Category: Armenian Question

“The great Turk is governing in peace twenty nations from different religions. Turks have taught to Christians how to be moderate in peace and gentle in victory.”Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary

  • EXPECTATION FOR A DISASTER –

    EXPECTATION FOR A DISASTER –

     Ömer Engin LÜTEM

    Turkish Forum Advisory Board member, E Buyukelci
    omer lutem
    Harut Sassounian is an American columnist of Armenian origin. He is known for always supporting extreme nationalist views and showing great reactions towards events, rebuking from time to time Turkish, Armenian and American statesmen and politicians and giving advice to them. Thus, due to these qualifications he is highly admired and frequently read by the Diaspora Armenians. He is a person who must be taken seriously due to his influence over the Armenian Diaspora rather than the value of his writings.

    In one of his articles last week entitled “Frequently Asked Questions on Armenian Demands from Turkey”, he expressed that with 2015 approaching, he will respond to some fundamental questions regarding Armenian territorial demands from Turkey.

    One of these questions was “Isn’t it a Fantasy to expect that Armenians will ever Regain Western Armenia (Eastern Anatolia)?” In response, he said that Turkish leaders will not voluntarily hand over to Armenians a single inch of land, therefore Armenians have to wait for unforeseen developments to occur in and around Turkey—such as civil war, global or regional conflict, revolution, Kurdish insurrection, natural disaster, or nuclear catastrophe— that bring about a power vacuum and possible border changes in that part of the world. In response to another question on “If Western Armenia is freed, wouldn’t the overwhelming majority of the population and elected officials be Kurds and Turks, making Armenians a small minority in their own homeland?”, he stated that demographic changes resulting from unforeseen circumstances in the region shall determine how many Kurds, Turks, or even Armenians remain in the area. Therefore, one cannot automatically conclude that Armenians would become a minority in Western Armenia.

    In short, Sassounian expects that a great development (civil war, global or regional conflict, revolution, Kurdish insurrection, natural disaster or nuclear catastrophe) will occur making it possible for border changes to take place in and around Eastern Anatolia. He expresses and hopes that this development will to a great extent cause the Turks and Kurds to be killed and therefore, the Armenians will be able to gain the majority and Eastern Anatolia could then unite with Armenia.

    Of course this is only a fantasy. Currently and in the discernible future there is not a single indication that such a development could occur in and around Eastern Anatolia. On the other hand, there is also no explanation to why such a development will not affect Armenia and the Armenians; in other words, why the Armenians will survive while the Turks and Kurds are killed. However, apart from these, expecting and even hoping for some disasters to take place and for Turks and Kurds to be killed just to gain territory creates a serious ethical question. This kind of idea could only be the result of a deep racist hatred.

    Although it could have an affect over the Diaspora, it could be thought that not too much importance should be attached to these kinds of insane delusions of a columnist. However, this kind of mentality is very common among the Armenians and even though indirectly, is actually embraced by high-level Armenian statesmen. We will only provide two examples.

    In 2005, in response to a question concerning the territorial integrity of Turkey, Robert Kocharyan, who was President from 1998-2008, had said that the foreign policy of the Government mainly entails the recognition of the Armenian genocide and that the Armenian presidents and politicians in the future should be concerned with the legal consequences of the recognition. According to the Armenians, since the legal consequences of recognizing the genocide allegations is the returning of properties to the relocated Armenians, compensation being paid to them and territory from Eastern Anatolia being given to Armenia, with his statements Kocharyan had indirectly claimed territory from Turkey, but had said that achieving this is up to the statesmen of future generations.

    Current President Sarkisian carries the same view on this issue as his predecessor. Last year in July, in response to a student’s question on whether Western Armenia, including Mount Ararat, will ever unite with Armenia, Sarkisian had said that “everything depends on the young generation. Every generation has some goal to achieve”. Since this response means that future Armenian generations must work towards uniting Eastern Anatolia, including Mount Ararat, with Armenia, the Turkish Foreign Ministry had condemned this statement and expressed that giving advice to the youth and the future generations in a way that will provoke an ideology of hostility and hatred among societies is an extremely irresponsible behavior.

    On the other hand, Prime Minister Erdoğan had said that statesmen ought not to inculcate enmity and hatred in future generations and that Sarkisian’s behavior is incitement, therefore it will lead Armenia’s youth into darkness and their outlook will always be through dark glasses. By also expressing that what Sarkisian meant was to say `Now you got Karabakh from us. In the future you will occupy Ararat` and that this means `Armenia could from now on enter a war against Turkey as it wants`, he had said that there can be no such diplomacy and statesmanship and that Sarkisian has made a serious mistake and must apologize for it.

    As could be seen, territorial claims of the Armenians from Turkey are not recent and although in an indirect manner, still exist and are even addressed on the presidential level. Therefore, there is nothing new in Sassounian’s statements. He has tried to address under which conditions these claims could be achieved and has reached the conclusion that only if a disaster occurs and a majority of the Turks and Kurds are killed in this disaster will it be possible for Turkey to give territory to Armenia.

  • What happens if Syrian Armenians are settled in Nagorno-Karabakh?

    What happens if Syrian Armenians are settled in Nagorno-Karabakh?

    The growing violence in Syria is strongly affecting the ethnic and religious elements in the country. This tension and upheaval raise concerns and worries among the Armenians in the country as well; for this reason, a portion of the Armenian population is seeking refuge in Armenia.

    The Armenian Ministry for the Diaspora has announced that there has been a visible increase in the number of Syrian Armenians filing an application for Armenian citizenship in 2012 and that so far, 4,000 applications for citizenship have been received. The current state of affairs in the city of Aleppo, historically a center of Armenian immigration, is one of the major concerns held by the Armenian authorities right now. It should also be noted that some Armenian groups have acted in favor of Bashar al-Assad’s regime so far. This is a huge handicap because the initial signs of the problems that will be exacerbated in the post-Assad era have become visible in the ongoing clashes where the Armenian people are subjected to violence by the opposition groups.
    Currently, the Armenian government is taking proper measures to facilitate the visa process for Syrian and Lebanese Armenians, to create proper infrastructure of education for the Armenians coming from foreign countries, to appoint teachers who would give lectures on Western Armenian to the newcomers and to ensure that flights become less expensive. Armenian authorities also note that the state is ready to deal with the problems of Syrian Armenians, including the acquisition of citizenship status and their settlement in the country.
    Sergey Minasyan from the Caucasian Institute in Yerevan notes that the post-Assad Syria will not serve Armenian interests, also adding that Syrian Armenians could be settled in Nagorno-Karabakh. Arguing that this would contribute to the economic development of the region, Minasyan wanted to stress other points. There are reasons for ignoring the problems that previously settled Armenians in the region encountered, including social adaptation and unemployment this time.
    First, it is extremely important to promote the flow of capital held by Armenians through recognition of the Syrian Armenians as proper citizens. In addition, there will emerge chances for the diaspora to extend help to these people; therefore, this will promote and improve the image of the diaspora. Funds have already been created for this purpose. For this reason, settlement of Syrian Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh is a reasonable option for Yerevan.
    Second, the new political concept developed to improve ties between Armenia and the diaspora seeks to develop the relations and to preserve unity between Armenia, the diaspora and Nagorno-Karabakh despite all disagreements. To this end, the settlement of the Syrian Armenians in the region seems to be a great opportunity for Yerevan to achieve this goal. This has already been set at the Panarmenian Congress, convened to secure unity and integrity. Bold steps have been taken in recent years to integrate Nagorno-Karabakh with the world and to promote development in the region. Bako Shakyan, the leader of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh administration, has met with representatives of the Iranian Armenian Society in the US, the Argentinean Armenian society members, the representatives of Dashnak Party on the American continent and some Armenian businessmen in Europe on political and economic matters concerning the region. The talks were fruitful; extensive investments have been made in Nagorno-Karabakh in such fields as mining and energy. Slovakia and the Czech Republic started construction of a huge hydroelectric plant in Nagorno-Karabakh. The opposition parties in Armenia including the Dashnak Party, as well as ruling parties, are eager to ensure that Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized as an independent state and that Azerbaijan is presented as an aggressor. To this end, the Armenian authorities used as propaganda the blacklisting by Azerbaijan of  deputies and academics from various countries visiting Nagorno-Karabakh.
    Third, there is eagerness to change the demographic outlook of Nagorno-Karabakh.
    In other words, by this change, Armenia seeks to acquire a stronger position in the probable future peace talks. From another perspective, however, this will be an attempt that will keep the issue unresolved. Even though some actors do not recognize the existence of two separate Armenian states and advocate the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia — and there are some disagreements between the politicians in Yerevan and in Karabakh — this matter needs to be considered in the long run. If it becomes successful in this, Yerevan will have secured strong solidarity between Armenians, and in that case, it can gain a stronger position in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Some experts hold that even though it seems unlikely, Armenia’s interest in this issue alone should be considered important.
    A new political move: Comparing Nagorno-Karabakh with Cyprus
    The Armenian authorities who are leading the way in the Karabakh issue note that they take Turkey as an example, arguing that economic development is much more important than military power. Armenia, which frequently stresses that it has liberated the Nagorno-Karabakh territories, also argues that Turkey needs to worry about the Cyprus issue rather than the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Shavars Kocharyan, the deputy foreign minister of Armenia, who reacted to Turkey’s criticism of the recently held elections in Karabakh also called on Turkey to stop teaching a lesson to Armenia. In fact, this approach is not new and will not be the last time because all Armenian politicians and experts use the Cyprus card against Turkey when it comes to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
    This is similar to the situation where Turkey was silenced due to its approaches vis-à-vis the regional conflicts. In international venues where Turkey was accused of committing genocide against Armenians, Turkey attempted to raise the issue of massacres in the Balkans. However, in each attempt, the Turkish authorities had to stop because of strong accusations. Our politicians and experts who experienced this frequently are displeased with this situation. Therefore, Turkey, instead of reiterating its conventional statements by which it declared it did not recognize the elections that it did not officially recognize, should be able to take alternate political, economic and cultural moves. This is possible through closer attention to regional developments and reshaping foreign policy. Otherwise, a Turkey that becomes hand-tied vis-à-vis diverse issues will have to deal with the risk of inability to promote its just causes in the eyes of the international community.
    Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU – Today’s Zaman / Analyst, Strategic Outlook
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  • Role of gender in Armenian Genocide topic of Istanbul conference

    Role of gender in Armenian Genocide topic of Istanbul conference

    From left: Arlene Avakian, Doris Melkonian, Anna Aleksanyan, Hourig Attarian, and Ay?e Gül Alt?nay.

    Sabanci Conference

    Istanbul, Turkey – The “Gendered Memories of War and Political Violence” international conference in Istanbul, Turkey, featured a panel devoted to the Armenian Genocide, titled “Gendering the Armenian Genocide.”

    The May 22-23 conference was organized by Prof. Ay?e Gül Alt?nay of Sabanci University and Prof. Andrea Petö of Central European University as a joint academic initiative between their two universities.

    Over 40 academics from around the world (Australia, Israel, Poland, Great Britain, Bulgaria, Finland, Netherlands, Greece, Canada, United States, and Armenia) gathered in Istanbul to present their latest research findings on women’s memories of war and political violence. Papers examined genocides and political violence in Cambodia, Vietnam, Congo, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Serbia, Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey.

    Keynote speaker, Prof. Cynthia Enloe of Clark University, set the tone for the conference, posing the question, “Which wartime women are remembered in post-wartime and which forgotten?” Enloe underscored the importance of paying tribute to women’s memories of political conflict, recognizing that stories remain untold as women live their lives in post-conflict silence.

    As Doris Melkonian of the University of California, Los Angeles said during her presentation, quoting Professor Kamala Visweswaran, “If we do not know how to hear silence, we will be unable to understand what is being said.”

    The conference papers were grouped into nine panels which included: “Gendered Memories of War in Literature and the Arts”; “Women’s Narratives of War and Soldiering”; “Sexual Violence: Silence, Narration, Resistance”; “Gender, Sexual Violence and International Law”; “Gendering the Armenian Genocide”; and “Reflecting on Feminist Memory Work.”

    The panel devoted to the Armenian Genocide consisted of (in order of presentation): Doris Melkonian (United States), Anna Aleksanyan (Armenia), Hourig Attarian (Canada), and Ay?e Gül Alt?nay (Turkey), with Arlene Avakian (United States) serving as discussant.

    Doris Melkonian (doctoral student at UCLA) presented a paper co-authored with her sister Arda Melkonian (doctoral student at UCLA) titled “Armenian Women and Men Narrating Sexual Violence During the Armenian Genocide.” Drawing upon the UCLA Collection of Armenian Genocide Survivor Memoirs, Melkonian analyzed gender differences in survivors’ use of language when retelling stories of rape and sexual violence. Melkonian’s close reading of the narratives underscores the importance of not only analyzing language but also paying close attention to the silences. While rape was a common occurrence during the Armenian Genocide, very little scholarly research has been conducted on this topic. Through their research, the Melkonians strive to fill this void.

    Anna Aleksanyan (researcher at the Armenian Genocide Museum Institute in Yerevan) presented the complex post-Genocide situation of Armenian women who had converted to Islam. Her paper, “The Gender Issue: The Dilemma of Re-Armenianization of Armenian Women after the Genocide” dealt with the difficult task of bringing Islamized Armenian women back into the Armenian community and to their roots. Aleksanyan highlighted the role of Danish missionary, Karen Jeppe, who worked relentlessly towards this end in Aleppo, Syria. Despite efforts to rescue Islamized Armenian women, many chose to not return to the Armenian community and to remain with their Arab/Kurd/Turk husbands due to the intense shame they felt.

    Hourig Attarian (post-doctoral fellow at Concordia University) shared her research on Armenian women who led double lives after the Genocide. In her paper, “Storying Narratives of Silences and Secrets in the Aftermath of Genocide,” Attarian incorporates material from the AGBU central archives in Aleppo. Marginal notes written after each ledger entry provide insight into these women’s lives. Attarian wove into her presentation moving accounts of her own family members, describing the joy, and later, anguish they experienced as they found, and then lost touch of an aunt.

    Ay?e Gül Alt?nay (professor at Sabanci University) discussed Armenian Islamized women in Turkey in her presentation, “Gendered Silencing of Islamized Armenians.” Altinay estimates that there were as many as two hundred thousand Armenian women who had been Islamized after the Genocide. Unfortunately, there is scant research on this subject, partly because Islamized Armenian women were considered “lost” and therefore, no longer Armenian. The grandchildren of Islamized Armenians are now surfacing in Turkish society, and thus, challenging notions of ethnic and cultural identity for both Turkish and Armenian nationalists.

    Arlene Avakian (retired professor at the University of Massachusetts), discussant for this panel, highlighted the unifying themes in each of the papers, seamlessly connecting the papers to each other.

    via Armenian Reporter:.

  • Nagorno-Karabakh Before the War

    Nagorno-Karabakh Before the War

     Paul Goble 2

     

     

     

     

    Paul Goble
    Publications Advisor
    Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy  
    Because the international community has rejected the argument that the right of national self-determination includes the right to declare independence from an existing state if that state does not agree, Armenian activists seeking independence for Nagorno-Karabakh or alternatively its transfer from Azerbaijani sovereignty to Armenian increasingly stress that ethnic Armenians there were subject to intense economic, cultural and ethnic discrimination prior to 1988 when the war between Armenian and Azerbaijan entered its active phase.

    However, as Azerbaijani analysts point out, the record shows that such claims lack any foundation and that in fact ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were on all objective measures economically, socially and politically better off than almost all ethnic Azerbaijanis there and in other Azerbaijani regions except for the republic capital of Baku.  Those findings have now been summarized in the latest article in the “Historical Prism” series of the Azerbaijani Day.az news agency. [1] 

    As the article notes, “beginning with the second half of the 1960s and up to the beginning of the last phase of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988, the Armenian side in numerous letters and appeals to Moscow pointed to the impossibility of guaranteeing its social-economic, cultural and national development within Azerbaijan as one of the main reasons for uniting the oblast to Armenia.”

    Unfortunately for their case, the article continues, the available evidence shows that Armenian claims in this regard lack any real foundation.  Because the last census was carried out in Nagorno-Karabakh only in 1979—the military conflict precluded the enumeration of that region in 1989 and later—ethnic Armenians formed roughly three-quarters of the total population there at the end of Soviet times.  Although industry accounted for 60 percent of the region’s GDP in 1986, only about 11 percent of working age adults were industrial workers.  Most were in agriculture and especially various aspects of grape and wine production.  Nonetheless, the article notes, only Baku and Sumgayit in Azerbaijan had a higher percentage of working-age adults in industrial pursuits.

    In the mid-1980s, Nagorno-Karabakh annually exported 150 million rubles of industrial and agricultural produce, but only three-tenths of one percent of that production went to Armenia—and only 1.4 percent of the region’s “imports” came from that Soviet republic.  These two figures underscore, the article continues, how little integrated Nagorno-Karabakh was with Armenia and how much with the rest of Azerbaijan, again contrary to Armenian nationalist claims.

    Both industrial and agricultural production in Nagorno-Karabakh was rising rapidly at that time, again contrary to Armenian claims.  Although the region constituted only two percent of the total Azerbaijani output, its share of republic GDP was five percent, a figure that reflected the fact that between 1973 and 1978, industrial production in Karabakh rose by 300 percent and agricultural by 150.

    Because of this growth and because of the capital investments in Karabakh by Baku, the article says, “the level of life of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh was the highest among other regions of the republic and could be compared with the level of life in Baku.”  In 1986, annual per capita income in Karabakh was 1113.5 rubles, 97.8 rubles above the all-republic average and 170.4 rubles above the per capita figure in Nakhchivan.

    Residents of Karabakh—including the ethnic Armenians—also had more housing stock.  In 1987, for example, each resident there had on average 14.6 square meters, compared to an all-Azerbaijani average of 10.9 square meters.  And similarly high levels existed in terms of the medical service Karabakh residents had as well, the Day.az article continues.

    Despite Armenian nationalist claims, the article says, “the Armenian language [at the end of the 1980s] occupied a dominant position in the oblast.”  At that time, there were 205 primary schools and six specialized secondary schools, almost all of which had Armenian as the language of instruction.  Moreover, and again contrary to Armenian nationalist claims, the Azerbaijani authorities encouraged visits by Armenian SSR cultural figures to Karabakh and did not prevent ethnic Armenians in that oblast from travelling to Yerevan.

    The educational system was not the only place where the ethnic Armenian majority in Karabakh enjoyed advantages.  The government soviets in that oblast, with the exception of Shusha, were overwhelmingly made up of ethnic Armenians, in most cases 90 to 98 percent.  In the oblast committee of the Communist Party, the majority of the 165 members consisted of ethnic Armenians, with only 24 of them—13 percent—being ethnic Azerbaijanis.  The same situation obtained among the secretaries of primary party organizations; in some cases, as in Khankendi, the Day.az article points out, “practically 100 percent were reserved for the Armenians.”  And Armenian predominance was observed in trade unions, the Komsomol, and also in the militia.  Indeed, in many of these institutions, ethnic Azerbaijanis were underrepresented relative to their share in the population.

    The underlying demography in Karabakh was changing, both as a result of higher fertility rates among the ethnic Azerbaijanis and outmigration of ethnic Armenians to Armenia if they spoke Armenian or to the RSFSR if they spoke Russian and of ethnic Azerbaijanis from Karabakh to major Azerbaijani cities such as Baku.  Prior to the 1960s, most ethnic Armenians who left Karabakh went to Baku or other industrial centers, the article continues, but after that time, most of them went beyond the borders of Azerbaijan and in large measure to neighboring Armenia.

    While some of this may have reflected underlying tensions between the two basic communities of the region, much of it reflects the fact that in 1959 the Soviet authorities gave collective farmers their passports thus allowing rural people to move more easily to the cities.  In the case of Azerbaijan, this led to an expansion in the use of Azerbaijani in Baku and other cities at the expense of Russian and undoubtedly to greater ethnic self-consciousness among the republic’s titular nationality as well, something that may have had an impact on ethnic Armenians in Karabakh and elsewhere.

    Between 1970 and 1979, the number of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan as a whole increased by 25 percent and in Karabakh by 37 percent.  And in the latter, Azerbaijanis “took the jobs freed up by the migration of ethnic Armenians out of Karabakh,” a situation that undoubtedly had an impact on how both groups viewed the future.  That, rather than any discrimination by Baku against ethnic Armenians, explains the basic trends, and as the international community seeks a resolution of the Karabakh conflict, it is worth remembering that before the war, the ethnic Armenians in Karabakh were doing better than many of their neighbors, something that would not have been the case had the current claims of Armenian nationalists were true.


    Notes

    [1] See https://news.day.az/politics/338784.html (accessed 20 June 2012).

     

    source – 

  • “PKK Failed in Armenia”

    “PKK Failed in Armenia”

    murinsonWe evaluated extremely important subjects and events in South Caucasus with Dr. Alexander MURINSON for Strategic Outlook readers. (more…)

  • NEW YORK SENATE – RECOGNIZING 1918 AZERBAIJANI GENOCIDE

    NEW YORK SENATE – RECOGNIZING 1918 AZERBAIJANI GENOCIDE

    Dear Mr. Huseynov,
    Congratulations on an important and noteworthy accomplishment.
    TURKISH FORUM

    On Sat, Jul 7, 2012 at 6:49 PM, Javid Huseynov <[email protected]> wrote:
    Azerbaijani-American Council
    (AAC)
    P.O.Box 54571, Irvine, CA 92619 
    Azerbaijan Society of America
    (ASA)
    103 Elwood Avenue, Newark , NJ 07104
    AzeriCouncil
    July 7, 2012
    OFFICIAL COPY OF THE NEW YORK SENATE RESOLUTION 3784 RECOGNIZING AZERBAIJANI GENOCIDE
    Dear Azerbaijani- and Turkic-Americans,
    We are pleased to inform that AAC has received an official copy of the New York State Senate resolution 3784the first-ever legislative recognition of the Azerbaijani Genocide – that also designated March 31 as Azerbaijani Remembrance Day in the State of New York. The resolution 3784, introduced by State Senator James Alesi of Rochester, New York (NY-55th district) and adopted in the Senate as a result of efforts by the members of Azerbaijan Society of America and Azerbaijani-American Council, details the facts of horrific massacres committed by Bolshevik and Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnak party) forces led by Stepan Shaumyan against Azerbaijani civilians in March 1918 and designates these acts as a genocide.
    The image scan of this important recognition by the New York Senate is now available at:
    proclamations/AzerbaijaniGenocide_NYSenateRes3784_2012.jpg