| Written by Administrator |
| Thursday, 15 October 2009 16:00 |
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Turkey closed its Armenian Border and suspended the relations between Turkey and Armenia as a consequence of the Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, in 1992. Recently a protocol between the Turkish and the Armenian governments has been signed, which may lead to the opening of Borders and normalizations of relations between the two nations, if approved by both nations’ parliaments. To the best of our knowledge, the protocol agreed by the two sides does not have any provisions that indicate that Armenia has promised to meet any of the conditions Turkey has put forth for opening of the Armenian Border and normalization of the relations between the two nations. Quite the contrary, the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian has recently stated that normalization of the relations between the two states should have no preconditions, and that Turkey and Armenia have a mutual understanding to that end. TurkishPAC firmly opposes normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations without preconditions. It believes that normalization should depend on Armenia’s agreeing to certain conditions. In particular, Armenia should:
With regard to items 3 and 4, note should also be made that in its Declaration of Independence in 1990, Armenia declared its support to false “genocide” claims against Turkey and has referred to Eastern Anatolia as “Western Armenia,” and as such, considers this area as part of Armenia. That is not a friendly posture toward a neighbor. TurkishPAC continues to view with apprehension the Turkish Government’s signing a protocol with Armenia, which will lead to opening the border and normalization of the relations between the two countries without any preconditions. TurkishPAC Board of Directors |
Category: Armenian Question
“The great Turk is governing in peace twenty nations from different religions. Turks have taught to Christians how to be moderate in peace and gentle in victory.”Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary
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Houston/TEXAS: TurkishPAC’s Position on the Recently Signed Protocol
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Letter Of Turkish Armenian Sevan Ince Before Committing Suicide
The other night, we four Armenian friends were out from our Clubhouse and enjoying our water pipes at Galatasaray. The conversation turned around and came to the known topic. I sensed that every one is troubled on the same subject. How would you make this heard to the world as a Turk with Armenian origin being a simple citizen of Turkey? . .
You are not a reputed artist, politician or president of some association that others would extend the microphone to you for an interview. You are not a columnist, so that you can make your ideas heard from your newspaper corner. All is fine, but we are fed up with this affair. Other persons speak in our place, knowing or having no idea.
On one side say that “there was a genocide made to Armenians” and on the other side they say “there is no genocide”. Now the latest fashion is those who say, “let us leave it to historians”. I just look to those who say that there was a genocide committed, and I see that they are either diaspora members full of hatred and grudge or politicians, who have a benefit from the matter. I look at those who say “there was no genocide” and I see that they have no deep knowledge, but refuse it as a habit. Moreover, speaking of historians, for God’s sake, what are they going to find out? Can be there a document of genocide? If a document is found by accident, a counter document is found and the argument continues to nowhere.
The truth is known by me and others like me, but no others! We are persons who heard the incidents from the first hand. We are Turkish Armenians. The Turkish Armenians bear a great difference from the Outside Armenians! We are the grand children of those Armenians who stayed in Turkey during the relocation or those who came back. We did not hear only one type of stories. Diaspora Armenians know only stories of death. They did not come back and did not see the embarrassed faces of their neighbors. They accuse only Turks for these deaths, they name all as genocide. But Turkish Armenians have many other different stories.
For example, my grandfather was telling how his elder brother was taken from his farm in Erzincan and that he had to pay a donkey-load of gold to a corporal as ransom to save him. None of them, the gold or brother came back! My grandmother was telling how the youngsters of the village were gathered, given arms and made revolutionist gangs. Persons who spoke foreign language gave their uniforms.
My grandfather used to tell in cries about the Ottoman Captain Sinan, who did his utmost to save all his family in Kayseri. Thanks to the captain, none in the family was ever hurt. We listened to stories of bloodshed, but we also heard of the Turks who lied in front of the Turkish soldiers to save his Armenian friend carried away, or the neighboring Turks who opened their arms when the relocated persons returned home.
Therefore, I say let them ask us. No one can be more objective than us. This story has a long version explanation and a short one. The short one is as follows:
A portion of the community was mislead by imperialist powers and fought for separation. The Ottoman government was angered and took decision for relocation. This relocation was carried under the difficult conditions prevailing at that time. The exiles were carried in various manners, and helpless persons, children suffered and died. These deaths were because of epidemics and hunger. There was no organized killing made by Ottoman soldiers. The deaths out of the epidemics are separate individual cases, and were done by the robbers of the region, to get hold of the gold in possession of the people being marched. It is a matter of debate if the Ottoman army fighting on several fronts, had enough soldiers to avoid the murders during the marches. Under the circumstances and given the fact that Armenians living in the western parts of the country never had such sufferings, this cannot be called a genocide. You can give other names, but none can be named “genocide”. Furthermore, the number of 1.5 million does not signify the number of deaths, but the number of losses.
We Turkish Armenians know pretty well that Anatolia is full of Armenians who became Moslem, during or after these incidents. These persons, when they became free later, did not return to their own religion and since they hide their past, they were put in the column of those lost. This is the short explanation.
If one has to speak, we can speak and tell them the long version of the incidents. There can be no other historians better than us!. As regards the French, they should chew musty cheese.
Sevan İnce
(Note: This letter was left by Sevan İnce, before he committed suicide, because his business went bad).
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A new role for Turkey
Friday, October 16, 2009
Article |
The Boston Globe | A new role for Turkey By Stephen Kinzer
October 15, 2009REACHING LAST weekend’s diplomatic breakthrough between Turkey and Armenia was not easy. It took six weeks of secret talks in Switzerland, seven last-minute phone calls from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to the two countries’ foreign ministers, and a wild ride in a Zurich police car, lights flashing and siren shrieking, for a Turkish diplomat carrying a revised draft of the accord.
This breakthrough could also be said to have taken 16 years, the length of time the Turkey-Armenia border has been shut, or 94 years, the time that has passed since Ottoman Turkish forces slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Armenians in what is now eastern Turkey.
In the end, pragmatism prevailed over emotion. Armenia is a poor, landlocked country that desperately needs an outlet to the world. Turkey is a booming regional power, but suffers from its refusal to acknowledge the massacres of 1915. With this accord, each side helps solve the other’s problem. The border is to be reopened and diplomatic relations restored, giving Armenia a chance to rejoin the world. Questions about what happened in 1915 – was it genocide? – will be submitted to historians for “impartial scientific examination.’’
The most bizarre aspect of this process was the effort by Armenians in France and the United States to derail it. Earlier this month in Paris, President Serge Sarkisian of Armenia was met by shouts of “Traitor!’’ and had to be protected by riot police. The potent Armenian-American lobby also rallied against the accord.
If President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran proposed that impartial historians examine the question of whether the Holocaust actually happened, most Jews would presumably accept happily. The failed rebellion by Armenians in the diaspora suggests that some are trapped by the past; their cousins back home, meanwhile, seek a better future.
“There is no alternative to the establishment of relations with Turkey without any precondition,’’ Sarkisian said as the new accord was signed. “It is the dictate of the time.’’
Both parliaments must ratify the accord. There will be disagreements over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, which Armenia occupies but which the rest of the world considers part of Azerbaijan, Turkey’s ally. Nonetheless, both countries seem resolved to thaw this long-frozen conflict. They will probably do whatever necessary to overcome remaining obstacles.
The accord will allow trade between the two countries to resume. It will also make it easier for Armenians to visit magnificent monuments from their past that lie within modern-day Turkey. Beyond that, it has far-reaching geopolitical importance.
For nearly all of its 86 years as a state, Turkey has kept a low profile in the world. Those days are over. Now Turkey is reaching for a highly ambitious regional role as a conciliator and peacemaker.
When Turkish officials land in bitterly divided countries like Lebanon or Afghanistan or Pakistan, every faction is eager to talk to them. No country’s diplomats are as welcome in both Tehran and Jerusalem, Moscow and Tblisi, Damascus and Cairo. As a Muslim country intimately familiar with the region around it, Turkey can go places, engage partners, and make deals that the United States cannot.
This new Turkish role holds tantalizing potential. Before Turkey can play it fully, though, it must put its own house in order. That is one reason its leaders were so eager to resolve their country’s dispute with Armenia.
Turkey has one remaining international problem to resolve: Cyprus. Then it must solidify its democracy at home. That means lifting restrictions on free speech and fully respecting minority rights not just those of Kurds, whose culture has been brutalized by decades of repression, but also those of Christians, non-mainstream Muslims, and unbelievers.
Under other circumstances, Egypt, Pakistan, or Iran might have emerged to lead the Islamic world. Their societies, however, are weak, fragmented, and decomposing. Indonesia is a more promising candidate, but it has no historic tradition of leadership and is far from the center of Muslim crises. That leaves Turkey. It is trying to seize this role. Making peace with Armenia was an important step. More are likely to come soon.
Stephen Kinzer is the author of “Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change From Hawaii to Iraq.’’
© Copyright 2009 Globe Newspaper Company. -
ATAA’s analysis of Turkish-Armenian protocols gives no comfort
by Ferruh Demirmen
After the signing of Turkish-Armenian normalization protocols in Zurich on October 10, the Washington-based ATAA (Assembly of Turkish American Associations) issued an analysis of the protocols to clarify the reasons for its earlier endorsement of the normalization process. The announcement was issued by President Gunay Evinch.
Relying on the language in the protocols that refer to “territorial integrity,” “inviolability of frontiers,” “foreign sovereignty,” “refrain from the use of force,” and “recognition of the existing border,” the ATAA analysis draws the conclusion that, once the protocols take effect, Armenia would no longer have territorial claims against Turkey.
It further infers that Armenia would withdraw from the occupied Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, account for its human violations in the territory, and allow the return of over one million Azeri refugees.
Based on another clause that condemns terrorism, it is argued that ASALA-type terrorism and other acts of violence against Turks and Turkish interests would henceforth come to an end.
ATAA believes that the establishment of historical commission as envisioned in the protocols would prevent US Congressional resolutions on genocide allegations.
After making cross linkages between several clauses, the ATAA analysis further concludes, in a quasi-legal manner, that the opening of the common border between Turkey and Armenia should logically lead to the realization of goals embraced by the Turkish side noted above.
But the ATAA’s analysis is far from convincing. The conclusions reached are not based on any concrete steps that the protocols call for Armenia to implement. Rather, the analysis relies on the goodwill of Armenia, on expectations that a well-intentioned Armenia would deliver.
And herein lies the problem: counting on the sincerity and goodwill of Armenia. Considering Armenia’s past hostility toward Turkey, the instruments contained in its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and the Armenian officials’ public pronouncements, e.g., on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and genocide allegations, prior to the signing of the protocols, it is naive to rely on the goodwill of Armenia.
The fact that the Armenian side objected to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s prepared statement to be delivered after the signing of the protocols in Zurich, says much about the supposed goodwill of Armenia. Without naming the conflict, Davutoğlu was going to make only an indirect reference to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, expressing the hope that the signing of protocols would lead to the resolution of the conflict. The Armenian side demurred, arguing behind doors that the statement would unnecessarily draw linkage between the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the normalization process.
So much about good intentions!
Judging from the language in the protocols, there are also serious reservations as to the usefulness of a historical commission to resolve, once and for all, the thorny issue of genocide allegations.(1)
If Armenia is to be believed in its good intentions, the protocols would contain unambiguous clauses as to the steps Armenia would take, e.g., amend its Constitution, withdraw from Nagorno-Karabagh, in return for the opening of the border. The protocols contain no such quid pro quo.
In contrast, the language in the protocols on the opening of the common border is clear and unmistakable: Once the protocols are ratified, the common border would be opened within two months.
The open border, of course, would overwhelmingly benefit Armenia.
For all it cares, Armenia can easily stonewall for years the implementation of steps it is expected to take, prevaricating on its acts, while in the meantime the Turkey-Armenia border remains open. It can maintain, for example, that it is not making (overt) territorial claims on Turkey while at the same time refusing to amend its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, or change the design of its national flag.
Or it can claim it is not actively pursuing “genocide” claims while winking at, and even secretly encouraging, genocide recognition efforts by the Armenian diaspora.
Or it can make a cosmetic withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabagh, arguing that it has fulfilled its obligations as far as “promoting peace in the region.”
And should Turkey contemplate re-closing the border because Armenia has not “delivered,” volleys of criticism from the American and European sympathizers of Armenia would surely follow.
Further, should the Turkish Parliament refuse to ratify the protocols for lack of progress on the Nagorno-Karabagh issue, as Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has inexplicably suggested recently, Turkey would surely be singled out for having bad faith in the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.
(Diplomatically, Erdoğan’s suggestion is a major faux pas, because there is no linkage in the protocols between the Nagorno-Karabagh issue and the normalization process. After giving repeated assurances to the Azeris on Nagorno-Karabagh, yet without any backing from the protocols, the PM has forced himself into a corner. Now he is expecting the Turkish Parliament to bail him out).
In conclusion, ATAA’s analysis, no doubt reflecting an idealistic outlook, is based on presumptive logic, or wishful thinking, and cannot be supported. ATAA says the normalization protocols are based on the concept of “constructive ambiguity” by which each side interprets the language as it sees fit. This is an interesting approach, but offers no comfort for the Turkish side – or, for that matter, the Azeri side.
ATAA should ponder: Would it ever sign a binding contract based pre-eminently on “constructive ambiguity,” wherein the only expressed certainty is for the advantage of the other side, but everything else is predicated on goodwill?
Nations signing intergovernmental agreements should be held to the same standards of credibility and accountability as persons who conclude private or business transactions.
ATAA issued its analysis on behalf of its Board of Directors. But ATAA also claimed in its announcement that it spoke on behalf of the Turkish-American community. A relevant question is: Has ATAA polled its members on the issue?
It is worth noting that almost all opposition parties in Turkey, certainly the major ones, are opposed to the Turkish-Armenian normalization process in its present form. They remember what happened in Cyprus.
(1) Current Turkish “opening” to Armenia cannot be supported: by Ferruh Demirmen, “Turkish Forum,” October 9, 2009.
Note to Turkish Forum readers: On October 10, the Azeri news outlet Trend News (http://en.trend.az)/ published on its website excerpts from my article cited above. The excerpted article, “Normalization of Ankara -Yerevan relations cannot be supported: Turkish expert,” was also published on the same day in Turkish Forum. The article contained a photo, purportedly depicting me. Turkish Forum readers are advised that the person depicted in that photo is not me. F. Demirmen.
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AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA GAS AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
October 15, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 189
by Vladimir Socor
On October 14 in Baku, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company president Rovnag Abdullayev and Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller signed an agreement on Azerbaijani gas exports to Russia. The move is a logical follow-up to the June 29 agreement, signed by the same company chiefs––in the presence of Presidents Ilham Alyiev and Dmitry Medvedev in Baku on that occasion––about the main principles of the gas trade between the two countries (see EDM, July 2, 17).
This agreement turns Azerbaijan for the first time in history from an importer of Russian gas into an exporter of gas to Russia—albeit with small initial volumes—thanks to growing internal production in Azerbaijan. If understood and handled appropriately by the European Union and Turkey, this event can lend impetus to the E.U.– and U.S.–backed Nabucco pipeline project, notwithstanding European media speculation about Russia pre-empting Nabucco’s Azerbaijani gas supplies.
The documents just signed involve a framework agreement for the years 2010 to 2014 and a sale-and-purchase contract for 2010. During this first year Azerbaijan shall export at least 500 million cubic meters (mcm) of gas to Russia through the Baku-Novo Filya pipeline, for use in Russia’s North Caucasus territories. Azerbaijan may increase that export volume during 2010, at its discretion. The gas may originate in any of Azerbaijan’s fields (Trend Capital, Day.Az, October 14).
The Russian purchase price is not publicly specified. According to Abdullayev at the signing ceremony, the price-setting formula “suits the Azerbaijani side” – apparently a hint that the price is in line with the anticipated European netback prices for 2010. This had been Baku’s objective all along in the negotiations on its gas price. Under this agreement, the price is said to be adjustable every quarter, pegged to the price of the basket of oil products (APA, Turan, October 14). Miller had proposed to buy Azerbaijani gas at $350 per one thousand cubic meters in the lead-up to the June 29 preliminary agreement.
Azerbaijan used to import Russian gas until as recently as 2006 through the old Baku-Novo Filya pipeline, which runs for approximately 200 kilometers along the Caspian Sea coast from the Russian border to Baku. This line will now be used in the reverse mode to carry Azerbaijani gas to Russia. The volume envisaged for 2010 will use only a fraction of this pipeline’s Soviet-era capacity. In addition, Azerbaijan is preparing its own section of the old Mozdok (Russia)-Gazimahomed pipeline, for possible reverse-use as a gas export outlet to Russia (Trend Capital, October 1).
Gas extraction in Azerbaijan is set to reach 27 bcm for 2009 (Day.Az, October 8). The rate of increase could have been faster, but has been affected by slowed-down development at the giant Shah Deniz offshore field. That slowdown in turn reflects delays on the Nabucco pipeline project and Turkish government obstructions to a gas agreement with Azerbaijan. These two factors have postponed the opening of Azerbaijan’s gas export route to the West. In this situation, Azerbaijan can only open an export route to Russia while awaiting progress on Nabucco and with Turkey.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan remains committed to the Nabucco project. The government and the State Oil Company are consistently reaffirming Baku’s readiness to supply 7 bcm per year for that pipeline’s first phase. Construction work on Nabucco is now expected to start in 2011, for the first gas to flow by 2015 from Azerbaijan to Europe.
Consequently, Baku has set the time-frame of the agreement just signed with Gazprom to expire in 2014, so as to release Azerbaijan from obligations to Gazprom after that year. Miller, however, declared at the signing ceremony explicitly that Russia wants to prolong this agreement after 2015, and for larger volumes of Azerbaijani gas (Interfax, October 14). That would pose risks for Nabucco. The October 14 agreement does not.
This agreement, however, reiterates and amplifies certain lessons for the E.U., Turkey, and U.S. that were already implicit in the June 29 preliminary agreement. Azerbaijan’s move can actually help concentrate minds all-around on the Nabucco project, bearing the following considerations in mind.
First, the volumes committed to Gazprom are meager and the time-frame does not impinge on the Nabucco project, assuming that Azerbaijan retains the necessary Western support to pursue Azerbaijan’s own Western choice. Awaiting Nabucco’s commissioning, it makes sense for Azerbaijan to use the existing pipeline(s) to Russia for exporting Azerbaijan’s growing surplus of gas during the interim period until 2014.
Second, this agreement does not allow Gazprom to compete against Nabucco for Azerbaijani gas. But the situation could change in Russia’s favor, if Turkey’s AKP government insists on its extortionate terms for the purchase of Azerbaijani gas and its transportation through Nabucco. By the same token, Washington and the reshuffled European Commission, now entering a new term of office in Brussels, are being reminded that they need to lift that logjam in Ankara.
Third, Baku’s agreement with Gazprom is a reminder to Ankara that Azerbaijan does not totally depend on the Turkish gas market or the Turkish gas transmission route. From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, adding a Russian export outlet—albeit a small one–is an export diversification move, away from Turkey’s perceived monopoly on transportation, which the AKP government seeks to abuse. Azerbaijan can also use the Baku-Astara pipeline to Iran, or swap arrangements with that neighbor country, during the interim period until 2014.
Fourth, Baku is successfully resisting Gazprom’s wish to re-export Caspian gas to third countries, at a profit to Russia and at the expense of Caspian producers. Baku has stipulated that its gas shall be used in Russia’s North Caucasus. And if the Russian purchase price is consistent with European netback prices—as envisaged at the time of the June 29 preliminary agreement and, apparently, in the October 14 agreement-–Baku will have achieved a strategic gain. Turkey’s AKP government would place itself in an embarrassing position by insisting on worse terms than Russia has now consented to Azerbaijan. Across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan will have set a useful precedent for Turkmenistan to also demand European netback prices from Gazprom. If the cash-strapped Gazprom fails to meet that benchmark, then a part of Turkmen export volumes would become available for the proposed trans-Caspian link to the Nabucco project.
–Vladimir Socor
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Turkey’s first lady cooks special meals for Armenian President
ARMENIA
Thu 15 October 2009 | 07:41 GMT
Serzh Sarkisian and Abdullah Gul The first lady of Turkey cooked special meals for Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, Novosti-Armenia’s correspodent reported from Turkey.Armenian FM Edward Nalbandian told Armenian journalists following the Armenia-Turkey football match that Gul arranged dinner in honor of the Armenian President.
“Special meals cooked by Turkish President’s wife were brought from Ankara in this regard. By doing this, Gul strived to make a reception in honor of the Armenian President more cordial”, said Nalbandian.
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan has visited Turkey to watch the Armenia-Turkey football match in frames of the 2010 World Cup qualification.
Armenian and Turkish FMs Edward Nalbandian and Ahmed Davutoghlu signed a Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and a Protocol on Development of Bilateral Relations in Zurich on October 10. The documents are to be approved by the parliaments of both countries after signing.
/Novosti-Armenia/