group within a state to rebel and attempt to replace the sovereign; then, either the rebellion succeeds and the great power achieves a moment of success in its foreign policy, or the rebellion fails and then the sovereign state that quelled the rebellion is blamed for the atrocities of war. This is not genocide, this is sophisticated imperialism.

    The second purpose, the Turkish-specific aspect of the accusation is that it provides the United States and the West with a political tool, a “stick” to raise against Turkey, to press it to make policy decisions according to their wishes, to deny Turkey its place in the European Union, to weaken its image and influence. The lack of a perfect cultural affinity between the US and Turkey has meant that there is no such brotherhood as that which exists among the English speaking countries. Applying for a visa to come here, it was interesting to learn that the information collected as part of my application is to be shared with government agencies in the US, the UK and Canada, the English-speaking gang. Turkey was not one of them. There is no complete trust in Turkey. Turkey’s different. However, if you are the United States, you are thinking that there has to be a way to make sure Turkey always picks up the phone when America calls. Sure, there have been carrots in this relationship. Turkey has done very well since the 1950s thanks to cooperation with the United States. But it’s doing much better now, some might say that things have been going too well for Turkey. Its government has reached a level of stability to the point where measures have finally been taken to reduce the influence of outside entities in Turkey. This is a problem for those who thrive on having outside influence around the world. It means that the Turkish government is vilified on Western TV whenever it has to take bold steps to maintain its democracy through fighting outside interference. It is not necessarily that there are better and lesser democracies, but rather sometimes some democracies face more challenges than others. As Turkey is strong enough to face new challenges it has not faced before, this also means that from the West’s perspective there is a need for means to influence Turkey’s decisions. Hence, the Armenian issue.

    Three, the Armenian-specific purpose of the genocide accusation is that it distracts from a real ongoing grievance, and that is the Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. As long as the headlines on the Armenians in the West show them as victims, there is not enough oxygen in the public’s brain to think of them as aggressive occupiers. The Armenian-Azeri conflict is an explosive conflict that has ignited the popularization of the genocide accusation as a proxy-polemic, almost like a replacement-conflict. As long as Nagorno-Karabakh is occupied, Armenian memory will be politicized, and the Armenian people will continue to suffer from this ill-advised politicization of Armenian memory. Instead of better understanding their own past, instead of enjoying greater international relations in their present, the Armenians are locked out of acting toward a more prosperous future for Armenia. It is a simple formula: settle the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the proxy-polemic would fade away, the misuse of genocide will stop. Granted, the genocide accusation began before the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, but the two other purposes have already began to lose their momentum.

    STUDYING “THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE”

    There is so much material to be studied – on the British political actors in the late nineteenth century, on the Anglo-American imperialist cooperation leading up to the twentieth century, and on the emergence of genocide as a field of study in the last two-three decades – that over time this information will be revealed and undoubtedly expose the political designs of this genocide accusation against Turkey. There is so much interesting material that there ought to be an association of scholars that are studying the study of genocide, studying the people behind the organization of genocide study: how did this field of genocide study, this genocide study, come into being and why. Study all of these people who made ungrounded accusations against Turkey, name by name, one by one. It is an utter disgrace to accuse an entire people of genocide without caring to study the facts. Why has it been so easy to issue such accusations against the Turkish people? What aspects of prejudice are related to this? Racism? Islamophobia? Racism and Islamophobia not necessarily as the reasons why this accusation is made – the reasons for that are political, as I stated – but racism and Islamophobia may explain why it is so easy in the West to make the accusation and have it be so effective in convincing the public of Turkish wrong-doing.

    “CREDIBLE INDEPENDENT EXPERTS”

    To me, it is an academic priority to understand what such people have done in the name of academia. How political interest has disguised itself as academia. It is already a fact that Cass Sunstein, who happens to be Samantha Power’s husband, and a friend of the US president, pushed for the US government to use scholars for its own interests. On the same year of being appointed the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs – a lofty US government position of information control – he co-authored an article in support of government involvement in academic affairs if it helps the government: “The government can partially circumvent these problems [referring to accusations of conspiracy against the US government] if it enlists credible independent experts… There is a tradeoff between credibility and control, however. The price of credibility is that the government cannot be seen to control the independent experts.” This is in the Journal of Political Philosophy, volume 17, issue number 2, 2009, page 223.

    This begs an immediate question that should be asked more and more: How much of this genocide accusation is done by the US government? How much of this academic discussion is really a manifestation of political power? It is important to remember that the term genocide became international law because of power, not morality. Morality is owned by power. The US itself was the driving force behind the convention but it did not sign the ratification of the Genocide Convention until the 1980s. Why? Because it feared that there would be accusations made against what happened to the Native Americans and the African slaves. The American enterprise that is known as the International Association of Genocide Scholars took care of that problem. Out of 20 issues of Genocide Studies International by the IAGS, upon its thousands of pages, only 9 pages of one pathetic article discuss the Native Americans. The verdict, surprise surprise, is that it was not a genocide per se. And that was that. When you have power, you control the conversation, and then you control the content, you control the language, you control what people think, and then you can talk about freedom. Freedom is not a problem for the government that has enough power to control thought. Do you know who thought the Native Americans suffered a genocide plain and simple? Raphael Lemkin.

    RAFAEL LEMKIN

    Let’s talk a bit about Raphael Lemkin. When the term genocide first became published in a 1944 book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, under Lemkin’s name, he was employed by the United States government.

    The book has the marking of having more than one author, and it is questionable, in my view, that Lemkin even wrote it, considering the quality of the English and the fact that he had only made it to the US in 1941 for the first time. There was no American TV to influence foreigners’ English at the time. There was no Bonanza or MacGyver on Eastern European TV in the 1930s. He could not have written that book on his own, and yet he does not credit anyone for either translating it or editing it, not even proofreading it. It’s odd. It is even odder considering that in the late 1950s when he was no longer employed by the US government, his autobiography was dismissed by publishers in the US partly because of his poor grammar. This was a problem 15 plus years after he immigrated, but it was not a problem just two-three years after he immigrated to the US? That is really odd. The only way for this to make sense is if he didn’t really write the 1944 book, and, guess what, he was working for the US government at the time, when a whole bunch of ivy-league graduates could do it for him.

    Regardless of who actually wrote the book, it coins genocide without regard to the Armenians. It does not mention Armenians, not even once. And yet, Yair Auron, an Israeli scholar who is affiliated with the Zoryan Institute – that’s an institute that promotes Armenian affairs in academia – is quoted all over the internet as saying “When Raphael Lemkin coined the word genocide in 1944 he cited the annihilation of Armenians as a seminal example of genocide.” That is not even a half-truth, but an entirely false statement. Why is this scholar saying such a thing if it is not true? Auron only began to write profusely about the Armenian issue in the 1990s, 15 years after completing a doctoral dissertation on a completely different topic, on Jewish youths in France… he might as well be a barrister. And he still goes on TV shows in Israel, writes for Haaretz from time to time, unopposed, without anybody questioning the veracity of his statements. Notice that I am not calling him names, like is done by such people who call Dr. McCarthy a denier; notice that I am not degrading Auron just because he doesn’t agree with my opinion. I am pointing out an actual statement made by him that is completely false.

    This Dr. Auron has been active in facilitating the teaching of the Armenian case as genocide in Israel, holding a position of influence in the main college in Israel that educates the teachers of tomorrow. There are organizations that frame people’s understanding of history in anti-Turkish ways. An “international educational” organization such as Facing History and Ourselves is said to reach over 1.5 million school kids, through close to 20,000 educators in the US and Switzerland. No wonder, then, that in Switzerland they believe these stories about World War One and Lemkin. A false narrative has made it seem as if Lemkin was inspired by the Armenian suffering to coin genocide. Is it any wonder, then, that when the honourable judges of the European Court of Human Rights corrected the wrong done by the Swiss government and courts that convicted a Turk, Doğu Perinçek, for sticking to his understanding of what happened, even these honourable judges who made this correction, still said, and this is a quote “We know that when Raphael Lemkin (Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 1944) coined the term genocide, he had in mind the 1915 massacres and deportations” (that’s on page 53 of the English version of their decision)? No, we do not know that. In fact, Lemkin did not express any thought on the Armenians at that time. This falsehood is easily acceptable for reasons that must be examined.

    The truth is that while he was employed by the US government, the Armenian issue did not seem to be on Lemkin’s mind. Why would it be? It was not a US political agenda at the time. After Lemkin was dropped by the government, he wanted to promote the term in every way he could, and promote himself in the process, and he became involved with the activities of American Christian organizations, who already had a long history of involvement in the tensions between Armenians and Muslims. Under their influence he said in an interview to CBS in 1949 – one of these organizations may have arranged for that interview, by the way – that he became interested in genocide because of what happened to the Armenians. However, at a different time, while campaigning for genocide ratification in Italy, and being asked “When did you first become interested in Genocide?” his answer was Armenian-free, made to fit to his audience in Italy. Time and place, audience and purpose, determined his answers. His written autobiography was just as flexible. And yet it is his autobiography, the one that could not get published while he was alive, that Samantha Power cites in her book like it was a mathematical truth.

    At the twilight of his life, while his push for greater discussion on genocide and for Noble Peace Prize nominations was ongoing, Lemkin referred to a total of 62 cases in history – in Antiquity, the Middle-Ages, and Modernity – as genocide. Among them the genocide of Native Americans, he called it the “Genocide against the American Indians,” the genocide by the Greeks against the Turks, the genocide in Belgian Congo. Of the 41 cases in modern times, number 39 states “Armenians.” Number 41 was added in handwriting and says “Natives of Australia.” This does not mean that they were all genocides. These were all researched hurriedly and superficially to gather as many cases for the promotion of the term’s popularity. Not only was the historical research insufficient, over time Lemkin distanced his definition from that of the Genocide Convention and began to follow a home-made definition of genocide. But, what’s interesting is that out of all of these, for some reason – and what is that reason? – the Armenian case, or should I say the anti-Turkish case, is the one that is kept alive, and made into an ongoing and going and going – without being gone – issue. Certainly not forgotten, but falsely advertised as such.

    JAMES BRYCE AT THE CENTER OF THE FALSEHOODS

    This accusation of genocide may still be turned around from falsehoods to greater truths that have yet to be brought out. But first we must expose the falsehoods for what they are. What are the genocide claims based on? Wartime articles in the New York Times? Missionary accounts? Armenian memories written down in Massachusetts? The report by Ambassador Henry Morgenthau whose embassy functioned as a hub for Entente agenda during the war’s first couple of years? The British government-based, government-issued, Blue Book?

    Go to the University of Oxford’s Bodleian Library, Special Collections, seek the help of a nice gentleman by the name of Colin Harris, and you will find there the catalogue of papers of one James Bryce.

    Going by my own growing familiarity with the facts, what happened may be characterized as a tragedy because the Armenians were set up for a big painful fall by the British, and by presumptive Armenian leaders, the so-called Armenian representatives who met with British officials – headed by Bryce – in London hotels, and acted irresponsibly toward the many innocent Armenians who were – as a result – fated to suffer the consequences of the actions of these so-called Armenian representatives.

    These representatives were fed by British hubris as they strove to advance the political quest for an Armenian independent state on Ottoman land, their personal ambition to be leaders of this state, but mainly on behalf of British imperialist agenda. There is no question that these actions, namely colluding with the British and agreeing to lead an intensified rebellion, meant selling out the safety of the Armenian people in eastern Anatolia who were not the majority in any of the provinces there, and would be subject to an escalation in violence similar to what followed Bryce’s previous campaigns to excite Armenian rebellion in the 1890s.

    James Bryce is not just the man behind the Blue Book during World War One. In 1967, Arnold J. Toynbee, who during World War One was a young historian fully employed by the British government to work under Bryce in editing the Blue Book and manufacture other propaganda, admitted that the Blue Book was designed to affect the American public during the war. By World War One, Bryce had already established strong connections with people who were in the loftiest political positions in the US. To quote the Washington Post from January 28, 1917, “No man in Europe commands a more sympathetic audience in America than Bryce.” What Toynbee did not share with his readers, even in his old age when he wrote Acquaintances, was that decades prior to World War One, Bryce had made a name for himself as a Liberal politician and an expert in foreign affairs thanks to raising the Armenian Question in 1876 as part of the larger Eastern Question raised by Gladstone and other anti-Muslim politicians, historians and journalists during the Bulgarian Agitation. It was imperialism, disguised as morality. Already in 1878, Bryce announced Turkey’s death, and presented the plan to cultivate “the growth of a native Christian race” – the Armenians – to the point of establishing “the nucleus of an independent state” – Armenia – whose territories would comprise of Ottoman land in the size of “about three hundred and fifty miles in length by two hundred and fifty in breadth.” Between then and World War One, Bryce engaged in many activities to organize the Armenians as a political entity within the Ottoman state that would replace the Ottoman sovereign. This was accompanied by the promotion of a conviction according to which the Turks as a race and as followers of Islam were inferior, uncivilized and an obstruction of progress. While giving the Romans Lecture in 1902 at Oxford, Bryce said that there are “cases in which the exclusion of the Backward race seems justified, in the interests of humanity at large,” and he invited his audience to “ Conceive what a difference it might make if Islam were within two centuries to disappear from the earth!” That’s a quote from 1902. Before World War One, before 9-11, before post-9/11ism supplanted postcolonialism. Before this idea of radical Islam became popularized. Bryce wanted Islam gone. It got in the way of his imperialist vision of the world.

    If you were to study Bryce’s papers, you would find that all of the sources of falsehoods, cited by biased scholars or “credible independent experts,” whatever you want to call them, they are associated with Bryce, all of these sources are associated with Bryce. Go read his correspondence with the editors of the New York Times – see how much influence he had with them, with US government officials, with American church-organizers, with overseers of missionary activities in eastern Anatolia, with Armenian leaders in the US, Britain and eastern Anatolia. Go read his published articles in liberal periodicals, feel the hatred for the Turkish race and its Muslim religion, understand how the pretense of morality and values served an imperialist agenda, and become aware of the plotting that was going on. Then you will begin to wonder what facts are being denied here? How much is currently known on what led the British Liberals to promote Christian nationalism within the Ottoman Empire while they were in the opposition and Benjamin Disraeli was the premier? How does it relate to the rise of Darwinism at the time? How does it relate to anti-Semitism? How does it relate – on conceptual and interpersonal levels – to the rise of German anti-Semitism?

    THE RISE OF RACISM, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ANTI-SEMITISM IN BRITAIN

    Bryce’s mentor in academia, the Oxford historian Edward A. Freeman was considered a spokesperson of sorts for Liberal Party ideology during Disraeli’s premiership, when the Liberal Party was in need of political pretext to win back the British public. He was described by historian Richard Shannon as “the natural leader of the Gladstonian historians.” Freeman wrote in 1877 that “the people of Aryan and Christian Europe” – the Christian minorities in the European territories of Ottoman Empire – were suffering from “ The union of the Jew and the Turk against the Christian.” To him, the Turk, much like the Jew, “did not belong to the Aryan branch of mankind” and did not belong in Europe. He elaborated on how the Jew and the Turk are the enemies of Europe. Upon visiting the US in the 1880s, in promotion of Anglo-Americanism, this was one of his impressions: “Very many approved when I suggested that the best remedy for whatever was amiss would be if every Irishman should kill a negro and be hanged for it.” Another observation: “The eternal laws of nature, the eternal distinction of colour, forbid the assimilation of the negroe.” And another one: “ The negro… is not a man and a brother in the same full sense in which every Western Aryan is a man and a brother. He cannot be assimilated; the laws of nature forbid it.” Or how about this: “…I must say that every nation has a right to get rid of strangers who prove a nuisance, whether they are Chinese in America, or Jews in Russia, Servia, Hungary, and Roumania.” This man was a racist, and he coached Bryce to develop the political potential of the Armenian people in Ottoman land, by highlighting their supposed superior race and religion. I am not bringing forth these quotes to judge a man according to our postmodern-postcolonialist standards. I am bringing these quotes before you to show that this is the frame of mind that propelled the British imperialist idea to pin the Armenian people against the Turks. There was a racial intensity that had proven effective then, and has been overlooked in academia to this day.

    The anti-Semitism shown against Disraeli, by these same people, was a new Darwinian-inspired anti-Semitism. It was a blood based, race based, anti-Semitism. It did not aim against Disraeli for being a practicing Jew, for “killing Jesus,” for working on Sundays, for not believing, because Disraeli was Anglican, he was baptized as a boy. This was not the anti-Semitism of the Middle-Ages, but the anti-Semitism that was later promoted in Germany by the likes of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a Briton in Germany, who grew up supporting Gladstone against Disraeli. The spiritual leader of Nazi racism was influenced by the anti-Semitism that developed in Britain during the time of the Bulgarian Agitation and the raising of the Armenian question. In the Holocaust, Jews were persecuted by the Nazis systematically, not because of religious differences but because of racial beliefs; certainly not because of a rebellion. The Jews were loyal Germans who participated in German culture and were proud of their German national home. The argument that feeds on comparisons between the Holocaust and a tragedy that followed Armenian, British sponsored, rebellion, is unacceptable. To suggest that Hitler was right when he equated – if he did – the Jews or the Poles to the rebellious, British-sponsored, Armenians, is unacceptable. It is important to internalize that the same people in Britain who wanted an Armenian independent state on Ottoman land were the ones who claimed that the Jews were never to be accepted in their European national homes. They were the racists who invented modern racism. Bryce wrote about Disraeli that he was not an Englishman. Disraeli was his prime-minister, English born and Anglican, and yet Bryce wrote about him that he was not really an Englishman. Why? Because Disraeli had Jewish blood.

    THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PROBLEM

    This is a big problem to this day – can the Jews be considered Englishmen or Englishwomen in Britain? Can the Muslims? Can the Turks? And how about in Australia? Are the Turks here Australians? We might receive an illuminating understanding of it if we were to address British historiography on the Armenian issue, on anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim, anti-Ottoman, anti-Semitic aspects of it, openly and sincerely. Instead of letting part-time scholars keep this fascinating and important period of history as part of a political game, let’s open up the books. Let’s read what was said at that time in Britain, and try to understand how this might be connected to the current national identity crisis in Britain and in Western states. How is an African Muslim to become aligned with British national identity? This is the basic problem. More basic than the tension due to the fighting of Western militaries in Muslim countries. The basic problem is that British historiography has not owned up to its hateful prejudice. Statements such as that made by William Gladstone, the much revered four-time prime-minister of Britain – elected more times than anybody in British history to be the premier – who ran policies against Muslims in Turkey and Egypt. He said: “It is not a question of Mahometanism simply, but of Mahometanism compounded with the peculiar character of a race… They [the Turks] were, upon the whole, from the black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity.” How can one expect Muslims to feel like they are a part of national identity, when such words are unaccounted for, and the man who said them is enshrined, literally, a figure that is a source of pride in Britain’s modern history? How has this tension between British pride in its anti-Muslim history and the pretense of bogus morality for imperialist gains been reconciled with its current social makeup?

    We can ask even further, what about British history of slave ownership? Has that been addressed? How many of you know that William Gladstone’s father, John, was one of the wealthiest slave owners in Liverpool? How many of you know that in his plantations Africans were hanged or shot down when they wanted to set themselves free? How many of you know that he was one of the most passionate voices in Britain against abolition, and that he called William Wilberforce – who was the leader of the anti-slavery campaign – he called him a “mistaken man,” and that he only gave up the fight once the government paid him a huge sum of money as compensation? How many of you knew that? There is no attempt of owning up to this history, of addressing the fact that William Gladstone was not so moral or that his father was not a philanthropist (a philanthropist they still call him!); there is no attempt to recognize that the anti-Turkish use of Armenians as colonialist pawns against the so-called “antihuman” Turks, is mentally related to the use of African slaves, just as the Gladstones – father and son – are related. There are churches in the Liverpool area that were built with slave money, and yet the name Liverpool does not make the common person think first of slavery; instead, people think of the Beatles and Ian Rush.

    IS AUSTRALIA A FAIR PLACE FOR ALL ITS CITIZENS?

    David Cameron, in his first speech as Britain’s prime-minister blamed state multiculturalism for the national identity crisis of Muslims in Britain. They have been allowed to live their separate lives for too long, he said. Why wouldn’t he say that? It is politically popular to take action against Muslims in Western societies in our post-9/11 world, and it means that Britain does not have to change its national identity, that it does not have to recognize a deep disrespect to the formerly colonized people who are now among its citizens. And here in Australia, a relatively new settler state, has it not been shown that when there isn’t a historiography that is filled with anti-Muslim moments, multiculturalism actually works? So what if Muslims or Turks prefer to maintain their traditional customs and live in their own neighborhoods? They still might watch Neighbours and Home and Away, if they are comfortable. If their historical background is truly respected by Australia, they will be proud Australians. It is not advisable to create a national identity crisis for Turks or Muslims in Australia by following a political ordinance from the US or the UK to twist history. Historiographical cleanliness is crucial for keeping national identity intact. How would Muslims or Turks feel about having to send their children to Australian schools if lies are taught about their people’s heritage?

    This is my message to you. Historiographical cleanliness goes a long way. The study of historical facts must be on full display. The approach taken by you on the characterization of the events in 1915-16 defines your national identity. Is Australia a fair place for all its citizens? May all of Australia’s citizens be proud of their government’s fairness in choosing historical study over prejudice, or is Australia a country that receives political dictations on history?

    Thank you!

    24. November 2014
    NEW SOUTH WALES PARLIAMENT
    AUSTRALIA