The recent tension between Turkey and Israel has over the last year affected the fronts of alliances in the region, leading to pursuits for new forms of alliances subsequent to the current crisis. (more…)
Category: Armenian Question
“The great Turk is governing in peace twenty nations from different religions. Turks have taught to Christians how to be moderate in peace and gentle in victory.”Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary
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Reflections of Israeli Crisis in Caucasus
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No One Can Force Armenia or Turkey, Insist Ambassadors in Armenia
Epress.am — No one from outside can force Armenia, Azerbaijan or Turkey to take this or that step. These countries have to sit together and resolve their problem, said former US Ambassador to Armenia John Marshall Evans today at the “Assessing Independence in Armenia and the Region” public forum organized by the Civilitas Foundation.
“As you know we often have difficult relations with Turkey, as, for example, in the war with Iraq, Turkey refused to get troops into Iraq. Thus, America can’t force, it can support processes through different formats, but resolving the conflict is the problem of those countries,” he said.German Ambassador to Armenia Hans-Jochen Schmidt, also speaking on the panel, likewise emphasized that the “outside world” cannot force a decision.
“The EU also takes steps in the issue of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as the normalization of relations with Turkey, but they can’t force anything,” he said.
Schmidt said the most important step in Armenia-Turkey relations is the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, after which discussions on other issues will begin.
“What’s important is that the parties understand that by establishing diplomatic relations, no one is doing anyone a favor; it is a normal process,” he said.
via ArmeniaDiaspora.com – News from Armenia, Events in Armenia, Travel and Entertainment | No One Can Force Armenia or Turkey, Insist Ambassadors in Armenia.
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Can we ever know the truth about the Armenian ‘genocide’?
By Jack Grove
Debate has been further inflamed by claims that Turkey has paid off historians. Jack Grove reports
Credit: ReutersNot forgotten: a protester places a banner, ‘For Hrant, for Justice’, outside the Agos newspaper offices during a demonstration to mark the third anniversary of editor Hrant Dink’s assassination
Few academic subjects are as politically explosive as the dispute over the mass killings in Armenia.
Almost 100 years after the alleged atrocities of 1915-16, arguments still rage over whether the deaths of between 600,000 and 1.5 million Armenian civilians constitute genocide.
Most historians agree that Ottoman Turks deported hundreds of thousands of Armenians from eastern Anatolia to the Syrian desert during the First World War, where they were killed or died of starvation and disease.
But was this a systematic attempt to destroy the Christian Armenian people? Or was it merely part of the widespread bloodshed – including the deaths of innocent Turkish Muslims – in the collapsing Ottoman empire?
Unlike most scholarly disputes, however, this clash goes far beyond the confines of academic journals and conferences.
More than 15,000 Armenian-Americans marched through the streets of Los Angeles in April 2008, calling for Turkey to apologise for its “ethnic cleansing”, and Turkey recalled its ambassador to the US after a congressional committee narrowly voted to recognise the episode as genocide.
The Turkish newspaper editor Hrant Dink was assassinated by a 17-year-old nationalist in 2007 after criticising the country’s denialist stance.
Before Dink’s death, such claims had resulted in his being prosecuted for “denigrating Turkishness”. The Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk was also prosecuted for making similar claims.
Denialist claims
Now a leading historian has further inflamed debate by claiming that academics have been paid by the Turkish foreign ministry to produce denialist works.
Taner Akçam, associate professor at Clark University in Massachusetts, told a conference at Glendale Public Library, Arizona, in June that he had been informed by a source in Istanbul, who wished to remain anonymous, that hefty sums have been given to academics willing to counter Armenian genocide claims.
Although Akçam claims he did not name any historians explicitly, five academics have threatened legal action, saying they were implicated and have therefore become targets for extreme Armenian nationalists.
Akçam denies he has defamed anyone, adding that he has been the target of a “hate campaign” for many years for his work on genocide.
“I never mentioned any names, nor accused anybody,” he says.
“I only shared information that I learned when I was in Istanbul – this was very general information without names.”
Beyond the legal writs, however, the episode has raised questions of whether free historical investigation of the genocide claims can ever take place amid the frenzied Turkish-Armenian political climate.
Akçam, who is often described as the first historian of Turkish origin openly to acknowledge and research the genocide, believes pressure from Ankara has made it impossible for Turks to look into the subject at home.
“There is no direct pressure on academia, in the sense that the government doesn’t issue bulletins or communiques to stay away from the subject.
“But if one works on Armenian genocide and uses the term, one would lose one’s job immediately.
“This is the very reason why almost none of the scholars use the term ‘genocide’, even though there are a lot of journalists and public intellectuals using this term.
“It is very risky to focus one’s work on this area, let alone to get funded by the state.
“If I wanted to work in Turkey, I would not be able to find a job at any university. None of the private universities can hire me as they would be intimidated by the government and public pressure, especially the media.”
However, Jeremy Salt, associate professor in history at Bilkent University, Ankara, believes the issue is no longer taboo.
“I have been in this country quite a long time and all kinds of things that could not be discussed 10 or 15 years ago are now discussed openly,” he says.
“Ten years ago public criticism of the army was unthinkable – I myself got into trouble for this. Now as part of the Ergenekon inquiry (into an ultra-nationalist group accused of trying to overthrow the government), retired generals have been arrested and the prominence of the army in politics has been shrunk to a shadow of what it was.”
Skewed perspectives
Indeed, he believes the influence of Armenian nationalists – including the powerful Armenian diaspora – has also skewed discussion of the era and prevented impartial consideration of the mass deaths.
“As far as the Western cultural mainstream is concerned, there is virtually no comprehension, outside (the battle of) Gallipoli…of the scale of the catastrophe that overwhelmed the Ottoman Empire. About 3 million civilians died.
“They included Armenians and other Christians, Kurds, Turks and other Muslims of various ethno-national descriptions.
“They died from all causes – massacre, malnutrition, disease and exposure. Armenians were the perpetrators as well as the victims of large-scale violence. No one comes out of it with clean hands.
“These are the facts that any historian worth his salt will come across, but which generally are skated over or played down, or treated as propaganda by writers who shape their narrative according to need and not according to where the search for truth leads.”
Diaspora measures
Hakan Yavuz, professor of political science at the University of Utah, and one of the academics threatening to sue Akçam, also criticised the role of the Armenian diaspora.
“In the late 1970s, a group of radical Armenian nationalists placed a bomb just outside (Ottoman historian) Stanford Shaw’s home in California. Many historians decided to steer clear from the discussion – in other words, the culprits succeeded in reaching their aim.
“The Armenian diaspora has been the key obstacle to advancing the debate over the causes and consequences of the events of 1915. It has invested lots of its time and resources to promoting the genocide thesis and silencing those who question their version.
“One may conclude that the Armenian diaspora seeks to use the genocide issue as the ‘societal glue’ to keep the community together.
But Akçam disagrees: “At the same time, the Turkish government’s heavy-handed policies are not helpful at all. If there were no diaspora effort, this issue would hardly be a topic in Turkey. Their efforts help to keep the topic alive and on the agenda.”
The legal action against Akçam threatened by Yavuz is not the first such case in the fraught world of genocide studies.
In March, a judge dismissed a claim by the Turkish Coalition of America, which argued that it had been defamed by the University of Minnesota’s Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies.
Judge Donovan Frank ruled that the department had acted legally when it created a “blacklist” labelling the coalition’s website as unreliable for academic use because it contained material denying the Armenian genocide.
But might the prospect of thawing relations between Armenia and Turkey finally help to bring about a reconciliation of this issue – or at least the possibility of debate free from political interference?
Akçam is hopeful. “If Turkey opens the borders and normalises its relations with Armenia, this could have a very positive impact on the research on genocide or different aspects of Armenian studies,” he says.
“The normalisation of the relations between both countries could be an important step for more independent academic work in the field.”
jack.grove@tsleducation.com.
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Turkey would be better neighbor for Armenia in straitjacket of EU – interview
September 05, 2011 | 16:15By Aram Gareginyan
Talks of Turkey and the EU over membership are still pending – but for Armenia it might as well be better otherwise. EU admission, long sought by Turkey, may impose certain guidelines in political behavior – particularly treating the Genocide issue. In an interview to Armenian News – NEWS.am, political analyst, head of the Center for Regional Studies, Richard Giragosyan, gives another possible scenario of Genocide recognition process – involvement of the Israeli lobby in Congress, in response to the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador to Ankara.
Do you think that the recent agreement between Turkey and the US on stationing NATO’s missile defense radar in the country could have repercussions on the relations between Turkey and Iran?
It could, but more interesting are the repercussions on the relations between Turkey and Russia. They have been moving closer together over energy, diplomacy, geopolitics for several years. Even on the Protocols Russia was generally supportive. This is the first time Turkey is doing something that Russia does not like. And for me it’s most interesting and significant because it is the first real test to see how deep and how strong the relationship between Russia and Turkey is. And we’re not sure what Russia will do. Because this is, in fact, the same missile defense plan involving Poland and Czech Republic, that Russia was so strongly against. From the Turkish perspective it’s interesting too, because despite the negative reaction from Russia, Turkey has decided to go further with this in order to bolster its own role in the region. Over the past two years Turkey was not acting in the interest of the United States – on Iran, in a deal with Brazil. Even with Armenia on the Protocols in was not an American plan. They didn’t brief the Americans, and the Americans were upset. Now this is the second time Turkey is moving in the direction of being an American ally again. The first one was Syria: Hilary Clinton went to Turkey, the Turkish foreign minister went to Syria. The interesting thing from the Turkish perspective is what price the Americans had to pay to get Turkey to agree. That we don’t know. It could be American cooperation, or abstaining from criticizing Turkey’s military attacks against Kurdish villages and positions in Northern Iraq.
So Iran is merely a pretext, and the move is directed against Russia?
Not in military terms, but politically – yes. Or it may be Turkey’s attempt to show Russia that Turkey is strong and important and may deserve more from Russia. That could be Turkey’s style of gamble. Regarding Iran, whether or not these defensive systems are in Turkey is less important, because Iran has no alternative but to try to use Turkey as a mediator or a broker, having limited options. What’s interesting from the Armenian perspective is there’s no statement or reaction. What Armenia should do is go to the European Union and say – we have good relations with Iran: let us help and advise you on European policy toward Iran or to be a neutral platform. In other words, Armenian foreign policy in this case shows more missed opportunities, because there’s no energy and no creativity in the Foreign Ministry.
Do you think the EU could heed to Armenian recommendations?
Definitely. In terms of either the Eastern partnership, or the EU foreign ministerial initiative. Armenia is the only country in the bigger region, in the whole Black sea region, that can play a constructive role. It’s the only country in the region that has good relations with Iran and the West. Turkey, for its own purposes, is playing a role. But Armenia, unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia, is the only neighbor of Iran that can be a messenger, or mediator.
Do you think that Russia possesses enough leverage to influence the political behavior of Turkey?
I think not too much of leverage. In many ways the relationship between Turkey and Russia in my opinion is a bad marriage; it’s not bound to last very long. They are historical and regional rivals. And there will come a point when Turkey and Russia begin to clash. The other thing that’s interesting is Turkey trying to promote itself as a bigger regional power, which also directly threatens Russian interests and power in the South Caucasus. In Armenian perspective this is probably a positive development, because the more problems between Russia and Turkey, the better for Armenia, in this context.
Do you regard the current signs of Islamisation of Turkish policy as a lasting trend?
Lasting as far as the AKP government is in power. Yes, it is an Islamist oriented government, but this is not just about Islam. This is about who wants to be stronger in the Middle East. The reason that Turkish-Israeli relations have declined so much, is that Turkey doesn’t see a need for Israel any more. And Turkey wants to win over the Arab masses, especially after the change of governments in Tunisia/Egypt, now possibly Libya/Syria. Now Turkey wants to emerge as the leader. Which is ironic, because, even under the Ottoman Empire, most of the Arabs in the region hated the Turks. They remember the Ottoman Empire, and the Genocide. But what’s interesting, is by being anti-Israeli, Turkey is being very populist in the Middle East. The other interesting thing is that Turkish government is using its problems with Israel as a way to weaken the Turkish military by cutting off military ties between the Turkish military and one of its key supporter, the Israelis. So it’s also about internal Turkish politics as well. From the Armenian perspective this greatly strengthens the Genocide issue. For many years the Israelis, because of the relationship with Turkey, have helped to sabotage or damage Genocide recognition efforts. Now the Israeli lobby in the United States and in Europe may actually turn around and support the Genocide issue to get revenge against Turkey. So in terms of Genocide recognition, this is a big change and a much more powerful development against Turkey and for Genocide recognition.
Do you think that the Genocide bill will finally get underway in Knesset?
It could, but my point is not just the Knesset, but the Congress. You will see the Genocide bill being seen no longer just an Armenian issue, but a convenient way for many of the Jewish lobby to use it as a stick to beat up Turkey. It’s not exactly a good reason for us pursuing Genocide recognition, but it will strengthen the campaign.
Do you view the Islamisation of Turkey just as an imitational move, or the government does plan to make the society more Islam-oriented?
It’s worth consideration. We don’t know yet whether it’s the AKP government, Islamist at its core, that is leading the Islamisation of Turkey, or it’s the population becoming more Islamic, and therefore the government is playing on that in terms of getting more power. In other words, the trend of Islamisation in Turkey could be from the bottom up, not necessarily top down. But it also changes the meaning of Islamic government. The trend of Turkey is not like the trend of Iran. This isn’t about establishing an Islamic state. This is about finding a way to be less secular and more democratic. But we’re not sure if Turkey will succeed. The other thing from an interesting Armenian perspective, since Turkey is on the border: the military, the secular reaction, the Ataturk camp against the Islamic government of Turkey. They haven’t lost yet. They may still be a powerful counter-reaction or even counterrevolution against the Turkish trend of Islamic politics. And Armenia should actually consider the different scenarios, and plan for the outcome of the battle for the future of Turkey. And I don’t think this has been thought of enough.
Do you think that moving off its secular policy may freeze talks of Turkey with EU over membership?
Perhaps I’m wrong, but over the past year and a half, even after meeting with Turkish officials in Turkey, my opinion is that the Turkish strategy has changed. It’s no longer begging to join the European Union. It’s much more now about making Turkey stronger, so that the European Union will need Turkey more than Turkey needs the European Union. That’s the danger, and that’s a new strategy. From the Armenian perspective, in the future, I would personally like to see Turkey in the European Union. Mainly because Turkey would be better as a neighbor and less dangerous within the straight jacket of the European Union. Because after joining the EU, Turkey would be much more accountable in treating Armenian issues, addressing the Genocide, historical legacies, property restitution. But most importantly, Turkey would also have to reduce is military, no longer be as aggressive or threatening either to Armenia or the Kurds, would have to play a different game with Azerbaijan. This would leave Turkey less room to maneuver to be a hostile neighbor. For that reason, Turkey within the European Union, and within a bigger European Union, may be a better neighbor to Armenia. This would also bring the EU borders to the Armenian border.
Military cooperation of US and Turkey has been uneven over the last decade. Why do you think the US still seek partnership?
What we see is for years or decades it was always the Pentagon, the US military that defended Turkey even when they shouldn’t have to, regarding the Genocide or relations with Armenia. And it was the State department who was pushing Turkey. Now it’s the opposite, it’s actually the Pentagon that is still upset with Turkey, and still no longer sees the need for Turkey. Now that the Americans are in Afghanistan, in Iraq, have a different role in the Middle East, they need Turkish military assistance much less than before. And even Turkey as a NATO member is a different Turkey. It sees the Black Sea not within the angle of NATO or cooperation with the US, but much more a Turkish sea, or in cooperation with Russia. So I think the military relation has changed dynamically, probably will never recover to what it was. And I think this is probably good for the region. Because for too long Turkey has been seen as a loyal NATO ally. But it wasn’t really loyal, and it wasn’t much of an ally, if we really analyze it.
What could you say of Turkey’ efforts to get a foothold at Balkans, manifested in recent statements of support to Bosnia by Davutoglu on his Balkan tour?
In fact, in general Turkish foreign policy, especially with Davutoglu, has prioritized the Balkans and the Turks rom the Balkans. But what’s interesting is the problem it demonstrates. In my opinion, the weakness of Turkish foreign policy is it’s over-extended. It doesn’t prioritize. It wants to be active in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Bosnia, Cyprus, Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Russia, Brazil and Iran, Sudan, North Korea – do all these things at once. And it’s much over-confident and over-extended. And this will be the downfall. If Turkey is trying all these initiatives in foreign policy, if it doesn’t give a 100 percent, it will fail in many attempts, rather than succeeding in fewer ones. This may actually bring Turkey back to the Armenian issue, because, according to many Turkish foreign ministry officials, they may return to the Armenian-Turkish border opening and diplomatic relations, the essence of the Protocols, because they are failing in other areas of foreign policy. And this one is maybe smaller and easier for them to accomplish, according to their thinking.
Do you think that the Protocols would be raised again in Turkish Parliament?
No. According to what I’m seeing as an analyst, the Protocols are dead, and will never come back. Not in Turkey, not in Armenia. What’s going on now in my opinion, is diplomacy of a much more limited nature to try to reach an agreement on the terms of the Protocols – border opening, diplomatic relations. But not on the Protocols themselves. Because Turkey realizes it made a strategic mistake with the Protocols in underestimating the Azerbaijan’s reaction. So I don’t think it will go back to them. From the Armenian side, it doesn’t make sense trying to resurrect the Protocols. Regarding the historical sub-commission issue, what’s good about the current situation, is it’s only about border opening and diplomatic relations first. There’s no more talk from the Turkish side, if you notice, about any sub-commission on the historical issues. So there’s less of danger of weakening or selling out Armenia’s defense of the Genocide issue.
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Turkey: Armenian Illegal Migrants Put National Grievances Aside for Work
September 2, 2011 – 4:16am, by Marianna Grigoryan and Anahit HayrapetyanNarrow, winding stairs lead up to 60-year-old housecleaner Ophelia Hakobian’s poorly furnished room on the second floor of an apartment building in the Istanbul district of Kumkapi. The tiny room, barely 1.5 square meters in area, contains hanging laundry, a table and chairs and photographs of Hakobian’s son and grandchildren.
“Is this a real life I’m living? I’m living like a slave here,” grumbled Hakobian, who migrated illegally to Istanbul from Armenia more than a decade ago. Each morning, she starts her work at 7 am; then comes back in the evening to sleep before starting another round of work again.
Nearly two years after signature of the protocols intended to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey, bitterness between the two neighbors remains strong, but has done little to detract thousands of Armenians from migrating to Turkey in search of the work they cannot find at home.
While Armenia faces an official unemployment rate of 6.6 percent – lower than Turkey’s official rate of 9.4 percent – unofficial unemployment estimates soar into the double digits. The country’s economy is limping along after the 2008 financial crisis, posting a mere 2.6 percent increase in 2010. That number pales next to the Turkish economy’s 2010 expansion of 8.9 percent, the highest in Europe; more moderate growth is expected for this year, however.
For Armenians struggling to make ends meet, that growth rate makes Turkey an attractive option for employment – despite the widespread bitterness over Ottoman Turkey’s World War I-era massacre of ethnic Armenians and ongoing anger over Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Transportation is cheap and low-paying jobs readily available, migrants say. The existence of a local Armenian community in Istanbul – Kumkapi traditionally had a large ethnic Armenian population – provides another incentive.
“This is our life, full of hardships and privation, but we believe at least that we can help our families in Armenia,” said one 62-year-old Armenian woman from Etchmiadzin, just outside Yerevan, who moved to Istanbul several years ago and works as a cleaner and cook for one Turkish family. Cleaners generally earn about $500 to $1,000 per month.
She says she has already mastered Turkish and enjoys “human communication” with her employers. “Our relations are far better than the ones I had while working in an Armenian family” in Istanbul, she added.
But she has kept her relatives in the dark about where she works and what she does. Many Armenians consider it unacceptable for an Armenian to work for a Turk, especially to clean a house. Many condemn even those who visit Turkey, as an ongoing outcry over Armenian travel agencies’ summer tours to Turkey illustrates.
“People have no other option; that’s why they come here,” the Etchmiadzin woman said. “They treat me very well, and we have no disputes on the national topic,” she said in reference to the Ottoman-era bloodshed, viewed by most Armenians as genocide.
Exactly how many Armenians have moved to Turkey to work illegally, however, is open to conjecture. “We have no data on the number of Armenians who live and work in Turkey illegally because we have no diplomatic relations with this country; this is a sphere that needs serious research,” said Irina Davtian, head of the Armenian Migration Agency’s Department on Migration Programs.
The agency hopes to organize a study on migration patterns from Armenia with the help of international donors, she added.
The Turkish government in 2010 told the Istanbul-based Armenian newspaper Agos that “approximately 22,000” Armenians were living illegally in Istanbul, said Agos Editor-in-Chief Aris Nalci. Some estimates put the number at closer to 25,000, he said.
A 2009 study carried out for the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (“Identifying the State of Armenian Migrants in Turkey”) reported that most illegal Armenian migrants in an interview pool of 150 people had traveled to Istanbul from the northwestern Armenian region of Shirak, site of a devastating 1988 earthquake, where unemployment runs high. Ninety-four percent of the respondents were women employed in domestic services jobs.
By contrast, the nine men who had accompanied these women mostly did not work. “They come to Turkey to stay with their wives and keep them safe,” the study reported. The migrants entered Turkey via a multi-entry, 30-day tourist visa, available for $15 at border crossings and airports.
Last year, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdoğan threatened to expel illegal Armenian migrants, whom he claimed number close to 100,000. The comment was seen as linked to Armenia’s push for recognition of Ottoman Turkey’s massacre of ethnic Armenians as genocide, but a sign of a thaw has emerged. This year, the children of illegal migrants will be allowed to study in Istanbul’s Armenian-language schools, Hürriyet Daily News reported.
As with illegal migrants worldwide, these migrants’ plans to return home often depend on their economic condition. One Armenian woman, who has worked illegally as a housecleaner in Istanbul since 2006, said that she and her husband, who works as a shop salesman, never discuss returning with their two children to their hometown of Vanadzor. They have learned Turkish and how to prepare Turkish dishes, and gained “many” Turkish acquaintances, she said.
Chances appear low that that trend will change anytime soon. Commented pollster Aharon Adibekian, director of the Sociometer research center: “Despite [Turkey’s] image as ‘the enemy,’ people keep leaving [Armenia] because . . . they have no other option.”
Editor’s Note:Marianna Grigoryan is a freelance reporter based in Yerevan and editor of MediaLab.am. Anahit Hayrapetyan is a freelance photojournalist also based in Yerevan.
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Turkey, Armenia have different reconciliations of 1915 events – envoy
Turkey and Armenia have different reconciliations of the 1915 events, Turkish Ambassador to Czech Republic Cihad Erginay said in an interview with RFE/RL.
“The Armenians term it as genocide, as alleged genocide. We say they are unfortunate events that happened during the First World War,” he said.The envoy said catastrophic events took place but the sides must discuss them and leave to historians the right to find out what exactly happened, he added.
He recalled that several years ago Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered to form a commission of historians who would discuss the matter openly.
“But we hope that [the Armenians] will [accept the commission] some day in order for us to open the gates for better relations between two countries, which we wish for,” Erginay said.
Speaking about joining the EU, the Ambassador stressed that Turkey is holding talks on full membership and hopes it would happen sooner or later.
Erginay said that Turkey has become almost a new country over the last ten years and “now it is the 16th strongest economy in the world, it’s the sixth strongest economy in Europe, it is a country which is the biggest contributor to operations in NATO.”
Commenting on the Cyprus dispute, the Ambassador noted Turkey is actively trying to solve it. He expressed confidence the talks would be over by the end of this year, as “an open-ended negotiating process is getting us nowhere.”
via Turkey, Armenia have different reconciliations of 1915 events – envoy | Armenia News – NEWS.am.