Category: Armenian Question

“The great Turk is governing in peace twenty nations from different religions. Turks have taught to Christians how to be moderate in peace and gentle in victory.”Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary

Opening a Border

Opening a Border

With help from Hillary Rodham Clinton, Turkey and Armenia take a step toward rapprochement.

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

SECRETARY OF STATE Hillary Rodham Clinton executed some deft diplomacy last weekend as the leaders of Turkey and Armenia signed a potentially historic deal to establish normal diplomatic relations and reopen their borders. We say “potentially” because there are some big obstacles to implementing the accord, which we’ll come back to. But Ms. Clinton helped to ensure that the signing ceremony in Zurich went forward after four hours of last-minute mediation. Not for the first time in her short tenure, she proved capable of overcoming an impasse and teasing out a favorable outcome for the United States.

The rapprochement between these two nations matters to the United States for a number of reasons. It could help stabilize the volatile Caucasus region, open the way for new corridors for the export of gas and oil to the West, ease Russia’s political domination of Armenia and remove a major irritant from U.S. relations with Turkey. The Obama administration worked diligently to promote the accord: Ms. Clinton made 29 phone calls to the leaders of the two nations. President Obama played a part by sidestepping a campaign promise to formally recognize the mass killing of Armenians by Turks during World War I as “genocide.”

The genocide issue — and the refusal of some in the American Armenian community to compromise on it — still threatens to undo the deal. The opening of the border, closed since 1993, would be a huge benefit to impoverished and landlocked Armenia. But there is resistance to a provision of the accords that would set up a joint commission to study the history of the massacres. Opponents say this could give Turkey, which denies that a genocide took place, a means to filibuster the issue — and to stop the annual attempt by some in the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution declaring that genocide occurred. In fact, the issue is one best left to the two countries; that several U.S. Armenian groups have endorsed the accord is a victory for common sense

A more formidable obstacle to the deal may be Armenia’s unresolved dispute with another neighbor, Azerbaijan, over the ethnically Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is occupied by Armenia along with some neighboring Azeri territory. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took the courageous step of declining to make the settlement of this “frozen conflict” a precondition to his accord with Armenia — thereby inviting the wrath of Azerbaijan, which is an ally and energy supplier to Turkey. But Mr. Erdogan has said — most recently last Sunday — that his government will not go forward with the deal unless Armenia executes at least a partial withdrawal from Azerbaijan. That would be a tough step for Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and require considerable international support: more delicate work for Ms. Clinton.

October 14, 2009
HISTORY: Musa Dagh and Armenians

Sevgi Zübeyde GÜRBÜZ

For many Armenians, “Musa Dagh” is a symbol of resistance against extermination by the Turks. Popularized by Franz Werfel’s 1933 book entitled “The Forty Days of Musa Dagh,” the battle is portrayed as the flight and struggle of the Armenian population of six villages, allegedly poorly armed and with few provisions,

against the onslaught of the Ottoman army, trying to implement the relocation orders that so many Armenians equate to genocide. After holding out for 53 days, roughly 4,000 Armenians were transported by five Allied warships to Egypt, where they stayed in refugee camps until the end of World War I, before finally returning to their homes in Hatay.
When the French relinquished control of Hatay to Turkey in 1939, many of these Armenians, by their own free will, chose to immigrate to other countries. According to the residents of the last of the Armenian villages near Musa Dagh, the village of Vakifli [1], those who chose to migrate were primarily “right-wing”, while those who stayed were “left-wing” and trusted Turkey’s new leader, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk [2].
As might be expected, Turkish accounts of the Battle of Musa Dagh are quite different. According to the Turkish Governor of Halep at the time, General Fahrettin Turkkan, the Armenians living around Musa Dagh had reports that the Allies intended to land forces in the region of Iskenderun, and thus decided to stop paying the taxes they owed the Ottoman government, ascending to the top of Musa Dagh in rebellion. Officials from the government were sent to warn and advise these Armenians to pay their taxes, but instead they were welcomed with gunfire. Left without any other choice but to confront these rebels, the local Jandarma commander, Colonel Galip, climbed with his forces to the top of Musa Dag, but was surprised to find that the Armenians had evacuated the region. Upon examination, it was found that the Armenians had gone towards the Mediterranean, boarding a French warship. There were no bodies, no wounded, no sick people found at all. Just 20-30 slaughtered animals. [3]

Another perspective on the Battle of Musa Dagh is given by Albert Amateau, a Sephardic Jew born and raised in Milas, Turkey, who in a signed, notarized deposition dating October 11, 1989, offered the following account:
“Fifty thousand Armenians, all armed, ascended the summit of that mountain after provisioning it to stand siege. Daily sallies from that summit of armed bands attacked the rear of the Ottoman armies, and disappeared into the mountain. When the Ottomans finally discovered the fortification the Armenians had prepared, they could not assault and invade it. It stood siege for 40 days, which is a good indication of the preparations the Armenians had made surreptitiously under the very nose of the Ottoman Government. Nor was it ever explained that the rebellion of the Armenians had been fostered, organized, financed, and supplied with arms and munitions by the Russians.”
This description is supported by Edward J. Erickson, who in his book “Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War”, wrote that there was strong fighting for forty days in Musa Dagh. All this raises several important questions about the Armenian version of events. For example, if the Armenians were truly poorly armed, and fled the mountain without much planning to avoid relocation, then how did they hold out so long? Furthermore, Musa Dagh is just one speck on Turkey’s very long Mediterranean coastline. Isn’t it just a bit too coincidental that a French warship just “happened” to be passing by at the right time to miraculously discover the Armenians on Musa Dagh and rescue them?
Regardless of whether the Armenians of Musa Dagh were in cahoots with the French or not, which ever way you look at it, the fact remains that the Armenians of Musa Dagh chose to rebel, they chose to fight the Ottoman army, they chose to resist the eviction order. Relocation is NOT tantamount to genocide, although clearly something undesirable from an Armenian perspective. I can understand why they’d want to resist leaving their homes. However, any losses incurred during the fighting cannot even be termed even a massacre because the Armenians were armed and willingly engaged the Ottoman army.
Furthermore, even if you accept the Armenian explanation that at they ascended Musa Dagh to flee relocation, that the revolt was provoked by the Ottomans, this can hardly be viewed as characteristic of Armenian revolts during that time. It is well documented that Armenian rebellions began in 1914, the year prior to the May 1915 relocation decree. In fact, dispatches even detail the names of Turks who were attacked, murdered or raped by Armenian militias [4]. A detailed analysis of the rebellion in Van, which triggered the relocation decision, is given by Justin McCarthy in his recent book entitled “The Armenian Rebellion at Van.”
Which brings me to my first question: why is Werfel’s book so precious to Armenians? Why would a film based on the battle be so detrimental to the image of Turks, and so useful in advancing Armenian allegations of genocide?
Unfortunately, Werfel’s book did not just dramatize the Battle of Musa Dagh, but interjected accusations and dialogue directly accusing the Ottoman regime of planning to systematically exterminate the entire Armenian population. In Werfel’s fiction, the deportation order was merely a cover for genocidal intentions.
For example, in his book, Werfel writes: “The same forthright and stumpy fingers (of Talaat Pasha) had composed that order sent out to the walis and mutessarifs: The goal of these deportations is annihilation.” Here, Werfel is clearly referring to the Andonian Documents which allegedly contain telegrams sent by Talat Pasha that openly state his alleged intention to kill Armenians. In Document #1 of the Andonian papers, Talat Pasha allegedly wrote: “Of course the Government will give the necessary instructions about the necessary massacres to the Governors.” And in the next document states that by November 18, 1915, “It is the duty of all to effect on the broadest lines, the realization of the noble project of wiping out of the existence the Armenians…”
The problem with the Talat Pasha telegrams, however, is that these have been shown by Professors Sinasi Orel and Surreya Yuca to be forgeries! [5] In fact, Armenians have no proof that the Ottomans ever planned massacres. To the contrary, archives show that Ottoman soldiers were ordered to protect migrating Armenians, a fact corroborated by the statement of 105 year-old Armenian Yeghisapet Kesabyan of Lebanon: “We walked for days. Ottoman soldiers were always by our side to protect us so that no one would attack us.” [6]
Both Armenians and Turks were victims of inter-communal violence, hunger, starvation and disease during that time. The Ottoman archives document that over 500,000 Muslims perished at Armenian hands. All in all, an estimated 2.5 million Muslims were slaughtered during World War I. The British are on record for having told Armenian leaders, “You kill the Muslisms, and we will supply you with the arms and ammunition.” [7] For some reason, Europe chooses to ignore Turkish victims, and selectively mourn Armenians.
The next important question then, is on what sources did Werfel base his book?
Albert Amateau offers the following information about Franz Werfel, a fellow Jew who he knew personally:
“My friend, Franz Werfel, of Vienna, a writer, wrote a book entitled THE 40 DAYS AT MUSA DAGH, a history of the massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks. The story was told to him by his friend, the Armenian Bishop of Vienna and Werfel never doubted the Bishop’s account. He did not investigate what he wrote. Years later, when the true facts about Musa Dagh were established by the research of neutral investigators – which was never denied by the Armenians – Werfel discovered that he had been duped by his friend, the Bishop, with a concocted story. Werfel confessed to me his shame and remorse for having written that story, in which he had blamed the Ottomans as the aggressors and terrorists.”
In his book, Werfel writes of how he got interested in the Armenian case: “This book was conceived in March of 1929, in the course of a stay in Damascus. The miserable sight of some maimed and famished-looking refugee children, working in a carpet factory gave me the final impulse to snatch from the Hades of all that was this incomprehensible destiny of the Armenian nation.”
Werfel goes on to state that he also used “historic records of a conversation between Enver Pasha and Pastor Johannes Lepsius” in reference to Lepsius’s book “Deutschland und Armenien.” From the sound of that statement, you might think that Lepsius was simply relaying information from Enver Pasha himself, but in fact much of what he wrote was based upon information provided by Armenian informants residing in Istanbul, and American Ambassador Morgenthaus (a man infamous for his racist anti-Turkish statements, who himself was primarily informed by Armenians). Lepsius himself never traveled into Anatolia, and obtained no first-hand information. [8]
Thus, the basic fact remains that Werfel had no direct knowledge of the Battle of Musa Dagh, never went to Turkey to investigate, or contact Turkish authorities to cross-check Armenian accounts, but merely regurgitated what he heard either directly or indirectly from Armenian sources.
Further complicating the reliability of “The Forty Days of Musa Dagh” as a source is that blatant historical mistakes were made, such as timing the Armenian revolt in Van as having taken place after the relocation orders, when in fact the rebellion began two months earlier in February 1915; and that in its translation from German into English, passages that could have been interpreted as favoring Turks were dropped. In his book, “The Myth of Terror”, Erich Feigl writes [9]:
“The Armenian circles that shorten and mutilate Werfel’s novel in the English edition know exactly why they must take these passages – in this particular case a whole page -~ out of the book. (There is, by the way, not one word to indicate that the novel has been altered in this fashion.) Today, there are a few scattered historical works in which anyone who is interested can find out about the true events and the sequence in which they occurred. In some libraries, one can even still find publications in which the Armenians boast of their war with the Ottomans, although these publications have now disappeared from nearly all libraries, and it has become truly difficult to find a magazine like Der Orient, put out by Johannes Lepsius.”
Why are Armenian accounts accepted by Europeans at face value?
Oral histories are never reliable sources because they are subject to human tampering. Stories can be exaggerated, one-sided, or even purposefully manipulated to demonize “the enemy.” As accounts are passed on from one person to the next, they also tend to be altered. I remember an exercise my middle school history teacher had us perform, in which she selected 10 students, telling one student a single sentence and asking him to pass it on to one of the other 10 students. Each time the sentence was passed on, the message bearer told it to the class, and we got to see first hand how even simple memory lapse could completely corrupt the message. Much of the hatred towards Turks has been instigated by horrific accounts by Armenian “survivors” – but how much is fact and how much is fiction, embellished for political purposes, is clearly up for debate.
Furthermore, doesn’t the fact that over the past 90 years Armenians have resorted to forgery, thievery, and terrorism to manipulate history and silence both the Turkish community and historians raise any alarm bells?
Sylvester Stallone has accused Turks of “killing” the “subject for 85 years.” Sly, we haven’t been “killing” anyone or anything. We’ve merely been pointing out the inconsistencies and inaccuracies with Armenian storytelling. Even in a court of law defendants are innocent until proven guilty. Surely the Turkish people deserve the chance to defend themselves, and not be hanged by 90 years of bad-press and contrary popular opinion.
Rather than criticizing Turks for defending themselves, both in World War I against European colonization and ethnic cleansing [10] and today, against false genocide accusations, perhaps you should think about the responsibilities actors have in remaining loyal to the truth.
If you are so concerning with Armenian history, perhaps you should try to become part of the solution, and act in support of proposals that could reconcile the Armenian and Turkish communities, such as Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s proposal for a joint historical research committee, or Ambassador Gunduz Aktan’s proposal for an open trial, in which the history could be debated and a final outcome reached.
The true epic tale here is not Musa Dagh, but the story of the Turkish Independence War, and how Turks overcame the armies of the British, French, Russians, Greeks and Armenians to establish the first modern, democratic republic in the Middle East.
Sevgi Zubeyde Gurbuz
[1] Adem Yavuz Arslan. “Son Ermeni Koyu: Vakifli” (The Last Armenian Village: Vakifli) Aksiyon Magazine, No. 555, July 25, 2005.

[2] Celal Baslangic, “Musa’dan Notlar” (Notes from Musa) Radikal Newspaper, July 29, 2002.
[3] Sakarya, Em.Tümg. İhsan-Belgelerle Ermeni Sorunu, Gnkur.Basımevi, Ankara 1984, s. 245-246, http://www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr/turkce/sorun/isyan13.html
[4] “Documents I,” Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information.
[5] Turkkaya Ataov, “The Andonian ‘Documents’ Attributed to Talat Pasha are Forgeries”
An article summarizing the research in the book by Sinasi Orel and Surreya Yuca, “The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction?” London, 1986.
[6] Hasim Soylemez, “During Expulsion the Turkish Troops Protected Us From Attacks,” Zaman Newspaper, May 5, 2005.
[7] Mim Kemal Oke, “The Armenian Question”, pp. 180.
[8] Frank G. Weber cited in “The Armenian File” by Kamuran Gurun, pp. 221.
[9] Excerpt from the book “A Myth of Terror” by Erich Feigl.
[10] Stanford Shaw, “The Turkish War of National Liberation”, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 2000; and Justin McCarthy, “Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims,” Darwin Press, March 1996.
TURKISH JOURNAL

October 14, 2009
CHAIRMAN OF TURKISH LOBI IS RESIGNING
U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler is leaving Congress to lead think tank
Related Content

Planet Washington Blog - Musings from the Capitol
By Beth Reinhard

The Miami Herald

U.S. House of Representatives member Robert Wexler of Boca Raton, a self-described "fire-breathing liberal," defender of Israel and friend of both President Barack Obama and Gov. Charlie Crist, is quitting Congress to head a think tank seeking peace in the Middle East. In a conference call Tuesday night with Democratic leaders, Wexler said he will become director of the Washington-based Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation. Wexler, 48, is expected to make a public statement about his plans at a 10 a.m. Wednesday press conference at his Boca Raton office. The jockeying to represent his heavily Democratic congressional district began in earnest Tuesday as the news of his departure began to leak out. "I'm still a little bit in shock over all this," said state Sen. Jeremy Ring, D-Parkland, though he added he was "for sure" considering a run for the seat. Other potential Democratic contenders in the district covering parts of North Broward and Palm Beach counties are state Sen. Ted Deutch of Delray Beach, West Palm Beach Mayor Lois Frankel, Broward County Mayor Stacy Ritter and former Broward County Commissioner Ben Graber. Once Wexler's resignation becomes official, state law requires Crist to call a special election. That can leave candidates little time to raise funds and campaign, and sometimes makes for an unpredictable and chaotic race. Wexler prided himself on representing the "greatest generation" -- the World War II veterans and Depression survivors from the Northeast who turned South Florida's retirement communities into Democratic strongholds. He was a high-profile spokesman for the Democratic party during the 2000 presidential recount in the state and fought for a paper trail for voters using electronic machines. To read the complete article, visit www.miamiherald.com.

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\\Bad news for us all..

MeltemB

From: Congressman Robert Wexler Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2009 5:05 PM Subject: Wexler to Head Middle East Non-Profit Institute Today, I am announcing that I will be accepting the position of President of the Center for Middle East Peace and will leave Congress in early January of 2010. I was able to successfully serve in Congress due in large part to the friendship and generosity of you and the thousands of my other friends and supporters throughout Florida and the entire country. Thank You. Many of you have supported me since my earliest campaigns for Congress or even my elections to the Florida State Senate. Your friendship and support has meant the world to me over the last nineteen years, and I value it immensely. I have truly cherished the opportunity to serve my constituents – many of who make up the generation that sacrificed in World War II and Korea and rebuilt our nation after the depression. I am proud that everyday I have sought to advocate for and provide a voice to my constituents; whether it was fighting for a legitimate vote during election 2000, or working toward enacting a voter verified paper trail in Florida, to countless other issues impacting health care, education, Social Security and more. Therefore, my decision to leave Congress did not come easy. Those who know me, and those who have followed my career know that one of my overriding passions has been my work on the Foreign Affairs Committee helping to strengthen and preserve the unbreakable bond between the United States and Israel, and working toward a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and the Arab world. Additionally, I have made a special effort to improve congressional relations with key allies in the Muslim world by founding the Turkey and Indonesia caucuses. Moreover, it was an extraordinary honor to serve as a Middle East Advisor to President Obama during the presidential campaign and I treasure the experiences I had traveling the country, and especially throughout Florida, advocating for the President’s Middle East agenda. Taking over as President of the Center for Middle East Peace offers me an unparalleled opportunity to work on behalf of Middle East peace for an important and influential non-profit institute. After much discussion with my family, I have decided that I cannot pass up on this opportunity. While I regret that I will be unable to complete my current term in office, I truly believe there is no time to waste. We are at a unique and critically tense moment in the history of the Middle East with both significant opportunities to succeed in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as major challenges involving Iran, Hamas, and al Qaeda. In the coming months, Israeli and Arab leaders will be faced with monumental decisions that will dramatically affect the region and the entire world for decades to come. Critically important American security and foreign policy interests are also at stake. I am convinced that now is the time for me to engage on these issues on a full time basis. If you want to learn more about the Center for Middle East Peace, you can visit its website at www.centerpeace.org. I may be leaving Congress but I except our friendship and work on the issues that we care about to continue. I will stay in touch in the months and years to come and I hope you will do the same. With gratitude and profound thanks, Robert

Paid for by "Wexler for Congress"

PO Box 810669 Boca Raton, FL 33481

Robert Wexler to resign from Congress
> Posted by Anthony Man on October 13, 2009 04:48 PM

Update: U.S. Rep. Robert Wexler, who represents Broward and Palm Beach counties, plans to resign from Congress. Wexler plans to meet with reporters Wednesday morning in Boca Raton to detail his next move. A Democratic source with knowledge of Wexler’s plans said the seven-term congressman is likely to take a public policy job that deals with the Middle East. The job does not involve working for the Obama administration and does not involve lobbying. Democrats expressed admiration for their longtime political colleague — and began handicapping who among their ranks might run. Republicans were critical of the Democratic congressman. The district is especially enticing for Democrats because the party holds an overhwhelming edge in registered voters. Most of the district lies in Palm Beach County, giving someone with that home base an edge in what will certainly be a Democratic primary. “This is a very safe Democratic seat. The Republicans have either mounted jsut a token opposition to Wexler’s re-election or he’s run unopposed. Even Republicans realize this is just a safe Democratic seat,” said Robert Watson, a political scientist and director of American studies at Lynn University in Boca Raton. “I wouldn’t be surprised if you’ve got 10 people [Tuesday] night invesigating it,” said state Sen. Jeremy Ring, D-Parkland. “This could be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.” Ring and state Sen. Ted Deutch, D-Boca Raton, are the two potential replacements mentioned Tuesday by Watson and several Democrats. Another possible candidate is Broward Mayor Stacy Ritter.
October 14, 2009

Nine Actions Armenia Must Take Before Ratifying the Protocols

The very first step in attempting to “normalize” relations between Armenia and Turkey — signing the Protocols in Zurich on October 10 — was nearly aborted when the Foreign Ministers of both countries objected to the statements that each had prepared for delivery following the signing ceremony.

Since both parties had the right to review in advance each other’s closing statements, the Armenian Foreign Minister complained that the Turkish side planned to raise unacceptable issues on Karabagh (Artsakh) and the historical commission. For his part, the Turkish Foreign Minister objected to his Armenian counterpart’s attempt to assert that the establishment of relations between the two countries was not based on “any preconditions.”

After more than 3-hours of intense back and forth, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and other high-ranking officials, succeeded in pressuring the Armenian and Turkish Foreign Ministers into signing the Protocols, without making closing statements.

Despite the massive outpouring of Armenian sentiment, accusing Armenia’s leadership of making unacceptable concessions, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian went ahead and signed the Protocols in Zurich.

The signed Protocols are now to be submitted to the Armenian and Turkish Parliaments for ratification. Before this final step, however, the Armenian side should consider taking the following nine actions in order to minimize the damage the Protocols would cause to Armenian interests:

1) A non-governmental organization or an opposition political party should file a lawsuit with Armenia’s Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality of the Protocols. This initiative would be separate from the legal requirement that the Constitutional Court pronounce judgment on whether a particular international agreement is in line with Armenia’s Constitution.

2) Before taking up these Protocols, the Armenian Parliament should wait and see if its Turkish counterpart will ratify them first.

3) If the Turkish Parliament fails to ratify the Protocols “in a reasonable timeframe,” the Armenian government should declare them to be null and void.

4) The Armenian Parliament should not ratify the Protocols, if the Turkish Parliament attaches any reservations or provisions at the time of ratification.

5) The Armenian government should withdraw the Protocols from parliamentary consideration, if the Turkish Parliament links its ratification to unrelated issues, such as the Artsakh negotiations or the Armenian Genocide.

6) The Armenian Parliament should add a provision to the Protocols, stating that they would be considered null and void, if after ratification Turkey does not open the border with Armenia within the stipulated 60-day timeframe or if it closes the border after opening it. In fact, Pres. Sargsyan committed himself to adding such a provision, in response to a suggestion I made during his meeting with Armenian-American leaders in Los Angeles on October 4.

7) The Armenian Parliament, before ratifying the Protocols, should pass a law making it illegal for any governmental entity or agency to participate in any effort that questions the truth of the Armenian Genocide. This law would counter declarations made by Turkish leaders and others that the historical sub-commission mentioned in the Protocols would re-examine the facts of the Armenian Genocide.

The Armenian Parliament should make it illegal for any Armenian official to negotiate, sign or approve any territorial concessions regarding Artsakh. This would shut the door firmly on repeated Turkish demands for Armenian concessions on Artsakh, prior to the ratification of the Protocols.

9) The Armenian Parliament should declare the Treaty of Kars, signed under duress by the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, to be null and void. Once the Treaty of Kars is annulled, the reference in the Protocols to relevant international treaties defining the existing Armenian-Turkish border would no longer be valid and therefore, would not preclude future Armenian territorial demands from Turkey.

It is imperative that the Armenian authorities implement the foregoing steps, because merely providing verbal explanations in defense of the Protocols would not eliminate their detrimental effects.

Since Armenia’s leaders are unwilling or unable to renegotiate and amend these Protocols, due to the international pressure brought to bear on them — as seen during the Zurich spectacle — the least they should do is to take actions that would limit the damage to Armenia’s national interests.

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Degerli arkadaslar, Onemli bir Ermeni stratejisti her konuda Turkiye’yi hakladiklarini dusunuyor. Ben de ona katiliyorum. I recommend you read the “positions” section towards the end if nothing else. Second best to read is the Conditions table. Fatma S. ocs/Armenia-Turkey%20Protocol+Analysis%2 0Rev%205.1.pdf.Turkish-Armenian Protocols: Reality and Irrationality

David Davidian

September 30, 2009

The Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Republic of

Armenia and the Republic of Turkey officially announced in Berne, Yerevan, and Ankara on August 31, 2009, has been brought to center stage and not without controversy. In order to fully appreciate and rationally analyze this yet-to-be-ratified document that is meant to serve as the basis for further dialog between the parties, its origins and accepted norms of international behavior regarding it must be understood. The document exists, it is not going away, and undoubtedly will be ratified by the Armenian Parliament in short order. The Turkish Parliament may delay ratification. While this article cannot cover every aspect in depth, the attempt is to provide a foundation to understand what may or may not be transpiring between Armenia and Turkey and why.

This Protocol is the culmination of at least five years of discussions between Armenians and Turks at different official levels. Beginning circa 2003, talks were underway between then Turkish and Armenians foreign ministers Abdullah Gul and Vartan Oskanian respectively. While these talks had the appearance of being non-productive, in 2005 Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan suggested instituting a joint historical commission to study what was termed “claims of genocide”. Armenia and Turkey are talking for many reasons; if for no other reason they are neighbors, irrespective of the outstanding historical issues. Why might Armenia deign talking with Turkey? Without talking, nothing can be addressed between the two parties, including issues not related to the Protocol, and these are the parties who are the internationally recognized as players, in spite of an extensive Armenian Diaspora.

Neither Armenia nor Turkey is in a position to unilaterally act completely independent of the interests of larger regional or international states. Subordinate states have to

constantly re-examine their interests in order to adjust with those of major powers with the aim of maximizing bargaining stand while understanding (and attempting not to capitulate to) the interest of the other parties. In general, this precludes these states from engaging in zero sum inanity, such as demanding an all-or-nothing state of affairs.

If the combined political pressure from Russia, US, and EU “strongly suggests” not only Armenia consider discussing with the Turks lifting their border blockade but attempt to discuss historical issues, it is not acceptable or even in Armenia’s interest to simply say “no”. In a crude analogy, Serbia’s Milosevic responded with the refrain “no, no, no” in response to the demands of major powers to end the campaign of ethnic cleansing regardless of the claim “we didn’t start it”. His country was bombed and its infrastructure heavily damaged.

Equivalent pressure was put on the Turkey to begin serious talks with Armenia in spite of Turkish demands that Armenian forces leave Nagorno-Karabakh and its environs, and that Armenia end support for genocide recognition before discussions can become substantive1. Interestingly enough, neither of these Turkish demands is stated in the Protocol.

Interplay of Competing and Converging Interests

There appears to be a confluence of outcome in advancing Armenian-Turkish relations despite major interests appearing orthogonal to each other. The EU requires no border conflicts among any of its members or those in ascension towards membership, such as Turkey. It also has trade pacts and bilateral agreements with Turkey required by EU’s ascension criteria. The Turkish blockade of the Armenian border makes a mockery of many of their tenets. Moreover, the EU would like to see a stable Caucasus to facilitate energy transport to Europe, as parts of Europe froze last winter when Russia was forced to shut gas through Ukrainian transport pipelines. Any stable routing is in EU’s interest. Moreover, without an open border, Armenia cannot actively engage in the European Neighborhood Policy which is an extension of the European Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Armenia. As of 20062 the resulting Action Plan for Armenia has provided over 2 billion Euros in Community assistance. The EU would like to see the fruits of their assistance grow through expanded trade. While it is unclear if Armenia would be part of any future or expanded energy transit routes, Turkey does want to expand its role and Armenia provides a convenient and alternative pathway. In the process, Georgia’s role as a forced transit route around Armenia may diminish. This would be in Russia’s interest.

The full extent of Russian interests in advancing this Protocol itself could be the subject of a small book.. However, it is clear that Russian economic interests in Armenia, which are considerable, amounting to nearly $2.5B3, can generate better returns with at least a semi-open border and established relations between Armenia and Turkey. Russia’s ability to bring Armenia to its knees in short order is astounding. It could force the closure of the Armenian nuclear power plant at Medzamor, for “technical reasons”, eliminating about 40% of Armenia’s electrical generating capacity. Russian gas, running through Georgian pipelines to Armenia could easily be “damaged” during winter months, cutting off gas and crippling Armenia. This combined with the ability to enact restrictions on remittances from Russian Armenians; it is clear Russia holds the keys in Armenia.

Whether Armenia should have sold off critical infrastructure to the Russians is now a

moot point. Russia watched Azerbaijan react in disbelief when Turkish President Abdullah Gul traveled to Armenia for a soccer match a year ago. It appeared to Azerbaijan that Turkey had forsaken it with Gul stepping foot in Armenia. Turkey has been the champion in support of Azerbaijan in the frozen conflict over the Armenian populated enclave Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh had been placed under Azerbaijani jurisdiction during the Soviet era. Now it is basically an extension of Armenia after Azerbaijan lost control of it in a war. Over the past year, Azerbaijan made threats to stop gas shipments to Turkey and the use of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and began auditing institutions in Azerbaijan funded with Turkish money. Turkey maintained, until the Protocol was made public, that it would not enter into border discussions until Armenian troops vacated Nagorno-Karabakh. There could not have been a more efficient way to create suspicion of Turkish intentions towards Azerbaijan, brining Baku to a point where it could decide to transport a larger percentage of its gas via existing Russian pipelines.

The Azerbaijanis may not like dealing with the Russians, but at least the latter is

predictable. Georgia’s war with Russia changed the balance of power in the Caucasus and in doing so became a catalyst in advancing Armenian-Turkish talks and accelerating, by perhaps a year or so, the establishment of the Protocols. Georgia became one of the two frontline states, along with Ukraine, that became a battleground for influence between the US and Russia. The United States can project power, but little can replace the influence on Georgia and Ukraine of a neighboring power. In the end, Georgia became a weaker state after the August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, not just because it effectively lost South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and is under partial blockade, but Russia made a clear statement about its continued influence in the Southern Caucasus. Azerbaijan was subsequently forced to re-think entertaining notions of attacking Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the zeal to create rough parity with the increased Russian influence moving south

across the Caucasus, Turkey was forced to engage Armenia by: accelerating diplomatic efforts, Gul attending the soccer match in Armenia, and advancing a now-defunct Caucasian Initiative, all at the expense of Azerbaijan. This exposed a flaw in Turkish foreign policy by damaging relations with Azerbaijan. In addition, Turkey has shown interest in actually buying Caspian Basin gas and reselling to the EU, cutting into Azerbaijani profits. Individual state interest trumps so-called brotherly relations.

The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war terminated Russia’s use of Georgian transport routes to maintain activities at Russian military bases in Armenia.. Reports and quick Turkish denials claim the Russians began working with Turkey to allow the use of their airspace to maintain operations in Armenia4,5. Also, supply trains destined for Armenia initially remained stalled in Georgia, creating enough worry that Georgian routes to the Black Sea or to the North Caucasus are simply not reliable for Armenian trade.

A closed Armenian border with Turkey would make any land transport of Russian

military items difficult – an open border would facilitate this. Why might Turkey allow

Russia to transport military equipment to its base in Gyumri? For Turkey, the prospect of an arrangement, especially on its terms, outweighed any potential threats from Russian bases especially in light of greatly increased bilateral trade and cooperation in potential energy transport to the EU. Besides, once in operation, Turkey can always attempt to extract concessions from Russia for the use of transport routes and can restrict passage any time.

Russia and Turkey cannot project complimentary influence in the larger region without a resolution of the Turkish blockade of the Armenian border. The $500M Russian loan to Armenia6 earlier this year reinforces the strategic importance Russia places on Armenia and with clear ability to influence policies in Yerevan.

There is talk of Turkey warming up to the estranged Georgian region of Abkhazia, which advances Russian interest at the expense of Georgian-Turkish relations. In the words of a think tank associated with the Turkish FM, “Ankara could no longer ignore the new reality in the region”7. Armenian news outlets have quoted Cenk Baslamis writing in the Turkish daily Milliyet, “Ankara will recognize independence of Abkhazia in the near future, while Moscow will recognize Turkish part of Cyprus”. Apparently, this topic began surfacing with an article by Paul Goble in the English Language Georgian Daily8. While this could hardly happen overnight, the trial balloon has been released. Ultimately, Turkey can simultaneously give tacit approval of the “new reality” while fomenting anti-Russian agitation in Abkhazia. Turkish-Russian political relationships have been quite dynamic since talks began circa 1996 to reduce Turkish involvement in Russia’s Chechen war and Russian support for the PKK9. The Turkish-Russian relationship culminated with the historic visit of Russian President Putin to Turkey in late 200410.

One can see a confluence of Russian and Turkish interest on one side and US pressure on the Turks to “unfreeze” discussions with Armenians and reach some interim agreement — the Protocol11.

The US has transitioned its policy objectives in the southern Caucasus from those of the previous decade. In the last decade the US aimed to secure the development of latent energy reserves and the ability to securely move them westward. Much of this effort was centered upon Azerbaijani oil and gas reserves and those on the eastern shores of the Caspian, such as Turkmen gas and Kazakh oil. This effort required the exaggeration of existing Azerbaijani reserves and tolerating a series of despotic regimes in Baku. The US State Department claimed that from 50 to 200 billion barrels of oil existed under Azerbaijani sovereignty. It turned out to be from 5 to 20 billion barrels. In fact, Azerbaijan will become net importer of oil by about 2021, with peak output declining circa 2012, unless substantial new fields are discovered12. Claims such as “The Deal of a Century” were touted in the western presses, especially in the US and the UK.

Clearly, the regional competitor capable of transporting Caspian Basin energy

resources was Russia. As the decade proceeded various projects were proposed. The largest was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project signed in 1994. This pipeline avoided Armenia and Iran, even though it was more expensive to construct the line through Georgia. Being Russia’s strategic partner in the region, Armenia was bypassed for political reasons. Iran was not even considered, since Azerbaijan is a major source of oil for Israel. US energy related companies have substantial percentage interest in nearly every transport consortium and gas or oil fields in Azerbaijan.

The latest gas pipeline proposed is the Nabbuco pipeline supplying Azerbaijani and

Turkmen gas through Turkey, to the Balkans and into central Europe. Other projects

include BlueStream bringing Russian gas into Turkey via a pipeline under the Black

Sea.

As western energy development and transport schemes became viable alternatives to the Russian pipelines and with Russia architecting and successfully negotiating with energy partners, by early to mid this decade, US policy in the region moved from competition with Russia to mild cooperation. Peace and stability were in both US and Russian interest. As energy transportation requires deposits and contiguous geography respectively, US (and European) efforts became focused first on freezing armed hostilities, then onto solving existing ethnic disputes. The closed Turkish-Armenian frontier must have been at the top of that list, considering the zeal at which Turkey accepted the soccer match invitation at the jaw dropping chagrin of Baku.

US officials have stated that an open border with Turkey would reduce Armenia’s

dependence on both Russia and Iran. However, any reduction in Russian influence on Armenia with an open Turkish border is questionable since Russia owns major

segments of Armenian’s strategic infrastructure, such as the electrical grid, the

operation of Armenia’s nuclear power station, the rail system, and has interest in the

Armenian-Iranian gas pipeline, among other things.

If steady energy transport and revenues generated are at the basis for current US

policy, it may not be surprising that a change in the political status quo of Nagorno-

Karabakh may now be in the interest of major powers. Until now the status quo with

respect to Nagorno-Karabakh was in the interest of major players except for those in

Baku who daily bellicose vocabulary would have one expecting an Azerbaijani attack on NK any day for the past several years. This frozen status was used by Moscow to

influence policy in Azerbaijan. The “new regional realities” and political transformations have taken place with the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh conducting their own affairs outside of Azerbaijani sovereignty. The existence of Nagorno-Karabakh in any form does not affect the transport of energy, for there would be no logical reason to run any pipelines over its mountains when that region is surrounded by relatively flat lands. In addition, NK does not have any hydrocarbon deposits. A real resolution to the NK conflict may be possible in the near future in light of these “new regional realities”.

With an open or semi-open Turkish-Armenian border, Georgia will quickly lose much of its overland transport fees from Armenian wholesale importers. Reduced importance of Georgia on Armenia also serves Russian interests. Russia would prefer to see Georgia in its sphere of influence. Until that time, Russia would like Georgia simply wither on the vine.

The Protocol

Other than state institutions and the negotiators themselves, no one knows under what conditions, stated or perceived interests, principles, etc., the Protocol discussions proceeded. The process was not at all transparent. It is clear that a unique confluence of political resolve exhibited between the US and Russia across the Atlantic and between Turkey and Russia regionally, had a strong influence on both parties to reach a framework for further negotiations. It is not accurate to assume that Turkey, Armenia or both could simply ignore these international pressures.

Before the Protocol was made public, Turkey maintained two basic preconditions that had to be addressed before formal negotiations could proceed: Armenia end its support for expanding international recognition of the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, and Armenian forces withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions. In addition to these two basic preconditions, references were made regarding Armenia specifically stating it has no claims on any lands in eastern Anatolia and by default recognizing current borders as inviolable. None of these items are mentioned in the Protocol. There are only three actionable items in the Protocol, the rest is procedural13. These are:

1. Agree to open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of

this Protocol,

2. Agree to conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of

Foreign Affairs of the two countries;

implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual

confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination

of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate

recommendations;

make the best possible use of existing transport, communications and energy

infrastructure and networks between the two countries, and to undertake

measures in this regard;

develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between the

two countries;

cooperate in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations

between the appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of

specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage

of both sides and launching common cultural projects;

establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on

Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance and

protection to the citizens of the two countries;

take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic

cooperation between the two countries;

engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.

3. Agree on the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission

which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the prompt implementation

of the commitments mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in this Protocol.

To prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its

sub-commissions, a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs

shall be created 2 months after the day following the entry into force of this

Protocol. Within 3 months after the entry into force of this Protocol, these

modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The intergovernmental

commission shall meet for the first time immediately after the adoption of the said

modalities. The sub-commissions shall start their work at the latest 1 month

thereafter and they shall work continuously until the completion of their

mandates. The timetable and elements agreed by both sides for the

implementation of this Protocol are mentioned in the annexed document, which is

integral part of this Protocol.

Both Turkey and Armenia must ratify the text before this Protocol becomes actionable.

Item 1 is the clause that serves as the basis for opening the border. However, how open

it would be and restrictions of its use by the parties, is not stated.

Item 2 refers to the furtherance of bilateral relations, but in particular notes a bilateral

commission to be established to examine the “historical” record. While not explicitly

stated, the overarching historical issue is the genocide of the Armenians. It is generally

understood this is the paramount issue that will be examined.

Item 3 is a procedural item referring to implementing Item 2.

Since Armenia has long stated its desire to enter into discussions with Turkey without

any preconditions to affect a resolution of Item 1 — lifting the Turkish border blockade —

it can be assumed that Item 2 was a Turkish initiative. It is also assumed that Turkey

was never strategically or fundamentally against opening the border, judging by its

current tactical interests.

Thus, we can tabulate the preconditions that were suggested, agreed to or dismissed

throughout discussions, post 2005, especially after the election of Armenian President

Serge Sarkisyan in 2008.

Condition Suggesting Party In Protocol

Open Border Both Yes

Armenian forces withdraw from N.K. Turkey No

Historical Commission Turkey Yes

End International Recognition of Arm. G. Turkey No

Explicitly State no Land Claims on Western Arm. Turkey No

Roughly speaking, the outcome of the agreement is the promise of an open border in

exchange for the establishment of the historic commission.

The “winning” and “losing” party has been spun by both sides. Typical of Turkish spin is read in the pro-government daily Hurriyet, September 15, 2009, in an article written by Yusuf Kanli14 where he states,

“First of all Armenia has accepted for the first time ever the creation of a history

commission that might feature historians from interested third parties in

examining the genocide claims. That is, without saying so the Serge Sarkisian

administration of Armenian has conceded from the “Genocide is a fact, there is

no need to verify it through scientific research or to discuss it” position.”

What appears to be an Armenian concession to the Turks is at best a method for Turks to delay international debate on genocide recognition. It is unclear why the Turkish side sees this as a victory unless delaying recognition was their original goal. Using such a commission as a delay tactic will ultimately result in a strategic blunder as Turkish disingenuousness will be clear to the international community. Whether the Turkish end game is gaining a few years of leeway or denying consent to an unfavorable commission outcome, or both, can have negative repercussions with EU countries, highlighting Turkish resistance to reforms expected of it. This may be the case with European states that have recognized the genocide, such as Switzerland. Switzerland is a party to this Protocol process.

Turkey may have made another mistake in misreading Armenian opposition to a

historical commission since Erdogan suggested it in 2005. Armenian opposition to an historical commission, mainly seen in the Diaspora, is based on the assumption that any inquiry into the historical record regarding the genocide is tantamount to questioning the veracity of the genocide. Over twenty countries have recognized the Turkish genocide of the Armenians as an indisputable fact and the Society of Genocide Scholars have stated without reservation that the Armenians were subject to genocide. Scores of renown historians agree it was genocide and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), commission by the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission, in their study concluded the Armenians were subject to genocide15 What other possible outcome could such an honest historical commission as stated in Item 2, be other than a reiteration of what is an accepted fact. Unlike the Jews in the aftermath of the Nuremberg Trials, Armenians do not have the luxury of completely rejecting any inquiries into confirming the genocide. The Jews have the ability to reject as blasphemous, for example, somebody publishing an analysis of the gas used in gas chambers as being not really Zyklon-B, but perhaps Zyklon-C, or –D.

Recent Armenian protests16 and proclamations against this commission certainly give the Turks reason to assume they extracted some sort of a concession from the Armenians. Protests since 2005 against any historical commission may have unwittingly helped Armenia’s negotiators.

Paraphrasing Turkish professor Taner Akcam17, what previously unknown document

could possibly exist that will allow one to negate the genocide of the Armenians in light of all the research that has been done and the clear recognition it has received.

It is entirely possible that Armenian historians would be so inept so as to allow Turkish denialists to re-write history. The chance of this happening with the entire concerned world watching is doubtful. Moreover, if the commission becomes a mockery of the facts, any conclusions it makes would be considered effectively null and void. Besides, chances are high that many of the commission sessions will be hosted in Switzerland, which not only has recognized the crime of genocide committed against the Armenians, but should arrest any deniers on their territory. However, even if the outcome of the historical commission’s “research” reiterates the fact of genocide, subsequent redress may remain unresolved.

Yusuf Kanli continues:

“Secondly, for the first time ever in the post-Soviet era, Armenia has agreed to

recognize the joint border with Turkey as was defined in the Kars treaty, though

there is no reference in the protocols to the Kars treaty. Such recognition by

Armenia is no less than declaring it has no territorial claims from Turkey or it has

turned a cold shoulder to Diaspora’s land claims from Turkey.”

There is a border that exists between Armenia and Turkey. On one side are Turkish

guards, on the other Russian and Armenian ones. Recognizing the current border is

required in order to open it. Hurriyet and its editors engage in extreme spin when they

claim that border recognition requires recognizing the process that created that

demarcation. No where in the Protocol does it mention the Treaty of Kars, the Treaty of Moscow, or the Treaty of Alexandropol for that matter. This is because there is no

international obligation for Armenia to recognize such previous treaties in this case. This is well defined in Villiger’s Customary International Law and Treaties18 and in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties19, ratified by Armenia20 in May 2005. The latter clearly states in Section 2,

APPLICATION OF TREATIES

Article 28: Non-retroactivity of treaties

Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established,

its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or

any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the

treaty with respect to that party.

Article 29: Territorial scope of treaties

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a

treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.

Article 30: Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter

1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and

obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subjectmatter

shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.

2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as

incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty

prevail.

3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but

the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the

earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with

those of the latter treaty.

4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier

one:

(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in

paragraph 3;

(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the

treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights

and obligations.

5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the

termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any

question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or

application of a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations

towards another State under another treaty.

At the time of this writing Turkey still has not ratified this convention21. Armenia has and is under no obligation to recognize the Treaty of Kars or Moscow that basically resulted in the current Turkish-Armenian border. The United States ratified this convention on April 24, 1970.

Positions

Armenia is in an interesting diplomatic position at the publication of this Protocol. The

only item that changes anything is the physical lifting of the Turkish border blockade.

Armenia should ratify this Protocol without delay and put pressure on Turkey not to

delay or will pay the PR consequences.

Turkey is in a situation where it has alienated its ally Azerbaijan by appearing to cut a deal with Armenia and has been making deals with Russia. It may also be under the false impression it has extracted concessions from Armenia. Turkey cannot appear overtly pan-Turkic in rhetoric in its support of Azerbaijan, as it will be used by opponents of Turkey’s EU ascension. Turkey may try to drag out the mandate of an historical commission but that has its time limits as well. Armenian diplomacy can consistently point to Turkish delay tactics.

Turkey also has an issue with ratification. Some opposition parties object to opening of the border without a resolution of the NK conflict. Turkey might use this as an excuse to re-work the Protocol, but that would come at a loss to Turkish diplomacy. Armenia can use this period to press Turkey publicly with actual preconditions if Turkish nonratification is being used as a technique to gain concessions from Armenia. If Turkey does indeed ratify the Protocol, the pro-Islamic AK party will be on the carpet to deliver the goods for Turkey. They have to end alienating Azerbaijan, not appearing too overtly helpful to Armenia while trying to convince the EU it is sincere in solving its ascension demands, and work with its new energy partner, Russia. If Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu, Prime Minster Tayyip Erdogan, and President Adbullah Gul fail to convince the Turkish public and the military that engaging Armenia using the guidelines agreed to in the Protocols, there may indeed be early elections in Turkey before 2012. The AK party could be swept from power, leaving the Protocol in the hands of nationalists which could face public pressure to declare it null and void.

Turkey will be in a diplomatic disadvantage if Armenia makes no errors.

Trade Issues

There appears to be no official public study commissioned by the government of

Armenia having as its basis a political and economic analysis demonstrating that

opening the border between Armenia and Turkey will benefit anybody. Armenia may

actually have an argument and not even know it. What has been stated publicly are

simply guesses, usually positive, by members of the Armenian Parliament, Turkologists, “experts”, or oligarchs. An open border isn’t binary as almost all simple guesses have been based on. An “open border” may simply mean it is not totally closed and only allow products and material to traverse a limited number of hours or days a week or may mean automobile and bus traffic allowed on a weekly basis. There may never be a completely open border. It could also be completely open. This is an unknown at this time, but its answer lies at the center of the affects of an open Turkish-Armenian border on the Armenian economy.

This missing study must include a competitive analysis of all major Armenian industries covering at a minimum: management team expertise, product sales & marketing, product planning, market channels and development, government relations, crossborder transportation, international business planning, credit and banking reviews, and yes, accounting practices. One must then compare these industries with their Turkish counterparts and using Armenian and Turkish demographic buying patterns, determine the viability probability of each Armenian industry assuming free and open competition with the added affects of partial and severe protectionism. Past, current and projected trading patterns must be evaluated. In parallel, a comparative study must be done with the only other country having a similar geo-political and economic position and that is Georgia. Such a study must determine why Georgia’s GDP is down nearly 40% from a year ago considering it has free and open trade with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and has many

Black Sea ports.

Solid conclusions cannot be made without studies. If the studies are skewed (such as not taking into account: general corruption, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud,

racketeering, graft, extortion, cartels, blackmail, potential EC-centric liability and product quality issues, engagement and exit strategies adjusting for changes in the Turkish government policies, Georgian and Iranian reaction, changes in employment patterns and the consequences of any subsequent brain drain, etc.) there is every chance of a failed evaluation. Perhaps the reason none of these studies seem to exist is because they would expose too much of Armenia’s black economy.

If history is any guide, Armenian oligarchs and those aspiring to be, may simply attempt to sell assets to Turks. An easy way to personal wealth is to replace the “headache” of producing domestic products with those made in Turkey, considering local distribution channels exist and are near monopolies. Armenians emptied out factories in the country in early and mid-nineties and sold their contents, including machines, to the Iranians.

Apparently no accounting was made of those transactions.

It will be interesting to note if laws will be enacted to protect indigenous Armenian

industries. Unregulated trade, combined with 90 years of Turkish experience in the

mechanisms of market economics, could easily destroy Armenia’s economy and return the Armenian people to the specter of Turkish domination.

However, with Russian control of major segments of Armenia’s infrastructure, unfettered Turkish inroads into the Armenian economy will presumably be moderated. In addition, EU analysis will be watching closely over Turkish treatment of its neighbors.

References

1 Turkish-Armenian relations, Football diplomacy, September 3, 2009

https://www.economist.com/europe/2009/09/03/football-diplomacy

2 Armenia,

3 There Are Still Untapped Reserves in Armenian – Russian Friendship,

4 Georgian Transit Ban Hinders Russian Military Presence in Armenia,

5 Ankara Denies Turkey Route for Russian Base in Gumri,

6 Armenia Confirms $500 Million Loan From Russia

https://www.rferl.org/a/Armenia_Confirms_Loan_From_Russia/1380318.html

7 Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia,

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-abkhazia-ties-test-turkeys-strategic-partnership-with-georgia/

62793752

8 Might Turkey be the Next Country to Recognize Abkhazia?, Paul Goble,

http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14534&Itemid=

130

9 Turkish Volunteers in Chechnya,

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-volunteers-in-chechnya/, Russia

accuses Turkish NGOs of continuing aid to Chechen rebels, praises improvements in

Saudi approach, , Russia’s “Kurdish

Card” In Turkish-Russian Rivalry,

10 Improving Turkish-Russian Relations: Turkey’s New Foreign Policy and Its

Implications for the United States,

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/rise-uae-and-meaning-mbz?CID=2219

11 Themes behind Turkey’s surprise move on Armenia,

12 Real Azerbaijan, “Khronika Neobyavlennoi Katastrofi (Chronically Unannounced

Catastrophe) January 2, 2007, Eldar Namazov

13 Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of

Armenia and the Republic of Turkey.

www.armenianow.com/pdf/20090831_protocol.pdf

14 The Armenian Opening,

2009-09-15

15 The Applicability of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the Crime of Genocide to Events Which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century

— Legal Analysis Prepared for the International Center for Transitional Justice

16 Aghjayan: In Pursuit of Justice and True Friendship,

17 Taner Akçam: The decision will be made by politicians, not historians,

politicians-not-historians

18 Customary International Laws and Treaties, Mark Villiger, 1985 ISBN 90-247-2980-7.

This is available at:

on+the+law+of+treaties&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=aboOfjxNy0&sig=6muWH

nnFkwNR3-_g-jRUT8K07ow&hl=en&ei=HcixSuz2M5-

NtgfV_KDzBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false

20 On July 13, 2006 Armenia recorded a reservation:

Reservation

“The Republic of Armenia does not consider itself bound by the provisions of article 66 of the

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and declares that for any dispute among the

Contracting Parties concerning the application or the interpretation of any article of part V of the

Convention to be submitted to the International Court of Justice for a decision or to the

Conciliation Commission for consideration the consent of all the parties to the dispute is required

in each separate case.”

21 Treaty Status of: 21-09-2009 04:03:52 EDT,

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/PageNotFound.aspx

apter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en

About the author: David Davidian is a Sr System Architect at a major IT corporation

engaging in Technical Intelligence Analysis. He manages the US office of

RegionalKinetics.com and currently resides in Belmont, MA, USA

October 14, 2009

US Armenians doubtful over relations with Turkey – Al Jazeera

From: Yusif Babanly [[email protected]]

—
Yusif Babanly
Board of Directors
Azerbaijani American Council (AAC)
14781 Memorial Dr., # 19
Houston, TX 77079
[email protected]
www.aac.azeris.org

October 14, 2009

ANCA STATEMENT

ON THE SIGNING OF THE TURKEY-ARMENIA PROTOCOLS

Armenian National Committee of America
1711 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Tel. (202) 775-1918 * Fax. (202) 775-5648 * [email protected]

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Release ~ 2009-10-10
Contact: Elizabeth S. Chouldjian ~ Tel: (202) 775-1918

ANCA STATEMENT ON THE SIGNING OF THE TURKEY-ARMENIA PROTOCOLS

WASHINGTON, DC – ANCA Chairman Ken Hachikian made the following statement following the signing of the Turkey-Armenia protocols earlier today.

“The success of Turkey in pressuring Armenia into accepting these humiliating, one-sided protocols proves, sadly, that genocide pays.”

“President Obama, rather than honoring his pledge to recognize the Armenian Genocide, went in exactly the opposite direction, applying the full force of our nation’s diplomacy to twist the arm of a landlocked and blockaded Armenia – a nation still struggling with the brutal legacy of its near-destruction – into accepting a dangerous set of protocols that call into question this very crime against humanity.”

“The ANCA and all Armenian Americans will continue our efforts to restore morality to our nation’s response to the Armenian Genocide, and, more broadly, to the cause of genocide prevention. We will also work to prevent Turkey from using this agreement to further its genocide denial campaign, to undermine the rights of the Armenian nation, or to threaten the freedom of Nagorno Karabagh.”

Azeri Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Karabakh After Protocols Signing
Armenia, Turkey Sign Protocols
ANCA Issue Statement On U.S. Pressure For Adoption Of Protocols
ANCA Protests Protocols Pressure on Armenia
AGBU Central Board of Directors Issues Statement on Armenia-Turkey protocols

6 Responses for “ANCA Statement On The Signing Of The Turkey-Armenia Protocols”

satenik says:

October 10, 2009 at 12:59 pm

Amot! Hazar amot!
Van Zakarean says:

October 10, 2009 at 1:45 pm

Bravo Ken Kachigian.

Turkey must pay for the Armenian genocide.
turkey will pay.

Genocide with no repercussions for the perpetrators,
reparations, restitution and return of lands for the few offspring of the survivors
is unacceptable.

turkey is nothing more than a sham nation built upon illegal abductions,
kidnappings, forced conversions to Islam of ever Armenian
from my grandparetn’s immediate family members to Armenian
women and boys from 9 centuries ago.

When is the commission to study 900 years of Turkish brutality
culminating in the 30 year massacre and expulsion
of 5 million Christians,
Armenians, greeks and Assyrians — more than 75% of whom died
and 12.5% of whom were converted to another religion
and ethnic group — GENOCIDE
by U.N. definition?

Shame on Armenia’s government..

Embarasment and humiliation upon the children and grandchildren
of Armenia–too impotent and few to overcome
the power of the Genocidal nation known as
illegal Turkiye.

Turkey:

Armenian blood on her hands,
Armenian blood in her veins,
Armenian blood on her teeth,
Armenian blood on her mind.

That is Turkey!
Krikor Ajemian says:

October 10, 2009 at 3:15 pm

Now it all begins.
Katia K. says:

October 11, 2009 at 12:07 pm

Our incongruity has been our weak link, and the one thing that our enemies have used consistently to break our backs.
Legal and Civic ties between the Diaspora and Armenia, such as dual citizenship, SHOULD BECOME THE NAME OF THE GAME FROM THIS POINT ON. All Armenians should partake in Armenia’s international and foreign affairs and have the right to vote on them. Not a penny should go to the campaigns of ANY US presidential candidate. The stance of the American State Department vis a vis our cause is loud and clear. Guess what, it has been the same for the last 94 years. Instead, regular income should go to Armenia in the form of a “national tax” that every Armenian should pay yearly to our homeland. That way, we can all claim a legal stake in the political health of our homeland.
Our unity is now our only chance to survive as a people.
These protocols are aimed to take care of the obvious, but also serve to demoralize the Diaspora because they serve to take away the only glue, Hye Tadh, that kept us together. It is high time that we all take upon ourselves the responsibility of being dully engaged in our homeland.. To be politically viable, we all have to be on the same page. How do we expect anyone to take us seriously if one hand does not know what the other is up to?
The first and most important politicians that we should LOBBY should be the politicians in Armenia. All others have made ping pong balls out of us, while they cut deals with Turkey. We will always take their “promises “with a grain of salt. Regular conferences and talks should be organized between the Diapsora and Armenia. WE BELONG TO ARMENIA AND TO ARMENIA ALONE.
Diane Piranian says:

October 11, 2009 at 6:44 pm

Turkish soil — soaked with Armenian Blood. It is not over!
Ahmot. Ahmot. Ahmot. Armenia and its people were sold by
a bunch of mediocre rogue politicians.

God Bless Armenia!
Barkev Asadourian says:

October 12, 2009 at 12:29 pm

TO WHOLE ARMENIIAN PEOPLE MAJOR STRUGGLE
MUST START SOON NOT ONLY AGAINST TURKEY PLUS
ARMENIA’S REGIME