Category: Armenian Question

“The great Turk is governing in peace twenty nations from different religions. Turks have taught to Christians how to be moderate in peace and gentle in victory.”Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary

Novruz Mammadov on opening of borders

Baku. Lachin Sultanova – APA. “There is principally no problem in holding of negotiations for the opening of borders between Turkey and Armenia.

We expressed our position. I think turkey also understands our position. These processes concern us because it is going on in the South Caucasus”, Chief of the International Relations Department of the President’s Office Novruz Mammadov exclusively told APA.

Mammadov noted that it would be better if the process was carried out by other means. “It would be within the interests of both Turkey and Azerbaijan and would assist the establishing of peace, stability and cooperation in the South Caucasus. The last statements of Turkish authorities showed that they also understand the issue and are taking the Azerbaijan’s position into consideration. They are stating, and we are also considering that Turkey and Armenia have to establish relationship. We are not against the opening of borders, but we demand the issue to be solved more correctly, within the conditions postulated by the Turkish authorities in the early days of our independence. These conditions were made by Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel, Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Turkey’s present leadership. The issue must be solved within these conditions (Armenia must leave its territorial and “genocide” claims against Turkey and must withdraw its forces from the occupied Azerbaijani lands- editor’s comment). The question is about that”.

The department chief said no one could damage the friendship, brotherhood and strategic partnership relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
“These peoples are brothers, fraternal states. The relations between our countries were formed for centuries,” he said.
Asked whether the issue would be discussed during President Ilham Aliyev’s visit to Moscow on April 16, Novruz Mammadov said as it was a working visit, it was impossible to express concrete opinion.
“Azerbaijan and Russia will exchange views on the issues of mutual interest, prospects of bilateral cooperation,” he said.

Novruz Mammadov said Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had not made up his mind yet to accept the offer of OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs to meet with Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian in Prague.

April 14, 2009
The Turkish-Armenian Thaw and Azerbaijan

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has criticized the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement

April 14, 2009

By Abbas Djavadi

U.S. President Barack Obama’s recent visit was a big boost for Turkey. But a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was in the works even before Obama was elected president.

Now Baku is upset that Ankara and Yerevan are about to formalize a deal sidelining Azerbaijanis’ main concern: restoring sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions of Azerbaijan that have been occupied by Armenian forces since early the 1990s. Are the days when both Turks and Azeris used to say they were “one nation with two state” gone for ever?

Ankara and Yerevan intensified their negotiations in August 2007 when their diplomats started to regularly meet in Geneva to discuss the details of establishing “good-neighborly” relations. Once the “technical preparation” was almost complete, President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Yerevan in September last year to attend a Turkish-Armenian soccer match, and the meeting between Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in January 2009 on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos signaled the political will of both sides to proceed.

Diplomats have confirmed to the Turkish media that Baku was not only fully informed about the progress and details of those talks, but even “in agreement” with the way Ankara has been approaching the rapprochement issue.

Dozens of rounds of talks between the Turkish and Azerbaijani presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers preceded this climax in the Turkish-Armenian thaw. Cengiz Candar, a Turkish journalist who accompanied President Gul to Tehran on March 11, reports that Gul and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, met in the Iranian capital specifically to discuss the issue.

What an irony of history that now a Turkish government with an Islamic background and an Armenian government led by a former nationalist fighter from Nagorno-Karabakh are close to a breakthrough

Turkish leaders seem to be surprised by the outrage with which President Aliyev, other Azerbaijani officials, and the Azerbaijani media have responded to the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Some Turkish analysts maintain that Baku’s “demonstrative dismay” is meant primarily for internal consumption, while others speculate that the intention is to make clear to Moscow, Yerevan’s main supporter, Baku’s readiness to include it in all political processes in the southern Caucasus.

Whatever the reason for Baku’s anger, the Turkish leadership seems to have concluded that having no diplomatic relations with one of its neighbors and keeping its border closed have not produced, and will not produce, any positive movement on three key issues that have frozen the status quo for nearly 17 years.

The first of those is Yerevan’s insistence that the mass killings of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 should be recognized as “genocide.”

The second is Ankara’s demand that Yerevan clearly recognize the current Turkish-Armenian border, and refrain in future from referring to eastern Turkey as “western Armenia.”

And the third is concluding an agreement between Baku and Yerevan on Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenian forces.

Referring to serious disputes on all these three points, Turkey “acknowledged” Armenia’s independence in 1991 but declined to extend formal diplomatic recognition. And following the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces, Ankara closed its borders with Armenia in 1993.

For the past 15 or more years, Yerevan has been demanding the opening of the border and the establishment of diplomatic relations “without any precondition.” Ankara, on the other hand, has made both those demands contingent on the resolution of the three main disputed issues. Endless and exhausting talks have been held between all parties involved: Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the “Minsk Group,” consisting of Russia, the United States, and France, to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

But those talks yielded no concrete results. What an irony of history that now a Turkish government with an Islamic background and an Armenian government led by a former nationalist fighter from Nagorno-Karabakh are close to a breakthrough in what was long enough considered a “frozen conflict.”

With technical details reportedly worked out and political will evident in both Ankara and Yerevan, the next few weeks may bring breaking news about the beginning of a historical rapprochement between Turks and Armenians. There are also reports that the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict may be “very close to a settlement,” although the players in each of these two distinct but intertwined dramas apparently don’t want to wait for the other game to be played out first.

The public, however, still doesn’t know much about what the agreements would produce, either with regard to the “genocide,” or the recognition of the Turkish-Armenian border, or how the Armenian-Azerbaijani territorial dispute will be resolved. “Having good relations with Armenia is very good,” said Tulin Kanik, a student of political sciences from Ankara. “But what will happen with their claims on eastern Turkey or with the districts of Azerbaijan still occupied by Armenian forces?”

That both Ankara and Yerevan look confident indicates that people on both sides of Mount Ararat will probably soon hear something they can not only live, but also be happy with. Both Erdogan and Sarkisian know that they have to present their respective populations with a win-win deal. And they also know that, however enthusiastic and supportive the West may be or Russia may become, their own constituencies must accept that deal if they want to survive as national leaders.

Abbas Djavadi is associate director of broadcasting with RFE/RL. The views expressed in this commentary are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL.

http://www.rferl.org/content/The_TurkishArmenian_Thaw_and_Azerbaijan/1608216.html

April 14, 2009
Turkish-Armenian Dialogue on the Verge of Collapse

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 71

April 14, 2009 12:55 PM Age: 38 min

Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Turkey, Armenia, Home Page, Foreign Policy

By: Emil Danielyan

Abdullah Gul (left) and Serzh Sarkisian

The nearly year-long negotiations between Armenia and Turkey look set to prove fruitless after Ankara has revived its long-standing linkage between the normalization of bilateral ties and a resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly made clear this month that his government will not establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan and re-open the Turkish-Armenian border without Azerbaijan’s consent. In Armenia and especially amongst its worldwide diaspora, meanwhile, there are growing calls for President Serzh Sarkisian to abandon the Western-backed talks.

The success of those talks seemed a foregone conclusion in the weeks leading up to President Barack Obama’s visit on April 6-7. According to reports in both the Turkish and Western media, Armenia and Turkey have finalized an agreement on gradually normalizing their strained relations and setting up inter-governmental commissions dealing with various issues of mutual interest. Some of those reports quoted unnamed Turkish officials as saying that the agreement could be signed during or shortly after Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian’s trip to Istanbul on April 6. The resulting outcry in Azerbaijan (EDM, April 10) suggested that Ankara and Yerevan were indeed very close to cutting a far-reaching deal.

Erdogan called into question the possibility of such a deal when he told a news conference in London on April 3 that Turkey cannot reach a “healthy solution concerning Armenia” as long as the Karabakh dispute remains unresolved (Today’s Zaman, April 4). He reaffirmed the linkage on April 8, two days after Obama stated in Ankara that the Turkish-Armenian negotiations were “moving forward and could bear fruit very quickly, very soon.” The Turkish premier went as far as demanding that the U.N. Security Council denounce Armenia as an “occupier” and called for Karabakh’s return under Azeri rule (Hurriyet Daily News, April 9).

Any doubts about the practical implications of these statements were dispelled by Erdogan during his holiday in southern Turkey on April 10: “We will not sign a final deal with Armenia unless there is agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Karabakh,” he told journalists (Anatolia news agency, April 10). In an interview with the Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo published the following day, the deputy chairman of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, Haluk Ipek, said the Turkish-Armenian border will remain closed for at least ten more years. Ipek dismissed speculation over its impending re-opening as “dishonest” Armenian propaganda aimed at driving a wedge between the two Turkic nations. Turkey’s more dovish President Abdullah Gul likewise underscored the importance of Karabakh’s peace when he commented on Turkish-Armenian reconciliation in an interview with The Financial Times on April 8.

That the Turkish-Armenian dialogue is reaching an impasse was effectively acknowledged by Sarkisian at an April 10 news conference: “Is it possible that we were mistaken in our calculations and that the Turks will now adopt a different position and try to set preconditions? Of course it is possible,” he said (Armenian Public Television, April 10). The Armenian leader insisted that Karabakh has not been on the agenda of that dialogue. Indeed, Ankara was clearly ready to stop linking Turkish-Armenian relations with a Karabakh settlement acceptable to Baku when it embarked on a dramatic rapprochement with Yerevan last summer. The two countries’ foreign ministers would have hardly held numerous face-to-face meetings since if it was not.

For his part, Sarkisian signaled his acceptance, in principle, of a Turkish proposal to form a joint commission of historians tasked with examining the 1915-1918 mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. One of the Turkish-Armenian commissions which the governments reportedly agreed to form would conduct such a study. The idea was floated by Erdogan in 2005 and rejected by then Armenian President Robert Kocharian as a Turkish ploy designed to scuttle greater international recognition of what many historians consider the first genocide of the twentieth century. Turkish leaders have made no secret of using the fence-mending negotiations with the Sarkisian administration to discourage Obama from making good on his election campaign promise to describe the slaughter of more than one million Ottoman Armenians as genocide.

The almost certain collapse of the talks has left Armenian politicians and pundits questioning the wisdom of further Armenian overtures to the Turks. “If Turkey suddenly succumbs to Azerbaijan’s threats and these negotiations yield no results soon, then I think the Armenian side will not carry on with them,” said Giro Manoyan, a senior member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, a nationalist party represented in Sarkisian’s coalition government (Hayots Ashkhar, April 10). Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian likewise advocated, in an April 7 interview with RFE/RL, Yerevan’s pullout from the reconciliation process if the sixteen year Turkish blockade of Armenia is not lifted.

Such views are indicative of the dominant mood in the Armenian diaspora and, in particular, the influential Armenian community within the United States. Harut Sassounian, a prominent community activist and commentator, criticized Armenia’s policy on Turkey, effectively blaming it for Obama’s failure to publicly use the word “genocide” during his visit to Turkey. “In view of these developments, it is imperative that the Armenian government terminates at once all negotiations with the Turkish leaders in order to limit the damage caused by the continued exploitation of the illusion of productive negotiations,” Sassounian wrote in an April 9 editorial by his Los Angeles-based newspaper California Courier.

Sarkisian insisted on April 10 that the dialogue with Turkey can be deemed beneficial for the Armenian side even if it produces no tangible results. He said Armenia will “emerge from this process stronger” in any case because the international community will have no doubts that “we are really ready to establish relations [with Turkey] without preconditions.”

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-armenian-dialogue-on-the-verge-of-collapse/

April 14, 2009
Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders

Europe Report N°199
14 April 2009

To access the media release of this report in Turkish, please click here.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over Turkey’s European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half, relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about history at a critical and promising time.

Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising, bipolar views of history are significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be healed. Most importantly, the advance in bilateral relations demonstrates that a desire for reconciliation can overcome old enmities and closed borders. Given the heritage and culture shared by Armenians and Turks, there is every reason to hope that normalisation of relations between the two countries can be achieved and sustained.

Internal divisions persist on both sides. Armenia does not make normalisation conditional on Turkey’s formal recognition as genocide of the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. But it must take into account the views of Armenians scattered throughout the global diaspora, which is twice as large as the population of Armenia itself and has long had hardline representatives. New trends in that diaspora, however, have softened and to some degree removed demands that Turkey surrender territory in its north east, where Armenians were a substantial minority before 1915.

Over the past decade, Turkey has moved far from its former blanket denial of any Ottoman wrongdoing. Important parts of the ruling AK Party, bureaucracy, business communities on the Armenian border and liberal elite in western cities support normalisation with Armenia and some expression of contritition. Traditional hardliners, including Turkic nationalists and part of the security services, oppose compromise, especially as international genocide recognition continues and in the absence of Armenian troop withdrawals from substantial areas they occupy of Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan. These divisions surfaced in events surrounding the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. That the new tendencies are gaining ground, however, was shown by the extraordinary outpouring of solidarity with Armenians during the Dink funeral in Istanbul and a campaign by Turkish intellectuals to apologise to Armenians for the “Great Catastrophe” of 1915.

The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential package deal between Turkey and Armenia on recognition, borders and establishment of bilateral commissions to deal with multiple issues, including the historical dimension of their relations. Azerbaijan has strong links to Turkey based on energy cooperation and the Turkic countries’ shared linguistic and cultural origins. Ethnic Armenian forces’ rapid advance into Azerbaijan in 1993 scuttled plans to open diplomatic ties and caused Turkey to close the railway line that was then the only transport link between the two countries. For years, Turkey conditioned any improvement in bilateral relations on Armenian troop withdrawals. Baku threatens that if this condition is lifted, it will restrict Turkey’s participation in the expansion of Azerbaijani energy exports. While Azerbaijani attitudes remain a constraint, significant elements in Turkey agree it is time for a new approach. Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate.

Outside powers have important interests and roles. The U.S. has long fostered Armenia-Turkey reconciliation, seeking thereby to consolidate the independence of all three former Soviet republics in the south Caucasus and to support east-west transit corridors and energy pipelines from the Caspian Sea. Washington was notable in its backing of efforts that kick-started civil society dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. The Obama administration is working hard at repairing the damage done to U.S. relations with Turkey by the war in Iraq. Although Obama repeatedly promised on the campaign trail to formally recognise the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide, he should continue to steer the prudent middle course he has adopted as president. The U.S. Congress, which has a draft resolution before it, should do the same. At this sensitive moment of Turkish-Armenian convergence, statements that focus on the genocide term, either to deny or recognise it, would either enrage Armenians or unleash a nationalist Turkish reaction that would damage U.S.-Turkish ties and set back Turkey-Armenia reconciliation for years.

U.S. support for Turkey-Armenia reconciliation appears to be mirrored in Moscow. Russian companies have acquired many of Armenia’s railways, pipelines and energy utilities and seek to develop them; Russian-Turkish relations are good; and Moscow is looking for ways to mitigate the regional strains produced by its war with Georgia in August 2008. If sustained, the coincidence of U.S.-Russian interests would offer a hopeful sign for greater security and prosperity in the South Caucasus after years of division and conflict. All sides – chiefly Armenia and Turkey but potentially Azerbaijan as well – will gain in economic strength and national security if borders are opened and trade normalised.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Turkey:

1. Agree, ratify and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; cultivate a pro-settlement constituency among Armenians; and avoid threatening or penalising Armenia for outside factors like resolutions or statements in third countries recognising a genocide.

2. Avoid sacrificing implementation of the normalisation package to demands for immediate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and seek opportunities to show Baku that by easing Yerevan’s fears of encirclement, normalised Turkey-Armenia relations may ultimately speed up such an Armenian withdrawal.

3. Make goodwill towards Armenia clear through gestures such as joint work on preserving the ancient ruins of Ani, stating explicitly that Turkey will recognise and protect Armenian historical and religious heritage throughout the country.

4. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue broader research on matters pertaining to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Armenian and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and increase funding for cataloguing and management of the Ottoman-era archives.

To the Government of Armenia:

5. Agree, ratify, and implement a normalisation package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation; and avoid statements or international actions relating to genocide recognition that could inflame Turkish public opinion against the current process.

6. Agree together with Azerbaijan to the OSCE Minsk Group basic principles on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement; then start withdrawals from Armenian-occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and pursue peace with Azerbaijan in full consciousness that only in this way can normalisation with Turkey be consolidated.

7. Make clear that Armenia has no territorial claim on Turkey by explicitly recognising its territorial integrity within the borders laid out in the 1921 Treaty of Kars.

8. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue more research on matters relating to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement of Turkish and third-party scholars; modernise history books and remove all prejudice from them; and organise the cataloguing of known Armenian archives pertaining to the events in and around 1915 wherever they may be located.

To the United States, Russia and the European Union and its Member States:

9. Avoid legislation, statements and actions that might inflame public opinion on either side and so could upset the momentum towards Turkey-Armenia normalisation and reconciliation.

10. Raise the seniority and intensify the engagement of the U.S., Russian and French co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group until Armenia and Azerbaijan reach final agreement on Minsk Group basic principles for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

11. Back up Turkey-Armenia reconciliation with projects to encourage region-wide interaction, heritage preservation and confidence building; and support as requested any new bilateral historical commission or sub-commission, development of archive management and independent Turkish- or Armenian-led scholarly endeavours to research into aspects of the 1915 events.

Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, 14 April 2009

April 14, 2009
Nabucco as a Chess Game: Azerbaijan’s Next Move

On March 27, 2009, a memorandum was signed between the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR and Russia’s Gazprom. This memorandum includes a statement of deliveries, beginning in January 2010, of Azerbaijani natural gas to Russia on the boundary conditions, DAF Azerbaijan / Russia. In the near future the Baku – Novo Filya pipeline, part of the transmission system of Azerbaijan, which runs from Baku to the Russian border on the Caspian coast, will be inspected. The length of the pipeline is about 200 km; the diameter of the pipe is the same 1220 mm.

On March 27, 2009, a memorandum was signed between the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR and Russia’s Gazprom. This memorandum includes a statement of deliveries, beginning in January 2010, of Azerbaijani natural gas to Russia on the boundary conditions, DAF Azerbaijan / Russia. In the near future the Baku – Novo Filya pipeline, part of the transmission system of Azerbaijan, which runs from Baku to the Russian border on the Caspian coast, will be inspected. The length of the pipeline is about 200 km; the diameter of the pipe is the same 1220 mm.

This agreement is important because for the first time since its independence Azerbaijan, which imported gas from Russia, has become an exporter to this country. The signing of this memorandum has led to a number of preconditions, which are the causes of events occurring in the region. The first is to note that Gazprom was particularly interested in signing such an agreement with Azerbaijan. This serves several reasons. The first reason is that in the past few years, production of natural gas in Russia has been decreased. Preferring not to invest large amounts of capital in the development of natural gas, Gazprom to date has preferred to operate with the Soviet Union deposits, although these deposits have begun to dry up over time. However, a treaty signed with European suppliers obliges Russia to search for additional volumes of gas. Therefore, first of all Russia has guaranteed the supply of gas from Central Asia, significantly increasing the price for it. Russia also extended the proposal to Azerbaijan, which opened the large Shahdeniz gas field in the late 90s.

Russia’s second reason lies in the problems of gas supplies to southern Russia. Thus, one could guarantee the stable supply in the North Caucasus republics. But the main reason is the desire of Russia to concentrate the supply of natural gas from former Soviet republics on its territory. Actually, Azerbaijan is the only state that could supply gas to the planned Nabucco pipeline. Proposed by the EU, this pipeline would transport natural gas from Azerbaijan and the Central Asia states through Turkey to south-eastern Europe. In reality, gas may come only from Azerbaijan.

Russia has proposed an alternative to Nabucco project, South Stream, which is also in need of Azerbaijani gas. In this case, Russia tries to prevent the realization of Nabucco.

With regard to Azerbaijan, it is the first time, after gaining its independence, that it shifted its energy exports from west to the north. There were several reasons for this.

The primary reason was the passive attitude of Western partners in the implementation of the project. Lack of coordination and understanding in the sphere of energy between the members countries of the EU led to the fact that this organization could not determine the strategy for the implementation of Nabucco. Paradoxically, the EU and its members are waiting for more concrete steps from potential exporters, hoping thereby to strengthen the project. However, Azerbaijan does not have a desire to pursue their own policies without the support of the West, and thereby worsen relations with Russia. This fact was especially true after the 5-day war in Georgia. Despite the fact that the political regime in Georgia came to power with broad support from the West, these countries did not provide the support it expected to receive. Azerbaijan also has the problem of separatism. In this case, in the interest of Azerbaijan is not to commit acts that could provoke Russia.

Another reason for signing the memorandum with Russia lies in the position of Turkey. Turkey is trying to address not only the transit of Azerbaijani gas through Nabucco, but also wants to become the seller. In particular, Turkey wants to purchase natural gas at the border with Azerbaijan and resell it to Western consumers at a several-fold price increase. This situation would not benefit Azerbaijan. In addition to that, Russia’s proposal to buy Azerbaijani gas is commercially much more attractive. Azerbaijan profits more from selling gas in Russia than Turkey.

In addition, between Turkey and Azerbaijan, disagreements arose about the intentions of Turkey to open its border with Armenia. This border has been closed since 1993, after Armenian troops occupied the Azeri region of Kelbedzhar. Recently, however, the government of Turkey has decided to develop relations with Armenia, and the first step was the visit of President Gul to Armenia’s capital Yerevan to watch a soccer qualifying match between the two national teams. The next step in the development of relations is to be the opening of borders between the two countries in mid-April. It should be noted that the prior condition for the opening of the border was the unconditional release of Armenian-occupied Azerbaijani territories.

This decision has received a sharp reaction in Azerbaijan. Public opinion in the country reacted negatively to the intentions of Turkey, which severely condemned the possible turn of events. Another reaction to the Turkish intention can be described with the signing of a contract between SOCAR and Gazprom. The President of SOCAR, Rovnaq Abdullayev, is also the president of the Football Federation of Azerbaijan. He arrived in Moscow on the eve of the qualifying soccer match between Azerbaijan and Russia. The signed contract has become a kind of symbolic response to Gul’s «football diplomacy» in Yerevan.

It should be noted that the signed memorandum negotiates gas exports to Russia for 2010. In this case, there is a certain amount of time to solve the problems of the realization of Nabucco, as the second phase of gas production at Shahdeniz has not yet begun. However, if there will be no concrete steps to implement Nabucco, gas for this pipeline could go in a northerly direction.

Rovshan İbrahimov

International Research Club – www.interesclub.org

April 13, 2009
‘Genocide’ Is A Matter Of Opinion

Simon Says

by Scott Simon

Weekend Edition Saturday, April 11, 2009 · When President Obama was beginning his run for office, he said he believed the 1915 slaughter of 1.5 million Armenians by Turkey was not war but genocide and that the American people deserved “a leader who speaks truthfully about the Armenian genocide and responds forcefully to all genocides.”

But when Obama addressed the Turkish parliament this week, he referred only to “the terrible events of 1915.”

I was part of a PBS program called The Armenian Genocide. There was no question mark in the title. I think there are times when you have to say “genocide” to be accurate about mass murder that tries to extinguish a whole group. That’s why slaughter of a million Tutsis in Rwanda is not called merely mass murder. An American politician who got to Germany, for example, and called the Holocaust of European Jews merely “killings” would be mocked.

I don’t doubt that Obama is still outraged by the Armenian genocide. But when he ran in the presidential primaries, it was important to win support from people concerned about human rights and, perhaps, Armenian-Americans in California.

Now, Obama may feel that it is more important for the United States to win Turkey’s cooperation on a range of issues than it is for him to be consistent on a controversy that may seem like old history.

But it’s not. Almost every year, the Turkish government has charged reporters and writers, including the Nobel laureate, Orhan Pamuk, for “insulting national identity” by referring to the massacres of 1.5 million Armenians as genocide.

Peter Balakian, the pre-eminent scholar of the genocide and co-translator of a new, widely lauded family memoir called Armenian Golgotha: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide, told us this week that he admires President Obama for telling Turkish leaders that confronting the past and restoring good relations with Armenia is important.

But he believes Turkey’s campaign against acknowledging its genocide raises questions about reliability.

Balakian told us, “A country that spends millions of dollars a year in an effort stop the facts about the Armenian genocide from being known and that persecutes and prosecutes its own citizens for speaking truthfully about the extermination of the Armenians is hardly a government to trust to broker honest and just foreign policy.”

In a way, the president’s choice to say “killings” in front of his hosts may remind us that it might be wise to regard what any politician says as the words of a suitor who coos “I love you” during courtship. They mean it in the moment. But any adult should know that they may not mean it in just a few weeks.

April 13, 2009