Category: Armenian Question

“The great Turk is governing in peace twenty nations from different religions. Turks have taught to Christians how to be moderate in peace and gentle in victory.”Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary

  • The Ottoman Empire, Turkey and the Armenian Genocide

    The Ottoman Empire, Turkey and the Armenian Genocide

    Pulat Tacar and Maxime Gauin – Answer to European Journal of International Law

    Reply  to “State Identity, Continuity and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide”

    Pulat Tacar[1] and Maxime Gauin[2]

    Introduction

    pulat tacar

    We have been asked by the European Journal of International Law to write a reply to a manuscript titled “State Identity, Continuity and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide”. The said manuscript accuses Turkey of “practicing a denialist policy” with regard to “the act of genocide committed during 1915-1916,” demanding it “make itself responsible for its own internationally wrongful acts committed against Armenians and other Christian minorities,” and also accused it of “expanding the massacres beyond its borders into the Caucasus and the territories of the independent Republic of Armenia.” According to the same manuscript, there is a state succession and continuation of responsibility from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, and the Republic must assume full responsibility for and should also repair the injury caused by the Ottoman Empire.

    The Armenian question is especially sensitive, among other reasons because of the long accumulation of prejudices against Turks[3], Armenian terrorism of 1973-1991[4], the Armenian invasion and occupation of western Azerbaijan since 1992[5], or more recently the virulent anti-Turkish  stance of Anders Breivik in his manifesto[6] and the various campaigns or attacks by Armenian nationalists.[7] Instead of easing the tensions, the manuscript  fuels them through the provocative[8], defaming,[9] irredentist[10] remarks of its author who harbors in his writings the colors of a political pamphleteer.

    On this sensitive issue our main objective is to restore much-needed understanding and fair as well as reconciliatory dialogue between the Armenian and Turkish people and all interested parties, including scholars.[11]

    “The right to truth” encompasses all the aspects of the truth and all the pages of history; in short, “a just memory.” Thus, initiatives for dialogue between those who defend different views should be promoted. In this respect, the creation of joint commissions foreseen by the protocols between Armenia and Turkey will no doubt serve the cause of reconciliation, even if parties to the conflict insist on highlighting their views on the different aspects of “their truth.” We believe, like the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, that history is not frozen or rigid forever; that assessments categorized as historical truth cannot be conclusive, and that the assertions related to historical knowledge develop. Consequently, research on history is continuous.

    Paul Ricoeur,[12] who has received international recognition with his book titled Memory, History, Forgetting, criticized the concept of “collective memory” and pointed out that some ideologies have been formed under the auspices of this concept concerning the warning—reminded frequently by local and foreign scholars or politicians—on completing the task of memory.” Paul Ricoeur emphasized that not the “task of memory” but a “study of memory” process should be developed in our minds. He further stated that discussions around “rightful memory” create a difficult picture vis-à-vis those who are forced somewhere to exceedingly remember their sorrows, and who may somewhere else equally face the position of those who tend to excessively forget that conviction and punishment are the task of judges. The citizen must resist “forgetting” and at the same time should possess a ‘just memory.’ The task of the historian is not to accuse or exculpate, but to understand; the ‘study of memory’ is open to improvement and its feature of défamiliarisation [13] outweighs the task of memory.”

    As we address our comments to the European Journal for International Law, we intend to focus  mainly on the   international   law aspects of the  question.

     

    I.  Why  Turkey does not qualify the tragic events of 1915-1916 as genocide?

     

    1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

     

    The main incrimination of the author is that Turkey denies recognizing the 1915-1916 Armenian genocide. Let us scrutinize if such an accusation is legally sustainable.

    “The concept of the “Armenian genocide” is being used in a historical and political rather than in a legal perspective. It has become a catchword which reveals deep scars in the Armenian collective memory. Learned legal discussions on the issue of genocidal intent are of little or no relevance to the perception by the Armenians of one of the most defining moments of their history [14]”.

    The term “genocide” is a legal term; it describes a crime specifically defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention and must be addressed accordingly. The existence of the crime of genocide can be legally determined only by the judges of a competent tribunal on the basis of the prescribed legal criteria and after a fair and impartial trial. The Genocide Convention does not allow for convictions on genocide by legislatures, scholars, pamphleteers, politicians or others. Some historians, sociologists, politicians and even political scientists who dealt with these issues tend to describe almost any incident which involves a significant number of dead[15] as genocide; they sometimes purposely mislead those who are not familiar with the law;  they created  an “Armenian taboo”  and now  they are prisoners of it.[16] Indeed,

    “To term the events of 1915 as genocide is to detach genocide from its legal definition and to use it for political or moral purposes. Whether it is sound to keep hammering on a legal term based on non-legal considerations is doubtful… it adds to a wrong conceptualization of the legal system and eventually could lead to a devaluation of the norm itself…” [17]

    But, Armenians and some of their supporters have deliberately set aside the legal aspects of the issue, because –they thought-  it would weaken their genocide claims. They have chosen to adopt a dogmatic political approach to underline the tragic nature of the incidents so that they can make genocide claims more easily acceptable by the public.[18]

    Dolus specialis – special intent

     

    The most important characteristic of the Genocide Convention is that for the crime of genocide to exist, acts must have been committed with the intent to destroy the protected groups as such. The mental or subjective element (mens rea) is a constituent of that crime. The concept of “general intent,” which is valid for ordinary crimes, is inadequate in the identification of acts of genocide.

    Sociologically and psychologically, the intent “to destroy a group as such” emerges in the most intensive stage of racism. Racial hatred is quite different from the ordinary animosity laced with anger, which parties engaged in a substantial dispute may feel toward one another. Racial hatred is a deeply pathological feeling or complicated fanaticism. Anti-Semitism is an example in this context.[19]

    According to the Genocide Convention, the intent to destroy a group must be in the form of “special intent,” dolus specialis, beyond any doubt. This crucial aspect of the crime of genocide has been underlined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in paragraph 187 of its verdict on Bosnia Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro[20]: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) examined the allegations by Bosnia and Herzegovina and conducted long and detailed investigations regarding the alleged atrocities, the findings of which are grouped according to the categories of prohibited acts described in Article II of the Genocide Convention. With regard to killing members of the protected group, the Court found that massive killings throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina were perpetrated during the conflict. However, with the exception of Srebrenica, the Court was not convinced that those killings were accompanied by the specific intent on the part of the perpetrators to destroy in whole or in part the group of Bosnian Muslims. So, if the “special intent” is not proven beyond any doubt, judicially an act cannot be qualified as genocide. The cases of civil war, rebellion, and mutual killings should not be confused with the crime of genocide.

     

    A competent tribunal to judge the genocidal acts

     

    Moreover, the existence of the crime of genocide must be decided by a competent tribunal. Article VI of the 1948 Genocide Convention on the subject reads as follows:

     

    Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

    The issue of a competent tribunal had been debated extensively by the International Preparatory Conference of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The question of determining a competent tribunal was resolved[21] after lengthy discussion and the above-mentioned text was approved. During the discussions, a proposal of “universal repression” was rejected[22]. Universal repression foresees the judging of the suspects by any tribunal of any state. Without a valid decision from a competent court, an act cannot legally be qualified as genocide.

    The Turkish government and the overwhelming majority of Turks, as well as other governments [23] and  many scholars  or experts     reject qualifying the  tragic events of 1915    as genocide, because the sine qua non legal conditions incorporated in the 1948 Genocide Convention have not been fulfilled. These torts  may be  legally qualified  criminal acts foreseen  by the Ottoman Penal Code and / or mutual killings.[24]

    On this occasion we would like to underline that, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu very clearly stated he was not insensitive to the sufferings of the Ottoman Armenians, but  was expecting the same understanding from the Armenian side with regard to the plight of the Muslim Ottomans which equally suffered during the same tragic events.[25] The Turkish government has more than once declared that it was ready to consider and eventually accept the conclusion of historians and legal experts who will meet to study the tragic events of 1915-1916; but Yerevan refused.[26] Regardless, Ankara has supported the Vienna platform since 2004, which in 2009 published a large compilation of documents.[27] Turkey fully opened its archives—unlike the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Armenian Patriarchate at Jerusalem—, and, according to Dr. Hilmar Kaiser, a supporter of the “Armenian genocide” label, there is no evidence for deliberate destruction of Ottoman documents.[28]

    Other general principles of international criminal law on internationally wrongful acts

    Thos who  refer to internationally  wrongful acts in the context of  1915 events, should also take into  consideration  the  following  principles of international law:

     

    “Nulla crimen sine lege”[29] and “Nulla poena sine lege”[30]

    The governing principles of criminal law are also valid for the crime of genocide: “Nulla crimen sine lege,” which means no crime shall exist without law, and “Nulla poena sine lege,” which means no person shall be punished without a law foreseeing such punishment.

    Ne bis in idem

    The principle “Ne bis in idem”[31] means that no person shall be tried with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the competent court.

    The Turkish government and the great majority of Turks do not deny that Ottoman Armenians, together with Muslim and other Ottoman citizens, were the subject of a great tragedy[32] during the 1915-1916 events,  that they lost their lives, properties, families as well as their homes. During the relocation or the transfer of a population within the borders of Ottoman territory, a number of military personnel or civil servants and other members of the population committed crimes in spite of orders given by the Ottoman government to protect the lives and properties of the displaced Armenians.

    The 1915-1916 trials by the Ottoman government for crimes against Ottoman Armenians

     

    In this respect it should be underlined that the criminality associated with the tragic events and the relocation of the Ottoman Armenians during the years 1915-1916 was addressed by the Ottoman judiciary. Individuals or members of the groups who attacked the Armenian convoys and officials who exploited the Armenian plight, neglected their duties or abused their powers were court-martialed and punished.

    In 1915, more than 20 Muslims were sentenced to death and executed for such charges.[33] Following a report of Talat Pasha, the Ottoman government created three commissions[34] to investigate the complaints of Armenians and the denunciations of civil servants. As a result, in March-April 1916, 1673 Muslims—including captains, lieutenants, first and second lieutenants, commanders of gendarme squads, police superintendents, and mayors—were sent to martial courts. 67 were sentenced to death, 524 were sentenced to jail, 68 received other punishments such as forced labor, imprisonment in forts, and exile. Since the author of the manuscript stresses the alleged “confiscation” of Armenian properties by the Ottoman State, it is not unimportant to notice that several people were sentenced to death for plunder, and that other death sentences were justified not only by murders, but also by robberies.[35]


    The Malta Investigation

     

    In 1919, the Ottoman government asked its Spanish, Dutch, Danish and Swedish counterparts to send impartial investigators of the Anatolian events of WWI. The demand went in vain because of British pressure.[36]

    Furthermore, the occupying British forces brought 144 Ottoman officials to Malta to judge them in a tribunal for presumed war crimes and crimes against Armenians. The author misrepresents the case of those 144 Ottoman officials interned in Malta from 1919 to 1921. They were released after more than two years of unsuccessful investigation by a British prosecutor and his staff. The occupying powers had not found enough evidence in the British, U.S. and Armenian archives, or in the Ottoman documentation seized by the British army. The statement of the author that the archives had been destroyed does not reflect the truth. It is known that at that time the British government relied on an Armenian researcher Haig Khazarian in its hunt for incriminating evidence against Ottoman officials brought to Malta. The British also requested the U.S. government’s help for this purpose, but received the response that there was not enough evidence there. If even the slightest proof existed at the hands of British authorities—enough to inculpate the prisoners at Malta—the trials would surely have taken place against the Ottoman citizens which were sent to Malta to face trial.[37]

    Malta’s prosecutor refused to use the material of the courts-martial of 1919-1920. Indeed, the trial of the ministers in 1919 was legally null and void, since it took place as a court-martial. According to the Ottoman Constitution, the ministers had to be judged only by the High Court for the crimes committed in the exercise of their responsibilities. As early as 1919, the right to appeal the sentences was suppressed. The courts-martial of 1919-1920 did not allow the right of cross-examination, which exists even at Guantanamo. In April 1920, Damat Ferit Pasha even banned the defendants from hiring a lawyer. After the final fall of Damat Ferit, the right to appeal and hire a lawyer was restored. All the surviving convicts of April-October 1920 appealed the decisions, and they were acquitted of all or most of the charges. These decisions took place when Istanbul was still occupied by the Entente.[38]

    Malta’s prosecutor did not adopt the allegations against the Ottoman Special Organization (SO) unit. Actually, the Special Organization took no part in the forced Armenian displacements and massacres and no observer of WWI accused this unit of crimes against Armenians. Many years after WWI, Mr. Dadrian, followed by Mr. Akçam, seriously distorted their material and invented references to the SO which actually do not exist in the records. For instance, they reverted purely and simply the sense of the Memoirs of Arif Cemil Denker, a officer of SO during WWI, seriously distorted the Memoirs and the statements and another officer, Eşref Kuşçubaşı, and falsely alleged that the martial-courts of 1919-1920 found the Ottoman SO guilty for Armenian deportation and massacres. Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Akçam also neglected the relevant Ottoman military documents.[39]

    The eastern front

    According to the author:

    Turkey did continue the same internationally wrongful acts, even expanding the massacres beyond its own borders into the Caucasus and the territories of the independent Republic of Armenia…

    We assume that the author wants to refer to the 1920 Turco-Armenian war. Much is written about that tragic period. One of the correct evaluations about the stated period was made by the then-Prime Minister of Armenia Hovannes Kachaznuni. He wrote:

    Despite these hypotheses there remains an irrefutable fact. That we had not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evade war. We ought to have used peaceful language with the Turks whether we succeeded or not, and we did not do it. […] With the carelessness of inexperienced and ignorant men we did not know what forces Turkey had mustered on our frontiers. When the skirmishes had started the Turks proposed that we meet and confer. We did not do so and defied them.[40]

    We would strongly recommend that those who are interested be acquainted with the realities of that time to consult this book. This may help them refresh their memories. Furthermore, we should add that the Russian, United States, British and Turkish archives are full of documents which prove the atrocities committed by the Armenian forces in eastern Anatolia during that period. A fact which some leaders of the Armenians are proud of and do not deny.[41]

    After the end of the Turco-Armenian War, the Kars Treaty was signed on October 13, 1921 by the delegates of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Turkey. The intervention of the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Mr. Muravian, who attended the Kars Peace Treaty Conference on September 22, 1921, is also worth mentioning to reflect the Armenian position at that point. He said:

    We have not come here with antagonistic feelings and we have no intentions of presenting here the controversial issues we have inherited from the former nationalist governments. We are only admirers of the brave struggle which the preserving people of Turkey engaged in. We carry a sincere wish, and we are absolutely convinced that a nation which defends its country will be victorious and the enemy will be defeated.[42]

    Is The War of Independence a Myth Invented By Kemalists?

    The author alleges that “The “War of Independence” is a myth invented by Kemalists; that it was not against the occupying Allies, but rather a campaign to clear Turkey from remaining “non-Turkish elements.” Even Taner Akçam does not assume such an absurd [43] stance. The author should ask himself the reason why France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Greece and other powers signed the Treaty of Lausanne which ended WWI and the War of Independence if this war had been a myth.

    The Kemalist movement was by no means hostile to the non-Muslims and was supported, not only by most of the Turkish Jews[44], but also by a portion of Istanbul’s Armenians, like the Karabetian Society and the Deputy Director General of the Ottoman Bank (promoted Director general during WWI), Berç Keresteciyan (1870-1949), future deputy of the Turkish National Assembly from 1935 to 1946. [45]

    Contrary to the author’s false allegations, the National Liberation Government even tried to keep the Christian population of Cilicia at the end of 1921—in vain, because of the Armenian nationalist propaganda.[46] Similarly, the exodus of most of the Christians of western Anatolia is chiefly due to the torched earth policy of the Greek army in 1922.[47]Most of the allegations of “massacre” against the National Liberation Movement were proven to be false.[48]

    II. Pacta sunt servanda and lex specialis principles governing the liabilities and legal responsibilities of the Ottoman State and of the Republic of Turkey

    After WWI and the War of Liberation, Turkey concluded international agreements to put an end to the wars and insurgencies disrupting the country and region’s peace since 1914. Some of these agreements contained amnesty clauses. The amnesties aimed to cover the humanitarian dimensions of the tragic past.

    To ignore these agreements and the declarations is in contradiction to the jus specialis principle foreseen by Article 55 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and also the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

    Let us briefly examine the Lausanne, Kars and Ankara treaties as well as the agreement between the United States and Turkey on all compensation demands.

    The Treaty of Lausanne

    The Treaty of Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923 included a Declaration of amnesty according to which Turkish nationals, and reciprocally nationals of the other signatory powers of the Treaty of Lausanne, who were arrested, prosecuted or sentenced prior to November 20, 1922, benefited from an amnesty.

    In addition, the Treaty of Lausanne, in ending the war between Turkey and other powers, decreed that former Ottoman citizens, who resided in countries that were separated from Turkey by Article 31 of the Lausanne Treaty and who had automatically gained citizenship of that country by Article 30, would have the right within two years to choose Turkish citizenship. Through these decrees, all the Armenians who were on that day outside the borders of Turkey and who retained Turkish citizenship, and those Armenians who were in those countries separated from Turkey, obtained the right to return to Turkey if they so wished. Article 6 of the Amnesty Declaration attached to the Lausanne Treaty states regarding the same subject:

    The Turkish Government which shares the desire for general peace with all the Powers, announces that it will not object to the measures implemented between 20 October 1918 and 20 November 1922, under the protection of the Allies, with the intention of bringing together again the families which were separated because of the war, and of returning possessions to their rightful owners.

    It is apparent that this article concerned the individuals who were forced to emigrate, and who returned to their homes during the period of armistice and occupation. At that time, Turkey announced that these procedures, prepared under the control of the occupation powers, would be maintained without modification. According the U.S. archives[49], 644,900 Armenians returned and settled in Anatolia after the war and right before the Treaty of Sevres.[50] By returning to Ottoman territories in 1918–1919, many Armenians regained some of their properties they had left behind during the 1915 transfer of population. For instance, the number of properties returned by April 30, 1919 was recorded as 241,000. This comprised approximately 98% of the immovable properties[51]. Records also state that some problems and injustices took place during the application of the regulations[52]. The possibility of judicially challenging these injustices continues to exist. Two recent decisions of the local courts in Adana and in Sarıyer (Istanbul) which returned properties to one Lebanese and one Turkish citizen of Armenian origin prove that those who possess appropriate documents may present their cases to a competent court, and if unsatisfied to bring the file to the European Court of Human Rights.

    It has already been mentioned that Ottoman citizens who committed crimes during the transfer of population were punished in courts-martial held during 1915-1916 pursuant to the Ottoman Penal Code.

    Article 65 of the Treaty of Lausanne stipulates that property of individuals who had foreign citizenship when the war started and whose possessions in Turkey had been confiscated would be returned to them. Article 95 gave a deadline for inquiries on this matter. Section VIII and paragraph six of the Lausanne Treaty on the Declaration of Amnesty declared the Turkish government’s intent to not contest the measures carried out under the auspices of the English and French during the period between 1918 and 1922 regarding Armenians scattered around outside Turkish borders returning and their properties being given back to them. According to this, Armenians wanting to return to Turkey would return. Arrangements were made concerning the measures for Armenians whose properties were returned to them; they would maintain their validity, a timeframe was determined for the Armenians to make their requests, and in order to resolve possible disagreements that could arise, a Special Civil Claims Tribunal was created. Judges of various countries to stand by Turkish judges were also foreseen in these courts[53].

    Liquidation of the Ottoman debts and other economic aspects

    Finally, Articles 46-63 of the Lausanne Treaty were about the liquidation of the debts of the Ottoman State. The Republic of Turkey paid all the Ottoman debts.

    According to Article 58 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the parties to the treaty reciprocally renounced all claims for the loss and damage suffered between August 1, 1914 and June 6, 1924 as a result of acts of war or measures of requisition, sequestration, disposal or confiscation.

    Articles 65-72 also entailed economic clauses; in the section of properties, rights and interests, all legal interests and interests related to properties of those subjected to relocation were protected. Article 74 entailed special provisions related to insurance contracts and in relation, prescription. The following take into account those provisions.

    Moscow and Kars Treaties

    The Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921 was signed between Turkey and Russia. Thereafter, the Treaty of Kars was concluded between Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on October 13, 1921. The Treaty Kars signed before the Treaty of Lausanne settled the conflicts between Turkey and Armenia as well as the other Caucasian republics. This Treaty stated in Article 15 that “each of the Contracting Parties agrees to promulgate a complete amnesty to citizens of the other Party for crimes and offenses committed during the course of the war on the Caucasian front.”

    The “murders and atrocities” were by no means limited to actions of Turks and other Muslims against Armenians. The investigation of Captain Emory H. Niles and Arthur E. Sutherland in eastern Anatolia during the year 1919 led them to conclude First, that Armenians massacred Moslems with many refinements of cruelty, and second that Armenians are responsible for most of the destruction done to towns and villages” (our emphasis).[54]

    The Ankara Treaty with France

    Some of the tragic events took place in territories occupied by France, where Armenian groups cooperating with France committed massacres against the Muslim population. The Ottoman Muslims retaliated. The Ankara Treaty signed on October 20, 1921 between France and Turkey had foreseen the parties promulgating a total amnesty for the crimes committed in that occupied territories. Article 5 of the Ankara agreement reads as follows: “Both sides will announce a general amnesty in the evacuated area, following the occupation of this area.”

    Once again, the amnesty was far from concerning only Turks. French courts-martial sentenced many Armenians for banditry, robbery, rape and assassination against Turkish civilians, and more generally the large scale of atrocities and destruction—by arson in particular—is confirmed by many French, British and American sources, in addition to the Turkish ones.[55]

    Those treaties constitute lex specialis in legal terms.[56] [57]

    Claims Settlement Agreement with the United States

    The Republic of Turkey, which settled the issue of Ottoman debts in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, also paid 899,840 U.S. dollars (dollars of 1930s) to the United States government for distribution to its citizens based on the Agreement of December 24, 1923 and Supplemental Agreements, concluded and implemented between the U.S. and Turkey[58]. The Supplemental Agreement of October 25, 1934 concluded by the two governments foresaw a settlement of the outstanding claims of the nationals of each country against the other; Article II of the agreement is as follows:

    The two Governments agree that, by the payment of the aforesaid sum [$1,300,000], the Government of the Republic of Turkey will be released from liability with respect to all of the above-mentioned claims formulated against it and further agree that every claim embraced by the Agreement of December 24, 1923, shall be considered and treated as finally settled. [59]

    The last U.S. report in 1937 finally estimated that the principal and interest amounts to $899,840 [60], It is remarkable that not a single claimant with an Armenian name was considered by the American civil servants to have made a credible case of seizure and/or destruction of property. [61]

    Conclusion: Turkey did not renege on its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention.

    The fact that Turkey does not recognize the 1915-1916 events as a crime of genocide does not violate the 1948 Convention. One should underline that if Armenia had seen the slightest proof with regard to the responsibility of Turkey on the matter, it would have attempted to bring the case before the ICJ many years ago.

    It should be clear from the above that

    a) the Turkish Republic paid all the Ottoman debts;

    b) the tribunals of the Ottoman State judged those who infringed on Ottoman laws during the relocation of the Ottoman Armenians;

    c) amnesty has been declared for all other suspects and/or criminals.

    We believe that no one now has the right to make any kind of demand from Turkey regarding the events which took place before the signing of the  above mentioned  Moscow, Kars, Ankara, Lausanne Treaties[62]  and the Claim Settlement  Agreement with the United States.

    Finally, we are in the opinion that those  who complain of an internationally wrongful act for which the Turkish Republic is responsible may be well advised to take their lamentations to the relevant international institutions  like the United Nations, the International Court of Justice [63],  the Council of Europe or any other similar establishment, instead of disseminating unfounded and misleading accusations.

    [1] Pulat Tacar has been Co-Chairperson of the Turkish National Commission for UNESCO (1995-2006); he was Ambassador of Turkey to UNESCO (1989-1995), Ambassador of Turkey to the European Communities (1984-1987) and to Jakarta (1981-1984). He is the author of  many books and articles.

    [1] Maxime Gauin is a researcher at the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK, Ankara) and a Ph.D. candidate at the Middle East Technical University.

    [1] Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America. The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010).

    [1] “ASALA: We All Believed In One Idea: Party,”  ;Maxime Gauin “Remembering the Orly Attack,” Review of International Law and Politics, VII-27, September 2011; Michael M. Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause of their People. A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism, (Westport-New York-London: Greenwood Press, 1986); Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and the Question of Genocide, (New York-London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Francis P. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: the Past, the Present, the Prospects, (Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1991); International Terrorism and the Drug Connection, (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984); Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror. For Forty Years We Fought Alone, (London-New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 11-13; Bilâl N. Şimşir, Şehit Diplomatlarimiz (Our  fallen-martyr  diplomats) (1973-1994), (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), two volumes.

    [1] Antoine Constant, L’Azerbaïdjan, (Paris: Karthala, 2002), pp. 343-344 and passim.

    [1] “Norwegian Hitman Was Obsessed With Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, July 25, 2011,

    [1] For example: Bahar Senem Çevik-Ersaydı, “Dehumanization in Cartoons: A Case Study of the Image of the Turk in Asbarez Newspaper,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 24, 2011, pp. 103-121: “Reviewing and shaping the already traumatized Diaspora identity with hostile feelings towards another group will most likely result in an unresolved trauma. […] The image of the Turk within Diaspora Armenians could be summarized as being worthless, inhuman, murderer, barbaric and savage” ;  Jugement du tribunal de grande instance de Lyon, 27 avril 2010 (Gauin c. Nissanian), 

    [1]  Like the recurrent comparison between the late Ottoman Empire and  the  Nazi Germany. On this point, see Türkkaya Ataöv, “The Jewish Holocaust and the Armenians,” in Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period, (Ankara: TBMM, 2001), pp. 315-344, https://web.itu.edu.tr/~altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/TheHolocaust.pdf ; and Yücel Güçlü, The Holocaust and the Armenian Case in Comparative Perspective, (Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth: University Press of America), 2012.

    [1]  Page 18 of the manuscript: “The Stalinist cleaning allowed Kemal to effectively eliminate all potential political rivals and opponents.” This slander by the author is an unfortunate example which demonstrates the state of his mind. The whole world knows Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as one of the great leaders of the 20th century. On the political nature of the Kemalist regime, see among others Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Third Edition, (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 290; Maurice Duverger, Les Partis politiques, (Paris : Le Seuil, 1981), pp. 375-377 ; and Salâhi R. Sonyel, Atatürk, the Founder of Modern Turkey, (Ankara: TTK, 1989).

    [1]  Page 17 of the manuscript: “the demand…of the reunification of West Armenia and the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus” reflects the irredentist dream of the Armenian nationalist to create “Great Armenia.” Furthermore, page 20 of the manuscript: “Most of the total losses claimed were from Turkish Armenia.”  “Western Armenia” and/or “Turkish Armenia” exist only in the minds of irredentist militant Armenians.

    [1]  For comparative analyzes, consult: Serdar Palabıyık, “A Literature between Scientificity and Subjectivity: A Comparative Analysis of the Books Written on the Armenian Issue,” Review of Armenian Studies, IV-11/12, 2007, http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=476 ; Hakan Yavuz, “Contours of Scholarship on Armenian-Turkish Relations,” Middle East Critique, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 231-251,

    [1]  Paul Ricoeur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000).

    [1]  Defamiliarization or ostranenie (остранение) is the artistic technique of forcing the audience to see common things in an unfamiliar or strange way, in order to enhance the perception of the familiar.

    [1] Hans Wilhelm Longva, “The concept of genocide in international law, A wound not healed,”  Conference on Turkish-Armenian relationship, University of Oslo, February 1st, 2010.

    [1] William A. Shabas, Genocide in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 7; Guenter Lewy, “Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Committ Genocide?”, Journal of Genocide Research, IX-4, December 2007, pp. 661-674 (second edition in Essays on Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2012).

    [1] Ahmet İnsel and Michel Marian, Dialogue sur le tabou arménien, (Paris: Liana Levi, 2009).

    [1]  Der Jan van der Linde, “The Armenian Genocide Question and Legal Responsibility,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 24, 2011, pp. 123-151

    [1] Gündüz Aktan “The Armenian problem and International Law,” in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), Armenians in the Late…, pp. 263-614, https://web.itu.edu.tr/~altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/InternationalLaw.pdf

    [1] Aktan ibid p. 270

    [1] Para 187 “Article II (of the Convention) requires a further mental element. It requires the establishment of the intent to destroy in whole or in part the protected group as such. It is not enough to establish, for instance in terms of paragraph. (a) That unlawful killings of members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be established and is defined very precisely. It is often referred to as the “specific intent” (dolus specialis). It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. The acts listed in Article II, must be done with the intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part. The words “as such” emphasize that intent to destroy the protected group.

    [1] See Travaux préparatoires Doc. E/794 page 294 and 97, the meeting of the Conference page 360 and following pages

    [1]  With regard to the “Power to Exercise Universal Repression” or “Universal Repression” (see: April 5, 1948. Doc. E/794. pp.29-33) The Committee rejected a proposal in this respect (Ibid, p.32).Those rejecting the principle of universal repression argued as follows: “ … universal repression is against the principles of traditional law; permitting the courts of one State to punish crimes committed in another state by foreigners will be against the sovereignty of the State; as genocide generally implied the responsibility of the State on the territory of which the crime was committed, the principle of universal repression would imply national courts to judge the acts of foreign governments. The result will be dangerous international tensions.

    [1] The British government on many occasions officially declared its position on the matter. On April 14, 1999 the Foreign Office spokesperson Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale said that “the British government has not recognized the events of 1915 as indications of genocide”; On February 7, 2001, acting on behalf of the British Government, Baroness Scotland of Asthal declared: “The government, in line with the previous British governments, have judged the evidence not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations on genocide….The interpretation of events in Eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916 is still the subject of genuine debate among historians.” The UK government did not accept qualifying as genocide the 1915 events. The Israeli government refused to accept the parallelism between the Holocaust and the tragic events of 1915. The Ambassador of Israel Rivka Kohen in Yerevan declared on February 7, 2002, during a press conference that “the 1915 events couldn’t be considered genocide because the main killings in these events were not planned and the Ottoman government had no intention to destroy a nation or a group of people as such. As a well-known fact many people from the Armenian and Muslim groups had lost their lives in these events. The Holocaust is unique. At this stage nothing should be compared with the Holocaust.” On April 10, 2001 the Nobel Prize-awarded Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Perez said that “the fate of Armenians in Anatolia was a tragedy, not genocide.” He added: “Armenian allegations are meaningless. We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegation. If we have to determine a position on the Armenian issue it should be done with great care not to distort the historical realities.”

    [1] Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkıran and Ömer Turan, The Armenian Rebellion at Van, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 265: “The slaughter of Muslims that accompanied the Armenian revolt in Van Province inexorably led first to Kurdish reprisals on the Armenian, then  to a general and mutual massaccre of the people of the East. The Armenian revolt  began an intercommunal war, in which both sides, fearing their own survival, killed those who, given the chance,would have killed them.The result was unprecended horror. History records few examples of mortality as great as that suffered in Van Province.”

    [1] “WWI Inflicted Pain to Everyone, Davutoğlu Says,” Hürriyet Daily News, December 30, 2011 ; “Turkey ‘Ready to Share Pain’ With Armenians,” Hürriyet Daily News, March 1, 2012,

    [1] For example: Anatolian News Agency, April 11, 2005; “Yerevan Rejects Turkish PM Erdogan’s Dialogue Letter,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, April 14, 2005, ; Interview of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Charlie Rose, September 27, 2007; “Turkey’s Proposal Clears Last-Minute Snag in Zurich,” Today’s Zaman, October 12, 2009, ; Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and…, pp. 125-129.

    [1] İnanç Atılgan and Garabet Moumdjian (ed.), Archival Documents of the Viennese Armenian-Turkish Platform, Klagenfurt-Vienna-Ljubjana-Sarajevo: Wieser Verlag, 2009.

    [1] “We should be really careful about not mixing information. Anything about the CUP archives is sheer speculation. We don’t have any indication that they have been destroyed.” Hilmar Kaiser, interview to Aztag, September 22, 2005. See also “Historian Challenges Politically Motivated  1915 Arguments,” Today’s Zaman, ; Yücel Güçlü, “Will Untapped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Armenian Debate?”, The Middle East Quarterly, XVI-2, Spring 2009, pp. 25-42, https://www.meforum.org/2114/ottoman-archives-reshape-armenian-debate

    [1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 22.

    [1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 23.

    [1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 20.

    [1] Shimon Perez: Statement in April 2001: “What happened to the Armenians was a tragedy, but not genocide.”

    [1] Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, p. 111.

    [1] Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts on the Relocation of Armenians. 1914-1918, (Ankara: TTK, 2002), pp. 84-86; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarınay (ed.), Turkish-Armenian Conflict Documents, (Ankara: TBMM, 2007), p. 294.

    [1] Yusuf Halaçoğlu, The Story of 1915. What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?, (Ankara: TTK, 2008), pp. 82-87; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, p. 112; Yusuf Sarınay, “The Relocation (Tehcir) of Armenians and the Trials of 1915-1916,” Middle East Critique, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 308-314.

    [1] Yusuf Halaçoğu, Facts on the…, p. 99 and annexes XX-XXI.

    [1] Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 122-128; Bilâl N. Şimşir, “The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question,” in Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926), (İstanbul: Tasvir Press, 1984), pp. 26-41; Bilâl N. Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri, (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009); Salâhi R. Sonyel, “Armenian Deportations: A Re-Appraisal in the Light of New Documents,” Belleten, January 1972, pp. 58-60; Salâhi R. Sonyel, The Displacement of Armenians: Documents, (Ankara: TTK/Baylan Matbaası), 1978.

    [1] Ferudun Ata, İşgal İstanbul’unda Tehcir Yargılamaları, (Ankara: TTK, 2005); Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 79-82; Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny of Akçam’s Version of History and the Armenian Genocide,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, XXVIII-2, August 2008, p. 307,

    [1] Ferudun Ata, İşgal İstanbul’unda Tehcir…, pp. 193, 199, 201 and 204; Edward J. Erickson, “Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame,” The Middle East Quarterly, XIII-3, Summer 2006, pp. 67-75, https://www.meforum.org/991/armenian-massacres-new-records-undercut-old-blame ; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 82-88 and 221; Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny of…”, pp. 310-312; Erman Şahin, “Review Essay: The Armenian Question,” Middle East Policy, XVII-1, Spring 2010, pp. 151, 153 and 162, n. 48, http://www.turkishcanadians.com/wp-content/uploads/armenian_question.pdf ; Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, (Ankara: TTK, tome I, 2006), pp. 373-409; Arslan Terzioğlu, “The Armenian Deportation in Line With National and Foreign Sources of Information,” in Selçuk Erez and Mehmet Saray (ed.), Uluslarası Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Sempozyumu, (Istanbul: Istanbul University Publications, 2001), pp. 321-358.

    [1] The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Has Nothing to Do Anymore, (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955), pp. 9-10, http://dn802605.us.archive.org/0/items/armenianrevolution00katc/armenianrevolution00katc.pdf

    [1] Ermeniler Tarafından Yapılan Katliam Belgeleri/Documents on Massacre Perpetrated by Armenians, Ankara, two volumes, 2001; Kara Schemsi, Turcs et Arméniens devant l’histoire, (Geneva: Imprimerie nationale, 1919), https://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/turcs_et_armeniens.pdf See also n. 37.

    [1] Kâmuran Gürün, The Armenian File, (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 2007), p. 339 (1st English edition, Nicosia, 1985).

    [1] For a comprehensive study of this war: Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923. A Documentary Study, (Ankara: TTK, 2000), five volumes.

    [1] Salâhi R. Sonyel, Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, (Ankara: TTK, 1993), pp. 439-441.

    [1] Mim Kemal Öke, The Armenian Question, (Ankara: TTK, 2001), pp. 196-202 and 210-216; Mim Kemal Öke, “The Response of the Turkish Armenians to the ‘Armenian Question’ (1919-1926),” in Armenians in the Ottoman…, pp. 71-88; Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire…, volume III-1, p. 1050. See also Rapport hebdomadaire, 23-29 mars 1920, 15-21 juin 1920, Service historique de la défense nationale (SHDN), 4 H 58, dossier 1.

    [1] Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 24 octobre 1921 ; télégramme du ministère au Haut-Commissaire à Beyrouth, 3 novembre ; télégrammes du général Pellé au ministère, 5, 15 et 23 novembre 1921 ; lettre du ministère à Franklin-Bouillon, 12 novembre 1921, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), P 17785 ; Commandement supérieur, Levant — Journal des marches et des opérations, 1921, pp. 456-469, SHDN, 4H 47, dossier 1 ; Bulletin périodique n° 39, 5 décembre 1921-5 janvier 1922, SHDN, 4 H 49, dossier 1 ; Bulletin de renseignements n° 279, 17-21 novembre 1921, 4 H 61, dossier 3; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia (1914-1923), (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), pp. 140-156 and 210-216.

    [1] Rapport du père Ludovic Marseille, septembre 1922 ;Télégramme du colonel Mougin au général Pellé, 8 septembre 1922 ; télégramme du général Pellé au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 8 septembre 1922 ; télégramme de Raymond Poincaré à Athènes, Londres, Rome, Washington, 9 septembre 1922 ; télégramme de l’ambassadeur de France à Londres au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 12 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.

    [1] American investigations: Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies…, pp. 124-127; Heath Lowry, “American Observers in Anatolia circa 1920: The Bristol Papers,” in Armenians in the…, pp. 42-58; French investigations: Rapport du commandant Labonne, 7 décembre 1919 ; le chef de bataillon Labonne, en mission à Afioun-Karahissar, à Monsieur le général Commandant en chef des armées alliées [Franchet d’Esperey], 2e bureau, 1919, SHDN, 7 N 3210 ; S.R. Marine, Affaires arméniennes, 15 novembre 1920, AMAE, P 16674; British accounts : Salâhi R. Sonyel, “How Armenian Propaganda Nurtured a Gullible Christian World In Connection With the Deportation and ‘Massacres’,” Belleten, January 1977, pp. 167-168. See also Bulletin de renseignement n° 285, 11-13 décembre 1921, SHDN, 4 H 62, dossier 3; Général Pellé au ministère, 8 septembre 1922, Télégramme de l’ambassadeur français à Londres, 12 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1360.

    [1] NARA, T1192 R2.860J.01/395; verified by the Armenian Patriarch.

    [1] “Yusuf Halaçoğlu Cevap Veriyor,” Taraf (newspaper), 23 June 2008.

    [1]  Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (BOA), UMVM 159/21, lef.3.

    [1] “Tehcirden Dönenlerin Malları,” (Properties of Those Returning from the Relocation), Sosyal Tarih, September 1994, pp.45-48; Bülent Bakar, “Malların İadesi,” (“Returning of properties”) in Hikmet Özdemir (ed.), Türk-Ermeni İhtilafı Makaleler (“Papers on Turko-Armenian Conflict”), (Ankara: TBMM, 2007), pp. 327-339. See: enactment of 8.1.1920. Md. 33 bTakvim-i Vekayi 12 Kanunu Sani 1336 N° 3747 BOA .MV. 245/15 Düstur II Tertip.C.II. pp. 553-554.

    [1] Prof. Dr. Nurşen Mazıcı, “Ermenilerin tazminat davası” (The Armenians’ Suit for Damages), Radikal, 13 August 2010.

    [1] Justin McCarthy, “The Report of Niles and Sutherland,” p. 1850. For other sources, see for example Maxime Gauin’s “The Convergent Analysis of Russian, British, French and American Officials Regarding the Armenian Volunteers (1914-1922),” International Review of Turkish Studies, 1.4, Winter 2011-2012, pp. 18-34, ; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…; Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, (New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), volume II, 1978, pp. 322-323 and 325.

    [1] Maxime Bergès, La Colonne de Marach et quelques autres récits de l’armée du Levant, (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1924), pp. 56, 81-82, 89 and 142-143 ; Maxime Gauin, “The Convergent Analysis…,” pp. 34-41; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies…; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…, pp. 202-208; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 107-108; Stanford J. Shaw, “The Armenian Legion and its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia,” in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), The Armenians in the…, pp. 155-206, https://web.itu.edu.tr/~altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/ArmenianLegion.pdf

    [1] Doç. Dr. Sadi Çaycı “Ermeni sorununun hukuksal boyutu” (The legal dimension of the Armenian question), http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankası/tr/index2_1_2.htm

    [1] See for Lex Specialis Article 55 of the text of the draft articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd session (2001) which foresees that the international responsibility of a State for the existence of an internationally wrongful act is governed by special rules of international law (lex specialis).

    [1] American-Turkish Claims Settlement Under the Agreement of December 24, 1923 and Supplemental Agreements between the United States and Turkey: On December 24, 1923 Opinion and report, prepared by Fred K. Nielsen, (Washington: GOP, 1937). Turkey and the United States of America concluded an agreement with regard to the settlement of claims of their citizens. A joint commission was created to examine the claims. 898 dossiers were laid before the Commission by the U.S. government. No claims of Turkish citizens against the U.S. were presented to the commission. The dossiers of the claims had to contain the documents establishing the nature, the origin and the justification of each claim. The claims had to be submitted by February 15, 1934. The U.S. government had the right to submit up to August 15, 1934 other documents in support of claims (Nielsen Report page 9) According to Mr. Nielsen, the author of the report, “These provisions are in harmony with international practice in relation to such matters. The following type of stipulations is found in numerous claims agreements: The high contracting parties engage to consider the result of the proceedings of the (claims settlement) commission as a full, perfect and final settlement of every claim upon either Government arising out of any transaction of a date prior to the exchange of the ratifications of the present convention; and further engage that every such claim, whether or not the same may have been presented to the notice of, made, preferred or laid before the said commission.” Nielsen report, p.15; our emphasis).

    [1] Selâhaddin Kardeş, Tehcir ve Emval-I Metrûke mevzuatı (Relocation and Legislation on Abandoned Property) Maliye Bakanlığı Strateji Geliştirma Başkanlığı Ankara 2008 (Publication of the Ministry of Finance, Ankara 2008).

    [1] Fred Kenelm Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims…, pp. 780-782. See also Kemal Çiçek, “The 1934-1935 Turkish-American Compensation Agreement and Its Implication for Today,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 23, 2011, pp. 93-146.

    [1] Fred Kenelm Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims Settlement…

    [1] Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File, pp. 360-379.

    [1] Pulat Tacar, “An Invitation to Truth, Transparency and Accountability: Toward ‘Responsible Dialogue on the Armenian Issue,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 22, 2010, pp. 135-170.


    [1] Pulat Tacar has been Co-Chairperson of the Turkish National Commission for UNESCO (1995-2006); he was Ambassador of Turkey to UNESCO (1989-1995), Ambassador of Turkey to the European Communities (1984-1987) and to Jakarta (1981-1984). He is the author of  many books and articles.

    [2] Maxime Gauin is a researcher at the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK, Ankara) and a Ph.D. candidate at the Middle East Technical University.

    [3] Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America. The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010).

    [4] “ASALA: We All Believed In One Idea: Party,”  ;Maxime Gauin “Remembering the Orly Attack,” Review of International Law and Politics, VII-27, September 2011; Michael M. Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause of their People. A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism, (Westport-New York-London: Greenwood Press, 1986); Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and the Question of Genocide, (New York-London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Francis P. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: the Past, the Present, the Prospects, (Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1991); International Terrorism and the Drug Connection, (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984); Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror. For Forty Years We Fought Alone, (London-New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 11-13; Bilâl N. Şimşir, Şehit Diplomatlarimiz (Our  fallen-martyr  diplomats) (1973-1994), (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), two volumes.

    [5] Antoine Constant, L’Azerbaïdjan, (Paris: Karthala, 2002), pp. 343-344 and passim.

    [6] “Norwegian Hitman Was Obsessed With Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, July 25, 2011,

    [7] For example: Bahar Senem Çevik-Ersaydı, “Dehumanization in Cartoons: A Case Study of the Image of the Turk in Asbarez Newspaper,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 24, 2011, pp. 103-121: “Reviewing and shaping the already traumatized Diaspora identity with hostile feelings towards another group will most likely result in an unresolved trauma. […] The image of the Turk within Diaspora Armenians could be summarized as being worthless, inhuman, murderer, barbaric and savage”;  Jugement du tribunal de grande instance de Lyon, 27 avril 2010 (Gauin c. Nissanian), 

    [8]  Like the recurrent comparison between the late Ottoman Empire and  the  Nazi Germany. On this point, see Türkkaya Ataöv, “The Jewish Holocaust and the Armenians,” in Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period, (Ankara: TBMM, 2001), pp. 315-344, https://web.itu.edu.tr/~altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/TheHolocaust.pdf ; and Yücel Güçlü, The Holocaust and the Armenian Case in Comparative Perspective, (Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth: University Press of America), 2012.

    [9]  Page 18 of the manuscript: “The Stalinist cleaning allowed Kemal to effectively eliminate all potential political rivals and opponents.” This slander by the author is an unfortunate example which demonstrates the state of his mind. The whole world knows Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as one of the great leaders of the 20th century. On the political nature of the Kemalist regime, see among others Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Third Edition, (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 290; Maurice Duverger, Les Partis politiques, (Paris : Le Seuil, 1981), pp. 375-377 ; and Salâhi R. Sonyel, Atatürk, the Founder of Modern Turkey, (Ankara: TTK, 1989).

    [10]  Page 17 of the manuscript: “the demand…of the reunification of West Armenia and the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus” reflects the irredentist dream of the Armenian nationalist to create “Great Armenia.” Furthermore, page 20 of the manuscript: “Most of the total losses claimed were from Turkish Armenia.”  “Western Armenia” and/or “Turkish Armenia” exist only in the minds of irredentist militant Armenians.

    [11]  For comparative analyzes, consult: Serdar Palabıyık, “A Literature between Scientificity and Subjectivity: A Comparative Analysis of the Books Written on the Armenian Issue,” Review of Armenian Studies, IV-11/12, 2007, http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=476 ; Hakan Yavuz, “Contours of Scholarship on Armenian-Turkish Relations,” Middle East Critique, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 231-251,

    [12]  Paul Ricoeur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000).

    [13]  Defamiliarization or ostranenie (остранение) is the artistic technique of forcing the audience to see common things in an unfamiliar or strange way, in order to enhance the perception of the familiar.

    [14] Hans Wilhelm Longva,“The concept of genocide in international law, A wound not healed,”Conference on Turkish-Armenian relationship, University of Oslo, February 1st, 2010.

    [15] William A. Shabas, Genocide in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 7; Guenter Lewy, “Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Committ Genocide?”, Journal of Genocide Research, IX-4, December 2007, pp. 661-674 (second edition in Essays on Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2012).

    [16] Ahmet İnsel and Michel Marian, Dialogue sur le tabou arménien, (Paris: Liana Levi, 2009).

    [17]  Der Jan van der Linde, “The Armenian Genocide Question and Legal Responsibility,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 24, 2011, pp. 123-151

    [18] Gündüz Aktan “The Armenian problem and International Law,” in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), Armenians in the Late…, pp. 263-614, https://web.itu.edu.tr/~altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/InternationalLaw.pdf

    [19] Aktan ibid p. 270

    [20] Para 187 “Article II (of the Convention) requires a further mental element. It requires the establishment of the intent to destroy in whole or in part the protected group as such. It is not enough to establish, for instance in terms of paragraph. (a) That unlawful killings of members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be established and is defined very precisely. It is often referred to as the “specific intent” (dolus specialis). It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. The acts listed in Article II, must be done with the intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part. The words “as such” emphasize that intent to destroy the protected group.

    [21] See Travaux préparatoires Doc. E/794 page 294 and 97, the meeting of the Conference page 360 and following pages

    [22]  With regard to the “Power to Exercise Universal Repression” or “Universal Repression” (see: April 5, 1948. Doc. E/794. pp.29-33) The Committee rejected a proposal in this respect (Ibid, p.32).Those rejecting the principle of universal repression argued as follows: “ … universal repression is against the principles of traditional law; permitting the courts of one State to punish crimes committed in another state by foreigners will be against the sovereignty of the State; as genocide generally implied the responsibility of the State on the territory of which the crime was committed, the principle of universal repression would imply national courts to judge the acts of foreign governments. The result will be dangerous international tensions.

    [23] The British government on many occasions officially declared its position on the matter. On April 14, 1999 the Foreign Office spokesperson Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale said that “the British government has not recognized the events of 1915 as indications of genocide”; On February 7, 2001, acting on behalf of the British Government, Baroness Scotland of Asthal declared: “The government, in line with the previous British governments, have judged the evidence not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations on genocide….The interpretation of events in Eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916 is still the subject of genuine debate among historians.” The UK government did not accept qualifying as genocide the 1915 events. The Israeli government refused to accept the parallelism between the Holocaust and the tragic events of 1915. The Ambassador of Israel Rivka Kohen in Yerevan declared on February 7, 2002, during a press conference that “the 1915 events couldn’t be considered genocide because the main killings in these events were not planned and the Ottoman government had no intention to destroy a nation or a group of people as such. As a well-known fact many people from the Armenian and Muslim groups had lost their lives in these events. The Holocaust is unique. At this stage nothing should be compared with the Holocaust.” On April 10, 2001 the Nobel Prize-awarded Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Perez said that “the fate of Armenians in Anatolia was a tragedy, not genocide.” He added: “Armenian allegations are meaningless. We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegation. If we have to determine a position on the Armenian issue it should be done with great care not to distort the historical realities.”

    [24] Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkıran and Ömer Turan, The Armenian Rebellion at Van, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 265: “The slaughter of Muslims that accompanied the Armenian revolt in Van Province inexorably led first to Kurdish reprisals on the Armenian, then  to a general and mutual massaccre of the people of the East. The Armenian revolt  began an intercommunal war, in which both sides, fearing their own survival, killed those who, given the chance,would have killed them.The result was unprecended horror. History records few examples of mortality as great as that suffered in Van Province.”

    [25] “WWI Inflicted Pain to Everyone, Davutoğlu Says,” Hürriyet Daily News, December 30, 2011 ; “Turkey ‘Ready to Share Pain’ With Armenians,” Hürriyet Daily News, March 1, 2012,

    [26] For example: Anatolian News Agency, April 11, 2005; “Yerevan Rejects Turkish PM Erdogan’s Dialogue Letter,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, April 14, 2005, ; Interview of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Charlie Rose, September 27, 2007; “Turkey’s Proposal Clears Last-Minute Snag in Zurich,” Today’s Zaman, October 12, 2009, ; Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and…, pp. 125-129.

    [27] İnanç Atılgan and Garabet Moumdjian (ed.), Archival Documents of the Viennese Armenian-Turkish Platform, Klagenfurt-Vienna-Ljubjana-Sarajevo: Wieser Verlag, 2009.

    [28] “We should be really careful about not mixing information. Anything about the CUP archives is sheer speculation. We don’t have any indication that they have been destroyed.” Hilmar Kaiser, interview to Aztag, September 22, 2005. See also “Historian Challenges Politically Motivated  1915 Arguments,” Today’s Zaman, ; Yücel Güçlü, “Will Untapped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Armenian Debate?”, The Middle East Quarterly, XVI-2, Spring 2009, pp. 25-42, https://www.meforum.org/2114/ottoman-archives-reshape-armenian-debate

    [29] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 22.

    [30] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 23.

    [31] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Article 20.

    [32] Shimon Perez: Statement in April 2001: “What happened to the Armenians was a tragedy, but not genocide.”

    [33] Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, p. 111.

    [34] Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts on the Relocation of Armenians. 1914-1918, (Ankara: TTK, 2002),pp. 84-86; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarınay (ed.), Turkish-Armenian Conflict Documents, (Ankara: TBMM, 2007), p. 294.

    [35] Yusuf Halaçoğlu, The Story of 1915. What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?, (Ankara: TTK, 2008), pp. 82-87; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, p. 112; Yusuf Sarınay, “The Relocation (Tehcir) of Armenians and the Trials of 1915-1916,” Middle East Critique, XX-3, Fall 2011, pp. 308-314.

    [36] Yusuf Halaçoğu, Facts on the…, p. 99 and annexes XX-XXI.

    [37] Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 122-128; Bilâl N. Şimşir, “The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question,” in Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926), (İstanbul: Tasvir Press, 1984), pp. 26-41; Bilâl N. Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri, (Ankara-Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009); Salâhi R. Sonyel, “Armenian Deportations: A Re-Appraisal in the Light of New Documents,” Belleten, January 1972, pp. 58-60; Salâhi R. Sonyel, The Displacement of Armenians: Documents, (Ankara: TTK/Baylan Matbaası), 1978.

    [38] Ferudun Ata, İşgal İstanbul’unda Tehcir Yargılamaları, (Ankara: TTK, 2005); Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 79-82; Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny of Akçam’s Version of History and the Armenian Genocide,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, XXVIII-2, August 2008, p. 307,

    [39] Ferudun Ata, İşgal İstanbul’unda Tehcir…, pp. 193, 199, 201 and 204; Edward J. Erickson, “Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame,” The Middle East Quarterly, XIII-3, Summer 2006, pp. 67-75, https://www.meforum.org/991/armenian-massacres-new-records-undercut-old-blame ; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 82-88 and 221; Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny of…”, pp. 310-312; Erman Şahin, “Review Essay: The Armenian Question,” Middle East Policy, XVII-1, Spring 2010, pp. 151, 153 and 162, n. 48, http://www.turkishcanadians.com/wp-content/uploads/armenian_question.pdf ; Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, (Ankara: TTK, tome I, 2006),pp. 373-409; Arslan Terzioğlu, “The Armenian Deportation in Line With National and Foreign Sources of Information,” in Selçuk Erez and Mehmet Saray (ed.), Uluslarası Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Sempozyumu, (Istanbul: Istanbul University Publications, 2001), pp. 321-358.

    [40] The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Has Nothing to Do Anymore, (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955), pp. 9-10, http://dn802605.us.archive.org/0/items/armenianrevolution00katc/armenianrevolution00katc.pdf

    [41] Ermeniler Tarafından Yapılan Katliam Belgeleri/Documents on Massacre Perpetrated by Armenians, Ankara, two volumes, 2001; Kara Schemsi, Turcs et Arméniens devant l’histoire, (Geneva: Imprimerie nationale, 1919), https://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/turcs_et_armeniens.pdf See also n. 37.

    [42] Kâmuran Gürün, The Armenian File, (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 2007), p. 339 (1st English edition, Nicosia, 1985).

    [43] For a comprehensive study of this war: Stanford Jay Shaw, From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923. A Documentary Study, (Ankara: TTK, 2000), five volumes.

    [44] Salâhi R. Sonyel, Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, (Ankara: TTK, 1993), pp. 439-441.

    [45] Mim Kemal Öke, The Armenian Question, (Ankara: TTK, 2001), pp. 196-202 and 210-216; Mim Kemal Öke, “The Response of the Turkish Armenians to the ‘Armenian Question’ (1919-1926),” in Armenians in the Ottoman…, pp. 71-88; Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire…, volume III-1, p. 1050. See also Rapport hebdomadaire, 23-29 mars 1920, 15-21 juin 1920, Service historique de la défense nationale (SHDN), 4 H 58, dossier 1.

    [46] Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 24 octobre 1921 ; télégramme du ministère au Haut-Commissaire à Beyrouth, 3 novembre ; télégrammes du général Pellé au ministère, 5, 15 et 23 novembre 1921 ; lettredu ministère à Franklin-Bouillon, 12 novembre 1921, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), P 17785 ; Commandement supérieur, Levant — Journal des marches et des opérations, 1921, pp. 456-469, SHDN, 4H 47, dossier 1 ; Bulletin périodique n° 39, 5 décembre 1921-5 janvier 1922, SHDN, 4 H 49, dossier 1 ; Bulletin de renseignements n° 279, 17-21 novembre 1921, 4 H 61, dossier 3; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia (1914-1923), (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), pp. 140-156 and 210-216.

    [47] Rapport du père Ludovic Marseille, septembre 1922 ;Télégramme du colonel Mougin au général Pellé, 8 septembre 1922 ; télégramme du général Pellé au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 8 septembre 1922 ; télégramme de Raymond Poincaré à Athènes, Londres, Rome, Washington, 9 septembre 1922 ; télégramme de l’ambassadeur de France à Londres au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 12 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.

    [48] American investigations: Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies…, pp. 124-127; Heath Lowry, “American Observers in Anatolia circa 1920: The Bristol Papers,” in Armenians in the…, pp. 42-58; French investigations: Rapport du commandantLabonne, 7 décembre 1919 ; le chef de bataillon Labonne, en mission à Afioun-Karahissar, à Monsieur le général Commandant en chef des armées alliées [Franchet d’Esperey], 2e bureau, 1919, SHDN, 7 N 3210 ; S.R. Marine, Affaires arméniennes, 15 novembre 1920, AMAE, P 16674; British accounts : Salâhi R. Sonyel, “How Armenian Propaganda Nurtured a Gullible Christian World In Connection With the Deportation and ‘Massacres’,” Belleten, January 1977, pp. 167-168. See also Bulletin de renseignement n° 285, 11-13 décembre 1921, SHDN, 4 H 62, dossier 3; Général Pellé au ministère, 8 septembre 1922, Télégramme de l’ambassadeur français à Londres, 12 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1360.

    [49] NARA, T1192 R2.860J.01/395; verified by the Armenian Patriarch.

    [50] “Yusuf Halaçoğlu Cevap Veriyor,” Taraf (newspaper), 23 June 2008.

    [51]Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (BOA), UMVM 159/21, lef.3.

    [52] “Tehcirden Dönenlerin Malları,” (Properties of Those Returning from the Relocation), Sosyal Tarih, September 1994, pp.45-48; Bülent Bakar, “Malların İadesi,” (“Returning of properties”) in Hikmet Özdemir (ed.), Türk-Ermeni İhtilafı Makaleler (“Papers on Turko-Armenian Conflict”), (Ankara: TBMM, 2007), pp. 327-339. See: enactment of 8.1.1920. Md. 33 bTakvim-i Vekayi 12 Kanunu Sani 1336 N° 3747 BOA .MV. 245/15 Düstur II Tertip.C.II. pp. 553-554.

    [53] Prof. Dr. Nurşen Mazıcı, “Ermenilerin tazminat davası” (The Armenians’ Suit for Damages), Radikal, 13 August 2010.

    [54] Justin McCarthy, “The Report of Niles and Sutherland,” p. 1850. For other sources, see for example Maxime Gauin’s “The Convergent Analysis of Russian, British, French and American Officials Regarding the Armenian Volunteers (1914-1922),” International Review of Turkish Studies, 1.4, Winter 2011-2012, pp. 18-34, ; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…; Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, (New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), volume II, 1978, pp. 322-323 and 325.

    [55] Maxime Bergès, La Colonne de Marach et quelques autres récits de l’armée du Levant, (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1924), pp. 56, 81-82, 89 and 142-143 ; Maxime Gauin, “The Convergent Analysis…,” pp. 34-41; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies…; Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile…, pp. 202-208; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres…, pp. 107-108; Stanford J. Shaw, “The Armenian Legion and its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia,” in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), The Armenians in the…, pp. 155-206, https://web.itu.edu.tr/~altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/ArmenianLegion.pdf

    [56] Doç. Dr. Sadi Çaycı “Ermeni sorununun hukuksal boyutu” (The legal dimension of the Armenian question), http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankası/tr/index2_1_2.htm

    [57] See for Lex Specialis Article 55 of the text of the draft articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd session (2001) which foresees that the international responsibility of a State for the existence of an internationally wrongful act is governed by special rules of international law (lex specialis).

    [58] American-Turkish Claims Settlement Under the Agreement of December 24, 1923 and Supplemental Agreements between the United States and Turkey: On December 24, 1923 Opinion and report, prepared by Fred K. Nielsen, (Washington: GOP, 1937). Turkey and the United States of America concluded an agreement with regard to the settlement of claims of their citizens. A joint commission was created to examine the claims. 898 dossiers were laid before the Commission by the U.S. government. No claims of Turkish citizens against the U.S. were presented to the commission. The dossiers of the claims had to contain the documents establishing the nature, the origin and the justification of each claim. The claims had to be submitted by February 15, 1934. The U.S. government had the right to submit up to August 15, 1934 other documents in support of claims (Nielsen Report page 9) According to Mr. Nielsen, the author of the report, “These provisions are in harmony with international practice in relation to such matters. The following type of stipulations is found in numerous claims agreements: The high contracting parties engage to consider the result of the proceedings of the (claims settlement) commission as a full, perfect and final settlement of every claim upon either Government arising out of any transaction of a date prior to the exchange of the ratifications of the present convention; and further engage that every such claim, whether or not the same may have been presented to the notice of, made, preferred or laid before the said commission.” Nielsen report, p.15; our emphasis).

    [59]Selâhaddin KardeşTehcir ve Emval-I Metrûke mevzuatı (Relocation and Legislation on Abandoned Property) Maliye Bakanlığı Strateji Geliştirma Başkanlığı Ankara 2008 (Publication of the Ministry of Finance, Ankara 2008).

    [60] Fred Kenelm Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims…, pp. 780-782. See also Kemal Çiçek, “The 1934-1935 Turkish-American Compensation Agreement and Its Implication for Today,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 23, 2011, pp. 93-146.

    [61] Fred Kenelm Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims Settlement…

    [62] Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File, pp. 360-379.

    [63] Pulat Tacar, “An Invitation to Truth, Transparency and Accountability: Toward ‘Responsible Dialogue on the Armenian Issue,” Review of Armenian Studies, n° 22, 2010, pp. 135-170.

  • Campaign Against Turkey and Islam , Posters to Chicago Buses , Campaign also Promotes Alleged Armenian issue and Uses PM  R. T. Erdogan’s Picture and words

    Campaign Against Turkey and Islam , Posters to Chicago Buses , Campaign also Promotes Alleged Armenian issue and Uses PM R. T. Erdogan’s Picture and words

    > Islamic Organizations Launches Counter Campaign To ‘Reclaim’ Meaning of ‘Jihad‘

    KAMPANYA ISLAMI HEDEF ALMAKTADIR FAKAT BU ARADA TURKIYE VE ERMENI SORUNUNADA OKUYACAGINIZ YAZILARDA VE SAYIN BASBAKAN RT ERDOGANIN RESIM VE SOZLERI ILE DOKUNMAKDA, BU AFISLER SIKAGO BELEDIYE OTOBUSLERI ICINDIR

    asagidaki resimler kampanyada kullanilan afislerdir.. / below are the posters used in anti-islam and anti- Turk campaign

    ISLAMIC GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS ARE REPORTEDLY FIGHTING TO STOP THIS CAMPAIGN. WE SINCERELY  HOPE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS DOING SOMETHING ON THE BACKGROUND,  TO PRESERVE TURKEY’S CLEAN IMAGE . CHICAGO DO APPEAR TO BE ONE OF THE STRONGHOLD OF  FETULLAH GULEN GROUPS .. THAT MAY BE THE REASON, THIS ANTI ISLAM CAMPAIGN USING RTE ORIGINATED FROM THAT REGION. AND NOW SHOWS SIGNS OF SPREADING TO OTHER STATES, AND TARGETING THE WASHINGTON DC

    19 posts categorized “AFDI My Jihad awareness ad campaign #myjihad”

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    Saturday, December 15, 2012

     

    You can put lipstick on a pig but it’s still jihad #myjihad

     

    Hamas-CAIR is running another new propaganda ad campaign, this time a deceptive #MyJihad bus ad designed to distract from and obscure the true meaning of jihad.

    We successfully educated the American people about the most brutal and extreme system of governance, the sharia, and Muslim Brotherhood operatives are still reeling from that stunning defeat. So now they hope to wash jihad? That’s oceans of blood, Rehab, oceans of blood.

    We have created a spectacular new ad campaign to fight the disinformation and propaganda campaigns of Islamic supremacists and Muslim Brotherhood groups in America. These new ads will counter the new deceptive MyJihad campaign by unindicted co-conspirator Hamas-CAIR.

    More on ‘Hamas-CAIR’.

    Americans need to understand Islamic jihad so that we can counter it effectively. Honest moderate Muslims need to stand up against this and work for Islamic reform rather than blame my ads for pointing out the truth.

    MyJihad is a public education campaign that seeks to share the proper and true meaning of Jihad.

    WATCH ATLAS FOR UPDATES:

    Hamas-linked CAIR applies cosmetics to the concept of jihad Jihadwatch
    Ahmed Rehab: No stranger to cosmetics

    Here’s the smell of the blood still. All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand.

    And all the perfumes in Ahmed Rehab’s purse will not sweeten the concept of jihad. His attempt to take out his lipstick (what’s your favorite shade, Ahmed?) and apply it to jihad is foredoomed to failure. It will fail the next time a Muslim commits murder in the name of jihad — and unfortunately for Rehab’s cosmetic efforts, that happens pretty much every day somewhere in the world.

    This deceptive campaign was formulated in response to our AFDI ad campaign, which is entirely truthful: Muslims do quote verses of the Qur’an such as 3:151 to justify violence against infidels. The Chicago Sun-Times and the rest of the mainstream media will continue to charge us with “hate,” but unfortunately for them as well as for the cosmetic-minded Rehab, reality will keep breaking through.

    “Local Muslim group reclaiming ‘Islam’ with ‘MyJihad’ campaign,” by Tina Sfondeles in the Chicago Sun-Times, December 14:

    A month after an ultra conservative group plastered controversial “Defeat Jihad” ads on 10 CTA buses and likened Muslims to “savages,” a local Muslim group countered back with a campaign to “reclaim Islam” and educate the country about the true meaning of the word “Jihad.”

    In the Chicago Sun-Times, you’re “ultraconservative” if you oppose jihad and Sharia. But for the Associated Press, you’re “ultraconservative” if you want Sharia and brand its opponents “followers of infidels.”

    Note also Tina Sfondeles’s flagrant dishonesty: our AFDI “Defeat Jihad” ad didn’t liken Muslims to savages. The ad read: “In any war between the civilized man and the savage, support the civilized man. Support Israel. Defeat jihad.” Thus the “savages” are those who pursue jihad attacks against Israeli civilians. By equating those who are undeniably savages with all Muslims, Sfondeles is painting all Muslims with a broad brush and committing “Islamophobia,” no?

    Through CTA bus and train ads and a social media campaign on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, participants are being asked to express what their Jihad is with the hashtag #MyJihad.By Friday morning, more than 3,000 users had “liked” the campaign’s Facebook page. And on Twitter, thousands have posted what their “struggle” or Jihad is.

    “#myjihad Is to have the serenity to accept things I can’t change. The courage to change the things I can, & the wisdom to know the difference,” a man in Saudi Arabia Tweeted.

    Ahmed Rehab, executive director of CAIR-Chicago, and creator of the campaign, said the goal is to explain the very misunderstood and sometimes seemingly controversial concept of Jihad.

    “Jihad in Islam simply means the struggle to a better place,” Rehab said. “Whatever barrier or burdens that you have in your life, you are asked, you are tasked to muster in the inner courage, the inner resolve, the inner determination to overcome those personal barriers, personal issues.”

    He said the word has been misconstrued by Muslim and anti-Muslim extremists and it’s time to re-educate the public about Islam and its concepts. Often the term “Jihad” is associated with violence and those waging “holy war.”

    “The only two things that God judges you by in the tradition of Islam are the two things that you control, your intentions and your effort,” Rehab said. “Your intention being sincere and your effort being for the best. That effort is Jihad.”

    Naperville mom Angie Emara is featured in one of the ads with her children. She said her Jihad is getting over the loss of her son, and also raising another son with special needs.

    “For me it’s personal. I don’t want my kids to grow up in an environment where they’re immediately rendered suspect for nothing of their doing,” Emara said. “…My Jihad is an ongoing struggle…My Jihad is to hold back the tears when I see my son live past Adam’s years and do things he never could. My Jihad is to push forward past the grief, past the second guessing.”

    CAIR-Chicago’s campaign, in part, was spurred by the anti-Muslim ads that turned up on CTA buses last month. The ads, financed by conservative blogger Pamela Geller and her organization American Freedom Defense Initiative, have caused controversy — and some legal challenges — in Detroit, New York City and Washington D.C.

    “In any war between the civilized man and the savage, support the civilized man. Support Israel. Defeat jihad,” the ad reads.

    The #MyJihad effort is staffed by CAIR volunteers, and the group paid for the CTA ads. But part of the campaign is aimed at seeking sponsors. For $500, a group can sponsor a bus. The group’s goal is to have enough sponsors so that the campaign can reach New York, Washington D.C., San Francisco, Seattle and Houston.

    The four schools of Sunni Muslim jurisprudence are clear about jihad:

    Shafi’i school: A Shafi’i manual of Islamic law that was certified in 1991 by the clerics at Al-Azhar University, one of the leading authorities in the Islamic world, as a reliable guide to Sunni orthodoxy, stipulates about jihad that “the caliph makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians…until they become Muslim or pay the non-Muslim poll tax.” It adds a comment by Sheikh Nuh ‘Ali Salman, a Jordanian expert on Islamic jurisprudence: the caliph wages this war only “provided that he has first invited [Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians] to enter Islam in faith and practice, and if they will not, then invited them to enter the social order of Islam by paying the non-Muslim poll tax (jizya)…while remaining in their ancestral religions.” (‘Umdat al-Salik, o9.8).

    Of course, there is no caliph today, and hence the oft-repeated claim that Osama et al are waging jihad illegitimately, as no state authority has authorized their jihad. But they explain their actions in terms of defensive jihad, which needs no state authority to call it, and becomes “obligatory for everyone” (‘Umdat al-Salik, o9.3) if a Muslim land is attacked. The end of the defensive jihad, however, is not peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims as equals: ‘Umdat al-Salik specifies that the warfare against non-Muslims must continue until “the final descent of Jesus.” After that, “nothing but Islam will be accepted from them, for taking the poll tax is only effective until Jesus’ descent” (o9.8).

    Hanafi school: A Hanafi manual of Islamic law repeats the same injunctions. It insists that people must be called to embrace Islam before being fought, “because the Prophet so instructed his commanders, directing them to call the infidels to the faith.” It emphasizes that jihad must not be waged for economic gain, but solely for religious reasons: from the call to Islam “the people will hence perceive that they are attacked for the sake of religion, and not for the sake of taking their property, or making slaves of their children, and on this consideration it is possible that they may be induced to agree to the call, in order to save themselves from the troubles of war.”

    However, “if the infidels, upon receiving the call, neither consent to it nor agree to pay capitation tax [jizya], it is then incumbent on the Muslims to call upon God for assistance, and to make war upon them, because God is the assistant of those who serve Him, and the destroyer of His enemies, the infidels, and it is necessary to implore His aid upon every occasion; the Prophet, moreover, commands us so to do.” (Al-Hidayah, II.140)

    Maliki school: Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a pioneering historian and philosopher, was also a Maliki legal theorist. In his renowned Muqaddimah, the first work of historical theory, he notes that “in the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force.” In Islam, the person in charge of religious affairs is concerned with “power politics,” because Islam is “under obligation to gain power over other nations.”

    Hanbali school: The great medieval theorist of what is commonly known today as radical or fundamentalist Islam, Ibn Taymiyya (Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, 1263-1328), was a Hanbali jurist. He directed that “since lawful warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the religion is God’s entirely and God’s word is uppermost, therefore according to all Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought.”

    Majid Khadduri was an Iraqi scholar of Islamic law of international renown. In his book War and Peace in the Law of Islam, which was published in 1955 and remains one of the most lucid and illuminating works on the subject, Khadduri says this about jihad:

    The state which is regarded as the instrument for universalizing a certain religion must perforce be an ever expanding state. The Islamic state, whose principal function was to put God’s law into practice, sought to establish Islam as the dominant reigning ideology over the entire world….The jihad was therefore employed as an instrument for both the universalization of religion and the establishment of an imperial world state. (P. 51)

    Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Assistant Professor on the Faculty of Shari’ah and Law of the International Islamic University in Islamabad. In his 1994 book The Methodology of Ijtihad, he quotes the twelfth century Maliki jurist Ibn Rushd: “Muslim jurists agreed that the purpose of fighting with the People of the Book…is one of two things: it is either their conversion to Islam or the payment of jizyah.” Nyazee concludes: “This leaves no doubt that the primary goal of the Muslim community, in the eyes of its jurists, is to spread the word of Allah through jihad, and the option of poll-tax [jizya] is to be exercised only after subjugation” of non-Muslims.

     

     

  • we petition the obama administration to: issue a proclamation commemorating and recognizing the war crime of the Khojaly Massacre, and its victims

    we petition the obama administration to: issue a proclamation commemorating and recognizing the war crime of the Khojaly Massacre, and its victims

    AZERI  bayrak

    On February 26, the Azerbaijani-Americans and all friends of the U.S. Azeris Network will mark the 21st anniversary of one of the most horrific events of the 1990s, the Khojaly Massacre — the biggest war crime in ex-USSR in the second part of the 20th century.

    This crime against humanity was perpetrated and acknowledged by the president of Armenia.

    Several countries as well as the U.S. states of Massachusetts, Maine, Texas and New Jersey have introduced resolutions and proclamations commemorating the Khojaly Massacre.

    On behalf of a group of Azerbaijani-Americans and our friends throughout the nation and the world, on the eve of the 21st anniversary of this tragedy, we hereby call upon you to help us commemorating Khojaly Massacre and its victims with a Presidential proclamation

    Created: Jan 26, 2013
    Issues: Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, Human Rights
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    Signatures needed by February 25, 2013 to reach goal of 100,000

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    116,617

     

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  • Young activists march to protest attacks on Armenians in Istanbul

    Young activists march to protest attacks on Armenians in Istanbul

    PanARMENIAN.Net – Members of Young Diplomats Club NGO and Nikol Aghbalyan Student Union marched to the UN office in Yerevan to pass a letter protecting against the attacks on Armenians in Istanbul.

    145215The activists further urged Armenian public, NGOs, youth organizations to unite in protest against discrimination of Armenians in Turkey.

    As one of the activists told a PanARMENIAN.Net reporter, the rally urges international organizations against showing the same indifference as was demonstrated during the Armenian Genocide.

    On Dec 28, an 85-year-old Armenian woman was repeatedly stabbed and killed in her home, with assailants carving a cross on her chest. On Jan 6, three assailants tried to kidnap an elderly Armenian woman. Other attacks include the Nov 2012 beating of an 87-year-old Armenian woman, and a failed attempt to abduct an elderly Armenian woman on Jan 6. Three elderly Armenian women were attacked in Istanbul on Jan 22, 23 and 25.

    via Young activists march to protest attacks on Armenians in Istanbul – PanARMENIAN.Net.

  • FCTA Newsletter: What is Genocide? The Armenian Case.

    FCTA Newsletter: What is Genocide? The Armenian Case.

     

    canadatdf

     

    What Is Genocide? The Armenian Case

    SOURCE : https://www.meforum.org/3436/genocide-definition-armenian-case

    Turkey, Past and Future
    by Michael M. Gunter
    Middle East Quarterly

    Winter 2013, pp. 37-46 (view PDF)

    Shortly after the World War II, genocide was legally defined by the U.N. Genocide Convention as “any… acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”[1] The key word from the perspective of this article is “intent.” For while nobody can deny the disaster wrought on the Armenians by the 1915 deportations and massacres, the question is whether or not it can be defined as genocide—arguably the most heinous crime imaginable.

    The Ambiguity of Genocide

    The liberal use of the term “genocide” has stirred numerous controversies and debates. Despite an international law definition, the word has been applied in some questionable instances. The deliberate murder of more than a million Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge, some of whose victims are pictured here, was undoubtedly a horrific crime, but does it fit the definition of genocide?

    The strict international law definition of genocide has not prevented its application to virtually every conflict involving a large number of civilian deaths from the Athenian massacre of the inhabitants of Milos in 416 B.C.E., to the Mongol sacking of Baghdad in 1258, to the fate of the native North American Indians, to Stalin’s induced famine in the Ukraine in the early 1930s, to the recent conflicts in Bosnia, Burundi, Chechnya, Colombia, Guatemala, Iraq, Sudan, and Rwanda, which is not to deny that some of these cases do indeed qualify as genocide.

    The liberal use of the term has naturally stirred numerous controversies and debates. Israel Charny offers little help by arguing that any massacre constitutes genocide, even the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear meltdown.[2] At the other end of the spectrum, Stephen Katz views the Holocaust as the only true genocide in history.[3] In between these two polar definitions, Ton Zwaan has attempted to distinguish between “total” and “complete” genocide and “partial” genocides.[4]

    Even the U.N. definition suffers from some ambiguities owing to being a compromise among all signatories. Thus, the convention legally protects only “national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups,” not those defined politically, economically, or culturally, giving rise to varying interpretations of its intentions. For example, while the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia convicted seven Bosnian Serbs of genocide for their role in the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre of some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims,[5] the International Court of Justice, in its judgment in Bosnia vs. Serbia, focused on Serbia’s “intent” rather than “outcome” regarding the murder of Bosnian Muslims, absolving it of the charge of genocide.[6] Clearly, these contradictory decisions have added to the confusion of what genocide legally constitutes.

    Likewise, the debate whether the Darfur events constituted genocide continues apace. U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell characterized Darfur as a case of genocide based on a U.S. government-funded study, which had surveyed 1,136 Darfur refugees in neighboring Chad.[7] By contrast, a study commissioned by U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan concluded that, while the Darfur events should be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, they did not amount to genocide.[8] Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also declined to characterize the violence in Darfur as genocide while the Arab League and the African Union took a similar position, emphasizing instead the civil war aspect of the conflict. For their part EU, British, Canadian, and Chinese officials, among others, have shied away from calling it genocide. Samantha Power, the author of a Pulitzer Prize winning study on genocide, favored the term ethnic cleansing to describe what was occurring.[9]

    When in July 2008, ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo accused Sudanese president Omar Bashir of genocide and asked the court to issue an arrest warrant, many in the Arab League and the African Union criticized the genocide charge as biased against their region.[10] It remains to be seen how wise the ICC has been in bringing genocide charges in this case. Clearly, there was a lack of agreement on what did or did not constitute genocide in Darfur. Such a situation illustrates the ambiguity surrounding the concept of genocide.
    In an attempt to alleviate these problems, scholars have offered such additional detailed concepts as “politicide” to refer to mass murders of a political nature, “democide” to describe government-perpetrated mass murders of at least one million people, ethnocide, Judeocide, ecocide, feminicide, libricide (for the destruction of libraries), urbicide, elitocide, linguicide, and culturicide, among others.[11] In addition we now have such concepts as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.

    Why this semantic disarray? Henry Huttenbach has argued, “Too often has the accusation of genocide been made simply for the emotional effect or to make a political point, with the result that more and more events have been claimed to be genocide to the point that the term has lost its original meaning.”[12] Jacques Semelin has similarly explained: “Whether use of the word ‘genocide’ is justified or not, the term aims to strike our imagination, awaken our moral conscience and mobilise public opinion on behalf of the victims.” He adds: “Under these circumstances, anyone daring to suggest that what is going on is not ‘really’ genocide is immediately accused of weakness or sympathizing with the aggressors.” Thus, The term genocide can be used as a propaganda tool by becoming the hinge for a venomous rhetoric against a sworn enemy. Given the powerful emotional charge the word genocide generates, it can be used and re-used in all sorts of hate talk to heap international opprobrium on whoever is accused of genocidal intent. … The obvious conclusion: The word is used as much as a symbolic shield to claim victim status for one’s people, as a sword raised against one’s deadly enemy.[13]

    Intent or premeditation is all important in defining genocide “because it removes from consideration not only natural disasters but also those man-made disasters that took place without explicit planning. Many of the epidemics of communicable diseases that reached genocidal proportions, for example were caused by unwitting human actions.”[14] Although some would disagree, the fate of the North American indigenous people is a case in point as they died largely from disease, not intent. Therefore, a large loss of life is not in itself proof of genocide. Ignoring intent creates a distorted scenario and may lead to incorrect conclusions as to what really occurred.

    The Armenians
    What then of the Armenian case? Unfortunately, as the well-known journalist and scholar Gwynne Dyer concluded more than thirty-five years ago, most Turkish and Armenian scholars are unable to be objective on this issue resulting in a situation of “Turkish falsifiers and Armenian deceivers.”[15]

    The main purpose of this discussion, therefore, is not to deny that Turks killed and expelled Armenians on a large scale; indeed what happened might in today’s vocabulary be called war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or even crimes against humanity. To prove genocide, however, intent or premeditation must be demonstrated, and in the Armenian case it has not. It must also be borne in mind that what occurred was not a unilateral Turkish action but part of a long-term process in which some Armenians were guilty of killing as many Turks as they could in their attempt to rebel. Christopher de Ballaigue argues that “what is needed is a vaguer designation for the events of 1915, avoiding the G-word but clearly connoting criminal acts of slaughter, to which reasonable scholars can subscribe.”[16]

    Arnold Toynbee, the renowned historian who coedited the Blue Book compilation of Turkish atrocities during World War I,[17] later wrote: “In the redistribution of Near and Middle Eastern Territories, the atrocities which have accompanied it from the beginning have been revealed in their true light, as crimes incidental to an abnormal process, which all parties have committed in turn, and not as the peculiar practice of one denomination or nationality.”[18] Indeed, in his final statement on the subject, Toynbee declared: “Armenian political aspirations had not been legitimate. … Their aspirations did not merely threaten to break up the Turkish Empire; they could not be fulfilled without doing grave injustice to the Turkish people itself.”[19] In addition, Adm. Mark Bristol, U.S. high commissioner and then-ambassador to Turkey after World War I, wrote in a long cable to the State Department in 1920: “While the Turks were all that people said they were, the other side of the coin was obscured by the flood of Greek and Armenian propaganda painting the Turks as completely inhuman and undeserving of any consideration while suppressing all facts in favor of the Turks and against the minorities.”[20]

    More recently, Edward J. Erickson, a military historian, concluded after a careful examination: “Nothing can justify the massacres of the Armenians nor can a case be made that the entire Armenian population of the six Anatolian provinces was an active and hostile threat to Ottoman national security.” This said, Erickson added: “However, a case can be made that the Ottomans judged the Armenians to be a great threat to the 3rd and 4th [Ottoman] Armies and that genuine intelligence and security concerns drove that decision. It may also be stated that the Ottoman reaction was escalatory and responsive rather than premeditated and pre-planned.”[21]

    On the other hand, Taner Akçam, a Turkish sociologist who has prominently broken with his country’s official narrative, concluded after compiling weighty evidence that the “Ottoman authorities’ genocidal intent becomes clear.”[22] This conclusion was challenged by Turkish researcher Erman Sahin who accused Akçam of “dishonesty—which manifests itself in the form of numerous deliberate alterations and distortions, misleading quotations and doctoring of data—casts doubt on the accuracy of his claims as well as his conclusions.”[23] In a later critique of Akçam’s subsequent work, Sahin concluded: “These are substantive matters that raise serious concerns as to the author’s theses, which appear to be based on a selective and distorted presentation of Ottoman archival materials and other sources. … Such errors seriously undermine the author’s and the book’s credibility.”[24]

    More recently, Akçam claimed that despite Turkish attempts to “hide the evidence” through systematic “loss” and destruction of documents, his new work in the Ottoman archives “clearly points in the direction of a deliberate Ottoman government policy to annihilate its Armenian population.”[25]Maybe, but maybe not. Equally likely is that any destruction of documents at the end of World War I was simply designed to protect military secrets from falling into enemy hands, something any government would want to do. More to the point, Akçam also states that “the clearest statement that the aim of the [Ottoman] government’s policies toward the Armenians was annihilation is found in a cable of 29 August 1915 from interior minister Talat Pasha” in which he asserted that the “Armenian question in the eastern provinces has been resolved. … There’s no need to sully the nation and the government[‘s honor] with further atrocities.”[26] This document, however, does not prove genocidal intent except to those determined to find it. Rather, Talat’s statement might simply mean precisely what it states: The Armenian deportations, although resulting in many atrocities and deaths, have solved the issue.

    In a carefully nuanced study, historian Donald Bloxham concluded that what happened was premeditated and therefore genocide.[27] Though stating in an earlier article “that there was no a priori blueprint for genocide, and that it emerged from a series of more limited regional measures in a process of cumulative policy radicalization,”[28] he, nevertheless, used the term genocide because of the magnitude of what happened and because “nowhere else during the First World War was revolutionary nationalism answered with total murder. That is the crux of the issue.”[29] At the same time, he wondered “whether recognition [of genocide] is really going to open the door to healing wounds and reconciliation, as we are often told, or whether it is a means of redressing nationalist grievances. Is it an issue of historical truth, morality and responsibility, or of unresolved political and material claims?”[30]

    Finally, it should be noted that the Armenian claims of genocide are encumbered by intrinsic legal and philosophical problems. This is due to the fact that any finding under international law of genocide in the Armenian case at this late date would constitute a legally untenable ex-post-facto proclamation, namely: Make a crime of an action which, when originally committed, was not a crime. The concept of genocide did not even exist until it was formulated during World War II by Raphael Lemkin, while the genocide convention only entered into force in 1951.

    The Manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni

    Hovhannes Katchaznouni was the first prime minister (1918-19) of the short-lived Armenian state following World War I. It is useful to turn to his April 1923 address to the Armenian revolutionary and nationalist Dashnak party congress, held in the Romanian capital of Bucharest. While not gainsaying “this unspeakable crime … the deportations and mass exiles and massacres which took place during the Summer and Autumn of 1915,”[31] Katchaznouni’s speech constitutes a remarkable self-criticism by a top Armenian leader. No wonder that many Armenians have done their best to remove this telling document from libraries around the world. It is, therefore, useful to cite what Katchaznouni had to say at some length: In the Fall of 1914, Armenian volunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks because they could not refrain themselves from fighting. This was an inevitable result of psychology on which the Armenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation. … It is important to register only the evidence that we did participate in that volunteer movement to the largest extent. …

    We had embraced Russia wholeheartedly without any compunction. Without any positive basis of fact, we believed that the Tsarist government would grant us a more or less broad self-government in the Caucasus and in the Armenian vilayets liberated from Turkey as a reward for our loyalty, our efforts, and assistance.
    We overestimated the ability of the Armenian people, its political and military power, and overestimated the extent and importance of the services our people rendered to the Russians. And by overestimating our very modest worth and merit was where we naturally exaggerated our hopes and expectations. …
    The proof is, however—and this is essential—that the struggle began decades ago against the Turkish government [which] brought about the deportation or extermination of the Armenian people in Turkey and the desolation of Turkish Armenia. This was the terrible fact![32]

    K.S. Papazian’s Patriotism Perverted
    A decade after the publication of Katchaznouni’s speech, but still much closer to the events of World War I than now, Kapriel Serope Papazian produced a most revealing critique of the Dashnaks’ perfidy, terrorism, and disastrous policies that had helped lead to the events in question. Written by an Armenian who bore no love for the Turks, but hushed up, ignored, and virtually forgotten by many because its self-critical revelations do not mesh with the received Armenian thesis of innocent victimization, Papazian’s analysis[33] calls for close scrutiny.

    Authored just after the notorious Dashnak murder of Armenian archbishop Leon Tourian in New York City on Christmas Eve 1933,[34] Papazian began by expressing disdain for the group’s “predatory inclinations” before examining the “terrorism in the Dashnaks’ early [1892] program,” which sought “to fight, and to subject to terrorism the government officials, the traitors, the betrayers, the usurers, and the exploiters of all description.” Having analyzed the movement’s ideological and operational history, Papazian explored what actually transpired during World War I:
    The fact remains, however, that the leaders of the Turkish-Armenian section of the Dashnagtzoutune did not carry out their promise of loyalty to the Turkish cause when the Turks entered the war. … Prudence was thrown to the winds … and a call was sent for Armenian volunteers to fight the Turks on the Caucasian front.
    Thousands of Armenians from all over the world flocked to the standards of such famous fighters as Antranik, Kery, Dro, etc. The Armenian volunteer regiments rendered valuable services to the Russian Army in the years of 1914-15-16.

    On the other hand, the methods used by the Dashnagtzoutune in recruiting these regiments were so open and flagrant that it could not escape the attention of the Turkish authorities … Many Armenians believe that the fate of two million of their co-nationals in Turkey might not have proved so disastrous if more prudence had been used by the Dashnag leaders during the war. In one instance, one Dashnag leader, Armen Garo, who was also a member of the Turkish parliament, had fled to the Caucasus and had taken active part in the organization of volunteer regiments to fight the Turks. His picture, in uniform, was widely circulated in the Dashnag papers, and it was used by Talat Paha, the arch assassin of the Armenians, as an excuse for his policy of extermination.[35]

    What then should be made of Papazian’s Patriotism Perverted? Without denying that the Turks played a murderous role in the events analyzed, his long-ignored and even suppressed revelations indicate that the Armenians were far from innocent victims in what ensued. Indeed, Papazian’s text makes it clear that incompetent but treacherous Armenians themselves were also to blame for what had befallen their cause. It is unfair to fix unique blame upon the Turks.

    Guenter Lewy’s Critic
    A major contribution to the debate over the Armenian atrocities, Guenter Lewy’s The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey,[36] rejects the claim of a premeditated genocide as well as the apologist narrative of an unfortunate wartime excess, concluding that “both sides have used heavy-handed tactics to advance their cause and silence a full and impartial discussion of the issues in dispute.” In his view, “the key issue in this quarrel is not the extent of Armenian suffering, but rather the question of premeditation: that is, whether the Young Turk regime during the First World War intentionally organized the massacres that took place.”
    Lewy questions the authenticity of certain documents alleged to contain proof of a premeditated genocide as well as the methods of Vakhakn N. Dadrian,[37] one of the foremost current Armenian scholar-advocates of the genocide thesis, whom he accuses of “selective use of sources … [which] do not always say what Dadrian alleges” and “manipulating the statements of contemporary observers.”

    As for the argument that “the large number of Armenian deaths … [offers] proof that the massacres that took place must have been part of an overall plan to destroy the Armenian people,” Lewy counters that it “rests on a logical fallacy and ignores the huge loss of life among Turkish civilians, soldiers, and prisoners-of-war due to sheer incompetence, neglect, starvation, and disease. All of these groups also experienced a huge death toll that surely cannot be explained in terms of a Young Turk plan of annihilation.”

    So how does Lewy explain what happened to the Armenians? “The momentous task of relocating several hundred thousand people in a short span of time and over a highly primitive system of transportation was simply beyond the ability of the Ottoman bureaucracy. … Under conditions of Ottoman misrule, it was possible for the country to suffer an incredibly high death toll without a premeditated plan of annihilation.”[38]
    Lewy’s book was reviewed prominently and positively in two leading U.S. journals of Middle East studies. Edward J. Erickson noted the finding that “both camps have created a flawed supporting historiography by using sources selectively, quoting them out of context, and/or ignoring ‘inconvenient facts,’” concluding that “simply having a large number of advocates affirming that the genocide is a historical fact does not make it so.”[39] Robert Betts, while claiming that “for the Turkish government to deny Ottoman responsibility for the Armenian suffering makes no sense,” also stated that “what emerges from Lewy’s study is the dire state of the empire and its population in 1915 and its inability to protect and feed its own Muslim citizenry, let alone the Armenians.”[40] Moreover, such distinguished scholars of Ottoman history as Bernard Lewis,[41] Roderic Davison,[42] J. C. Hurewitz,[43] and Andrew Mango,[44] among others, have all rejected the appropriateness of the genocide label for what occurred. On May 19, 1985, sixty-nine prominent academics in Turkish Ottoman and Middle Eastern studies (including Lewis) published a large advertisement in The New York Times and The Washington Post criticizing the U.S. Congress for considering the passage of a resolution that would have singled out for special recognition “the one and one half million people of Armenian ancestry who were victims of genocide perpetrated in Turkey between 1915 and 1923.” Instead, they argued that such questions should be left for the scholarly community to decide.

    Indeed, the Armenian massacres of 1915 did not come out of the blue but followed decades of Armenian violence and revolutionary activity that elicited Turkish counter violence. There is a plethora of Turkish writings documenting these unfortunate events, just as there are numerous Armenian accounts.[45] The Armenians, of course, present themselves as freedom fighters in these earlier events, but it is possible to understand how the Ottomans saw them as treasonous subjects.

    Moreover, throughout all these events, the Armenians were never more than a large minority even in their historic provinces.[46] Yet they exaggerated their numbers before World War I and their losses during the war. Had the Armenian fatality figures been correct, very few would have survived the war. Instead, the Armenians managed to fight another war against the nascent Turkish republic in the wake of World War I for mastery in eastern Anatolia. Having lost, many Armenians claimed that what transpired after World War I was a renewed genocide. As Christians, the Armenians found a sympathetic audience in the West whereas the Muslim Turks were the West’s historic enemy. Add to this the greater Armenian adroitness in foreign languages—hence their greater ability to present their case to the world—to understand why the Turks consider the genocide charge to be grossly unfair, especially since the Armenians have adamantly rejected any culpability on their part in this tragic event.

    Conclusion
    Without denying the tragic massacres and countless deaths the Armenians suffered during World War I, it is important to place them in their proper context. When this is done, the application of the term “genocide” to these events is inappropriate because the Turkish actions were neither unilateral nor premeditated. Rather, what transpired was part of a long-continuing process that in part started with the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, which triggered an influx of Balkan Muslims into Anatolia with the attendant deterioration of relations with the indigenous Christian Armenians.[47]

    To make matters worse, Patriarch Nerses, an Ottoman subject and one of the leaders of the Armenian community, entered into negotiations with the victorious Russians with an eye to achieving Armenian autonomy or even independence. This was followed in coming decades by continued Armenian nationalist agitation, accompanied by the use of terror, aimed at provoking retaliation, which they hoped would be followed by European intervention. When World War I broke out, some Armenians supported the Russian enemy. Kurdish/Muslim-Armenian animosities also played a role in this process.[48]

    As for the necessary attribute of premeditation to demonstrate genocide, there are no authentic documents to such effect. Although there are countless descriptions of the depravations suffered by the Armenians, they do not prove intent or premeditation. The so-called Andonian documents that purport to demonstrate premeditation are almost certainly a fabrication.[49] And in response to the Armenian contention that the huge loss of Armenian lives illustrates premeditation, what then should be said about the enormous loss of Turkish lives among civilians, soldiers, and prisoners-of-war? Were these Turkish deaths also genocide or rather due to sheer incompetence, neglect, starvation, and disease? And if the latter were true of the ethnic Turkish population, they were all the more so in respect to an ethnic group that had incurred upon itself suspicion of acting as a fifth column in a time of war.

    Even so, Armenian communities in such large Western cities as Istanbul and Smyrna were largely spared deportation probably because they were not in a position to aid the invading Russians. Is it possible to imagine Hitler sparing any Jews in Berlin, Munich, or Cologne from his genocidal rampage for similar reasons? If, as the Armenians allege, the Turkish intent was to subject their Armenian victims to a premeditated forced march until they died of exhaustion, why was this tactic not imposed on all Armenians? Therefore, without denying outright murders and massacres that today might qualify as war crimes, it seems reasonable to question the validity of referring to the Armenian tragedy as genocide.
    Michael M. Gunter, professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University, was senior Fulbright lecturer at the Middle East Technical University in Turkey.

    [1] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N. Treaty Series (UNTS) 277, adopted by the General Assembly, Dec. 9, 1948, entered into force, Jan. 12, 1951.
    [2] Israel W. Charny, “Towards a Generic Definition of Genocide,” in George J. Andreopoulos, ed.,Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 64-94.
    [3] Stephen Katz, The Holocaust in Historical Context, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
    [4] Ton Zwaan, “On the Aetiology and Genesis of Genocides and Other Mass Crimes Targeting Specific Groups,” Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, University of Amsterdam/Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Nov. 2003, p. 12.
    [5] David Rhode, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre since World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), p. 167; Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 34-5, 65-6, 138-9, 195-8, 213-20, 245-6; “Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica,” U.N. doc. no. A/54/549, Nov. 15, 1999.
    [6] The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro), case 91, International Court of Justice, The Hague, Feb. 26, 2007.
    [7] “Documenting the Atrocities in Darfur,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2004.
    [8] The Guardian (London), Feb. 1, 2005.
    [9] Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 2005, pp. 128, 130.
    [10] Public Radio International, July 28, 2008; Voice of America, July 22, 2010.
    [11] Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 319-20.
    [12] Henry R. Huttenbach “Locating the Holocaust under the Genocide Spectrum: Toward a Methodology of Definition and Categorization,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 3 (1988): 297.
    [13] Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 312-3.
    [14] Kurt Jonassohn, “What Is Genocide?” in Helen Fein, ed., Genocide Watch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 21.
    [15] Gwynne Dyer, “Turkish ‘Falsifiers’ and Armenian ‘Deceivers’: Historiography and the Armenian Massacres,” Middle Eastern Studies, Jan. 1976, pp. 99-107.
    [16] Christopher de Ballaigue, Rebel Land: Among Turkey’s Forgotten Peoples (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), p. 104; M. Hakan Yavuz, “Contours of Scholarship on Armenian-Turkish Relations,” Middle East Critique, Nov. 2011, pp. 231-51.
    [17] James Bryce, compiler, “The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16,”Parliamentary Papers Miscellaneous, Great Britain, no. 31 (London: Joseph Cavston, 1916).
    [18] Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), pp. vii-viii.
    [19] Arnold J. Toynbee, Acquaintances (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 241.
    [20] Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 272.
    [21] Edward J. Erickson, “The Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy, 1915,” War in History, no. 2, 2008, p. 167.
    [22] Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2006), p. 187.
    [23] Erman Sahin, “Review Essay: A Scrutiny of Akçam’s Version of History and the Armenian Genocide,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Aug. 2008, p. 316.
    [24] Erman Sahin, “Review Essay: The Armenian Question,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2010, p. 157.
    [25] Taner Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 19, 27.
    [26] Ibid., p. 203.
    [27] Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Ronald Grigor Suny, “Truth in Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Ottoman Armenians,” American Historical Review, Oct. 2009, pp. 930-46.
    [28] Donald Bloxham, “The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy,” Past & Present, Nov. 2003, p. 143.
    [29] Ibid., pp. 143, 186.
    [30] Ibid., p. 232.
    [31] Hovhannes Katchaznouni, “The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) Has Nothing To Do Anymore,” Arthur A. Derounian, ed., Matthew A. Callender, trans. (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955), p. 2.
    [32] Ibid., pp. 2-3.
    [33] Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism Perverted: A Discussion of the Deeds and the Misdeeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the So-Called Dashnagtzoutune (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934).
    [34] See Christopher Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), p. 354; Maggie Lewis, “Armenian-Americans,” The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), Nov. 18, 1980.
    [35] Papazian, Patriotism Perverted, pp. 7, 13, 15, 21, 38-9.
    [36] Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2007.
    [37] For examples of Guenter Lewy’s critiques of Dadrian’s writings, see “Revisiting the Armenian Genocide,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2005, pp. 3-12; idem, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995); idem, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1999).
    [38] Lewy, The Armenian Massacres, pp. ix, 47, 51, 83-6, 250, 253, 258, 282.
    [39] Edward J. Erickson, “Lewy’s ‘The Armenian Massacres,’” Middle East Journal, Spring 2006, p. 377.
    [40] Robert Brenton Betts, “The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide/The Armenian Rebellion at Van,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2008, p. 177.
    [41] See, for example, Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 356.
    [42] The New York Times, May 19, 1985.
    [43] Ibid.
    [44] Andrew Mango, Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (Woodstock and New York: The Overlook Press, 1999), p. 161.
    [45] See, for example, Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); Garegin Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo), Bank Ottoman: Memoirs of Armen Garo (Detroit: Armen Topouzian, 1990); James G. Mandalian, ed. and trans., Armenian Freedom Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouben der Minasian (Boston: Hairenik Association, 1963).
    [46] See Justin McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire (New York: New York University Press, 1983), p. 115.
    [47] M. Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett, eds., War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011), pp. 1-13.
    [48] See Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 50, 131, 183.
    [49] Aram Andonian, ed., The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportations and Massacres of Armenians (London: 1920. Reprinted, Newtown Square, Pa.: Armenian Historical Research Association, 1964). For the case against the authenticity of these documents, see Sinasi Orel and Sureyya Yuca, The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction? (Nicosia: K. Rustem and Bros., 1986). For the counterclaim that newly found Ottoman archival source material vindicates the Adonian documents see, Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity, p. xviii, fn. 22.

     

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  • Almanya: Airport Opening In Khojaly Violates Airspace Of Azerbaijan

    Almanya: Airport Opening In Khojaly Violates Airspace Of Azerbaijan

    almanyaGermany supports Azerbaijan’s position in the issue of airport opening in the occupied lands of Azerbaijan.

    The statement came from Bundestag deputy of Germany from the Christian Democratic Union, state secretary of the federal agency for environment, nature protection and nuclear safety Katarina Raiche, while commenting on Armenia’s plans on airport opening in Khojaly.
    “It is time for the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from Nagorno-Karabakh. The UN Security Council has repeatedly demanded that in its resolutions. Germany and the EU adhere to this position”, Raiche said.

    She recalled that the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton has openly declared that the European Union does not recognize the bogus presidential elections in Nagorno-Karabakh, held on 19 July 2012.

    “As for Germany, our position is clear: Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the occupation must end. Ending the occupation will create new opportunities for many of the refugees in the region “, she said.

    According to her, Germany closely cooperates with Azerbaijan in order to ensure stability and security in the South Caucasus. She stressed that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the biggest problem for Azerbaijan.

    “A peaceful solution to the conflict will give a positive boost to the economy and population of the region as a whole. It meets the interests of the whole region. Cooperation with the international community in the peace process is particularly important for Germany. UN, EU and OSCE have long been looking for the solution to the conflict by peaceful means. You can not deviate from the path that leads to peace.

    Opening Khojaly airport in the occupied territories of Nagorno-Karabakh just proves it. This is a violation of the airspace of Azerbaijan “, she said.

    News.Az